Velocity Manager Presentation October 2011

MANAGER PRESENTATION | OCTOBER 2011

LEVEL 27, 225 GEORGE STREET, SYDNEY NSW 2000 | PH: 612 8078 5000 FAX: 612 8078 5050ACN: 096 269 322 ABN: 50 096 269 322 AFSL: 252748

“It is impossible to produce a superior performnce unless you do something di!erent to the majority.”

SIR JOHN TEMPLETON

Table of Contents1.0 MATHEWS CAPITAL PARTNERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.1 INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 OUR PEOPLE AND HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.3 BIG IS NOT ALWAYS BETTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.4 HOW WE ARE ORGANISED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.5 BUSINESSES AND OWNERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.6 OUR FUNDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51.7 KEY COUNTERPARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2.0 VELOCITY FUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.1 INVESTOR SUITABILIT Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.2 INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY ! KEY PRINCIPALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.3 THEMATICS MATTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82.4 MARKET CONSENSUS IS MORE OFTEN THAN NOT WRONG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82.5 FOCUS ON SMALLER MARKET CAP COMPANIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92.6 RUN A CONCENTRATED PORTFOLIO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112.7 IGNORE THE BENCHMARK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122.8 SHORT SELLING CAN REDUCE RISK, CREATE ALPHA AND DIVERSIFY . . . . . . . . . . 122.9 RISK EQUALS LOSS OF CAPITAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

3.0 PEOPLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134.0 RESEARCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144.1 IDENTIFYING THEMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144.2 SECTOR ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154.3 COMPANY LEVEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174.4 RESEARCH ANALYSIS DISCUSSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

5.0 PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION AND RISK MANAGEMENT . . . . . . . . 195.1 PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195.2 SHORTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

6.0 FUND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237.0 EXTERNAL FUND COVERAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277.1 RESEARCH AND RATINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277.2 PERFORMANCE RANKINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297.3 AWARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

8.0 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

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1.0 Mathews Capital Partners1.1 INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHYWe seek to exploit the fact that the share market has a tendency not to fully understand, or factor in the impact of macroeconomic, or industry level changes. Speci"cally we are interested in changes that will have sustainable, long-term impact on the investments that we hold.

Focusing on a) where the most change is taking place or b) where market consensus has wrongly estimated change by a wide margin results in a small number - usually 3 or 4 - investment themes that present the greatest opportunity for long-term capital appreciation with the least risk of loss of capital.

Identifying change at the company, industry sector and market level is equally if not more important as determining a company’s fair value.

Having identi"ed the macroeconomic or industry thematics that matter, we focus on deep analysis of each theme. #e goal is to "nd the most e$ective way to exploit these opportunities over the medium term.

We believe it’s a lower risk to invest only in our best ideas and to hold onto an investment until the underlying thematics and the fundamentals of the investment change. It is better to hold an investment that we know, as opposed to "nding new ideas to replace it.

We are "rm believers in the importance of frequent company meetings. Each year, we attend hundreds of meetings to ascertain the company’s own views and expectations for their organisation.

We believe that a skilled and experienced portfolio manager who a) has the %exibility to invest where the opportunities lie, b) is focused on generating positive absolute returns over time and c) is dedicated to the preservation of client capital will o&en invest in ways that di$er signi"cantly from market benchmarks.

We de"ne risk as the potential loss of client capital as opposed to de"ning risk with statistical measures such as than volatility of investment returns or deviation from a benchmark.

Our remuneration is primarily dependent on the investment performance of our Funds. We ‘eat our own cooking’ by investing alongside our clients.

#e fundamentals of our investment style have not changed since inception, however we are constantly investigating advances in "nance and portfolio theory and the way markets react to the macro environment.

Note - #roughout this document we have sought to explain our investment philosophy and process by drawing on academic research in support of our approach to investment and our own empirical knowledge learned over many years.

We acknowledge that there is a wide range of possible investment philosophies, which could work successfully. Due to the manner in which markets function, no single investment philosophy can ever dominate. As soon as such an investment philosophy was discovered, every investor would adopt it and consequently the opportunity that gave rise to the strategy would be arbitraged away.

We have great con"dence in our approach to investment and in the ability of our Funds to continue to deliver strong investment performance on behalf of our clients.

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1.2 OUR PEOPLE AND HISTORYMathews Capital Partners Pty Ltd (“MCP” or the “"rm”) is sta$ed with a group of seasoned investment professional with a minimum of 10 years experience in investment management and investment related "elds. Each of the senior operational sta$ has a similar level of experience.

With over two decades of investment markets experience, Philip Mathews, MCP’s founder and Managing Director is widely regarded as one of Australia’s leading absolute return Fund managers. Attachment 1 Masters of "e Market, Secrets of Australia’s Share Market Investors.

Mr Mathews has developed a strong corporate culture that allows the investment sta$ to retain both %exibility and autonomy with regard to their portfolio management duties, while adhering to a systematic and highly disciplined research process.

Mr Mathews has oversight of the "rm’s investment strategy that results in a focus of the "rm’s primary research resources into 3-4 key thematics. #e selection and monitoring of the "rm’s key investment thematics is a continuous and dynamic process.

We believe that MCP has competitive advantage in identifying change and exploiting share market anomalies and ine'ciencies, due to the following important characteristics:

A stable team in investment professionals, highly skilled and experienced Each Fund manager is solely responsible and accountable for portfolio performance of their Fund with incentives that ensure an alignment of interest between investment manager and the client Ensuring that the portfolio retains %exibility at all times to take advantage of changing market conditions An investment process that ensures quick decision making to construct a portfolio that can take advantage of changing market and economic conditions, diversify risk and remain liquid

#ese characteristics position us to take advantage of changes at a macro, industry sector and company level and ensure that the portfolio is best positioned to take advantage of the opportunities before a market realignment, or before a change in market consensus reduces or eliminates the investment opportunity. #e ability of the team to take pre-emptive action is equally important as the skill-set required to complete an accurate valuation at a company level.

1.3 BIG IS NOT ALWAYS BETTERTo a large extent, our business strategy drives our investment philosophy. A manager that has a business strategy of “collecting” large amounts of funds under management (FuM), has little option but to deploy this capital into larger cap companies. To attract large amounts of FuM, these managers are more focused on maintaining performance relative to their peer group, or a benchmark, rather than producing that best absolute returns for investors. At MCP, we are driven to produce the best returns for our investors and ourselves. We are paid to perform, not aggregate huge amounts of FuM.

Our approach to capacity management is consistent with the academic research of Berk and Green, who note in their 2004 paper “Mutual fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets”, (See Attachment 2.) that “managerial talent is a scarce resource and is dissipated as the scale of operations increases.” #is is because the majority of investors chase performance; that is they interpret high historical performance as evidence of a Fund manager’s superior ability. At the same time, Fund managers are incentivised to increase the size of their Funds, and their own compensation, to the point where size inhibits them from continuing to deliver excess returns.

