Vigilant and Ready - Allied Land Command - NATO

Vigilant and Ready LAND FORCES

for Deterrence and Defence.

EXCLUSIVE

CREVAL“New Approach”

COMMENTARY

DETERRENCE Through Competition

MAGAZINEA BI-ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF ALLIED LAND COMMAND

FALL 2019

EXCLUSIVE

SACEURMEET Gen. Wolters

INSIGHTS

RUSSIANEW Capability

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contents.

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Commander´s message

SACEURGen T od Wolters

The CREVAL“NEW APPROACH”

Prep for TRIDENTJACKAL 19

05 Commander´s message

06 CSEL´s message

07 CSEL´S biography

08 Meet the new SACEURGeneral Todd Wolters

10The CREVAL “New Approach”

12 NRDC-ESP Prepares For TRIDENT JACKAL 19

16 The 2nd NATO Mountain Warfare Conference - BELOW ZERO

20Vigilance and Readiness in the Land Domain

24 CMI and CIMIC Mobile Training Teams

28Meet the 2019 Sergeant Yahya Award Recipient

30North Macedonia poised to become NATO´s 30th member

32NATO Land Standardisation Week

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RUSSIAN EW capability

Letter of CooperationGeorgia Defence Forces

TheatreEnablement

MND-SE the Road to Success

34SABER GUARDIAN 19: MND-SE & the Road to Success

37Russian EW capacity rapidly rises

40LANDCOM signs letter of cooperation with Georgia Defence Forces

42LANDCOM’s Joint Effects and Fires Branch: Current Activities

44Eurocorps: Road to Readiness

46How the Cyber Domain Supports LAND Operations

48Theatre enablement: A Key to Readiness

50Trip Report: Logisticians in Kiev

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WELCOME

The LANDPOWER magazine is a bi-annual publi-cation produced by Allied Land Command (LAND-COM) dedicated to the promotion of actions and ideas, contributing to the improvement of the NATO Force Structure (NFS) efficiency and effec-tiveness. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the LANDCOM Commander, SACEUR, NATO or its member na-tions and cannot be quoted as an official state-ment of those entities. An electronic version that includes additional links to in-depth articles, sup-plementary articles and an ability to provide online comments is available from the LANDCOM web-site (www.lc.nato.int).

To contact the LANDPOWER Magazine staff and/or to submit an article to be considered for publication in the next issue, please use the following contacts: E-mail: [email protected] [email protected] Postal: NATO Allied Land Command Public Affairs Office General Vecihi Akin Garrison 35380 Izmir / Turkey All articles are edited for length and content.

The LANDPOWER Magazine staff: LTC Travis Dettmer (USA) - Editor and ChiefLT Jonathan Bateman (GBR) - Senior EditorSFC Jonathan Fernandez (ESP) - Art DirectorSFC David Vivar (ESP) - Deputy Art DirectorMr. Jakub Klepek (POL) - Graphic Designer

LandcomHQ channel

Front Cover:Credit, Latvijas armija- Latvian Soldiers operating the CVRT light reconaissance vehicle during Joint Response Force training held on Salisbury Plain, UK.

Rear Cover:

Credit, NATO- A British Army Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank lays down a smoke screen during Spring Storm 19, Estonia’s largest annual military exercise.

Bianchi Giovanni

“Viva la N.A.T.O. !”

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COMMANDERfrom the

J.T. THOMSONLANDCOM Commander

LC

Today’s security environment is marked by a return of great power competition, increasing complexity, growing

uncertainty and a rapidly changing character of warfare. While land power remains central to deterrence and defence, it must also adapt to retain competitive advantage over potential adversaries. Within the NATO land domain, I am encouraged by the positive embrace of changes designed to ensure we remain fit for purpose and can act at the speed of relevance. Ultimately, it is about promoting a culture of readiness to compete, deter, and if necessary, fight and win.

Building and sustaining land power readiness remains our main effort. It is our primary contribution to deterrence. Accordingly, the theme for the 15 th Land Corps Commanders

Conference (LC3) is “Vigilant and Ready Land Forces for Deterrence and Defence.” During this semi-annual conference, we will discuss our changing roles and responsibilities in fostering vigilance and readiness to strengthen deterrence...not just in the land domain, but in an integrated manner across all domains…thereby manifesting decisive advantage.

In 1949, Gen. Omar Bradley stated that “peace is our goal but preparedness is the pricewe must pay”. Those words continue to ring true today. In the spirit of preparedness, a new NATO Military Strategy was unveiled this past May and we are now focused on its implementation. For the land domain, this requires vigilance and preparedness in baseline activities and current operations (BACO). Or in other words, deterrence through realistic and rigorous demonstration of collective defence based on decisive combined arms, multi-domain operations. Maintaining strong linkage between the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS) to ensure coherency and cohesion, change management is fully underway to increase our warfighting capabilities, including the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI) and Adapted NATO Response Force (aNRF); Joint, Domain, and Functional Command and Control (C2) concepts of operation; a Joint Fires and Targeting framework; Theatre Enablement; and a refined Training, Exercise, and Evaluation program that reflects realism. These initiatives along with on-going standardisation, interoperability and modernisation efforts will ensure our continued success as an Alliance.

Leadership remains the most decisive and dynamic element of combat power. Across the NATO land domain, we continue to be blessed with an abundance of strong leaders...

another key advantage of the Alliance. However, an element marked by significant change over recent months. At LANDCOM, CWO Kevin Mathers replaced CWO Steve Rice as Command Senior Enlisted Leader and Maj. Gen. Metin Tokel replaced Maj. Gen. Erhan Uzun as Chief of Staff. At 1st German-Netherlands Corps, Lt. Gen. Alfons Mais replaced Lt. Gen. Michiel van derLaan. At the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, Lt. Gen. Edward Smyth-Osbourne replaced Lt. Gen. Tim Radford. At Rapid Reaction Corps-France, Lt. Gen. Pierre Gillet replaced Lt. Gen. Laurent Kolodziej. At the EUROCORPS, Lt. Gen. Laurent Kolodziej replaced Lt. Gen. Jürgen Weigt. And at Multinational Division Southeast, Maj. Gen. J.J. Berdila replaced Maj. Gen. Daniel Petrescu. We thank the outgoing leaders for their exceptional leadership and teamwork and extend a warm welcome to the new leadership. Despite such significant change in names and faces, rest assured that the thread of continuity is commitment to readiness, excellence and teamwork.

Having recently celebrated NATO’s 70th anniversary as the strongest and most successful Alliance in the world, we can be rightfully proud of land power’s vital role in deterrence and collective defence. As we lead historic change, let us remember the wise words of SACEUR, who reminds that readiness means being responsive, being resilient, and being lethal.

#LandPower! #StrongerTogether! #WeAreNATO!

For the Soldier!

“If you don’t like change, you’ll like irrelevance even less.”

General Eric Shinseki

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CSELfrom the

MY PERSPECTIVE: TWO MONTHS INTO LANDCOM

On the 21st of June I had the distinct honour of assuming the incredible responsibility as Command Senior Enlisted Leader (CSEL) of NATO Allied Land Command. The outgoing CSEL, Canadian Chief Warrant Officer Stephen Rice, went to great lengths to prepare me to assume the position. Before I dive into what is my first editorial for Land Power magazine, I would be remiss if I did not thank Steve and his incredible wife Karyn for their unwavering support to the mission here at LANDCOM. Steve, you helped Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) identify what right looks like and modeled behavior that inspired Partners and Allies alike. You, without a doubt, left behind a legacy that will have a lasting effect. You are a top notch soldier and great Canadian who should be proud of your accomplishments.

MAKING PEOPLE THE MISSION

With only a short time in the job, I thought it best to outline my perspective on the proper relationship between LANDCOM Officers and NCOs serving within the command’s construct. The NCO Corps is responsive and accountable up and down the chain of command. NCOs must be resilient and sustain our efforts, from planning all the way through to execution of our task, and always in support of the

Commander’s intent. As warriors, we train for lethality and fully accept the expectation of unlimited liability – the willingness to give the ultimate sacrifice – and remain vigilant as a result.

As experts of human terrain, NCOs in the land domain must be empowered to enable and build capacity within LANDCOM, and by extension, the land domain. I expect responsible junior and senior NCOs to embody the professionalism needed for leaders in the ground fight.

#WeAreNATO is not merely a catchy hashtag. It identifies that we are NATO, the most powerful military alliance in history. For the NCOs of this command, it is the way of life as we prepare the land forces in their training and preparation for the defence of the Alliance. A mentally and physically tough NCO is an undeniably intimidating source of deterrence against our adversaries. Take it from none other than the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. Tod Wolters, who, during the International Senior Enlisted Seminar forum with NATO and partner nations in Garmisch earlier this summer, lauded the NCO Corps’ unparalleled ability to shape the battlespace.

Developing and managing our enlisted talent

As the landscape of modern warfare changes, so too does the path to professionalism and relevance for the NCO. This means soldiers must pursue a deliberate, designed path that includes professional military education (PME), civilian education, and self-development. To be a value-added NCO today requires confidence and emotional intelligence. The 2017 NATO NCO BI-SC Strategy and NCO Guidelines capture these requirements by formally recognising the importance of investing in human capital at every level. They emphasise the importance of iterative development of NCOs at all ranks, ensuring their baseline knowledge, skills, and abilities meet National and NATO standards and expectations for interoperability.

What does this mean for me and my coun-terparts? NCO talent management is the job of the command’s CSEL. The CSEL is the empowered NCO leader linked delib-erately to the commander. They are com-mitted to fulfilling the commander’s intent through impartial, multi-level communica-tions, advising where and when necessary, and monitoring critical vulnerabilities. The CSEL is uniquely positioned to champion all NCO training, professional education, and self-development, and ensure we provide the right person at the right time to take advantage of these prerequisites, these professionalising opportunities, us-ing a team of dedicated and empowered NCOs. I look forward to forming that team. The way ahead

So far I have been thoroughly impressed by the tireless efforts of the entire team here at LANDCOM. I’m sincerely proud of the dedicated members of our command who are busy preparing, planning and creating training objectives for our ambitious training and capacity building series of LANDCOM-lead supported and supporting exercises for execution this Fall. The incredible efforts of the Allied Land Command team are sure to test the boundaries of operational excellence. It’s been said that leading is not about taking charge but rather it’s about leading the people in our charge. I accept this reality and look forward to the challenge. I for one am looking forward to the journey ahead.

FOR THE SOLDIER!

KEVIN J. MATHERSLANDCOM Command Senior Enlisted Leader

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CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER KEVIN J. MATHERS

I FEEL EXTREMELY FORTUNATE AND I

AM HUMBLED BY THE EXPERIENCE AND

EXCELLENCE OF THE WARRIORS THAT MAKE

UP OUR TEAM AT LAND COMMMAND.

Chief Warrant Officer Kevin Mathers joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 1985 and upon graduation from Crewman training was posted to the Lord Srathcona’s Horse (RC) in Calgary. In 1988 he was deployed to Cyprus and over the course of the next thirty years took part in a number of Operational Deployments in the Golan Heights, Bosnia and two to Afghanistan, amongst others.

In 2011 Mathers was invested into the Order of Military Merit and later the same year was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal for his contributions and performance during his time serving as the Sergeant Major of his Reconnaissance Squadron, part of Task Force 3-09, in Afghanistan.

During his thirty three year career Mathers has been posted to 15 different units and has served in all three of the Canadian Armoured Regiments, the Directorate of Military Careers as part of the Crewman Career Management Team, Land Force Central Area Training Centre Meaford, Canadian Forces Training Development Centre CSM Borden and the Armour School in Gagetown. On promotion to Chief Warrant Officer in 2013, Mathers attended RMC Kingston for a year of studies before being appointed as the Regimental Sergeant Major of the Armour School. After completing his RSM posting he occupied key appointments as the Senior Army Mentor at the Royal Military College St. Jean and recently completed a tour as the Chief Instructor of the CWO Robert Osside Institute.

Mathers is the proud father of two children and grandfather to four grandsons and two granddaughters.

In preparation to assume his role as the Command Senior Enlisted Leader in 2019, Mathers completed the NATO CSEL course and the Keystone Joint Senior Enlisted Command Course in Washington DC. LC

CWO Kevin Mathers training with his crew in his Leopard main battle tank in the early 2000s.

