ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 1 - Flora Pidoux & Maria Mundt September was a key month for NATO: the Summit in Wales gathered all the leaders of the member and partner countries in order to discuss the future of the Alliance. What was meant to be an event to assess the relevance of the organization in today’s world turned out to be a reaffirmation of its goals. Considering the recent crises that have emerged right at the door of NATO, namely the crisis in Ukraine, Syria, and caused by the emergence of ISIS, the Alliance is faced once again with threats to the security of its member states. NATO therefore needs to adapt to this new situation The coinciding Future Leaders Summit enabled the young generation to also debate on issues the Alliance is currently facing. This issue of Atlantic Voices focuses on the Wales Summit as well as the parallel Future Leaders Summit, and their outcomes. The articles aim at providing several viewpoints on common threats, and how to respond to them through NATO. A month after the NATO Summit, this issue of Atlantic Voices presents some of the outcomes of the Summit. NATO Wales Summit and Atlantic Council Future Leaders Summit official logos (Photo: NATO) NATO Summit Review Volume 4 - Issue 10 October 2014 Contents: Communicating The NATO Summit: A View From The Inside Daniel Hatton offers an interesting insight on the Wales Summit, both from a British and from an organizational perspective, presenting the challenges and expectations from the Wales Summit. NATO Post-Wales: Meeting Challenges In A Changed Security Environment Marte Ziolkowski, from the Norwegian delegation,examines the various topics that have been touched upon during the Future Leaders Summit, from the dif- ferent security threats to the future of the Alliance. A View From Canada Julie Lindhout and Christian Paas-Lang present the perspective of Canada: how they prepared, and what they took home from the Summit.
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ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 1
- Flora Pidoux & Maria Mundt
September was a key month for NATO: the
Summit in Wales gathered all the leaders of the
member and partner countries in order to
discuss the future of the Alliance. What was
meant to be an event to assess the relevance of
the organization in today’s world turned out to
be a reaffirmation of its goals. Considering the
recent crises that have emerged right at the
door of NATO, namely the crisis in Ukraine,
Syria, and caused by the emergence of ISIS, the
Alliance is faced once again with threats to the
security of its member states. NATO therefore
needs to adapt to this new situation
The coinciding Future Leaders Summit
enabled the young generation to also debate on
issues the Alliance is currently facing.
This issue of Atlantic Voices focuses on
the Wales Summit as well as the parallel Future
Leaders Summit, and their outcomes. The
articles aim at providing several viewpoints on
common threats, and how to respond to them
through NATO. A month after the NATO
Summit, this issue of Atlantic Voices presents
some of the outcomes of the Summit.
NATO Wales Summit and Atlantic Council Future Leaders Summit official logos (Photo: NATO)
NATO Summit Review
Volume 4 - Issue 10 October 2014
Contents:
Communicating The NATO Summit: A View From The Inside
Daniel Hatton offers an interesting insight on the Wales Summit, both from a
British and from an organizational perspective, presenting the challenges and
expectations from the Wales Summit.
NATO Post-Wales: Meeting Challenges In A Changed Security
Environment
Marte Ziolkowski, from the Norwegian delegation,examines the various topics
that have been touched upon during the Future Leaders Summit, from the dif-
ferent security threats to the future of the Alliance.
A View From Canada
Julie Lindhout and Christian Paas-Lang present the perspective of Canada: how
they prepared, and what they took home from the Summit.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 2
But what was the Summit going to be about?
What would the big issues be? What would our narrative
be? All good questions. And we thought we had decent
answers.
Afghanistan: 2014 would see the end of NATO’s
ISAF mission, which for
over 10 years had fought
to stop Afghanistan from
ever again becoming a
safe haven for terrorists.
We’ve built up the
ANSF. We were looking
forward to launching
Resolute Support.
Capabilities: we wanted
to strengthen NATO’s
ability to deliver security
for its members by mak-
ing sure it was fast, flexible
and fit for the future.
Partnerships: NATO’s 2010 strategic concept out-
lined ‘cooperative security’ as one of the Alliance’s core
tasks. An important part of Future NATO would be to
strengthen and deepen NATO’s already large network of
partners, both politically and operationally. The Summit
would look to deliver on all these.