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1.4 HOW WE ARE ORGANISED Each member of the investment team has dual responsibilities. Firstly, contributing as a research analyst and secondly, as a dedicated Portfolio Manager. All team members participate in and share equal responsibility for the "rm research e$ort.

MCP’s resources are designed and organized to meet the demands of the "rm’s research process. Key features include;

Collaborative research e$ort with open lines of communicationE'cient, %exible and responsive decision making processMaximum time allocated to the most critical investment tasksMinimum “red tape”/%at management structure/no hierarchyHigh level of accountability for each sta$ member

Research and Portfolio Management Team Philip Mathews, Founder and Managing Director/Portfolio Manager – Sabre Fund/Peak Energy and Global Resources FundBen Henri, Senior Research Analyst/Portfolio Manager – Velocity Fund Rod Hinchcli$e, Senior Research Analyst/ Portfolio Manager – Mathews Capital Global Opportunities(FundGlen Barnes, Senior Research Analyst/Portfolio Manager – Searchlight Asia Paci"c FundAngus Wright. Senior Research Analyst/Portfolio Manager – Searchlight Asia Paci"c Fund

Attachment 3 includes the biographies for the senior sta! in the Research and Investments Team and the Client Services#and Operations Team.

1.5 BUSINESS AND OWNERSHIPMathews Capital Partners Pty Limited holds Australian Financial Services Licence no.252748 and was established in 2001 by the "rm’s Managing Director and Founder, Mr Philip Mathews. MCP is owned 100% by Philip Mathews.

#e "rm has 5 full time investment sta$ and 5 full time client services and operational sta$ based in Grosvenor Place, 225 George Street, Sydney Australia.

In addition to the Velocity Fund, MCP performs the role of the management company for external Funds including the Sabre Fund, Mathews Capital Global Opportunities Fund LP, Peak Energy and Global Resources Fund. MCP is also the manager of the "rm’s managed accounts and private investment vehicles.

#e Manager of the Velocity Fund, Velocity Management Pty Limited, is jointly owned by Mathews Capital Partners Pty Limited (60% ownership) and the Fund’s Chief Investment O'cer, Ben Henri (40% ownership).

#e Manager of the Searchlight Asia Paci"c Fund, Searchlight Management Pty Limited, is owned by Mathews Capital Partners Pty Limited (75%) and the Fund’s Portfolio Manager, Glen Barnes (25%).

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1.6 OUR FUNDSMathews Capital manages in excess of A$1.5 billion1 on behalf of a variety of high net worth individuals, private companies, trusts, superannuation Funds and selected institutional clients. Table 1 on the following page outlines the di$erentiating factors of our other unlisted Funds to Velocity Fund.

#e balance of the group FuM is held in accounts managed for external clients and private investment(vehicles.

1. As at 30 June 2011

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Table 1

FUND NAME(CAR net a!er all fees to 30/6/11)

LAUNCH DATE

FUM 30/6/11 STATUS

DIFFERENTIATING FACTORS (to Velocity)

Sabre Fund (23%)

April 2002 A$520 mio Closed 2008

Higher leverageGreater trading biasInternational investments Greater exposure to direct commoditiesAgri sector exposure

Searchlight Asia Paci"c Fund (39%)

October 2010

A$45 mio Open pan Asian mandate and investments

Peak Energy and Global Resources Fund (N/A < 1 yr)

February 2011

A$52 mio Seeding Phase

Greater trading biasHigher leverage Greater exposure to direct commodity futures

Mathews Capital Global Opportunities Fund (43.5%)*

Re-launched June 2011

US$36.2 mio Open Larger cap stocksHigher leverageInternational investments

* Under the full-time management of Rodney Hinchcli$e, the Mathews Capital Global Opportunities Fund has produced annualised returns in excess of 43.5% (net of all fees, for the period I January 2009 to 1 June 2011).

1.7 KEY COUNTERPARTIES For the Velocity Fund, MCP utilises the services of the following counterparties;

Prime Broker – Bank America Merrill LynchCustodian – Bank America Merrill LynchAdministrator – Citco Fund ServicesAudit – Ernst & YoungLegal – Henry Davis York

MCP acts as Trustee for the Velocity Fund.

MCP has institutional broking accounts with most of the major and second tier brokers.

MCP has maintained long-standing and successful commercial relationships with key counterparties including our Fund auditors, administrators and prime brokers. #e "rm currently employs the services of prime brokers including Bank America Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank. We believe there to be signi"cant additional capacity, from both existing, as well as new prime brokers to support the growth of Velocity Fund AuM.

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2.0 Velocity Fund2.1 INVESTOR SUITABILIT Y #e Velocity Fund (“the Fund”) is best suited to sophisticated investors seeking access to an investment strategy that has the potential to deliver a high level of absolute performance over the medium term. Investors should have a high tolerance for a month-on-month volatility in returns as the Fund does not target volatility or standard deviation of returns as a measure of risk. Investors most commonly use the Fund as a high growth/aggressive growth strategy.

For these reasons we seek to partner with sophisticated investors who are focused on capital preservation and growth. #e Velocity Fund is not recommended for investors concerned about month-on-month volatility in returns as they are more are likely to redeem their investment in the Fund during periods of market volatility, crystallising market-to-market losses, missing any potential rebound and consequently su$ering a loss of capital.

#ere are currently 156 individual investors in the Velocity Fund, including family o'ces, SMSF, investment companies, Not-for-Pro"ts and high net worth individuals.

#e Fund is currently available to wholesale investors under an Information Memorandum with a minimum investment of $250,000. MCP intends registering the Fund and opening it to retail investors via a PDS in December 2011, with a reduction of the minimum application amount to $100,000. #is will greatly improve access to the Fund.

2.2 INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY ! KEY PRINCIPLESOur investment philosophy is built on the following core principles based on our years of experi-ence, empirical evidence and academic research:

#ematics matterMarket consensus is more o&en than not wrongFocus on smaller market cap companiesRun a concentrated portfolioIgnore the benchmark Short selling can reduce risk and diversifyRisk equals loss of capital

We cover each of these points in detail the following pages.

2.3 THEMATICS MATTERJust as a rising tide %oats all boats; positive thematics can lead to signi"cant and sustainable changes to an industry. #ese themes create investment opportunities for investors willing to put in the hard work and time necessary to understand what is changing. Identifying these themes is the main priority of our investment research.

In contrast, most equity Fund managers adopt a bottom-up perspective. By focusing on individual stocks, a Fund manager avoids making infrequent and di'cult decisions on large portfolio positions. Instead they focus on frequent decisions regarding many small positions. #is approach might minimise the impact of a wrong decision on investment performance, but it also forgoes the opportunity to position the portfolio to bene"t from sustainable themes.

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2.3 THEMATICS MATTER )CONTINUED*We have come to appreciate the importance of focusing on things that other investors ignore. As Sir John Templeton famously observed in his ten investment principles:

“If you buy the same securities as other people, you will have the same results as other people. It is impossible to produce a superior performance unless you do something di$erent to the majority.”

