VOLUME 1.6 June 2009dusp.mit.edu/sites/dusp.mit.edu/files/attachments/publications/Volu… · (Security Design: Achieving Transparency in Civic Architecture at the 2003 AIA National

VOLUME 1.6 June 2009

Developing Architects is a monthly e-newsletter made up of commentary andcontributing articles on various topics relevant to the design and developmentprofessions. To learn more about Developing Architects go to the website.

About the Editor

In This Month's Issue...Security and Architecture with Guest Contributor Susan Silberberg-Robinson Lecturer in Urban Design and Planning Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Architecture and Planning,[email protected]

Commentary - The Architect and Developer Post 9/11 – Asking the RightQuestions

Do You Need An Architect? - The Jersey Barrier

Contributing Article - The Securitization of Spaces and Buildings Post 9/11: SixPoints to Guide Architects/Developers in Project Planning and Design

Gaps in Common Language - Perimeter Building Protection

The Architect and Developer Post 9/11 – Asking the Right Questions -Commentary

© Susan Silberberg-Robinson 2009. All rights reserved. Susan Silberberg-Robinson, Lecturer in Urban Design and Planning Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Architecture and Planning

Fortress America! The End of Public Space! Stop the Jersey Barriers! Immediatelyafter 9/11, articles and editorials appeared lamenting the counter terrorismmoves that were changing American cities by the day. And of course, if youpractice architecture in a city, have public clients, or read trade publications andnational newspapers, you know that our urban landscape has indeed changedpost 9/11; Washington, DC, New York City, Chicago and west coast cities all playhost to streets closed to vehicular traffic, new buildings with substantial setbacksfrom the sidewalk, police security booths in “target areas” and a proliferation ofCCTV surveillance. While these changes are often framed as concerns for theurban designer, city planner and landscape architect, in fact, our preoccupationwith terrorism threats is having profound effects on how architects practice,their control over design, and how they are perceived by clients. Thesepreoccupations with security have shifted options and decision-making fordevelopers as well and a better understanding of the new terrain would benefiteveryone involved.

This new environment leaves little room for design professionals to contribute tothe broader discussions that drive security interventions in 21st century America.Why do I say this? My research of the past two years, initially funded by a BostonSociety of Architects Research in Architecture Grant, has delved deeply into notonly the changing physical environment of our post-9/11 world but also into themotivations and players in this new security-conscious environment. What isrevealed is a decision-making landscape that minimizes the role of the architectand surprisingly, the developer as well, in some cases. Who else but your friendlyneighborhood architect could you turn to for questions regarding how to have agreat marriage of counter terrorism techniques and good design? Well, it turnsout that the discussion starts well before the architect becomes involved. Add tothis the fact that many security decisions occur outside the conference room andin the marketplace and public policy arena, and we have a scenario where designprofessionals can have very little say. And developers have less say than youwould think as well. The scenarios are remarkably similar in the cities I havestudied although the players are somewhat different. Outside forces control theprocess and architects should be paying as much attention to public policy andprocess as they are paying to design.

We are in uncharted territory. In the U.S., the language and process surroundingcounter-terrorism strategies and security and design are new ones. It’s an

important lesson to keep in mind. Just as architects jumped at the chance toframe the discussion around design elements within our secure landscape, so too,should architects immerse themselves in the public policy debate. This is nosmall challenge. No one wants to argue with security concerns. Who, after all,wants to be proved wrong in a disastrous scenario that can only be described asthe stuff of nightmares? However, a little knowledge is a powerful weapon. Howare threat assessments performed? Who is making security decisions and why?Threat assessments can seem to take on the appearance of the “black box” oftransportation modeling that spits out information that informs our publicroadway policy and design. What’s in the black box? If you don’t know orunderstand what goes into the box and how it’s assessed, it’s difficult to arguewith the outcome or influence the decision making. While security is a seriousmatter, there is room for a more informed debate and more discussion aboutappropriate uses and strategies and architects have a right and a responsibility tobe at the table. This isn’t only a question of how can we make security design thebest it can be but rather, “is this the right project to be considering security anddesign and to what extent?” And that means that architects need education,need to understand the security profession, and speak security language toengage in the debate. Are you up to the task?

