Virginia Policy Review Volume IX Issue I

2 Virginia Policy Review

Volume IX | Issue I | Fall 2015

A student-run journal from

Virginia Policy Review 3


From the Editors

Dear Reader,

Thank you for taking the time to delve into the Fall 2015 edition of the Virginia Policy Review.

This issue tackles a broad range of topics, all relevant to modern public policy debate. To highlight a few pieces, our issue features critical analysis of Donald Trump’s tax plan, an overview of actions the president can take to improve relations with Cuba, and analysis of the impact poverty has on the perceptions children have about obesity. All of the featured articles provide insightful analysis and should prove useful to policy makers everywhere.

We also encourage you to look into the other projects VPR currently is working on. Our online policy blog, The Third Rail, is updated weekly and is now featured on our newly redesigned website — virginiapolicyreview.org. Then, in January, we will host our annual National Journal Conference. If you work on a student-run academic journal or know someone who does, please visit our website to learn more. Finally, in the spring, we plan to launch a brand new VPR podcast that will feature smart policy-based discussion. Please download!

We hope you enjoy this issue and possibly even consider submitting to a future iteration.


All the best,

Matthew Comey & Gabrielle JorgensenEditors-in-Chief


Staff Acknowledgements

Editors-in-Chief: Matthew Comey

Gabrielle JorgensenManaging Director: Locher GroveSenior Editors:

Alexander GregorioMichael

MozelleMark White

Associate Editors:Eric Barker Robert BiggsPat Cary Danielle ChildressKaitlyn Howard Kelly KalerReade Paterno Sydney PetersenSarah Swygard

The Third RailSenior Online Editor: Grady BrownStaff Writers: Kate Clark

Samantha GuthrieMadeline

Merrill


Podcast Editor: Patrick Lyons

We welcome your thoughts. Please forward any comments, questions, or concerns to [email protected] or visit us online at www.virginiapolicyreview.org. We also invite you to visit our blog, The Third Rail, and engage further in the policy debate.


Table of Contents

Commentary in BriefI. Tax Cuts Trump the National Debt 7

By Daniel J. Palazzolo, chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Richmond

II. The Affordable Care Act Saves Lives 10

By Benjamin Paul, MPP candidate at the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy and former full-time advocate Virginia Medicaid Expansion

Commentary in Depth

III. The Case for On-Campus Voting Precincts 13

By Donald Garrett, MPA candidate at George Mason University


IV. Public Choice and Arrow’s Impossibility 21 Theorem: Implications for the Public Policy Discipline

By Gilbert Michaud, Ph.D. candidate at Virginia Commonwealth University and former Energy & Power researcher for US Business Executive

V. Cuba and Continued Normalization of Relations 32with the United States: Potential for ExecutiveAction

By Abbigail Dobbertin, MPP candidate at the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy and former fellow with Engage Cuba, a public policy advocacy organization

Research Articles

VI. The Shackles of African Neocolonialism: 39 Françafrique and its Effects on African Political Institutions


By Samir Salifou, MPP candidate at the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy

VII. The Power of Community-Based Solutions 53for Crime Prevention in Latin America

By Ana Derrick, fourth-year Foreign Affairs major at the University of Virginia

VIII. The Impact of Poverty on Child Weight and 66Weight Perception

By Marissa Bialek, MPP candidate at the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy

Virginia Policy Review11

Tax Cuts Trump The National DebtDaniel J. Palazzolo

Donald Trump, billionaire real estate developer and television personality, rose to the top of national tracking polls for the 2016 Republican presidential nomination contest with his populist attack on immigration, political correctness, and corrupt politicians. More recently, he has proposed a tax reform plan that seeks to fulfill his larger promise to “make America great again.” Although the plan contains several components that reflect mainstream thinking among conservative economists and will increase economic growth, preliminary analyses suggest that it would greatly magnify the national debt.

Trump’s plan may well be described as comprehensive and populist. For individuals, the main goals are greater progressivity and more incentives to work. Trump’s proposal creates four tax brackets (0%, 10%, 20%, and 25%), eliminates the marriage penalty and the alternative minimum tax, and retains “many deductions” for the “middle class.” At a 0% rate, single persons making less than $25,000 and married couples making less than $50,000 would pay no taxes and presumably would receive sizeable refunds. Meanwhile, although the plan eliminates all estate or “death” taxes,


it does away with many deductions for the “rich.” In an appeal to the middle class, Trump announced his plan “is going to cost me a fortune.” For corporations, the plan guarantees a tax rate of no more than 15%.

Mr. Trump contends the plan is “revenue neutral” and will not add to deficits or the national debt. He contends that revenue losses from tax cuts will be made up by “reducing or eliminating most deductions and loopholes to the very rich,” repatriating overseas corporate cash at a rate of 10%, “reducing or eliminating corporate loopholes that cater to special interests,” and imposing a “reasonable cap” on deduction of business expenses. Several highlights include: curbing personal exemptions, itemized deductions, and exemptions on life insurance for the “very rich;” ending special tax treatment of carried interest; prohibiting corporations from deferring taxes on income earned abroad; and cutting “special interest loopholes.”

Yet Trump promises far more than he delivers in terms of fiscal responsibility. Trump’s strategy is consistent with several commission reports that seek to deal with the national debt (e.g. Bowles-Simpson and Peterson-Pew), a strategy that includes eliminating tax expenditures, lowering marginal tax rates, and reducing the corporate rate. But, since Trump wishes to maintain tax breaks for the vast majority of income earners and lowers rates far


below other plans, his proposal has drastic consequences for the national debt.

The conservative leaning Tax Foundation predicts that, over ten years, Trump’s plan will increase economic growth (GDP) by 11.5%, capital investment by 29%, wages by 6.5%, and jobs by over 5.3 million. However, the plan fails to deliver on his promise of revenue neutrality. Even with the Tax Foundation’s growth assumptions, the plan will cause revenues to decline by $10.2 trillion over ten years. Citizens for Tax Justice, a liberal-leaning advocacy organization, predicts that Trump’s plan will cost $11 trillion revenue over ten years.

Of course, the federal government is already deeply in debt, but Trump’s plan will make matters much worse. The national debt, which grows at a rate of roughly $2 billion per day, currently exceeds $18 trillion. Economists are more concerned with the national debt as a portion of the size of the economy, i.e. the debt to GDP ratio, than the total debt because the debt to GDP ratio is a better indicator of a country’s ability to pay its creditors. In addition, in a widely debated paper on the subject, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have reported that countries with a 90% debt to GDP ratio experience slower economic growth. The publicly held debt stands at about 74% of GDP and is projected to grow to 77% of GDP over the next ten years without any changes in policy. According to the Committee for a


Responsible Federal Budget, if Trump’s plan were enacted, the projected debt would climb to over 125% of GDP, which puts the United States well within range of the debt levels seen in countries like Greece.

Trump has linked his tax plan to the broader message of his campaign by announcing that those in the 0% tax bracket would fill out an IRS form entitled “I win.” But if Trump’s plan became a reality, he should also send a letter to the US Department of Treasury and the next generation of taxpayers that states, “you lose.”

Daniel Palazzolo is the chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Richmond. His research focuses on partisan cooperation and polarization in Congress.


The Affordable Care Act Saves LivesBenjamin Paul

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, commonly called “Obamacare,” continues to be the most controversial policy intervention in recent history. The public remains evenly split on the law, and its opponents continue to obstruct its implementation at every turn. Yet, one central achievement of the law has been overlooked. Obamacare has led to a dramatic reduction in preventable adverse events (PAEs). This revolution has saved tens of thousands of lives and billions in unnecessary health care costs.

A preventable adverse event is any medical condition or complication acquired in a hospital that could have been prevented by better care. Examples of PAEs include infections acquired while at the hospital, patient falls, and incorrect drug dosages. One misconception about PAEs is that they are usually a consequence of neglect. In reality, they are typically due to poorly designed care systems that set up health care providers for failure. Medical devices may not be standardized across or within hospitals. Physician and nursing teams may be working together for the first time. Medical records may be poorly written and organized.


Preventable adverse events have plagued the United States. A study in the Journal of Patient Safety by toxicologist John T. James estimates between 210,000 and 400,000 hospital patients die each year due to PAEs, placing it in the top five leading causes of death. For context, heart disease is the leading annual cause of death for Americans, claiming approximately 600,000 lives each year. A study in Health Affairs by David Classen, et. al., found preventable adverse medical events occur in one-third of all hospital admissions.

Preventable adverse events are costly, as patients who suffer from PAEs need additional care. A 2010 study commissioned by the Society of Actuaries estimated medical errors cost the United States economy an unnecessary $19.5 billion in 2008. These costs included additional medical spending to care for the adverse event as well as the lost economic value due to increased mortality rates and lost productivity. The total economic loss inflates to between $73.5 billion and $98 billion per year when applying quality-adjusted life years, a commonly used measurement to value disease burden, to PAEs.

Obamacare’s architects recognized this problem and took unprecedented steps to solve it. The law authorized the government and stakeholders to develop quality measures to evaluate performance. It also directed Medicare to begin reimbursing providers based


on the quality, not quantity, of care provided. The law also prohibited the federal and state governments from paying doctors for treating infections developed in the hospital. Lastly, Obamacare introduced the hospital readmissions reduction program, which financially penalizes hospitals that have a disproportionate number of preventable readmissions.

These measures, passed in 2010, have had their intended effect. The Department of Health and Human Services estimates there were 1.3 million fewer PAEs between 2010 and 2013 — a 17% reduction, compared to the 2010 baseline. There was also an 8% reduction in preventable hospital readmissions among Medicare patients. There were decreases in adverse drug reactions, patient falls, and central line infections. According to HHS, the reduction in PAEs has saved as many as 50,000 lives and $12 billion.

By linking payment to quality instead of quantity, the Affordable Care Act set the foundation for improving health care quality in the United States. However, there is still work to do. Preventable adverse events are just that – preventable.

Ben Paul is an MPP candidate at the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. He worked on Tim Kaine's successful 2012 Senate campaign and spent a year advocating the Virginia General Assembly to expand Medicaid.


The Case for On-Campus Voting PrecinctsDonald Garrett

On July 26, 2011, the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors ventured into exciting and unchartered territory. By a unanimous vote, the Board elected to establish precinct #134, the University precinct at George Mason University (GMU). Never before in the Commonwealth of Virginia had the lines of a voting precinct fallen entirely with the boundaries of a college campus. Now, several residential schools like Liberty University (City of Lynchburg) and Virginia Tech (Montgomery County) have followed Fairfax’s lead and established similar on-campus voting locations.

Unfortunately, there are still many voting districts that split campuses apart or require students to travel off-campus to vote. The University precinct in Fairfax should serve as a model for other residential colleges and their electoral boards. Arrangements where students living on campus can vote on campus allow for universities to supplement their educational goals by promoting civic participation.

Precinct #134 is an active part of the George Mason University community that can be replicated at other colleges across the Commonwealth. The precinct contains 3,200


registered voters (Virginia Department of Elections, 2015) and obtained a 71% voter turnout rate for the last Presidential election (Fairfax County Office of Elections, 2012). This high electoral energy is important in the face of younger Americans voting at the lowest rate in the nation (US Census Bureau, 2014).