Mathers during his last tour of Afghanistan, in Kandahar fall 2009. Pictured with his Squadron Commander, Major Mark Popov

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LAND POWER MAGAZINE CONNECTED WITH GEN. TOD WOLTERS, THE NEW SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE, TO FIND MORE ABOUT HOW HE VIEWS ALLIANCE LAND POWER AND LAND-COM’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO IN THELAND DOMAIN.

SACEURMeet the 19th

“ACO will leverage our over-whelming strength in multi-domain and combined arms operations to deliver deci-sive effects.”

LANDPOWER: As the NATO Alliance celebrates its 70th anniversary this year, what are some of the challenges you see for the Alliance in the land domain?

TW: Increased threat capabilities, diffusion of disruptive technologies, and ambiguous malign activities below the level of armed conflict are significant challenges in the Euro- Atlantic. Allied Command Operations (ACO) will meet these challenges with vigilance and speed across all domains and functions. These efforts ensure the Alliance deters, and if called, defends with victory.

LANDPOWER: How important is land force integration when it comes to deterrence and defence?

TW: NATO’s persistent presence, demonstrated resolve, and human interaction across the land domain is tangible, unique, and strategically vital to deterrence and defence. Having ready ground forces that are responsive, resilient, lethal, and capable of operating at relevant speed and scale enhances deterrence and reduces the potential for miscalculation. Land forces are essential and offer unique strengths, but they should not operate alone in crisis or conflict. If called, ACO will leverage our overwhelming strength in multi-domain and combined arms operations to deliver decisive effects.

LANDPOWER: Speaking of joint effects and integration of enablers to better deter and defend, how do you see addressing the readiness of enablers in the land domain?

TW: A prudent balance between ready forces and supporting enablers is essential. Enablers optimise combat power and sustain operations across the AoR. SHAPE is collaboratively working on initiatives to improve coherence within the pool of ready forces and to apply a more holistic approach to readiness in the near term. Ongoing operations, major joint exercises, and evaluation programs offer regular opportunities to integrate enablers and improve Alliance force posture and responsiveness.

LANDPOWER: From your perspective as SACEUR, how important is the new Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL) approach to ensuring readiness and interoperability of NATO’s land forces?

TW: As a pilot, rifleman, logistician, or any professional warfighter, there are few things more critical than mission evaluations. They improve transparency and provide useful milestones for organisational certification. The new CREVAL approach empowers commanders to select focus areas relevant to their mission, providing them with recommendations and feedback to enable learning and assist formations to become more responsive, resilient, and lethal. LC

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General Tod D. Wolters assumed duties as NATO’s 19th Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on May 3, 2019. As SACEUR, he is one of NATO’s two strategic commanders and commands Allied Command Operations (ACO), which is responsible for the planning and execution of all Alliance operations. He is responsible to NATO’s Military Committee for the conduct of all NATO military operations.

General Wolters previously served as Commander Allied Air Command; Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe; Commander, U.S. Air Forces Africa, headquartered at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and Director, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Kalkar, Germany.

General Wolters received his commission in 1982 as a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has been assigned to numerous operational command and staff positions, and has completed nine overseas tours, including two tours in Afghanistan. He commanded the 19th Fighter Squadron, the 1st Operations Group, the 485th Air Expeditionary Wing, the 47th Flying Training Wing, the 325th Fighter Wing, the 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Afghanistan, and the 12th Air Force.

General Wolters fought in operations Desert Storm, Southern Watch, Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. He served in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force as Legislative Liaison Director and in headquarters staff positions at U.S. Pacific Command, Headquarters U.S. Air Force and Air Force Space Command. Prior to commanding U.S. Air Forces in Europe and U.S. Air Forces Africa, General Wolters served as the Joint Staff Director for Operations. He is a combat-experienced command pilot with more than 5,000 flying hours in the F-15C, F-22, OV-10, T-38, and A-10 aircraft.

General Wolters earned his Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1982, a master’s degree in aeronautical science technology from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in 1996, and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the Army War College in 2001. Additionally, he served as a senior executive fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government in 2004 and a fellow with National Defense University’s Pinnacle Course in 2014.

General Wolters’ decorations and awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Defense Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star with oak leaf cluster, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Air Medal, the Aerial Achievement Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters and the Air Force Combat Action Medal.

SACEURwho is

Gen. Tod Wolters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa commander, speaks during a press conference at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, April 19, 2017. The press conference was held for the visiting F-35 Lightning II’s at RAF Lakenheath. (U.S. Air Force photo/Senior Airman Malcolm Mayfield)

Source: https://shape.nato.int/saceur-2

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The CREVAL “New Approach”

The CREVAL, or Combat Readiness Evaluation pro-gram, is SACEUR’s opera-tional tool to evaluate and

verify the combat readiness of land forces and provide the commander of the organisation with recommenda-tions for what to sustain and what to improve.

CREVAL focuses on a headquarters or unit’s ability to plan for and execute large scale, high intensity, multi-domain warfare against a near peer adversary with an overall concentrated focus on Command and Control (C2), Fires, and Logistic Support.

Evaluations are an essential part of the certification process to facilitate end-to-end quality assurance of the preparation processes of forces for current and future operations.

What’s in a CREVAL?

The current CREVAL process has a rigid checklist format based off the concept of “trust but verify.” Thou-sands of performance measures must be checked, which entails maintaining large evaluation teams that are costly to deploy. Additionally, in the current

model there is little ability for the com-mander of the evaluated unit to tailor an evaluation to his or her specific unit.

Thus, CREVALs are changing to become more focused, supportive and balanced. While SACEUR retains the authority to direct evaluations at his discretion, in future CREVALs the scope and scale will be determined through Commander’s dialogue with the intent of reaching an agreement on targeted areas to scrutinise within his or her command. The benefits of using this approach include:

a. Evaluation data becomes a valuable aid to commanders in planning their future training events.

b. Reinforcement of the commitment and intent to continuous improvement.

c. NATO’s Evaluation and Training (E&T) becomes even more of a genuine learning system.

d. Evaluations are reduced in scope and scale, are more targeted and are better synchronised.

e. Consequently, the costs and burden

of evaluations are reduced.

Future evaluations will tailor the evalu-ation criteria to focus on the evaluated commander’s priorities. No longer will a rigid evaluation format require the inspection of every performance measure applicable to a headquarters or unit. However, to be clear, this new CREVAL approach will still focus on SACEUR’s requirements and his focus areas (SAGE) of Command and Control (C2), Fires, and Logistics Support.

How will the CREVAL New Approach work in practice?

A CREVAL, on average, takes about 18 months of effort and is comprised of several events, starting with the Initial Coordination Meeting (ICM) and fol-lowed by exercise planning events that include initial, mid and final planning conferences. For HQs, the evaluation is broken down into Phase I, Crisis Response Planning (CRP), and Phases 2 and 3. Unit evaluations consist of Phases 1 and 2 only. (Phasing is de-scribed below.)

The first new event for CREVAL under the new approach is implementation of an Evaluation Team Chief (ETC) to

By Maj. Nathan Loomis, formerly of LANDCOM G7

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evaluated commander (COM) dialogue. This is where the ETC and COM reach an agreement on what will be evalu-ated and the scope and scale of that evaluation. It’s important to note that, for Corps-level evaluations, COM LANDCOM is the ETC, thus COM to COM dialogue is analogous with ETC to COM dialogue. This ETC to COM dialogue sets the tone for the ICM. Once the ETC and evaluated COM agree to objectives, the evaluation team finalises the plan. At some point between Phases 1 and 2, and sometimes even before Phase 1, the CRP of the evaluated HQ oc-curs. The CRP focuses on the evalu-ated HQ’s planning capabilities and processes.

Phase 1 of the CREVAL New Approach continues to be in-barracks evaluation. This is where the exchange of informa-tion and evaluation of documentation occurs. Phase 2 is the evaluation of procedures, exercise conduct and execution of operational mission. Field evaluation is done during a Command Post Exercise (CPX) and usually lasts 96 hrs. During Phase 3 the formal report is finalised to include recom-mendations and conclusions. This phase contains a new event added to the CREVAL process: the After-Action-Review (AAR). The AAR is a structured review process that allows training participants to discover for themselves what happened, why it happened and how they can perform better. Phase 3 concludes with the COM LC’s back-brief and signing of the Evaluation

Formal Report. Once complete, this concludes the CREVAL.

In summary, the new CREVAL ap-proach engenders a more focused, supportive, and balanced process. Through establishing a new baseline to the process, we are striving to set a new paradigm for evaluations and ensure the system is best utilised for its primary purpose – as a tool for the Commander to assure force readiness for the SACEUR.

MORE INFORMATIONFor additional information about LANDCOM, visit:

http://lc.nato.int

LC

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TRIDENT JACKAL 19 Prepar ation

BEST PRACTICES FROM THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING PROCESS IN A SMALL JOINT OPERATION (LAND HEAVY)

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TRIDENT JACKAL 19 Prepar ationDuring the recent preparations

for the upcoming exercise TRIDENT JACKAL 19, the NATO Rapid Deployable

Corps-Spain (NRDC-SP) Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ) Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) conducted Sub-phase IIB, Crisis Response Planning. The primary evaluation objective for this phase was to prepare and plan a crisis response operation within a comprehensive, combined and joint operational context. The exercise, held in the Bétera Military Base from June 10-21, was designed to incorporate all branches and component commands, ensuring each participant contributed effectively to the process in adherence with the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD).

Crisis Response Planning

Led by Plans Division/G5 Branch, the CRP effort was the main venue to certify the NRDC-SP staff’s ability to conduct operational level crisis planning through the establishment of a JOPG. For this exercise, NRDC-SP JOPG leveraged the Skolkan 2 scenario, a demanding NATO Non-Article 5 crisis response exercise designed around a small, joint land heavy operation. The complex operational environment surrounding the scenario afforded many opportunities for the staff to demonstrate planning proficiency.

Coming on the heels of the previous week’s two day strategic documentation workshop simulating an operational appreciation of the strategic environment (COPD Operational Phase 2), and immediately following a briefing about the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment, COM NRDC-SP issued his planning guidance for mission analysis. This

guidance was critically important for the duration of the exercise, both for the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) and the JOPG, because it provided the framework for the OLRT and JOPG to align efforts within the COM’s initial intent.

Crisis response planning began with mission analysis (COPD Operational Sub-phase 3A). This was the first opportunity for the JOPG,working in a plenary format, to integrate the staff’s augmentation personnel and liaison elements/officers. After the JOPG introductory briefing and a situation update, the nearly 80 exercise participants were assigned to a colour team (white, blue, green or red) and placed under the authority of a team leader for the remainder of the exercise.

Col. Jaime V. Mena Redondo, former G5 Plans Section A Chief and JOPG Coordinator, NRDC-Spain.

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THE MAIN EVENTS LIST/MAIN INCIDENTS LIST (MEL/MIL) SCRIPTING WORKSHOP FOR NATO EXERCISE TRIDENT JACKAL 2019 (TRJA19) TOOK PLACE FROM JULY 9-18 AT JOINT WARFARE CENTRE’S (JWC) TRAINING FACILITY IN STAVANGER, NORWAY

Mission Analysis

During the fifth day of the exercise JOPG members conducted a comprehensive mission analysis briefing to COM NRDC-SP. The group credits their success to that point to deliberate integration of the COM’s guidance from previous days, their focus on adversarial centres of gravity for analysis of possible adversarial courses of action, and their own operational design, all of which facilitated a successful alignment between the command group and the JOPG. These efforts were also bolstered by senior mentors and training team members from the Joint Warfare Centre serving in advisory roles.

There were two critical aspects underpinning the successful planning process during the mission analysis step. These included feedback provided to the JOPG by the OLRT deployed to the host nation (simulated by JWC at Stavanger,

Norway), either through daily VTCs or requests for information (RFIs) facilitated through the NATO web portal. Secondly, the JOPGs firm grasp of both the COPD, as well as the solid understanding by most CRP participants of TOPFAS/OPT1, resulted in the timely production of planning products.

Courses of Action and War Gaming

Operational Planning Guidance, established the end of the mission analysis, provided the JOPG with refined guidance for further development of two friendly force courses of action (COAs). From this point the blue team, charged with friendly COA development and refinement, rapidly facilitated analysis on the advantages, disadvantages, similarities, and differences of the two COAs. A subsequent brief comparing the COAs resulted in additional guidance

from COM and additional refinement prior to the war gaming phase. War gaming, considered very useful when operating in a time constrained environment, once again

aligned with the COM’s intent.

