UY KHEYTIN VS. VILLAREAL (1920) Facts:Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of thePhilippine Constabulary, presented to the judge ofthe Court of First Instance of Iloiloan application for search warrant; "That inthe house of ChinoUy Kheytin, there is kept a certain amount ofopium."- Armed with that search warrant, the respondent Lt. Torralba, on the same day (April 30th) searched the house of thepetitioner and found therein 60 small cans ofopium. They wanted to search also the bodega, but the ptr. positively denied that it was his. For this reason, Lt. Torralba placed a guard inthe premises to see that nothing was removed therefrom, and then went away to findout who the owner ofthe bodega was.The next morning he learned from the owner of the house,that the ptr.was the one who was renting thebodega. Thereupon Lt. Torralba and his subordinates resumed thesearch andthere found andseized articles which were all with connection to the using ofopium.- A criminal complaint was filed against ptr. chargingviolation of the Opium Law. Theywere duly arrested.-Defendants urged: (1) that thesearch warrant of April 30was illegal and because thejudge who issued it did notdetermine the probable cause by examining witnesses under oath (2) that the searches and seizures made on May1st had been made was illegal; and (3) that the seizure of thedefendants' books and letters was a violation of the provisions of theJones Law providing that no person shall be compelled totestify against himself, and protecting him against unreasonable searches and seizures.Issue:WON the defendants positions are withmerit.Ruling (s):1. That although in theissuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not complywith the requirements of section 98of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled tothe return of the opium and itsparaphernalia which were foundand seized under said warrant, andmuch less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of thejudge. 2. That the search made on May1st was a continuation of thesearch begun on the previous day, and, therefore, did notrequire another search warrant. 3. That the seizure of thepetitioner's books, letters, telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent relation with opium and the possession of which is notforbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the ptr.s' constitutional rights.D. VALID SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT1. Incident to llawful arrestRule 126, Sec. 13Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. (12a)PP VS. CHUA HO SAN (1999) FACTS:Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, LaUnionpatrollingtheBacnotancoastlinewithhisofficer.Whilemonitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call fromBarangayCaptain AlmoiteofBarangayTammocalaorequestingforpoliceassistanceregardinganunfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to him, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men ,proceededimmediatelytoTammocalaobeachandthere conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lonemale passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, andwalkedtowardstheroad.Uponseeingthepoliceofficers,themanchanged direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent him from fleeing.They then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what theyre saying. And by resorting of sign language, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was identified to be methamphetaminehydrochlorideorshabu.Chuawasthenbroughtto Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure constituteavalidexemptionfromthewarrant requirement.RULING: The Court held inthe negative.The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person'sbody, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid ofavalidsearchwarrantissuedinaccordancewiththeRules.However,warrantless searches may be permitted in the followingcases, to wit:(1)search of moving vehicles,(2)seizure in plain view,(3)customssearches,(4)waiver or consent searches 5)stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and(6)searchincidental toa lawfularrest.It is required in cases ofin flagrante delictothat the arresting officer musthavepersonalknowledgeofsuchfactsorcircumstancesconvincinglyindicativeorconstitutiveofprobablecause.Probablecausemeansareasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficientlystrong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the personaccused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case atbar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrativeof CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise that could havespurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA wasnot identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact thatthe vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishingboats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process ofperpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was noprobable cause to justify a search incidental to alawful arrest.The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecutionthattherewasawaiverorconsentedsearch.IfCHUAcouldnotunderstand what was orally articulated to him, how could he understandthepolice's"signlanguage?"Moreimportantly,itcannotlogicallybeinferredfromhisallegedcognizanceofthe"signlanguage"thathedeliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against suchan intrusive search.Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was heldto be inadmissible inevidence.Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient toestablish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Plain ViewDel Rosario v. PPPP v. MusaPP v. SalanguitPP v. Macalaba3. Consented searchPP v. Kagui4. Terry RuleCaballes v. CAPP v. Chua5. CheckpointsValmonte v. De VillaPosadas v. CAPP v. Exala6. Moving vehiclesPP v. Del MundoPP v. LapitajePP v. Libnao7. Airport SearchPP v. CantonE. REMEDY AGAINST IMPROPER ISSUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT1. Motion to quash or suppress evidenceRule 126, Sec. 14Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence;where to file. A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.2. Exclusionary Rule (Fruit of the poisonous tree)Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 3 (2)Alih v. CastroPp v. AlicandoF. Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights
a.
Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz [GR L-32409, 27 February 1971] En Banc, Villamor (J): 7 concur, 1 filed a separate concurring opinion to which 1 concurs, 1 concurs in result Facts: On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera's letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. The Judge signed de Leon's application for search warrant and Logronio's deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The corporation's lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents. On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and attorney's fees. After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Issue: Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of documents from its officeHeld: The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be; and that the corporate officers therefore may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the former case, only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners; while in the latter, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer's readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a), Section 72 and Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Section 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation). Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.
Stonehill vs. Diokno [GR L-19550, 19 June 1967] En Banc, Concepcion (CJ): 6 concur Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon City) issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the said persons and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: "Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)" as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Alleging that the search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed with the Supreme Court the original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al. Issue: Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the contested warrants that allowed seizure of documents, papers and other effects in the corporate offices, and other places besides their residences. Held: Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the corporate officers and the corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. However, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations and (b) those found seized in the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) residences of Stonehill, et. al. As regards the first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June 1962 Resolution of the Supreme Court, denying the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by the Court on the documents, papers and things seized in the residences, in effect, restrained the prosecutors from using them in evidence against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the Court held that the warrants for the search of 3 residences are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences is made permanent, that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the residences are concerned; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the 29 places, offices and other premises.
People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17 June 1999] En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach, conferred with Almoite, and observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. Although Cid introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then resorted to "sign language," motioning with his hands for the man to open the bag. The man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not comprehend. Hence, Cid placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters. At the police station, Cid then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, Cid ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime, Badua opened the bag and counted 29 plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." When the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely showed his ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. Chua's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, Chua was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid), conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95, she stated that her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037). However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the information was subsequently amended to allege that Chua was in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 (illegal transport of a regulated drug). At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the amended complaint was read to him by a Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the RTC's direct request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure to acquire one from the Department of Foreign Affairs). Chua provided a completely different story, claiming that the bags belong to his employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied in the speedboat; that they decided to dock when they were low on fuel and telephone battery; that the police, with nary any spoken word but only gestures and hand movements, escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police, led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag, which they presented to him; that the police inspected opened the bag, weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methamphetamine hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of the RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme Court. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Issue: Whether persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, constitute "probable cause." Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. The prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident, but the Court is certain that Chua was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of Chuas participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police
People vs. Chua Ho Sanofficers from conducting the obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that "accused was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu when apprehended." In short, there is no probable cause. Persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal entry into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20 confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting aside the regulated substance as evidence, the same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chuas conviction.
People vs. Salanguit [GR 133254-55, 19 April 2001] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur Facts: On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol. At about 10:30 p.m. of said day, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguits door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but Salanguit refused to sign it. After the search, the police operatives took Salanguit with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q- 95-64358, respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995. After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of 6 months of arresto mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, and reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds that (1) the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and (3) the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant. Issue: Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of drug Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the plain view doctrine. Held: The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the "plain view doctrine," the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.