I. The Education Case

Outside the primary mission to educate students, universities are tasked with creating communities where a free flow of ideas can flourish, with the ultimate goal of creating productive members of society upon their graduation. Encouraging voting is a great way to promote this goal, but the frequency of elections can pose a problem. Lijphart (1997) notes that America’s very high frequency of elections, when compared to most other nations, leads a voter fatigue that negatively impacts turnout. While government accountability is fostered through regularly occurring elections, many find it a hassle to show up and exercise this right frequently. On-campus precincts help combat future complacency by getting students accustomed to this annual duty. Establishing a convention of voting earlier in life could lead to more frequent voting down the road, fostering a positive habit that would have a lasting impact on the future communities in which the school’s


graduates will settle. Although this proposition has yet to be empirically tested, a longitudinal study could shed light on this benefit.

George Mason University’s on-campus precinct has allowed the university’s students to step into a community leadership role and become election officers for the precinct. Election officers have the responsibility of administering the election laws on Election Day, including setting up the voting equipment, processing voters, verifying their identification, and tallying the results. Students serving other students can add confidence to the democratic process. At points of contention, such as access being denied on the basis of improper identification or the voter not showing up on the rolls, voters may be more receptive if the objections come from a peer. When contentious situations arise from interactions with members outside of a peer group, this can create an “us versus them” mentality, lowering confidence in election administration. This is in line with Tajfel and Turner’s (1977) seminal work on Social Identity Theory, finding “the mere awareness of the presence of an out-group is sufficient to provoke intergroup competitive or discriminatory responses on the part of the in-group” (p. 38).

Also, it is important for college students to find ways to get enthusiastic about elections. The 2012 election was a celebration of democracy at GMU: student government conducted exit


polling, get-out-the-vote organizations played music and drove individuals on a 12-person circus bike to the polls, and a news station from Thailand interviewed students. It was heart-warming to see so many individuals excited about government, which was bolstered by the entertainment available while they waited in line to vote.

II. The Legal Case

On-campus voting precincts easily meet both the statutory and regulatory requirements for precincts in Virginia. The main restrictions the law gives local governing bodies are 1) precincts cannot have more than 5,000 registered voters, 2) precincts in counties must have at least 100 registered voters, 3) precincts in cities must have at least 500 registered voters, and 4) a precinct cannot have more than one location for voters to cast their vote (Code of Va. Ann. § 24.2-307). Nearly every college and university in Virginia with dorms would be able to meet these low thresholds.

Students registering to vote at their dorm address also meet the Commonwealth’s registration requirements. Voter registration statutes and regulations in Virginia tend to be inclusive of potential voters and attempt to provide a wide range of options to ensure those who are eligible to vote can do so. Voter registration in Virginia is based on voter-


asserted residence. This location “shall be broadly construed to provide the greatest opportunity to register and to vote” and can even be established in a “commercial, industrial, or other building that is not normally used for residential purposes if the building serves as the applicant's primary nighttime residence” (1 Va. Admin. Code 20-40-30). The regulations provide additional protections to college-aged voters. There can be no presumption in favor or against residence merely on the basis that an individual is a student or lives in a dorm (1 Va. Admin. Code 20-40-30). Voters still meet the domiciliary intent required to register to vote even if he or she “may leave upon the happening of a future contingency,” like graduating from school or moving for a job (1 Va. Admin Code 20-40-20).

Finally, universities typically provide all students with an ID card that is valid identification for voter verification at the polls. Virginia law specifically allows voters to present “any valid student identification card containing a photograph of the voter and issued by any institution of higher education located in the Commonwealth” for admission to the polls (Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-643). Since most schools provide adequate identification, no one should be turned away from the polls for lack of a valid ID. Additionally, ID cards issued by public institutions could meet the threshold of being a government-issued ID, should the statutes be amended to remove the enumeration of college


ID cards. This is important to student voters because they may not have other acceptable forms of identification.

III. The Convenience Case

Numerous articles attempt to understand the abysmal turnout rates for voters under the age of 30. A common theme of these works is the lack of convenience associated with voting, but on-campus precincts may provide a solution. Monahan (2014) argues that access to automobiles is a reason for the low turnout. Because some colleges limit access to automobiles, students might not be able to drive to their precinct to vote. On-campus precincts address this issue because the voting location would be within walking distance for the individuals that are eligible to register to vote in the precinct. George Mason’s Student Government used to provide shuttle service to the local precint on Election Day; however, in light of the new precinct, those resources can now be used to educate voters.

Another inconvenience in Virginia’s election laws is the lack of unjustified absentee voting. Although students can vote absentee if they are away at school in a different locality from their voting residence, the process of applying for, submitting justification, and mailing in an absentee ballot can be cumbersome. If students register to vote at their campus residence


instead of their hometown, the process to vote at an on-campus precinct is as simple as bringing a student ID to the designated building on campus.

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, college students are impacted by decisions of government at every level and deserve to have an easy and accessible way to get their voices heard within the democratic process. On-campus voting locations are novel because they can provide a unique snapshot of the electoral preferences of university students, without diluting the voice of surrounding neighborhoods. The convenience, educational opportunities, and ability to work within existing regulations are three strong arguments to bring this service to more residential campuses across the Commonwealth. All in all, electoral boards, boards of supervisors, and university administrators should look to George Mason as an example and see the potential benefits this voting arrangement can bring to students.

Donald Garrett is an MPA candidate at George Mason University. His research interests include local government and government use of social media.


References

1 Virginia Administrative Code 20-40-20. Required intent for voter registration.

1 Virginia Administrative Code 20-40-30. Presumptions.

Code of Virginia § 24.2-307. Requirements for county and city precincts.

Code of Virginia § 24.2-643. Qualified voter permitted to vote; procedures at polling place; voter identification.

Fairfax County Office of Elections. (2012, November 6). November 6, 2012 general and special elections - Official returns [PDF]. Retrieved from http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/elections/webreports/resu1112.pdf

Lijphart, A. (1997). Unequal participation: Democracy's unresolved dilemma. American Political Science Review, 91(1), 1-14.

Monahan, G. (2014, November 3). Youth voter turnout typically low, especially for midterm elections [Editorial]. Retrieved October 1, 2015, from The State News website: http://statenews.com/article/2014/11/youth-vote-2014-midterm


Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33-47).

US Census Bureau. (2014, April). Young-Adult voting: An analysis of Presidential Elections, 1964-2012 (T. File, Author) [PDF]. Retrieved from https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p20-573.pdf

Virginia Department of Elections. (2015, October 1). Registrant counts by district type [PDF]. Retrieved from http://elections.virginia.gov/Files/Registration-Statistics/2015/09/Registrant_Count_By_Election.pdf


Public Choice and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: Implications for the Public Policy DisciplineGilbert Michaud

Public choice theory is of considerable significance to the discipline of public policy. Often a subject studied by economists and political scientists, public choice utilizes traditional economic theory to comprehend political behavior. McLean (1991) stated, “public choice is not a subject; it is a way of studying a subject” (p. 1), signifying the application of economic tools, such as rational choice theory, to understand politics. While there has been debate concerning methods and topics taught in graduate public policy programs (Morçöl & Ivanova, 2010), public choice is a subject that is often disregarded outside of the economics and political science disciplines (Pincione, 2004). However, Altman (2012) showed how bounded rationality and behavioral economics have significant applications to public policy, and Pincione (2004) claimed that it is “highly advisable” to teach public choice in other disciplines while it “need not be predictively accurate” (p. 469).

This article will demarcate some of the principal concepts of public choice theory and


historical foundations related to governments and elections. An in-depth analysis of Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem will follow, since voting and preference aggregation are the most crucial takeaways for the public policy discipline. Overall, public choice and Arrow’s impossibility theorem should be increasingly incorporated into the study of public policy as a way to better understand political motivation, plurality voting, and policymaking.

I. Public Choice

Public choice applies neoclassical economic methods focused on self-interest and utility maximization to explain political behavior (Hill, 1999). Mueller (2003) described it as “the economic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to political science” (p. 1). In public choice, individuals, interest groups, and politicians are all assumed to seek their self-interest (MacLean, 2011), just as the “economic man” does in the marketplace. Political decisions depend on the costs and benefits of an action taken, and each group attempts to maximize their utility via egoistic and rational processes (Mueller, 2003). Public choice’s subject matter primarily consists of the theory of the state, voter behavior, and party politics (Hill, 1999).

Public choice theory does recognize market failures (Lemieux, 2004), which explains why


government ought to exist. In this sense, efficiency, redistribution, and externality elimination are justifications for collective action (Oppenheimer, 2012), as governments work to provide public goods. Moreover, public choice theory outlines how the federalist system is optimal as it is efficient in sorting out the local, regional, and national levels of government (Mueller, 2003). However, it asserts that direct democracy is impossible in two-party systems since both parties are pushed in the direction of the stance preferred by the median voter (i.e., Anthony Downs’ median voter hypothesis) (Turnbull & Djoundourian, 1994). This phenomenon is a crucial component of public choice theory, showing how voting systems often choose the candidate or outcome favored by the median voter, subsequently pushing politicians toward the middle of public opinion.

In public choice theory, self-interest also motivates officeholders in terms of career advancement and re-election. Similarly, electorates back propositions and candidates that they believe will maximize their respective utility (McLean, 1991). However, voters in democracies face a small probability that their vote will decidedly change the result of the elections, and collecting the information necessary for a well-informed voting decision requires substantial time and work. Thus, public choice theory claims it to be rational for voters to be largely uninformed of government


and politics and perhaps even refrain from voting (Downs, 1998). Downs’ ‘paradox of voting’ observation may explain low voter turnout.

However, for those who do turn out, collective choices emerge based on preferences expressed at the ballot box. While elections are a central component of democratic governance (Powell, 2000), is it possible that individual preferences, through a system of voting, can be aggregated accurately to represent the inclinations of the greater citizenry? Can the aggregate (i.e., society) be expected to behave like a rational individual in ordering social outcomes? Arrow’s impossibility theorem helps address these questions.

II. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Numerous scholars have focused on preference aggregation issues (e.g., Bouton & Castanheira, 2012; Chambers & Hayashi, 2014; Feddersen & Pesendorfer, 1997; Radcliff & Wingenbach, 2003), though none more pointedly and notoriously than economist Kenneth Arrow. In his Ph.D. dissertation, Arrow proved that there is no reliable method of making a fair selection between three or more political contenders via a preferential voting method (Sen, 1985). This social choice paradox illuminates the impossibility of having a perfect plurality voting system, and thus, the concept is now


recognized as the “impossibility theorem” or sometimes the “general possibility theorem.”

Most economists today agree that individuals have ordinal preferences, rather than a numeric scale of psychic happiness that one can gather from goods, services, actions, etc. (i.e., cardinal preferences) (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2009). In other words, a combination of goods (or candidates) can be ordered such that each is measured as better, worse, or equal to another. However, it is uncertain how much more or less these individuals might prefer a good or candidate in comparison with another (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2009). Each individual’s ordinal favorite forms a preference relation, which provides information to determine collective decisions. How can the honest revelation of these preference orderings be assured? If individuals cannot agree with how to rank a candidate, then how can it be claimed that society as a whole ranks these outcomes one way or the other?