Please send comments to Susan Silberberg-Robinson at [email protected]

Do you NEED an architect?

Jersey barriers protecting terrorism target: Is this Sculpture at Haymarket inBoston’s Government Center really in danger? ------------ Copyright SusanSilberberg-Robinson

The stairs to Boston City Hall Plaza are protected from a truck bomb. This“temporary” solution has been in place since 9/11. ---------------- CopyrightSusan Silberberg-Robinson

One of two main entrances to Boston City Hall. Jersey Barriers aren’t judged tobe enough protection here; crowd control barriers have been added as well. ---------- Copyright Susan Silberberg-Robinson

Do you NEED an Architect???!!!!

Help us out! If you see a notable or entertaining building, pull out your cameraphone and shoot a pic and email it to us at [email protected]

The Securitization of Spaces and Buildings Post 9/11: Six Points toGuide Architects/Developers in Project Planning and Design

By Susan Silberberg-Robinson © Susan Silberberg-Robinson 2009. All rights reserved. Susan Silberberg-Robinson, Lecturer in Urban Design and Planning Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Architecture and Planning Article excerpt from larger research study on “Security and the City” in theUnited States

The events of September 11, 2001 and the continued threat of terrorism havecaused many cities and the federal government to rethink issues of publicaccessibility, open space design and perimeter building protection. Owners anddevelopers have rethought building and site design and have altered siteselection criteria for new projects. Significantly increased resources (consultantfees and security budgets) are now available to address security concerns in manypublic and private buildings and spaces. This shift in priorities and funding hasprompted the expected reaction from the design professions but that reaction is

not enough to meet the scale and breadth of our new security consciousness. Inour age of security creep, architects will need to know much more than simply“best practices” in order to remain influential on the project team.

The American Institute of Architects partnered with the American Society ofLandscape Architects, the Society for Environmental Graphic Design and anumber of other professional organizations to craft a coordinated response to thepost 9/11 security push and to offer recommendations for good security design.The work of this effort was aimed at “recommend(ing) an inclusive decision-making process, consisting of experts in the fields of security, landscapearchitecture, architecture, historic preservation, and community planning, fordetermining what security for the National Capital region will look like and how itwill function.” (ASLA website accessed 7/10/06) The intention of this early focuson security planning in our nation’s capital was to serve as a model that wouldinform other securitization efforts. The topic of security and design has also beenhighlighted at various AIA conventions and meetings during the past eight years(Security Design: Achieving Transparency in Civic Architecture at the 2003 AIANational Convention, 21st Century Urban Design: Security and Civic Engagement athe 2006 AIA National Convention, etc.). Predominately these efforts havefocused on sensitive design solutions to the securitization push from public andprivate clients and in 2004 the AIA culminated its work by publishing “SecurityPlanning and Design.” In this book, architects are taken on a walk through ahistory of security in the built environment, a discussion of the nature of securitythreats and concepts, and an overview of security design strategies, securitytechnologies and emergency operations. The AIA has responded to our newnational security awareness by providing information on best practices, offering aforum for discussion of projects and design solutions, and providing guidance formembers to better position themselves to get contracts and respond to clientsecurity concerns. Clearly the design and development communities areattempting to match an increased client/tenant desire for security and a newavailability of security funds with an increased expertise in security design. Butexpertise in security design interventions is not enough. What is missing fromthese efforts is a discussion and understanding of the motivations and playersbehind the securitization push and the importance of expanding the designprofessional’s knowledge beyond best practices can best be illustrated with astory.

The mayor of a major city announces an office tower project, complete withaward-winning architect, central business district location, and all the rightelements to win support: large public plazas with gathering space for specialevents, ample furniture and amenities such as fountains and seating/eating

areas, public programming, and major interior public spaces with a proposedmuseum annex and big name tenants. It’s a big project, a tall project, a denseproject. The mayor sells the project to constituents with talk of benefits tonearby office workers and residents and of the expected boost to the CBD andCity’s image. The project requires zoning relief and the use of publically ownedland (sold at a handsome profit). In the pre-9/11 world the developer wouldhave pushed back a bit on the public programming and spaces required by theCity but would have realized the market potential of such amenities whenrecruiting tenants and would have touted the iconic nature of the project, thepublic access to interior spaces, the retail component and the museum annex.The post 9/11 reality? The public spaces and programming and the uniquebuilding design killed the project because no major tenant would sign on to abuilding with that much public space and access and with such a high profiledesign (read: perceived security risk).

