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Asian Survey, Vol. 51, Number 4, pp. 683–712. ISSN 0004-4687,
electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2011 by the Regents of the University
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AS.2011.51.4.683.
683
MA NGOK
Value Changes and Legitimacy Crisis in Post-industrial Hong
Kong
ABSTRACT
Social, political, and economic changes in post-industrial Hong
Kong brought a less instrumental view of democracy, more skepticism
against the neoliberal regime, and more support for
post-materialist values. The changing values make the old
legitimacy formula obsolete, creating a legitimacy crisis for the
undemocratic, business-dominated, and low-interventionist
government.
K E Y WO R D S : post-materialism, legitimacy crisis, value
changes, democracy, Hong Kong politics
Social, economic, and political changes in Hong Kong in recent
decades have led to value changes toward a less instrumental view
of democ-racy, more skepticism about the prevailing neoliberal
ideology, and more support for post-materialist values. These value
changes have called into question the legitimacy of the current
business-dominated, semi-democratic regime of Hong Kong, leading to
more challenges to government legitimacy in 2009–10.
Based on various surveys on political values, this paper traces
the major processes of value change in Hong Kong in recent years.
For years, Hong Kong’s legitimacy formula relied upon political
values in the colonial era, including an instrumental view of
democracy, belief in the “openness thesis” of neoliberal ideology,
and the primacy of materialist values. But years of political
change and democracy movements meant that Hong Kong people have
begun to see democracy in terms of equal political rights, which
makes them less content with the inequality and semi-democratic
nature of the
Ma Ngok is Associate Professor in the Department of Government
and Public Administration, Chinese University of Hong Kong. He
wishes to thank Olivia Kwan and Ting Wang-liang for their research
assistance, and the Faculty of Social Science and the Institute of
Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, for
supporting related research. Email: .
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 683 10/08/11 11:12 AM
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684 • ASiAN SuRVEY 51:4
current regime. Economic restructuring into a post-industrial
economy in-creased income inequality, reduced mobility, and made
more people doubt the neoliberal myth and question the legitimacy
of the business-dominated regime. In order for Hong Kong to emerge
from its legitimacy crisis, the change in political values requires
a more fundamental change in governing ideology, state-society
relations, and political institutions.
THE LEGiTiMACY OF THE ANTECEDENT REGiME
Regime legitimacy depends on basic allegiance from its subjects,
which in turn is conditioned upon affection for and positive
evaluation of the system, its input processes, and policy outputs.1
Colonial Hong Kong was born with an inherent legitimacy problem. As
a non-elected polity imposed from abroad proffering only a low
level of welfare, Hong Kong’s colonial govern-ment nonetheless
managed to elicit basic allegiance from its Chinese subjects for
most of its history from 1842 to 1997.
There have been different explanations for the regime legitimacy
of colo-nial Hong Kong. Scott claimed that the colonial regime was
in repeated le-gitimacy crises after 1842, when China was forced to
cede Hong Kong Island to the British following the First Opium War.
In Scott’s view, the recurring crisis was resolved each time by
enlarging the circle of elites, gradually build-ing a more
inclusive corporatist regime.2 Corporatism as a legitimacy for-mula
was a recurrent theme in Hong Kong studies: Ambrose King’s
“administrative absorption of politics” formulation saw colonial
legitimacy as rooted in a synarchy between colonial bureaucrats and
appointed Chinese elites.3 Potential opposition from Chinese
society was pacified by appointing key Chinese elite members into
fringes of the decision-making structure, and by granting them
colonial honors.
A prevalent explanation for colonial stability amid rapid
development in post-World War Two years was the political passivity
of the Hong Kong Chinese. Lau Siu-kai saw postwar Hong Kong as a
refugee society of immi-grants from China who harbored “utilitarian
familism,” putting material
1. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (London: Sage, 1989).
2. Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in
Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989).
3. Ambrose King, “Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong
Kong: Emphasis on the Grass-root Level,” Asian Survey 15:5 (May
1975), pp. 422–39.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 684 10/08/11 11:12 AM
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MA / HONG KONG-CHiNA SHiFTiNG VALuES • 685
interests and family values above social ideals. Lau saw the
amorphous Chi-nese society and the colonial bureaucracy as being
“boundary conscious”; both sides shared a tacit understanding of
mutual non-intervention, result-ing in a “minimally-integrated
social-political system” that nurtured little political
participation.4 Because Chinese society was content with a low
level of welfare and had no expectations for democracy under
colonialism, the legitimacy of the colonial regime was seldom
called into question.
Goodstadt and Ngo concurred that the economic strategy of low
inter-vention was an important part of the colonial legitimacy
formula, as the British found it difficult to adjudicate competing
demands for subsidies and intervention from the business sectors,
and preferred to stay aloof.5 Although the business sector had
dominating political influence, the Hong Kong pub-lic believed that
the colonial regime could separate public interest from pri-vate
profits and was not too predatory. Sing asserted that the colonial
regime based its legitimacy on performance. The Hong Kong people
were content with being governed by a non-elected bureaucracy
because the latter could deliver economic growth, protect freedom,
and was corruption-free.6
The different narratives about the legitimacy basis of colonial
Hong Kong share two common assumptions: that Hong Kong people were
materialistic and pragmatic, and that they adopted an instrumental
view of the gover-nance of Hong Kong. Even if Hong Kong people did
not agree with colo-nialism per se, they could accept living under
a colonial government if it delivered good governance (Sing’s
claim), if it was not overly predatory or interventionist
(Goodstadt, Ngo, and Lau), and/or it could to a certain ex-tent
respond to public needs (Scott and King). The non-democratic
political regime was acceptable because people believed it “worked
well,” without see-ing it in ideological terms. These narratives,
however, could only explain why the Hong Kong Chinese acquiesced
under colonialism, without really seeing the colonial regime as
legitimate. As Przeworski put it, a regime does not suffer from a
legitimacy crisis if no credible alternative is provided for
the
4. Lau Siu-kai, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong:
Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1984).
5. Ngo Tak-wing, “Colonialism in Hong Kong Revisited,” in Ngo
Tak-wing, ed., Hong Kong’s History: State and Society under
Colonial Rule (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1–16; Leo
Good-stadt, Uneasy Partners: The Conflict between PUBLIC INTERESTS
and PRIVATE PROFIT in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University
Press, 2004).
6. Sing Ming, “Democratization and Economic Development: The
Anomalous Case of Hong Kong,” Democratization 3:3 (Autumn 1996),
pp. 343–59.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 685 10/08/11 11:12 AM
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686 • ASiAN SuRVEY 51:4
citizens.7 Before the 1980s, most Hong Kong people bought into
the “Hong Kong as a lifeboat” concept: rocking the boat would only
mean falling into the sea of Communist China.
THE TWiN PiLLARS OF POST-COLONiAL LEGiTiMACY
When decolonization started in the 1980s, Hong Kong started
looking for a new legitimacy formula. With colonialism’s imminent
departure, the colo-nial masters found their authority rapidly
depreciating. Decolonization and gradual democratization
politicized Hong Kong society, with “Hong Kong people ruling Hong
Kong” after 1997 now a plausible alternative. Popular elections
could have served as a new basis of legitimacy after 1997, but
hopes for full democracy were quickly dashed by an unholy alliance
of the Chinese government, British government, and local business
conservatives. The Basic Law instituted only a semi-democratic
regime, with business and profes-sional elites heavily represented.
The chief executive (CE) is elected by an Election Committee, which
is elected by a narrow franchise including most major business and
professional groups. The proportion of popularly elected seats in
the Legislative Council (Legco) increased very gradually from 30%
in 1991 to 50% in 2004; the other half was elected by functional
constituencies (FCs) that represent the major business and
professional groups. The Basic Law stipulates that the CE and the
Legco would ultimately be fully elected by universal suffrage, yet
no concrete timetable has been offered.
This partial democratic formula was compatible with political
values dur-ing the transition era. Surveys in the 1980s showed that
while a majority of Hong Kong people supported faster
democratization, they could also accept government by elites and
civil servants, and they harbored paternalistic val-ues. Many
respondents saw “democracy” not in procedural or institutional
terms but as a government that would consult public opinion, or as
an in-strument to ensure efficient government in order to bring
about stability and prosperity.8 In other words, the Hong Kong
people had a “partial vision of democracy,” seeing it not in terms
of ideas or “rights” but rather as an
7. Adam Przeworski, “Some Problems in the Study of the
Transition to Democracy,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe
Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 47–63.