2.4 MARKET CONSENSUS IS MORE OFTEN THAN NOT WRONGExperience has shown us that market consensus frequently underestimates or overestimates the change to a company’s earnings and the subsequent revaluation of a company’s shares. Research by McKinsey (McKinsey on Finance Number 35, Spring 2010) provides a dramatic example of the magnitude and the consistency with which the share market misestimates earnings.

McKinsey found that sell side research analysts covering shares listed on the S&P 500 “were typically overoptimistic, slow to revise their forecasts to re%ect new economic conditions, and prone to making increasingly inaccurate forecasts when economic growth declined.”

Graph 1 below shows how analysts have gradually revised their over-optimistic forecasts downwards. In the 25 years from 1985 to 2009, only in years such as 2004 to 2006, when strong economic growth generated actual earnings that caught up with earlier predictions, do forecasts actually hit the mark.

Graph 1 - S&P 500 companies

Moreover, as Graph 2 on the following page shows, from 1985 to 2009 analysts have been persistently overoptimistic, with estimates of earnings growth ranging from 10 % to 18 % a year, compared with the average actual earnings growth of 7 %.

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Graph 2 - Earnings growth for S&P 500 companies 5 year rolling average (%)

2.5 FOCUS ON SMALLER MARKET CAP COMPANIESWe believe that investing in smaller to medium size market cap companies (i.e typically < $1 bn market capitalization) consistently o$er a greater money making opportunity when compared to(larger companies, for the following reasons;

Increased margin volatility and variability in earnings means that picking winners and avoiding losers(makes a bigger di$erenceMore sensitive to the economic cycle, interest rates and changes in cap-ex Companies far less likely to be included in the major indicesMore short term growth potentialGreater likelihood of corporate actions such as mergers and acquisitionsSigni"cantly less, or no broker coverage of smaller companiesLess broker consensus on earnings

#e result of this is that small cap shares prices are less likely to re%ect their true value, which in turn creates investment opportunities for active managers. Conversely, less coverage by sell side analysts may also indicate that there is less demand from institutional investors for small cap shares. #is is consistent with the relative illiquidity, higher bid/ask spread and market impact costs relative to large and mid cap shares, all of which limit the capacity of large institutional investors (particularly those with high levels of Funds under management) to invest in small cap shares.

We have learned that some of the best investment opportunities can be found when the price of an investment is lower than it should be. And the price of an investment can be lower than it should be only when people do not see its merit. #is is o&en true of small cap shares.

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2.5 FOCUS ON SMALLER MARKET CAP COMPANIES )CONTINUED*#e November 2010, JPMorgan publication “Small caps: the case examined” supports this view. #e data included in the Graph 3 below shows that market cap companies above $10bn are followed by an average of 13.3 analysts; cap bands below $500m have on average fewer than three active analysts.

See Attachment 4.

Graph 3

In addition to less broker coverage of small cap stocks than large stocks, Graph 4 below shows that analysts are less likely to agree on earing forecasts. #is divergence of opinion creates a greater number of opportunities for a manager to identify and exploit companies where the market has overstated or understated earnings.

Graph 4

#e above charts illustrate factors as to why small caps potentially o$er greater investment opportunities than large caps. Graph 5 on the following page further supports this view and shows that with the median manager in the small cap universe outperforming their benchmark by a greater amount than the large cap equivalent. Commencing in 2003 (without the tech boom included), the simple average of the rolling 12-month excess returns is 6.5% for small caps compared with 1.7% for large caps.

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Graph 5

2.6 RUN A CONCENTRATED PORTFOLIOConsistent with all the MCP investment vehicles, the Velocity Fund is managed on a concentrated, index agnostic basis with most of the Fund’s capital allocated to the "rm’s very best research ideas. We do not believe that diversi"cation de-risks the portfolio. In fact, diversi"cation o&en results in a manager investing in poorly performing sectors, or companies. Diversi"cation is a “necessary evil” for many managers as they focus on performance relative to particular benchmark, or tracking error and peer relative performance.

Concentrated, best ideas portfolios such as those successfully run by MCP are consistent with academic research. For example, in 2009 Randy Cohen, Christopher Polk and Bernhard Silli published a research paper which analysed the holdings data of every U.S. registered mutual fund registered with the Securities Exchange Commission for the period from January 1991 to December 2005. See Attachment 5.

#is data sample represents assets of $2.6 trillion and large part of the U.S. professional money management industry. Eligible funds included those with assets exceeding $5 million and must contain more than 20 stocks. Key "nding of the Best Ideas paper include;

A small number of ideas provide most of the positive portfolio alphaInvestors are generally worse o$ in a diversi"ed portfolio#e need to over diversify is driven by institutional factors, not investment related factorsLarge FuM is driven by manager’s desire to collect fees and minimize idiosyncratic volatility

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2.7 IGNORE THE BENCHMARKWe do not use market benchmarks to guide our investment decisions. #ere is, in fact, no single index that resembles our portfolio.

Benchmark-relative investment is prone to the following problems:

#e use of market capitalisation benchmarks encourages investment managers to measure investment performance and risk on a relative basis rather than an absolute basis Investment managers are at times forced to hold shares that they deem unattractive for investment simply because they are included in the benchmark. #us investment managers may not be free to take full advantage of their best ideas Market capitalisation benchmarks are backward looking. #ey systematically underweight value shares((i.e. shares trading at a lower price relative to their earnings/dividend yield) and the shares of smaller companies Benchmark churn. As of March 2010, of the 200 shares that comprise the S&P ASX 200 only 82 have been constituents since inception

2.8 SHORT SELLING CAN REDUCE RISK, CREATE ALPHA AND DIVERSIFYShort selling is an important risk management tool as well as an opportunity for additional investment return. For example we use short selling to reduce the portfolio’s net equity exposure during periods of macroeconomic uncertainty.

In addition to identifying investment themes and companies that are suitable long-term investments, our research also identi"es stocks, which we believe are due for a fall in price for many reasons, including thematic headwinds, poor management and/or overvaluation.

We seek to incorporate all of our insight about industries and companies, whether they are positive or negative, when constructing the portfolio. #us our short ideas are also an important source of diversi"cation.

We do not use short positions as a source of funding for long positions.

2.9 RISK EQUALS LOSS OF CAPITALWe believe that the most appropriate measure of investment risk is loss of invested capital and that the biggest contributor to a loss of capital is paying too much for an investment. Paying too much e$ectively locks in an insu'cient reward or risk premium as compensation for investment risk.

In contrast, investing at a discount to fair value or looking for a margin of safety helps to ensure that we are taking investment risks that are more likely to be rewarded. #erefore the best protection against risk is our in-depth research. It is only once we understand how thematic and company-level changes will a$ect a stock’s valuation that we are able to ensure that we invest with a margin of safety.

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3.0 PeopleBen Henri, is the Chief Investment O'cer of the Velocity Fund and has been responsible for management of the Velocity Fund since inception in July 2006. Ben also participates actively as a senior member of the MCP research team.

Prior to taking on fulltime responsibility for the management of the Velocity Fund, Ben worked as senior research analyst from 2002 to 2006 for the successful Mathews Capital’s Sabre and Mathews Capital Global Opportunities Fund L.P. (previously named Tomahawk Fund L.P.)

