UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (http://dare.uva.nl) UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Changing channels : flexibility in empathic emotion processes Hawk, S.T. Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Hawk, S. T. (2010). Changing channels : flexibility in empathic emotion processes. Amsterdam. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. Download date: 01 Oct 2020
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UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (http://dare.uva.nl)
UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)
Changing channels : flexibility in empathic emotion processes
Hawk, S.T.
Link to publication
Citation for published version (APA):Hawk, S. T. (2010). Changing channels : flexibility in empathic emotion processes. Amsterdam.
General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s),other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, statingyour reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Askthe Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam,The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
CHAPTER 4 Affective Perspective-Taking and Mimicry as
Routes to Empathic Embarrassment
This chapter is based on: Hawk, S.T., Fischer, A.H., & Van Kleef, G.A. (in
review). Taking your place or matching your face: Embodied paths to
empathic embarrassment. Submitted to Emotion.
Empathic Embarrassment
107
Empathic responding is imperative to the maintenance of interpersonal
connections, and to human survival, more generally. Empathy fosters social
bonds between individuals and within groups (Bavelas et al., 1986; Preston &
de Waal, 2002; Yabar & Hess, 2007; Van Kleef et al., 2008), inspires
generosity in negotiations (Galinsky et al., 2008), and prompts helping
toward distressed others (e.g., Batson et al., 1997). It also provides useful
information to empathizers, both about experiences that should be pursued or
avoided (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, 2009) and about the extent to
which they value other's welfare (Batson et al., 1995). It is no surprise, then,
that this topic has enjoyed much attention in the last century of psychological
research. The term "empathy" has been defined in many ways throughout
this time, but is typically conceptualized as a vicarious affective response that
is a stronger match to another person's emotional situation than to one's own
circumstances (Eisenberg et al., 1991; Hoffman, 1984, 2008). In the present
research, we investigate the different paths leading to empathy, and which
cues in an observer's environment activate these processes.
Empathic reactions range from complementary feelings of sympathy
and tenderness (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Lamm et al, 2007; Van Kleef et al.,
2008) to emotions that more closely match a target's expressed feelings or
specific circumstances (e.g., Hatfield et al., 1992, 1994, 2008; Hess & Blairy,
2001; Miller, 1987). This latter, matching emotional response is the focus of
the present investigation. Even when situations have no immediate
consequences for ourselves, we can be angered by an injustice toward
someone else, or cringe with embarrassment when witnessing another's gaffe.
Interestingly, individuals can respond empathically toward another, even
when affective cues from that person are limited, or altogether absent. A
critical issue is how empathy, which is usually viewed as a reaction to the
affective state of another, occurs under such circumstances. Such an
important aspect of human relations is likely instigated by multiple processes,
in order to maximize adaptive responding (Hoffman, 1984, 2002, 2008).
Chapter 4
108
Different kinds of contextual and emotional cues may instigate
several distinct processes that result in empathic emotions (see Hoffman,
1984 and 2008, for a more extensive review). Although such a notion has
existed for some time, these multiple sources of information have rarely been
directly investigated within a single study. We address this equifinality in the
present research, by examining how the salience of particular cues can
instigate different routes to empathic responding. We focus upon empathic
embarrassment (Miller, 1987) as a specific reaction that can illustrate these
multiple routes to empathy. We investigate the role of emotion displays in
fostering empathic embarrassment, as well as how this response can occur
when such affective cues are absent.
An Embodiment Perspective on Empathic Embarrassment
While people typically feel embarrassed when their own self-image is
threatened or discredited (Sabini, Siepmann, Stein, & Meyerowitz, 2000),
they can also experience this emotion empathically, on behalf of others
(Miller, 1987). For example, watching someone give a bad audition on the
television program American Idol may be sufficient to elicit embarrassment.
While this empathic reaction may be understandable when performers
noticeably signal their embarrassment, through behaviors such as
combinations of gaze aversion, smiling, and touching their faces or bodies
(Keltner, 1995), regular viewers of the Idols program are also likely aware of
the personal mortification one can feel even when performers do not display
such emotion cues. This suggests that while targets' expressions of
embarrassment are sufficient to foster empathy in others, they are not
completely necessary (Hoffman, 1984, 2008; Marcus & Miller, 1999; Marcus
et al., 1996; Miller, 1987). The presence or absence of particular cues,
including a target's expressive displays, may result in different processes
ultimately being responsible for experiences of empathic embarrassment. We
utilize recent theories on embodiment of emotion (e.g., Barsalou et al., 2003;
Empathic Embarrassment
109
Niedenthal, 2007; also see Preston & De Waal, 2002, and Van der Gaag et
al., 2007) to provide a unifying framework for these different processes.