Yee Sue Koy vs. Almeda [GR 47021, 15 June 1940] Laurel (J): 3 concur, 1 concurs in result Facts: In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, dated 5 May 1938, the justice of the peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros, after taking the testimony of applicant's witness, Jose Estrada, special agent of the Anti-Usury Board, issued on the same date a search warrant commanding any peace officer to search during day time the store and premises occupied by Sam Sing & Co., situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, as well as the person of said Sam Sing & Co., and to seize the documents, notebooks, lists, receipts and promissory notes being used by said Sam Sing & Co. in connection with their activities of lending money at usurious rates of interest in violation of law, or such as may be found, and to bring them forthwith before the aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay. On the same date, at 10:30 a. m., search was accordingly made by Mariano G. Almeda, Jose Estrada, 2 internal revenue agents and 2 members of the Philippine Army, who seized certain receipt books, vales or promissory notes, chits, notebooks, journal book, and collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and enumerated in the inventory receipt issued by Mariano G. Almeda to the owner of the documents, papers and articles seized. Immediately after the search and seizure thus effected, Mariano G. Almeda filed a return with the justice of the peace of Sagay together. With a request that the office of the Anti-Usury Board be allowed to retain possession of the articles seized for examination, pursuant to section 4 of Act 4109, which request was granted. Under the date of 11 March 1939, Godofredo P. Escalona, counsel for Sam Sing & Co. filed a motion with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Occidental Negros praying that the search warrant and the seizure effected thereunder be declared illegal and set aside and that the articles in question be ordered returned to Sam Sing & Co., which motion was denied in the order dated 24 July 1939. A similar motion was presented to the justice of the peace of Sagay on 27 October 1939 but was denied the next day. Meanwhile, an information dated 30 September 1939 had been filed in the CFI Occidental Negros, charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing & Co., with a violation of Act 2655. Before the criminal case could be tried, Yee Sue Koy and Yee Tip filed the petition with the Supreme Court on 6 November 1939. The petition is grounded on the propositions (1) that the search warrant issued on 2 May 1938, by the justice of the peace of Sagay and the seizure accomplished thereunder are illegal, because the warrant was issued three days ahead of the application therefor and of the affidavit of the Jose Estrada which is insufficient in itself to justify the issuance of a search warrant, and because the issuance of said warrant manifestly contravenes the mandatory provisions both of section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders 58, and (2) that the seizure of the aforesaid articles by means of a search warrant for the purpose of using them as evidence in the criminal case against the accused, is unconstitutional because the warrant thereby becomes unreasonable and amounts to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against compelling the accused to testify against themselves. Issue: Whether the application of the search warrant is supported by the personal knowledge of the witness, besides the applicant, for the judge to determine probable cause in issuing the warrant. Held: Strict observance of the formalities under section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders 58 was followed. The applicant Mariano G. Almeda, in his application, swore that "he made his own personal investigation and ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is lending money without Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) license, charging usurious rate of interest and is keeping, utilizing and concealing in the store and premises occupied by it situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks, lists, receipts, promissory notes, and book of accounts and records, all of which are being used by it in connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in violation of the Usury Law." In turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in his testimony before the justice of the peace of Sagay, swore that he knew that Sam Sing & Co. was lending money without license and charging usurious rate of interest, because he personally investigated the victims who had secured loans from said Sam Sing & Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest; that he knew that the said Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and using books of accounts and records containing its transactions relative its activities as money lender and the entries of the interest paid by its debtors, because he saw the said Sam Sing & d make entries and records of their debts and the interest paid thereon. As both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore that they had personal knowledge, their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they could be held liable for perjury if the facts would turn out to be not as their were stated under oath. That the existence of probable cause had been determined by the justice of the peace of Sagay before issuing the search warrant complained of, is shown by the following statement in the warrant itself, to wit: "After examination under oath of the complainant, Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury Board, Department of Justice and Special Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila, and the witness he presented, . . . and this Court, finding that there is just and probable cause to believe as it does believe, that the above described articles, relating to the activities of said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at usurious rate of interest, are being utilized and kept and concealed at its store and premises occupied by said Sam Sing & Co., all in violation of law."