Ben has a successful and longstanding working relationship that extends over a decade with Philip Mathews and other senior members of the investment investments team, including Rodney Hinchcli$e.

Prior to joining Philip Mathews, Ben worked as an oil analyst with Global Paci"c & Partners.

In addition to his day-to-day, portfolio management responsibilities Ben participates actively at all levels of the research process from thematic research, to the individual company analysis. Ben is highly regarded in the market by other research analysts, managers and companies. His key strengths include his;

consistency, discipline and conviction with his research views ability to ignore market “noise” and focus on factors that will impact on his portfolio over the medium to long-term.skill in quickly identifying the “value proposition” at a company level investment management style that is both committed and passionate, while not retaining an emotional attachment to individual investments or themesattention to the details that really matterassessment of company management and information %owteam-work and open communication style

Ben’s strengths are common to other successful managers and best summarized by James Valentine Global Head of analyst training and development at Morgan Stanley and Author of Best Practices for Equity Research Analysts. See Attachment 6.“Time is an analyst’s most valuable resource and will be the weapon to provide competitive advantage. During my career, I had the opportunity to watch hundreds of buy-side and sell-side analysts conduct their jobs. Over time I could put the analysts into one of two categories: o$ensive and defensive.

#e defensive analyst attempts to digest all incoming information, regardless of its importance in generating alpha, primarily out of concern that something will be missed. While this is a great CYA strategy, it doesn’t give analysts time to "nd ideas that separate them from the pack.

Richard Bilotti, an analyst with 27 years of experience on the buy-side and sell-side, reinforces this view with, “Most analysts on the buy-side don’t have time to be creative in terms of exploiting unknown areas.”

#e analyst who is on the o$ensive learns to ignore most, if not all, of the noise, so as to explore unique avenues that may lead to great stock picks. #ese types of analysts have enough con"dence so as not to be embarrassed when they don’t have an answer to more esoteric questions that may come up from portfolio managers (for buy-side analysts) or salespeople and clients (for sell-side analysts)… Successful analysts spend most of their day on conducting research o$ensively, speci"cally focusing on activities that help discover unique insights about critical factors. Some people might call these activities the proprietary aspect of research or the core to developing an edge.”

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4.0 Research 4.1 IDENTIFY THEMESOur internal research is focused on identifying the main themes driving change in company earnings and investing in securities that will a) bene"t from a thematic tailwind and b) are attractively priced.

Our key investment themes are typically developed by the research team starting at a marco, or global level. Most themes are driven by changes in one, or more of the following areas;

GeopoliticsDemographicEconomicTechnologyClimate

Identifying large-scale demand /supply changes in the market are most o&en the catalyst for developing the next level of the investment thesis. Table 2 below provides examples of how the themes are developed and the end investment made by the Velocity Fund.

Table 2

THEMATIC

INITIAL REVIEW PERIOD CATALYST

INDUSTRY SECTOR

INVESTMENT EXAMPLE

Energy 2005 Supply/demand “sea change”

Oil WTI

Precious Metals 2000 Central bank led demand/Financial Market instability

Gold ASX SAR

Energy 2006 China/India led demand

#ermal Coal ASX CEY

Energy 2005 Technological change

Coal Seam Gas ASX AOE

China 2006 Supply Constraints

Coking Coal ASC CLR

Resources 2008 Industry Activity Mining Services ASX NRWREITS 2009 GFC/

RecapitalisationProperty ASX GPT

Resources 2007 Technological /Demographic led Demand

Copper ASX DML

As the table above demonstrates, the Fund has consistently identi"ed sustainable investment themes at an early stage, investing before these themes have become popular. By investing early, the Fund has positioned itself to bene"t as more and more investors recognise the investment opportunity and assets and liquidity increase. We have learned that most trends – both bullish and bearish – eventually become overdone, pro"ting those who recognise them early but penalising the last to join.

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4.2 SECTOR ANALYSISGraph 6 below shows the performance of the 13 leading ASX sector over the past 5 years. Our research process has led us to invest in 4 of the 5 best performing sectors on the ASX. It is worth noting that all 8 sectors that the Fund choose not to invest in, have produced negative returns over the same period.

Graph 6

Portfolio managers are also analysts, covering all industry sectors. #is allows us to share the insights gained from our top-down and bottom up research among the team to construct a picture of what’s happening across the market.

Our goal is to continuously check the facts supporting the investment thesis behind each stock that we own. To achieve this we gather as much information as possible, through company visits, internal research and broker research.

We conduct between 400 - 500 company visits per annum meeting with CEO and CFO level sta$. Graph 7 on the following page, illustrates the level of research activity in CY 2010 and is drawn from data accessed from the MCP group diary.

#is e$ort allows meaningful interaction with senior management of the companies that we are researching as well as their competitors, clients and suppliers of companies.

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4.2 SECTOR ANALYSIS )CONTINUED*Graph 7

As part of our research e$ort we use external research in the following ways:

To determine the market consensus view on a company, industry sector or the share market as a whole. We seek to identify opportunities where market consensus is underestimating or overestimating change and broker research can provide an insight into market consensus. Using broker valuation models to save time. #e intellectual capital in any valuation model is the assumptions used. We develop our own assumptions regarding the key drivers of company performance, such as sales, costs, margins, working capital requirements, debt, interest rates, foreign exchange rates and commodity prices as well as other assumptions such as the WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) or relative valuation multiples.

Our assumptions are based on our decades of investment experience researching companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange and the hundreds of company meetings that we attend each year.

We stress test our valuations by varying the key assumptions in the valuation model to determine the impact of our assumptions on the valuation.

#e research e$ort focuses on sourcing direct information from corporates and industry experts. #is includes a large number of meetings with senior management, engaging the services of industry consultants, lawyers and other professional service providers, undertaking numerous site tours of potential investment opportunities, attending industry conferences and events and reading various annual reports, company presentations and industry reports.

Flexibility is central to the way that we invest. To remain %exible our research process must allows us to notice when the fundamentals of an investment or market have changed and respond accordingly.

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Several of our senior sta$ began their investment careers on the sell-side preparing detailed broker research. #is experience has taught us that writing detailed stock reports and maintaining valuation models for a large number of stocks has the potential to be counterproductive. #is is due to the following behavioural biases:

Anchoring Con"rmation BiasE$ort Justi"cation

A summary of the psychological challenges that a$ect investment can be found in the book “Best Practices for Equity Research Analysts” by James J. Valentine.

4.3 COMPANY LEVEL RESEARCHBy avoiding a rigid research process, we are free to spend most of our time on company meetings and research; activities, which our experience has taught, yield the greatest investment insight and therefore the greatest potential for pro"t.

Graph 8 below illustrates the level of company contact with Bathurst Resources a major position in the Fund. #is graph illustrates the consistency of direct company contact at the CEO/CFO level. #e Manager has on average met, or spoken directly with the CEO, at least once a month since the Fund’s initial investment was made in July 2010.