8. Kuan Hsin-chi and Lau Siu-kai, “The Partial Vision of
Democracy in Hong Kong: A Survey of Popular Opinion,” China Journal
34 (July 1995), pp. 239–64.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 686 10/08/11 11:12 AM
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MA / HONG KONG-CHiNA SHiFTiNG VALuES • 687
instrument to achieve pragmatic goals. If good governance, civil
liberties, and clean government could be maintained, Hong Kong
people would be content with a partially democratic regime.9
The Hong Kong people were also notorious for their low level of
partici-pation and low political efficacy. Surveys in the 1980s
showed that although they actively consumed political news, levels
of organizational political par-ticipation were very low; hence,
the people were labeled as “attentive spectators.”10 Lau and Kuan
attributed this low participation to a low sense of political
efficacy: years of serving as colonial subjects made many believe
that they had little say in government affairs. This brought weak
mobiliza-tion in support of the democracy movement, in turn
weakening the bargain-ing power of the democrats vis-à-vis the
Chinese government.
Both the “attentive spectators” and “partial vision” narratives
saw the po-litical values of Hong Kong people as instrumental and
pragmatic. In these narratives, Hong Kong people supported
democracy not because of its in-trinsic value or as a principle of
societal or political organization, but because they believed it
could deliver good governance and defend their way of life. Even if
they supported democracy, they considered their participation
incon-sequential in bringing about its fruition, and many preferred
to stay away and free-ride. Because they did not see a democratic
system as a natural right, they could settle for a partial
democratic reform before and after 1997.
On top of the partial-democratic system, the Basic Law enshrines
a neo-liberal economic regime that perpetuates the pre-1997
low-welfare and low-interventionist regime. Hong Kong has long been
regarded as the last bastion of free market ideology. Rapid
economic advancement in postwar years made many Hong Kong people
believe that non-interventionism was the best philosophy of
economic governance, and adherence to free market prin-ciples was
the key to Hong Kong’s economic miracle. For those who had fled
from mainland China to Hong Kong, “socialism” was associated with
the command economy that had caused economic havoc in China, and
the over-politicized Communist regime that was the antithesis of
free-wheeling Hong Kong. During the political transition preceding
1997, “stability” and “pros-perity” were hailed as collective goals
of Hong Kong, as a conservative, pro-capitalist ideology was
consolidated.
9. Ibid. 10. Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, “The Attentive
Spectators: Political Participation of the
Hong Kong Chinese,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 14:1
(Spring 1995), pp. 3–24.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 687 10/08/11 11:12 AM
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688 • ASiAN SuRVEY 51:4
For decades, neoliberal ideology in Hong Kong was justified on
the grounds that it provides “equal opportunity.” Surveys in the
1980s showed that the Hong Kong people in general, and the middle
class in particular, bought into the dictums of equal opportunity,
upward mobility, and self-reliance within the Hong Kong capitalist
order. The Social Indicators Sur-veys (SIS)11 in the 1980s showed
that more than 80% of respondents thought Hong Kong was a “land of
opportunities” with adequate chances for upward mobility.12 A
similar proportion believed that one could change one’s for-tunes
by working hard, and that one’s economic fortunes were largely
deter-mined by individual hard work and education.13 The
better-educated and higher-salaried professionals had more
confidence in this “openness thesis,” largely, because they were
the winners in the competitive game.14 Lau and Kuan’s survey in
1988 showed 57.5% of respondents agreeing with the govern-ment’s
“laissez-faire” policy.15 Because quite a few in Hong Kong did
improve their living standards through hard work and improved
education during the economic take-off, economic inequality under
Hong Kong’s neoliberal re-gime was legitimized by “equal
opportunity” and “open chances of upward mobility.”
Hong Kong’s neoliberal economic regime was institutionalized and
made official ideology by the Basic Law. Driven by the concept of
“fiscal constitution,”16 the Basic Law stipulates low tax rates
(Article 107), a bal-anced budget (Article 107), free flow of
capital and no foreign exchange
11. The SISs were a long-term collaborative project by Hong Kong
social scientists since 1988. Through biennial territory-wide
surveys, the project focused on subjective indicators such as
percep-tions, behavioral tendencies, values, beliefs, and sense of
well-being, and explored their implications for the social
development of Hong Kong.
12. Wong Wai-pong, “Inequality, Stratification, and Mobility,”
in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds.,
Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1988 (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong
Kong, 1991), p. 161; Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, The Ethos of
Hong Kong Chinese (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1988), pp.
63–65.
13. Lau and Kuan, The Ethos of Hong Kong Chinese, p. 64; Wong,
“Inequality, Stratification, and Mobility,” pp. 160–61.
14. Thomas Wong, “Personal Experience and Social Ideology:
Thematization and Theorization in Social Indicator Studies,” in Lau
Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds.,
Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1990 (Hong Kong: Hong
Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong
Kong, 1992), p. 211.
15. Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, “Public Attitude toward
Laissez-faire in Hong Kong,” Asian Survey 30:8 (1990), pp.
767–81.
16. Fiscal constitution is defined as “to impose legally and
morally binding constitutional rules so as to limit the
government’s fiscal capacity and its interference in the private
sector.” See Tang
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 688 10/08/11 11:12 AM
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MA / HONG KONG-CHiNA SHiFTiNG VALuES • 689
controls (Articles 112 and 115), and free port status and free
trade (Articles 114 and 115) in the post-1997 economic regime.17
The legitimacy of the post-1997 political and economic regime
relied on an instrumental and partial view of democracy by the Hong
Kong people, and belief in the fairness of a low-intervention
economic system. The following sections will show how politi-cal,
social, and economic changes in the past 20 years gradually
transformed political values in Hong Kong, leading to the crumbling
of these “twin pil-lars” of the legitimacy of the post-1997
regime.
CHANGiNG DEMOCRATiC VALuES: TOWARD LESS
iNSTRuMENTAL ViEWS
The democracy movement in the 1980s more or less tried to cope
strategi-cally with the instrumental view of the Hong Kong people
at the time. The democrats’ major argument for the necessity of
democracy after 1997 was that it is the best system to guarantee
autonomy, freedom, and rule of law. In other words, a popularly
elected government was more likely to stave off intervention from
Beijing and defend Hong Kong’s way of life, or in a popu-lar phrase
at the time, minju kanggong (resist communism by democracy).
Political development in the new century changed the nature of
support for democracy and enhanced the sense of political efficacy
of the Hong Kong people. The turning point was July 1, 2003, when
500,000 Hong Kong citi-zens (more than 7% of the population) took
to the streets to protest against the impending enactment of the
National Security Ordinance. Based on Ar-ticle 23 of the Basic Law,
the proposed legislation outlawed acts related to sedition,
secession, theft of state secrets, and other political acts deemed
threatening to the national security of China. Human rights groups
and legal professionals criticized the draft legislation as too
imprecise and liable to abuse by the authorities.18 The post-1997
economic downturn and various governance problems aroused
anti-government sentiments, and the outbreak of the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in spring 2003 plunged Hong
Kong’s economy to a historic low. The July rally was a grand
outburst against government failure, driven by the fear of loss of
freedom.
Shu-hung, “Fiscal Constitution, Income Distribution, and the
Basic Law of Hong Kong,” Economy and Society 20:3 (August 1991), p.
285.
17. Ibid. 18. See Ma Ngok, “Civil Society in Self-Defense: The
Struggle against National Security Legisla-
tion in Hong Kong,” Journal of Contemporary China 14:44 (August
2005), pp. 465–82.
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690 • ASiAN SuRVEY 51:4
The show of people’s power forced withdrawal of the bill and the
resignation of two unpopular bureau secretaries, sparking a rebirth
of the democracy movement. In the years that followed, the July 1
rally became an annual dem-onstration of people’s power, where
political and civil society groups staged a plethora of demands,
including the recurrent theme of full democracy.
Research after 2003 showed that the original July rally was a
major turning point in political values, empowering people,
spurring participation, and bringing renewed support for democracy.
A comparison of the 2001 and 2007 Asian Barometer (AB)19 survey
results showed an increased sense of political efficacy. In 2001,
less than 5% of those surveyed said they thought they had the
ability to participate in politics. The proportion rose to 10.4% in
the 2007 AB survey. The proportion who disagreed that “politics and
government seem so complicated that people like me could not
understand” rose from 15.3% in 2001 to about 20% in 2007. The
percentage that said they are interested in politics increased from
17.6% in 2001 to 24% in 2007 (see Table 1).
The political efficacy of Hong Kong was still low compared to
other Asian regions, but a small contingent of active participants
began to emerge. Focus group research showed that the July 1
experience was one of empowerment: participants gained the
confidence to participate in future social actions, bring-ing to
the fore a core of activists who were no longer “attentive
spectators.”20
After 1997, the democrats seldom asserted minju kanggong, the
notion that democracy is a tool to fend off intervention from
China, probably in part for reasons of “political correctness.”