The embodiment perspective can accommodate a variety of processes
suggested to instigate empathic emotions. This theory holds that partially
simulating or reenacting perceptual, expressive, and introspective
components of prior experiences is central to understanding and responding
to others' emotion cues. An individual's own history of experiencing particular
emotions or emotion-eliciting situations is thus fundamental to their
understanding and adoption of others' feelings. This perspective therefore
proposes that individuals draw upon their own personal knowledge of emotion
expressions, subjective experiences, and eliciting contexts in order to make
sense of others' emotional circumstances and to share in their joy, rage, or
(in this case) embarrassment. In the present study on empathic
embarrassment, we focus upon two types of embodied processes, in
particular, namely observers' affective perspective-taking and their nonverbal
mimicry of a target.
Perspective-Taking as an Independent Route to Empathic
Embarrassment
The notions of simulation and reenactment explain the first proposed
process contributing to empathic embarrassment, participants' affective
perspective-taking, or imagining how they would feel in another's situation.1
1 While other research has distinguished between "imagine-self" and "imagine-other" types of perspective taking (Batson et al., 1997; Lamm et al., 2007; Stotland, 1969), we focus explicitly on the former, for several reasons. First, "imagine-other" perspective-taking draws heavily upon information provided by targets (e.g., Davis, 2005), which we viewed as redundant with our focus on the role of expressive behaviors. Second, a great deal of evidence exists that the self is a "default" platform on which to base inferences about others (Decety, 2005, Preston & De Waal, 2002). Third, although conceptually distinct, experiments attempting to manipulate the two forms through explicit instructions have shown rather poor differentiation in participants' self-reported focus (Batson et al, 1997; Davis et al., 1996). Thus, in the remainder of this article, we use the term "perspective-taking" to describe the act of imagining oneself in another's situation.
Chapter 4
110
When instructed to engage in such perspective-taking, individuals show
higher physiological and self-report indices of personal distress while
witnessing another's expressions of distress (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Lamm
et al., 2007; Stotland, 1969), as well as enhanced empathic embarrassment
reactions (Miller, 1987). An embodiment perspective would suggest that a
range of environmental cues, including simply hearing about a person's
plight, can prompt individuals to reflect on their own potential emotions.
Contextual cues may thus be sufficient to facilitate conscious simulations of
introspective states (Barsalou et al., 2003; Niedenthal, 2007), independent of
whether such reflections are further supported by a target's emotional
behavior (Hoffman, 1984, 2008). Empathic embarrassment may thus not be
fully contingent on targets' emotion displays, but instead be possible
whenever observers witness situations that (would) have caused them
personal embarrassment (Miller, 1987).
The notion that individuals can consciously simulate the introspective
component of emotions, through affective perspective-taking, can thus
address empathic emotions that arise even in absence of another's overt
emotional behaviors. In this sense, however, the paradigm typically utilized in
research on perspective-taking presents a problem for determining the exact
nature of its influence. This methodology involves exposing participants to an
emotion-provoking situation, in which a target's objective emotion cues are
either uniform across conditions or are not examined in further detail.
Observers are explicitly instructed to remain objective or to engage in
perspective-taking as they witness the targets' distress (e.g., Batson et al.,
1997; Davis et al., 1996; Lamm et al., 2007; Miller, 1987; Stotland, 1969).
This particular approach, however, cannot address whether conscious
perspective-taking can indeed independently influence empathic emotions, in
absence of a target's concordant nonverbal displays.
A critical test of this position is whether perspective-taking increases
empathy not only when targets convey their distress in an emotion-eliciting
Empathic Embarrassment
111
situation, but also when they show no overt reaction. A recent study (Vaish,
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009) suggests that this may indeed be the case.
Toddlers in this research were exposed to situations in which one adult stole
or damaged another's possessions, or performed a similar action that did not
incur harm. The victim never responded with an expression of emotion.
Regardless, children in the "harm" condition showed more facial expressions
of concern, as well as more helping behavior toward the actor. The authors
implied perspective-taking as a specific process influencing these reactions.
