JAMES DUERLINGER VASUBANDHU’S PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THE V ATS IPUTR IYAS’ THEORY OF PERSONS (I) INTRODUCTION At th e be gi nnin g of hi s “Ref ut at io n of the Theo ry of Se lf” ( Atmav adapratisedha), the appendix to his Treasury of Knowledge with Commentary ( Abhidarmako sabh as ya), Vasubandhu presents a series of philosophical objections to the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of persons. 1 A theory of persons is a metaphysical account of persons which includes or implies accounts of their nature, existence, unity, and identity over time. The V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory in the “Refutation” explicitly concerns only the nature and existence of persons. What is meant by “persons” is that to which we refer when we use the pronoun, “I,” and its equivalents in other languages, to refer to ourselves. I present here the first of three articles in which Vasubandhu’s objections to the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory and their replies to these objections are reconstructed and evaluated. 2 The theory to which Vasubandhu objects is that persons ( pudgala-s) exist in the sense that they exist apart from being perceived or conceived 3 and are neither other than nor the same as 4 the phenomena (dharma- s) in dependence upon which they are perceived and conceived. 5 Both Vasubandhu and the V ats ıputr ıyas believe that the phenomena in dependence upon which persons are perceived and conceived are the bodies and mental states of persons. Let us, as Vasubandhu and V ats ıputr ıyas do, refer to these phenomena as the aggregates (skandha- s). 6 What is neither other than nor the same as the phenomena in dependence upon which it is perceived and conceived is a phenomenon which the V ats ıputr ıyas’ call inexplicable ( avaktavya). 7 Let us say that persons conceived in dependence upon the aggregates are the objects of the concept of ourselves. The V ats ıputr ıyas are claiming that these objects exist and are inexplicable. I shall also express their theory by saying that we exist and are inexplicable, since I shall use “we” (“us,” “ourselves,” etc.) to refer to the objects of the concepts of ourselves. Their theory may also be expressed by the claim that we exist and are neither other than nor the same as our aggregates, where Jou rnal of Indi an Philo soph y 25: 307–335, 1997. c 1997 Kluwe r Academi c Publishe rs. Print ed in the Netherla nds.
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8/3/2019 Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of the Vatsiputriyas Theory of Persons I - James Duerlinger
a), to be the phenomena in dependence upon which we are
conceived.9 This argument sets the stage for his introduction of the
V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of persons. “They assert,” he says, “that a person
exists” ( pudgala santam icchanti). The Sanskrit word for “person”
( pudgala) is being used here, as the V ats ıputr ıyas use it, to refer to
an appropriator of aggregates, which is not the same as the aggregates
appropriated. The Sanskrit word for “exists” (santam) is used, as
Vasubandhu also uses it, to signify the possession of existence apart
from being perceived or conceived. So when the V ats ıputr ıyas assert
that a person exists, they are implying that the person to whom they
refer is not the same as its10 aggregates and asserting that it exists.
Vasubandhu begins his first objection to the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of
persons by challenging them to explain whether, in saying that a person
exists, they are claiming that a person is real in the way a substance is(dravyasat ) or real in the way a mental construction is ( praj ~ naptisat ).11
He continues:
If it is a distinct entity like bodily form and other such things [each of which is anentity of a certain sort],12 it is real in the way a substance is; but if [by analysis] itis [shown to be the same as] a collection [of substances of different sorts], like milk and other such things [each of which seems to be, but is not, an entity of a certainsort], it is real in the way a mental construction is. Consequently, if a person is realin the way a substance is, it must be said that it is other than the aggregates in theway that each of them is other than the others, since it will possess a different nature
[than possessed by any of the substances of which the aggregates are comprised].[If it is other than the aggregates, it must be either causally conditioned or causallyunconditioned. If it is causally conditioned,] its causes should be explained. But if itis causally unconditioned, the false theory [of persons] espoused by the T ırthikas isheld and a person has no function [to perform in the production of aggregates]. If [a person is said to be] real in the way a mental construction is, [it is the same asthe aggregates, and] this is the theory [of persons found in the Buddha’s discoursesand is] held by us.
According to Vasubandhu, to be real in the way a substance is is
to be an ultimate reality ( param arthasatya) and that to be real in the
way a mental construction is is to be a deceptive conventional reality
(sam.
vr .
tisatya), as these realities are defined by the Vaibh as.
ikas.13 What
exactly are these two realities?