The JOPG’s war gaming was both well planned and well executed. Each COA was only war gamed against the most dangerous adversarial COA as it was considered the most likely to occur. For each friendly COA war gamed, the JOPG conducted additional analysis focused on the time required from JTF initial operating capacity (IOC) to full operating capacity (FOC). They also conducted a second analysis focusing on a Key Decisive Condition, which is identified by JWC in the First Impression Report II as a best practice for war gaming.

“SIMPLICITY IN PLANNING FOSTERS ENERGY IN EXECUTION.” ON WAR -CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

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Once the JOPG applied war gaming criteria and compared the two COAs within different scenarios, the JOPG conducted a COA decision briefing to COM. During this brief, the COM selected one of the COAs, but also provided additional guidance for further refinement prior to Concept of Operations development.

The extremely valuable expertise provided by joint personnel – both the staff augmentees and those provided by the component commands (Maritime, Air, Special Operations and Logistics) – were essential to the efficient development of complete COAs.

The Results

The final CRP products developed by the JOPG included CONOPS, issued June 27, followed by the 500 page OPLAN released on July 4 as the basis for the development of the Joint Coordination Order #01. These documents were developed for use as the main operating planning references for Command Post Exercise Trident Jackel 19 Phase III on Menorca Island, Spain, planned for September 20 –October 8. By the time this article reaches publication the exercise will be near completion.

Best Practices

In conclusion, among the best practices NRDC-SP JOPG identified during this exercise was the full engagement of the COM throughout the entire Operational Level Planning Process, especially during the early stages. Secondly, the early integration of joint personnel in support of the planning process greatly improved the core Land capabilities of the NRDC along the way toward certification as a JTF HQ. Finally, a solid understanding of COPD and planning supporting tools (TOPFAS) by the JOPG members was a significant key to success.

1 Tools for Operational Planning Functional Area Service (TOPFAS)/ Operational Planning Tool (OPT)

LC

The JOPG’s war gaming was both well planned

and well executed.

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Four steps to assess the risk

By Lt. Col. Reinhold Ramesberger (DEU) and Lt. Col. Aleš Centa (SVN), Doctrine & Standardization Branch (D&SB), NATO MW COE.

The 2nd NATO Mountain Warfare Congress

The 2002 NATO Summit in Prague re-sulted in the creation of Headquar-ters, Supreme Allied Command for

Transformation (HQ SACT) with the respon-sibility for further development of strategies, doctrines and technologies. As one aspect of the tangible outcomes of this, our current Centres of Excellence (COE) are expected to provide expertise to NATO and the part-ner nations. For this reason the Mountain Warfare COE, based in Slovenia, hosted the 2nd Mountain Warfare Congress from April 9-12. A total of 92 participants from 14 na-tions attended the event.

The comprehensive topic of the 2nd NATO Mountain Warfare Congress was Risk Man-agement under an overaching theme of Act-ing based on Knowledge. The goal was to expand the competence of the participants in order to increase their ability to act within their area of responsibility. The Congress aimed first to gain a broad understanding of the basics, then to cognitively expand participants’ expertise in order for them to mature as decision makers. For this purpose, organisers hired a mix of scientists and prac-titioners to ensure that verified knowledge and a systematic approach, not gut feelings, formed the basis for Risk Management in the

field of Mountain Warfare.

Initially, the issue of overall risk management was highlighted broadly before narrowing the more specified topic of military risk man-agement in winter, especially from the perspective of avalanche dan-ger. The speakers highlighted civil-ian as well as military perspectives using national and international approaches. Additionally, present-ers also covered failed risk manage-ment and the transition to local cri-sis management. A total of 16 experts hailing from the United States, Nor-way, Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia and Germany contributed their knowledge and experiences. Engineers from Ger-many and Slovenia also demonstrated technological approaches to the mini-misation of risk.

What we learnedThe keynote Speaker, Dr. Franz Fis-cher, Ph.D, of Danube-Krems-Universi-ty in Austria, presented the theoretical Risk Management framework. Fischer discussed both the historical devel-opment of standards in risk manage-

ment as well as some popular theories. Building on this, MW COE’s follow-up speaker, Lt. Col. Reinhold Ramesberg-er, gave an overview of NATO’s Risk Management doctrine, and presented a “4-Step Risk Management” approach to Mountain Warfare.

German extreme mountaineer, Philipp Reiter, and Deputy Chief of Groupe de Haute Montagne, French Maj. Jacques-Olivier Chevallier, discussed risk man-agement in extreme situations. In this presentation they compared extreme mountain situations to extreme situa-tions in combat, citing similarities re-

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°C

Prof. Jože Duhovnik, PhD, explains the drone

garding decision-making.

Subsequent lectures covered various approaches to assessing or minimising avalanche danger. These approaches ex-tended from analytical avalanche science taught in Alaska, to the Norwegian “rule-based/experience-based” approach, to the probabilistic and strategic systems of Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Also discussed were the technical possibilities of risk minimisation.

Dr. Phillip Weißgraeber, Ph.D, of Darmstadt Technical University also demonstrated a state of the art app he developed capable of extrapolating the danger of an avalanche to its starting point given the availability of necessary data. Professor Jože Duhovnik, Ph.D, of Slovakia showed another techno-logical approach to minimizing risk by pre-senting a fully operational prototype drone

for military use that can be steered from a safe location in order to trigger avalanches in avalanche prone areas. This technology is already fully developed and available.

Risk Management Failures Klemen Volontar of Slovenia discussed his first-hand experience where mountain warfare risk management had failed. After covering all aspects of a winter rescue op-erations, he discussed his experience dur-ing the largest organised avalanche rescue in Slovenia to date that involved a total of 276 rescuers, 30 avalanche dogs and sev-eral helicopters and other vehicles over a seven day period, a difficult task to coor-dinate and supply. To mitigate failure, MW Congress organisers displayed methods for rapid decision making and organisa-tion within a multinational force, including searching for casualties using the ‘’raster-probing’’ method.

On the final day, German judge Klaus Burger, Ph.D, highlighted the topic of risk management in mountain warfare from a legal perspective, clearly presenting the responsibilities through real case studies. The event concluded with presentations by Evi Partholl, Germany, of the Crisis Inter-vention Team and Military Chaplain Violeta Mesarič, Solvenia, who both outlined the need for psychological first aid in the event of serious injury or death, and expressed recommendations to military leaders to have these tools available in their emer-gency plans. An industrial exhibition with 11 international companies closed the pro-gramme of the 2nd MW Congress.

SummaryThe central idea of the MW Congress was risk management in mountain warfare from both theory to practice, and from preven-tion to emergency. Organisers offered so-lutions for risk reduction, risk transfer, risk avoidance and risk handling. NATO and parter attendees left the gathering with the understanding that “many people help to make a decision, but only one person is responsible for it!”

Avalanche-App

Many people help to make a decision, but only one person is responsible for it

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LANDCOM TRANSITIONS

I was blessed to have Lt. Gen. Darryl Williams and Lt. Gen. John Thomson as leaders. Our relationship was a model across the NATO Command Structure and the NATO Force Structure,” said Rice. “It was an honor to serve as the CSEL.”

By LANDCOM Public Affairs Canadian Army Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Stephen Rice passed the pace stick of

responsibility as NATO’s Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) Command Senior Enlisted Leader (CSEL) to Canadian Army CWO Kevin Mathers in a change of responsibility ceremony held June 21, 2019 in front of family, friends and soldiers at the LANDCOM Headquarters. U.S. Army Lt. Gen. J.T. Thomson, the LANDCOM Commander, presided over the ceremony.“I was blessed to have Lt. Gen. Darryl Williams and Lt. Gen. John Thomson as leaders. Our [CSEL – Commander] relationship was a model across the NATO Command Structure and the NATO Force Structure,” said Rice. “It was an honor to serve as the CSEL.” During his speech, Thomson thanked Stephen and Karyn Rice for their leadership to LANDCOM. “Change is an inevitable part of

life,” said Thomson. “It happens whether we are ready or not. And like today, sometimes change is bittersweet. Bitter because we say farewell to a trusted teammate that has given his heart and soul to this command. Sweet, because we welcome a seasoned and experienced leader that will carry on excellence.” Thomson continued, “Today, Rice ends his tour as the third [CSEL] for [LANDCOM]. He has led from the front and done so exceedingly well. He is the example of what right looks like. He embodies our motto, ‘For the Soldier.’”

CWO Rice has returned to the Royal Military College of Canada to complete a yearlong French language course. This is a requirement of the Canadian Army before he moves into his next command appointment in the near future. All of us at LANDCOM wish him well with the remainder of his career. LC

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IZMIR, Turkey – Standing left to right, Canadian Army Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Stephen Rice, the outgoing Command Senior

Enlisted Leader (CSEL) of Allied Land Command (LANDCOM); U.S. Army Lt. Gen. J.T. Thomson, Commander of LANDCOM; and CWO

Kevin Mathers, the incoming CSEL; stand on stage prior to the passing of the pace stick during the Change of Responsibility at the

LANDCOM Headquarters held June 21, 2019 in Izmir, Turkey. The pace stick originated in the British Army, the Royal Regiment of

Artillery, and was used to measure the distances between the gun placements on the battlefield. It was later adopted by Infantry units

within the British and Commonwealth Forces as an aid to drill on the parade square.

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PIKNER ARTICLE X4 PAGES

DETERRENCE THROUGH COMPETITION:VIGILANCE AND READINESS IN THE LAND DOMAIN

Deterrence is at the heart of what we aim to achieve as an Alliance. For decades the threat of war was

met with the credible counter-threat of overwhelming force that would punish an aggressor to such an extent that war itself was unthinkable. In recent years, however, NATO has been challenged by an increasingly adversarial Russia that uses subversive, nonmilitary means enabled by the threat of rapid, localised military coercion to achieve strategic ends. To compete against this approach, this article argues NATO should focus on denying the effectiveness of Russian military intimidation through a combination of vigilance and readiness, thereby blunting a critical element of our adversary’s strategic approach and reducing the threat of war.

Particular to the land domain, this focus will bring a degree of coherence and rigor to the array of training, interoperability, and readiness activities that our Soldiers do every day.

Tracing the Russian Strategic Approach

The preferred Russian strategic approach is most coherently outlined in an article written by Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov in 2013.1 In this piece, Gerasimov builds on a long history of Russian strategic thought that considers nonmilitary and military measures as complementary elements of a single, coherent approach rather than (as is often viewed in the West) mutually exclusive alternatives.2 While in many ways

a continuation of Soviet methods that blended ideological, political, and economic elements along with military might to realise strategic gains, the increasing willingness of Russia to use such an approach sparked a renewed interest within NATO on how best to counter such a strategy. 3 Gerasimov estimates the correlation of nonmilitary to military measures in this strategic approach as “4:1,” a ratio which emphasised the relative importance of the political, informational, and economic elements. While much attention has been focused on the nonmilitary (the “4”), it is important, in the words of a panelist at a recent Allied Command-Transformation hosted Strategic Foresight Analysis workshop, to “remember the ‘1’”—that is, the coercive military capacity that underpins the

U.S. Soldiers of Alpha Company, 1st Battalion,

41st Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade

Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division stand

guard in a watch tower while conducting

training during a Kosovo Force (KFOR)

mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at the Joint

Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels,

Germany, Feb. 24, 2016. The KFOR MRE 21 is

based on the current operational environment

and is designed to prepare the unit for peace

support, stability, and contingency operations

in Kosovo in support of civil authorities to

maintain a safe and secure environment.

(U.S. Army photo by Spc. Nathaniel Nichols/

Released)

By Lt. Col. Stephan Pikner, Ph.D, LANDCOM G5

1 “The Value of Science is in the Foresight”, by General Valery Gerasimov (Translated from Russian by Robert Coalson) Military Review, (January/February 2016); “Hybrid War and Its Countermeasures: A Critique of the Literature,” by Robert Johnson, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29:1 (2018); “New ‘Hybrid War’ or Old ‘Dirty Tricks’? The Gerasimov Debate and Russia’s Response to the Contemporary Operating Environment,” by Andrew J. Duncan, Canadian Military Journal 17:3 (Summer 2017)2 “Getting Gerasimov Right”, by Charles K. Bartles, Military Review, (January/February 2016)3 NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats, edited by Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey A. Larsen (NATO Defense College: 2015) 20

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Battle Group Poland U.S. Solders conduct a M777A2 Howitzer night live

fire in preparation for a combined arms live fire exercise for distinguished

visitor during Saber Strike 2017 at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, near

Orzysz, Poland, June 16, 2017. Saber Strike 17 is a U.S. Army Europe-led

multinational combined forces exercise conducted annually to enhance the

NATO Alliance throughout the Baltic region and Poland. This year’s exercise

includes integrated and synchronized deterrence-oriented training designed

to improve interoperability and readiness of the 20 participating nations’

militaries. (U.S. Army Photo by Staff Sgt. Brian Kohl)

By mixing nonmilitary and military measures short

of armed conflict aims to stay below the international threshold for openly declared war and achieve far greater efects.

broader, nonmilitary elements. Without the threatened ability to rapidly deploy military forces, the nonmilitary measures of Russia’s strategic approach are far less effective and can be largely countered using civilian-centric methods.