To answer these questions, consider Arrow’s specific work on this topic. Arrow examined social preference construction from personal inclinations by identifying five conditions that should be satisfied: 1) presented a selection between options A and B, either A should be favored over B, or B over A, or an indifference exists between the two; 2) options should be transitive in the sense that if A is favored over B, and B over C, then A is also favored over C;


3) if every person favors A over B, then communally, A should be favored over B (i.e., Pareto efficiency); 4) communal preferences should not be subject to the partialities of one person (i.e., the dictator); and 5) communal preference for A compared to B should remain free of inclinations for other possible options (Arrow, 1963). What Arrow proved is that in elections with three or more candidates, it is impossible to satisfy these five criteria simultaneously.

To illustrate, assume there are three candidates competing for political office: a republican (R), a democrat (D), and a libertarian (L). These candidates are all contesting in the same region, which is populated by 1,000 voters. Now, assume that (R) has 450 voters who would elect him, but would instead vote for (D) if (R) were not running. (D), on the other hand, has 350 voters who back him primarily, but who rank (R) as their second choice. Lastly, (L) has only 200 voters who are committed supporters, and they would vote for (D) if (L) withdraws, but not for (R). Hence, the voters’ ranking preference may be presented as follows: 450 voters (R)>(D)>(L); 350 voters (D)>(R)>(L); 200 voters (L)>(D)>(R). What is seen is that of the non-(R) voters, a clear majority of 350 out of 550 backs the (D) candidate. An overwhelming majority of non-(R) voters would vote for (R) if (D) decides to withdraw. However, presenting all three candidates makes the election less democratic,


particularly due to the lack of political equality in the voting process.

If all three candidates run, the (R) simply wins with 450 votes (scenario 1). However, suppose the (L) candidate withdraws. All of its 200 supporters vote for their next choice, the (D) candidate. As a result, (D) wins with 550 votes to 450 votes (scenario 2). In scenario 1, (R) won despite the fact that they were one of the top two choices of only 800 voters. The (D) lost even though they were one of the top two choices of all 1,000 voters. Hence, the resulting outcome is paradoxical since adding more ballot choices actually results in a less equitable outcome. Here, a candidate who ranked first or second on everyone’s list loses to a candidate who has lesser support in the electorate’s first or second place ranking. Why is it that the (R) candidate wins in one scenario and the (D) candidate wins in the other, although the preferences of the citizenry remained the same?

To further develop the example, consider a third possibility in which the (D) candidate withdraws and the (L) candidate remains in the running (scenario 3). In this case, the (R) candidate wins with 800 votes as opposed to 200 votes for (L). Once again, there is a sub-optimal result where the winning candidate is the choice of only 800 voters, while a non-running candidate (D) ranks in the top two in everyone’s preference list. What scenario 3


demonstrates is that if either opposing candidate in an election has to withdraw, the less popular one should consider giving way to the favorite in order to ensure an outcome more reflective of the constituency. Of course, this is hardly applicable in the real world. Contrary to common belief, restricting voters’ choices by having one opposition candidate withdraw could produce a more democratic conclusion.

Furthermore, the law of transitivity is broken in the example, as (R) is favored to (D) which is favored to (L), but (L) is favored to (R). Consequently, who is the true victor? Imagine another illustration, in which an individual prefers the third party candidate, the (L), in the election to the two main candidates, (R) and (D). Since is it customarily acknowledged that the (L) is not going to win, individuals may instead vote for the (R) or (D) candidate so that their vote ‘counts’ toward the eventual victor. Tsebelis (1986) refers to this as “tactical voting” (p. 395), which is common in contemporary elections.

Ultimately, Arrow legendarily proved that group aggregation is dissimilar to individual choice, as a preferential voting method cannot comply with all of the noted criteria concurrently (Arrow, 1963). The key implication of Arrow’s theorem for public policy is that, in democratic systems, there is no way to truly determine what policies citizens want, or which candidates they want in office. Yet, while no


voting system may be perfect, this finding should not blind individuals to the fact that plurality voting is still the most used method in the world today. Arrow’s assertion was a remarkable achievement, and public policy scholars ought to consider its implications when cogitating elections and policymaking processes. For instance, scholars and analysts must consider the fact that policymaking via social preferences (e.g., multiple-choice referenda) may be inaccurate. They must also note the fallacies in the plurality voting method, and perhaps explore ordinal ranking schemes, such as the Borda count system, as an alternative approach to determining a winner.

III. Conclusion

Public choice theory and Arrow’s impossibility theorem should play a more prominent role in the public policy discipline today. The theorem is substantial when considering the implications it has on elections, and Arrow is generally correct in his proclamation on the complications of aggregating individual preferences into communal ones. However, it is important to recall that Arrow was working within a particular set of requirements to establish his proof. Therefore, public policy should not relegate itself strictly to Arrow’s theorem, as it may be impossible to guarantee the aggregation of individual wishes within his conditions. Consider, for instance, the influence


of money power on elections and the imbalance that provides to elections (Nichols & McChesney, 2013). Moreover, individuals repeatedly make decisions that diverge from the expectations of rational choice models (Eriksson, 2011). Despite such limitations, Arrow’s theorem needs to be integrated into the conventional public policy curriculum, particularly concerning the discussion of voting procedures for collective decision-making. The neoclassical economic models of public choice used to explain political behavior offer an intriguing way to think about how politicians and constituencies act under a certain set of conditions, which has far-reaching implications for public policy studies.

Gilbert Michaud is a Ph.D. candidate at Virginia Commonwealth University, pursuing a degree in Public Policy & Administration. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Economics and a Master of Science in Community Economic Development. Previously, Gilbert worked for the US Business Executive Journal as the lead researcher for the Energy & Power segment, producing over forty organizational case studies.


References

Altman, M. (2012). Implications of behavioural economics for financial literacy and public policy. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 41(5), 677–690.

Arrow, K. (1963). Social choice and individual values. (2nd ed.). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.

Bouton, L., & Castanheira, M. (2012). One person, many votes: Divided majority and information aggregation. Econometrica, 80(1), 43–87.

Chambers, C. P., & Hayashi, T. (2014). Preference aggregation with incomplete information. Econometrica, 82(2), 589–599.

Downs, A. (1998). Political theory and public choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Eriksson, L. (2011). Rational choice theory: Potential and limits. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Feddersen, T., & Pesendorfer, W. (1997). Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information. Econometrica, 65(5), 1029–1058.


Hill, P. J. (1999). Public choice: A review. Faith & Economics, 34, 1–10.

Lemieux, P. (2004). The public choice revolution. Regulation, 27(3), 22–29.

MacLean, S. M. (2011). Public choice theory and House of Lords reform. Economic Affairs, 31(3), 46–48.

McLean, I. (1991). Public choice: An introduction. New York, NY: Basil Blackwell.

Morçöl, G., & Ivanova, N. P. (2010). Methods taught in public policy programs: Are quantitative methods still prevalent? Journal of Public Affairs Education, 16(2), 255–277.

Mueller, D. (2003). Public choice III. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Nichols, J., & McChesney, R. W. (2013). Dollarocracy: How the money and media election complex is destroying America. New York, NY: Nation Books.

Oppenheimer, J. (2012). Principles of politics: A rational choice theory guide to politics and social justice. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.


Pincione, G. (2004). Should law professors teach public choice theory? Chicago-Kent Law Review, 79, 451–470.

Powell, G. (2000). Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Radcliff, B., & Wingenbach, E. (2003). Preference aggregation, functional pathologies, and democracy: A social choice defense of participatory democracy. Journal of Politics, 62(4), 977–998.

Samuelson, P. & Nordhaus, W. (2009). Economics. (19th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Sen, A. (1985). Social choice and justice: A review article. Journal of Economic Literature, 23(4), 1764–1776.

Tsebelis, G. (1986). A general model of tactical and inverse tactical voting. British Journal of Political Science, 16(3), 395–404.

Turnbull, G. K., & Djoundourian, S. S. (1994). The median voter hypothesis: Evidence from general purpose local governments. Public Choice, 81(3), 223–240.



Cuba and Continued Normalization of Relations with the United States: Potential for Executive ActionAbbigail Dobbertin

On December 17, 2014, the Obama administration took significant actions to normalize the relationship between the United States and Cuba. These actions have increasingly allowed both nations to exchange culture and foster more productive relationships (The Washington Post, 2015). While the United States Congress needs to be involved in lifting the embargo restrictions, the executive branch has the ability to further build a relationship outside of the embargo.

I. Powers of the Executive Branch

The constitution grants the president broad authority to conduct foreign affairs. While the president cannot control congressional ratification decisions, executive branch agencies can modify existing Cuba policies. For example, the secretary of the treasury and the secretary of commerce have the authority to change restrictions placed upon Cuba through actions such as expanding licenses or exemptions. These changes can legally be made


if they are consistent with the US foreign policy objectives recognized by Congress, i.e. the policies increase the provision of humanitarian support for the Cuban people and the promotion of democratic reform (Johnson, 2013).

President Obama's use of executive authority to loosen trade and travel restrictions is not without precedent. The administrations of Presidents Clinton and Bush both acted within the statutory parameters to change restrictions on Cuba. The Clinton administration made changes to travel and remittance provisions and President Bush made further alterations to the qualifications for a travel license and implemented the cap on remittances (Propst, 2015).

Based on the constitutional framework and precedents set by previous administrations, the executive branch has significant authority to make additional modifications. Below is a list of recommended actions for the executive branch to take, which are consistent with US foreign policy objectives and powers given to the executive branch, and could be made without further action by Congress.

II. Options for Executive Action

i. Expand and Increase Travel Eligibility through Modification of License Requirements


Currently, there are 12 categories of individuals and groups that are permitted to travel to Cuba. The executive branch is legally authorized to modify the requirements of the existing categories to include more people (US Department of the Treasury, 2015).

For example, individuals and groups may travel between Cuba and the US for educational purposes, as long as there is a structured program or an official sponsorship of the individual. Since educational exchanges, such as study abroad programs, aim to teach culture and diversity to students, it could be more helpful to expand the educational umbrella to include any higher education students traveling to Cuba in a learning capacity, even outside of an official sponsorship or structured program.

Another option, proposed by the Center for Democracy in the Americas, is to expand people-to-people travel to include individuals, not just groups. As of now, groups can plan people-to-people "educational exchanges that aim to aid humanitarian efforts and to develop a civil society in Cuba." Expanding this general license to individuals would increase contact and transactions between US visitors and the Cuban people reinforcing the normalizing relations and increasing exchanges of knowledge and culture (Wheeler, 2015).


ii. Expand the Licensing and Exemption for Imports and Exports between the US and Cuban Private Sectors

The president and the Commerce Department have the authority to enforce restrictions on and modify exceptions to exports of US-origin goods to Cuba (Propst, 2015). The executive branch should establish additional exemptions for exports to Cuba, on items such as school supplies, athletic equipment, food preparation equipment, or water purification equipment, which could greatly benefit the Cuban people.