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002] First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari. Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter "will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive" be considered as waiver on Caballes part on warrantless search and seizure. Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 42 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
People vs. Libnao [GR 136860, 20 January 2003] Third Division, Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: On August 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. On 19 October 1996, at about 10 p.m., Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint. At about 1:00 a.m. of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as Agpanga Libnao and Rosita Nunga. In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center 2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the black bag. Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of Libnao, Nunga, and personnel of the center. Found inside it were 8 bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana. To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. Nunga stated that it was owned by Libnao. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of their right to have one. During the course of the investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were present. The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on 23 October 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos. Libnao and Nunga were charged for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. On 19 November 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, found Libnao and Nunga guilty. For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos. Libnao appealed. Issue: Whether the warrantless search and seizure made upon Libnao and Nunga was reasonable. Held: The constitutional guarantee (in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution) is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 54 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) persons and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest. Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. The warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month, Libnao and Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of 19 October 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of Libnaos bag was not illegal. It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto.
People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993] Third Division, Romero (J): 4 concur Facts: On 13 December 1989, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Zamboanga City conducted surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. The Narcom agent (Sgt. Ani) was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00, which was turned over to the Narcom office. The next day, a buy-bust was planned with Sgt. Ani being the poseur-buyer. NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in 2 civilian vehicles. Ani gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa returned to his house and gave Ani 2 newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. The signal to apprehend Musa was given. The NARCOM team rushed to the location of Ani, and a NARCOM officer (Sgt. Belarga) frisked Musa but did not find the marked money. The money was given to Musas wife who was able to slip away. Later, Belarga found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Musa was placed under arrest and was brought to the NARCOM office. One newspaper-wrapper marijuana and the plastic bag containing more marijuana was sent to the PC Crime Laboratory, the test of which gave positive results for the presence of marijuana. On the other hand, Mari Musa alleged that the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside his house without any search warrant, neither his permission to enter the house. The NARCOM agents searched the house and allegedly found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa was handcuffed and was taken to the NARCOM office where he was joined by his wife. Musa claimed that he was subjected to torture when he refused to sign the document containing details of the investigation. The next day, he was taken to the fiscals office to which he was allegedly made to answer to a single question: that if he owned the marijuana. He allegedly was not able to tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office. Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Still, an information against Musa was filed on 15 December 1989. Upon his arraignment on 11 January 1990, Musa pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 31 August 1990, the RTC Zamboanga City (Branch XII) found him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425. Musa Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 55 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the contents of the red plastic bag found in the kitchen may be admitted as evidence as evidence acquired incidental to a lawful arrest. Held: Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested and money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When the discovery of the evidence did not constitute a search, but where the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view, the warrantless seizure of the object was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of said evidence. The "plain view" doctrine, however, may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. The "plain view" doctrine neither justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Thus, the exclusion of the plastic bag containing marijuana does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. By virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by Musa to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of Musa of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt .
