V2X security, privacy and trust overview

V2X security,  privacyand trust overview

Dr. José María de Fuentes ([email protected])

COSEC LabUniversity Carlos III de Madrid

Agenda• Intro: Vehicular communications (V2X), what for?

o Real-world news• V2X stakeholders• Security, privacy, trust issues• Our previous results• Conclusions

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V2X – what for?

• Part of smart cities• Road safety + infotainmentImage source: Telematicsnews.org, arm.com

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V2X privacyin the real world

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V2X securityin the real world

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V2X sec&priv&trustin the real world

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V2X sec&priv&trustin the real world

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V2X stakeholders

• What about V2X security, privacy, trust?

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Automakers& car industry

Governments

ConsumersIntelligentTransportSystems(or V2X)

V2X active stakeholders• Automakers

o Increasingly involved – proof‐of‐concept, experimental settingso R&D efforts

• Governmentso Legal framework for ITS: EU directive & action plan on ITS, also in the

US…o Also initiatives in the National level: Spanish ITS initiative…

• Research communityo Reliable connectiono Bandwidth improvementso Protocol designo … security, privacy and trusto Standardization (IEEE, SAE…)

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V2X – design constraints• Short‐range communications

o Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) – IEEE 802.11po 1 km nominal range – 300 mts in practice

• Short communication periodo Vehicles driving at 140 km/h or higher

• Embedded platformo Not PC… low computation resources

• Lack of global infrastructureo Ad‐hoc nature

• Regular sec/priv mechanisms cannot be applied“as is”

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V2X – security• Data may be privileged

o On‐trip services (e.g. next gas station pre‐booking)o Need for confidentialityo IEEE 1609.2 : use of elliptic curves

• Data must come from authorized entitieso Road safety announcement (e.g. bottleneck ahead)o Need for source authenticationo IEEE 1609.2 : public‐key certificates

• Some actions must be accountableo Illusion attack – forcing a collisiono Someone has to be liable! Need for non‐repudiationo IEEE 1609.2 : elliptic curves digital signature (ECDSA)

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V2X – privacy

• Beacon permanently sent• Signed with public key certificates• Hot topic – use pseudonyms? Anonymous certificates? 

How to deal with accountability?

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V2X – trust• Data must be trustworthy

o Avoid false alarmso Building plausibility checkso Data‐centric trust establishment

• (Low) in‐vehicle data securityo CAN bus : efficiency vs. Securityo Cheap sensors

• Safety is at stake! Secure on‐board platformo Car‐to‐car consortiumo EU R&D projects: EVITA, OVERSEEo Use of Hardware Security Modules (HSM)

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V2X sec/priv/trust miscellaneous issues

• Over‐the‐air updateso Flexibility against security

• Non‐repudiation of receipto Future issue: “I was not aware of the speed limit in force!”

• Data aggregationo Good for efficiency , what about security?

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V2X sec/priv/trustat COSEC

• Overview of security issues in V2X• Hindering false event dissemination in V2X• V2X for enforcement

o Privacy-preserving speed controlo V2X-based fine notificationo Evidence management to report misbehaving vehicleso Use of steganography to hide information in V2X communicationso Patent: Privacy-preserving check of driving authorizations without

stop

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Summary

• V2X security, privacy and trust deserve attention in the near term

o Industry – upcoming developmentso Research – open challenges

• Existing state-of-the-art technologies call for a final step ahead

• In this talk, a short overview on security, privacy and trust in V2X has been presented

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V2X security,  privacy and trust 

overviewDr. José María de Fuentes ([email protected])

COSEC LabUniversity Carlos III de Madrid

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