The United States is currently prohibited from importing Cuban goods. However, the president is legally authorized to exempt certain items if they provide support for the Cuban people (Propst, 2015). The executive branch should authorize the imports of any services and goods from individuals and small-scale, non-state businesses in Cuba. Although some imports are allowed through the recent reforms made by President Obama, agricultural products, textiles, and many types of technological equipment are banned (The State Department Section 515.582 List, 2015). Even the goods and services allowed require documentation and detailed recording to confirm that they originated from the Cuban private market. Expanding the licensing to include textiles, agricultural products, or technological products as well as loosening documentation


requirements would support the budding private market and the Cuban people.

The sinking of the Deepwater Horizon in 2010 signaled that the cleanup of oil spills requires sustained cooperation between Cuba and the US. Cooperation agreements have been signed to expedite clean-up protocol in the Caribbean; however, as of now, most American companies skilled in oil cleanup still require a specific license in order to acquire equipment for environmental disasters or oil spill cleanup. The added processing of licenses slows down response and prevention efforts. The executive branch should create a general license category for times that aid environmental disaster relief efforts, since these issues are often mutually concerning to both American and Cuban waters (KeysNet, 2015).

iii. Expand Licensing to Allow Private Financing for Microcredit

United States citizens are currently prohibited from doing business or investing in Cuba unless they have a license under certain restricted categories. The executive branch has the authority to expand the provisions to include more investment categories, as long as it benefits the Cuban people or promotes democracy (Propst, 2015).


One area the executive branch should expand licenses in is microcredit lending for the emerging private sector in Cuba. Successful microcredit models began with Grameen Bank, which delivered small loans at low-interest rates to the rural poor. The repayment rate was 99%, and ultimately initiated successful development (Grameen Bank, 2015). Although President Obama expanded licensing to allow microfinancing projects in December 2014, this license still excludes extension of actual credit or loans (US Department of the Treasury, 2015). Expanding the opportunity for the United States organizations to establish micro-lending to Cuban entrepreneurs would support the Cuban people and the growing private sector.

iv. Remove Punishments on Third-party Trade and Use of the Dollar

The use of the dollar in transactions with Cuba is a fineable offense in the world market. Current statutes also ban the exportation of US-origin goods to Cuba, even when they are used in another product. The executive branch has the authority to modify the enforcement of these restrictions (Propst, 2015). By decriminalizing the use of the dollar and allowing more US-origin goods to be exported to Cuba, the President would remove unnecessary punishments on the Cuban people. This step would move the two countries towards more normalized relations and would


support the Cuban population by increasing their access to US-origin goods.

III. Conclusion

There are many actions that the executive branch can take to continue the progress we have seen in the US-Cuba diplomatic and trade relationships. Congress retains the power to formally lift the entire embargo, and they play a necessary role in public financing and taxpayer dollars, democracy funding, and the regulation of military goods and technology. However, while these issues are being debated and decided, the executive branch can continue moving forward with the normalization process through positive reforms.

Abbi Dobbertin is an MPP candidate at the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. She spent this past summer working as a fellow with Engage Cuba, a public policy advocacy organization that works to support the normalization of US-Cuba relations.


References

Cuba Study Group. (2013, Feb. 1)."Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba." Retrieved from http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032.

Goohue, David. (2015, July 24). "Historic oil meeting in Cuba set for October." Keys Net. Retrieved from http://www.keysnet.com/2015/07/24/503778_historic-oil-meeting-in-cuba-set.html?rh=1.

Grameen Bank. (2015) "History." Grameen Bank Bank For Small Business RSS. Retrieved from http://www.grameen-info.org/history/.

Johnson, Toni. (2013, Jan. 24). "Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy." Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/united-states/congress-us-foreign-policy/p29871.

Karen DeYoung. (2015, Jan 15). "U.S. eases Cuban trade and travel rules as it moves toward restoring full ties" Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-eases-cuban-trade-and-travel-rules-in-step-toward-restoring-


full-ties/2015/01/15/752f10aa-9cc3-11e4-96cc-e858eba91ced_story.html.

Muse, Robert, and Jorge R. Piñon. (2010, May 1)."Coping with the Next Oil Spill: Why U.S.-Cuba Environmental Cooperation Is Critical." Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/5/18-oil-spill-cuba-pinon/0518_oil_spill_cuba_pinon.pdf.

Propst, Stephen F. (2011, Feb. 11). "Presidential Authority to Modify Economic Sanctions Against Cuba." Hogan Lovells US LLP. Retrieved from http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/57d34e80-51b8-4ee0-ae64-750f65ee7642/Preview/PublicationAttachment/55896b90-840a-42bf-8744-752a7a206333/Cuba%20Aritcle%20FINAL.pdf.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2015, Sept. 18)."Frequently asked questions related to Cuba." Location: Retrieved from https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_faqs_new.pdf.

U.S. Department of State. (2015, Feb. 13). "The State Department's Section 515.582 List." Location like above: Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/515582/237471.htm.


Wheeler, Lydia. (2015, Aug. 20) "Group Urges Treasury to Expand Travel to Cuba." TheHill. Retrieved from http://thehill.com/regulation/251577-treasury-urged-to-expand-people-to-people-travel-to-cuba.


The Shackles of African Neocolonialism: Françafrique and its Effects on African Political Institutions

Samir Salifou

Abstract: In this paper I focus on the historical context of African independence in an attempt to understand past failures of the independence process that led to the authoritarian, and often violent, political regimes that took root from the 1960s to the 1990s. To help explain these failures, I start by discussing whether democracy is the proper regime type for Africans to aspire to. I focus my study on the former French colony Gabon and its continued relationship with its colonial metropolis. I argue that, beyond the different theories of political and democratic transitions, international linkage is an endogenous variable to the institutional design that influences African regime outcomes. I will then reject the notion of an African exceptionalism and show how my argument helps in the understanding that an organic implementation of an institutional framework, in conjunction with the aforementioned theories, will provide the best outcomes for Africa’s nascent democracy.

I. Introduction


Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa has followed a slow, arduous and sometimes painful path. After achieving independence in the 1960s, most African states have not fully transitioned to democracy. In some instances, these states have regressed into colonial-style oppression of their people. Academia has taken several approaches to understanding what went wrong in the African experience. Scholars have advanced several theories, ranging from political institution theory (which argues the need for formalized rules of the political game), political culture theory (which argues that informal institutions and cultural context are determinants of political outcomes), to political economy theory (which focuses on rational choice and economics as determinants of political outcomes). Yet, in this vast spectrum of theories, we lose focus that in a real world application of politics over people – who are presumed to have consciousness, agency, and intentionality – these theories tend to be endogenous to one another and all play an important role in regime outcomes.

II. Defining Democracy

The available African scholarship discusses development in terms of democratization and democratic consolidation. It is necessary to first establish whether democracy is the proper regime type for African development. Using the work of professors Michael Bratton of Michigan


State University and Nicolas van de Walle’s of Cornell University, I define democracy as “a form of political regime in which citizens choose, in competitive elections, the occupants of the top political offices of the state” (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997, p.13). This definition presupposes political liberalization to ensure that democracy is free, fair, and follows a set of pre-established rules that are institutionalized over time through constitutional constraints. Democracy for the sake of legitimacy is important in that the elected class has a mantle of authority in making policy decisions. Yet, democracy for the sake of holding the elected class accountable is even more important for citizens of African nations who aspire to self-determination as much as Europeans, Asians, or Latin Americans.

This definition of representative democracy is not to be misconstrued as being an endorsement of direct democracy. Direct democracy – the Athenian model – is analogous to mob rule. The political philosopher Colin Bird highlights the dangers of direct democracy by comparing it to the reason why “we do not have passengers on airplanes vote on how they are to be flown, or patients vote on the medical treatments each should receive” (2006, p.210). Condorcet’s Paradox, which speaks to the downfalls of majority rule voting, highlights another peril of direct democracy. The Marquis de Condorcet, an 18th century mathematician and philosopher, found that individual,


complete, and transitive preference ordering does not necessarily lead to collective transitive preference ordering. In other words, majority-rule direct democracy can lead to a chaotic and unstable government where individual rational preferences may drive to collective gridlock (Waldner, 2013). This effect may be remedied by considering Nobel Prize winning economist Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which suggests that strong institutions are necessary to mitigate the downsides of democratic collapse while maintaining the upsides of democratic constraint.

As defined herein, democratic states hold certain advantages over authoritarian states insofar as leaders are accountable to a broad electorate. They also tend to understand that violence and war are suboptimal resolutions to international relations and to the relationship between the state and its citizens. Democratically-elected leaders that follow a democratically-inclusive institutional design benefit from a broader-reaching developmental state that has higher infrastructural power because of legitimacy. While it is important to not reify democracy, it is equally important to understand the power that democracy wields in legitimizing political action by holding elected officials accountable through periodic elections.

Why then has Africa had such a hard time establishing the proper institutional design conducive to democratization? It is tempting to


identify a panacea, but the answer is multi-dimensional. Looking at Gabon – an oil rich former French colony – as a case study, we can better understand the role international linkage plays as an endogenous variable to the lack of inclusive institutions.

III. The Case of Gabon: Democratic Growing Pains

On August 17, 1960, the Republic of Gabon received its independence from its colonial ruler, France. As in most newly-independent African countries at that time, with independence came the hope for liberty and self-determination. This zeitgeist was exemplified in a speech former Guinean President Ahmed Sékou Touré delivered in front of former French President Charles De Gaulle on August 25, 1958. In it, Touré said “there is no dignity without liberty; we prefer poverty in liberty, than wealth in slavery” (Françafrique la Raison d’état, 2010). The new era of independence was seen as a chance for Africa to grow to its full potential, given its immense wealth in natural resources. While Gabon was known for its logging export, it would soon discover its massive oil reserves. The first president of Gabon, Leon M’ba, was a part of the new Pan-African ruling class that saw an alliance with France as in the best interests of his new country; these leaders included Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Léopold


Sédar Senghor. This African desire for economic integration with France was advantageous to the French who had just conceded to the Algerians after a bloody war, leaving them without a reliable source of oil. Gabon, with its large reserves, became the biggest supplier of oil to France (Françafrique la Raison d’état, 2010). The relationship between France and its former colonies has been dubbed “Françafrique” and has been said to be partly responsible for the lack of democratization across French-speaking Africa.

The term Françafrique, since its first use by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, has earned a nefarious connotation as a form of exploitative neocolonialism. Yet, the question is whether Françafrique is any different from an innocuous form of hegemonic stability theory creating an economic relationship between Gabon and France. The answer to this question highlights the role that international linkage has played in destabilizing African agency and in being a hindrance for organic and inclusive institutional design. Several people with direct knowledge of French-African relations, such as Maurice Delauney, French Ambassador to Gabon during independence, and Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, former CEO of the French national oil company Elf Aquitaine, have identified Françafrique as a neocolonial relationship.

Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, former CEO of Elf, said France’s primary national security interest was


a stable source of oil imports. He describes this bilateral relationship by saying that “from the time it took to discover oil and extract it from the ground it could have been up to 7 years … it was in France’s interest to maintain stability in Gabon by making sure that there wasn’t [frequent] government turnover” (Françafrique la Raison d’état, 2010). This statement – from the person who was in charge of France’s energy policy as it pertains to oil – is an indicator of the relationship between the two nations.