about 8:00 p.m. of G.R.No.128222 June17,1999PP vs. Chua Ho San PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.CHUA HO SAN@ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.FACTS: Inresponsetoreportsoframpantsmugglingoffirearmsandother contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, LaUnionbeganpatrollingtheBacnotancoastlinewithhisofficers.Whilemonitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around12:45p.m.fromBarangayCaptainJuanAlmoiteofBarangayTammocalaorequestingforpoliceassistanceregardinganunfamiliarspeedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel lookeddifferent from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and waspoised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1ReynosoBadua,proceededimmediatelytoTammocalaobeachandthereconferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lonemale passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag,andwalkedtowardstheroad.Uponseeingthepoliceofficers,themanchanged direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent him from fleeing.They then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did notunderstand what theyre saying. And by resorting of sign language, Cidmotioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man acceded tothe request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plasticscontaining yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to bemethamphetaminehydrochlorideorshabu.ChuawasthenbroughttoBacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to informhim of his constitutional rights.ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conductedbythePoliceOfficersconstituteavalidexemptionfromthewarrantrequirement.RULING: The Court held inthe negative.The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person'sbody, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid ofavalidsearchwarrantissuedinaccordancewiththeRules.However,warrantless searches may be permitted in the followingcases, to wit:(1)search of moving vehicles,(2)seizure in plain view,(3)customssearches,(4)waiver or consent searches, 5)stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and(6)searchincidental toa lawfularrest.It is required in cases ofin flagrante delictothat the arresting officer musthavepersonalknowledgeofsuchfactsorcircumstancesconvincinglyindicativeorconstitutiveofprobablecause.Probablecausemeansareasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficientlystrong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the personaccused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case atbar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrativeof CHUA's participation in on going criminal enterprise that could havespurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA wasnot identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact thatthe vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishingboats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process ofperpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was noprobable cause to justify a search incidental to alawful arrest.The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecutionthattherewasawaiverorconsentedsearch.IfCHUAcouldnotunderstand what was orally articulated to him, how could he understandthepolice's"signlanguage?"Moreimportantly,itcannotlogicallybeinferredfromhisallegedcognizanceofthe"signlanguage"thathedeliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against suchan intrusive search.Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was heldto be inadmissible inevidence.Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient toestablish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
DEL ROSARIO y NICOLASvs.PEOPLE, G.R. No. 142295,PARDO,
FACTS:Accused-appellantVicentedelRosariowasfoundguiltyofviolationofP.D.No.1866oftheRegionalTrialCourtofMalolos.Allegedly, sometimeinMay 1996,thepolicereceived areport thataccused-appellantVicente delRosario wasinpossession ofcertain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, thePNP Criminal Investigation Group inquired from the PNPFirearms and Explosive Division whether or notthe report was true. The PNPFirearms and Explosives Division issued a certificationstating that per records in his office, the appellant is nota licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with thesaid certificationthe policeapplied for a search warrant to enable themto search the house of appellant.Upon the issuance of the warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before proceeding tothe residence of the appellant, the police officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman AurelioPanteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant. Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officersintroduced themselves to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had asearch warrant and that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducteda search of the house. The search yielded the following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines ofcaliber .45 (Exhibits B andH) found at the master's bedroom; (b) five magazines of5.56 M-16 rifle and tworadios (Exhibits C to C-4)found in the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673 (Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of liveammunition (Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the firearms, the appellant failedto produce any. Thisprompted the police officers to seize the subject firearms.For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his bedroom and that the other itemsseized during the search including thecaliber .22 revolver, were merely planted by thepolice officers. Appellant likewise assails themanner in which thesearch was carried out, claiming that the police officers justbarged into his house without asking permission.Furthermore, he claimed that the barangay officials arrived only after thepolice already had finished the search.However, after trialthe trial court rendered ajudgment of conviction which decision was affirmed by theCourt of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure ofitems not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.
HELD:The Supreme CourtREVERSESthe decision of the Courtof Appeals andACQUITSpetitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas ofthecharge of violation of P. D. No. 1866.Seizure is limited to thoseitems particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are without discretion regardingwhat articles they shall seize. Evidence seized onthe occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure istainted and excludedfor being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence forany purpose in any proceedingIn this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchenof petitioner's house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned inthe search warrant. Thus, the seizure is illegal.True that as anexception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed firearm orany contraband for that matter,inadvertently found in plain view. However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the police officeris notsearching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminatingobject."52Specifically, seizure ofevidence in "plain view" is justified when there is:(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of theirofficial duties;(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by thepolice who had the rightto be where they are.(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure ofevidence without further search.