Although it would seem that perspective-taking plays a central role in eliciting
observers' congruent affect when emotion information from a target is absent,
we are aware of no research directly examining this issue. We thus sought to
examine this idea more explicitly in the context of adult observers' empathic
embarrassment.
The Role of Embarrassment Displays
The embodiment perspective would also suggest that the availability of
a target's emotion signals can further strengthen empathic responding, by
activating multiple processes that lead to convergent emotions. Perceptions of
targets' embarrassment do indeed appear to be associated with observers'
own empathic embarrassment (e.g., Miller, 1987). For example, in
naturalistic settings such as classroom presentations, individuals who report
the strongest embarrassment during their own talks also foster the greatest
embarrassment in observers (Marcus & Miller, 1999). We propose that
observing emotion displays will activate two embodied processes that
contribute to experiences of empathic embarrassment. The first process,
affective perspective-taking, has been discussed previously. However, in
contrast to the experimental manipulations of perspective-taking that
demonstrate effects of deliberate and motivated introspection (e.g., Batson et
al., 1997; Davis et al., 1996; Galinsky et al., 2008; Lamm et al., 2007; Miller,
1987; Stotland, 1969), the factors that spontaneously prompt this activity
Chapter 4
112
have received much less attention (but see Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986). In
particular, the potential for nonverbal displays to activate this process has not
been subjected to empirical testing in past research. Others have previously
conjectured that emotion displays may prompt observers to spontaneously
reflect upon their own potential feelings, or about similar past experiences
(Batson, Sympson, Hindman, Decruz, Todd, Weeks, et al., 1996; Hoffman,
1984, 2002, 2008; Ruby & Decety, 2004). This may be especially relevant for
emotion displays that are known to facilitate social bonding and affiliation,
including expressions of embarrassment (e.g., Fischer & Manstead, 2008;
psychophysiological research has shown that participants who acquired
experience with an embarrassing task blushed more intensely when later
watching another perform the same act (Shearn, Spellman, Straley, Meirick,
& Stryker, 1999). The authors of this study suggested that this effect arose
from participants being reminded of their own previous embarrassment, but
they did not additionally examine targets' nonverbal behaviors. As
demonstrated by both of these studies, however, the idea that perspective-
taking is the mechanism responsible for the link between prior experience and
empathy is typically inferred from the pattern of results, rather than tested
directly.
We examined whether prior experience would moderate participants'
perspective-taking responses to embarrassment displays. To this end, we
asked half of Study 2 participants to perform the confederate's dancing task
before viewing the film. Our examination of prior experience differed from
past studies in one important way, however. Previous research has typically
examined participants' empathic responses as a product of their experience
with a target's exact situation, often in comparison with a control group with
no emotion-rich history (e.g., Batson et al., 1996; Shearn et al., 1999). This
method, however, conflates the experience of a situation with the experience
of an emotion. In Study 2, we contribute to this body of research by
investigating whether having previously been in the target's specific situation
Empathic Embarrassment
121
increases empathy beyond merely having experienced a particular emotion,
more generally. Therefore, we asked the other half of the sample to perform
a different, but equally embarrassing, task than the confederate.
In sum, we refined our investigation of empathic embarrassment in
several ways. First, we tested the notion that embarrassment displays may
affect empathic embarrassment by leading observers to engage in expressive
(mimicry) and introspective (perspective-taking) simulations of the emotion
in a parallel fashion. Second, we attempted to heighten perspective-taking
through an additional, prior experience manipulation. We expected that prior
experience with the situation, and not merely with the emotion, would
increase the effects of embarrassment displays upon perspective-taking.
Finally, we examined whether nonverbal mimicry and conscious perspective-
taking mediated the links between our manipulations and participants'
empathic embarrassment.
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 103 University undergraduates in the Netherlands
(23 male, 80 female; MAge = 20.30, SD = 3.09), who again received either
course credit or 7 Euros. Three participants were excluded from analyses
because they reported knowing the confederate. Two participants were
excluded because they declined to perform their assigned embarrassing task.
An additional four participants were excluded as statistical outliers due to
exceptionally low reports of personal embarrassment during their assigned
task. The remaining 94 participants (22 male, 72 female) were randomly
assigned to a 2x2 factorial design, manipulating the target's nonverbal
behavior (unembarrassed or embarrassed) and prior experience with the
confederate's task (no experience or prior experience).