The substances to which Vasubandhu refers in the passage above
are distinct entities in the sense that they are phenomena which possess
by themselves just one nature and are conceived on the basis of their
possession of this nature. They are called ultimate realities, apparently,
because they are what they are conceived to be. Substances are known to
be what they are conceived to be because they continue to be conceivedeven if they are taken apart physically or are mentally analyzed into
parts and brought to consciousness in that form. They continue to be
8/3/2019 Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of the Vatsiputriyas Theory of Persons I - James Duerlinger
The point of the objection, of course, is that the V ats ıputr ıyas’ only
alternative to adopting Vasubandhu’s own theory of persons is to accept
that of the T ırthikas, and they do not accept that of the T ırthikas. So
how can persons exist if they are not reducible in existence to their
aggregates?
V ATS IPUTR IYAS’ AGGREGATE-RELIANCE REPLY
The V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply to Vasubandhu’s objection is as follows:
A person is neither real in the way a substance is nor real in the way a mentalconstruction is, since it is conceived in reliance upon aggregates which pertain toourselves, are appropriated, and exist in the present.
In other words, we are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conven-
tional realities, as Vasubandhu defines them, since we are conceived
in reliance upon aggregates which possess the three attributes listed.
Let us set aside for the moment a discussion of the three attributes
of these aggregates so we may first come to an understanding of the
V ats ıputr ıyas’ use of “in reliance upon” (up ad aya) in the claim that
we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates.
Although we exist, the V ats ıputr ıyas believe, we are inexplicable
phenomena in the sense that we are not ultimate realities, since we are
not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates, nordeceptive conventional realities, since we are not reducible in existence
to our aggregates. We are neither clearly and distinctly separable in
existence from, nor reducible in existence to, our aggregates, because
we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates. But what is meant by
our being conceived “in reliance upon” aggregates? To understand its
meaning let us begin by seeing why inexplicable phenomena are not
conceived in the way substances are conceived.
Phenomena which are inexplicable, according to the V ats ıputr ıyas,
are like substances insofar as their existence is not reducible to that of
a collection of substances of different sorts. But they are also unlike
them insofar as they do not by themselves possess just one nature
and are conceived on the basis of their possession of this nature. The
V ats ıputr ıyas apparently believe that inexplicable phenomena do possess
by themselves natures by reason of which they exist, but not that they
can be conceived on the basis of possessing these natures. It is precisely
because the natures we possess by ourselves do not enable us to be
conceived that we must be conceived in reliance upon aggregates.In the third article in this series I shall discuss Vasubandhu’s dispute
with the V ats ıputr ıyas concerning how we are known to exist. If we are
8/3/2019 Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of the Vatsiputriyas Theory of Persons I - James Duerlinger
THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE AGGREGATES IN RELIANCE UPON WHICH WEARE CONCEIVED
Let us now discuss the attributes the V ats ıputr ıyas assign to the aggre-
gates in reliance upon which they believe we are conceived. They say
that these aggregates are those which pertain to ourselves ( adhy atmik an),are appropriated (up att an), and exist in the present (varttam an an). The
aggregates which pertain to ourselves are our organs of perception and
mental states, and perhaps even our so-called bodily properties.16 The
aggregates are appropriated, the V ats ıputr ıyas seem to believe, in the
sense that they are “clung to” as possessions of the self which we falsely
appear to be because we form a concept of ourselves in dependence
upon the presence of these aggregates. The self we falsely appear to be,
they claim, is a permanent and partless substance.17 The effect produced
by the aggregates being appropriated in this sense would seem to be the
continued existence of their causal continuum from one lifetime to the
next.18 As causes of the continued existence of this continuum, we are
not selves, since we separately exist without being separate substances.
Vasubandhu verbally agrees with the V ats ıputr ıyas that the aggregates
in reliance upon which we are conceived are those which pertain to
ourselves and are appropriated. But he believes, first of all, that we are
conceived in reliance upon these aggregates in the way in which milk
is conceived in dependence upon its constituents, not in the specialway the V ats ıputr ıyas claim we are conceived. Secondly, he seems to
think that the inexplicable person the V ats ıputr ıyas believe to be the
appropriator of the aggregates is itself the self. For he does not, as the
V ats ıputr ıyas do, believe that we suffer by reason of assuming that
we are permanent and partless substances which exist apart from our
aggregates, yet does believe that we suffer by reason of assuming that
we exist without being reducible in existence to our aggregates. Thirdly,
he thinks that the appropriator of the aggregates is real in the way a
mental construction is, not in the way an inexplicable phenomenon is.
