Standards Certification Education & Training Publishing Conferences & Exhibits Integration of Safety Lifecycle Tools and PLC Programming Iwan van Beurden, exida Charlie Fialkowski, Siemens
Oct 24, 2014
Standards
Certification
Education & Training
Publishing
Conferences & Exhibits
Integration of Safety Lifecycle Tools and PLC Programming
Iwan van Beurden, exida
Charlie Fialkowski, Siemens
2
Presenters & Co-authors
• exida– Iwan van Beurden, MSc, CFSE
– Senior Safety Engineer
– exSILentia product Manager
• Siemens– Charlie Fialkowski, CFSE
– Safety System Product Manager
– John Cusimano, CFSE – Business Development Manager, Process Safety Systems
– Patricia Ela
3
Integration of Safety Lifecycle Tools and PLC Programming
• Safety Lifecycle Phases• Example HIPPS• Safety Lifecycle Engineering Tools
– SIL Selection– SIL Verification (conceptual design)– Cause & Effect Matrix (detailed design)
• Integration of exSILentia and Safety Matrix
4
ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-2004 Safety Lifecycle
Management of Functional Safety and Functional
Safety Assessment
Clause 5
Safety Lifecycle Structure
and Planning
Sub-clause
6.2
Verification
Sub-clause 7, 12.7
Management of Functional Safety and Functional
Safety Assessment
Clause 5
Safety Lifecycle Structure
and Planning
Sub-clause
6.2
Verification
Sub-clause 7, 12.7
Risk Analysis and Protection Layer DesignSub-clause 8
Allocation of Safety Functions to Safety Instrumented Systems or Other Means of Risk ReductionSub-clause 9
Allocation of Safety Functions to Safety Instrumented Systems or Other Means of Risk ReductionSub-clause 9
Safety Requirements Specification for the Safety Instrumented SystemSub-clause 10
Design and Development of Safety Instrumented SystemSub-clause 11
Design and Development of Safety Instrumented SystemSub-clause 11
Design and Development of Other Means of Risk ReductionSub-clause 9
Design and Development of Other Means of Risk ReductionSub-clause 9
Installation, Commissioning, and ValidationSub-clause 14Installation, Commissioning, and ValidationSub-clause 14
Operation and MaintenanceSub-clause 15Operation and MaintenanceSub-clause 15
ModificationSub-clause 15.4
DecommissioningSub-clause 16
ANALYSIS
REALIZATION
OPERATION
5
Example HIPPS Safety Instrumented Function
• Example Process– Heat used to separate
petroleum into various components in distillation column
• Hazard identified– Column C-51 Overpressure,
with Possible Overloading of Flare System
• Safety Instrumented Function– High Pressure on Column C-
51 Causes Steam Supply to Reboiler E-52 to Close
6
SIL Selection
SIF Item Hazard Description Inputs Outputs Target SIL
SIF 1 Column C-51 overpressure, with
possible overloading of flare system.
High Pressure on Column C-51 causes Steam Supply to
Reboiler E-52 to close.
PT-51PT-52PT-53
(2oo3)
XV-51 CloseXV-52 Close
(1oo2)
3
Note: Target SIL and input / output voting are for illustrative examples only and are not to be taken as typical, suggested or recommended.
Assume• Demand frequency
– Over pressure every 3 years
• Consequence– Single Fatality
– Economic Loss of $4 Million
7
Conceptual Design (I)
PT-51
PT-52
PT-53
2oo3
Logic Solver
S S
1oo2
SIF Item Hazard Description Inputs Outputs Target SIL
SIF 1 Column C-51 overpressure, with
possible overloading of flare system.
High Pressure on Column C-51 causes Steam Supply to
Reboiler E-52 to close.
PT-51PT-52PT-53
(2oo3)
XV-51 CloseXV-52 Close
(1oo2)
3
Note: Target SIL and input / output voting are for illustrative examples only and are not to be taken as typical, suggested or recommended.
XV-51 XV-52
8
Conceptual Design (II)
9
Detailed DesignLegend:O = OpenC = ClosedR = ResetA = Action1 = See Note 1 (and so on)SD = Shutdown (Stop)P = Permissive
Tag
FC
V-0
01
HV
-001
HV
-002
Tag Description Vote EULO EUHI Units Trip Act 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 151 FSLL-001 Flashed crude to B-2A Heater Pass 1 Lo-Lo Flow 1oo1 C2 FSLL-002 Flashed crude to B-2A Heater Pass 2 Lo-Lo Flow 1oo1 C34 HS-001 B-2A Heater Fuel Gas Control Valve Minimum Firing SW 1oo1 C5 HS-002 B-2A Heater Fuel Gas Block Valve Dropout SW 1oo1 C6 HS-003 B-2A Heater Pilot Gas Block Valve Dropout SW 1oo1 C789
1011121314151617181920
Rev Date B y App
0 17-May-06 xx yy
Project No. Page of Rev
xxx 1 1 0
Item: 1
Cause o
r Effect
Tag: I-1ADescription: B-2A Heater Shutdown
(1) Reference P&ID: xxx
Description
B-2
A H
eate
r Fue
l Gas
Con
trol
Val
ve (M
inim
um F
ire) (2
)
B-2
A H
eate
r Fue
l Gas
Blo
ck V
alve
B-2
A H
eate
r P
ilot G
as B
lock
Val
ve
Input or Cause
Switch delay of 3 Seconds on the input.Switch delay of 3 Seconds on the input.
Notes: Description
Under Development
(2) Minimum firing: de-energize relay to interrupt 4-20 mA signal from FC-001(3) Restores FC-001 control.
Client: By:
SIS Functional Specification
C&E 001
Drawing No.
xxx
10
exSILentia to Safety Matrix Integration Workflow
project.exiexSILentia export file
exSILentiato
Safety Matrix Utility
11
SIMATIC Safety Matrix for HIPPS Example
12
The Safety Lifecycle - Objectives
• Build safer systems that do not experience as many of the problems of the past
• Build more cost effective systems that match design with risk
• Eliminate “weak link” designs that cost much but provide little
• Provide a global framework for consistent designs
13
Summary
• The ANSI/ISA 84.00.01-2004 (IEC 61511 Mod.) offers the opportunity to design safer systems and optimize cost
• Safety Lifecycle implementation can be engineering and documentation intensive
• Various software tools address different phases of the Safety Lifecycle
• exSILentia covers SIL selection, SIL verification and reliability calculations
• SIMATIC Safety Matrix is a Cause and Effect Matrix design, programming, and operations and maintenance tool
• Import utility provides a comprehensive cost effect and less error prone solution for managing the entire Safety Lifecycle
14
Path Forward
• Standardize a conceptual design to detailed design transition format
Standards
Certification
Education & Training
Publishing
Conferences & Exhibits
Integration of Safety Lifecycle Tools and PLC Programming
Iwan van Beurden, exida
Charlie Fialkowski, Siemens