And then Russia annexed Crimea, and continues
to destabilise the east of Ukraine. Russia’s actions threat-
ened the Alliance’s vision of a Europe whole free and at
peace – the very thing NATO leaders had committed to
the last time they met in the United Kingdom in 1990.
The Wales Summit had just got a whole lot bigger.
Communicating The NATO Summit:
A View From The Inside
By Daniel Hatton
I t all happened very quickly. NATO had not held
a Summit since Barack Obama had invited his
fellow heads of state and government to his
home patch of Chicago, Illinois in 2012. NATO, unlike
the European Council, with its regular meetings of Pres-
ident and Prime Ministers, only meets around every two
years or so. At the height
of the Cold War, Alliance
leaders only met once be-
tween 1957 and 1974 –
they became a bit more
regular after that.
So when the
Prime Minister decided
back in September 2013
that the UK would host
the next NATO Summit,
it was a big deal. The UK,
while no stranger to playing an
important role within the transatlantic alliance, was sud-
denly thrust to the forefront. Every word from “our
Summit hosts” would be scrutinised, every action ana-
lysed, and, in the digital world we live in, every tweet
re-tweeted. For the UK Delegation to NATO, where I
work, it was going to be a big challenge. This, in the
words of a former Ambassador, “small but perfectly
formed” part of the UK Government was going to have
to step up to the plate; but it was a challenge we rel-
ished. From a communications perspective, things got
off to an interesting start. High international diplomacy
was conducted before the public announcement of the
UK’s intention to host the Summit over what hashtag to
use. The nature of working in a multilateral setting
meant that there were many different stakeholders to
coordinate with. In the end we managed to settle on
one, and people used it, quite a lot.
Member States Leaders during aircraft demonstration (Photo: NATOWales)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 3
Comms Approach
Now I would like to talk a bit about what it was like
to work on the Summit, what I did, and what happened at
it. As I mentioned earlier, I work at the UK Delegation to
NATO, which was at the heart of the UK’s effort to deliver
the Summit. The Summit presented many challenges. Secu-
I n January of this year, the upcoming NATO Summit in Wales looked to be a dull affair. Though the world continued to be wracked by crises, few of them direct-
ly impacted NATO states. Even the rapidly developing invasion of Iraq by ISIS forces concerned primarily just the United States, not NATO as a whole.
Events quickly robbed the summit of its potentially relaxed atmosphere. Ukrainian President Victor Yanu-kovych’s decision not to embrace an EU partnership deal sparked massive street protests that eventually led to his removal and flight from Kiev on February 22, 2014. The ouster, deemed a coup by neighbouring Russia, incited a secessionist movement in much of eastern Ukraine, a region dominat-ed by Russian speakers. In Cri-mea, the movement quickly devel-oped into a rebellion encouraged and materially supported by Rus-sia. Following a referendum in the peninsula, Russia annexed Crimea on March 18.
NATO’s response was swift.
Scheduled joint military manoeu-vres with Russia were cancelled and NATO states imposed sanctions on Crimean and Russian officials. Additional troops and warplanes were deployed in Romania, Poland and the Baltic states. Assurance of collective defence be-gan emanating from NATO headquarters in Brussels and from foreign offices on both sides of the Atlantic.
Despite this, the extent of NATO’s response suf-
fered immediately from some of the realities on the ground. Direct intervention against the growing rebel movement in Eastern Ukraine, centred around Donetsk and Luhansk, was nearly impossible due to Russia’s mas-sive deployment of troops to the border region. Political will in Atlantic states extended only so far as bolstering the defences of NATO’s newest members in Eastern Europe.