The Russian approach hinges on coupling efforts to undermine a target state’s sovereignty and cohesion with the implicit threat of rapidly applied force. Russia’s emphasis on snap exercises and the

rapid deployment of ground forces along its frontiers is intended to intimidate neighboring states. By demonstrating the ability to mass combat forces quickly along a border these drills aim to instill fear and doubt among target populations and their governments. Rather than being a prelude to invasion, however, the effect of these exercises is often to enable the nonmilitary elements of the larger Russian strategy.

By mixing nonmilitary and military measures short of armed conflict, the preferred Russian strategic approach laid out by Gerasimov aims to stay both stay below the international threshold for openly declared war and still achieve far greater effects than through solely nonmilitary means. Remaining short of war while clearly competing in the military realm allows

Russia to probe the limits of a deterrence posture that hinges on the overwhelming

military force NATO can bring to bear. Importantly, this is not a reflection of Russian strength; Russia’s preference for this strategic approach is predicated on it being effectively deterred from using more overt, assertive measures.4

In addition to probing the limits of deterrence, the Gerasimov approach also seeks to exploit the West’s clear distinction between peace and war. The bifurcation that exists in both international law and broadly among the foundational governing structures of the democracies that make up NATO serves several important purposes. First, it maintains important legal and structural constraints on the armed forces, keeping their use tightly held at the political level. Second, it maintains expenditures of money and manpower at sustainable levels by avoiding the economic and societal burdens of a perpetual wartime footing.

U.S. Soldiers and an Interim Armored Vehicle Stryker exit a C-17

Globemaster III during Exercise Arctic Pegasus at Deadhorse, Alaska,

March 13, 2018. The exercise tested the Air Force and Army’s ability

to operate in cold weather. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman

Tryphena Mayhugh)

4 Joint Doctrine Note 1/19 Deterrence: the Defence Contribution, (UK Ministry of Defense: February 2019); Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone, by Lyle Morris et al (RAND: 2019)

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A M777A2 Howizter executes a fire mission that was part

of a Fire Support Coordination Exercise at Land Forces

Field Training Center June 6, 2017. Saber Strike 17 is a

U.S. Army Europe-led multinational combined forces

exercise conducted annually to enhance the NATO Alliance

throughout the Baltic region and Poland. This year’s exercise

includes integrated and synchronized deterrence-oriented

training designed to improve interoperability and readiness

of the 20 participating nations’ militaries. (U.S. Army photo by

Sgt. Justin Geiger)

Finally, it elevates the use of force in international affairs to the exclusive domain of the state, which reinforces the status of national governments by making them the sole actors capable of legitimately waging war. 5

Competition Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict: Vigilance and Readiness Acknowledging the value of this sharp distinction between war and peace, in the current environment where adversaries exploit these seams and use military measures alongside nonmilitary ones to compete internationally necessitates a more integrated strategic approach that involves both military and nonmilitary elements. The initial outlines of such an approach are outlined in several pieces that consider military competition below the threat of armed conflict.6 Competition below the threshold of armed conflict is an integrated approach that forms a set of activities continuously applied and refined in conjunction with other elements of power such as diplomatic, economic, and informational means. These military activities challenge our adversaries and reinforce our allies, short of war. Competition below armed conflict can include mechanisms such as strengthening alliances and partnerships, preventing the deterioration of a stable situation, weakening a competitor through physical and informational aspects of power, and developing a shared perspective with partners to identify areas where cooperation would be of mutual benefit.

In short, they are much of what the Allied land community already does, but in a more coherent and focused manner.

While the nonmilitary dimensions of such a strategy, such as expanding the rule of law,countering corruption, and expanding economic opportunities, are indispensable components of competition, they are beyond the scope of what NATO forces in the land domain can achieve. The success of these broader efforts, however, is contingent on countering the Russian military intimidation that underwrites their strategic approach. By undermining the effectiveness of the military intimidation through vigilance and readiness, NATO land forces can both deter Russia from pursuing the preferred strategic approach outlined by Gerasimov and prevent an overly emboldened adversary from accidently overstepping into war.

The gradual and insidious nature of nonmilitary approaches that aim to “transform differences into contradictions” in a Russian target require constant vigilance.7 While many of the specific vigilance measures fall outside of land domain warfighting, tailoring exercises, activities, and posture can be effective ways to support the broader campaign. Importantly, subject matter experts within the land community—often, but by no means exclusively, working at Allied Land Command—can be effective advocates for these ground-centric capabilities at the Joint echelons where integrated vigilance measures are developed and implemented.Complementing vigilance is the timeliness

with which forces can be brought to bear. Enhanced readiness and deployability of NATO land units adds invaluable credibility to the military dimension of a broader competitive strategy aimed at deterring Russia’s preferred approach. While encompassing many facets, for the specific purposes of denying Russia’s ability to militarily intimidate its vulnerable neighbors two dimensions stand out: speed and enablement.

The strategic value of Russia’s emphasis on rapid deployment, displayed through frequent snap exercises, can be countered with a renewed emphasis on the speed andflexibility of NATO land forces. While inherently slower than airpower and less self-contained than a maritime task force, land forces provide an irreplaceable signal of commitment and power and must be brought rapidly to bear. As laid out in a recent article, countermeasures against incremental seizure of territory include “rapid and forceful retaliatory action, as early as possible.”8 Exercising and demonstrating that speed in the land domain carries a powerful deterrent message that undermines Russia’s intimidation efforts.Rapid deployment of forces in the land domain depend in large part on pre-existingenablement. Building and exercising the physical infrastructure, cross-border transitauthorities, and sustainment reach enables the ground forces to rapidly and flexibly respond to and thereby deter Russian attempts at intimidation. Enabling the environment through multilateral exercises, mobile training teams, and interoperability efforts similarly allows for the timely

5 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, (US Department of Defense: March 2018).6 Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum, (US Department of Defense: June 2019); “A New Blueprint for CompetingBelow the Threshold: The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning,” by Phillip Lohaus. War on the Rocks May 23, 20187 Gerasimov, 28.8 Johnson,149.

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US Army gunners from Archer Battery, 2nd platoon, 4th section, Field Artillery

Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment carry out a mission on the M777 howitzer.

Exercise Dynamic Front 18 includes approximately 3,700 participants from

26 nations at the U.S. Army’s Grafenwoehr Training Area (Germany), Feb.

23-March 10, 2018. Dynamic Front is an annual U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR)

exercise focused on the interoperability of U.S. Army, joint service and allied

nation artillery and fire support in a multinational environment, from theater-

level headquarters identifying targets to gun crews pulling lanyards in the

field.

Denying the effectiveness of

Russia’s coercion hinges on a coherent

posture of vigilant and ready land forces that are able

to flexibly and rapidly respond.

deployment of NATO land forces. In contrast to other warfighting domains, where the expense and size of many platforms limit the number of Allies with relevant capabilities, the ubiquity of land forces allow for more persistent, meaningful engagement and more equitable partnerships among Allies.Critically, the deterrent value of ready and vigilant land forces hinges largely on perception. If Russia recognises that its preferred strategic approach is no longer

viable because the military measures that underwrite its broader activities have been blunted, it will be deterred from pursuing such an approach and instead compete within, rather than to the detriment of the rules based international order. Similarly, if vulnerable allies and partners are assured by the speed and flexibility of NATO land power, Russian snap exercises and demonstrations become far less intimidating. Communicating this to all sides requires persistent engagement and coherent messaging across the theater.

ConclusionCountering preferred Russian strategic approach of leveraging military intimidation measures to enable nonmilitary activities that weaken and undermine a target state requires a comprehensive approach that includes diplomatic, informational, and economic dimensions.

Critical to any approach, however, are military measures that blunt Russian intimidation.

Denying the effectiveness of Russia’s coercion hinges on a coherent posture of vigilant and ready land forces that are able to flexibly and rapidly respond. Through deliberate partnership, training, and interoperability exercises, coupled with the strategic communications messaging to both our friends and foes that counters military intimidation, we as an allied land community can blunt the key component of the Russian strategic approach. Most importantly, this sustained competition below the threshold of armed conflict is the clearest way to deter war. By denying the effectiveness of Russian intimidation, we deter its use.

U.S. Soldiers with Battery A, 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery

Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry

Division, observe the impact zone during a M109A6 Paladin

howitzer live fire exercise at the 7th Army Training Command’s

Grafenwoehr Training Area, Jan. 17, 2018. The rotational

deployments of armored brigade combat teams are a

tangible expression of U.S. commitment to strengthening the

defensive and deterrent capabilities of the NATO alliance.

(U.S. Army photo by Markus Rauchenberger)

LC

4 Joint Doctrine Note 1/19 Deterrence: the Defence Contribution, (UK Ministry of Defense: February 2019); Gaining CompetitiveAdvantage in the Gray Zone, by Lyle Morris et al (RAND: 2019)5 Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, (US Department of Defense: March 2018).6 Joint Doctrine Note 1-19: Competition Continuum, (US Department of Defense: June 2019); “A New Blueprint for CompetingBelow the Threshold: The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning,” by Phillip Lohaus. War on the Rocks May 23, 20187 Gerasimov, 28.8 Johnson,149.

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CMI AND CIMIC MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS

Civil Military Interaction/Civil Military Cooperation MTTs are a core activity of the HQ LANDCOM G9. The number of MTTs will most likely continue to increase over the next several years, which in turn will help enhance NATO’s partnership spirit and contribute to regional and global peace and stability.

UPDATE LANDCOMG9 DIVISION

Today’s challenges demand a comprehensive approach by the international community. This

approach includes coordinating action between the range of civil and military actors enabled by the orchestration, coordination and de-confliction of NATO’s military and political instruments with other instruments of power. Hence, the military should be trained in order to prepare, plan and execute required tasks in a complex international environment. HQ LANDCOM G9 has a cadre of experienced staff officers, NATO Civilians and Non-Commissioned Officers capable of conducting these MTTs.

Recent ActivityThe team conducted three Civil Military Interaction (CMI)/ Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Military Training Teams (MTTs) recently. These include Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic from May 18 – 22; Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates from June 23-26; and Kiev, Ukraine from June 24-26. These MTTs, fulfilled by request of the host nations, were conducted in accordance with the various NATO Military Cooperation Partnership Programmes, such as Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).

CMI/CIMIC MTT provides students with an understanding of how NATO

conducts Civil-Military Cooperation activities with representatives from international organisations and non-governmental organisations who are actively involved in peace support and reconstruction and institution building activities in theatre.

LANDCOM trainers, often using their personal experience gained from operational deployments and interactions with non-military authorities, provided training to the students, ranging from OR-8 to OF-5 on topics such as NATO’s organisation and core tasks, the HQ LANDCOM mission and responsibilities, Comprehensive Approach, CIMIC contributions

By Mr (A-2) Jasper Beerends and Mr (A-2) Mehmet Aykut,HQ LANDCOM G9 Division

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UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES ARE EAGER TO ADOPT AND INTEGRATE NATO POLICIES INTO THEIR SYSTEM. CIMIC IS NO EXCEPTION.

to operations planning, Interaction with Non Military Actors, Cultural Property Protection and Building Integrity and Anti-Corruption. The students participated very actively in the syndicate work throughout this successful training.

In Focus: CIMIC in Ukraine The June LANDCOM CIMC MTT travelled to the National Defence University of Ukraine. Three G9 and one G5 (former CIMIC) personnel were appointed to train an audience composed of 25 officers ranging between OF-1 and OF-5. Ukraine CIMIC is relatively new and all students participating were assigned CIMIC staff or field workers. Although some were brand new to CIMIC, the homogeneous composition contributed to the success of the training. The course followed a prescribed agenda prepared for CIMIC MTTs which begins with the basics of CIMIC, such as the need for a Comprehensive Approach in crisis resolution, the difference between CMI and CIMIC, as well as, CIMIC contribution in planning; CIMIC staff work; CIMIC doctrine; CIMIC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs); and cross-cutting topics.