G.R. Nos. 146284-86.January 20, 2003]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee, vs.ABDUL MACALABA y DIGAYON,appellant.D E C I S I O NDAVIDE, JR.,C.J.:Appellant Abdul Macalaba y Digayon (hereafter ABDUL) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, with violations of the Presidential Decree No. 1866[1]; Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code[2]; and Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236, 1237 and 1238, respectively.The accusatory portions of the informations in these cases read as follows:Criminal Case No. 1236That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused without the required permit/license from the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1) caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 909904, and one (1) magazine with five (5) live ammunition thereof.CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]Criminal Case No. 1237That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2) ONE THOUSAND PESOS bill with Serial Numbers BG 021165 and BG 995998, knowing the same to be forged or otherwise falsified with the manifest intention of using such falsified or forged instruments.CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]Criminal Case No. 1238That on or about April 12, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1) self-sealing transparent plastic bag of methamphetamine hydrochloride shabu weighing 226.67 grams (3 medium sized transparent plastic bags and 1 big heat-sealed transparent plastic bag).CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]The three cases were consolidated and raffled to Branch 31 of said court.Upon his arraignment, ABDUL entered in each case a plea of not guilty.At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Generoso Pandez, PO3 Ernani Mendez, Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura and Police Inspector Lorna Tria.ABDUL was the sole witness for the defense.SPO1 Pandez, a PNP member of the Laguna Criminal Investigation Detection Group (CIDG), testified that on 12 April 1999, at 5:15 p.m., Major R Win Pagkalinawan ordered the search of ABDUL, alias Boy Muslim, based on a verified information that the latter was driving a carnapped Mitsubishi olive green car with Plate No. UPV 511 and was a drug-pusher in San Pedro, Laguna.Two teams were formed for the search.The first was headed by Major Pagkalinawan, with SPO4 Aberion and five others as members; and the second was led by Capt. Percival Rumbaoa, with SPO1 Pandez and PO3 Mendez as members.[6]Between 6:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., the two groups proceeded to Barangay Nueva, San Pedro, Laguna, on board a car and a van.They went to ABDULs apartment where he was reportedly selling shabu, but they learned that ABDUL had already left.While looking for ABDUL, they saw the suspected carnapped car somewhere at Pacita Complex I, San Pedro, Laguna, going towards thePoblacion.When it stopped due to the red traffic light, the CIDG officers alighted from their vehicles.Capt. Rumbaoa positioned himself at the passenger side of the suspected carnapped car, while Major Pagkalinawan stood in front of the car.SPO1 Pandez, with PO3 Mendez beside him, went straight to the driver and knocked at the drivers window.ABDUL, who was driving the car, lowered the glass window.SPO1 Pandez introduced himself as a member of the Laguna CIDG and asked ABDUL to turn on the light and show them the cars certificate of registration.[7]When the light was already on, SPO1 Pandez saw a black Norinco .45 caliber gun[8]inside an open black clutch/belt bag placed on the right side of the drivers seat near the gear.He asked ABDUL for the supporting papers of the gun, apart from the cars certificate of registration, but the latter failed to show them any.[9]When ABDUL opened the zipper of the clutch/belt bag, the CIDG officers saw inside it four plastic sachets of what appeared to be shabu.They likewise found a self-sealing plastic bag which contained the following items: two fakeP1,000 bills, a list of names of persons, a magazine and five ammunitions for a .45 caliber gun.They confiscated the gun, the shabu,
and the fakeP1,000 bills and thereafter brought ABDUL to the CIDG office.[10]PO3 Mendez substantially corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Pandez.[11]The twoP1,000 bills were found to be counterfeit after an examination conducted by Police Inspector Anacleta Cultura,[12]a document examiner at Camp Vicente Lim,Calamba, Laguna.The white crystalline substance contained in the four small plastic bags was subjected to physical and laboratory examination conducted by Police Inspector Lorna Tria, a Forensic Chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim.Her findings[13]were as follows: (a) the three small plastic sachets weighed 29.46 grams, while the big plastic sachet weighed 197.21 grams, or a total weight of 226.67 grams; (b) representative samples taken from the specimens thereof were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride orshabu, a regulated drug; and (c) the improvised tooter and the rolled aluminum foil with residue found in the self-sealing plastic bag were also positive of the presence forshaburesidue.As expected, ABDUL had a different story to tell.He testified that on 12 April 1999, between 6:50 and 7:00 p.m., he was driving a borrowed Mitsubishi Galant Car with Plate No. UPV 501 somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna.With him was Rose, his live-in partner, whom he fetched from Angeles City, Pampanga.He had borrowed the car from his friend Ferdinand Navares, who instructed him to return it in front of the latters store at San Pedro Public Market.[14]ABDUL was about to park the car when a man knocked hard on the glass window on the drivers side of the car and pointed at the former a .45 caliber pistol.Another one who was armed with an armalite rifle positioned himself in front of the car, while the third one positioned himself near the window on the passenger side and pointed a gun at his live-in partner Rose.ABDUL then lowered the cars window.The man near him opened the door, held him, and told him to alight. When the man asked him whether he was Boy Muslim, he answered in the negative.The same man opened the back door of the car and boarded at the back seat.Rose remained seated at the front passenger seat.