Measures
Manipulation checks. Participants rated the extent of the
confederate's observed embarrassment on the basis of the same six-item
Chapter 4
122
scale from Study 1. To ensure that the two tasks assigned to participants
were equally embarrassing, they completed a similar scale with regard to
their own emotions directly after completing their task. Reliability was good
for reports of task-related embarrassment (α =.93), and confederate
embarrassment (α = .95).
Participants' nonverbal mimicry. We drew upon Keltner's (1995)
description of prototypical embarrassment displays to assess participants'
own embarrassment-related nonverbal behaviors as they watched the film.
These prototypical displays include behaviors such as smiling, gaze aversion,
downward head movements, and touching one's face or body. Importantly,
however, it is the combination of these behaviors - not their occurrence in
isolation - that produces reliable ratings of embarrassment (Keltner, 1995;
Keltner & Buswell, 1997). The behavioral representations activated by
witnessing such displays may often be incomplete and/or inaccurate, however
(e.g., Niedenthal, 2007; Preston & De Waal, 2002), and the full sequence of
prototypical behaviors may not always occur. As a compromise between these
two positions, the first author (blind to participants' conditions) rated the
number of times each participant engaged in two or more of the
aforementioned actions in close succession (separated by no more than one
second).2 A frequency score was constructed for each participant by totaling
the number of discrete behavioral incidences.
Participants' conscious perspective-taking was measured with four
items (e.g., "While watching the other participant… I imagined myself in her
situation; I thought about how I would feel if I were in her shoes; α = .67),
measured on a 7-point scale (0 = not at all; 6 = a great deal). These items
were randomly intermixed with those measuring empathic embarrassment
responses.
2 Given that downward head movements often also entail gaze aversion, we did not count the co-occurrence of these two actions as an instance of mimicry behavior. To be counted in our analyses, one or both of these actions had to co-occur with smiling and/or face-touching.
Empathic Embarrassment
123
Empathic embarrassment. Participants' empathic embarrassment was
assessed with the same six-item scale as in Study 1, which again achieved
good reliability (α = .90).
Materials and Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in individual cubicles containing a
computer monitor with a visible camera, a table-mounted microphone, stereo
speakers, a work booklet, and a set of colored pencils. All measures and tasks
were administered by the computer. The same confederate videos from the
previous study were again utilized for this experiment.
Procedure
The purpose of the experiment was ostensibly to study the effects of
music upon creativity and problem-solving. Upon providing informed consent
(including notification that they could withdraw at any point), participants
were instructed to sit in front of a computer in an individual cubicle, fitted
with a visible webcam and microphone. Participants were informed that the
camera and microphone would become active during the study. Participants
then began by responding to various personality measures, followed by a
bogus questionnaire that asked about the importance of music in their lives.
The computer informed participants that they would begin the first of
several tests designed to examine the link between certain types of music and
their creative abilities. The participants then heard the same song used in the
previous study, and the lyrics to the song were presented on the computer
screen. Participants were instructed to pay close attention as they listened to
the song. Following presentation of the music, participants were told that they
would perform a randomly-assigned task designed to test their own musical
and rhythmic abilities. Participants were then instructed to either dance to the
song (prior experience) or to sing along with the music (no prior experience)
in front of the supposedly active camera. Afterward, participants reported
their level of embarrassment during the activity. These manipulation check
Chapter 4
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items were intermixed with items assessing their liking of the song and
whether they became more familiar with the lyrics.
Participants then engaged in approximately 30 minutes of unrelated
activities, including a timed maze-completion test and a "creative" coloring
exercise. Participants were then told that they would complete one final music
test, where their job was to provide observations of another participant.
Participants then viewed either the unembarrassed or embarrassed version of
the dancing confederate video. The webcam became active upon the start of
the film, unbeknownst to participants, and recorded their nonverbal behaviors.
After the video, participants completed the empathic embarrassment and
perspective-taking items, followed by their impressions of the confederate's
embarrassment. These latter items were also intermixed among other, bogus
items assessing the confederate's musical and rhythmic abilities. Participants
then provided demographic data and were debriefed. All participants gave
written consent for their films to be analyzed, and none indicated a suspicion
that they had been filmed.
Results
The means and standard deviations of all variables are in Table 2.
