The concept of virtue was first introduced by Aristotle in his Ethica Niomachea. (c. 350 BC) For Aristotle, goodness in any facet of life can be understood in relation to the telos, or end towards which a thing is moving. 1 For example, the telos of medicine would be health. Aristotle believed that for humans, the telos of life is happiness or well being, and that a human being is happy if he acts in a way that is virtuous. The virtues are acquired character traits that are intrinsically good. 2 An attitude must be genuine to be virtuous, and the satisfaction one gains from acting in a virtuous way is also intrinsic. Not all of the virtues that Aristotle lists in his pivotal work on the subject are relevant to modern economics or commerce. For the purpose of modernizing and generalizing the concept of virtues in relation to the free market’s effect on character, and so to not limit the discussion to the Aristotelian conception of morality, the definition of virtues that will be used is more similar to the definition used by Ian Maitland in his 1997 paper titled “The Market as School of the Virtues.” He defines a virtue as “the qualities of character or disposition or 1 Graafland, 2. 2 Bruni & Sugden, 143. Himmelrich 1
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The concept of virtue was first introduced by Aristotle in
his Ethica Niomachea. (c. 350 BC) For Aristotle, goodness in any
facet of life can be understood in relation to the telos, or end
towards which a thing is moving.1 For example, the telos of
medicine would be health. Aristotle believed that for humans, the
telos of life is happiness or well being, and that a human being
is happy if he acts in a way that is virtuous. The virtues are
acquired character traits that are intrinsically good.2 An
attitude must be genuine to be virtuous, and the satisfaction one
gains from acting in a virtuous way is also intrinsic.
Not all of the virtues that Aristotle lists in his pivotal
work on the subject are relevant to modern economics or
commerce. For the purpose of modernizing and generalizing the
concept of virtues in relation to the free market’s effect on
character, and so to not limit the discussion to the Aristotelian
conception of morality, the definition of virtues that will be
used is more similar to the definition used by Ian Maitland in
his 1997 paper titled “The Market as School of the Virtues.” He
defines a virtue as “the qualities of character or disposition or
1 Graafland, 2.2 Bruni & Sugden, 143.
Himmelrich 1
intellect that enable a person to lead a virtuous life or to act
in an ethically appropriate manner.”3 It is still helpful to keep
the Aristotelian definition in mind when discussing any form of
virtue, as it is the foundation of the concept and a useful
reference point and there are similarities between the more
modernized concept and the historic one. Virtues in both are
developed habitually over the course of one’s life, in a cyclical
manner. Acting virtuously makes it easier to perform good acts,
which in turn makes one more virtuous. Every action offers the
opportunity to act in a virtuous manner, in every aspect of life.
However, in modern times, there has been a debate surrounding the
effect capitalism, consumer society, and the free market have on
character and morality.
There are two prominent theses that summarize the major
divide in the debate surrounding the effect of the free market on
morality and character in society. The doux commerce thesis
postulates that the free market and capitalism polish our
manners, and the wealth that is generated through the market will
in fact make people less greedy, as it will increase the general
3 Maitland, 17.
Himmelrich 2
quality of life.4 Alternatively, the self-destruction thesis
claims that the moral foundation for the market is based on a
pre-capitalist and pre-industrial past, and that the values which
the market promotes erodes its own foundation.5 In his book Social
Limits to Growth, Fred Hirsch identifies five social virtues that he
believes are necessary for a functional and efficient free market
economy; truth, trust, acceptance, restraint, and obligation.6
While Hirsch himself endorses the self-destruction thesis, there
are others who theorize that the market does not only need the
framework of moral virtues such as the ones listed above, but
also generates them.