[15]The other men likewise boarded the car, which was thereafter driven by one of them.While inside the car, they saw a .45 caliber pistol at the edge of the drivers seat.They asked him whether he had a license.He showed his gun license and permit to carry.After taking his gun, license, and permit to carry, they tried to remove his belt bag from his waist, but he did not allow them.[16]Upon reaching the headquarters, ABDUL learned that these people were C.I.S. agents.There, he was told to surrender the belt bag to the officer who would issue a receipt for it.He did as he was told, and the money inside his belt bag was counted and it amounted toP42,000.They then got his money and the cellular phone, which was also inside the bag, together with some other pieces of paper.They also took another cell phone from the car.He was never issued a receipt for these items.[17]Thereafter, a man entered the office with a white plastic bag allegedly taken from the borrowed car.ABDUL denied ownership over the plastic bag.That same man then told him that it containedshabu. ABDUL and Rose were detained at the headquarters.The next morning, Rose was allowed to get out; and in the afternoon, he was transferred to San Pedro Municipal Jail.[18]After the trial, the trial court acquitted ABDUL in Criminal Cases Nos. 1236 and 1237 for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively, due to insufficiency of evidence.However, it convicted him in Criminal Case No. 1238 for violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended,[19]and sentenced him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetuaand to pay a fine ofP500,000, as well as the costs of the suit.Dissatisfied with the judgment, ABDUL interposed the present appeal, alleging that the trial court erred in (1) convicting him for violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, despite insufficiency of evidence; and (2) admitting the evidence presented by the prosecution although it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.In his first assigned error, ABDUL argues that the prosecution failed to prove the material allegations in the information.The information charges him, among other things, that without being authorized by law, [he] did then and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control methamphetamine hydrochloride.However, the prosecution did not present any certification from the concerned government agency, like the Dangerous Drugs Board, to the effect that he was not authorized to possess shabu, which is a regulated drug.Thus, his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.In his second assigned error, ABDUL asserts that he was not committing a crime when the CIS agents boarded his car, searched the same and ultimately arrested him.He was about to park his borrowed car per instruction by the owner when he was harassed by the operatives at gunpoint.The gun seen was properly documented; thus, there was no reason for the CIS agents to bring him and his companion to the headquarters.Theshabuallegedly found in the car was brought in by somebody at the time he was under interrogation.It was taken in violation of his constitutional right against illegal search and seizure.Being a fruit of a poisonous tree it should not have been admitted in evidence.Moreover, the members of the CIDG merely relied on the information received from an anonymous telephone caller who said that ABDUL was driving a carnapped vehicle.They had no personal knowledge of the veracity of the information.Consequently, there was no legal basis for his warrantless arrest.In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that ABDUL had the burden of proving that he was authorized to possess shabu, but he failed to discharge such burden.Therefore, it is presumed that he had no authority; consequently, he is liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.The OSG likewise refutes ABDULs argument that there was a violation of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.The general rule is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or that a negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden of proving the charge.However, this rule is not without an exception.Thus, we have held:Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, theonus probandirests upon him.Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other evidence within the defendants knowledge or control.For example, where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a license (as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the selling of a
regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiarly within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer conviction.[20]In the instant case, the negative averment that ABDUL had no license or authority to possess methamphetamine hydrochloride orshabu, a regulated drug, has been fairly indicated by the following facts proven by the testimonies of the CIDG officers and the forensic chemist: (a) ABDUL was driving the suspected carnapped vehicle when he was caught, and he appeared to be healthy and not indisposed as to require the use ofshabuas medicine; (b) the contents of the sachets found in ABDULs open clutch bag inside the carwereprima faciedetermined by the CIDG officers to beshabu; and (c) the said contents were conclusively found to beshabuby the forensic chemist.With these established facts,the burden of evidence was shifted to ABDUL.He could have easily disproved the damning circumstances by presenting a doctors prescription for said drug or a copy of his license or authority to possess the regulated drug. Yet, he offered nothing.And now on the second issue.The Constitution enshrines in its Bill of Rights the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.