Instead, they attributed governance fail-ures, business-government
collusion, and low responsiveness to public needs to the
undemocratic and business-dominated nature of the regime. The 2003
National Security Legislation saga, when the government tried to
push un-popular legislation through a partly elected legislature,
gave the democrats much ammunition to convince Hong Kong people
that a non-democracy could easily imperil civil liberties they had
long cherished. These are still all “instrumental” arguments about
democracy.
During the 2003 movements, the main slogan was “sovereignty to
the people,” alluding to the key concept in Western democratic
ideology. This
19. The AB is the longest, most systematic, and most
comprehensive cross-national survey on political attitudes in Asia.
With surveying teams in 17 different polities, the project has
conducted longitudinal surveys with the same battery of core
questions on values and attitudes on democracy and citizens’
action. See .
20. Francis Lee and Joseph M. Chan, “Making Sense of
Participation: The Political Culture of Pro-democracy Demonstrators
in Hong Kong,” China Quarterly 193 (March 2008), pp. 84–101.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 690 10/08/11 11:12 AM
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MA / HONG KONG-CHiNA SHiFTiNG VALuES • 691
table 1. Political Efficacy: Hong Kong 2001 and 2007
How Interested Are You in Politics?
Very Interested
Somewhat Interested
Not Very Interested
Not at All Interested
DK/NA
2001 survey (N = 811)
1.6 16.0 55.1 25.9 1.4
2007 survey (N = 849)
2.9 21.1 53.6 20.1 2.2
I Think I Have the Ability to Participate in Politics.
Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
DK/NA
2001 survey (N = 811)
0.1 3.8 80.4 11.3 4.3
2007 survey (N = 849)
0.2 10.2 63.7 19.6 6.3
Sometimes Politics and Government Seem So Complicated That a
Person Like Me Can’t Really Understand.
Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Strongly Disagree
DK/NA
2001 survey (N = 811)
6.9 73.1 14.9 0.4 5.3
2007 survey (N = 849)
9.8 66.0 19.2 0.7 4.4
source: AB surveys, Hong Kong, 2001 and 2007.note: DK = “don’t
know”; NA = “no answer” or “don’t understand.”
quickly drew criticism from Beijing, where officials charged
that “people’s sovereignty” was a separatist slogan.21 As a result,
“sovereignty to the people” was used less frequently. The democrats
began to argue that election by uni-versal suffrage is a basic
human right. In debates or meetings in the Legco,
21. In China’s official ideology, the Communist Party represents
all the people of China, and they delegate part of the power to the
Hong Kong government. In this official rhetoric, Hong Kong’s
sovereignty handover in 1997 was already “sovereignty to the
people.” To Beijing, demanding “sovereignty to the Hong Kong
people” is tantamount to seeing Hong Kong as a separate political
entity deriving its sovereignty from the Hong Kong “people,” which
smacks of separatism.
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692 • ASiAN SuRVEY 51:4
pro-democracy legislators repeatedly questioned government
officials as to how current electoral arrangements could be
considered compatible with the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR),22 which sees universal and equal suffrage
as a basic right. This usually put officials in a difficult
situation because they are reluctant to admit that Hong Kong falls
short of ICCPR standards but cannot deny the inequality of the
current CE and Legco elections.
In 2008, about 213,000 electors, members of various business and
profes-sional groups, elected 30 legislators through the FCs, while
about 3.2 million general electors elected another 30. This means
that an FC voter’s vote is worth about 15 times that of a general
voter.23 In the 2007 Green Paper on Constitutional Development, the
Hong Kong government admitted that electing the CE and Legco by
universal suffrage was a constitutional goal that must ultimately
be attained. The question is how and when.24 In the 2009
consultation on constitutional reform, Chief Secretary Henry Tang
admitted that the current FC system falls short of the requirements
of uni-versal and equal suffrage as required by the ICCPR.25
The changing narratives and political movements after 1997
brought value changes to democracy in Hong Kong. The AB surveys
tested various aspects of political values, including support for
paternalism, authoritarian alterna-tives, a moral state, political
pluralism, political equality, and checks and balances. In Tables
2A–2C, I compute E as the percentage who agree with the
“authoritarian alternative” minus the percentage who disagree; a
smaller E implies a higher support for democracy. The result shows
that by 2007, Hong Kong people had very little support for the
authoritarian alternatives: only 4.5% concurred with letting the
military rule (down from 5.7% in the 2001 AB survey), 10.9% agreed
with abolishing the legislature and holding
22. Article 39 of the Basic Law stipulates that the provisions
of the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong before 1997 shall remain in
force and be implemented through the laws of Hong Kong. The legal
sector has long argued that Hong Kong has a constitutional duty to
have all policies and insti-tutions meet ICCPR standards.
23. For detailed arrangements and various problems of the FC
system, see Ma Ngok, “Twenty Years of Functional Elections in Hong
Kong: Exclusive Corporatism or Alternative Democratic Form?”
Representation 45:4 (November 2009), pp. 421–33; and Christine Loh
and Civic Exchange, eds., Functional Constituencies: A Unique
Feature of the Hong Kong Legislative Council (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2006).
24. Hong Kong government, Green Paper on Constitutional
Development (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government, 2007), Sections 1.05
and 1.06.
25. Sing Tao Daily News, December 19, 2009, p. A13.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 692 10/08/11 11:12 AM
-
tabl
e 2.
Agr
eem
ent t
o Au
thor
itaria
n Al
tern
ativ
esta
ble
2a.
Supp
ort f
or M
ilita
ry R
ule
The
Mili
tary
Sho
uld
Gov
ern.
Taiw
anM
ongo
liaPh
ilipp
ines
Tha
iland
Kor
eaSi
ngap
ore
Indo
nesia
Vie
tnam
Japa
nM
alay
siaH
K
Stro
ngly
agr
ee (A
)0.
74.
07.
84.
81.
20.
32.
54.
01.
42.
10.
4So
mew
hat a
gree
(B)
5.5
7.7
16.6
14.9
3.5
3.9
27.2
20.0
2.9
7.6
4.1
Som
ewha
t disa
gree
(C)
58.0
36.4
24.6
37.1
39.5
47.5
52.6
39.3
14.0
51.1
49.9
Stro
ngly
disa
gree
(D)
30.2
47.0
48.4
34.2
51.0
44.9
9.8
24.8
77.3
36.5
37.6
DK
/NA
5.7
4.9
2.6
9.0
4.8
3.5
7.9
12.0
4.4
2.7
8.0
(A +
B) –
(C +
D)
–82.
0–7
1.7
–48.
6–5
1.6
–85.
8–8
8.2
–32.
7–4
0.1
–87.
0–7
7.8
–83.
0
tabl
e 2b
. Su
ppor
t for
Stro
ng L
eade
r
Shou
ld G
et R
id o
f Par
liam
ent a
nd E
lect
ions
and
Hav
e a
Stro
ng L
eade
r D
ecid
e Thi
ngs.
Taiw
anM
ongo
liaPh
ilipp
ines
Tha
iland
Kor
eaSi
ngap
ore
Indo
nesia
Vie
tnam
Japa
nM
alay
siaH
K
Stro
ngly
agr
ee (A
)1.
825
.516
.55.
82.
61.
02.
53.
72.
611
.10.
5So
mew
hat a
gree
(B)
15.0
35.4
22.0
16.0
9.4
8.5
7.3
8.0
12.4
21.6
10.4
Som
ewha
t disa
gree
(C)
58.8
22.7
27.8
40.6
48.7
52.0
70.2
38.8
36.9
38.5
62.0
Stro
ngly
disa
gree
(D)
17.3
13.1
30.8
28.1
34.0
34.2
13.4
37.3
41.6
24.7
16.8
DK
/NA
7.1
3.2
3.0
9.4
5.3
4.4
6.8
12.2
6.5
4.1
10.4
(A +
B) –
(C +
D)
–59.
325
.1–2
0.1
–46.
9–7
0.7
–76.
7–7
3.8
–64.
4–6
3.5
–30.
5–6
8.0
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 693 10/08/11 11:12 AM
-
tabl
e 2c
. Su
ppor
t for
One
-Par
ty R
ule
Onl
y One
Pol
itica
l Par
ty Is
Allo
wed
to S
tand
for E
lectio
n an
d H
old
Offi
ce.
Taiw
anM
ongo
liaPh
ilipp
ines
Tha
iland
Kor
eaSi
ngap
ore
Indo
nesia
Vie
tnam
Japa
nM
alay
siaH
K
Stro
ngly
agr
ee (A
)0.
9 10
.6
12.7
5.
5 1.
2 1.
1 1.
1 15
.8
0.9
5.3
0.5
Som
ewha
t agr
ee (B
) 10
.3
16.4
20
.4
12.2
5.
9 6.
4 7.
1 39
.3
8.7
14.1
6.