In truth, he insists, there is no appropriator of the aggregates which
exists apart from them.
When the V ats ıputr ıyas say that the aggregates in reliance upon which
we are conceived exist in the present, what they must mean by the
present is the time we are actually being conceived. The V ats ıputr ıyas
are implying that past and future aggregates, which are those not present
at the time when we are conceiving ourselves, are not phenomena in
reliance upon which we are conceived.19 It might be objected thatwe conceive ourselves in reliance upon past aggregates when we
remember something we did or experienced in the past and that we
8/3/2019 Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of the Vatsiputriyas Theory of Persons I - James Duerlinger
conceive ourselves in reliance upon future aggregates when we foresee
or imagine what we shall do or experience in the future. In these cases,
would we not be conceiving ourselves in reliance upon past and future
aggregates? The V ats ıputr ıyas would surely reply that, if we conceive
ourselves on the basis of past and future aggregates, we would not be
conceiving ourselves from the first-person singular perspective, sincepast and future aggregates are the phenomena on basis of which we
would conceive ourselves from the third-person singular perspective.
The concept of ourselves is the concept of ourselves as it is used from
the first-person singular perspective, for example, as it is used in the
thoughts that I am feeling pleasure now, that I felt pleasure yesterday,
and that I shall feel pleasure tomorrow. It should be clear that in each
of these cases, I am conceiving myself in reliance upon thinking these
thoughts, not in reliance upon the content of these thoughts.
VASUBANDHU’S CAUSAL OBJECTION TO THE AGGREGATE-RELIANCEREPLY
Vasubandhu objects, on the assumption that the cause of a concept must
be the object of the concept, that it cannot be true, as the V ats ıputr ıyas
claim, that if we are conceived in reliance upon the aggregates, we are
neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities.
If we are to understand this obscure statement [of how a person exists without beingeither real in the way a substance is or real in the way a mental construction is], itsmeaning must be disclosed. What is meant by [saying that a person is conceived]“in reliance upon [the aggregates]”? If it means [that a person is conceived] “on thecondition that the aggregates have been perceived,” then the concept [of a person]is applied only to them, just as when visible forms and other such things [thatcomprise milk] have been perceived, the concept of milk is applied only to them. If [saying that a person is conceived “in reliance upon the aggregates” means that itis conceived] “in dependence upon the aggregates being present,” then [once again,the concept of a person is applied only to them], because the aggregates themselves
will cause it to be conceived. [Therefore,] the difficulty is the same.
Vasubandhu here argues that insofar as the first premise of the
V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply from aggregate-reliance is true, it cannot be used
in a sound inference to prove that its conclusion is true. The sense in
which that premise is true, he claims, is that the concept of ourselves
is formed because the aggregates have been perceived or because the
aggregates are present. The distinction Vasubandhu is drawing between
the perception of the aggregates being a condition for the concept of
ourselves being formed and the presence of the aggregates being thecondition for the concept being formed does not mark a real difference
in his view about the cause of the concept of ourselves, since the
8/3/2019 Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of the Vatsiputriyas Theory of Persons I - James Duerlinger
now need to do, and indeed, do, is to find a way to reject the theory of
cause-dependent objects of concepts. Their rejection of this theory is
built into their attempt to provide an example of a phenomenon other
than a person which is conceived in dependence upon a collection
of substances of different sorts and is neither clearly and distinctly
separable in existence from, nor reducible in existence to, that collectionof substances. The V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply is as follows:
A person is not conceived in this way, but rather in the way [in which] fire isconceived in reliance upon fuel. Fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel, [they claim,in the sense that] it is not conceived unless fuel is present, and it cannot be conceivedif it either is or is not other than fuel. If fire were other than fuel, fuel [which isburning] would not be hot. And if fire were not other than fuel, what burns wouldbe the same as the cause of its burning.
In the translation I have taken the V ats ıputr ıyas to be providing an
account of what it is for fire to be conceived in reliance upon fuel and
have added to that account the qualification that fuel is burning, since it
is clear that fuel which is not burning is not hot and it is being assumed
that the fuel to which the V ats ıputr ıyas are referring is in fact hot.