Other political considerations factored into
NATO’s actions. Many European states continue to be heavily reliant on Russian oil and natural gas for their ener-gy consumption, weakening their leverage in potential negotiations. Canada and the United States, relatively independent from foreign energy imports, have been markedly more assertive than their neighbours across the Atlantic. As the insurgency in eastern Ukraine fully devel-oped, further sanctions were laid against Russian and rebel
officials. NATO has other issues apart from the Ukrainian
crisis. NATO faces many challenges in securing Afghani-stan after the departure of the majority of International Security Assistance Forde (ISAF) troops. “Insider attacks” by Afghan security personnel against ISAF members occur often enough to be a real concern. The Taliban forces are still active in much of Afghanistan, as well as across the porous border in the tribal regions of Pakistan.
The war in Afghanistan has had effects that reach beyond the country’s borders. Do-mestically, NATO states have struggled to address the issue of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among war veterans. With fatigue and frustration running high from the experience in Afghanistan, inter-ventions like those possible in Syria and Iraq appear even less attractive. Even a previously successful intervention in Libya in 2011 fades as that country has collapsed back into conflict.
In addition, given the economic downturn of 2008, most NATO countries have cut back substantially on their defence budgets, which will affect their ability to
respond to any call by NATO to guarantee security, espe-cially in the less capable states in Eastern Europe.
NATO states, especially multicultural states such as
Canada, have experienced strong debates regarding cultur-al values, in part as a result of NATO’s actions overseas. Compounding this, the phenomenon of radicalization has led to nationals of NATO states travelling abroad to fight in foreign conflicts, and returning home with dangerous skills.
Roundtable, August 21, 2014
It was against this background that the Atlantic Council of Canada organized a Roundtable to discuss issues for the then upcoming NATO Summit. Professor Stephen Saideman of Carleton University in Ottawa, and Professor David Wright, Kenneth and Patricia Taylor Distinguished Visiting Professor in Foreign Affairs, Victoria College, University of Toronto, and former Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO led a stimulating and informative discussion with interested attendees, several of whom were experts in international politics and security issues in their own right.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen and David Cameron
welcome Stephen Harper , Prime Minister of
Canada (Photo: NATO)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 9
The discussion first turned to what is perhaps the most pressing and most significant issue facing NATO today: its changing relationship with Russia. Though Putin is clearly the driving force behind Russian aggression, there was also a dis-cussion of some dangers that Putin may be facing in the near future. First, the economic impacts of confrontation with the West may eventually undermine Putin’s support, as Russian integration into the global economy has made the country more vulnerable to international sanctions. Second, Russian nationalism, so long stoked by Putin, may be a force he is una-ble to control in the long run. Trying to tame Russian irreden-tism for practical purposes —compromise or accommodation with the West— may prove difficult and unpopular for the Russian president, who has gained enormous domestic support for his belligerent actions. Despite this, Putin risks solidifying a Russian isolation that neither he nor the country can survive. Participants felt that the situation had become even more dangerous as a result of the strong evidence that surfaced over the summer of Russian troops being active in Ukraine in support of rebel units. Some felt that marked a clear escalation of the crisis, an incontrovertible breach of international law and a strong challenge to the West and NATO. This new de-velopment would almost surely strengthen the need for NATO personnel to be deployed in countries like Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to provide both security and assurance. The result from the emergency Security Council and NATO meetings would, no doubt, prompt additional measures, if need be. While the recent ceasefire in Ukraine was a hearten-ing sign that peace could be restored to the region, there was some doubt as to how well the ceasefire would hold, or wheth-er it would simply be a pause to allow the conflicting factions to regroup. Some suggested that NATO, in some ways, is reaping what it sowed in its waves of enlargement after the Cold War. While the perception in Russia that NATO expansion is aimed against it is misguided, Russia’s interests and strength should be taken into account. Russia has far too much influence in crisis zones like the Middle East and Central Asia to be ignored without consequence. Knowing this, it is interesting to see debate being sparked in countries like Finland, Sweden and Georgia concerning possible membership in NATO. Though talks are unlikely to start in the near future, renewed Russian aggression has led to renewed