Utilizing Criminological Theory to Counter Violent Extremism

Utilizing Criminological Theory 1

Running head: Theory to Counter Violent Extremism

Utilizing Criminological Theory to Counter Violent Extremism

Eric Maudsley

Kent State University

Abstract

Despite politically motivated rhetoric to the contrary, domesticUnited States policy toward Violent Extremists espousingfundamentalist misinterpretations of Islam are focused on

interdiction and prosecution, which contributes to the cycle ofradicalization through Strain and Labeling. The Radicalizationprocess relies heavily on Social Learning theory. RestorativeJustice and Life Course theories have proven most successful at

prevention and rehabilitation of violent extremists. It isrecommended that the United States emphasize preventative

intervention over prosecution, and seek a closer relationshipwith Muslims and citizens of Middle Eastern and South Asian

decent to better control domestic terrorism.


Utilizing Criminological Theory to Counter Violent Extremism

On February 25th, 2015, the Director of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, James Comey, stated that FBI agents were

investigating more than 1,000 individuals in the United States in

relation to violent extremism motivated by the al Qaeda ideology.

There are currently al Qaeda-related criminal cases under active

investigation in all 50 States (Shaylor, 2015).

Since September 11th, 2001, the domestic

anti-terrorism/counter-terrorism (AT/CT) strategy of the United

States has been predicated largely on countering the threat of an

enemy that ceased to exist in early 2002. In the intervening 13

years, the highest levels of government and academia have

recognized that law enforcement and intelligence alone will never

eliminate the threat of terrorist attacks in the United States,

but in practice, almost all emphasis has been placed on treating

violent extremism solely as a law enforcement problem. In 2015

the threat of terrorism comes primarily from independent, self-

generated cells and individual actors linked only by ideology,

not hierarchical organizations with established leaders and

chains of command. Until we reduce the supply of individuals

willing to kill to promote their political and religious beliefs,

there will always be another potential attack.

Violent Takfiri Extremism

For most Americans, the war against the organization known

in the west as al Qaeda (in Arabic, “The Base”) began on

September 11th, 2001, when the group successfully hijacked four

airliners, crashing them into three targets in Manhattan and

Washington D.C., and losing control of the last over central

Pennsylvania.

Few people realize that al Qaeda had been at war with the

United States since 1996, when the group’s leader, Osama bin

Laden, issued a fatwa (an interpretation of Islamic law typically

made by a recognized religious scholar called a mufti) claiming

that it is the duty of individual Muslims everywhere to fight the

“Jews and Crusaders” anywhere they can. Bin Laden was a member of

a prominent Saudi family with close ties to Kingdom’s royalty,

but had been stripped of his Saudi citizenship two years earlier

for, among other things, accusing the ruling al Saud family of


apostasy, a capital offense in the Kingdom. A veteran of the

Afghan war against Soviet occupation in the 1980s, he had spent

the previous seven years transforming the expatriate veterans of

that war into a global network dedicated to his own Takfiri

ideology (Sageman, 2004).

The Takfiri interpretation of Islam

A Takfiri is one who accuses other Muslims of apostasy.

Adherents to the Takfiri ideology believe that they are the only

pure or true Muslims (Atran, 2010). The root word of Takfiri is

kuffar, or “unbeliever”. Bin Laden and the other members of what

we now call “al Qaeda Core,” or the pre-9/11 al Qaeda, were

fundamentalists who believed that the Qur’an (Islam’s holy

scriptures, believed by Muslims to be the direct, perfect word of

God revealed to the prophet Mohammed) and Hadith (collected

sayings of, or stories about Mohammed that provide an example for

living a righteous life) should be followed in an extremely

literal way. This belief system is referred to as Salafism, as it

is inspired by a desire to return to the “pure” Islam of the

first generations of followers (Salaf) after Mohammed received

the Qur’an. Salafism is a major movement in Islam, especially in

the Arabian Peninsula, where close to half of all Sunni Muslims

self-identify as Salafists.

Takfiris take this puritanical view a dangerous step further.