The V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply is more than a simple counter-example on
the basis of which they would have us reject the assumption upon
which Vasubandhu’s causal objection is based, since it includes, as I
have interpreted it, a definition of “conceived in reliance upon.” For
if what I am calling their definition of this phrase is substituted forthe phrase in the original aggregate-reliance reply, that reply will then
take the form, “A person is neither real in the way a substance is nor
real in the way a mental construction is, since it [is conceived, but] is
not conceived unless aggregates are present and it cannot be conceived
if it either is or is not other than aggregates.” This definition in fact
supplies us with premises (iv) and (ix) of the reconstruction I made
above of the aggregate-reliance reply. In my reconstruction, however,
I have supplied the premises upon which (iv) and (ix) are derived, and
then supplied the further premises from which the conclusion of the
aggregate-reliance reply is derived.
A logically perspicuous reconstruction of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply to
Vasubandhu’s causal objection will include arguments for the premises
(a) that fire is not conceived unless fuel is present, (b) that fire is not
clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel, and (c) that fire
is not reducible in existence to fuel, and it will end with the conclusion
(d) that that in dependence upon which a phenomenon is conceived need
not be what is conceived. Both Vasubandhu and the V ats
ıputr
ıyas agree,of course, that fire is conceived and that it is conceived in the sense
that a concept of fire is formed. Both also agree that fire is the object of
8/3/2019 Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of the Vatsiputriyas Theory of Persons I - James Duerlinger
(Xiv) If fire is conceived in dependence upon fuel and fuel is not
the object of the concept of fire, then that in dependence
upon which something is conceived need not be the object
which is being conceived.
Therefore, from (xiii) and (xiv) we may infer
(xv) That in dependence upon which something is conceived
need not be the object which is being conceived.
I shall argue in the next article of this series that Vasubandhu, on
question-begging grounds, rejects premises (i) and (vi) in his objection
to the fire-fuel reply, and fails to address the actual point of the reply,
which is that the cause of the concept of ourselves need not be the
object of the concept.
The V ats ıputr ıyas, according to my interpretation of their fire-fuel
reply, are attempting to introduce into the standard Buddhist theory of
causality the idea of an inexplicable phenomenon which can cause the
continuum of a collection of substances of different sorts in dependence
upon which this cause is conceived to continue to exist or to cease
to exist. To be possible, this inexplicable cause must be separable in
existence, without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence,
from the continuum of the collection of substances in which it produces
its effect. Vasubandhu, we shall see, does not even attempt to show,on philosophical grounds, why a cause of this sort is not possible.
THE V ATS IPUTR IYAS’ MIDDLE-WAY ARGUMENT FOR THEIR THEORY OFPERSONS
We have seen how the V ats ıputr ıyas use the fire-fuel reply to overturn
Vasubandhu’s causal objection to their aggregate-reliance reply to his
two-realities objection to their theory of persons. Their reply is used to
show that our aggregates need not be, as Vasubandhu assumes, what
is conceived when we are conceived. Immediately after replying to
Vasubandhu’s objection, they introduce premises analogous to those
used in the reply to formulate their main argument for the view that
we are in fact inexplicable phenomena. This is the argument I have
called their middle-way argument.
Similarly, a person is not conceived unless the aggregates are present, [and] if itwere other than the aggregates, the reificationist theory [that a person is a substance]would be held, and if it were not other than the aggregates, the nihilist theory [thata person does not exist at all] would be held.
8/3/2019 Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of the Vatsiputriyas Theory of Persons I - James Duerlinger
Finally, on the basis of (viii) and (x), they conclude that their own
theory of persons is the middle way between the extremes of asserting
that we are separate substances and that we lack existence apart from
our aggregates. Hence,
(xi) We are neither clearly and distinctly separable in existencefrom the aggregates we appropriate nor reducible in exis-
tence to the aggregates we appropriate.