In order to share lessons learned, team members briefed practical experiences from operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. The training team also covered two syndicate work topics, including one focused on domestic natural disaster relief operations associated CIMIC tasks, and the other on a multinational peacekeeping operation using CMI and CIMIC reporting tools.

New Centre for ExcellenceUkrainian Armed Forces aim to establish a new Centre of Excellence for the Protection of Civilians. As a facilitator, Ukrainian Armed Forces are in contact with the Center for Civilians in Conflict, a NGO also working in coordination with the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in writing the NATO Protection of Civilians policy and doctrine. Based on requests from the host nation, a local member of CIMIC participated in the training and briefed on Protection of Civilians. Here he shared civilian experiences from operations.Ukrainian Armed Forces are eager to adopt and integrate NATO policies into their system. CIMIC is no exception. However,

due to the conflicts in some parts of the country, the military is tasked to undertake some civilian tasks such as supporting and/or enabling public administration, or providing direct assistance to the civilian population.

The ChallengeWhat makes this challenging for the Ukrainian CIMIC is the fact they lack experience in this area and their construct is not completely in line with NATO CIMIC doctrine. NATO CIMIC doctrine acknowledges civilian primacy, especially in public administration and humanitarian work. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (UNOCHA) guidelines, which CIMIC doctrine is based upon, emphasises that military assets should be used only as the last resort. Very few NATO countries allow their militaries to conduct domestic CIMIC except under specific circumstances. For some, domestic CIMIC is never an option. Because of this, Ukraine must develop a unique CIMIC approach, taking into consideration their own challenges and national requirements while following NATO CIMIC doctrine. NATO CIMIC, while assisting the establishment of a robust CIMIC capability in Ukraine, could also benefit from monitoring the implementation of Ukraine CIMIC in the field. LC

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FACES OF LANDCOM

JEREMY MORONSergeant Yahya award

Since the inception of Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) in 2012, the commander of LANDCOM has presented the Sergeant Yahya Award annually to the Non-Commissioned Officer whose has made an outstanding individual contribution to the success of Allied Land Command through their exceptional commitment, dedication and Duty.

COM LANDCOM presents the award

What did you feel when you received this award?

I felt a great inner pride when I was told that I would receive the highest distinction for a non-commissioned officer at LANDCOM. It was greatly rewarding to see that hard work and dedicated service are recognised here.

What was the reaction of your family and friends?

They are naturally proud of me and this has shown them that sooner or later the work will be rewarded.

Why did you decide to be a Soldier?

There were several reasons for this. I have two great

passions in life, motorcycles and

the Army. I started my

active and

profes-sional

TO SEE PICTURES OF THE EVENT:Check our Flickr

page.

life as a motorcycle mechanic and I quickly realised that this job could not offer me the satisfaction that I expected. So I pursued my second passion, the Army. After only a few weeks in the institution I quickly realised that this job was made for me.

What are some of the most impactful things you’ve done and learned while serving at LANDCOM?

My most valuable lesson that I learned in LANDCOM is that when serving in a multinational environment, we have the opportunity to share our experience and highlight all our skills by accepting tasks that are not always part of our “job description” and which are sometimes higher than our level of responsibility.

How do you see yourself in the future? What are your career aspirations from here? Has your career plan changed since you first joined the Army?

I will start by answering the last question; of course my career plans have changed. Service in the Army offers you a choice of trade and a chance to climb to higher echelons that no other profession can offer. It allows you to make your own choices and decide how you will go forward in the future. For personal reasons I have served for a long time as a soldier and decided to exploit and develop my knowledge by actively searching for new responsibilities. That’s why I joined the corps of non-commissioned officers. My goals are to pass the BSTAT, which is an important exam in the career of a NCO, and which allows you, after obtaining it, to go from being a contracted soldier to have a military career.

From your perspective, what is the secret to being a great soldier?

If I answer it will not be a secret any more, but I will answer because for me there is no secret, I simply live and follow the code of the French soldier.

By SFC Jonathan Fernandez ESP-A, LANDCOM Public Affairs Office.

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Sergeant Yahya 25-26 April 1915 Battle of Gallipoli

It was greatly rewarding to see that hard work and dedicated service are recognised here!

Sergeant Yahya, of 10th Company, 3rd Battalion, 26th Regiment, distinguished himself by acts of gallantry during the Battle of Gallipoli, at Ertugrul Cove (V Beach), Turkey on 25 April 1915.

On this day, Sgt. Yahya, with just 63 men and four maxim machine guns, was dug in with other Turkish Soldiers on Hill 138; one of the most strategic defensive points because of its location between V and W Beaches. In the early morning hours British Soldiers from the 1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers and the 1st Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers conducted an amphibious assault from the Landing Ship “SS River Clyde” to begin the Gallipoli campaign. As the boats came ashore Sgt. Yahya directed his men, and the machine guns, to engage the landing parities. Almost immediately Sgt. Yahya’s commander, Lieutenant Abdur Rahim, was killed. When no one stepped up to lead the company, Sgt Yahya took command of the company. Despite a continuous bombardment and multiple attempts by British forces to take the beach all morning, Sgt. Yahya courageously moved from position to position to rally soldiers and direct deadly fires onto the beach below. In the afternoon they received word that British soldiers were advancing toward Hill 138 from W Beach, which was to their rear. Sgt. Yahya quickly

mobilised his men and reinforced units defending the other side of Hill 138 facing W Beach. Because of his leadership and heroic actions Turkish forces were able to stop the British advance, forcing the British to abandon all attempts to capture the beaches until the next day. A Royal Naval Air Service observer flying above the battle that morning reported that the shallow waters of the cove were ‘absolutely red with blood’. Midshipman George Drewry, who was awarded the Victoria Cross for his courage at this landing, wrote to his father: ‘I never knew blood smelt so strong before’.

On the evening of the 25th British forces increased the bombardment of V Beach, and continued it throughout the night, with goal of destroying the trenches and displacing Sgt. Yahya’s men. Despite the bombardment and lack of reinforcements Sgt. Yahya and his men remained in position throughout the night and on the morning of 26 April the British resumed their attack. Sgt Yahya and his men continued to hold their ground throughout the morning, but by 3 PM that afternoon Sgt Yahya, along with most of his men, had been severely wounded and were ordered to move to alternate positions further up the coast. Shortly after moving to the alternate position Sgt. Yahya succumed to his wounds and became a martyr. LC

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North Macedonia Poised to Become NATO’s 30th Member

The NATO family is eagerly anticipating a new addition in the months ahead. After clearing a

longstanding hurdle to its membership last year, the Republic of North Macedonia is expected officially to join the Alliance once all 29 current members have ratified its Accession Protocol. This is considered likely to occur by the end of 2019.

Clearing the Way

From its founding declaration of independence in 1991, the nation recognised by the UN in 1993 under the provisional name of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)1 has had its sights on NATO membership. FYROM joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1995, and with other Balkan states in 1999 it embarked on a

Membership Action Plan path to accession, pending a resolution of the nation’s name acceptable to all Allies. After the Prespa Agreement settled on the Republic of North Macedonia in June 2018, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved an Accession Protocol in February 2019.

It now remains for all 29 current member states to ratify the Protocol. This process normally takes about a year, but given the 20-year wait in this case it might proceed more quickly. As of summer 2019, 20 Allies had put their signatures to the document. At the June 2019 meeting of Defense Ministers, North Macedonia’s MoD Radmila Shekerinska took her seat at the table for the first time.

North Macedonia’s accession will expand NATO’s security umbrella in the strategic region of the Western Balkans.

By LANDCOM POLAD Office

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North Macedonia’s location is important, helping to fill in a

Balkan gap in SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility

North Macedonia as a NATO Part-ner: Key Areas of Cooperation 2

A Valued Contributor

Although North Macedonia’s Army is small, it already contributes to a range of NATO missions, from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). From June 5 to July 9 of this year North Macedonia held Exercise Decisive Strike, its largest ever training exercise involving 2500 participants, in which the host nation was supported by joint forces from the USA, Lithuania, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Albania.

North Macedonia’s accession will expand NATO’s security umbrella in the strategic region of the Western Balkans.

North Macedonia’s location is important, helping to fill in a Balkan gap in SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). Its accession provides the Alliance territorial continuity with existing members Albania, Greece, and Bulgaria. The extension of NATO’s stabilising influence is a benefit in a region of small multi-ethnic states riven by conflict over the last century, and where Russian intentions are destabilising. In parallel with its NATO accession, North Macedonia’s pending application for EU membership demonstrates its firm orientation toward the West, building defensive solidarity in the Western Balkans.

Open Door Policy

NATO maintains an “Open Door” policy to new members, as set out in Article 10 of its founding document, the Washington Treaty: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” In spite of Russian displeasure at the enlargement of the Alliance in what it considers to be its “near abroad” sphere of influence, Article 10 makes clear that it is for NATO nations to set the criteria for Alliance membership, with no right of refusal accorded to any adversary.

1 Turkey recognized the nation under its Constitutional name.

Building capabilities and interoperability- An important focus of cooperation is to develop the ability of North Macedonia’s forces to work together with forces from NATO countries and other partners, especially in peacekeeping and crisis-management operations. Participation in joint planning, training and military exercises is essential in this regard.- Participation in the PfP Planning and Review Process since 1999 has also helped develop interoperability, as well as providing planning targets that are key to security reform and transformation objectives for the country’s armed forces.- In 2005, the country joined the Operational Capabilities Concept, a mechanism through which units available for operations can be evaluated and better integrated with NATO forces to increase operational effectiveness.- Participation in the Defence Education Enhancement Programme is helping improve education and training, which is essential for the country’s defence reform efforts.- Through participation in the Building Integrity Programme, North Macedonia is working to strengthen good governance in the defence and security sector, and reduce risks of corruption by strengthening transparency and accountability.- In 2013, the country’s Public Affairs Regional Centre in Skopje was recognised as a Partnership Training and Education Centre, opening its activities to Allies and partners.

Support for NATO-led operations- North Macedonia deployed troops in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2002 to end 2014. It is currently supporting the follow-on Resolute Support mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces.- The country was a key partner in supporting NATO-led stabilisation operations in Kosovo in 1999, as NATO forces deployed North Macedonia to halt the spread of the conflict as well as to provide logistical support to the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The Allies also provided humanitarian assistance to help the North Macedonia deal with the flood of refugees from Kosovo. The country continues to provide valuable host nation support to KFOR troops transiting its territory.

2 Source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48830.htm

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NATO Land Standardisation Week

Delivering a new initiative for the Land Interoperability and Standardisation community of interest, LANDCOM G7 Standardisation, Interoperability and Lessons Learned (SIL) team facilitated a new Land Standardisation seminar to provide an interoperability and standardisation update. The update ‘piggy backed’ off the Land Operations Working Group (LOWG),

and Army Service Task Group (ARSTG) and Doctrine and Procedures Working Group (DPWG) home base conferences this year. This year the activity, held at both the Swissotel in Izmir and Allied Land Command Headquarters, attracted over 180 Standardisation, Doctrine and Interoperability subject matter experts (SMEs) representing 21 nations from across the NATO land environment and national communities of interest. The activity was hosted by Lt. Gen. J.T. Thomson (USA-A), LANDCOM Commander.

From a land interoperability and standardisation perspective, the activity was instrumental in providing coherence and consensus across multiple ongoing issues and concerns, and helped set conditions for the individual working group sessions which followed the initial plenary. A key part of this initiative was to better inform and develop networking relationships through multiple networking sessions and coordination breaks, a cultural trip to the Ancient City of Pergamon, and a well-attended ice-breaker event.

Land Operations Working Group (LOWG)

The LOWG is responsible for the development of Land Doctrine, providing a way ahead to address future Land Doctrinal challenges. The event was chaired by LANDCOM Assistant Chief of Staff G7 Col Hakan Demirel (TUR-A) and coordinated by Cmdr. Arturo Paturzo (ITA-N), a LANDCOM Standardisation SME. The secretary was Lt. Col. Albert Strijker (NLD-A) representing the NATO Standardisation Office (NSO) and Military Committee Land Standardisation Board (MCLSB). The Terms of Reference constituent held five panels dealing with specific doctrinal functions; Terminology, Reports, Land Doctrine, Military Police and a new Specific Environments panel.