1 So
mew
hat d
isagr
ee (C
) 61
.6
38.3
30
.8
40.2
44
.6
52.2
70
.3
25.6
32
.7
45.3
64
.8
Stro
ngly
disa
gree
(D)
21.3
32
.1
33.8
32
.9
43.2
36
.0
16.8
9.
1 50
.4
31.0
18
.7
DK
/NA
5.9
2.6
2.3
9.2
5.1
4.4
4.7
10.3
7.
2 4.
3 9.
9 (A
+ B
) – (C
+ D
) –7
1.7
–43.
4–3
1.5
–55.
4–8
0.7
–80.
7–7
8.9
20.4
–7
3.5
–57.
0–7
6.9
sour
ce: I
bid.
to T
able
1, W
ave
II.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 694 10/08/11 11:12 AM
-
MA / HONG KONG-CHiNA SHiFTiNG VALuES • 695
elections for a strong leader (down from 15.3% in 2001), and
only 6.6% liked one-party dominance (down from 23.0% in 2001).
Comparing the E values, Hong Kong has a higher rejection rate for
authoritarian alternatives than most Asian states, at a level
similar to that of the region’s established democ-racies (e.g.,
Japan and South Korea) (see Tables 2A–2C).
Hong Kong also had a lower support level for paternalism and the
moral state than most Asian states except Taiwan and Japan. Hong
Kong is more inclined to pluralism and checks and balances than
many other states, infe-rior only to Japan and South Korea, with
Vietnam and Indonesia at a similar level. The support for political
equality was lower than that of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea,
Malaysia, and Vietnam, but almost 80% of respondents agreed that
less-educated people should have as much say as the more-educated.
All in all, the AB figures showed that by 2007 Hong Kong evinced
stronger sup-port for democratic values than many electoral
democracies in Asia, behind only a few modernized and consolidated
democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) (see Tables
3A–3E).
The enhanced support for democracy has several implications. The
“partial vision of democracy” thesis posits that Hong Kong people
can settle for half-baked reforms because they see democracy in
instrumental terms, and if the political goods can be delivered by
an undemocratic system, they can live with the status quo. As more
and more people in Hong Kong conceive democracy in terms of
political rights or equality, they are less likely to accept
partial de-mocracy. If full democracy is not delivered, the pursuit
of it will continue. Second, performance legitimacy is not
sufficient when the people adopt a less instrumental view. They
would continue to demand procedural legitimacy in policy-making,
including democratic policy-making and government borne by
election. Third, for want of procedural legitimacy, government
decisions are liable to challenge by civil society mobilization.
Although the government con-trols the majority in the Legco,
societal mobilization against unpopular deci-sions would aggravate
the government’s legitimacy problems.
ECONOMiC CHANGES AND THE PERiSHiNG OF THE NEOLiBERAL MYTH
In the 1980s, the Hong Kong people were so confident in the
fairness of the neoliberal regime that its principles were elevated
to “constitutional” status in the Basic Law. However, economic
restructuring since the 1980s has gradually weakened the
credibility of the “open thesis” of neoliberal ideology. Since the
1980s, Hong Kong’s manufacturing industries have moved north of the
border
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 695 10/08/11 11:12 AM
-
tabl
e 3.
Sup
port
for D
emoc
ratic
Val
ues
tabl
e 3a
. Po
litic
al E
qual
ity (E
)
Peop
le w
ith L
ittle
or
No
Educ
atio
n Sh
ould
Hav
e as
Muc
h Sa
y in
Pol
itics
as H
ighl
y Ed
ucat
ed P
eopl
e.
Taiw
anM
ongo
liaPh
ilipp
ines
Tha
iland
Kor
eaSi
ngap
ore
Indo
nesia
Vie
tnam
Japa
nM
alay
siaH
K
Stro
ngly
agr
ee (A
)17
.3
23.6
28
.8
35.4
21
.8
11.2
11
.1
52.3
36
.1
36.8
10
.8
Som
ewha
t agr
ee (B
) 69
.0
31.5
31
.3
40.1
65
.3
59.5
68
.3
35.0
52
.6
48.3
69
.8
Som
ewha
t disa
gree
(C)
9.8
20.4
23
.3
15.3
8.
8 17
.0
17.1
3.
3 6.
0 11
.3
12.7
St
rong
ly d
isagr
ee (D
) 0.
6 21
.5
15.3
4.
4 1.
5 10
.0
1.0
2.8
0.7
1.6
0.9
DK
/NA
3.4
2.9
1.5
4.8
2.6
2.4
2.5
6.7
4.7
2.0
5.7
(A +
B) –
(C +
D) =
E75
.913
.221
.555
.876
.843
.761
.381
.282
.072
.167
.0
note
: The
hig
her
the
valu
e of
E, t
he h
ighe
r th
e su
ppor
t for
pol
itic
al e
qual
ity.
tabl
e 3b
. Pat
erna
lism
(P1) G
over
nmen
t Lea
ders
Are
Lik
e th
e H
ead
of a
Fam
ily; W
e Sh
ould
All
Follo
w T
heir
Dec
ision
s.
Taiw
anM
ongo
liaPh
ilipp
ines
Tha
iland
Kor
eaSi
ngap
ore
Indo
nesia
Vie
tnam
Japa
nM
alay
siaH
K
Stro
ngly
agr
ee (A
)1.
5 31
.2
20.2
14
.6
3.9
9.7
6.2
36.4
0.
6 13
.1
0.9
Som
ewha
t agr
ee (B
) 24
.1
40.2
35
.8
39.8
32
.5
46.8
67
.5
37.3
23
.3
48.9
28
.3
Som
ewha
t disa
gree
(C)
63.5
19
.4
30.0
29
.4
50.0
34
.9
21.8
16
.4
48.7
28
.5
58.5
St
rong
ly d
isagr
ee (D
) 7.
0 6.
9 12
.9
9.6
10.1
6.
4 1.
0 2.
6 20
.5
5.7
4.2
DK
/NA
3.9
2.1
1.2
6.6
3.5
2.2
3.5
7.4
6.9
3.8
8.0
(A +
B) –
(C +
D) =
P1
–44.
945
.113
.115
.4–2
3.7
15.2
50.9
54.7
–45.
327
.8–3
3.6
note
: The
hig
her
the
valu
e of
P1,
the
high
er th
e su
ppor
t for
pat
erna
lism
.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 696 10/08/11 11:12 AM
-
tabl
e 3c
. Po
litic
al P
lura
lism
(PP1
) ta
ble
3c1.
Plu
ralis
m o
f Opi
nion
s
The
Gov
ernm
ent S
houl
d D
ecid
e Whe
ther
Cer
tain
Ide
as S
houl
d B
e A
llow
ed to
Be
Disc
usse
d in
Soc
iety
.
Taiw
anM
ongo
liaPh
ilipp
ines
Tha
iland
Kor
eaSi
ngap
ore
Indo
nesia
Vie
tnam
Japa
nM
alay
siaH
K
Stro
ngly
agr
ee (A
)0.
7 46
.0
20.8
8.
4 2.
6 10
.4
3.3
26.8
1.
6 14
.5
0.9
Som
ewha
t agr
ee (B
) 20
.5
36.2
35
.9
33.6
32
.9
60.6
42
.4
46.1
15
.5
55.7
35
.9
Som
ewha
t disa
gree
(C)
63.1
10
.7
28.0
31
.7
48.2
17
.8
43.1
7.
8 46
.0
20.3
45
.5
Stro
ngly
disa
gree
(D)
7.9
3.8
12.8
12
.2
10.3
7.
3 3.
3 2.
1 24
.7
6.1
4.9
DK
/NA
7.7
3.2
2.6
14.1
6.0
4.0
7.9
17.3
12.2
3.4
12.7
(A +
B) –
(C +
D) =
PP1
–49.
867
.715
.9–1
.9–2
3.0
45.9
–0.7
63.0
–53.
643
.8–1
3.5
note
: The
hig
her
the
valu
e of
PP1
, the
low
er th
e su
ppor
t for
pol
itic
al p
lura
lism
.
tabl
e 3c
2. S
ocie
tal P
lura
lism
(PP2
)
Har
mon
y of
the
Com
mun
ity W
ill B
e D
isrup
ted
If P
eopl
e O
rgan
ize
Lots
of G
roup
s.
Taiw
anM
ongo
liaPh
ilipp
ines
Tha
iland
Kor
eaSi
ngap
ore
Indo
nesia
Vie
tnam
Japa
nM
alay
siaH
K
Stro
ngly
agr
ee (A
)5.
0 60
.5
26.7
36
.4
3.1
7.5
3.5
14.3
4.
3 16
.1
2.6
Som
ewha
t agr
ee (B
) 52
.4
21.3
30
.8
45.6
32
.3
41.8
38
.4
25.3
36
.5
53.0
45
.3
Som
ewha
t disa
gree
(C)
35.5
12
.0
27.1
9.