Graph 8

Bathurst Resources also provide a good example of an investment where the Manager has employed the services of external industry experts to support the in-house research e$ort. Bathurst Resources is currently managing the appeal process a&er gaining resource consent in September for their coal asset located on the Buller Plateau on the South Island of New Zealand. #e Manager has employed New Zealand based environmental lawyers to monitor the process and provide expert advice.

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4.3 COMPANY LEVEL RESEARCH )CONTINUED*Graph 9 below shows the distribution of the gains/losses of the Velocity Fund’s long equity positions, from 1 July 2006 to August 2011. #e dollar value of gains over the life of the Fund has been almost three times the value of losses. For every dollar of “research capital” we are investing, we are producing three times the amount of “wining dollars” than “losing dollars”, further validating the quality of the "rm’s research process.

Graph 9 - Winning vs Losing Stock Positions

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Winning Positions

Losing Positions

MCP’s research process consistently delivers some of the top performing stocks on the ASX. In 2010, the Fund owned signi"cant positions in 3 of the Top 10 best performing stocks in the ASX200 Index including; Bathurst Resources (#1 up 585.6%), NRW Holdings (#5 up 184.69%), Intrepid Mines (#7 up 181.79%).

4.4 RESEARCH ANALYSTS DISCUSSIONThematic ReserachCoking Coal – (Glen Barnes)

Crude Oil (Rod Hinchcli$e)

Company Level ResearchNexis Energy – sell action (Ben Henri)

Carabella Resources – buy action (Angus Wright)

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5.0 Portfolio Constructions and Risk Management5.1 PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION #e Velocity Fund strategy is a high-conviction, long-short equity strategy. #e portfolio has a long bias and investment is concentrated in our best ideas. #e investment horizon for long positions is typically 12-36 months.

Risk is de"ned as permanent loss of capital. For this reason the strategy is focused on long-term capital preservation.

#e portfolio manager has the %exibility to expresses his investment view via listed equities, and derivatives whose underlying assets include equities, market indices and commodities.

#e portfolio typically invests predominantly in small cap stocks. Industry sector positioning is an outcome of our macroeconomic research to identify the industry sectors that are likely to experience change.

Short positions are used to manage the portfolio exposures and downside risk. #ey are also an important contributor to the Fund’s performance. #e Fund does not use excessive leverage, as this can create situations where the Fund may be a forced seller.

Rather than use excessive "nancial gearing, we use portfolio construction to, in e$ect, leverage our investment ideas. #is involves:

Select the right theme – selecting companies from industries that will bene"t from sustainable change and avoiding companies in industries facing structural headwinds which can have a large impact on investment performance. Focus on small companies – Liquidity is a key driver of small cap performance. By recognising attractive small cap stocks at an early stage, the Fund is positioned to bene"t as other market participants also invest and liquidity %ows into the stock. Concentrated holdings – Backing our best ideas increases the impact of each investment decision on the Fund’s performance.

#e Fund has capacity to grow further without negatively impacting performance. We are committed to close the Fund to new investors once the Fund has reached an optimal size.

We adopt a disciplined and systematic approach to portfolio construction. Each positioned is sized to re%ect the following factors:

1. Conviction – Our level of con"dence in an investment idea based on our in-depth research2. Downside risk – Where we feel that there are downside risks to our investment thesis we will size a

position accordingly. 3. Portfolio overlap (both on a company and a sector basis) – #is involves answering the question -

does the investment idea bring something new to the portfolio or does it double-up on an exposure or investment theme already present in the portfolio?

4. Market Liquidity – Ensuring that there is enough liquidity to a) take a position proportional to our conviction in an investment idea and our assessment of downside risk and b) exit a position relatively quickly if our investment thesis turns out to be incorrect.

As of September 2011, Velocity Fund’s average holding in a single company is less than 1% of the company’s issued capital, with the largest holding less than 2% of issued capital.

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5.1 PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION )CONTINUED*Portfolio and Risk ManagementWhile Velocity Management Pty Ltd operates under a %exible mandate, under normalised market conditions, the Fund will not materially exceed the parameters outlined below in Table 3 (as measured at(the time of investment).

Table 3

RISK PARAMETER INVESTMENT GUIDECURRENT POSITION (1 September 2011)

Position Diversity 35-45 41Concentration Single Position < 20% NAV

Top 5 < 50% NAVTop 10 < 75% NAV

13.6%41%62%

Exposure Gross < 200%Net < 100%

160%46%

Unlisted Investments 5% of NAV <1 %Individual holding as a % of Issued Capital

< 5% 2.38%

Portfolio average holdings as a % of Issued Capital

<1% 0.82%

Market Cap/Liquidity % of Total Portfolio in Market Cap Companies < 200 million

< 20% 14.4%

Buy Decisions - We look to purchase shares, which meet any or all of the buy criteria for each theme. Individual company characteristics such as valuation or quality of management are looked at in relation to other shares in the same sector.

Sell Decisions - We constantly monitor investment themes to ensure that they are sustainable and that the investment thesis behind each theme still holds. Individual stocks are monitored to ensure that their characteristics remain attractive relative to competing shares. When this is no longer the case, we will mark the share for sale and will time the sales based on our normal market timing considerations. Secondly we monitor behavioural "nance issues such as liquidity and market sentiment to determine an optimal selling period.

Underperforming shares are constantly reviewed via daily and monthly attribution analysis and we consider whether to sell or to possibly add to the holding.

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5.2 SHORTINGIn order to minimise portfolio downside risk and reduce net exposure in periods of market uncertainty, the Manager adopts an active and diversi"ed shorting strategy. #e manager has maintained short positions on 92% of months since the Fund inception. Selection of shorting instruments is generally based on a combination of the following factors;

Liquidity and observable pricingComparable beta to Fund’s long positionsOverlap with Fund’s long positions from a macro driver perspectiveDelivering the most e$ective exposure to the Manager’s investment viewImpact on Fund’s Net/Gross Exposure

Shorting has been a material pro"t centre for the Fund contributing approximately 10% of the total Fund pro"t since Fund inception (noting that the Fund has a de"nite long-bias, averaging a 80% net long position since inception).

Table 4 below shows the various shorting instruments applied by the Manager and the reasons why the exposure was required.

Table 4INSTRUMENT WHY REQUIRED

Merrill Lynch Mining Basket Small-Mid Cap ASX Mining stocks by positionEuroStoxx50 Index Shorts European Sovereign Debt Crisis ("nancials speci"c)VIX Index Sept 30 Call Options US equity market volatilityS&P500 Futures Shorts US equity market downside riskS&P500 August 1300 Put Options US equity market downside riskS&P ASX200 Dec put options Australian equity market downside riskASX SPI Futures Shorts Australian equity market downside risk

Opportunistically, the Manager also uses stock speci"c shorts as pro"t centre. Recent stock speci"c shorts that have been pro"table for the Fund, have included ERA, Macquarie Bank and Leighton Holdings.