During the week delegates and LANDCOM SMEs worked on common areas of interest necessary to focus maximum national effort to support the Land domain. The other working groups had separate programmes of work, but all reported to the Land Doctrine Panel on completion of activities. Prior to dispersal, the audience, augmented by Lt. Gen. J.T. Thomson and all LANDCOM senior leaders, attended the LOWG final plenary where Brig. Van Wagenen (Deputy Commander, 3 UK Division) briefed on Land Warfighting Interoperability opportunities, focussing on the lessons from the USA Exercise WARFIGHTER 19.

Finally, Lt. Col. McGown, MBE (GBR-A), briefed multiple groups on the outcomes of the other working groups. Once again, the LOWG confirmed its critical role in the enhancement and delivery of Land Doctrine despite the logistic challenges presented by the large conference and multitude of activities. Their hard work was rewarded by the positive contribution from the national NATO Command Structure (NCS), NATO Force Structure (NFS) and SME delegates.

By Lt. Col. Jock McGown, MBE, Head of Land Standardizsation, Interoperability and Lessons

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Land Concept Development and Experimentation Working Group (LCDE WG)

Formerly known as the Doctrine and Procedures Working Group (DPWG), this forum represents all the NATO Response Force (NRF) Corps Headquarters and Multinational Division South East (MND SE). The forum offers a critical ‘bottom up’ approach to standardisation, doctrine and interoperability influence and initiative. The main focus for this session was an agreement to ratify a new change in name and Terms of Reference to reflect transformation and criticality of Graduated Response Force Land (GRF (L)) headquarters and its ability to contribute toward and influence future doctrine, concept development and experimentation necessary to enhance NATO Land interoperability and standardisation.

This critical capability remains in safe hands with COM LANDCOM providing assurance and advocacy across the community of interest, providing the NFS a land champion and the NCS a bridge towards better operating capabilities. Lt. Col. McGown and Maj. Patrice Merjay provided the co-chair and secretary of this forum which is an integral part of the Land Standardisation Week. Of particular note was the attendance by doctrine representatives from all of NRDC Italy’s subordinate divisions who provided ‘ground truth’ throughout proceedings.

Army Service Task Group (ARSTG)

NATO Education, Training, Exercise and Evaluation (ETEE) is guided by capability requirements and operational standards as identified by SACEUR. With the exception of mission specific education and training of the NATO Command Structure (NCS), which is the responsibility of NATO, education and training of individuals and forces allocated to NATO is a national responsibility. NATO supports nations in achieving this via the Steering Group NATO Task Group (SG NTG), a critical forum working directly for Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and managed by the Executive Working Group NATO Task Group (EWGNTG). The ARSTG is the executive Land branch of this forum and provides COM LANDCOM with the conduit to ensure coherence and currency across the ACO/ACT nexus. The main aim of the ARSTG is to enhance professionalism, interoperability and standardisation among Alliance and Partner forces through improved coordination of ETEE with an emphasis on supporting operations.

In summary, the Land Standardisation Week activity was a huge administration and coordination challenge, but the benefits and positive deliverables from the separate forums and networking opportunities will quickly filter down through the community of interest, improving activities and operational readiness. The next event returns to Izmir in Spring 2020 and the aspirations for the next LSW plenary is to ensure that SHAPE, ACO, and ACT SMEs attend and support the activity. This will ensure a coherent top down and bottom up approach that addresses ground truth issues and concerns, and better influences change and development across this critical environment.

The Land Standardisation Week was

a huge administration and coordination

challenge, but the benefits and positive

deliverables will quickly filter down

through the community.

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THE BRIDGE TO SUCCESS

TopBUILDING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Headquarters Multinational Division South-East (HQ MND-SE) demonstrated its ability to support regional exercises as part of allied deterrence posture by

participating in exercise SABER GUARDIAN 19 (SAGN19) from June 3-24. Approximately 13,500 soldiers from 14 Allied and partner nations participated in the military drills, co-led by U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and Romanian Land Forces and spanning various locations in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

“Participating in SAGN 19 offered us the opportunity to maintain

the Headquarters core competencies in defensive operations,” said Maj. Gen. Daniel Petrescu, who was Commander of HQ MND-SE at the time. “In addition, building and maintaining situational awareness, especially during the deployment phase of allied forces, were also our main focus.”

The exercise was split into several stages with the initial stages focused on a fictitious scenario-based Computer Assisted Exercise/Command Post Exercise (CAX/CPX) under operational control of HQ MND-SE. The latter stages included a Live Exercise

By MND-SE Public Affairs

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EX. SCORPIONS FURY 19 INVOLVED MORE THAN 1,800 TROOPS AND OVER 600 VEHICLES

(LIVEX) with the primary objective of executing a wet gap crossing over the Danube River. This was under the operational control of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division.

Article V CAX/CPX

HQ MND-SE participated as secondary training audience in the CAX/CPX, with Romanian Land Component Command as the primary target audience. The HQ objectives were to plan, prepare, coordinate, conduct and assess an Article 5 operation in order to increase interoperability between MND-SE staff, the US and other regional participants. Additionally, HQ MND-SE tested the C2 capability provided by mission secret and unclassified networks with other NATO and partner forces.

During the CPX/CAX, more than 150 soldiers from HQ MND-SE worked alongside affiliated and subordinate units to solve a multitude of scenario based problems from their training location in Romania. The 2nd Bulgarian Mechanized Brigade, for example, afforded HQ MND-

Multi-national participants of EX SABER GUARDIAN 19 conduct the LIVEX wet gap crossing over the Danube.

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Approximately 13,500 soldiers from 14 allied and partner nations participated in exercise saber guardian 19

SE the training experience necessary for enhanced partnership between nations for the shared understanding and vision necessary if conflict occurs.

Overseeing the River Crossing

HQ MND-SE monitored the participation of Multinational Brigade Southeast (MN BDE-SE) during Exercise SCORPIONS FURY 19 (SCFY 19), the LIVEX component of SAGN 19. Under the command of Brig. Gen. Cristian Dan (ROU-A), SCFY 19 involved more than 1,800 troops and over 600 vehicles from the 10th ROU Engineer Brigade, a ROU Riverine Task Group, the 307th Marine Infantry Regiment, and elements from ROU Navy Special Forces, the Romanian Air Force, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. 141st Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.

The wet gap crossing alone involved 1,100 soldiers and 200 vehicles and began with modular training. Troops rehearsed each tactical phase of the river crossing, ranging from securing the near river bank, overtaking and securing the far bank,

occupying the bridge head and continuing the offensive. Following the modular training portion, the units involved executed a full wet gap operation from start to finish in real time.

All in all, the aim of SAGN 19, according to one Romanian Ministry of National Defense official, was to “emphasise cohesion, unity and solidarity of the partner and allied states with a view of defending themselves against any type of aggression, especially by a rapid mobilisation and concentration of forces in a short time, anywhere in Europe.”

The aim was achieved. SAGN 19 increased the interoperability between the organisations, tested staff procedures and proved, once again, the strength and professionalism of all participants. Moreover, the successful recertification of both NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) Bulgaria and NFIU Romania proved these standing units fully capable of completing operational tasks in order to facilitate the rapid deployment of the NATO Response Force and other NATO forces in the region. LC

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Russia Re-establishing Electronic Warfare Capacity After Years of Neglect

Over the past decade, Russia has increasingly focused on modernising their armed forces. These efforts include ad-justments to force structures as well as development and testing of new equipment and tactics. While the develop-ment and fielding of the T-14 Armata Main Battle Tank and associate T-15 Armata Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehi-cle may dominate the thoughts of NATO land forces in some circles, Moscow has consistently invested in mod-ernisation and development of Russian electronic warfare (EW) (Radioelektronnaya Borba—EW) capacity.

Clearly an important element of the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) future plans for both hybrid and armed conflict, Russia is actively developing a “total pack-age” of EW systems and CO capability. Already, the RFAF fields significant EW capability at the operational and tactical levels that can potentially impact NATO land op-erations. Recent operational employment and exercises further illuminate the growth of RFAF EW thought and capability as well as ways in which Russia intends to inte-grate these capabilities across any future operations. As a result, networked NATO land forces need to ensure we

train our units and leaders to both counter and compete in a denied or degraded electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). This is especially relevant as Russia is likely to employ a scaled version of their very capable national cyber effects in the tactical environment as the next logical extension of the EMS targeted by more traditional EW.

More than 10 years in the making

Starting in 2008, RFAF restructured ground forces to move from a mostly Divisional structure toward a Bri-gade-based force. As part of this modernisation, Russia added an EW company to each manoeuvre brigade, and equipped each with the capacity to jam HF, VHF, and UHF communications as well as select satellite and GSM (Glob-al System for Mobile) -based phones. Between 2009 and 2015, RFAF formed and equipped EW brigades under each of the four Military Districts (two in the Western Military District (WEMD)). These EW brigades field some of the most modernised EW systems in the RFAF inven-tory that provide all the capabilities already mentioned at

PAVEL LISITSYN/SPUTNIK VIA APA soldier mans one of the terminals inside a Krasukha-4 electronic warfare vehicle during an exercise.

1 McDermott, R. N. (2017, September). Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025. International Centre for Defence and Security, Republic of Estonia MoD, 1. https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/ICDS_Report_Russias_Electronic_Warfare_to_2025.pdf

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Russian EW system R-330Zh ‘Zhitel’ (first and second from the left) designed to interfere with satellite commu-nications equipment, as well as navigation systems and mobile phones; and R-330BMV vehicle (right) element of RB-301B ‘Borisoglebsk-2’ EW system designed for sur-veillance and interference of ground and airborne radio communications

longer range along with the added capacity to disrupt ground/air-based radar and UAV opera-tions. In some cases, these operational level EW systems offer ranges out to several hundred kilo-metres as compared to less than fifty kilometres for those organic to manoeuvre brigades. Russia remains focused on fielding increasingly capable EW systems across the strategic, operational and tactical levels. These “force enablers and capabil-ity multipliers” augment all service branches with a distinct focus on support to ground forces. These capabilities cover surveillance (detection), protection, and countermeasures (jamming), whilst at the same time, efficiently supporting measures to protect Russia’s own use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Many of the Russian EW systems are highly mobile, including small

systems deployable by UAVs, making it more complex to target and neutralise their effects.

Russia’s new and nimble EW capability

During the first and second Chechen Wars, Rus-sian EW capability proved to be a shadow of what it had been at the height of the Cold War. Small decentralised groups of specialists provided only an inconsistent capacity to monitor and disrupt the communications of a technologically infe-rior force using primarily commercial rather than military grade devices. The war with Georgia in 2008 saw only limited improvement relevant to the land domain with Russia potentially demon-strating a nascent capacity to disrupt Georgian UAV operations. Russian EW operations since

that time, in theatres like Syria and Ukraine, have displayed a marked increase in capacity. Many observers now assess that Russian EW forms an organic part of Russia’s kinetic and non-kinetic operations—both in sup-port of forces and in some cas-es as independent operations. Much of the Russian EW effort in Syria remains focused on sim-ple force protection and in the air domain. While these actions are beyond the scope of this article, there is clear evidence of RFAF efforts in support of Syrian Arab Army (SAA) ground action on a smaller scale. Russian operators employed systems like the Leer-3 which leverages one or more Orlan-10 UAVs to jam signals including mobile phones, all with-out placing the EW operator in harm’s way. These EW specialists

Russian EW system RB-341V ‘Leer-3’ designed to use ORLAN-10 UAS for surveillance and jamming of GSM networks

2 Ibid p.6,7.3 Ackerman, R. K. (2017, November). Russian Electronic Warfare Targets NATO Assets. SIGNAL Magazine AFCEA. https://www.afcea.org/content/russian-electronic-warfare-targets-nato-assets4 McDermott, R. N. (2017, September). P. 20.5 Ibid p. 22.

6 Gould J. (2015, August). Electronic Warfare: What US Army Can Learn From Ukraine. Defense News Online.7 Mehta, A. (2017, November). Interview: Col. Kaupo Rosin, Estonia’s Military Intelligence Chief. Defense NewsOnline. 8 McDermott, R. N. (2017, September). P. v.

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COMMANDERS AND LEADERS AT ALL LEVELS MUST EVALUATE IF OUR UNITS AND SOLDIERS ARE PREPARED TO OPERATE IN A DEGRADED OR DENIED ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT.

were able to deny opposition forces the ability to commu-nicate despite their use of more advanced communica-tions platforms. Clearly a force multiplier, operations like this enabled SAA forces to isolate and dislodge oppo-sition forces and retake con-trol of most of Syria. Russian actions against con-ventional Ukranian units in Crimea again saw execution of EW operations as a ma-jor means to enable ground operations. After isolat-ing Ukranian forces on the peninsula by destroying the terrestrial based, station-ary infrastructure they used to stay tethered to the rest of Ukraine, irregular forces continued to employ EW capabilities through proxies, no doubt supported by RFAF experts.