The virtue of trust for example, exemplifies how the market
can foster virtues, and also highlights why it can be seen as a
problematic method for doing such. For the market to efficiently
and genuinely cultivate the virtue of trustworthiness, it is
necessary for there to be a benefit to having long-term
relationships, for companies to be transparent in their
operations, and for there to be a self-enforcing reputational
4 Ibid.5 Graafland, 1.6 Bruni & Sugden, 156.
Himmelrich 3
network. If all of these factors are present in a market
dominion, then the market should positively foster the virtue of
trust. However, and unfortunately, these requirements are usually
not met. Given the right circumstances and the appropriate
positive leadership and guidance, the market can promote honest
behavior, however it is not sufficient in fostering
trustworthiness as a virtue. Market relationships should not
extend to encompass all, or even most, forms of relationships,
because it is necessary to have other examples of virtuous
behavior outside of relationships based on economic gain. This is
due to the problems associated with the method by which virtues,
like trust, are fostered within the market.
The ideal free market is grounded in the ideals of freedom
and of mutual benefit and reciprocity.7 Focusing on these ideals,
it is clear to see how trust, as a virtue, can be habitually
cultivated through market interactions and relationships.
Trustworthiness is certainly a valuable quality when doing
business, for a number of reasons. Practically speaking, it can
be costly and time consuming to have a third party enforce
7 Bruni & Sugden, 143.
Himmelrich 4
contracts or transactions.8 An equal amount of trustworthy
behavior as well as trust in those you are dealing with is
necessary to promote efficient market exchanges. As well, due to
the global and expanding nature of the market, it is necessary to
trust those you are doing business with, as there is often a
large degree of geographical separation between parties involved
in transactions. Since the development of virtues necessitates
habitual action, the repetitive nature of market interaction
facilitates this development.
Another way in which the market can foster the virtue of
trust is through the development of long-term relationships with
repeated market interactions. The idea of forming long-term
relationships is one that is crucial to the function of a free
market that promotes virtues. It makes sense logically as to why
repeat interactions in business benefit all involved; it is less
risky to deal with somebody who you have dealt with
satisfactorily before, and can lead to possible partnerships,
specialized investments, and mutually beneficial agreements in
the future. These sorts of relationships foster the value of
8 Maitland, 19.
Himmelrich 5
trust, and even though they start out as a means to an extrinsic
financial end, over time they become intrinsically valuable.
The third way in which markets promote the development of
the virtue of trust is by virtue of the reputation one gains by
being trustful. For the conception of the free market as virtue-
generating to be plausible, it is necessary for there to be a
transparent and valued reputational network.9 Adam Smith, in his
seminal work The Wealth of Nations, famously identifies
trustworthiness with self interest, for the sake of one’s
reputation. It is not likely that a business that has the
reputation for being dishonest will gain new business.
Comparatively, a business with a good reputation for being honest
and trustworthy will be more likely to obtain new clients and
achieve longevity.
However, this reputation mechanism is only effective if
three conditions are met. Information about past behavior must be
available; the company must have a long-term vision to justify
passing up opportunities to cheat and make fast money, and there
must be collective punishment and reward for having a bad or a
9 Maitland, 23.
Himmelrich 6
good reputation, respectively.10 A 2004 study by Graafland and
Smid concluded that while the reputational mechanism does
stimulate virtuous behavior, it does not function in a self-
enforcing manner.11 Furthermore, a lack of transparency in
companies has a serious negative influence on the efficiency and
functioning of the reputation mechanism.
There is an additional problem with a critical aspect of the
free market’s ability to cultivate the virtue of trust; the
incentive of short-term versus long-term gain. Factors such as
information asymmetries and increased focus on quarterly earnings
due to pressure from the stock market can cause companies to
focus on the short-term.12 Long-term gain is a necessary
condition of a virtue-generating free market. Without incentive
to form long-term, mutually beneficial relationships, the
advantage to acting trustworthy or virtuous in any sense other
than an intrinsic one virtually disappears. If others are
dishonest, which they are much more likely to be if the
interactions are one time or short-term, then the individual is
10 Graafland, 10.11 Ibid.12 Graafland, 12.
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at a disadvantage, and is also forced to act dishonestly.13
Without the incentive to form long-term relationships, it becomes
much easier and lucrative to take advantage of people and act in
a dishonest manner.