Shorting AnalysisA review of the how the Fund’s net equity exposure has changed over time provides an insight into the portfolio construction process, speci"cally how short positions are used to reduce risk.

For example, as the graph on the following page shows, the Velocity Fund began reducing the net equity exposure of the Fund in July 08. By Sept 08 it was only 56%, which helped to reduce the impact of some of(the worst months of the global "nancial crisis.

Conversely, the Fund increased its net equity exposure in March 09 as the equity market was bottoming. By May 2009 the rally was in full swing and the Fund’s net equity exposure was 88% , positioning the portfolio appropriately to participate in the subsequent rally.

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Graph 10

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ASX 300 Accumulation Net Equity Exposure6 per. Mov. Avg. (Net Equity Exposure)

For the last 2 years , the ASX 300 has been range bound between 4000-5000 points. #e net equity exposure of the Fund has been below 80% for most of this period . #us the Fund has been generating returns in excess of the ASX 300 with less than 100% netmarket exposure suggesting that the Fund’s performance is primarily driven by stock or theme selection rather than market directionality .

#e Fund has reduced its net equity exposure since the beginning of the year, before the US Debt crisis and the Euro crisis really blew up , again positioning the portfolio appropriately to reduce risk.

In summary, the net equity exposure of the Fund varies in response to current conditions. Rather than forecast the future, the portfolio is positioned protect capital and or capitalise on current market conditions at the time, i.e. when there is an increase in risk, shorting is used to reduce net equity exposure. Conversely, if markets are its cheap and bad news has already been priced in, then the Fund’s net equity exposure increases.

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6.0 Fund Performance AnalysisTable 5: Returns (net of all fees) to 1 September 2011

VELOCITY FUND ACCUMULATED

RETURN

ASX300ACCUMULATION

INDEX RETURN

VELOCITY FUND OUT PERFORMANCE

V’S ASX300 ACCUMULATION

INDEX

August (0.11%) (1.98%) 1.87%

Calendar 2011 0.95% (6.93%) 7.88%

2010 38.00% 1.90% 36.10%

2009 62.27% 37.59% 24.68%

2008 8.64% (38.92%) 47.23%

2007 50.24% 16.22% 34.02%

2006 52.82% 14.39% 38.43%

Total Since Inception 463.90% 5.96% 457.94%

Compound p.a. 39.76% 1.13% 38.63%

#e Velocity Fund has consistently delivered positive returns to investors through a wide range of economic conditions and equity market conditions over the past 5 years and produced a high level of outperformance in each "nancial and calendar year, since inception. #e Fund has consistently ranked as one of Australia best performing absolute return Funds over the past 5 years.

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Table 6: Risk Metrics (as at 1 September 2011)

RETURN

VELOCITY FUND ACCUMULATED

RETURN

AUSTRALIAN ALL ORDINARIES

EQUITY INDEX

BANK OF BERMUDA/ASIA HEDGE "

AUSTRALIAN LONGSHORT A$

Best Month 29.81% 7.64% 5.86%

Worst Month (17.58%) (14.00%) (8.92%)

% Positive Returns 70.37% 57.41% 61.29%

COMPARISON TO BENCHMARK!S"

Alpha 3.65% 2.51%

Annualised Alpha 53.74% 34.65%

Beta 1.02 1.70

Correlation 0.50 0.53

R-Squared 0.25 0.28

RISK / RETURN DATA

Standard Deviation 33.21% 16.05% 10.18%

Sharpe Ratio (5%) 1.03 -0.39 0.21

Sortino Ratio (10%) 1.55 -0.70 -0.37

Downside Deviation (10%) 18.42% 14.79% 8.55%

Max Drawdown (41.38%) (51.37%) (24.09%)

Months in Maximum Drawdown 5.00 16.00 16.00

Months to Recover 6.00 0.00 9.00

Source: Zenith Investment Partners, September 2011

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KEY TERMSBest Month – Highest monthly investment return since inception.

Worst Month – Lowest monthly investment return since inception.

% Positive Returns – Percentage of months that the Fund has delivered a positive investment return. It is calculated as the number of months where the Fund had a positive investment, divided by the total number of months since the Fund’s inception.

Alpha – #e incremental return over and above a benchmark added by an investment manager through active management since inception.

Annualised Alpha - Alpha expressed as an annualised rate.

Beta – Statistical measure of the sensitivity of a portfolio to movements in the market index. Portfolios with a beta greater than one are expected to be more volatile than the market as a whole, outperforming in rising markets and underperforming in falling markets (vice versa for portfolios with a beta less than one).

Correlation – Measure of the interdependence of two or more variables; for example, the returns recorded by a portfolio and a market benchmark. A correlation coe'cient can range from -1 (inverse relationship) to +1(perfect correlation – change in variables will be identical). A correlation coe'cient of 0 indicates the absence of a relationship between the variables.

R2 - Statistical measure of how well a regression line approximates real data points; an r-squared of 1.0 (100%) indicates a perfect "t.

Standard Deviation – Statistical measure of the historical variability of returns relative to their mean (or expected return). An indicator of the degree to which a portfolio’s returns deviate over a speci"c period in absolute terms or relative to a market benchmark.

Shape Ratio – Statistical measure of reward per unit of risk. It is calculated as the excess return over the risk-free return, divided by the standard deviation of excess returns.

Sortino Ratio – Modi"cation of the Sharpe Ratio. Calculated as the di$erence between the actual return and the risk free return, divided by the downside risk. Here, downside risk is a measure of deviation of historical returns falling below a speci"ed target rate of return.

Downside Deviation - A measure of downside risk that focuses on returns that fall below a minimum threshold or minimum acceptable return (MAR). It is used in the calculation of a risk measure known as the Sortino Ratio.

Maximum Drawdown – #e maximum peak-to-trough decline in the Funds value since inception.

Months in Maximum Drawdown – #e period of time, expressed in months, that the Fund remained at maximum drawdown,

Months to Recover – #e period of time, expressed in months, for the Fund to recover its peak-to-trough loss in value. In other words the time taken for the value of the Fund to return from maximum drawdown to the previous high-water mark.

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COMMENTS ON RISK METRICS#e high volatility associated with our concentrated, best ideas investment philosophy is obvious. While the Fund’s volatility is relatively high according to traditional measures, it has delivered more positive months with higher average returns than the broader Australian equity market. #e best month performance is far superior to the broad market index (29.92% vs 7.64%). While the worst month for the Fund is a worse relative to its the Australian equity market, the Fund has captured more positive months than the Index, with higher average returns than the broader Australian equity market. #e Fund’s Sharpe Ratio, a commonly applied metric of investment risk/return is high at 1.03 indicating that it delivers a high return for its underlying volatility. #is compares favourably to both the broader market indices (-0.39) as well as peer group indices (0.21) providing further evidence that our research, analysis and portfolio construction all help to ensure that the Fund is rewarded with strong returns for the investment risk taken.

Concentrated investment portfolios typically exhibit higher than usual variability in performance over the short term; the Fund is no exception with standard deviation of the Fund’s returns 33.21%. What is most important is that the majority of the volatility is upside, as downside volatility is only 18.42%, which is similar to the broader equity market. #e result is an outperforming Fund where losses are rapidly recovered.