As the Ukranian forces moved to alternate means of communication, these small, mobile teams with advanced EW equipment from Russia were able to deny commu-nications and support target-

ing. In at least two instances of larger conventional op-erations, we can see a clear foreshadowing of RFAF in-tent to employ coordinated EW. During the Russian led conventional engagements at Ilovaysk near Donetsk and at Debaltseve, there is evidence that Russian forces employed a comprehensive technical monitoring group to detect, jam, and target signals on the battlefield; dis-rupt early warning aircraft; and impact mobile phone networks.

As part of this last task, it is likely that these EW forces supported Psyops forces by sending demoralising text messages to Ukrainian sol-diers. In both engagements we see that EW enables not only manoeuvre, but also targeting and other forms of action. When employed in echelon, the many systems that Russia brought to bear were dispersed across the battlefield with tactical sys-tems up to thirty kilometres from the line of engagement and more operational level

systems able to stand off up to 100 kilometres or more.

Russia’s Pivot

Moscow increasingly frames the future of armed conflicts as shifting to be network centric and thus heavily reli-ant on the electromagnetic spectrum. RFAF have already learned how to degrade or even deny adversary usage of the EMS and then take ad-vantage of this state to cre-ate an operational environ-ment favouring their forces. Russian forces regularly train in jamming mitigation and operations in a downgraded or denied spectrum, likely in preparation for both the side effects of their own jamming as well as actions by others on the battlefield. Ukrain-ian land forces had to learn these lessons under com-bat conditions in the face of Russian executed EW that former COM LANDCOM, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, once described as “eye watering”. Col. Kaupo Rosin, Chief of Estonia’s Military Intelligence from 2012-2018, also mar-

Russian EW equipment reported from Donetsk region by OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (source: https://twitter.com)

veled on RFAF’s extensive use of EW when he stated his surprise of “the amount of jamming of their own troops” during EXERCISE ZA-PAD 2017.

The lesson is clear. Russia’s ap-proach to the spectrum is com-prehensive and complemented by changes to its organisation, doctrine and training, as well as tactics, tech-niques and procedures for their EW forces. Roger N. Mc Dermott, au-thor of the International Centre for Defence and Security’s report “Rus-sia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025” summed it up well

Russia’s ability to contest the EMS, combined with its holistic military thinking, means that EW capability will be exploited and effects created well beyond the traditional realms in which NATO’s thinking about EW is rooted. We might witness an ever-growing convergence of Russia’s EW, cyber- and information warfare approaches, which will further chal-lenge NATO’s concepts and prac-tices.8

These words should resonate strongly within NATO land force units. Knowledge of EW can no longer be the purview of a select few experts in a unit. Commanders and leaders at all levels must evaluate if our units and soldiers are prepared to operate in a degraded or denied electromagnetic environment. LC

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Commander LANDCOM signs letter of cooperation with Georgia Defence Forces

U.S. Army Lt. Gen. J.T. Thomson, Commander of NATO Allied Land Command (LANDCOM), and Georgian Army Col. Nikoloz Janjgava, First Deputy of Georgia Defence Forces (GDF), signed a letter of cooperation at the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre in Krtsanisi National Training Centre, March 29, 2019.

During the closing ceremony of NATO-Georgia Exercise 2019, Thomson shared a few words.

“History teaches us that strength deters aggression,” Thomson said. “Given today’s complex, dynamic and uncertain security environment, it is vital to be ready and strong. Strength not only comes from

economic might or military might, but it also depends on trusted friends. In Georgia, we have extraordinary friends, and for that, NATO is exceptionally grateful.”

Janjgava agreed. “This exercise has proved to be very productive and well-coordinated in terms of sharing experience and improving efficiency of the GDF through practical application of NATO exercise planning and execution processes,” he said. “We are able to conclude that the exercise fulfilled its objectives, which are to enhance our capabilities to plan and execute multinational crisis response operations and to further improve our interoperability with the Allied staffs.”

By LANDCOM Public Affairs

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The purpose of the letter is to establish the framework for future cooperation between NATO’s LANDCOM and the GDF in the land domain. As Europe continues to respond to the aggressive actions of a potential adversary, this cooperation has deep implications in the NATO deterrence

mission and in the efforts of NATO member nations and partner nations in the collective defense of Europe.

Georgian Col. Alexander Kiknadze, Commander of the GDF’s Eastern Command, emphasised the importance

of the letter, “we are truly committed to future cooperation with NATO.”

The senior leaders signed the letter just prior to the closing ceremony of the second iteration of the NATO-Georgia Exercise, which is a computer assisted command post exercise focused on the interoperability and readiness of GDF as they are the lead of a multinational brigade with troops from 24 participating NATO member and partner nations. The exercise is scheduled every third year as a part of the Substantial NATO- Georgia Package framework, a set of 15 defence capacity building initiatives between NATO and Georgia established during the Wales Summit in 2014 and reinforced at the Warsaw Summit in 2016. The first iteration of this exercise occurred in 2016 involving 15 NATO member and partner nations.

During this year’s exercise, the Georgian led multinational brigade headquarters staff planned, coordinated and executed a scenario-based military response to a humanitarian crisis. The exercise tested the interoperability of Georgian, member and partner nation forces in the ability to adopt a comprehensive approach to a non-article 5 crisis response involving civil-military cooperation with international organisations and non-governmental organisations. This brigade-level exercise is scheduled by NATO Allied Command Transformation, conducted by the Georgian General Staff with mentoring from NATO Allied Land Command, and directed by the

NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre mentored by NATO Joint Force Training Centre.

“Georgia today is a critical partner for the NATO Alliance,” Thomson said. “Nothing speaks to commitment like boots on the ground and … I witnessed it first hand from Georgia on a daily basis [in Afghanistan].” The letter of cooperation is mutually beneficial to enhance readiness, capability and capacity and is a win-win for all. LC

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LANDCOM’s Joint Effects and Fires Branch: Current Activities

SPANISH ARMY 7TH AIRBOURNE LIGHT

INFANTRY BRIGADE OPERATING A L118

LIGHT GUN

In the spring 2018 edition of LANDPOWER we discussed LANDCOM’s Joint Fires and Targeting Initiative. This initiative, which is a programmatic, federated approach from LANDCOM together with NATO Force Structure Headquarters, aims to increase readiness and warfighting capability in Joint Fires and Targeting through process improvement; training and education; doctrine and policy; interoperability; organisational structure; and building capability and capacity to deter and defend. The first results of these efforts are contained in the ARRC Handbook on “Corps Deep Operations” and NRDC-ITA “Battle Space Management Concept”.

SHAPE Takes Notice

This initiative drew attention from higher as SHAPE tasked LANDCOM to broaden the initiative and define a Joint Fires Initial Requirements and Roadmap, not only aimed at the LAND domain, but delivering a solid single document for a further way ahead for NATO Command Structure, NATO Force Structure and the nations. The result is in line with all other LANDCOM efforts within the NATO Readiness Initiative and the Allied Military Re-Enforcement program. For example, the document includes, but is not constrained by, a focus on initial requirements for the early reinforcement of forward forces by joint and strategic effects including Joint Fires. It is also a tool that can support national defence planning processes. These identified requirements are intended to inform modifications to existing capabilities and the development of new minimum capability requirements within the nations to drive the development of new capabilities, as well as doctrine and procedures.

One key aspect to success is to include ongoing initiatives, working groups, and concepts under development at various levels. These include not only the other

NATO Command Structure HQ commands and Joint commands, but also ACT entities such as the NATO School in Oberammergau. LANDCOM completed the task recently and provided the Joint Fires Initial Requirements and Roadmap to SHAPE. The document was signed by the SHAPE Chief of Staff in early July and forwarded to the International Military Staff for approval and further guidance, underpinning the importance of this LANDOM initiative.

Lines of Effort

LANDCOM Fires & Effects Branch used the Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability (DOTMLPFI) methodology to develop five lines of effort:

LOE1. Doctrine and Procedural Interoperability, focused on development of Joint Fires Doctrine across multiple domains, as well as coordinated with Joint Effects, Targeting and Information Operation doctrine review process.

LOE2. Planning, focused on building up a NATO wide centralised Targeting Capacity contributing to future NATO operational planning process.

US SOLDIERS OF THE 2ND CAVALRY REGIMENT CARRY OUT A FIRE MIS-SION USING THE M-777 DURING EX DYNAMIC FRONT

By Lt. Col. Stephen Saul (DEU-A)

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LOE3. Force Structure & Capabilities, focused on Joint Fires force structure and capabilities in NATO and feeding national capabilities and procurement processes with quantitative and qualitative requirements.

LOE4. Technical & Cyberspace Interoperability, focused on improving existing and developing new Computer Information Systems and Functional Area Systems requirements and integrating the cyberspace operations.

LOE5. Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation, focused on improving exercise construct and design as well as training enhancement through integration of live, virtual and constructive means.

Additionally, two Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) studies are ongoing or planned. The first involves Optimising Tactical Air C2 supporting Land Operations. ARRC has the lead here

on behalf of LANDCOM with their first analysis report scheduled for completion in September and to be briefed during LC3 in October. The second study, led by LANDCOM is planned for 2020 will run under the working title of Joint Fires.

LANDCOM Focus

LANDCOM’s main focus lies within LOE 1, LOE 3, and the command’s own JALLC study. Some activities, such as support for a Joint Fires doctrine, a concept that currently does not exist in NATO, is something SHAPE and LANDCOM will work towards for approval during the Doctrine Working Group in October.

Secondary are Land focused topics, such as the Multinational Field Artillery Brigade Concept and an Operational (Surface) Fires Command Concept together with NFS and USAREUR. Upcoming exercises in 2019 and 2020, including EAGLE METEOR, DYNAMIC FRONT series, RAMSTEIN

AMBITION 20, and the TRIDENT JUPITER/LOYAL LEDA series, will provide opportunities to implement and test solutions. These efforts should also provide enough insight for development of user requirements for a potential NATO Joint Fires Functional Area System. Current options under consideration include a Fires capabilities in the future Land C2 system development (LC2IS replacement) or the creation of an entirely new system.

In summary, the Joint Fires Initial Requirements and Roadmap document provides both vision and detailed, actionable items. Of course, furthering this way ahead depends on cooperation throughout the NCS. It also enables LANDCOM to take the initial initiative we began with the GRF(L)s with the defined workstrands and align them with the defined lines of effort of the Joint Fires Initial Requirements and Roadmap. LC

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Eurocorps Road to ReadinessEurocorps’ focus changed significantly since the beginning of 2018.

After a total of five rotations of the European Training Missions in Mali and the Central African Republic,

the road had to be paved for NATO assignments. Eurocorps’ commitment to NATO Response Force (NRF) 2020 as the Land Component Command is the most significant, near future mission for the organisation. Because of this, Eurocorps completed a series of exercises in recent months involving numerous multinational units, including the German 10th Panzer Division and the Polish Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) Brigade 20.

New C2 Tools

The new Command Post System is an essential core element for how Eurocorps must operate as the NRF alongside multinational units. Developed using existing C2 systems, this new command and control tool was tested for the first time during exercise COMMON BOOST 18. It was tested again against a high-intensity combat Article 5 scenario at the component command level during exercises COMMON TENACITY 18 and 19. This step proved incredibly important due to the simple fact that

The new Command Post

System is an essential

core element for how

Eurocorps must oper-

ate as the NRF alongside

multinational units.

Eurocorps Signal Coy change of com-mand at Lehbach, Germany.

By Lt. Col. Torsten STEPHAN (DEU-A), EUROCORPS

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Eurocorps CP Coy was deployed to Lebach DEU Barracks to conduct basic schooting training.

the contemporary experiences of most modern soldiers have been primarily shaped by low intensity and drawn-out stabilisation missions like the NATO mission to Afghanistan. In addition, during this collection of exercises, emphasis on joint and combined operations during tactical situations became tangible for every member of Eurocorps, helping the organisation complete this essential step on the road to certification as the NRF.