The V ats ıputr ıyas’ middle-way argument, so reconstructed, shows us that
the most basic disagreement between them and Vasubandhu concerns
the truth or falsity of premise (iv), that we are correctly conceived to
be appropriators of the aggregates. Unfortunately, in the “Refutation”
Vasubandhu does not discuss the V ats ıputr ıyas’ middle-way argument,
and the V
ats
ıputr
ıyas are, for the most part, made simply to assumethe truth of (iv) in their arguments against Vasubandhu’s own theory
of persons, just as Vasubandhu assumes its falsity in his arguments
against their theory. So what the middle-way argument accomplishes,
in the end, is simply a reformulation of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of
persons which fits with the Buddhas’ claim that his own theory is a
middle way between extreme views. To support their theory they need
to argue that we are in fact correctly conceived to be appropriators of
aggregates. Consequently, their middle-way argument cannot be said
to provide by itself a good reason to accept the truth of their theory
that we are inexplicable phenomena.
University of Iowa,
Iowa City 52242
NOTES
1 What is known about the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory is for the most part found in thepolemical works of their Indian Buddhist critics, which include, besides the “Refu-tation” of Vasubandhu, Mogal ıputtatissa’s Kath avatthu, Asanga’s Sutr alamk ara and Madhyantavibhan ga, S antideva’s Bodhicary avat ara, Candrak ırti’s Madhyamak avat ara,and Kamala sila’s Tattvasamgraha, along with S antaraksita’s Pa ~ njika commentary onKamala sila’s work. Of the texts of the V ats ıputr ıyas school, only the fifth centuryC. E. S ammit ıyanik aya S astra survives, and that only in a Chinese translation. AnEnglish translation of a Chinese translation of this text has been published, butneither it nor the Kath avatthu, at least in their English translations, seems to me toportray a clear statement of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of persons. In any case, in this
study, I confine my discussion to the V
ats
ıputr
ıyas’ theory of persons as Vasubandhupresents it.There are three translations of the “Refutation” in print. The most recent translation
is based on the Sanskrit text which was discovered in Tibet in 1934. It was composed
8/3/2019 Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of the Vatsiputriyas Theory of Persons I - James Duerlinger
by myself and published in The Journal of Indian Philosophy in 1988 (17: 137–187)On the basis of Ya somitra’s commentary and a Tibetan translation T. Stcherbatskycomposed an English translation, entitled “The Soul Theory of the Buddhists,” publishedby the Bulletin de l’Academie des Science de Russie, 1919, pp. 823–854, 937–958(reprinted in 1976 by the Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi). A French translation,by L. De la Vallee Poussin, which is in the last volume of his L’Abhidharmako sa de
Vasubandhu (Paris, 1923–1931), is based on Ya
somitra’s commentary and a Chinesetranslation by Hs uan-tsang. There is also a complete English translation of Poussin’stranslation made by Leo Pruden in 1990 and published by the Asian HumanitiesPress in Berkeley, California.2 Since Vasubandhu’s subsequent criticisms of their theory of persons are basedprimarily on scriptural quotations, they require a different sort of treatment which Ihope to provide elsewhere in the context of a more comprehensive account of theargumentation of Vasubandhu’s “Refutation.” Discussions of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theoryof persons can be found in Nalinaksha Dutt’s Buddhist Sects in India (Delhi, 1978),ch. VIII, and Edward Conze’s Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor, 1967), pp.122–134. In my 1982 paper, “Vasubandhu on the V ats ıputr ıyas’ fire-fuel analogy,”
in Philosophy East and West (32: 151–158), I made an attempt to make sense of Vasubandhu’s critique of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ use of the analogy to fire and fuel tosupport their theory, but I have, since its publication, radically changed my view. Acompletely new analysis is laid out in the second article of the three of which thepresent article is the first. The discussions by Dutt and Conze do not carefully analyzewhat I am here calling Vasubandhu’s philosophical objections to the V ats ıputr ıyas’theory of persons. Nor do they, in my opinion, adequately represent the V ats ıputr ıyas’theory as it is set out in Vasubandhu’s “Refutation.” Claus Oetke, in “ Ich” und das Ich (Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Stuttgart: 1988), presents a summaryof Vasubandhu’s “Refutation” and a close analysis of his own reductionist theory of persons, but he does not carefully analyze Vasubandhu’s critique of the V ats ıputr ıyas’
theory of persons.3 Among the Indian Buddhist schools, only the M adhyamikas deny that we possessan existence apart from beign perceived or conceived.4 Vasubandhu often uses “is not other than” in place of “is the same as,” therebycreating the impression that the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory violates a law of logic. Thatthe theory does not in fact violate a law of logic I shall argue below.5 Here and elsewhere when I use “conceived” by itself I mean “conceived to bean entity of a certain sort.” Similarly, an object of a concept is assumed to be anobject conceived to be an entity of a certain sort, and to form a concept is assumedto be to conceive an object to be an entity of a certain sort.6 We need not enumerate and explain the very complicated theory of the aggregates
laid out in the Treasury in order to reconstruct and assess Vasubandhu’s philosophicalobjections to the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of persons.7 Alternatively, inexplicable phenomena may be defined as those which are neitherreal in the way a substance is nor real in the way a mental construction is, or asthose which are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities. Seebelow.8 Ya somitra, in his commentary on the “Refutation,” makes it clear that the T ırthikaopponents Vasubandhu has in mind are primarily the Ny aya-Vai sesikas.9 A more detailed exposition of Vasubandhu’s argument can be found in JamesDuerlinger, “Reductionist and Nonreductionist Theories of Persons in Indian BuddhistPhilosophy.” in Journal of Indian Philosophy (21: 79–101), 1993.