Claiming that only Salafists are Muslims, Takfiris regard

followers of any other strain of Islam as apostates deserving of

death. They also believe that violent struggle to convert or kill

all non-believers is not only justified, but an individual duty

required of all “true” Muslims. Religious authorities view this

not as a sect within the faith, but a corruption that sets

Takfiris outside orthodox Islam. This is supported in the Hadith,

(Bukhari: Book 8: Volume 73: Hadith 73) “…and whoever accuses a

believer of Kuffar (disbelief), then it is as if he killed him."

Al Qaeda’s Takfiri ideology is based in part on the writings

of Sayyed Qutb, an Egyptian political activist executed as an

enemy of the state in 1966 by the Nasser regime. Orthodox Islam

places particular emphasis on avoiding fitna, or disagreement or

disorder. Communal decision-making and consensus are highly

prized, as is submission to the rule of law. Qutb agreed with

the Salafi viewpoint that modern innovation or bida is against


Islam, but was the first to advocate violence against fellow

Muslims in order to overthrow secular political systems. This is

the bright line dividing orthodox Islam and Takfiris, a belief

that they can accuse fellow Muslims of apostasy, and act as judge

and executioner on their own authority (Smith, 2007). Qutb was

also responsible for changing the meaning of the word jihad. The

classical definition of jihad was “an internal struggle to follow

the righteous path”. For Qutb and his intellectual successors,

Jihad is an external struggle to impose their own vision of “pure”

Islam by violence. Takfiris view Jihad as a “sixth pillar” of

their faith, equally important to the five obligations all

Muslims have a duty to perform (Smith, 2007).

Takfiri extremists self identify with and adopt differential

definitions consistent with the social movement commonly referred

to as al Qaeda. For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to

individuals holding this belief system who commit, attempt to

commit or incite violence as “Violent Takfiri Extremists” (VTE).

Sageman (2004, 2008) identified three distinct “waves” of

VTE which each occur over about a decade. The first, of which Bin

Laden was a member, were veterans of the 1979-1989 war in

Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. The second wave

occurred from 1990 to September 2001. In the 1990’s large numbers

of young Muslim men were inspired by the defeat of the Soviets to

travel to other countries where, in their view, Muslims were

being oppressed. Expatriate fighters, mostly but not exclusively

from the Middle East, traveled to ongoing conflicts in the

Balkans, Chechnya and the Central Asian Republics (Tajikistan,

Uzbekistan, etc.). A common route was to travel to Pakistan,

then over the border to Afghanistan for military training by al

Qaeda en route to these conflict zones. Some were recruited into

al Qaeda and stayed on, the majority of those fighting alongside

the Taliban in the ongoing Afghan civil war. A small minority

joined AQC. The second wave is distinguished as being too young

to have fought the Soviets, and by their high educational

attainment; many had university educations, primarily in

engineering fields (Hegghammer, Atran). These were men like

Khalid Sheik Mohammed (The main planner and coordinator of the

9/11 attacks) and his cousin, Ramzi Yousef (The man who built the

truck bomb used in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing). Most

first and second wave AQC members were captured or killed


following 9/11. Those who were not scattered and were forced to

live as fugitives. The features of al Qaeda that made it an

effective organization (social networks, communications,

financial links) became the means by which the U.S. and its

allies hunted them down. Bin Laden himself was located and killed

because he maintained communication ties with other VTEs.

The third wave is distinct from the other two in that there

is no organizational hierarchy linking them to AQC. After the

U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in winter 2001, and particularly

following the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003, al Qaeda

transformed itself from a structured group into a social

movement, a virtual “brand name” for VTEs. All one had to do to

claim to be a member of al Qaeda was commit violence on their

behalf. This attracted young Muslim men worldwide to self-

identify with the group and its goals in a process called

“radicalization”.

The Radicalization Process

Research by Sageman (2004, 2008), Atran (2010), and Silber &

Bhatt (2007), describes a common process through which young men

become sympathetic to the Takfiri ideology, take on an identity

as VTEs, and carry out violence on behalf of the social movement

commonly called al Qaeda. This process is consistent with

Positivist and Critical Criminological theory (Cullen, F., Agnew,

R., & Wilcox, P. 2015). The FBI has adopted this model and

divides the process into four stages, with decision trees

inherent in each stage (Dyer, McCoy, Rodrigues and Van Duyn,

2007). Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the stages of the

radicalization process.