A Dual Role

At the same time, Eurocorps must also maintain and intensify a dual-purpose role as key to the defence of the European Union, as evidenced by Europcorps’ total of five rotations on European training missions. The command implemented significant new activities during the

first half of 2019 that included regular professional exchanges between Eurocorps and the European Military Staffs. These exchanges were focused in particular on the support of exercises and training initiated by the European Military Staff and supported by Eurocorps. This is of great importance for Eurocorps as the framework nations of Eurocorps fully intend to task the Headquarters to participate at European Union Training Missions following the NRF commitment.

European Recognition

The role and prominence of Eurocorps is clearly recognised by European leaders. After French President Macron announced the motto “We defend together” for the 2019 Bastille day military parade in Paris, Eurocorps was invited to take part in a parade alongside members of the Rapid Reaction Corps-France (RRC-FR) on July 14th on the Champs Elysees. This was a great experience for the participants and sent a strong message of relevance for Eurocorps in Strasbourg.

The remainder of 2019 holds some important changes. For one, Eurocorps’ command changed from Lt. Gen. Juergen Weigt of Germany to Lt. Gen. Laurent Kolodziej of France. At the same time, most of the Command Group will change only a few months out from our NATO certification. In November Eurocorps will deploy to Norway and participate in the exercise TRIDENT JUPITER 19, which is the final step toward certification before assuming NRF responsibility in Jan. 2020. After 20 months of preparation, this will mark the final steps on the road to readiness.

How the Cyber Domain Supports LAND Operations

Cyber defenders fight against simulated cyber attacks during Exercise Locked Shields 2019.

Image of the Exercise Locked Shields 2019. A team of nearly 40 NATO cyber security experts competed from April 9-12 in LOCKED SHIELDS 2019, the world’s largest live-fire cyber exercise. More than 1,000 international cyber defenders and decision makers took part in the drills. Organised by the NATO Cooperative Cy-ber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia, the event used a game based approach, enabling participants to take on roles in fictitious response teams. Their goal was to assess a crisis sit-

Close attention to

Cyberspace« Cyber » has become a very fancy word these days. Almost daily, we read an article about the latest software vulnerability, data stolen from various websites, or factory production lines blocked by ransomware. For many years, military entities only considered “cyber” as the technical way to protect information technology (IT) systems. At a time when traditional operational domains (Air, Land and Maritime) and the cyber domain are becoming more interdependent than ever, a posture change from “information assurance” to “mission assurance” was necessary. We now must consider how cyber aggressions could impact our operations, and how our cyber domain functions may support other operational processes (i.e. cyber contribution to the intelligence collection cycle or the targeting cycle).

For NATO, the recognition of cyber threats to its IT systems during Prague summit in 2002 was the first step toward incorporating and acknowledging the significance of the cyber domain. Since this time, NATO has strived to gain

experience and expertise and is now ready to operate in this domain.

By LANDCOM G6

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NATO Decisions Considering Cyberspace

The specific evolutions of the domain were decided in parallel with NATO Command Structure Adaptation (NCS-A) and for HQ LANDCOM this offers concrete opportunities. In the past the cyber branch of LANDCOM was designed for Communication and Information Systems (CIS) security. With the adaptation concept, the Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO) branch retains this task as a major objective, but is now comprised of seven members tasked to contribute to cyberspace operationalisation and development and coordination of cyber support to land operations.

Maintaing Top Level CIS Security:

The CIS Security task is a core task of the DCO branch. It’s a fundamental part of the overall security of the HQ. By identifying and managing risks related to CIS infrastructure, the team directs appropriate cybersecurity hygiene and practices, coordinates their implementation with the CIS service provider and the organisation’s divisions, and performs routine checks to ensure effective application.

Supporting the Process of a Land Operation:

Due to the interdependence of cyber and land domains and the technical specialisation requirement to properly understand cyber domain actions, DCO

branch has a huge role in advising every component of the land operations (Intelligence, Planning, Force Protection, Information Operations, etc.) and translating technical terms to operational impacts. The DCO branch head also serves as the cyber advisor to HQ senior officers and ensures their situational awareness.

Defensive Cyberspace Operations and NATO Cyber Community:

As the primary entity responsible for the elaboration and coordination for LAND defensive cyberspace operations, DCO members are the entry point to the SHAPE Cyber Operations Center and the cyber teams of the other NCS HQs and NATO specialised cyber units. Currently, the team is initiating interchanges with the NFS HQs with the aim to identify and address any potential cyber operations interoperability challenges.

NATO clearly understands the importance of cyber operations and how critical they are to modern warfare. In LANDCOM, based on strong CIS security bases, success is defined by integrating cyber supporting effects and understanding those actions taken in cyber domain impact every element of a synchronised land operation. Lead by SHAPE and its CyOC, the domain stakeholders are on track to reach initial operational capability in 2020 and full operational capability in 2022.

uation, maintain services and defend networks that have fallen victim to cyber attacks. In the exercise scenario, the fictitious country Berylia faced coordinated cyber attacks against its civilian infrastructure, while it was holding national elections. The job of NA-TO’s team was to help contain the damage and protect the networks from further attacks. The exercise took place in a laboratory environment. Footage includes various shots of experts on computers, as well as shots of various IT equipment involved in the exercise,

LC

This graphic depicts the progression of NATO in terms of cyber

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Vigilant and Ready Land Forces for Deterrence and Defence is the theme of the Fall 2019 LANDCOM Corps Command-

er’s Conference. Deterrence is the mechanism by which the Alliance con-ducts soft power projection along its Eastern flank and ensures the defence of Europe. Readiness is the mindset that underpins that mechanism. Central to operationalising the readiness mindset is Theatre Enablement. Theatre Enable-ment is key to the concept of readiness as it allows for the free and unrestrict-ed access of all NATO forces across and through the European Theatre at all times. This capability, fully realised and demonstrated, is a key component of the wider mechanism of deterrence. Full comprehension of how the Alliance achieves the LC3 theme requires an understanding of what Theatre Enable-

ment entails, how it underpins readiness and, finally, how it further contributes to effective deterrence and defence.

What is it?Theatre Enablement is the umbrella term for a host of initiatives and work strands that have been in development over a number of years. LANDCOM be-came involved in Summer 2017 when SACEUR determined that more focused control was required over a greater part of the European theatre. This concept is also linked into the ongoing work of NATO Command Structure – Adapta-tion (NCS-A) and LANDCOM’s tran-sitioning role within the Alliance. The creation of a host of new organisa-tions with responsibilities across the rear area of the theatre has played into LANDCOM’s strengths as the Land do-main advisor. The Joint Sustainment and

Soldiers from the 5th Bat-talion 7th Air Defense Ar-tillery Regiment steady canisters on the Patriot Missile Defense System as they are offloaded and on loaded during mis-sile transport and reload training in Koper, Slove-nia, June 3, 2019. Soldiers are tasked with keeping the Patriots mission ready with a quick response time for joint exercise As-tral Knight 19. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Erica Earl)

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By Maj. Fergus J. O’Leary GBR-A, LANDCOM G4

Enabling Command (JSEC), the Standing Joint Logistic Support Group (SJLSG) and NATO Forces Integration Units (NFIUs) are all relatively new organisations that require close coordination and liaison as they take on new responsibilities within the wider Theatre Enablement concept.

How it Enables ReadinessTheatre Enablement is absolutely vital to maintaining readiness in the European theatre for Alliance forces. Troops ready to move at a short notice are ineffective if the means by which they will travel to the crisis zone are inadequate. The European Union mobility study and the Trans-Euro-pean Transport Network (TEN-T) works programme are being closely monitored by NATO and LANDCOM to ensure that we are working hand in hand to maxim-ise use of the studies in identifying tran-sit corridors, movement networks and infrastructure requirements. Linking to the NCS-A development, and factoring in the future requirements of the NATO Readiness Initiative and the Allied Mili-tary Reinforcement Concept, LANDCOM G4 has staffed crucial domain centric ad-vice to higher HQ in order to ensure that the full suite of enablers and sustainment requirements is properly factored into Al-liance forward planning from the begin-ning.

How it DetersReadiness, which is underpinned by The-atre Enablement, is a key contributing factor to the deterrence posture of the Alliance. Deterrence is the action of dis-couraging an action or event through in-stilling doubt or fear of the consequenc-es. Alliance posture does not encourage doubt as much as ensure fear with its use of enablement. Exercises and strategic messaging demonstrate that NATO pre-empts threats by laying the necessary groundwork of a response and creating the conditions to avoid confusion and chaos in the opening stages of a crisis. Operating from a known and rehearsed plan across a familiar area is essential to deterrence.

Theatre Enablement is the vehicle by which the Alliance focuses efforts on ensuring the widest possible area of the European theater is covered by a com-prehensive response plan. This vehicle

supports the concept of readiness by en-suring various national and trans-national initiatives come together for analysis by NATO staff in order to maximise efficien-cy. This work is one of several founda-tional stones upon which NATO builds up vigilant and ready land forces for deter-rence and defence. LC

Top: USAF C-130 conducts aerial re-supply of ground forces whilst on Exercise in Romania

Bottom: British Royal Air Force Chinooks conduct underslung load operations in support of a British Armoured Battlegroup

Opposite: A US AH-64 Apache attack helicopter is offloaded from a C-17 transport aircraft.

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The NATO Mobile Training Team on Logistics Operational Planning Process Date: 24-27 June in Kyiv Ukraine

Team from LANDCOM: LTC Olivier Reinbold FRA A, LTC Renaud Monatte FRA A, Maj Federico Vizzini ITA A, SFC Jayson Ford USA A, LTC Dré Kerstjens NLD A

In late June our Mobile Training Team of five LANDCOM logistics experts travelled to Kiev, Ukraine, with one mission in mind: To help Ukrainian logistics officers understand their role in the Logistics Operational Planning Process. The primary aim was to educate a group of 25 J4 Staff Officers,

ranking from Captain to Colonel and serving at the operational level on the application of current logistics doctrine, policy and planning procedures in a Crisis Response Operation.

We met the trainees at the Ukrainian Officers club June 24 to kick off the first day of training.

Luckily, the majority of the group already had experience working at the joint level in various logistics disciplines.

The first and second days included a series of lectures establishing basic logistics foundations and preparing the group for more advanced

Trip Report:

LOGISTICIANS IN

KIEVBy SFC Jayson Ford and Lt. Col Dré KerstjensG4 LANDCOM

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www.domain.com

training the following days. The subsequent days we conducted small group tasks designed to train all logistics phases in the Operational Planning Process, including syndicate tasks. The tasks were embedded in a scenario with challenges in the different phases of the planning process. Each phase had to be analysed, understood and translated into plans with achievable decisions taken, which then had to be back briefed in the classroom where the students received feedback on their products.

The syndicate tasks also

turned out to be a very good tool to compel maximum participation from the group. They challenged the analytical capabilities of the officers and forced participants to deepen their knowledge of planning processes and their roles as members of the Logistics Operational Planning Group (LOPG).

Overall, feedback from the participants was quite positive. The bulk of the Ukrainian officers rated the training “interesting and challenging”. We’re not surprised as the audience was very enthusiastic and involved throughout. Despite the fact that we relied heavily on interpreters for simultaneous translation during the lectures, the trainees were fully engaged and asked a lot of good questions to deepen their understanding of the challenging subject matter.

From the LANDCOM MTT perspective, it was great to see the innovative approaches in logistics planning and creative solutions to logistics challenges our trainees

produced during the week. Some of the officers went as far as suggesting the course be lengthened to allow for more in depth discussions based on case studies. We could not agree more. To get the full benefit and understanding of the operational planning process and associated logistics implications, a more in depth mobile course could be designed and employed.

For us it wasn’t only about training. In between sessions we had the opportunity to learn and understand a little more about Ukrainian Armed Forces culture. Our hosts took us on a tour of their impressive Armed Forces museum located at the training site. The museum itself focuses mainly on Ukrainian military history dating back centuries, with one floor of the museum dedicated to history of the last five years and Ukraine’s struggles against Russian aggression. This part of the museum tour was clearly very personal to our guides.

Which brings me to a final point: Training

and education of NATO doctrine with partners is important because it supports the comprehensive reform vital for Ukraine’s democratic development strengthening its ability to defend itself and become an interoperable partner.

Overall it was an incredibly satisfying experience. The hospitality of our hosts was incredible. We were energised by the atmosphere both inside and outside the classroom. Kiev is a great city with a very proud population. And Ukraine, a formidable partner to the NATO Alliance, clearly understands how logistics enables land power. LC

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Available for download at:lc.nato.int/media-center/landpower-magazine/latest-edition