It is also worth noting that the Fund’s maximum drawdown is 10% less than that of the Australian equity market. Also the number of months spent by the Fund in a drawdown and the number of months required to recover capital losses is a signi"cantly less than that of the Australian equity market. #is is consistent with our de"ning risk as permanent loss of capital rather than volatility of investment returns.

A low correlation of 0.5 to the Australian equity market indicates that there might be a diversi"cation bene"t if Velocity is combined with other equity managers in a multi manager portfolio (e.g. in a core/satellite portfolio).

#e risk metrics demonstrate that the Fund clearly adds the stock speci"c risk that it wants to capture, but not that of the broader market. #e Fund does not dilute its stock picking best ideas with other ideas in an attempt to reduce volatility. It is expected that the Fund will continue to experience variability in returns on a month-by-month basis.

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7.0 External Fund Coverage7.1 RESEARCH AND RATINGS

Mathews Capital The Velocity Fund - January 2011#e Mathews Capital Velocity Fund (the “Fund”), is an Australian long/short absolute return fund managed by Portfolio manager, Ben Henri. #e Fund is a rare example of true high conviction investing. It has demonstrated that it can deliver consistently high returns dominated by high monthly upside volatility.

Mathews Capital Partners Pty Limited (“Mathews Capital”) is the trustee of the Fund. Velocity Management Pty Limited (“Velocity” or the “Manager”) is the Manager and is 60% owned by Mathews Capital. #e directors of Velocity are Philip Mathews and Ben Henri.

#e Fund invests principally in Australian listed equities but also has smaller exposure to commodities and derivatives. #e Manager invests locally believing that it has the most competitive advantage in this geography due to the time zone, proximity and, in particular, access to company management.

#e Fund has continued to produce consistently strong returns since inception in July 2006 with a total return of 457% at an annualised rate of 46.46% net of fees as at December 31, 2010. Published performance surveys rank the Fund amongst the top performing Australian based absolute return funds since inception.

#e Fund has produced positive returns every calendar year since launch through a wide range of economic and "nancial market conditions including the GFC and associated equity market downturn.

While the Fund’s volatility is relatively high according to traditional measures it has delivered more positive months with higher average returns than the broader Australian equity market. It is expected that the Fund will continue to experience variability in returns on a month-by-month basis.

See Attachment 7 for a complete copy of the Zenith Product Assessment.

For more information on the Morningstar Ratings go to http://www.velocityfund.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Mornigstar_Ratings_Flyer.pdf

#e Velocity Fund was awarded a “Five Star” rating by Morningstar in September 2011.( #is rating is a quantitative rating based on risk-adjusted returns. #e Velocity Fund’s rating was for the Hedge Funds – Australia Category. #e Morningstar Rating is an assessment of a fund’s past performance – based on both return and risk – which shows how similar investments compare with their competitors.

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7.1 RESEARCH AND RATINGS )CONTINUED*

Management Company OverviewMathews Capital Partners Pty Ltd is a privately owned Sydney based investment manager established by Philip Mathews in 2001 following a career as a fund manager, research analyst and stockbroker both in London and Sydney. Prior to founding Mathews Capital he was employed by Bell Potter from 1992 to 2001 as the "rm’s senior institutional adviser.

Mathews Capital o$er a number of actively managed funds, principally on behalf of wholesale investors including high net worth individuals, superannuation funds, family o'ces, and institutions and has total funds under management (FUM) of over A$1.5 billion. Other funds include the Sabre Fund, a domestic unit trust established in June 2001, and the Tomahawk Fund, established in the Cayman Islands for o$shore investors in February 2005 (both of which are now closed to new investors) the Velocity Fund and the Searchlight Asia-Paci"c Fund.

Mathews Capital has an established and stable investment team of six people including Philip Mathews himself, along with portfolio managers Rod Hinchcli$e and Ben Henri, both of whom have been with Mathews Capital since the "rm’s inception, and Glen Barnes who joined in September 2010. Ben McGary joined Mathews in 2008 as the "rm’s senior analyst to provide analytical and research support to the Portfolio Managers.

#e investment team is supported by a back-o'ce and administrative department of three, including the CFO, Susan Smyth and the Operations Manager and Accountant, Cathy Young.

See Attachment 8 for a complete copy of the AFM Fund Review, February 2011.

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7.2 PERFORMANCE RANKINGS

From the data provided by global alternative investment database provider BarclayHedge (www.barclayhedge.com), the Velocity Fund ranked #rst of the 249 long-bias equity funds surveyed for(the 5 year reporting period to 30 June 2011.See Attachment 9 for complete survey details.

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7.2 PERFORMANCE RANKINGS )CONTINUED*

From data as at 30 April from Australian Fund Monitors (www.fundmonitors.com) showing annualised returns a&er fees since fund inception, the Velocity Fund ranked #rst out of the 96 equity based managers with a track record more than two years.

See Attachment 10 for complete survey details.

Based on the annualised returns since fund inception net of all fees the Triple A Partners (triplepartners.net.au) September 2011 Hedge Fund Performance Rankings placed the Velocity Fund as one of(the best performing funds across all strategies over a 5 year reporting period.See Attachment 11 for complete survey details.

Absolute Return Equity Fund Performances

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7.3 FUND AWARDS

#e Mathews Capital Velocity Fund has been nominated as 1 of 6 funds (from amongst 900 Asia based hedge funds with an aggregate $150billion in Funds under Management) in the category of Best Single Country Fund for 2010/11 at the 2011 AsiaHedge Awards, to be held in Hong Kong on October 20th, 2011.

For more information go to http://www.hedgefundintelligence.com/AsiaHedge

#e Mathews Capital Velocity Fund received the BarclayHedge Recognition Award for Excellence as the best performing long-bias equity fund.

#e Fund was ranked #8 in the Equity Long-Bias category for the month of August, 2011.

For more information go to: http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/rankings.html

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8.0 AppendicesAttachment 1 – Masters of the Market. Secrets of Australia’s Leading Sharemarket Investors. 2nd Edition, 2005 (http://www.bookworm.com.au/Book/Masters-of-the-Market-Secrets-of-Australias-Leading-Sharemarket-Investors-2nd-Edition-9780731402946.aspx)

Attachment 2 – Berk and Green, “Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets”, 2004.

Attachment 3 – Biographies of Senior Sta$

RESEARCH AND INVESTMENTS TEAMPhilip Mathews, Founder and Managing Director. Philip has a proven investment track record that spans over 25 years as chief investment o'cer of private unlisted Funds. Philip has managed the group’s successful %agship investment vehicle, the Sabre Fund since inception in 2002. Philip is also responsible for managing the Peak Energy and Global Resources Fund launched in February 2011. Philip is widely recognized as one of Australia’s most astute and successful private investors. Early in his career he worked with Bell Potter Securities, Jardine Fleming Australia and ArmstrongJones Investment Management Pty Limited. Philip has a Bachelor of Economics from Sydney University.

