Viot t i Armed Intervention and Warfare

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Course of study: Foreign Policy Analysis (MA InternationalRelations Option).Course Code: AM25689-7

Book Title: American Foreign PolicyAuthor: Viotti P

Title of Chapter: Armed Intervention and Warfare Ch.3 pp77-95Author: Viotti P

Name of Publisher: Polity Cambridge 2010


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Name of Publisher: Polity Cambridge 2010


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41ese grerips a s d e , an e \en d e r ~ e r as\ance :rt tl:c'r m i n d s!a) \\:GI oppoz : i "~n r o>.:!.el~,~n .$nil \4 ~ c t e r r ;9:s-~ EJT . ~ :S efg ie3a l~za~or . ihber ai \ 3 l~ e r - ai . &re?-ex.izl&rto::=.!1s-d:r,rc c.i*!;~:lc-s In the Xllddic. Easx 2x2 Soi:ih ;ill4 S;,!lheastAsla. Ad ding fiwl to these i e d c r 0 ~ 6 n 1ec % a s13


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decisive a d o n im.Bqhdad ,


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+oxau ir~c!ude;! f i i e ;-.cc ~rez:?en: d;iCi s e c t e m \ d d a f e n s ~5 ~2pi?l?eC by neOcsn>er\ZiE! t?s hold?;;$ ::;3'3Cl ids: ~:Slkd i r7cslrims m QIC J~parr::~ecrc T D e f e n 5 ~i3oC'i,T:.ar DUI?~,,CT&S 1 , 1 37 siovi i i e ;n:pTe;1:e11-an i r i ~ i 3' S ~ O L ~--r , . , ~ ~ ~-,,- of new pai iuei i-i \\hi&&."-el n a\ disaplee l u sSeen well estaolisked Sa"t:ia,- \ \as r-io sltclz ctppcs:t~nn or..b~leaucldncseek ekrierar m :?it defenstt se,leta:>'s oiilcesA X -ougb n-st wlc?elt reported, 1 ad dico n tc :lie ad;:?inr>tr&-@on'spolitlcai appoxriaes. career ci~l!S i ' i \ d ~ i t S s t ~ , a a i h e t i ~13necjcolaservahvt- %ilea_; :%~,:m l e r h e ~ rp o i l ~ i o r ~ st:lsngt h e Reagan-Bush aclm~c~stratrons formed 3;: tnlpor::n?tbt~reaucrat icbase, pamcu:drly iil rile Offic: of t!,e S e c ~ e c ~ iof Defense (OSD),g.ln~d-iai~iitatecipolrct nl1p1e!12e1ic~bo11Tilose elsewhere in DoD \g.ko registered o p p o s i ~ g ietics,nbtd.51) sn the D ep d~ ~ rn eri t :elnu\ ed f r om t!!e~:f the 4rm1, ~ e r c~ ~ a b o n s , ~ i olius sending a clear anti unan~blgi iuuss~gl~,ala n y who would stand m the W ~ Lf \vllat l i d bec~l-ne solibs-s\


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Armed latT&&i&%

since doing so also removed a significant regional threat toIranian leaders previously posed by Saddam Hussein 's regimeirs Baghdad. Be that as it may, the invasion did establish s e a -tegic bases in Iraq and expansion of others in the region thatcould be used to defend American oil and other interests. Tomany observers, particularly those wearing realist lenses, thisBras the decisive rationale for intervention, albeit under a dualcover: the search for weapons of mass destruction and thepromotion of American liberalism, using the democratictan-sition in Iraq as a model for all of Araby.

The NeoconservativeTurnConservative thought, at least in the Burkean sense of theterm ,, counsels a careful, cautionary, incremental approachto changes in policy. As noted in Chapter I, H e n ~ y issingerdraws an important distinction between risk-averse consewa-tive powers at the top of the heap who have a vested interest


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Seatea :s nnl {a:~?skm i??! riot cel d?e I . , crIL'h ;5011~e21~!_- aY L ) d - r i- &t'- ;reglcenf ~ Z Z iri his ~ a m p h ; g re~2;tedEGCF,.~ I I ~ Z ~ Slor -ce"K;?;re I - rc~ ie1 2 :I" pSrii'e afier ~ , ' I I\\as * Iha1 s c ~ e* I . *" ^PC_ ~ , ~ r r e c io a ~eo-iviiionlanai! frsr global demi?c:snz;idor~.C o n i r w n n g authaalnnan legrnes peacei-dl? ~f?ossrb:e, SLL:ne:_rig a:meC force as nee3 b?, de-'ir?et!the neiv order =if rnedx- en a post-9; i r av~r";