Manipulation Checks
A two-way ANOVA showed that participants' experienced
embarrassment while performing their assigned task did not differ depending
on whether they sang (M = 3.54, SD = 1.55) or danced (M = 3.96, SD =
1.01). An additional ANOVA again confirmed participants' perception of higher
confederate embarrassment in the presence of emotion displays (M = 4.98,
SD = .91), compared to no displays (M = 3.06, SD = 1.14), F(1, 90) = 81.97,
p < .001, ηp2 = .48. These scores did not differ based on prior experience,
and no significant interaction existed.
Empathic Embarrassment
A two-way ANOVA examining participants' empathic embarrassment
revealed no main effect of prior experience, F(1, 90) = .01, p =.94, ηp2 < .01.
ηp2 = .08. There was no effect of prior experience, nor was there a significant
interaction. Thus, only the observation of embarrassment displays increased
mimicry of the confederate.
Mediation Analyses
For all mediation analyses, the experimental manipulations were
dummy coded as -1 (no display/no prior experience) and 1 (display/prior
experience). Only participants with no missing data (n = 84) were considered
in the mediation tests. All variables were centered prior to conducting the
analyses. We began by conducting a series of multiple regressions to
determine the relationships between our manipulations and each of the
dependent variables (empathic embarrassment, mimicry, and perspective-
taking). We then tested for simple and multiple mediation, using the non-
parametric bootstrapping procedure recommended by Preacher and Hayes
(2008). This test estimates the sampling distribution of indirect effects, and
avoids the assumption that such effects are normally distributed. We used
5000 bootstrap resamples to describe the confidence intervals (CIs) of
indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). To compensate for the loss of
statistical power that accompanies using this number of resamples with a
relatively small sample size, we set the CIs at 90%, indicating one-tailed tests
of mediation (Hayes, personal communication). Significant mediation is
demonstrated when the CI values do not bridge zero (i.e., the upper and
lower CIs have the same valence).
Empathic Embarrassment
129
An initial regression with the predictors display, experience, and their
interaction showed that empathic embarrassment was predicted by the
interaction between the manipulations (B = .36, SE = .13, p = .008),
replicating the results of the ANOVA. There were no significant effects of
display (B = .17, SE = .13, p = .21) or experience (B = -.06, SE = .13, p
= .67). Also in line with the previous ANOVA, perspective-taking was
predicted by the two-way interaction (B = .40, SE = .12, p = .001). A main
effect of display also existed (B = .34, SE = .12, p = .006), indicating that
seeing embarrassment displays enhanced perspective-taking. There was no
main effect of experience (B = -.11, SE = .12, p = .38). Finally nonverbal
mimicry was predicted by the display manipulation (B = .66, SE = .26, p
= .01), but the main effect of experience (B = -.006, SE = .26, p = .98) and
the interaction (B = -.15, SE = .26, p = .55) were not significant.
Simple Mediation
Perspective-taking. As both empathic embarrassment and
perspective-taking were predicted by a Display x Experience interaction, we
used the bootstrap resampling procedure (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to
examine whether the interaction effect upon empathic embarrassment was
mediated by participants' reported perspective-taking. The main effects of
display and experience upon the mediating and dependent variables were
controlled for in these analyses. When considering the effects of both
perspective-taking and the interaction upon empathic embarrassment, the
direct effect of perspective-taking was significant (B = .28, SE = .12, p = .02),
and the aforementioned effect of the interaction was reduced (B = .24, SE
= .14, p < .08). As can be seen in Table 3, the CIs for perspective-taking did
not bridge zero, indicating that indirect effects of the interaction upon
empathic embarrassment occurred through perspective-taking (i.e.,
significant mediation).
Nonverbal mimicry. As shown by both the ANOVAs and the initial
regressions, participants' behavioral mimicry was predicted only by the
Chapter 4
130
manipulation of displays, but empathic embarrassment was predicted only by
a Display x Experience interaction (with no significant main effect of display).
It is still conceivable, however, that the display manipulation exerted indirect
effects upon empathic embarrassment through nonverbal mimicry (Hayes, in
press). To test for this possibility, we used the bootstrapping procedure to
investigate whether display exerted indirect effects upon empathic
embarrassment through nonverbal mimicry. The effects of the experience
manipulation and the Display x Experience interaction were controlled for in
this test. When considering the effects of both nonverbal mimicry and the
display manipulation upon empathic embarrassment, the direct effect of
mimicry showed a trend toward significance (B = .10, SE = .06, p < .08), and
the aforementioned (nonsignificant) effect of display was further reduced (B
= .10, SE = .13, p = .46). As shown in Table 3, the CIs for the simple
mediation test of mimicry did not bridge zero. Thus, the display manipulation
appeared to exert significant indirect effects on empathic embarrassment,
through nonverbal mimicry.