The story above is constructed from different case studies and anecdotes indifferent cities and in each, the projects are either dead or going throughsignificant revision and redesign. What can the architect and developer do asbuilding plans are slowly chipped away, leaving a dismayed city government andpublic with no project at all or a fortress-like office tower with few perceivedpublic benefits? Perceptions alone can stop a project by engendering a lack offinancial support and leasable space when transparency and porosity of spacesincreases security concerns; these projects need more than an understanding ofsecurity design solutions. We are in a new professional environment that requiresarchitects and developers to be cognizant of and conversant in the many forcesshaping our security-conscious world in order to be involved in meaningfuldecision making. Architects who understand the nature of the forces at work arein the best position to influence the overall project planning and design processand to use increased security budgets to a project’s benefit rather than to itsdetriment.

In my research in Boston over the past two years, I have found that in existingand new projects and spaces thorough threat assessments by qualified securityand counter terrorism professionals account for a surprisingly small percentage ofthe design interventions by the project team. Many security interventions aremade based on ad hoc assessments and client perception. Discussions withdevelopers, design professionals, building owners and managers, and tenantshave revealed a complex web of actions and consequences. Understanding thisweb of motivations and relationships can help architects and developers respondto concerns and perceptions in our post 9/11 world and allow them to have agreater influence on projects. I offer the following six observations to guide

professionals:

Tenants don’t need a professional security threat assessment to walk away

from a project or drastically influence design decisions. Perception is equally

influential.

A lack of tenants translates to a lack of financing. Those architects/developerswho ignore perceptions of security concerns from potential tenants do so at theirown risk (no pun intended here). Developers have always thought about thematch between potential tenants and a project’s image, design and amenities.The current focus, however, on counter terrorism in major cities (and now evenin suburban development) has made the marketing of buildings and image a muchmore complex game and the architect and developer can be stuck in the middle.While high profile projects are loved by developers and public officials intent onburnishing the reputation of city or firm, tall buildings, public access and openspace and iconic design can all be seen as potential targets…greatly reducingdesirability for tenants.

Developers know that public spaces and amenities (programming, interior publicaccess, retail and even public parking facilities) are good for projects and thesethings may in fact be a requirement for regulatory approval. But if potentialtenants won’t sign on, what room does that leave for negotiation? Not much. Asmany building owners and managers acknowledge, security enhancements,particularly highly visible design changes and retrofits, are often carried outsimply to satisfy tenant unease and to help project marketing efforts and havelittle if nothing to do with formal threat assessments by experiencedprofessionals.

Peer pressure and market forces can affect security strategies as much or

more than other forces.

In Boston, office building lobbies that had no security after 9/11 gradually gotturnstiles and guard stations and many owners eliminated public access to groundfloor lobbies resulting in the closing of public services and businesses that oncepopulated those spaces. Why? Peer pressure. The actions of competitors and thewishes of tenants, irrespective of actual security threats, drove these securityretrofits and continue to drive security design decisions in existing and newprojects. Events in NYC can drive changes in Boston and products and methodsused in London suddenly seem “state of the art” in NYC. In a State Street officetower in Boston, security interventions were minimal after 9/11 until monthslater when visitors from NYC compared their company’s office tower in that city

to the branch offices in Boston and put pressure on the Boston building owner fortighter security. As one visiting client asked the major building tenant, “your NYCbuilding has turnstiles and guards, why don’t you have them here in Boston?”

Invisible security interventions are often at odds with industry tactics

Many of the design profession’s efforts around security interventions are aimed atproviding increased barriers to a terrorism threat with minimal sense of intrusion.The Federal Reserve Bank in Boston spent millions post 9/11 reconstructing thepublic space surrounding the building and repositioning and redesigning theparking garage and loading dock screening and entry points.