Ben Henri, Senior Research Analyst and Chief Investment O'cer, Velocity Fund. Ben has over 12 years investment markets experience and previously worked with Philip Mathews at Bell Potter Securities. He has worked at Mathews Capital Partners since it was established in 2001. Ben has been responsible for the management of the very successful Velocity Fund since inception in July 2006. Prior to managing the Velocity Fund, Ben worked as a Research Analyst for Mathews Capital’s Sabre and Global Opportunities Fund L.P. (previously named Tomahawk Fund L.P.) He has a B Arts (Hons) from University of Queensland. Prior to working with Philip Mathews, Ben worked in oil exploration consulting.

Rod Hinchcli!e, Senior Research Analyst and Portfolio Manager, Mathews Capital Global Opportunities Fund L.P. (previously named Tomahawk Fund L.P.) Rod has over 14 years’ experience in equity research sales and trading. Prior to joining Mathews Capital Partners Rod worked with Philip Mathews at Bell Potter Securities. Prior to this Rod spent 3 years in London with the asset-trading group of Nomura International and the treasury division of GE. Rod is Investment Manager of the Mathews Capital Global Opportunities Fund L.P. and has a BBus from UTS and a Masters of Applied Finance from Macquarie University.

Glen Barnes, Senior Research Analyst and Portfolio Manager, Searchlight Asia Paci"c Fund. Glen joined Mathews Capital in 2010. Glen is responsible for the management of the Searchlight Asia Paci"c Fund launched in September 2010. Glen has over 10 years "nance experience, including over 5 years in corporate "nance in M&A and leveraged and project "nance, primarily at Deutsche Bank in Sydney and over 3 years in the Non US Special Situations team at US based hedge Fund Satellite Asset Management in their London o'ce. While at Satellite Asset Management, Glen was a portfolio manager for a US$300m portfolio and involved in the management of a portfolio of up to US$1bn. Glen holds a Masters of Applied Finance through KAPLAN and a Bachelor of Commerce (BCom) from the University of Queensland.

Angus Wright, Senior Research Analyst and Portfolio Manager, Searchlight Asia Paci"c Fund. Angus has over 12 years’ experience in Funds management and corporate "nance. Angus is jointly responsible for the management of the Searchlight Asia Paci"c Fund launched in September 2010. Prior to joining Mathews Capital Partners in 2011, Angus spent 6 years working in various investment roles in London, most recently as a proprietary trader at Je$eries International and before that as a Portfolio Manager at Satellite Asset Management and Lionhart Investments. Angus started his career with Deutsche Bank, where he worked in mergers and acquisitions for 6 years in Sydney. Angus has a BCom from the University of Sydney.

3232

33

CLIENT SERVICES AND OPERATIONS TEAMRobert Duke, Head of Fund Distribution at Mathews Capital Partners and is responsible for the organisation’s expanded Fund distribution activities. Robert has over 20 years’ experience in the marketing and sales of "nancial products. Prior to working with Mathews Capital Partners, Robert held the position of Managing Director of boutique investment "rm Longreach Global Capital Pty Limited and held senior management positions at JPMorganChase (and its predecessor banking organizations) from 1994 to 2003. Robert has a BSc from Macquarie University. Susan Smyth, Chief Financial O"cer of Mathews Capital Partners Pty Ltd. Sue is a fellow Chartered Accountant and holds Bachelor and Master’s degrees in Economics. She has over 20 years’ experience in accounting and administration in the "nancial services industry. Prior to joining Mathews Capital in 2000, she was "nancial controller/company secretary of a successful investment bank, and before that, was a manager in the business services division of Pricewaterhouse Coopers.Cathy Young, Head of Operations for Mathews Capital. Cathy has over 6 years accounting and Fund administration experience. While studying towards BBus(FinPlan) Cathy gained her experience in the "nancial markets working for a private investment o'ce based in Sydney. Cathy has also completed Dip. Financial Services through FINSIA, is a member of the Taxation Institute of Australia and is currently studying towards a Masters of Applied Finance.Miles Balman, Operations for Mathews Capital. Miles has over 4 years’ experience in Hedge Fund Operations. Prior to joining Mathews Capital Miles gained his experience with UBS where he worked in the Prime Brokerage/Hedge Fund Operations Division. Miles has completed his Dip. Financial Services, Dip. Financial Markets, Graduate Cert in Applied Finance and is currently studying to complete his Masters in Applied Finance.Sarah Jackson, Executive Assistant/Investor Relations Sarah joined Mathews Capital in May 2011. Sarah has recently worked for the Bank of New Zealand, based in Auckland; she managed the O'ce of the Director of Retail Banking. Prior to that, Sarah spent "ve years in London working in administration positions in Private Investment and Hedge Funds. Sarah holds a BBus (Management and International Business) from the Auckland University of Technology in New Zealand.

Attachment 4 - JPMorgan, “Small caps: the case examined”. November 2010Attachment 5 – Best Ideas Research Paper, Randy Cohen, Christopher Polk, Bernhard Silli 2004Attachment 6 – Best Practices for Equity Research Analysts: Essentials for Buy-Side and Sell-Side Analysts, James Valentine www.amazon.com/Best-Practices-Equity-Research-Analysts/dp/0071736387 Attachment 7 - Zenith Product Assessment, September 2011Attachment 8 - Australian Fund Monitors Review, February 2011Attachment 9 - Barclay Hedge Performance Ranking, June 2011Attachment 10 - Australian Fund Monitors Performance Ranking, April 2011Attachment 11 - TripleA Partners Performance Ranking, September 2011

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IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER#is presentation is given by Mathews Capital Partners Pty Limited ABN 50 096 269 322, AFSL 252748 (Mathews Capital). #is presentation is intended only for wholesale clients (as de"ned in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)(Act). Although the statements of fact in this presentation have been added from and are based on sources that Mathews Capital believes to be reliable, we do not guarantee their accuracy, and any such information may be incomplete or condensed. Mathews Capital is not under any obligation to update the information contained in this presentation to the extent that it is or becomes out of date or incorrect. #is information must not be made available, published or distributed to any third party without our prior written consent. Mathews Capital is not providing any general advice or personal advice regarding any potential investment in any "nancial products within the meaning of section 766B of the Act. No consideration has been made of any speci"c person’s investment objectives, "nancial situation or needs. Recipients should make their own enquiries and evaluations they consider appropriate to determine the suitability of any investment and should seek all necessary "nancial, legal, tax and investment advice. Mathews Capital, its directors and employees assume no "duciary responsibility or liability for any consequences "nancial or otherwise arising from any reliance on the information in this presentation, or for any negligent misstatements, errors or omissions.#e information in this presentation is indicative and may change with market %uctuations. #is presentation does not purport to be a comprehensive statement or description of any markets or securities referred to within. All performance "gures are shown net of all fees. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

“It is impossible to produce a superior performnce unless you do something di!erent to the majority.”

SIR JOHN TEMPLETON

MANAGER PRESENTATION | OCTOBER 2011

www.velocity fund.com.au