The Preradicalization Phase corresponds to General Strain theory

and Labling Theory (Cullen et al., 2015). Whether the individual

grew up culturally Muslim or converted later in life, they begin

to identify more intensely with what they see as a worldwide

community of believers under attack by the United States and

Western culture. This emotional investment causes them to further

research the issue, usually on the internet, but occasionally

through a social network of with the same beliefs. As this belief

system deepens, they begin to see injustice against the Muslim

community in more and more circumstances, and feel that they are

branded an enemy of the state simply because of their faith. As


predicted by General Strain theory, individuals who feel strongly

that they are subject to repeated injustice feel a strong

emotional need to act out to “right” it. This is particularly

true of young Muslim men in the U.S. and Europe, who feel both

disconnected from their religious heritage and feel that the

countries they live in are the mains “oppressors” (Dyer et. al.,

2007).

Labeling theory also plays an important role. Young Muslim

men who feel that they or their fellow Muslims are discriminated

against or judged enemies of the state simply because of their

ethnicity are more likely to act out against that perceived

injustice. Stern (2010) and Atran (2010) also found that in-group

acceptance and strong identity bonds between group members were

more important to individual VTEs than the ideological goals of

the movement, which many of the VTEs interviewed failed to fully

comprehend. Ongoing infiltration and surveillance of Muslim

communities in the U.S. and Europe, and the social acceptance of

discrimination against Muslims by the mainstream culture are

strong contributing factors to adverse reactions to labeling.

In the first and second wave of VTEs, it was at this point

that the individual might make contact with a veteran of the

Afghan Jihad in their local mosque, or change their place of

worship to follow an Imam (Prayer leader) who preaches Takfiri

ideology (Sageman, 2008). Post 9/11, this became the easiest way

to be identified, placed under surveillance and apprehended.

Members of the current generation of VTE socialize with others in

their subculture and learn differential associations favorable to

violent extremism primarily on the Internet (Atran, 2010).

VTEs draw from a pool of disaffected Muslim youth worldwide.

A key feature of the Muslim faith is the concept of a worldwide

community of believers, or umma. An attack on one is considered

an attack on all, and the belief that defensive violence against

non-Muslims who attack or oppress Muslims is justified has deep

support among most Muslims.

It is important to note that al Qaeda never recruited

members. This is especially true of the third wave of VTEs.

Instead, individuals motivated to commit violence on behalf of

the ideology might make contact with a respected figure in the

movement with a request for “guidance” on how to resolve the


strain between mainstream behavioral norms and their deepening

commitment to a Takfiri belief system (Sageman, 2008).

In the Identification Phase, Social Learning theory comes to the

fore (Cullen et. al, 2015). The individual begins to

differentially associate only with other believers in Takfiri

ideology, rejecting friends and family who are insufficiently

pious. The individual might decide at this point to undertake

training in weapons and tactics, or attempt to travel overseas to

link up with active Takfiri extremist movements. Those accepted

into Takfiri social networks will most likely move on to the next

phase (Dyer et. al., 2007).

Fully imersed in a new social role, the individual gradually

decides that the only way to achieve their chosen political and

religious goals is through violence during the Indoctrination Phase.

Through these newly formed social networks, some individuals who

have successfully made contact with organized groups might be

tested for reliability before being trusted to carry out an

operational plan. Those without direct contact cement social

bonds with like-minded others, reinforcing their commitment to

violent action (Dyer et. al., 2007).

The final phase in the radicalization process is action on

behalf of the violent Takfiri ideology. The individuals who reach

this point are a fraction of the number who fit the description

of Preradicalization, and most do not go on to commit actual

violence, although they might facilitate it through the spread of

propaganda or helping others make the social connections

neccissary to commit an attack.

Nidal Hasan, a U.S. Army Officer who opened fire in a Ft.

Hood, Texas medical clinic, in an interesting case study in how

the radicalization process works. A veteran Army psychologist,

Hassan experienced increasing role strain between his career in

the U.S. Army and his deepening Takfiri beliefs. He began to

differentially associate with other Takfiris online, and reached

out to al Awlawki, the spiritual leader of al Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula, several times via email in search of “advice”.

He never physically met with or received assistance from any

organized network. Hassan eventually chose to carry out a violent

attack on his fellow soldiers, and planned, prepared for and

carried it out completely alone.