In 1963, Gabon’s President M’ba decided to consolidate his power in Gabon by instituting measures such as a single-party system and reducing the number of members of parliament from 67 to 47 (Michigan State University Global Edge, n.d.). This arbitrary change in the rules of the political game in Gabon was the catalyst to a nonviolent coup that took place on February 18, 1964. Within 24 hours, French troops re-established the M’ba government, despite that government’s anti-democratic institutional changes (Michigan State University Global Edge, n.d.). Because M’ba had taken away the capacity for opposition parties to air their grievances through a formalized political process, the opposition did so through force. Yet, this organic movement was not able to change the political system or establish a formalized structure for the political process because of French interference.


After the coup of 1964, the French wanted to make sure that they could better protect their investments in Gabon by stabilizing the political climate. Maurice Delauney, former French Ambassador to Gabon, discussed in an interview the role that France played in the transition of power that occurred in Gabon in 1967. Knowing that President Leon M’ba was ill, Ambassador Delauney said:

When we, Mr. Foccart and I, saw that President M’ba’s health was failing, Mr. Foccart had the good idea to request that President M’ba reform the constitution to incorporate an elected Vice President who would succeed the President in the event of his death. We then staged a ceremony at the Gabonese embassy in France to make it official … From that time forward there was a Vice President who was Bongo. When M’ba died Bongo became the President of the Republic, which allowed us [France] to avoid a difficult transition (Françafrique la Raison d’état, 2010).

In this interview, Ambassador Delauney was referring to Jacque Foccart, Secretary-General of the French Community and President de Gaulle's advisor on African and Malagasy affairs (Whitney, 2015; Johnson, 2011). After President M’ba’s death on November 27, 1967, his Vice President, Omar Bongo, succeeded him and served as president for over 41 years, with


the support of the French government and its military. Ambassador Delauney’s comments showcase the manner in which French interference into the sovereign affairs of its former colonies was a burden on African democratic institutional design. African leaders no longer had an incentive to acquire the political legitimacy discussed above through democratization because they could wield their power with impunity. President Bongo’s depiction of this relationship is telling; he says, “Gabon without France is like a car with no driver. France without Gabon is like a car with no fuel” (The Independent, 2009). Unfortunately, for the analogy to hold true, it would be necessary to add that the car either left the citizens of Gabon behind or was recklessly running over their political agency.

Françafrique was not a relationship unique to Gabon. It played out in several African countries including Togo, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, and even the oppressive regimes in Zaire and the Central African Republic. University of Wisconsin Professor Crawford Young, in talking about the post-colonial state in Africa has said, “although we commonly described the independent polities as ‘new states,’ in reality they were successors to the colonial regime, inheriting its structures, its quotidian routines and practices and its more hidden normative theories of governance” (1994, p.283). The veiled hand of French influence is representative of international


linkage, which is an endogenous mechanism that helps to explain the lack of African democratization.

IV. The Myth of African Exceptionalism

Understanding why Africa has had such a hard time with democratization can help to dismiss certain claims of an African exceptionalism. The idea behind this exceptionalism has been that the salience of African culture and patronage is a barrier to effective state building. University of Florida Professor Goran Hyden believes Africa relies on what he calls “an economy of affection” (2006, p.73). He further says that “in the absence of a welfare state set of institutions aimed at providing citizens with a measure of social security, Africans have always relied on informal social support systems such as the extended family, neighbors, or community at large” (Hyden, 2006, p.88). Hyden’s claim is that the economy of affection “rests on communal rather than collective action in that persons band together not as autonomous individuals trying to achieve a common goal, but as people interdependent on each other and anxious to satisfy each other’s sense of fairness” (2006, p. 93).

Granted, African culture is unique and has evolved through tribes that form villages, but it would be difficult to discount the endogenous role that factors such as the Cold War and


Françafrique have played in blocking formal institutional design. The fact that several African countries experienced political coups during times of single party regimes is an indication that state-building in Africa is not undermined by African culture, but by the lack of a formal and inclusive electoral process. That electoral process, in turn, is undermined by external actors who influence electoral outcomes and the changing of constitutional rules in the manner in which Ambassador Delauney described above. The existence of the rule of law is undercut in these cases because the incentive structures for politicians to adhere to any rules are geared toward external forces (e.g. France) and not internal forces (e.g. the indigenous citizenry). Because of this imbalance in the incentive structures, I reject the notion of an African exceptionalism.

V. Françafrique in the Post-Cold War Era

How can we expect Africa to transition from its autocratic past to a democratic future that is more conducive to development? Thankfully, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the international dynamics of hegemony changed. Western nations could no longer turn a blind eye to the excesses of autocratic leaders. On June 20, 1990 the traditional French-Africa Summit was held in La Boule, France where French President Francois Mitterrand announced that French aid would, going


forward, be conditional on democratization and political liberalization (Riding, 1990). In Gabon, like other French-speaking African countries, this change sparked a chain of events that led to several national conferences where citizens and elites forged new constitutions and started the practice of political liberalization. According to University of Wisconsin Professor Aili Mari Tripp, “since the 1990s, there has been a general shift toward political liberalization and democratization in Africa, with an increase in civilian led regimes” (2010, p.16). This phenomenon stresses the role international linkage played in maintaining undemocratic structures within African authoritarian regimes prior to 1990.

Regrettably, the national conference process has not led to complete democratic consolidation across Africa, but it has led to what Professor Tripp calls “hybrid regimes” throughout the continent (2010, p.16). These hybrid regimes are characterized as having the elements of political liberalization (e.g. multiparty systems, a free press) without having the proper inclusive institutional design to allow for political turnover (Tripp, 2010, p.13). Dr. Tripp highlights that authoritarian regimes are disappearing, with “two thirds [of African states] moving out of this category from 1990 to 2008 and the remaining eleven experiencing political reforms” (2010, p.22). Since the process of democratic consolidation is not necessarily linear and can require several


generations to fully take hold, these hybrid transitions are an encouraging sign. Tripp (2010) accentuates this point:

Democratic regimes in Africa have generally emerged from countries that had already instituted multipartyism [sic] and introduced a good measure of civil liberties and political rights. This suggests that hybrid regimes can provide important stepping stones to further democratization in Africa, as has been the case in other parts of the world, where countries with improved civil liberties created favorable conditions for transitions to democracy (p.19).

This hope for African democratization is not one that is rooted in blind optimism but one that is forged from past experiences with democratic consolidation, while taking into account the reduced influence of Françafrique.

VI. The Next Step: True African Democracy

Based on the analysis laid out thus far, Africa has undergone two stages of independence. The first occurred in the 1960s with the departure of the colonial governments, even though the colonial regimes were maintained. The second occurred in the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This second independence has seen a changing of the guards. It has been a rupture


between the past regimes that maintained an oppressive and sometimes bloody grip on power, to new hybrid regimes. The next step in this transition is one that requires these semi-authoritarian regimes to create the proper incentives for their leaders to step down and not be forced to hold on to power for the sake of their livelihood or freedom. This form of rational choice theory is addressed by Aili Tripp, who discusses a catch-22 power imperative. This theory states that leaders of semi-authoritarian regimes have had to resort to violence and patronage in past ventures while ascending to power and thus will allow political liberalization only to the extent that it will not cause them to be removed from power because of a fear of reprisal (Tripp, 2010, p.24). However, this step in the process inevitably leads to an issue of credible commitment. Would African legislatures be willing to negotiate a way out for leaders such as Museveni of Uganda, or Obiang of Equatorial Guinea? Would these rulers have enough faith in this system, if it were implemented? If these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative, power becomes a cycle where coercive force and exclusive institutions perpetuate strong-man rule.

If the conditions are properly set for African institutions to be inclusive and for the electoral processes to be free and fair, then there is no reason why Africa cannot have an organic institutional design that takes into account the


cultural contexts that surround Africa while holding certain universal principles of democracy intact. These principles include a multiparty system (to allow for political grievances and not political movements), the rule of law through constitutional constraints with an independent and strong judiciary, a legislature that is accountable to its citizens, and an executive officer that is constrained by the political process but has a mantle of authority through the legitimacy of elected office. With the retreat of neocolonialism, Africa stands a chance to set the stage to meet these prerequisites. Once those conditions are met, policymaking should be conducive to economic development that benefits the masses and not just a few elites.

Understanding the strong force of democratization as a source of organic power for African political agency and self-determination is the foundation to understanding the setbacks that African countries have faced with development. In the recent past – from the 1960s to the 1990s – international events such as the Cold War and Françafrique burdened the role that African citizens played in political outcomes. These events shifted the incentive structures for African leaders from needing to produce economically-sound policy for their citizens to needing to produce the best cooperation with external actors that would help propagate their regimes. As we have seen with Gabon, this


system allowed Omar Bongo to stay in power for over 41 years, not unlike other leaders such as Eyadema in Togo and Mobutu in Zaire, who were in power 38 and 32 years, respectively (The New York Times, 2005; French, 1997). The second wave of African independence has allowed for the emergence of hybrid regimes that are more democratic, but have not yet achieved full political liberalization. Yet, based on past examples of democratic transition, democratization is an incremental process. The political scientists Bratton and van de Walle found that “regimes are shaped by the institutional legacy of preceding political regimes” (1997, p. 137). Ultimately, African development and democratization will occur according to the desires and the will of the African people. With the proper policies and political incentives in place, the future of Africa’s prosperity will play an encouraging role for mankind as it did in its past capacity as the cradle of humanity.

Samir Salifou is an MPP candidate at the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. His policy interests focus on social justice, international development, and foreign affairs.


References

Bird, C. (2006). An introduction to political philosophy. Cambridge University Press.

Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press.

Françafrique la Raison d’état. (2010).

French, H. (1997). Mobutu Gives Up, Leaving Kinshasa and Ceding Power. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/17/world/mobutu-gives-up-leaving-kinshasa-and-ceding-power.html?pagewanted=all

Hyden, G. (2006). African politics in comparative perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, D. (2011). Obituary: Jacques Foccart. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-jacques-foccart-1273923.html

Michigan State University Global Edge. Gabon: History. Retrieved 18 April 2014, from http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/gabon/history

http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/17/world/mobutu-gives-up-leaving-kinshasa-and-ceding-power.html?pagewanted=all




Riding, A. (1990). France Ties Africa Aid to Democracy. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/22/world/france-ties-africa-aid-to-democracy.html

The Independent. (2009). The Corrupt Nepotist Who Ruled Gabon for 40 Years. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-corrupt-nepotist-who-ruled-gabon-for-40-years-1700197.html

The New York Times. (2005). Gnassingbé Eyadéma, 69, Togo Ruler, Dies. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/07/world/africa/gnassingbe-eyadema-69-togo-ruler-dies.html

Tripp, A. M. (2010). Museveni's Uganda: paradoxes of power in a hybrid regime. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Waldner, D. (2013). Democracy. Lecture, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.

Whitney, C. (2015). Jacques Foccart Dies at 83; Secret Mastermind in Africa. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/20/worl


d/jacques-foccart-dies-at-83-secret-mastermind-in-africa.html

Young, C. (1994). The African colonial state in comparative perspective. Yale University Press.