P:eerr?~i!p~geve3 in the absstice oi'rfimied?ate danger - ,neffect ?gkting grevenhve wars - acquired ~e p h rn 2 c ) amcti-lady ;insong %.i3 self-described neoconsemdhce foreign-polrcgel i te la: i%asli~ngton,,or whom Prrsldent Bus]: became clirefs3&espessor, Tile pre s~ dc nt ndesscored Arnm can wil ing-ae3s to use foice preemp:Ively :XI defen?;e of h e horneland:m h ~ sTune zoo2 speechat the LS Mihtary Acacierny at \TJes:Pot-,[, ~hhlchIsm tha t year was incoaporated formdlt; ln theVf7,'hlieHouse's fo ~ m u lh t~ o nf U S national secwitj stlategy.Another important component of long-term strategy ararticu-iated by the pres~dentwas a commitment to do vrhate~erl t


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w


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pppnent,Containment,and Armed 1tlterventjon

this neoconservative point of new . The public heard calls forassassination - taking certain persons "out" - as if it were alegitimate instrument of state policy, %'hat may previousiphave been 1n the shadows of covert actions or "special" opera-tions cam e seemingly into the full light of day. Asserilvenessby American leaders -particularly by the president, vice presi-dent, and secretary of defense - became the new order. To theextent that multilaterallsm mattered, it was only a m eans toends determined to be in the US interest, certainly never anend in itself.

The unilateral impulse was strong, particularly when neitherallies nor ad hoc coalition partners were considered essentialto achieving U S objectives. At most, policymakers workedunilaterally within a multilateral context, adding partners tothe US bandwagon as need be. As the secretary of defense putit in earlier discussions on what to do about Iraq, the mission(i.e., the U S agenda) should drive the coalition, no t the coa-


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Armed fntervedi

(nor likely %dlit be the last) time legal c o n s t r a m were pen.ceived as contrary to objectives seen a s senring the nationalinterest.Consistentwith past practices, US decisionrnakers did turnsuccessfully to the UN and &AT0 to secure backing for the

invasion of Afghanistan In 2002 , which unseated the Talibanregime in Kabul that had given sanctuary to al-Qaeda, Thestory was dectdedly different, however, when it came to mus-tering international support for invading Iraq o n t-he premisethat the reg ime in Baghdad was acquiring weapons of massdestruction. Notwithstanding an exea0rdinal-y effort by &thesecretary of state, the director of the CIA, and other officialsto make the case for invading Iraq on these grounds, UNSecurity Council members passed resolutions limited onlyto condemning violations of or non-compliance with earlieaSecurity Council resolutions and warning that unspeafiedactions might be taken in the absence of Iraqi compliance.


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, ' , k+* t - t i r l te~,==~&f;'' saeec&.rj*>- since"he)'L.S r,'tilji211: J nlanls. ?;]b 3$Silt 51; G lor -oint." >,has,: i l ~ f r ~ r e s ~ i n n ;?urposesp%+ B ' - . z%z% . ',t--..; i ? t , \ r ~ v ~ " ~ ,is the refiecd~non a41e re:ai?;ye iack of :ln:cx-I iesc 3~ h m e , ~ ? ~ a : . ~ on the const,.aSniag eiT?ct of'o i i c p a 4 c ; r cjntel-j2:iliona] jli.;:

i : S v i p a r ~~f i:;tenlati$:.naj !ass. vasv fiOrfiL+~:o f t h e cI(and:he intsr1:alicnsI as rn~:un iq . Regirne change per se is nota ?roper bask for r ~ i l l ~ r yction uncier inter~atiunal aw.But regi%e cltange cedd :~s>JTction that is otherwise~ i xt


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cblgeJ o d ~ .*] la: arl.rish b L x hza;!tka!l~;~;~far he mterz.e~;tior;,a pas:hon 2-1153fi~i22:ngS ' ~_CPCT~) p h i rn:d:ers iii th e L'S Depcr:i:r?en.: of State.A broad i n t e ~ ~ r e t a 5 o n s ~ ! ~ - d e f e ~ z s e asii ~ k e t.\icp'nondc;!~orizing preempw~e n r e r i e n ~ c z ~as ri.vo;v:t:cr;ary 121 1.3~ ~ ~ E I ~ E ~ ~ I o x s . X F C ~ C Yeh-tes ~ 2 3ttri1itije put.-~rihcs oiE?~-:1 ~ sxpressed cozxerr, that csn!;ln~at!o:~of a LS ~ro-pzcsiti*TO % m e ne n e v;r?ilatera!Ey undermmed any srsid~adico;~s:r:,~l!-Ing :~:flite~lcehat soverelgnw retampd. n;e !*as 5x1oncer~~the precedent set -c+o~rldecome iorrz~ion?racrice 11ot justby )i_grea? powers, bu t aha b, othel sta tes engage6 m region*!conflrcts. From !his p a n t of t-ie\i, extending the self-defeaseexcephon \%e]il eyond its cuhtoinary ~nbcxpretadono ~nc!tldea generalized ~ i g h to preempt could have destablilzing con-sequen ces adverse to a cansenrdrive ~ ri te rr s t n sa st ain ir~ gthe exi,ting order oi'it~tematnonal elations. To borl.1 Irberai-in ternat ia~lahs t nd conservative-internario11al1stpolic? elites,