The Federal Reserve, Boston, MA March 2007 copyright Susan Silberberg-Robinson

The Federal Reserve, Boston, MA March 2007 copyright Susan Silberberg-Robinson

However, the efforts of design professionals to hide security interventions can beat cross purposes with security industry strategies. The New York PoliceDepartment believes the mere existence of signs notifying the public ofsurveillance cameras is a deterrent to terrorism and uses the presence of policeofficers and unannounced, disruptive and noisy security drills on city streets toscare would-be terrorists. As Michael Sheehan, former NYPD DeputyCommissioner for Counter Terrorism puts it in his book, “Crush the Cell,”terrorists strike when they can and most are not particularly smart or courageous—they are not looking for a challenge. If terrorists see a barrier to success theywill move on to the next target or the next tactic. While the active andaggressive presence of police and security personnel and in-your-face designinterventions such as guard booths, pedestrian barriers, check points, and CCTVsare touted as effective counter terrorism techniques, Business ImprovementDistricts in NYC look for a friendlier image with less police presence and lesssecurity signage. They worry that pumped up security scares tourists andcustomers by signaling an “unsafe” district in need of extra services. But publicsafety officials aren’t the only ones pushing for higher visibility for counter-terrorism measures. As one office building security manager in Boston puts it,“we can’t eliminate the threat but if we harden our building enough and if wemake it visible, the threat will move to the other guy’s building…whateverbuilding is weaker. And that’s our goal…move the threat to the next guy.” Thebottom line is that architects’ goals for sensitive, invisible security interventionscan contradict some counter terrorism strategies.

Product manufacturers have created a market for security products and they

speak directly to your clients. Architects are not managing the message.

It is in the best interest of product manufacturers to promote security creep. Alandscape architect notes that manufacturers were heavily marketing securityproducts just days after 9/11; revamped websites, product brochures and salesvisits to professional design offices were carefully designed to speak directly tonew concerns and the traumatic aftermath of the attacks. Manufacturers ofsecurity devices and furniture have a big stake in the current security surge. Asampling of websites of various manufacturers of street furniture, planters, andbollards shows that most of these companies provide security evaluations, designassistance and ready-made specifications and guidelines on how to use theirproducts. In explicit and implicit ways, these companies send messages todesigners and clients alike that security design is becoming the standard for anycommercial or public building. When asked about guidelines for security work, adesign professional stated that most information is obtained from themanufacturers themselves. The language used on marketing materials pushes aclear and alarming message: a new level of security consciousness is needed forall spaces and places and to be remiss in security retrofit or intervention is to beremiss about basic public safety. The pressure imposed on developers and designprofessionals and the message received by tenants and the general public is thatthe bar has lifted and the minimum expectations are much greater. No one wantsto be caught not keeping up—what I call security creep.

Legal professionals will always err on the side of caution

As might be expected, liability fears also play a role in security interventionsthroughout the city and the country. Counter terrorism expertise is evolving inthe United States and in the absence of established frameworks and long-testedassessment criteria, concern is rampant and more protection always seems betterthan less (security creep). As described by one person involved with new buildingplanning, lawyers can call the design shots without specific reasons, all becauseof legal liability fears. A source involved in the planning meetings for the newDepartment of Transportation headquarters in Washington, DC, the first majorpost 9/11 agency building, recalls lawyers simply saying “no” to elements of thedesign, citing general security concerns, seemingly at whim. There was notolerance for counter-arguments nor was there discussion. End of story.

Public officials and private players don’t yet have a common language or

shared set of standards and tools to address security concerns. Understanding

reasonable parameters to managing security will be important as the US

evolves its security criteria.

We are in a new world. Israel and Great Britain have been addressing terrorismissues and fears for a long time and security decision-making infrastructure andprocesses are in place in those countries. The challenges in the United States arenot only new but some are also unique to our country, culture and governance.There are new and varied players at the table; developers, architects, planningagencies, elected officials, public safety agencies and the security industry arestill sorting out collaborations and standards. Public and private sector actorshave engaged in a new level of collaboration and cooperation with each other…creating a type of de facto private/public planning agenda that is heavilyinfluenced by private interests. Corporate leadership is collaborating directlywith public safety officials on security interventions, oftentimes bypassingtraditional planning agencies entirely. BIDs are retrofitting commercial areas withterrorist-proof street furniture in response to effective sales pitches by Britishcompanies. These examples illustrate a patchwork collection of ideas, alliancesand actions that often lack common standards for threat assessment andresponse. The piecemeal nature of public and private efforts leaves room forinterpretation, lack of oversight, duplication of efforts and misinterpretation oflanguage.