The Power of Community-Based Solutions for Crime Prevention in Latin AmericaAna Derrick

Abstract: With the ongoing Central American migrant crisis still capturing the world’s attention, it is important to more closely consider root causes of the situation. Many migrants are seeking to escape a Latin America region that is besieged with a spiraling level of violent crime that threatens their very survival. A blend of social, economic and security concerns are fueling illegal immigration with no end in sight. In the case of El Salvador, national and local governments are weak and many are corrupted with criminal elements. The Salvadoran government is beginning to understand the extent of the nature of violent crime, but it is complex. While previous efforts of devising solutions to this rising national security threat have had limited success, a deeper look at the nature of violent crime and its underlying causes suggest the need to move toward broader unity of effort through locally driven solutions with the nation’s private sector. In El Salvador, new pilot initiatives to promote municipally led crime prevention programs are demonstrating positive impacts that could well reverse the region’s rise in violent crime.


I. Why Violent Crime is an Issue

i. Defining Violent Crime

Violent crime can be defined as crime in which “intentional harm is inflicted against another individual” (Schubert, 2013). In other words, it is a delinquent act in which the offender uses or threatens force upon a victim. Violent crime includes acts of murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. All of these crimes involve violence as their ultimate goal and are commonly performed by gang members.

ii. A Summary of the Problem

Contemporary statistics reveal that Latin America is undoubtedly the most violent region in the world, with crime rates more than double the world average (Franco, 2005). A relatively recent study carried out by the United Nations suggests that Latin America had an average of 25 murders per 100,000 people compared to the world average of only 6.2 per 100,000 in 2012 (The Economist, 2014). These homicide rates, along with other violent crime rates in Latin America, continue to escalate on a yearly basis and are now comparable to those of war-torn regions in Africa. In general, the issue of violent crime in Latin America is taking a tremendous toll on the development of that region. It is negatively affecting both economic advancement and public faith in democracy.


Despite the substantial progress toward democracy the region has experienced over the last twenty years, economic growth continues to be “largely stagnant and democratic consolidation scarce.” (Franco, 2005).

iii. Hindering Economic Potential

The pervasiveness of violent crime in Latin America has evidently slowed down economic growth in the region. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, Latin America’s per capita Gross Domestic Product would be 25% higher if the region’s crime rates were equivalent to the world average (Franco, 2005). The World Bank has detected a strong correlation between increasing crime rates and income disparity as well. Crime is damaging the regional market as it raises insecurity among entrepreneurs and business owners. Companies become afraid to invest in neighborhoods that have limited security, high insurance rates, and low probabilities of success. In fact, business organizations in the region have ranked crime as the number one issue adversely affecting trade and investment (Franco, 2005). It seems as though Latin America is trapped in a vicious circle, where economic growth is impeded by high crime rates, and the lack of economic opportunity contributes to high crime.

iv. Obstructing Democratic Consolidation


In addition to hindering economic potential, violent crime negatively affects democratic consolidation. Since governments are perceived as incapable of delivering basic services like public security, public faith in democracy itself weakens. A 2013 report by the Latinobarómetro Corporation (a private non-profit organization that is responsible for carrying out an annual public survey across Latin America) revealed that only 56% of citizens support democracy and only 39% are satisfied with its performance (Zovatto, 2014). This data suggests that the notion of democracy is under threat. Furthermore, crime is causing people to revolt as they face political distrust and corruption. As stated by the Economist magazine, massive rallies on the street and other expressions of protest against violence like those that took place in Venezuela have made it “increasingly difficult for politicians to avoid dealing with the issue and, in many countries, have made tackling crime a central theme in political party platforms across the region” (Franco, 2005). In recent years, the presidents of Honduras and El Salvador have even claimed that gangs are an immense threat to national security. It is clear that violent crime is undermining democratic consolidation.

II. The Setting of El Salvador

Regarded as one of the most violent countries of the Western Hemisphere, El Salvador yielded


a homicide rate of 40 per 100,000 people compared to the world average of only 6.2 per 100,000 people in 2013 (Martinez, 2013). El Salvador’s democracies are beset with weak leadership, inexperienced government officials, and low investor confidence (Otto, 2014). The executive, judicial and legislative branches squabble over power and are deeply polarized. A high degree of distrust exists between the private sector and the government leading to low levels of investment and stagnant growth. Hence, the government has little capacity to plan, resource, and execute programs that are vital to the country’s development and security. The government has even become vulnerable to infiltration of organized crime, which is corrupting their efforts to reduce crime.

While government weakness contributes to violent crime, El Salvador’s private sector is also contributing to widening social gaps. It appears that approximately 30 families have a very large level of economic influence over the entire economy (Velasquez, 2010). Private sector leaders are perceived to be distant, self-serving, arrogant, indifferent about the growing social inequities, status quo minded, and not willing to engage. Limited corporate social responsibility programs exist from well-resourced national level foundations and private sector entities. Excessive security costs also impact the economy. For example, high levels of private sector resources must be invested in private guards, security forces,


equipment, and training to provide personal and business protection. These costs reduce firm profitability, undercut future investment, and undermine competitiveness, while adversely impacting consumers.

III. Past Approaches to Reduce Crime in El Salvador

Up until recently, most regional responses to violent crime in El Salvador have focused on strengthening law enforcement and toughening anti-gang policies. In 2004, El Salvador’s Congress unanimously approved the “Firm Hand” policy, which aimed at strengthening anti-gang regulations (COHA, 2007). The policy was proposed by President Tony Saca and increased the prison sentence for arrested gang members to five years and those of gang leaders to nine years (COHA, 2007). Moreover, the policy established a controversial rule that allowed children less than 12 years of age to be convicted. The United Nations claimed that this aspect of the legislation undermined international human rights and was not an effective solution to the gang problem. While improving law enforcement and expanding the grounds for arrests resulted in a significant increase in the number of arrests, such policies are insufficient for eradicating violence. This is because law enforcement officials in El Salvador are confronting a combination of threats, such as “organized crime networks,


narco-trafficking, high levels of corruption, ineffective legal systems, and gang violence” (Franco, 2005).

Recent events with regard to El Salvador’s justice system show that gang members are compromising with the judges and possibly using bribes. For example, during the months of January and February 2010, Salvadoran judges released over 51 gang members of the MS-13 gang from custody due to “inconsistencies” in the testimonies against them despite the insistence of locals that they were guilty (Sullivan & Logan, 2010). Evidently, the legal and justice system of El Salvador is rather weak which has enabled crime to thrive.

IV. Present Community-Based Approaches in El Salvador

i. The New Approach

Over the last few years, El Salvador adopted a national crime prevention strategy that features local level municipal planning in crime deterrence. As part of the US government’s Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has designed and implemented various programs to improve citizen security by “strengthening community capacity to combat crime and by creating educational and employment


opportunities for at risk youth (USAID, 2014).” More specifically, USAID has greatly invested in establishing the Crime and Violence Prevention Program, Regional Youth Alliance, and SolucionES, discussed below.

ii. Crime and Violence Prevention Program

First, the Crime and Violence Prevention Program aims at reducing violent crime on the local level through community-based interactions. Before implementing the program, USAID identified municipalities that were to be targeted in El Salvador. The conditions that were considered when selecting “at-risk” districts included the presence of abandoned houses, inadequate public lighting, difficult access and poor road conditions, signs of gang presence (like graffiti on the walls), and ineffective garbage disposal systems (USAID, 2014). Once these areas were identified, USAID invested in building churches, community organizations, police stations, schools, crime observatories, and health centers (USAID, 2014). USAID also initiated “Municipal Crime Prevention Committees,” which primarily consist of community development association leaders (USAID, 2014). They work closely with the local police to prevent crime by discussing key issues and fostering trust within the community. Basically, the committees directly report incidents of crime to the police, communicate their concerns, examine local situations, and offer propositions for


improvements in the system. Moreover, USAID established at-risk youth programs in local communities, including outreach centers, workforce development courses, and mentorships. For example, new after-school activity centers provide youth populations with quality musical instruments, computers, board games, books, and refreshments. These recreational centers prevent the youth from spending time on the streets and thus reduce their chances of getting involved with gangs.

iii. Regional Youth Alliance

Second, USAID has partnered with Creative Associates International to implement the Regional Youth Alliance. This project consists of innovative programs that rehabilitate and reintegrate ex-gang members into society while preventing the participation of youth in gangs (Krenichyn, Schaefer-McDaniel, Clark, & Zeller-Beckman, 2009). Through the establishment of community-based public-private alliances, the Regional Youth Alliance supports crime and violence prevention activities among youth. The project grants awards to local organizations in 66 targeted communities working with gangs and gang prevention (Krenichyn, Schaefer-McDaniel, Clark, & Zeller-Beckman, 2009). These local organizations develop successful job placement initiatives for the youth and encourage community participation through municipal crime prevention committees. The membership for these committees includes


representatives from local communities, the private sector, civil society, and faith-based organizations who all gather to pinpoint risk factors in each municipality.

iv. SolucionES

Third, USAID has invested $20 million in SolucionES to further promote community-based solutions for crime prevention (Voices of the Border, 2013). SolucionES is a public-private partnership led by the Foundation of Businesses for Economic Development (FEPADE). It is essentially an alliance between Salvadoran businesses and non-governmental organizations that have agreed to match USAID’s funds with $22 million (Voices of the Border, 2013). The Alliance works alongside local government to decrease crime and violence among the youth population in 50 communities across five municipalities (Voices of the Border, 2013). By uniting their efforts, the Alliance and local governments provide workshops on violence, youth leadership, entrepreneurship training, and extracurricular clubs. Moreover, the program works alongside local businesses to train their employees on violence prevention and funds educational classes for policy makers on the same subject.

V. The Effectiveness of Community-Based Solutions


In order to assess the effectiveness of the programs described above, Vanderbilt University carried out an impact evaluation study in 2014 (USAID, 2014). The study consisted of surveys executed by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). Through a controlled experiment, the impact evaluation compared municipalities that were “treated” with community-based crime prevention programs with those that were not. The “treatment” was considered effective at the point of evaluation if the outcomes in the treatment group “improved more (or declined less) than they would have if the treatment has not been administered” (USAID, 2014). In the end, the evaluation revealed that USAID’s local crime prevention tactics have been very successful. LAPOP interviewed and surveyed local residents and community stakeholders in their neighborhoods while carrying out systematic neighborhood observations. The evaluation analyzed the perceptions of locals toward violent crime and feelings about security in their neighborhoods before and after the programs started. According to the study, more than 50% of residents living in communities which have implemented USAID’s programs for crime prevention have reported that they feel more secure, have witnessed less crime, and trust the National Police more than before (Marroquin, 2014).

There has been a significant reduction in reports of crime victimization and violence


compared to what would be expected without the treatment. In fact, 51% fewer residents reported being aware of murders, extortions, and blackmail while 26% fewer residents reported being aware of illegal drug sales (USAID, 2014). Moreover, 19% fewer residents reported being aware of robberies (USAID, 2014). In addition to statistical evidence, LAPOP revealed qualitative evidence suggesting that USAID’s community-based programs are effective. For example, police officers were asked about their perceptions on crime. A police officer in El Salvador said, “I feel that we have lowered the crime rate substantially, compared to previous years, because now you certainly can enter certain neighborhoods, which before if you entered them, perhaps you were risking some type of mishap” (USAID, 2014). Evidently, the community-based approach to reduce violent crime seems to be very efficient.