Multiple Mediation
Given that the display manipulation directly affected both perspective-
taking and nonverbal mimicry, we further explored whether embarrassment
displays exerted indirect effects upon empathic embarrassment through both
mediators, simultaneously. We used the non-parametric bootstrapping
procedure for multiple mediation, again controlling for the experience
manipulation and the Display x Experience interaction. When considering the
simultaneous effects of all three predictors (perspective-taking, mimicry, and
the display manipulation) upon empathic embarrassment, there were
significant direct effects of both perspective-taking (B = .29, SE = .12, p
= .02) and mimicry (B = .11, SE = .05, p = .05), and the previous
(nonsignificant) effect of display was further reduced (B = -.002, SE = .14, p
= .99). The results further indicated that embarrassment displays exerted
significant indirect effects upon empathic embarrassment through both
Empathic Embarrassment
131
mediators, as neither of the mediators' confidence interval ranges included
zero (see Table 3). The contrast between the two putative mediators was not
significant (the CI crossed the zero boundary), indicating an equivalent
magnitude of these two indirect effects.
Table 3. Simple and Multiple Mediation of the Indirect Effects of Emotional Display and Prior Experience on Empathic Embarrassment through Perspective-Taking and Nonverbal Mimicry BCa 90% CI Point estimate Lower Upper Simple indirect effects
Multiple indirect effects Nonverbal mimicry .074 .012 .180 Perspective-taking .097 .031 .211 Total .171 .076 .305 Contrast: Perspective-taking vs. Mimicry
.023 -.094 .151
Note. Based on n = 84; 5,000 bootstrap samples. Bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping confidence intervals are adjusted for median bias and skew. All tests of mediation are one-tailed. Confidence intervals bridging zero are interpreted as not significant.
Discussion
Study 2 addressed our prediction that nonverbal expressions of
embarrassment would exert dual effects upon observers' empathic emotions.
First, we expected the presence of these displays to exert influences through
nonverbal mimicry. Second, we also predicted that witnessing such behaviors
would heighten empathy via participants' affective perspective-taking,
especially when they had prior experience with the target's embarrassing
circumstances. These predictions were supported by our data.
The results showed that the confederate's nonverbal embarrassment
displays prompted observers to enact these behaviors more frequently,
themselves, and this effect was not additionally heightened by the prior
experience manipulation. Further, although there were no direct effects of
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132
emotion displays upon empathic embarrassment (cf. Hess et al., 1998; Van
der Gaag et al., 2007), both the simple and multiple meditation analyses
demonstrated that embarrassment expressions did indeed exert indirect
effects via nonverbal mimicry. This finding suggests that such mimicry can
occur automatically, especially in absence of overt motivations to inhibit or
enhance mirroring behaviors (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001), but also that
it plays a more minor, supporting role in fostering empathic emotions than
would be suggested by primitive contagion theories (e.g., Hatfield et al.,
1992, 1994, 2008).
Also as predicted, the embarrassed confederate prompted stronger
perspective-taking in observers. This is consistent with the notion that
embarrassment displays can activate introspective simulations of an emotion
that prompt the experience of concordant feelings. It also supports prior work
demonstrating that displays of embarrassment serve the specific social
function of promoting affiliation with a target (Keltner & Buswell, 1997;
Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Semin & Manstead, 1982). As expected, this effect
was somewhat stronger when observers had earlier performed the
confederate's task. Participants confronted with an embarrassed confederate
reported both stronger perspective-taking and stronger empathic
embarrassment when they had prior experience with the confederate's
situation, as opposed to a different but equally embarrassing task. Prior
experience with a target's exact situation thus had effects that extended
beyond mere experience with the emotion, more generally (cf. Batson et al.,
1996; Shearn et al., 1999). Apparently, we are likely to feel the sting of
another's expressed emotion more intensely when we are familiar with the
particular details of a situation, and the specific ways that the other may be
affected, as this first-hand knowledge allows for a richer simulation of the
emotional experience (Barsalou et al., 2003; Niedenthal, 2007; Preston & De
Waal, 2002). These enhancing effects of prior experience parallel those in
Empathic Embarrassment
133
earlier studies in which targets' expressions of distress were held constant
(e.g., Batson et al., 1996).