Another factor that can be detrimental to the development of
virtues stemming from market participation is the grand economic
incentives for corruption that the market provides. The recent
real estate crisis and bank crashes that have led to a financial
recession sweeping the globe only serve to illustrate this point.
The following empirical case study also demonstrates this
unfortunate phenomenon. In a paper discussing the problems with
Professor Maitland’s case for the markets generating virtues,
Bill Shaw provides an example of a study from The Journal of
Business Ethics that was reported in The Wall Street Journal.
“After getting nearly 400 people (more than 85% of
them men)
over the past seven years to play the role of a
fictional exec…
13 Maitland, 19.
Himmelrich 8
47% of the top executives, 41% of the controllers,
and 76% of
the graduate level business students…were willing
to commit
fraud by understating write-offs that cut into
their companies’
profits.”14
This example comes from the Treadway Commission, headed by
James Treadway who is the former commissioner of the US Security
and Exchange Commission. He goes on to state that these findings
are consistent with the kind of fraud that is commonly
investigated by the SEC. One of the researchers involved in the
case study even suggested that the findings were most likely
conservative, given that the participants were not really
impacted by their decisions in the study.15 This study confirms
many of the claims that are made in opposition to the idea of the
market as a mechanism for generating virtues; namely that the
values demonstrated in market interactions are merely a means to
14 Shaw, 44.15 Ibid.
Himmelrich 9
an end, and that their motivation is extrinsic and based on
financial gain rather than intrinsic and based on moral values.
Many of the factors that have been discussed so far that
could contribute to the market fostering virtues are idealized
and mostly based on hypotheticals. This is partly because of the
difficulties in obtaining empirical evidence on virtue due to the
abstract and objective nature of the concept of ‘virtue’ itself.
Any empirical observations concerning the virtues would be of
behavior rather than the existence of the intrinsic virtue
itself. Behavioral changes do not necessarily indicate changes in
character traits, which is what we are concerned with when
discussing virtues.16 It would take years of empirical data to
conclusively prove that virtue has been developed. This, combined
with the unrealistic necessary requirements for a morally
conscious and virtuous free market, paints a much grimmer picture
of the nature of capitalism and consumer society than the hopeful
one Professor Maitland postulated. Markets are inherently
expansionary, and the danger lies in the potential
commodification of aspects of life that should not necessarily be
16 Graafland, 3.
Himmelrich 10
bought and sold such as the concept of friendship or a more
practical application like healthcare or education. Another
concern is that markets will grow to commodify the internal goals
of practices, making everything a means to an economic end.17
Viewed through this lens, the market does not seem to foster
virtues; rather it promotes behavior based on economic self-
interest. While it is true that the habitual repetition of this
behavior could lead to the development of virtues in some cases,
the preconditions that would be necessary to facilitate this kind
of development are unrealistic. There are clearly rules that
should be adhered to if the market is meant to function
efficiently and well, however much evidence tends towards people
taking advantage of the opportunities and economic incentives
that lead to corruption. In the case of trustworthiness, while
the market could promote it because of the necessity to uphold
reputation, form relationships, and for the sake of efficiency,
it seems as if these are extrinsic factors, and ultimately the
means to an end motivated by self-interest. For a person to be
truly virtuous, one must not only perform good acts, but
17 Bruni & Sugden, 147.
Himmelrich 11
genuinely have that character traits that are in line with
virtuous behavior. In the instance of the market, any initial
motivation is economic and therefore not necessarily virtuous in
nature.
Himmelrich 12
Bruni, Luigino. Sugden, Robert. “Reclaiming Virtue Ethics for
Economics”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 27 No. 4 (Fall
2013) 141-163
Graafland, J. J. “Do Markets Crowd out Virtues? An Aristotelian
Framework”. Journal of Business Ethics. Vol. 91 No. 1 (Jan., 2010) 1-19
Maitland, Ian. “The Market as School of the Virtues”. Business