VI. Conclusion

Overall, it is clear that violent crime is a fundamental issue in Latin America that can be most effectively tackled by community-based solutions for crime prevention. Considering that crime undermines effective governance and economic development, it is important to understand the most efficient way to address these threats. As El Salvador’s local initiatives like the Crime and Violence Prevention


Program, Regional Youth Alliance, and SolucionES have shown, the reduction of violent crime is feasible if people focus on the community. These programs focus on the long-term sustainability of violence reduction by addressing the core of problem, which include low economic opportunity, a lack of education, high unemployment rates, and gang influence among youth populations. Moreover, the community-based solutions in El Salvador pivot toward much greater of effort between the nation’s private sector and local government. Other countries across Latin America ought to emulate El Salvador’s new approach and hopefully make the region a more secure and prosperous place.

Ana Derrick is a fourth-year student at the University of Virginia majoring in Foreign Affairs with a minor in Global Sustainability. For most of her life, she was raised in developing countries and was exposed to an array of development issues including poverty, the spread of infectious disease, environmental degradation, lack of access to quality education, social unrest and natural disasters. Most recently, she lived in El Salvador where she witnessed first-hand the detrimental effects of rising violent crime on governance, the private sector and the national economy.


References

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COHA. (2007, July 31). “Central America’s Increasing Gang Problem: A Comforting Handshake Needed as Much as a Tough Fist to Fight Crime Epidemic.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.coha.org/central-america%E2%80%99s-increasing-gang-problem-a-comforting-handshake-needed-as-much-as-a-tough-fist-to-fight-crime-epidemic/

Carillo, Carlos V. (2010). “The Neoliberal Oligarchic Consolidation in El Salvador: Origins, Impacts, and Challenges for the FMLN.” Academia. York University. Retrieved from http://www.academia.edu/818780/_The_Neoliberal_Oligarchic_Consolidation_in_El_Salvador

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Franco, Adolfo. (2005, April 20). “Crime Hinder Development, Democracy in Latin America, U.S. Says.” IIP Digital- U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/tudio/texttrans/2005/04/20050420161901asrellim0.5433161.html

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The Impact of Poverty on Child Weight and Weight Perception Marissa Bialek

Abstract: According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, one in three children in the US are obese (2015). Recent anti-childhood obesity policy revamped school food nutrition guidelines, which relies on children exerting self-control in making healthier food choices. However, if environmental influencers can predict a child’s weight, policymakers should reconsider the underlying self-control rhetoric and instead focus on reducing environmental constraints that make decision-making difficult. This paper will explore the relationship between poverty and both an increase in children’s weight and perception of being overweight through a series of probit regressions. I control for supplementary household stressors that may induce overeating, as well as child demographics, dietary and exercise habits, and geography, so as to best approximate a causal relationship. I use an extract from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) of 8,984 youths (ages 14-22) for years 1999, 2001, and 2003. Results suggest poverty statistically significantly predicts both weight and weight perception, even with the series of control variables. I find that youth from poor households are 7.09 percentage points more likely to be obese or


overweight but are 9.35 percentage points less likely to perceive themselves as being obese or overweight.

I. Introduction and Contextual Background

Childhood obesity and related diseases put children at significant risk for life-threatening physical and mental ailments, such as heart disease, type 2 diabetes, asthma, sleep apnea, social discrimination, and low self-esteem (Let’s Move, 2015). In addition, childhood obesity places a significant cost burden on society — about $14 billion in annual health costs (State of Obesity, 2015). Nutritional changes to the National School Lunch Program through the 2010 Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act (HHFK) has been the most expansive attempt to combat childhood obesity. HHFK set new standards for the quantity of calories, sodium, sugar, and fat allowed in public school lunches. According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the impetus for the Act was to motivate children to choose healthier options during the school day (2015). As such, the policy relies on children exerting self-control to make healthy food and beverage choices in the lunch line. Literature suggests childhood obesity rates are higher among low-income children since individuals who live in impoverished regions have poor access to fresh food. Poverty-dense areas are frequently dubbed “food deserts” to represent the limited


access to fresh food (Levine, 2011). The link between geographic environment and weight appears even stronger for adolescents (Downs, Shauna, Fraser, et al, 2012). I hypothesize this relationship may be so strong due partially to varied perceptions of being overweight, as it is conceivable poor youth who live in fresh food deplete areas are surrounded by overweight individuals, leading to a norm off which the child perceives their own body image.

Below, I analyze the relationship between poverty and childhood obesity while controlling for possible non-income related household stressors, as well as child demographics, dietary and exercise habits, and geography. In addition, I consider the association between poverty and child overweight perception, regardless of actual weight. The results are critical, as current anti-childhood obesity policy disregards the impact of economic status and may not be targeting the root of the childhood obesity problem. As a result, society risks leaving in jeopardy children who are in serious need of attention.

II. Methods and Data Exploration

I first explore the effect poverty has on the probability a youth is overweight or obese primarily through five probit regressions, that


adding new control variables in each successive model: Model 1 (no controls), Model 2 (child demographics), Model 3 (supplementary household stressors), Model 4 (diet and exercise), and Model 5 (geography). Controlling for these factors seeks to ensure internal validity, such that the analysis can make good inferences about a casual, rather than purely correlational, relationships. I subdivide household income into high/middle (above the 50th percentile income level) and low (below the 25th percentile income level). I then shift attention to child overweight perception by reanalyzing each of the five models delineated above, but looking at a child’s perception of being overweight as the outcome variable. Before conducting the regression analysis, I explore the data so as to ensure survey respondents appear representative of the larger population as a means to assess external validity.

I use data from the NLSY 1997 dataset, which contains results from a survey of young men and women born in the years 1989-84. Respondents were ages 12-17 when the survey was first administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1997 and were asked to take annual follow-up surveys (2015). Because I am interested in the impact of youths’ household income on the probability a youth is actually obese or overweight or perceives him or herself as such, this analysis exclusively looks at survey data from 1999 to 2003, pertaining to


respondents aged 12-22 years old. I define youth as individuals who are likely in school and still living at home, though the oldest of the respondents conceivably had recently entered college and/or were living on their own. For this subgroup, I assume that household characteristics, including household income, still plausibly affect youth behavior. In this subgroup, the

average respondent is 18 years old, which is equivalent to the mean age for both males (who make up 51.2% of all respondents) and females (who make up 48.8% of all respondents). The age distribution across this set of respondents appears normally distributed.

I first conduct preliminary difference in means tests to examine the relationship between


household income and select covariates. Of all youth respondents, about 33.4% come from poor households. Among poor youth, 55.1% are female, while among non-poor youth, only 47.4% are female. This difference is statistically significant at the 99% significance level. Similarly, the average household income for female children is $47,909.25, while that of male children is statistically significantly different at about $53,812.33 (p<.001). This result is surprising given the gender of babies born into households is random.

A majority of respondents are White or Asian (52%), while Hispanics make up 21% of respondents, Blacks 26%, and mixed/other races 1%. Among poor youth, 37.7% are White or Asian, 21.4% are Hispanic, and 40.2% are Black, while among non-poor youth, 61.9% are White or Asian, 18.7% are Hispanic, and 18.3% are Black — these differences are statistically significant (p<.001). The average household income for White and Asian children is $62,253.28, while that of non-White or Asian children is $38,475.33 — this difference is also statistically significant (p<.001). Also of note, household income is lower for households in which parents are divorced or separated and for households in which a parent is widowed. The average household income for households in which parents are divorced or separated is $42,373.12, relative to that of married households at $59,756.28 (p<.001). Households in which a parent is widowed have an average


household income of $33,378.78, relative to those without a widowed parent at about $57,305.4 (p<.001).

Before conducting regression analysis, I briefly examine the income difference between the percentage of obese or overweight youth, as well as the income difference between the percentage of youths that perceive themselves as obese or overweight. For low-income households, 46.3% of youth are obese or overweight, while for high- or middle-income households 40.8% are obese or overweight. This difference is statistically significant (p<.001). However, the data show an opposite relationship between income and youth perception of being overweight or obese. For low-income households, 33.5% of youths perceive themselves as obese or overweight, while in high- and middle-income households, 36.4% have this perception (p<.001).

III. Regression Analysis

i. Youth Probability of Being Obese or Overweight

The first probit model examines the simple relationship between household income and the probability a youth is overweight or obese. The findings confirm that children from poor


households are more likely to be obese or overweight relative to high and middle-income households. In particular, if a child comes from a poor household, the probability a youth is obese or overweight increases by 5.52 percentage points at the 99% confidence level (Model 1, see Table 1). Controlling for youth demographics slightly decreases the predicted effect household income has on the probability a child is obese or overweight. However, the predicted effect remains significant (p<.001) (Model 2, Table 1). The inclusion of demographic covariates shows that the original estimate for the predicted effect of poverty on the probability a youth is overweight or obese was probably overstated. This is likely a function of the fact female was left out in Model 1 and is negatively associated with household income and negatively associated with the probability a youth is obese or overweight. If a child is female, she is 7.57 percentage points less likely to be obese or overweight.

Adding controls for supplemental household stressors that conceivably lead a child to overeat interestingly increases the predicted effect of income on the probability a child is obese or overweight over that of the predicted effect in Model 1. If a child comes from a poor household, the probability he or she is obese or overweight is predicted to increase by 7.35% points. Again, the predicted effect remains significant (p<.001). The inclusion of household stressor covariates shows that the predicted


effects of poverty in the prior models were actually understated. Of note, the only household stressor supplementary

Table 1: Select Predicted Effects on the Probability a Youth is Obese or Overweight

ModelRegressor (1) (2) Add

Demographics

(3) AddHousehold Stressors

(4) AddDiet &Exercise

(5) AddGeography

Poverty .0552***(.0104)

.0373***(.0109)

.0735***(.0167)

.0736***(.0168)

.0709***(.0171)

Female -.0757***(.0099)

-.0909***(.0122)

-.0913***(.0124)

-.0902***(.0126)

Hispanic .1076***(.0132)

.1048***(.0165)

.1034***(.0166)

.1082***(.0181)

Black .1239*** (.0123)

.1084***(.0160)

.1063***(.0161)

.1104***(.0172)

Mixed RaceOther

.1672***(.0507)

.2165***(.0622)

.2168***(.0622)

.2215***(.0367)

Parent Widow

.1227***(.0381)

.1227***(.0381)

.1253***(.0384)

Urban -.0530***(.0157)

** Note: All models show mfx output of probit regression with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Sample size for Models 1 and 2: 13,042; M3: 8,169; M4: 8,158; M5; M5: 7,855. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1

covariate that is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level is a widowed parent. If a child has a widowed parent, the probability he or she is obese or overweight increases by 12.27 percentage points at the 99% confidence level, a larger predicted effect than that of income (Model 3, Table 1).