On November 5th, 2009 he entered the crowded waiting room

of a medical clinic on Ft. Hood and fired on the unarmed patients

with a 5.7mm semi-auto handgun that he had purchased at a local

gun shop. Hassan was eventually stopped by responding base police

officers, but not before killing 13 people and wounding 32 more.

Paralyzed from the waist down during the arrest and sentenced to

death, Hasan is currently awaiting execution (CBS News, 2012).

Countering Radicalization

Stern (2010) delineates three categories of programs

intended to lower the number of active VTEs outside of “kinetic”

operations to capture or kill hardcore members.

“Deradicalization” programs are rehabilitative efforts to

return former VTEs to mainstream society. “Prevention” programs

are intended to reach out to and guide potential VTEs away from

Takfiri ideology before they reach the stage of active

participation in criminal behavior. Both Deradicalization and

Prevention fall under the umbrella of “Counter-Radicalization”,

along with political and media campaigns to influence the broader

public to accept mainstream definitions of acceptable religious

and political behavior and reject Takfiri ideology (Stern, 2010).

Deradicalization: Restorative Justice and Life Course solutions to radicalism

Research and practice have shown that all but the most

hardcore VTEs can be rehabilitated. Since VTEs are acting out in

a misguided belief that they are defending their faith from

attack, rehabilitative programs based on Restorative Justice and

Life Course theories show the most promise (Cullen et. al.,

2015).

The Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

operates the most effective rehabilitative program aimed at

reintegration of former VTEs into society. From 2003 to 2006, the

Kingdom experience a wave of VTE attacks fueled by the return of

hundreds of Saudi citizens fleeing the U.S. invasion of

Afghanistan. Once back in the Kingdom, former members of AQC

formed their own franchise, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

(AQAP), and began a series of attacks (Hegghamer, T., 2010). The

authorities realized that, more than anything else, they were

dealing with misguided people motivated to fight on behalf of a


religion that most of them barely understood. During the same

period, the MoI began accepting the repatriation of Saudi

citizens captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other

undisclosed locations. H.R.H. Prince Naif bin Mohammed bin Saud,

head of the ministry, knew that holding these men indefinitely

was out of the question (Ansary, A., 2007).

The MoI reintegration program has three parts, and is firmly

rooted in the principles of Restorative Justice. The first part

is religious education, conducted in conjunction with the

Kingdom’s ulama, or religious authorities. The MoI found during

entry interviews that a large majority of the VTE prisoners knew

very little of the Qur’an or orthodox Islamic doctrine, and what

they did know had been corrupted by what the ideologues in the

Takfiri community had taught them. Provided with rigorous

instruction and dialogue with religious experts, former VTEs

largely saw that the movement had led them astray (Ansary, A.,

2007).

The second part of the MoI rehabilitation program is

vocational training. Many former VTEs has spent their late teens

and early twenties fighting and had few marketable job skills. In

the MoI program, they learn solid, marketable trades with which

to earn an honest living, contributing to the third and most

important part of the program.

Saudi society is intensely centered on close and extended

family ties. While radicalizing, the first people that the VTE

rejected as “not Muslim enough” was likely his family. This

estrangement from close relatives in favor of the Takfiri group

puts the former VTE in a position of being an outcast, alone in a

society in which belonging is literally a matter of life and

death. The MoI program works with family members of prisoners to

reconcile and forgive the individual, creating an opportunity for

a turning point away from violent deviance. Once reconnected with

family, the MoI even assists with finding them a wife (marriages

in Saudi Arabia are still almost exclusively arranged between

families) and provides a stipend for a dowry. This is based on

Life Course research, which indicates that individuals who have

strong roots in the community are less likely to reoffend. An

additional benefit is that in a society strongly oriented towards

extended family connections, establishing the former offender

into the roles, relationships and responsibilities of his peers


also introduces a great deal of very effective informal social

control (Alqahtani, Y., 2013).

With nearly 4,000 beneficiaries and a recidivism rate of

between 10-20%, the success of the Saudi rehabilitation program

is startling (Stern, 2010). Some features, however, cannot be

replicated anywhere but the Kingdom. For example, Prince Naif

rejected a proposal by the United States to accept Yemeni

prisoners from Guantanamo into the program, based on the lack of

critical family ties in Saudi Arabia. The basis of the program,

however, is theoretically sound and could be implemented anywhere

as long as it has the support of the offender’s family.