[21]To give full protection to it, the Bill of Rights also ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[22]It is obvious from Section 2 of the Bill of Rights that reasonable searches and seizures are not proscribed.If conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the guidelines prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court, the search and seizure is valid.The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence are (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs search; (4) waiver or consented search; (5) stop and frisk situation (Terry search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrestsin flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.[23]Another exception is a search made pursuant to routine airport security procedure, which is authorized under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235.[24]The warrantless arrest of, or warrantless search and seizure conducted on, ABDUL constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.The evidence clearly shows that on the basis of an intelligence information that a carnapped vehicle was driven by ABDUL, who was also a suspect of drug pushing, the members of the CIDG of Laguna went around looking for the carnapped car.[25]They spotted the suspected carnapped car, which was indeed driven by ABDUL.While ABDUL was fumbling about in his clutch bag for the registration papers of the car the CIDG agents saw four transparent sachets ofshabu.[26]These sachets ofshabuwere therefore inplain viewof the law enforcers.Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within theplain viewof an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.Nonetheless, the seizure of evidence inplain viewmust comply with the following requirements: (a) a prior valid intrusion in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) the plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[27]We are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt under the circumstances above discussed that all the elements of seizure inplain viewexist in the case at bar.Thus, the warrantless search and seizure conducted on ABDUL, as well as his warrantless arrest, did not transgress his constitutional rights.ABDULs sole defense of denial is unsubstantiated.We have time and again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness.A mere denial, just like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.[28]On the issue of credibility between ABDULs testimony and the declarations of the CIDG officers, we hold for the latter.As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over accuseds self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed.[29]ABDUL miserably failed to rebut this presumption and to prove any ulterior motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses.Unauthorized possession of 200 grams or more ofshabuor methylamphetamine hydrochloride is punishable byreclusion perpetuato death under Section 16 of Article III, in relation to Section 20 of Article IV, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by P.D. Nos. 44, 1675, 1683, and 1707; Batas Pambansa Blg. 179; and R.A. No. 7659 (now further amended by R.A. No. 9165).These sections provide as follows:SEC.16.Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. --The penalty ofreclusion perpetuato death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.SEC. 20.Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. --The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
There is no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu in Criminal Case No. 1238 was proved beyond reasonable doubt since ABDUL knowingly carried with him at the time he was caught 226.67 grams ofshabuwithout legal authority.There being no modifying circumstance proven, the proper penalty pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code isreclusion perpetua.The penalty imposed by the trial court, including the fine, is, therefore, in order.WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, in Criminal Case No. 1238 convicting appellant ABDUL MACALABA y DIGAYON of the violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetuaand to pay a fine ofP500,000 and the costs of the suit, is hereby affirmedin toto.Costsde oficio.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142295.May 31, 2001]VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS,petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.D E C I S I O NPARDO,J.:Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas appealsviacertiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals[1]affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos, and finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal possession of firearms), sentencing him to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days ofprision correccional,as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day ofprision mayor,as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos an Information charging petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas with violation of P. D. No. 1866, as follows:That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the municipality of Norzagaray, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession under his custody and control, the following, to wit:a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o license)b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o license)c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal. .45d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22f)Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56 (M16)g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal 5.56without first having obtained a proper license therefor.Contrary to law.[2]On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the petitioner.He pleaded not guilty.[3]Trial ensued.The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:Sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the PNP Criminal Investigation Group at Camp Olivas, Pampanga inquired from