interest in NATO from coun-tries that have traditionally been sensitive to Russian interests. It was suggested, however, that such developments can pose dangers to NATO and the countries involved. If NATO shows itself to be too willing to support these states, it risks escalating any possible conflict, as occurred in Georgia in 2008, by em-boldening a faction. The situation in Afghanistan also featured heavily in the discussion. While official Canadian government policy makes it clear that Canada would have little, or nothing, to do with Afghanistan after the last of its troops has left, security con-cerns would remain. The Taliban continues to have a presence in the region, the Afghan-Pakistan border remains porous and the government unstable. NATO’s involvement has been ex-pensive, both in human life and in money, and the ambiguity of
the mission’s success has contributed to growing war-weariness in Western states. Nevertheless, no one could foresee 9/11, and no one can guarantee that there would not be some event of sufficient impact on NATO countries in the future, that might draw NATO in again. The situation in Iraq was also briefly discussed. The quasi-revival of the “coalition of the willing” by President Obama, this time to fight ISIL, was seen as an interesting development both in American foreign policy and in NATO’s role in Iraq. Many NATO states have already signed on to the mission, and Obama is working closely with Gulf and Arab League members to secure their support for a coordinated assault against the ISIL. The participants at the roundtable stressed the need for a representative gov-ernment in Iraq, while underlining the difficulties of multi-lateral military operations. It was also suggested that thanks to the challenges it faces in Ukraine and elsewhere, NATO may be experienc-ing a rejuvenation it has been searching for since the end of the Cold War. Reorienting the Alliance from an organiza-tion explicitly meant to counter the Soviet Union to one relevant in the post-Soviet world has proven difficult. With Russia as a clear and present threat to peace in Europe, NATO has in some sense regained its initial purpose. Re-newed Russian aggression may help to strengthen emphasis on transatlanticism, a policy focus previously losing ground to North America’s growing interest in the Pacific region. The Summit So how did the Summit in Wales actually deal with these issues? In the first place, the Summit addressed all the issues raised and a few more. According to the official text of the Wales Summit Declaration, its first order of business was to approve the NATO Readiness Action Plan (NRAP), an overarching plan “capable of meeting current and future challenges from wherever they may arise.” The plan includes a significant enhancement of the NATO Response Force (NRF), and the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint task Force (VJTF). The VJTF will consist of a land component with appropriate air, maritime, and special operations forces support, which can be deployed quickly especially when challenges arise on the periphery of NATO’s territory. The NRAP also includes a greatly enhanced exercise program for all elements of the plan, including complex civil-military scenarios. There is special mention of a focus on the south-ern and eastern peripheries of the Alliance. Reading be-tween the lines, that allows NATO to enhance its presence in those states without permanently stationing forces there, which Russia would see as a provocation, and which some of NATO’s member states would not agree to. The second major issue addressed in the Declaration is the need to increase defence budgets and the need for a more “balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities”. While the Declaration acknowledges that “how we spend it” is also important, the major focus of Section 14, is on the amount of spending. There is much emphasis on the guideline for
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 10
member countries to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is a guideline emphasized by successive Secretaries-General, but met by very few countries over the more than 60 years of NATO’s existence.
The Declaration also makes very strong state-ments condemning Russia’s illegal military interven-tion in Ukraine, including its “illegitimate ‘annexation’” of Crimea. It also identifies “Russia’s pattern of disregard for international law” referencing the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Con-ventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, citing Rus-sian behaviour in Georgia and Moldova as further ex-amples.
The Declaration spe-cifically acknowledges measures taken by Canada, Norway, and the United States, as well as NATO’s immediate decision to sus-pend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, to put pressure on Russia to deescalate and lead to a political solution in Ukraine. It emphasizes that political channels of commu-nication will remain open, but that any sustainable, political solution must respect “Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its inter-nationally recognised borders.” In other words, Russia is not entitled to keep Crimea. The declaration uses the same terms of sovereignty, independence and ter-ritorial integrity with reference to Armenia, Azerbai-jan, Georgia, and Moldova.