The addition of diet and exercise factors does not significantly change the predicted effect of income on the probability a youth is obese or overweight, while none of the diet and exercise factors are significantly associated with the probability a youth is obese or overweight at the 95% significance level (Model 4, Table 1). The fifth and final model adds covariates that seek to control for child geography. The predicted effect of poverty is not particularly sensitive to the addition of geographic covariates and remains statistically significant (p<.001). However, it is interesting to note that if a child lives in an urban area, the probability that he or she is obese or overweight drops by 5.30 percentage points (p<.001).

ii. Youth Perception of Being Obese or Overweight

The first probit model for this portion of the analysis examines the simple relationship between poverty and the probability a youth is overweight or obese, regardless of actual weight. The next set of findings confirm what was found with difference in means testing in that children from poor households are less likely to perceive themselves as obese or overweight relative to high and middle-income households. In particular, if a child is from a poor household, the probability he or she perceives himself-or-herself as obese or overweight decreases 6.16 percentage points at the 99% confidence level (Model 1, Table 2).


Demographic controls do not significantly change the predicted effect poverty has on the probability a child has obese or overweight perceptions (Model 2, Table 2). With controls for household stressors, however, the predicted effect of poverty increases such that being from a poor household predicts a 9.6 percentage point decrease in the probability a youth perceives himself-or-herself as obese or overweight. Again, the predicted effect remains significant (p<.001). Model 1 and Model 2 likely have a slight downwards bias on the predicted poverty effect; however, the change in the predicted effect from Model 1 to 3 is 3.64% — a small fraction of the mean probability a youth perceives himself-or-herself as overweight or obese — so I do not consider the change significant.

The fourth model again adds the diet and exercise covariates. The addition of these factors does not significantly change the

Table 2: Select Predicted Effects on the Probability a Youth Perceives Himself-or-Herself as Obese or

OverweightRegressor (1) (2) Add

Demographics

(3) AddHousehold Stressors

(4) AddDiet &Exercise

(5) AddGeography

Poverty -.0616***(.0103)

-.0639***(.0109)

-.0980***(.0161)

-.0963***(.0162)

-.0935***(.0166)

ObeseOverweight

.4476***(.0089)

.5173***(.0093)

.5403***(.0115)

.5409***(.0115)

.5452***(.0117)

Female .3117***(.0099)

.3131***(.0126)

.3077***(.0128

.3031***(.0130)


)

Black -.1527*** (.0113)

-.1390***(.0149)

-.1405***(.0150)

-.1453***(.0146)

Parentincarceration

.0651**(.0305)

.0654**(.0306)

.0624**(.0311)

HighFruitConsumption

-.0450**(.0214)

-.0488**(.0218)

HighExercise -.0554***(.0152)

-.0560***(.0154)

Urban .0356**(.0159)

** Note: All models show mfx output of probit regression with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Sample size for Models 1 and 2: 13,005; M3: 8,155; M4: 8,144; M5; M5: 7,842. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1

predicted effect of income on the probability a youth perceives him or herself as obese or overweight. Interestingly, a high intake of fruit and adequate exercise statistically significantly predict a lower probability a youth perceives himself-or-herself as overweight, whereas that variable was not significant in the actual obese or overweight probability probit models. This finding suggests children who eat the recommended fruit quantity and exercise adequately may think these factors are good indicators of a healthy weight when they may not be. The effect of income is not sensitive to geographic controls, though living in an urban area has a predictive effect of a 3.56 percentage point increase on the probability a


youth perceives him or herself as obese or overweight (p<.001). iii. Supplementary Models to Explore Gaps Between Weight and Weight Perception

I finally explore whether poverty can predict the probability of (A) a youth is obese or overweight but does not perceive himself-or-herself as such and (B) a youth is not obese or overweight but does perceive himself-or-herself as such. In both supplementary models, I include all controls (demographic, household stressors, diet and exercise, and geography).

The results suggest that if a youth is from a poor household, the probability he or she is obese or overweight but does not perceive him or herself as such increases by 6.31 percentage points, statistically significant at a 99% significance level. In contrast, if a youth is from a poor household, the probability he or she is not obese but perceives him or herself as such decreases by 3.58 percentage points (p<.001). I explore possible reasons for this below. However, gender predicts these gaps in weight and weight perception at a higher magnitude — if a youth is female, the probability she is obese or overweight but does not perceive herself as such decreases by 13.94 percentage points while the probability she is a healthy weight but perceives herself as obese or overweight increases by 12.94 percentage points — these predictions are significant (p<.001).


Finally, I look at whether an increase in income by a certain amount across from 1999 to 2003 for each individual would have a significant impact on whether or not a child goes from being obese or overweight to being a healthy weight during the same time period. In particular, I estimate when an obese or overweight child’s household income increases by $20,000 whether that child is predicted to achieve a healthy weight. The results show that there is no statistically significant predicted effect (p = .631). Additionally, I find a household that goes Table 3: Select Predicted Effects for Supplementary

Models A & BRegressor (A) Youth is obese

or overweight but does not perceive himself-or-herself as such

(B) Youth is not obese or overweight but does perceive himself-or-herself as such

Poverty .0631***(.0130)

-.0358***(.0071)

Female -.1394***(.0088)

.1294***(.0072)

Hispanic .0460***(.0141)

-.0212**(.0075)

Black .1008***(.0140)

-.0565***(.0064)

High FruitConsumption

.0404**(.0154)

-.0065(.0102)

High Exercise .0393***(.0110)

-.0027(.0078)

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Urban -.0323***(.0114)

.0189***(.007)

** Note: All models show mfx output probit regression with robust standard errors in parenthesis. Sample size for Models A & B: 7,855 ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1

from poor to not poor in the same timespan also does not statistically significantly predict the probability a youth goes from obese or overweight to not obese or overweight (p = .173). These findings suggest four years is not long enough to alter the food lifestyle of youth even with a change in economic status.

IV. Discussion

The analysis suggests youth from poor households are more likely to be obese or overweight, but less likely to perceive themselves as such. This result may be indicative of poor youth living in low fresh food access areas since the analysis also shows living in an urban (rather than rural) area significantly decreases the probability a youth is obese or overweight. In addition, the results may suggest poor youth are not educated on what it means to be obese or overweight and the severe health consequences of such. The supplementary Model A indicates obese or overweight youth from poor households are less likely to match weight perception with reality, again suggesting poor youth may not


understand what it means to be obese or overweight. Interestingly, when a youth is not obese or overweight, youth from middle or high-income households are more likely to perceive themselves as such anyways, which is troubling as it suggests these youth may have a heightened preoccupation with weight, thus putting themselves under unnecessary duress.

Future research may explore whether or not the implementation of a school health class focusing on obesity and healthy lifestyles could lead to a decrease in the gap between weight and weight perception for all socioeconomic youth cohorts. In addition, future research may explore the mental health of youth who perceive themselves as obese or overweight when in reality they are healthy. One shortfall of my analysis was a lack of a reliable income variable and information about welfare receipt. The NLSY data does not have additional available data to proxy a youth’s household income status, and the data on household education and government welfare program participation are in regards to the youth’s household after leaving his or her parents home. A more accurate analysis may add additional controls for the child’s parents’ use of food stamps or highest education level, so as to test the models’ sensitivity to various income proxies. In addition, there may be omitted variables unaccounted for in my analysis, such as distance to the closest fresh food grocery store (a good proxy for fresh food availability),


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that were not available in the NLSY dataset. If omitted variables are correlated with included variables then the estimated parameters will be biased – future research should take these factors into account.

V. Conclusion

I hypothesized that youth from poor households have a higher probability of being obese or overweight as well as a higher probability of perceiving themselves as obese or overweight, regardless of actual weight. My analysis shows that that youth from a poor households are 7.09 percentage points more likely to be obese or overweight (std: .0171, p<.001). However, these youths are 9.35 percentage points less likely to perceive themselves as being obese or overweight (std: .0166, p<.001). In addition, poor youth are 6.31 percentage points more likely to be obese or overweight while not perceiving themselves as such (std: .0130, p<.001). As discussed, these results may suggest poor youth, while more likely to be obese, may not fully understand what it means to be obese and the negative health ramifications that follow. As a result, anti-childhood obesity that counts on kids to make healthy decisions may not be effective, especially among poor youth, if they do not perceive themselves as unhealthy.


More broadly, these results indicate policymakers could look to altering the environmental conditions that make it difficult for youth to maintain a healthy weight. While my results suggest four years may not be enough to change food behavior through a change in economic status, policy that ensures economic status changes are long-term may be the answer. For example, Congress could legislate a mandatory 10-year guarantee of receipt for families receiving food stamp benefits, which could have a food behavior altering effect — a point of inquiry for future research. In the short-term, policymakers may consider gender, ethnicity, geography, and even a widowed parent to target childhood obesity limiting policy, as the predicted effects are higher in magnitude than poverty. For example, policymakers may create state zoning ordinances that prohibit fast food establishments from locating in rural areas while providing financial incentives for fresh food establishments to locate in those areas. Ultimately, environmental factors outside of a child’s control significantly predict the probability a youth is obese or overweight, as well as a child’s perception of such. As a result, anti-childhood obesity policy that relies on individual self-control rhetoric may be ineffective, as it does not address the factors that make eating healthy a difficult feat.

Marissa Bialek is an MPP candidate at the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School of


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Leadership and Public Policy. Her policy interests include food justice, especially related to youth, and media-based advocacy.


References

Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2014, December 10). National Longitudinal Surveys. Retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/nls/#overview.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2015, August 27). Childhood Obesity Facts. Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/obesity/facts.htm.

Downs, Shauna, Fraser, et al. (2012, February 16). Geography Influences Dietary Intake, Physical Activity and Weight Status of Adolescents. Hindawi Journal of Nutrition and Metabolism. Retrieved from http://www.hindawi.com/journals/jnme/2012/816834/.

Let’s Move. Health Problems and Childhood Obesity. Retrieved from http://www.letsmove.gov/health-problems-and-childhood-obesity.

Levine, James. (2011, October 17). Poverty and Obesity in the U.S. 60(11). Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3198075/.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3198075/

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3198075/

http://www.letsmove.gov/health-problems-and-childhood-obesity

http://www.letsmove.gov/health-problems-and-childhood-obesity

http://www.hindawi.com/journals/jnme/2012/816834/

http://www.hindawi.com/journals/jnme/2012/816834/

http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/obesity/facts.htm

http://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/obesity/facts.htm

http://www.bls.gov/nls/#overview


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State of Obesity. (2015). Cost Containment and Obesity Prevention. Retrieved from http://stateofobesity.org/cost-containment/.

United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service. (2014, March 3). School Meals. Retrieved from http://www.fns.usda.gov/school-meals/healthy-hunger-free-kids-act

http://www/

http://www/

http://stateofobesity.org/cost-containment/

http://stateofobesity.org/cost-containment/



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Submission Information

To submit a piece, please visit virginiapolicyreview.org and navigate to the Submissions tab. Submissions for the Spring 2016 edition are due February 15, 2016.

Research Article: These articles are typically longer and reflect some kind of research in a particular policy area of interest. It can be an empirical analysis of a government program or perhaps a case study of some kind. They can take a position, make recommendations or suggest specific improvements to a particular program or policy. Length may vary, but they must be no longer than 7000 words. Please also include an abstract no longer than 250 words and a short biography on each author no longer than 100 words.

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1. Use the font Times New Roman.2. Double-space your submission.3. Follow the APA Citation Style4. Convert all your citations to in-text, parenthetical style.