This insight into the other's circumstance, however, was also
responsible for a decrease in perspective-taking and empathy when observers
with prior experience saw an unembarrassed target perform an embarrassing
act. In comparison, even participants who saw no displays, but also had no
first-hand frame of reference, were able to engage in more perspective-taking
and subsequently experience stronger empathic embarrassment. Although
this result was unexpected, it has intuitive appeal. Individuals who have
embarrassed themselves by delivering a particularly poor classroom
presentation, for example, may have difficulty understanding another person
who gives an equally disastrous talk, but doesn't seem at all bothered. In
such a situation, embarrassment expressions likely signal not only an
awareness of poor performance, but also recognition that the situation and
others' evaluations are important. In contrast, an absence of embarrassment-
related behavior may communicate indifference, and perhaps even signal that
empathy is unnecessary or undesired. Thus, having experienced another
person's situation might not lead to a de facto increase in perspective-taking
or empathic emotion, and may even minimize such responses if the emotion-
eliciting aspects of the situation are not confirmed by a target's own
behaviors.
Finally, perspective-taking directly mediated the effects of our
manipulations upon empathic embarrassment. Additionally, it appeared to be
a pathway through which embarrassment displays exerted indirect effects.
These results are largely consistent with the results of Study 1. Conscious,
introspective simulations of an emotion, once initiated deliberately or
spontaneously, offer a route to empathizing with another's feelings or
emotional circumstances, even in the absence of a target's overt emotional
expressions. Combined with the aforementioned findings on nonverbal
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mimicry, these results demonstrate the dual influence of emotion displays
upon empathic responses.
General Discussion
The capacity for individuals to experience empathy in a variety of
circumstances is an indispensable component of social functioning, but cues
to another's distress are typically not the same from one situation to the next.
Several kinds of internal and external cues can likely instigate empathic
responding (Barsalou et al., 2003; Hoffman, 1984, 2008; Niedenthal, 2007),
but the extent to which these cues simultaneously activate different processes
has remained a relatively unexplored issue until quite recently. We focused
upon two embodied processes, namely mimicry of a target's emotion
expressions and observers' affective perspective-taking, which may be
differentially responsible for empathic emotions depending on the presence or
absence of emotion signals from a target. Our results help to clarify the roles
of these processes in fostering the specific reaction of empathic
embarrassment.
As predicted in Study 1, perspective-taking instructions increased
empathic embarrassment regardless of whether embarrassment displays were
present or absent. The results of Study 2 additionally showed that
perspective-taking mediated the interactive effects of target's emotional
displays and participant's prior experience on empathic embarrassment.
These findings thus contribute to the existing empathy literature by
suggesting that conscious simulations of introspective states, either when
initiated purposefully (Study 1) or when prompted more reflexively by
witnessing another's expressive displays (Study 2), can foster empathic
emotions.
Our research also demonstrated the potential for displays of emotion
to influence multiple processes leading to empathy. In Study 1, we showed
that embarrassment signals influenced the empathy of observers instructed to
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provide objective assessments of the confederate's feelings. In Study 2, we
further showed that embarrassment expressions led observers to
spontaneously engage in both in nonverbal mimicry and increased
perspective-taking. Emotion expressions can thus influence empathy not only
through the mimicry-mediated routes typically examined in emotional
contagion studies, but also by activating more direct simulations of
introspective states (cf. Barsalou et al., 2003). This supports earlier
suggestions (e.g., Batson et al., 1996; Hoffman, 1984, 2008) that witnessing
emotion displays can prompt observers to reflect upon the situation as if they
were the target, and also that displays of embarrassment function to increase
bonding and identification with the expresser (e.g., Keltner & Buswell, 1997).
Participants' prior experience further informed this link, enhancing both
perspective-taking and related empathy when displays were present, and
decreasing such effects when the target showed no signs of embarrassment.
These results underscore the utility of examining perspective-taking as a
process variable, rather than manipulating such activity directly though
explicit instructions. Our findings also highlight the importance of considering
the external and internal cues salient to observers when studying the
potential effects of perspective-taking upon empathy.
Emotion displays affected participants' enactment of related motor
behaviors (Keltner, 1995), but these mimicked actions did not map directly
onto participants' conscious experience of concordant emotion. Instead, the
effects exerted through this route were rather subtle and indirect, suggesting
that motor mimicry may be a more automatic and unconscious process than
is an observer's assessment of their own emotional reactions (cf. Eisenberg et