7 46
.3
28.7
48
.0
29.3
36
.2
22.9
41
.5
Stro
ngly
disa
gree
(D)
2.1
4.2
12.7
2.
9 8.
2 18
.5
2.6
14.8
7.
3 4.
3 2.
5 D
K/N
A5.
01.
92.
85.
410
.13.
67.
516
.415
.83.
78.
1(A
+ B
) – (C
+ D
) = P
P219
.865
.617
.769
.4–1
9.1
2.1
–8.7
–4.5
–2.7
42.0
4.0
note
: The
hig
her
the
valu
e of
PP2
, the
low
er th
e su
ppor
t for
pol
itic
al p
lura
lism
.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 697 10/08/11 11:12 AM
-
tabl
e 3c
3. P
lura
lism
of Th
ough
ts (P
P3)
If P
eopl
e H
ave T
oo M
any
Diff
eren
t Way
s of T
hink
ing,
Soc
iety
Will
Be
Cha
otic
.
Taiw
anM
ongo
liaPh
ilipp
ines
Tha
iland
Kor
eaSi
ngap
ore
Indo
nesia
Vie
tnam
Japa
nM
alay
siaH
K
Stro
ngly
agr
ee (A
)7.
8 49
.2
29.7
29
.8
3.5
12.2
3.
1 13
.0
10.2
17
.2
5.2
Som
ewha
t agr
ee (B
) 58
.0
24.6
32
.1
46.1
38
.7
53.7
50
.7
30.5
40
.8
52.2
53
.0
Som
ewha
t disa
gree
(C)
28.5
13
.2
23.9
14
.4
45.0
17
.8
38.3
31
.2
30.1
22
.9
33.8
St
rong
ly d
isagr
ee (D
) 2.
1 10
.0
11.8
3.
4 6.
8 13
.2
3.5
13.7
8.
2 3.
9 2.
5 D
K/N
A3.
63.
02.
66.
46.
03.
24.
511
.610
.73.
75.
5(A
+ B
) – (C
+ D
) = P
P335
.250
.626
.158
.1–9
.634
.912
.0–1
.412
.742
.621
.9
note
: The
hig
her
the
valu
e of
PP3
, the
low
er th
e su
ppor
t for
pol
itic
al p
lura
lism
.
tabl
e 3d
. Che
cks a
nd B
alan
ces (
CB)
If th
e G
over
nmen
t Is C
onsta
ntly
Che
cked
by
the
Legi
slatu
re, I
t Can
not P
ossib
ly A
ccom
plish
Gre
at T
hing
s.
Taiw
anM
ongo
liaPh
ilipp
ines
Tha
iland
Kor
eaSi
ngap
ore
Indo
nesia
Vie
tnam
Japa
nM
alay
siaH
K
Stro
ngly
agr
ee (A
)5.
2 20
.6
18.4
8.
6 3.
3 4.
3 2.
6 6.
3 3.
9 8.
4 2.
5 So
mew
hat a
gree
(B)
50.6
33
.4
32.6
33
.6
32.3
43
.0
31.0
18
.6
26.4
41
.3
41.0
So
mew
hat d
isagr
ee (C
) 32
.5
24.4
29
.6
28.7
47
.3
27.3
52
.4
35.4
41
.0
34.5
41
.3
Stro
ngly
disa
gree
(D)
1.8
11.6
13
.5
9.4
9.2
18.8
3.
5 16
.7
12.5
7.
1 1.
9 D
K/N
A9.
99.
86.
019
.87.
86.
710
.523
.116
.28.
713
.3(A
+ B
) – (C
+ D
) = C
B21
.518
.07.
94.
1–2
0.9
1.2
–22.
3–2
7.2
–23.
28.
00.
2
note
: The
hig
her
the
valu
e of
CB
, the
low
er th
e su
ppor
t for
che
cks
and
bala
nces
.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 698 10/08/11 11:12 AM
-
tabl
e 3e
. Mor
al S
tate
(M) If
We
Hav
e Po
litic
al L
eade
rs W
ho A
re M
oral
ly U
prig
ht, W
e C
an L
et T
hem
Dec
ide
Ever
ythi
ng.
Taiw
anM
ongo
liaPh
ilipp
ines
Tha
iland
Kor
eaSi
ngap
ore
Indo
nesia
Vie
tnam
Japa
nM
alay
siaH
K
Stro
ngly
agr
ee (A
)2.
5 44
.6
23.2
22
.6
13.7
7.
8 3.
4 20
.5
3.4
9.3
1.2
Som
ewha
t agr
ee (B
) 30
.3
33.9
34
.0
43.6
48
.5
48.9
40
.0
39.4
29
.5
39.4
32
.5
Som
ewha
t disa
gree
(C)
56.1
12
.2
27.4
21
.9
28.9
22
.9
47.0
20
.6
41.1
40
.0
51.2
St
rong
ly d
isagr
ee (D
) 6.
4 5.
6 12
.9
3.9
5.4
17.4
5.
2 9.
9 13
.4
7.2
5.9
DK
/NA
4.8
3.8
2.5
7.9
3.5
3.0
4.1
9.6
12.6
4.1
9.2
(A +
B) –
(C +
D) =
M–2
9.7
60.7
16.9
40.4
27.9
16.4
–8.8
29.4
–21.
61.
5–2
3.4
sour
ce: I
bid.
to T
able
2.
note
: The
hig
her
the
valu
e of
M, t
he h
ighe
r th
e su
ppor
t for
a m
oral
sta
te.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 699 10/08/11 11:12 AM
-
700 • ASiAN SuRVEY 51:4
in search of cheaper labor and land. Hong Kong began to
transform into an international financial center, a logistics
center, and an entrepôt feeding off China’s phenomenal growth.26
The transformation into a post-industrial econ-omy put Hong Kong’s
low-skilled labor at risk. The Asian financial crisis ag-gravated
the situation, leading to drastic pay cuts and rising
unemployment.
Instead of reinforcing state action to help those affected by
the crisis, the Hong Kong government’s response was a renewed drive
for neoliberaliza-tion.27 In the face of a burgeoning budget
deficit and negative growth, the government accelerated
marketization, subcontracting, and privatization, including
privatizing more public assets to feed the financial market. This
neoliberalization drive heightened job insecurity among middle
class profes-sionals, arousing strong protests from civil servants
and public sector profes-sionals. In the private sector, more
corporations pursued slimmer and less hierarchical structures to
cut costs, making many experienced middle/upper level managers
redundant.28 Unemployment climbed from the lowest point of 2.2% in
1997 to the highest point of 7.9% in 2003, affecting almost all
walks of the salaried class (see Figure 1).
26. See Stephen Chiu and Tai-lok Lui, Hong Kong: Becoming a
Chinese Global City (Oxford: Routledge, 2009), chs. 2 and 3.
27. Chen Yun-chung and Pun Ngai, “Neoliberalization and
Privatization in Hong Kong after the 1997 Financial Crisis,” China
Review 7:2 (Fall 2007), pp. 65–92.
28. Lui Tai-lok and Jimmy Wong, Xianggang zhongchan jiejji
chujing guancha [Observations on Hong Kong’s middle class] (Hong
Kong: Joint Publishers, 2003), p. 120.
% o
f Pop
ulat
ion
9876543210
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Self-employmentrate
Unemploymentrate (not seasonallyadjusted) (%)
figure 1. Rate of Unemployment and Self-employment,
1982–2009
source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, General
Household Survey Section; and idem, Quarterly Report on GHS:
October to December, 1982–2009.
AS5104_06_Ma.indd 700 10/08/11 11:12 AM
-
MA / HONG KONG-CHiNA SHiFTiNG VALuES • 701
The share of flexible employment in the labor force increased,
meaning less job security and more pressure on average employees.29
Income inequal-ity increased as more people moved into the highest-
and lowest-paying job levels simultaneously.30 The Gini coefficient
of Hong Kong (for household income)31 rose from 0.451 in 1981 and
0.453 in 1986, to 0.476 in 1991, 0.518 in 1996, 0.525 in 2001, and
0.533 in 2006. By 2005, as many as 89% saw in-come inequality as
“very serious,” up from 65% in 1992.32
The economic changes cast doubts on the “openness thesis.”