Even the use of security devices illustrates the lack of understanding of materialsand methods. The temporary fences around Boston City Hall Plaza, known asFrench barriers in the trade, are designed and manufactured solely as crowdcontrol measures.

“Temporary” crowd control barriers at City Hall Plaza, Boston---------------Source: Susan Silberberg-Robinson February 2007

Break in Barriers to Allow Parking on City Hall Plaza, Boston, MA Source: SusanSilberberg-Robinson February 2007

They are not designed to withstand any vehicular force and can’t act asperimeter building protection from truck bombs. The fences have been in placesince 9/11 and it is ironic that these French barriers exacerbate an existingpublic complaint about the lack of activity and people friendly spaces on theplaza by blocking pedestrian access to the plaza and creating a huge zone ofdead space in front of City Hall. At the same time, the privilege of parking on theplaza is deemed so important that this “security barrier” is breeched at theGovernment Center T stop to allow MBTA workers and others to park at theirconvenience. One has to ask, “Why have the fences at all?” There are certainlyno crowds to control. This is only one of many examples where securityinterventions are used incorrectly or inconsistently and there is lack ofcoordination around intended purposes and results.

Conclusion

These six points illustrate the complexity of designing and developing buildingsand spaces in our security-conscious world. Security creep—the new level ofexpectations for protecting our society-- becomes a tide that is hard to fightagainst and it can be difficult to argue about security concerns without seemingcavalier. At the same time, knowledge of best practices in security design isn’tenough to answer many of the challenges presented by a newly complexenvironment. However, there is room for architects to contribute to thediscussion and to manage impacts at every stage of a project. At the very least,knowledge of the players and motivations can help professionals positionthemselves to be valuable resources on the project team and to advocate for

good design principles in spite of the security push. Architects need to be in frontof this issue and should bring security into project discussions early on to assureclients and potential tenants that considerations are being made. Speaking ofsecurity early and often allows developers and architects to control theconversation and assuage fears that counter-terrorism concerns have not beenaddressed and avoid scuttling preliminary designs. Good design can exist in asecure environment but it takes a lot more work than knowing how to disguise ajersey barrier to look like a planter.

Gaps in Common Language

Architects, Developers and Planners use much of the same terminology but oftenthis terminology has very different meanings. This is a regular feature that willexplain what is meant by each professional for a variety of terms.

Perimeter Building Protection

Architect: Traditionally, perimeter building protection has meant structurally stableenclosures, lock hardware and perhaps alarm systems. It could also mean usingmaterials that withstand the harsh elements of nature and or humans. Anexample might be the use of granite instead of more porous marble or fragilesandstone at the base of buildings to withstand assault from pet and humanurine, skateboards, etc.

Developer/Owner:

CCTVs, signage discouraging loitering, security guards are all part of the packagein creating an image of security for building occupants/tenants. A doorman mightbe part of this package or in larger commercial buildings, it is an informationdesk and building directory.

Security Expert/Counter-terrorism Official: Security professionals see perimeter building protection as a hardening of theenvelope of the building and by association, the building site through the use ofstructural impediments and visual elements that can thwart terrorist attack.Examples of common hardening techniques include thickened exterior walls andstructural elements on the lower floors of buildings (with limited amounts ofglass), tiger traps in open space around buildings (materials placed under publicplazas that collapse under heavy weight and will deter trucks approaching close

to buildings), and bollards, guard gates and security personnel that inspectpeople and vehicles before entering or approaching a building.

Planner:

A planner might look at the term perimeter building protection and think ofCPTED design principles…Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design.CPTED, or the notion of defensible space made popular by the architect OscarNewman in the 1970’s uses urban and architectural design and the builtenvironment to encourage more people to use and take ownership of space whichputs “eyes on the street” and may lead to a reduction in fear and perhaps areduction in crime and vandalism.

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