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Factors Tnfiarencing J#P,ether or N ot to InCemene X4ilitarily 'ki;eii:e~ or xiot :rj me n i e n e isritil amled fsrce or e i l g ~ g ein% a r k r e is ccinda:ror~ed b) sebera! cons~derations b t ;ar>111 rjeglet. aad !iir!d acwss poiicy elites and i:i tile minds ofi r idi i ,d~ia '3i.asrcjs~yla~tersIn 11105t con:;ngencres L S p o i l a -n ? ~ k e s sh a w not se6a fnex?~se::es as parr1ili"lriy constr~ined?12 ?n.inc:al 01. e i 0 3 0 m ; ~capacit? jnd ~ n l i i l ~ qapabiIiaei,whicl? ;he country has enjoyed in hi1 mneasure. B) contl-dst.poiicyuiakelx in most other stares coniempIatirig aimed inrer-veri:~rslisnccessardv confine rhpir a c t ~ i t i e segonaIly do se tohome, findnciag and u t J ~ z i n gizmil~ta~-):orces at subreanhall?lotqer ievels rhan then i i n e r ~ c a nounterparts a le prolie to do


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3s having more freedom to make policy choices - a greaterfa a h ? an d perhaps higher ldcelihood to use force when faced'it1th contingenc~es hey see dem anding a response of on ekind or another Less popular presidents at a lot?] poin t in theirlegrtimacy, particularly those for whom mterventions havegon e badly or have been too prolonged, tend to face s q p f i c a n tpubllc or congressional opposition to armed intervenhons aswell as other initiatives a president might entertam. Giventh e unpopularity of th e war in Vietnam an d the Watergatescandal tha t led to President Nhon's reslgnatlon from odiicei n August 1974,it was a particularly weak polnt for th e presi-dency. Congressional leaders and other members selzed them o m e n t with th e passage of the War Powers Resolution in a neffort to constrain presidents from using the executive's u a rpower without 1eg;lsla.hveconcurrence.

A fourth factor is the understanding policymakrng eliteshave of external constramts. In ~ t srosecution of the war InVietnam, policy elltes in the Kennedy, lohnson, and Nkon


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$rsc:;~or: A ~ e 2 zpo:~? ( re ! )125ri31-i::vr-!v less on Dwst:cafqfrec tbar! rj-e;-i .:e ~ ~ 2 . d h4;lcrrp ~ v e d: )la: E beel: me CajeI,i:e-:s*ii? r- tcair,~:,,~i S.;':~ma~l;,n ,,:son. t'n!liis n nere L"ic fit---- -" Ci:;UT_JY!i-?~adtls&~er7.a e6 s broad base sfpcpk,.i d - s t ~u~ i -- Fs ~ e p p ~ " " :ii3n :n me saektk, Iraq w a s i ~ 1 6ernd~risja deep:c!!~iia?,l poy:kce %lrh 3i1do ~ ~ ~ ? ~ ~ J : ; o I I sq a l a t e ~ d e ~ n t e s :Othe ~ a g ~ d d d drno?:g ill? Kurds rn the n orth , theegtme S ~ m dh ~ n n ililihe ,erxer, arid rlze Shia 181 i h ~cutk Pvtting end:~c--.p:g30s'-war i;aq :ggethex has csnsequentl1 j een bj n oi;3ez:;s a:e25> td>k

In tile abbeace c i me;r::ngi,rf ?_r,te~nalr eliteifid reshalrirjr,?rrrilaitzed by poLcvrnakers, cairtdzidtkon oi rano nal (or u~:;i_t~ .a k a n a ij r:terests - a fi5h :actor - 1s Inole prone ao makeinten.~nt-,on a vlable opn~on or an adrnllri ist tah~~ie m o : ~puis:Anlg strck; po!:c;e; lr ,tervention advoidtes ale likely TOOxcco~;nithose \%ho ee such assertiveness (0.1 arrogance) asIn; h i ~ gd\ el se consequences brp!oir?_aticcillj, e c o ~ ~ o m l ~ a l l yor rn othri %,bays\ t i i d t irmtenellrlon adlocates tend to see as


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. ~ c c\ t ' f(>;71~~ i l i ~ t propone?:. stdies >:I ii:c ci>ait"ion!ij d~ss i l aueI:on? g , ! ~ t ~ g ~ I POW I dcfinitior: -0 $e\e7: cortse,ltir:!


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,-, 721kcddr1) ke5c!i?!n?il~ :lit. h '~ i t 'L :d~?>r f l d ~in ~ k d ~ ~ e rof L "\ Chase!

2-r this, m e RIA\* a j d an egkth :",c:i:enoc or i'actcr - rter?tr:, i i l h i d ~dec~sionrrmaiiers a te ~nternzairzed he irnportarlceof ~rteigixng he likely moral alrd iegal cullsequences of their


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What rila'tfers .for our pu

fellow members of the polif i e deas they have and the

when met by armed resistance or. attack.

Viot t i Armed Intervention and Warfare

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