Upward mobility was not guaranteed with hard work, as many in Hong
Kong had chosen to believe, even for the well-educated middle
class. Increased mono-polization made it more difficult for small
businesses to survive. Privatization of public housing malls
gradually saw small proprietors driven out by drastic rent hikes
and replaced by chain stores. Studying the subjective class
identi-fications of Hong Kong people in the past 20 years, Zheng
and Wong pointed out that 1997 was a watershed for the perception
of social mobility.33 The percentage who defined themselves as
lower class steadily increased after 1997, even during the economic
rebound in 2005 (see Table 4). The less educated, who bore the
brunt of the economic downturn after 1997, were the most
pessimistic. In the 1988 and 1990 SISs, about 63% believed that
their family living standard would be better after three years; the
figures decreased to around 30% in surveys in 2001, 2004, and
200634 (see Table 5), a clear decrease in optimism about the
prospects of mobility in the Hong Kong capitalist order.
29. Stephen W. K. Chiu, Alvin So, and May Tam Yeuk-mui,
“Flexible Employment in Hong Kong: Trends and Patterns in
Comparative Perspective,” Asian Survey 48:4 (July/August 2008), pp.
673–702.
30. See Chiu and Lui, Hong Kong: Becoming a Chinese Global City,
pp. 85–88.31. The Gini coefficient measures inequality of income
distribution in a society, ranging from
zero (totally equality) to one (total inequality). 32. Michael
H. H. Hsiao and Wan Po-san, “Minzhong gonggong xinren di bian yu bu
bian:
Taiwan yu Xianggang di bijiao 1991–2005” [Changes and
changelessness of public trust: A com-parison between Taiwan and
Hong Kong in 1991–2005], in Wong Siu-lun, Wan Po-san, and Leung
Sai-wing, eds., Xin shiji Huaren shehui mianmao: Shehui zhibiao de
fenxi [The changing faces of Chinese societies in the new century:
Analyses from social indicators] (Hong Kong: Institute of
Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008), p.
281.
33. Victor Zheng and Wong Siu-lun, “Class, Mobility, and Social
Transformation: Hong Kong before and after 1997,” in Joseph Cheng,
ed., The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Its First
Decade (Hong Kong: City University Press, 2007), pp. 495–533.
34. Zheng and Wong, “Social Trends: A Comparison of Subjective
and Objective Indicators,” in Leung, Wan, and Wong, eds.,
Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 2006, p. 272.
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table 4. Subjective Class Definition, 1988–2006
Lower Lower-Middle Class Middle Upper-middle class N
1988 24.3 35.8 35.2 4.7 1,5541990 19.2 38.0 38.0 4.9 1,8101993
20.1 35.5 39.3 5.1 1,8961995 21.6 36.0 38.6 3.8 2,1831997 18.4 35.4
42.0 4.3 2,0421999 19.3 35.8 41.2 3.7 3,1162001 23.5 33.8 39.0 3.7
3,9092004 23.6 33.8 39.0 3.5 3,1332006 26.5 34.5 35.6 3.3 3,135
source: Victor Zheng and Wong Siu-lun, “Social Trends: A
Comparison of Subjective and Objective Indicators,” in Leung, Wan,
and Wong, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 2006
(Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University
of Hong Kong, 2008), p. 277.
table 5. Expectations of Family Living Standard after Three
Years, 1988–2006 (%)
Worse About the Same Better N
1988 7.4 29.5 63.1 1,2761990 6.7 30.5 62.9 1,6021993 15.1 31.7
53.2 1,6051995 25.0 40.4 34.6 1,8631997 14.3 43.1 42.6 1,8611999
18.4 46.0 35.6 2,8192001 21.0 46.9 32.1 3,6132004 20.1 49.9 30.0
2,8802006 14.6 52.7 32.6 2,998
source: Ibid. to Table 4, p. 272.
More people began to question neoliberal dictums. In 1988,
surveys found 58% agreed with the laissez-faire policy, while only
42% did in 1994. The 1999 SIS showed that 45% supported maintaining
the “positive non-interventionist policy,” while 23% were
opposed.35 More people began to
35. Note that the two surveys used different terms in the
questionnaire: one used “laissez-faire” and one used “positive
non-interventionism.” See Lau Siu-kai, “Confidence in the
Capitalist Society,” in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and
Wong Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong
1999 (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese
University of Hong Kong, 2001), p. 101.
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question the fairness of the system. The 1999 SIS had 67%
believing that Hong Kong’s capitalist system allows fair
competition, about 20% lower than the figures in the 1980s. The
1997 SIS had 56.7% agreeing that average employees were not treated
fairly, 50% agreeing that there was not enough protection for
workers, 77.8% agreeing that social welfare was not sufficient, and
63% considering wealth distribution in Hong Kong to be unfair (up
from 57% in 1994).36
The changing perceptions of the capitalist system were
accompanied by a rise in anti-neoliberal social movements after
1997, beginning with anti-privatization movements in the public
sector, from civil servants, teachers, and other service
professionals. A critical mass of anti-globalization and
anti-privatization civil society groups coalesced over subsequent
years, staging movements to counter the dominant neoliberal
narrative, push for policy changes, and promote community
self-help, gradually changing the dis-courses of local social
movements.
Two events best illustrated this value change. In 2004, the
government decided to privatize car parks, shopping malls, and
other facilities in public housing estates by putting these assets
in a real estate investment trust (REIT) named The Link, and
listing it on the stock exchange. Pressure groups of public housing
tenants were adamant that privatization would drive up rents and
then living costs. They took the government to court, accusing it
of violating the Housing Ordinance, which guaranteed govern-ment
provision of basic facilities for public housing tenants. The court
ac-tion delayed listing of The Link, arousing vehement criticism
from all corners. Most Hong Kong people saw the project as an
ordinary public list-ing from which they could make a quick fortune
in the under-priced initial public offering. Most did not see the
pitfalls of privatization, choosing to believe the government’s
promise that it could bring better management. A couple of years
after privatization, the public quickly found out the cruel fact of
drastic rent hikes in Link-operated malls, which drove prices up
and small proprietors out. This lent a big support to
anti-privatization narratives
36. Ng Chun-hong and Thomas Wong, “The Ethos of the Hong Kong
People: Taking Stock in 1997,” in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan
Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social Development:
Hong Kong 1997 (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies,
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999), pp. 233–53; Lau Siu-kai,
“Confidence in Hong Kong’s Capitalist Society in the Aftermath of
the Asian Financial Turmoil,” Journal of Contemporary China 12:35
(May 2003), pp. 373–86.
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and movements: many small shop owners joined in efforts to
oppose rent hikes since 2007.37
The Sixth World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial conference,
held in Hong Kong in December 2005, was hailed by the government as
a major international event, a hallmark of Hong Kong’s place in
globalized capital-ism. Protest groups from all over Asia clashed
violently with the Hong Kong police, drawing the public’s attention
to the debate over globalization. The conference was a major
rallying point for anti-globalization groups in Hong Kong. The
widespread coverage and high-profile protests provided an
un-precedented chance for the propaganda of the anti-neoliberal
narratives.38
The government’s persistent neoliberalism during the economic
downturn made people question the political origins of its economic
philosophy. Dis-satisfaction with the business class increased, and
more people saw their economic plight as originating from business
dominance. The 1997 SIS showed 52% of respondents considered
business people to be too powerful.39 In the 2006 SIS, when asked
about the influence of business leaders on gov-ernment policy, 44%
said “very big,” 22% said “big,” while only about 5% thought the
influence “small” or “very small.” As many as 82.4% of the
re-spondents believed that there was government-business collusion,
with 44% seeing the problem as “serious” or “very serious.” About
47% agreed that the government was unable to constrain the scramble
for interests among busi-ness leaders.40
The diminishing credibility of the neoliberal ideology weakened
the legiti-macy of the political regime. The legitimacy of the
low-intervention strategy and political privileges for the business
sector hinges on the belief that the society benefited from it as a
whole. This was in turn premised on the prag-matic and instrumental
inclinations of the Hong Kong people, who were
37. For a collection and narratives of these movements, see ,
accessed on April 23, 2010.
38. See Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce, “Defining Hong Kong as an Emerging
Protest Space: The Anti-Globalisation Movement,” in Khun Eng
Kuah-Pearce and Gilles Guiheux, eds., Social Movements in China and
Hong Kong (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2009), pp.
91–115; Hong Kong People’s Alliance on Globalization, Chaoyue Xiao
zhengfu Dashichang: Pipan xin ziyou zhuyi xianggang sheyun wenji
[Beyond “small government, big market”: Hong Kong social movement
essays in critique of neoliberalism] (Hong Kong: HKPA, 2006).
39. Ng and Wong, “The Ethos of the Hong Kong People,” p. 246.
40. Victor Zheng and Wong Siu-lun, “Xianggang simin ‘yishang
yanshang’ di xintai” [Hong
Kong people’s skepticism and dislike of business], in Wong, Wan,
and Leung, eds., Xin shiji Huaren shehui mianmao, p. 296.
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willing to tolerate political and economic inequality in
exchange for the perceived economic viability of the system. When
both these “pillars” were weakened, the legitimacy of the
business-dominated, non-elected regime was on shaky ground.