With regard to the situation in the Middle East, the declaration re-affirms NATO’s continued commit-ment to the NATO-Iraq partnership, and states that NATO will consider other assistance measures within the framework of NATO’s Defence and Related Secu-rity Capacity Building Initiative if the Iraqi Govern-ment should request it. The Declaration also expresses concern about developments in Syria and references NATO’s role in deploying Patriot missiles to defend Turkey, and the role of NATO Allies in the still ongo-ing process of securing the destruction of chemical weapon material in Syria. NATO also continues to stand ready to support Libya with advice and the will-ingness to develop a partnership which might lead to Libya’s membership in the Mediterranean Dialogue. Not surprisingly, the Declaration repeats the statement in the 2010 Strategic Concept that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance,” and affirms the “deterrence and security” value of the nuclear forces of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. It also restates the
aim “to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational Ballistic Missile Defence” to protect all Europe, but em-phasizes that this capability is purely defensive and can only complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence. A large part of the Declaration is taken up with details of enhancements that have been made or will be made to the various elements of NATO’s capabilities including the Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance initia-tive and the AWACs. It also describes various initiatives undertaken by groups of Allies for joint operations. Almost buried in the middle of the Declaration is a very important endorsement of an Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy which acknowledges that a cyber attack could have sufficient harmful impact to make it an Article 5 attack, but that a decision to invoke Article 5 would be taken on a case-by-
case basis. The Declaration gives special recognition to the value of partnerships with other organiza-tions like the UN, EU, the Afri-can Union (AU), and OSCE, in enhancing international security especially in the face of terror-ism. It also celebrates internal partnerships mentioning the 20 years existence of the Partnership
for Peace, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; 20 years of the
Mediterranean Dialogue; ten years of the Istanbul Cooper-ation Initiative, and the development of a Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative to help part-ner nations. The first countries involved in this initiative will be Georgia, Jordan, and Moldova, at their requests.
The establishment of a permanent position of NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security confirms NATO’s commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and also to UNSCR 1612 on the protection of children affected by armed conflict. There is also a strong statement on the Open Door Policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty as one of the Alli-ance’s great successes. NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies who meet the requirements and it is emphasized that “decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself.” Special mention is made of Georgia, including a call to Russia to reverse its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Mention is made of the good progress made by Montenegro, and that the aspirations of Bosnia and Herze-govina are fully supported, but that the country needs to meet conditions set by the NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in 2010, before it can be admitted to the Member-ship Action Plan. As at all Summits since the 2008 Bucha-rest Summit, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continues to be invited to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN. The Declaration also expresses appreciation for the country’s long-standing
Armed Forces Declaration by the NATO Heads of State and
Government (Photo: NATO)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 10 11
commitment to NATO operations and to the NATO ac-cession process. There is a separate Wales Summit Decla-ration on Afghanistan which outlines NATO’s commit-ment for short-term training, advising, and assisting of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after 2014; con-tribution to the financial sustainment of the ANSF in the medium term; and strengthening NATO’s partnership with Afghanistan in the long term, with the commitment and cooperation of Afghanistan.
Canadian Reaction Canadian media and government opposition parties have largely concentrated on the first two topics: the Re-sponse Force and the defence spending guidelines, but not with great enthusiasm. There has been little focus even on such previously hot button items as Ballistic Missile De-fense and very few picked up on the issue of a cyber attack being a potential Article 5 attack. Most media commenta-tors are skeptical at best about the extent to which the plans for the NRF will be implemented. Even in real crisis situations like Libya and Ukraine, they contend, there is no concerted effort to provide real resources. There is always much talk, but only certain countries provide the heavy lifting and it is not always the same countries. Even the most capable countries have pulled back in recent years in active operations, so how can one expect real commit-ments to the NRF? They also point to the fact that not all NATO members see the various crises in the same way, with the same degree of urgency, and the same willingness to act in the larger interest of the Alliance rather than in their narrower national interests.
When pressed on the issue of defence spending, Prime Minister Harper has stated that 2% of GDP is an arbitrary amount. It is more important to look at specific expenditures that need to be made, rather than talk about spending a certain amount for the sake of spending it. He has also pointed out that when it was necessary, Canada spent a lot of money to equip its forces in Afghanistan and that the country continues to deliver military supplies to forces fighting ISIL in Iraq, contributes planes and ships when asked, and is spending a lot of effort and money in Ukraine. One media opinion writer also asked if countries were to meet their 2% of GDP targets in good times, would it be acceptable for them to lower their spending appreciably in bad economic times to match a reduced GDP?