10 Here and elsewhere I shall use the neuter pronoun and its correlates to refer toa person, since the gender of the phenomena to which we apply “I” is irrelevant toits analysis.
8/3/2019 Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of the Vatsiputriyas Theory of Persons I - James Duerlinger
11 Dravyasat and praj ~ naptisat are difficult terms to translate, an indication of which is the many different ways in which they have been translated. Part of thedifficulty is that their meanings are differently construed by different Indian Buddhistphilosophers. I have chosen translations which I believe convey the sense they havefor Vasubandhu.12 In my translations of passages from the “Refutation” I place in brackets words,
phrases, or sentences which I believe will help the reader to grasp unexpressedparts of theses and arguments presented in the text. So the reader can distinguishwhat Vasubandhu actually says from what I add in an effort to make it clearer, Ihave translated the text so that it can be read either with or without these additions.To make grammatical sense of the unembellished translation the reader needs todisregard punctuations required for the readability of the expanded translation.13 In verse 4 of Bk. VI of the Treasury and in his commentary on the verseVasubandhu presents, with approval, the Vaibh asika accounts of these two realities.The accounts are operational definitions in which we are given the means by which todetermine whether a phenomenon known to exist is a deceptive conventional realityor an ultimate reality. A deceptive conventional reality is defined as a phenomenon
which is no longer conceived if it is taken apart physically or is mentally analyzedinto constituent parts and brought to consciousness in that form. An ultimate realityis defined as a phenomenon which continues to be conceived if it is been taken apartphycically or is mentally analyzed into constituent parts and brought to consciousnessin that form,14 See note 4.15 See Conze, op. cit., p. 125.16 We attribute to ourselves not only the possession of sense organs and mentalstates, but also physical properties such as height, weight, color, odor, etc. We neednot, as Stcherbatsky and Poussin do, take adhy atmik an in the technical sense of “internal” or “subjective.”17
This claim is, among the Indian Buddhist schools, peculiar to the V
ats
ıputr
ıyas.18 We must distinguish the effect produced by the false view of self from the effectproduced by the false view of the aggregates. By reason of accepting as true ourappearance of being permanent and partless substances, the V ats ıputr ıyas seem tobelieve, we continue to appropriate our aggregates, and by reason of appropriatingour aggregates, the continuum of our aggregates is perpetuated from one lifetime tothe next.19 We need not suppose, with Poussin, that the V ats ıputr ıyas deny that past andfuture phenomena exist.20 Abhidharmako sabh as ya, I, 12a–b.21 Ibid ., I, 12d.
22 See Stcherbatsky’s The Central Conception of Buddhism (Motilal Banarsidass,Delhi: 1970), p. 13.23 Stcherbatsky and Poussin in fact attribute this account to the V ats ıputr ıyas. Ifollow Ya somitra in attributing it to Vasubandhu.24 Dutt claims (op. cit., p. 185) that the V ats ıputr ıyas believe that persons cease toexist when the continuum of their aggregates ceases to exist, but no such view isexpressed in the “Refutation” itself.25 This view is later deemed contradictory by the Buddhist philosophers of theM adhyamika school.26 The standard Indian Buddhist example of this principle is that a knife cannot cutitself.27 See Conze (op. cit., pp. 125–126).