TOWARD POST-MATERiALiSM?
Inglehart posited that a major trend of value change in advanced
societies is from “materialist” to “post-materialist” values. With
economic affluence, the stress on economic and physical security
and bread-and-butter (materialist) issues in the industrial age
gradually gives way to self-expression values and quality of life
(post-materialism) issues in post-industrial societies.41 The value
change toward self-expression and post-materialism poses a
challenge to authoritarian regimes. In established democracies, the
value change drives the young generation to shun traditional forms
of participation, such as vot-ing and political parties, in favor
of unconventional, expressive, and elite-challenging mass actions
through loosely organized civic networks.42
The past narrative of Hong Kong’s stability and legitimacy rests
on the assumption of a materialist culture. With Hong Kong
transforming into a post-industrial society since the 1980s, the
young generation that grew up in relative affluence should focus
less on economic security and more on post-materialist values.
However, the SISs in the 1990s showed only a minimal proportion of
respondents who could be classified as “post-materialists.” The
1993 SIS classified only 0.3% of respondents as post-materialists,
with the vast majority as “mixed type.”43 The 1995 SIS classified
0.6% as post-materi-alists.44 Based on the 1992 East Asian Middle
Class survey, Hsiao and Wan classified 8.5% as post-materialists
and 68% as mixed.45
41. Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and
Political Styles (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
42. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization,
Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 116.
43. Ho Kwok-leung and Leung Sai-wing, “Materialism and Political
Attitude,” in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong
Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1993
(Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University
of Hong Kong, 1995), pp. 229–57.
44. Ho Kwok-leung and Leung Sai-wing, “Postmaterialism
Revisited,” in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong
Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1995
(Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University
of Hong Kong, 1997), pp. 331–58.
45. H. H. Michael Hsiao and Wan Po-san, “Hou wuzhi zhuyi de
fuxia? Xianggang yu Taibei de Bijiao” [The rise of
post-materialism? A comparison between Hong Kong and Taipei], in
Lau Siu-kai,
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Inglehart and Welzel argued that although modernization was the
struc-tural factor behind post-materialism, progress was not
linear: historical events could bring sudden changes in values,
leading to breakthroughs or retrogression.46 Events in 2003 served
as accelerators in the value change to-ward post-materialism. The
SARS epidemic, which took 299 lives in Hong Kong, plunged the whole
city into economic and psychological distress. It aroused a renewed
sense of community as the media and social organizations started
campaigns to help medical professionals and victims. The 2004 SIS
showed that many respondents agreed SARS made them care more about
non-materialist aspects of life such as personal health, community
hygiene, friends, and the meaning of life. Fewer said they were
more concerned about work.47 About 81% agreed that “the SARS
epidemic made Hong Kong people more caring,” and 53.5% agreed that
“the July 1 [2003] rally made Hong Kong people more united.”48 A
comparison of SISs in 1997 and 2006 showed that the public in the
latter year paid more attention to issues such as pollu-tion,
education, and health services49 (see Tables 6 and 7). By 2006, 80%
believed that the government should spend more money on
environmental protection, the highest percentage of support among
13 policy areas.50
This value change brought movements for environmental and
heritage protection, spurring a resuscitation of Hong Kong identity
and more hatred against the business-dominated regime. In 2004, a
movement against recla-mation of Victoria Harbor led to an
outpouring of nostalgic sentiment, with developers to blame for
relentless reclamation for development, and for building
skyscrapers that hurt air quality and destroyed the
“skyscape.”51
Wong Ka-ying, and Wan Po-san, eds., Xianggang shehui zhengzhi de
yanxu yu bianqian [Continuity and change in Hong Kong society and
politics] (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese
University of Hong Kong, 2004), pp. 243–73.
46. Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and
Democracy, pp. 21, 39–43.47. Ng Chun-hung, “After the Crises:
Changes in Social Ethos,” in Lau Siu-kai, Lee Ming-
kwan, Wan Po-san, and Wong Siu-lun, eds., Indicators of Social
Development Hong Kong 2004 (Hong Kong: Institute of Asia-Pacific
Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006), p. 268.
48. Ibid., p. 270. 49. Wan Po-san, Kenneth Law, and Timothy K.
Y. Wong, “Attitudes towards Social Problems,
1997–2006,” in Leung et al., eds., Indicators of Social
Development: Hong Kong 2006, pp. 99–132.50. Hong Kong Transition
Project, Parties, Policies, and Political Reform in Hong Kong
(Hong
Kong: Hong Kong Transition Project, 2006), p. 48. 51. For a list
of major environmental movements, see Yip Yan-yan and Christine
Loh, “New
Generation, Greening Politics, and Growing Civil Society,” in
Ming Chan, ed., China’s Hong Kong Transformed: Retrospect and
Prospects beyond the First Decade (Hong Kong: City University
Press, 2008), pp. 213–32.
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table 6. Change in Attitude toward Important Things in Life
(%)
Gone Down a Lot (A)
Gone Down Somewhat
(B)
Same Gone up Somewhat
(C)
Gone up a Lot(D)
(N) (C + D) – (A + B)
A steady job 5.4 15.8 40.5 28.5 9.7 771 17.0A constantly
developing career
3.7 16.7 51.1 24.5 3.9 747 8.0
A city with low contamination
1.3 8.1 50.1 35.4 5.1 786 31.1
A group of mutually supportive friends
1.0 4.6 56.8 31.6 6.0 798 32.0
A harmonious family 1.0 4.5 61.1 29.0 4.4 797 27.9A society that
cares for the weak
1.1 7.0 57.1 30.7 4.1 783 26.7
A society with freedom of thought
1.7 7.9 53.3 31.3 5.9 784 27.6
An economically prosperous society
2.1 10.6 46.2 33.0 8.1 793 28.4
A politically stable society
2.7 8.2 47.3 31.3 10.4 776 30.8
source: Ng Chun-hung, “After the Crises: Changes in Social
Ethos,” in Lau, Lee, Wan, and Wong, eds., Indicators of Social
Development: Hong Kong 2004, pp. 265–84.
This was followed by movements against demolition of the Star
Ferry Pier in 2006 and the Queen’s Pier in 2007, when the
government faced long, drawn-out sit-ins by young protesters, each
time arousing much public sympathy. Some termed these a
“post-modernist” mode of social movement—spontaneous, loosely
organized, with diversified participants and non-materialist
objectives, mobilized via information technology or mass
media.52
These movements in the new century have multiple meanings.
Mostly led by young people, they demonstrated increasing support
for post-materialist values among the young generation. The
movements contested the essence and core values of Hong Kong,
seeking to redefine the city’s history and
52. Chan Kin-man, “Civil Society and the Democracy Movement in
Hong Kong: Mass Mobi-lization with Limited Organizational
Capacity,” Korean Observer 36:1 (Spring 2005), pp. 167–82; Alvin
So, “Social Conflict in Hong Kong after 1997: The Emergence of a
Post-modern Mode of Social Movements?” in Ming Chan, ed., China’s
Hong Kong Transformed, pp. 233–51.
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table 7. Changing Perception on Seriousness of Social Problems,
1997 and 2006
1997 2006 % Change F-ratio
ImprovingHousing 3.64 (0.87) 2.94 (0.78) –19.2 933.76***Public
order 3.03 (0.83) 2.63 (0.72) –13.2 338.98***Transport 2.92 (0.83)
2.73 (0.81) –6.5 68.03***Unemployment 3.52 (0.84) 3.38 (0.83) –4.0
35.24***Youth 3.89 (0.81) 3.74 (0.81) –3.9 41.23***Morale 3.52
(0.87) 3.44 (0.86) –2.3 10.64**Corruption 8.78 (0.81) 2.72 (0.81)
–2.2 5.93*
StalemateSocial welfare 3.00 (0.81) 2.99 (0.83) –0.3 0.06
DeterioratingIncome inequality 3.88 (0.89) 3.95 (0.83) 1.8
9.84**Elderly 3.52 (0.86) 3.67 (0.84) 4.3 38.74***Health service
2.82 (0.76) 2.99 (0.83) 6.0 55.01***Pollution 3.56 (0.87) 3.83
(0.90) 7.6 117.16***Education 2.85 (0.80) 3.12 (0.92) 9.5
109.07***
source: Wan Po-san, Kenneth W. K. Law, and Timothy Wong,
“Attitudes towards Social Problems, 1997–2006,” in Leung, Wan, and
Wong, eds., Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 2006, p.
104.*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Degree of
seriousness is calculated by the mean score on the perceived
seriousness of the social issues: 1 = very minor; 2 = minor; 3 =
average; 4 = serious; 5 = very serious.
identity. In rediscovering and re-narrating bits of history
through these movements, the activists asserted that Hong Kong’s
history was rich in social movements and political action, and not
a purely “economic city,” as the mainstream narrative suggests.