The fact remains, that on the whole the Canadian public is war weary and does not support significant de-fence spending. The general reaction after Canada’s with-drawal from Afghanistan has been in effect to say, “We have done our bit, and now it is time to focus on domestic needs.” The official opposition New Democratic Party has always been pacifist, and the Liberal Party does not have a strong record from which to attack the government. The official statements from all opposition parties have usually promoted diplomatic efforts, and condemned specific ex-penditures, so there has been limited discussion of the broader defence spending issue in Parliament.
Some more hawkish commentators have attacked specific examples of lack of spending, such as the delays in replacing aircraft and ships, and the need to provide better support to veterans, but they have not, by and large, sup-ported the concept of spending a certain percentage of GDP, and have generally left the impression that when necessary, Canada will rise to the occasion and spend what it takes for its troops to do their usual excellent job. Julie Lindhout is the President of the Atlantic Council of Canada. Julie previously worked as a secondary school teacherm , then for the Ontario Ministry of Education. In 1998, Ms. Lindhout established Lindhout Associates Edu-cation Consulting, and increased her involvement with the Atlantic Council of Canada (ACC) and became President in 2002. She has also been active in the Brussels-based At-lantic Treaty Association (ATA). She is also a director of the Canadian Turkish Business Council, the Canada-Albania Business Council, and a member of the Ontario Special Education Tribunal. She is the recipient of a Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal.
Christian Paas-Lang was the program editor for Cana-da’s NATO during his internship with the ACC in the summer of 2014. His interests are wide-ranging, including topics such as economics, security and international rela-tions. He is particularly interested in European and Middle-Eastern history, international relations and culture. As a second year student, Christian has just started a specialist degree in International Relations at Trinity College, Uni-versity of Toronto. He looks forward to eventually pursu-ing graduate studies in international relations upon the completion of his degree. Opencanada.org, The NATO summit: commitmentphobia [Online] Available from: http://opencanada.org/features/blogs/roundtable/the-nato-summit-commitmentphobia/; Prime Minister of Canada, PM delivers closing remarks [Online] Available from: http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/09/05/pm-delivers-closing-remarks-nato-summit; Prime Minister of Canada, The gov-ernment of Canada’s response to the crisis in Ukraine [Online] Available from: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/09/11/government-canadas-response-situation-ukraine-0; Prime Minister of Canada, PM concludes successful NATO Summit in Wales [Online] Available from: http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2014/09/05/pm-concludes-successful-nato-summit-wales; Pugliese, David, Stephen Harper prom-ises boost in defence spending but provides non details [Online] Available from: http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/stephen-harper-promises-boost-in-defence-spending-but-provides-no-details; Pugliese, David, Canada and Germany derail NATO request to increase military spending targets [Online] Available : http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/09/03/canada-and-germany-derail-nato-request-to-increase-military-spending-targets/; NATO, Wales Summit Declaration [Online] Available from: http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/09/03/canada-and-germany-derail-nato-request-to-increase-military-spending-targets/; NATO, NATO Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan [Online] Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112517.htm?selectedLocale=en
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In cooperation with NATO SPS, the Atlantic Treaty Association
and the Atlantic Council of Georgia are organizing a workshop in Tbilissi,
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discussions and information sharing, in order to find solutions for today's
emerging energy security challenges. The workshop will feature panels
on the role of international organizations, public and private stakeholders
in energy security; terrorism and its implica-
tions for energy infrastructure security and
cyber threats to critical energy infrastructures.
Two months after the Wales Summit, The German Atlantic Asso-
ciation and the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS) are organiz-
ing an international conference in Berlin to revisit key outcomes of the
summit and to discuss the process of policy implementation. On 4-5th
November 2014, the conference will gather high level NATO representa-
tives and experts from acedemia, national
policies, and civil society. The aim is to
provide a public platform and a forum for
young voices in the Alliance.
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