Hong Kong played an important role in China’s political
development, and small closely knit communities, apart from the
globalized metropole, were part and parcel of Hong Kong’s way of
life. These movements symbolized resistance against pervasive
developmen-talism, against business domination of land policy and
top-down decision-making by the government.
These value changes were well expressed in the anti-express rail
link (XRL) campaign of 2009–10. The campaign started with protests
from villagers who were forced to relocate to make way for a US$857
million XRL to mainland China. More problems were revealed with
information disclosure about the XRL plan, leading to a
territory-wide movement of considerable scale. The
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campaign became a grand standoff of contrasting ideologies, and
public opinion was deeply split.53 The government justified the XRL
through ex-pected economic benefits brought by enhanced integration
with China. It was supported by the business sector in general, and
by sectors that would benefit: engineers and architects who would
get jobs, tourism and consump-tion sectors eyeing more mainland
tourists, real estate developers envisaging more mainland “hot
money,” and the like.
On the other hand, opposing activists criticized the government
for sacri-ficing small, old, closely knit communities on the
grounds of overall eco-nomic (business) interest. They accused the
government of seeing land only as a commodity for making money,
disregarding its meaning in and links with human life. They claimed
that the expensive XRL would serve mostly the middle and upper
class, and its construction would disrupt urban house-holds and
create traffic congestion. Above all, they were unhappy with the
top-down decision-making and the ignoring of affected communities
for urban planning.
Starting from December 16, 2009, a group of young protesters,
mostly under 30 years of age, used the “satyagraha walk” (kuxing)
as a form of pro-test. Holding rice and seeds in their hands, the
barefooted protesters walked very slowly to a drumbeat, prostrated
themselves once every 26 steps,54 and walked for 15 hours per day
for three days. The protesters claimed this en-abled them to
directly experience the linkage between people and land;
re-discover the importance of the land that feeds them; rethink
their own identity; and show their respect to community networks,
land, and life.55 These expressive actions with strong religious
flavor and post-materialist overtones aroused much public sympathy.
Networking primarily through the Internet, on successive Fridays
thousands of protesters surrounded the Legco building, demanding a
veto of the government appropriation pro-posal. Unable to persuade
the opposition, the government pushed through
53. On the eve of the appropriation decision, public opinion
polls showed that 47% supported the government plan, 23% opposed
it, while 22% supported delaying the decision. See , accessed
February 22, 2011.
54. The protesters chose “26 steps” because the Hong Kong part
of the XRL is 26 kilometers long. Protesting Korean farmers used a
similar form of protest during the 2005 WTO Ministerial
Conference.
55. Their attachment to the land can be seen from the overall
slogan of the walk: “Every Inch of Soil Triggers a Change of Heart;
Every Drop of Future Needs Your Cultivation.”
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the proposal by dint of its control of the legislative majority,
with the sup-port of most FC members.
The XRL campaign also reflected deep-rooted uneasiness among the
Hong Kong people about integration with mainland China. With
increased social and economic integration after 1997, there were
fears that Hong Kong would lose its identity and distinctiveness.
The cry for rediscovering Hong Kong’s identity, rethinking how
people are related to land, and protecting indigenous communities
reflected the rise of indigenous sentiments, and was a response to
growing dominance of China over Hong Kong’s political and economic
affairs. The XRL was seen as something that served China more than
Hong Kong, imposed by Beijing and pushed through against public
opposition by a Beijing-designed political structure. Physically,
the XRL may bring better China-Hong Kong integration in the future,
but sentimentally, it strained relations.
The anti-XRL campaign exposed the multifaceted legitimacy
problems of the Hong Kong government. The old formula justifying
the sacrifice of mi-nority conditions for “overall economic
interest” failed to convince the young generation, now skeptical
about the fairness of neoliberalist theory. On the
materialist/post-materialist divide, government officials found
them-selves talking at cross purposes with the protesters. The
government’s gospel of developmentalism would never convert those
disciples of post-materialism who treasure land, community, and
less materialistic lifestyles.When the gov-ernment failed to win
over public opinion and resorted to political strong-arm tactics,
the injustice of the regime became all too apparent. The top-down
decision-making, the pro-business ideology and policy, and the
dominance of the FC elites were all seen as roots of economic
inequality and injustice in Hong Kong, in the end raising a
challenge to the legitimacy of the regime.
CONCLuSiONS
Various narratives have been proposed for the origins of the
post-1997 gov-ernance and legitimacy crisis of Hong Kong. Lee and
Ma concurred that institutional incongruity was the root cause:
current institutions were unable to cope with societal demands and
developmental needs.56 Lau attributed
56. Eliza Lee, “Governing Post-colonial Hong Kong: Institutional
Incongruity, Governance Crisis, and Authoritarianism,” Asian Survey
39:6 (November-December 1999), pp. 940–59;
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former CE Tung Chee-hwa’s (1997–2005) governing crisis to a
wrong govern-ing strategy, while Lo blamed it on decreasing levels
of institutionalization and weak political communication.57
Goodstadt argued that the lack of sec-toral intervention in
colonial times made the public believe that the govern-ment would
not seek private benefit at the expense of public interest. It
follows that sectoral intervention after 1997 will bring
accusations of govern-ment-business collusion, undermining the
government’s legitimacy. Chiu and Lui saw the origins of the crisis
in the government’s inability to build a ruling alliance that could
legitimately allocate interests after the departure of the colonial
masters.58
The above scholars, however, did not address the role of value
changes in this crisis. The design of the post-1997 legitimacy
formula assumes a materi-alist, pragmatic Hong Kong populace with
only an instrumental support for democracy and who could tolerate a
non-elected government and unequal economic regime as long as
economic goods could be delivered. Decades of value change have
made the old formula powerless in face of a new genera-tion that
adopts a less instrumental view of governance, has much less faith
in the fairness of the neoliberal regime, and is more
self-expressive and post-materialist. With the passage of time, the
gap between the old legitimacy formula and the political values of
Hong Kong people will only widen. A brief economic rebound or
improvement in government performance is un-likely to rescue the
Hong Kong government from its legitimacy problem. Without an
overhaul of neoliberal ideology, democratic institutional re-forms,
and/or a renegotiation of the state-society contract, the Hong Kong
government will likely find itself facing ever-increasing
challenges to its le-gitimacy in the future.
With increasing integration between China and Hong Kong, these
value changes can be expected to affect mainland society,
heightening Hong Kong’s tensions with the Chinese government. The
vocal Guangzhou
Ma Ngok, Political Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong:
University of Hong Kong Press, 2007), Conclusion.
57. Lau Siu-kai, “Tung Chee-hwa’s Governing Strategy: The
Shortfall in Politics,” in Lau Siu-kai, ed., The First Tung
Chee-hwa Administration: The First Five Years of the Hong Kong
Special Adminis-trative Region (Hong Kong: Chinese University
Press, 2002), pp. 1–39; Lo Shiu-hing, Governing Hong Kong:
Legitimacy, Communication, and Political Decay (New York: Nova
Science Publishers, 2001).
58. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners, passim; Chiu and Lui, Hong Kong:
Becoming a Chinese Global City, ch. 5.
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newspaper Nanfang Dushi Bao gave the 2010 Citizens Award to Choi
Yuen Village (the Hong Kong New Territories area village that
started the XRL campaign). Anti-XRL struggles found resonance in
mainland communities that repeatedly had their land rights violated
by local officials.
Struggle movements for human and civil rights in Hong Kong could
spill over and inspire mainland activists, particularly in an age
of network activ-ism. With the Hong Kong people more supportive of
basic rights and more concerned about economic inequality, reports
of human rights violations and economic oppression (such as
tragedies at Foxconn)59 in China have cre-ated much distaste for
the Chinese government. It will be increasingly dif-ficult for
China’s emphasis on “development first” or “harmonious society,”
both values or goals suiting early industrial ages, to find echo in
the post-industrial society of Hong Kong.
It seems probable that as Hong Kong activists become more
conscious of ways to use their freedom to influence China, as Hong
Kong media reports highlight mainland dissidents’ actions and
plights, and as social protests are potentially “re-imported” to
the mainland, a process is underway of mutual influence between
civil societies across the border. Beijing will undoubtedly see
this as a thorn in its political flesh. But its solution has been
to redouble its efforts at China’s economic integration with Hong
Kong, which ironically may only expose the wide value gap and
sharpen tensions between them.
59. Foxconn International Holdings is the largest producer of
electronic components in the world. In the year 2010, 18 employees
of a Foxconn plant in Guangdong committed suicide because of
extremely adverse working conditions in the factories. This created
an uproar against and great concern about the abysmal working
conditions in China’s factories.
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