Prevention: Providing turning points for at risk individuals

Providing these turning points before an individual commits

to violence creates more opportunities for effective

intervention. Another Saudi program, called “as-Sakina”

(tranquility), aims to redirect potential Takfiris by engaging

them in productive dialogue. As-Sakina is a private project, but

is supported by both the Ministries of Interior and Religious

Affairs. As-Sakina staff members patrol Takfiri message boards

and propaganda sites and attempt to begin conversations with new

posters. Once engaged, the conversation is continued with the

assistance of Islamic scholars, who work to help the individual

understand orthodox doctrine and the contradictions inherent in

Takfiri ideology. A related effort catalogues and works to shut

down web sites run by know or suspected terrorist groups, and

blocks pages that present religious views contrary to orthodox

Islam as practiced in the Kingdom (Boucek, C., 2008).

As-Sakina has many similarities to anti-gang initiatives in

some major U.S. cities, which makes sense since the same factors

that contribute to gang membership are also conducive to

radicalization into a violent Takfiri ideology. Young men between

15 and 25, feeling that they are labeled by the state as a threat

and under intense emotional strain from what they perceive as

systematic discrimination against their community, often form

strong social bonds with and learn differential definitions from

others who share the same feelings while rejecting mainstream

society. This pattern is the same whether it occurs in a socially

disorganized neighborhood in an inner city or on the Internet in

a Takfiri chat room. It stands to reason that successful anti-


radicalization intervention programs would have much in common

with successful anti-gang intervention programs if the underlying

theories were sound.

“Operation Cease Fire”, an anti-youth violence program in

Boston, Massachusetts, has much in common with the Saudi MoI

programs. By partnering with the community and offering social

services to at-risk youth, Boston saw 66% drop in serious violent

offenses (Braga and Winship, 2009, Braga, Kennedy, Waring and

Piehl, 2001). Police were then able to target intensive

enforcement activity to separate the small minority of hard-core

offenders who were behind the vast majority of violent crime.

What is not working: Making enemies of allies.

Since September 2001, there have been four successful

attacks on U.S. soil out of 49 attempts by self-radicalized

Violent Takfiri Extremists (Zuckerman, Bucci and Carafano, 2013).

According to former FBI agent Tom Fuentes, the FBI currently has

over 1,000 persons of interest under some level of surveillance,

typing up multiple agents per suspect in the process (Shaylor,

2015).

Self-radicalized VTEs do not necessarily have the capability

to commit another mass casualty attack on the scale of 9/11, but

one or two individuals with small arms and homemade explosives

can easily accomplish another attack like the one at Ft. Hood, or

the Boston Marathon bombing. It is unrealistic to believe that

law enforcement alone can prevent 100% of any type of criminal

activity in an open society, and while the current paradigm is

over 90% effective, it is focused on detecting, watching and

interdicting potential attacks, not reducing the number of

radicalized individuals, and the level of surveillance activity

required to do so contributes heavily to the Labeling that

contributes to Preradicalization. If even only 10% of those 1,000

persons of interest radicalize to the point of violence, at

current rates of effectiveness, it is likely that eight will

successfully commit an attack, with predictable injury and loss

of life.

The Nidal Hasan case is an example of how a potential threat

can avoid detection. As early as 2005, fellow U.S. Army officers

had suspicions about Hasan based on pro-VTE statements that he

made. In a confidential internal report, mention was made of a


2007 training presentation Nidal made to fellow officers

essentially justifying violence as a legitimate response to the

“aggression” of the United States against Muslims. Senior

officers decided to take no action, believing Hasan was engaging

in protected free speech, and uncomfortable with the politics of

accusing a Muslim U.S. Army Officer (Bender, 2012). The

Washington FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (an inter-agency

working group dedicated to investigating only terror-related

crime) was aware of Hasan’s communication with al Awlawki, but

bureaucratic missteps and poor information practices related to

how classified material is disseminated prevented any action from

being taken (Webster, 2012).

Law Enforcement practice typically emphasizes refraining

from taking action until there is enough evidence for a

conviction. This requires first building a prosecution-ready

case, with a secondary goal of intelligence gathering and

interdiction. Following this policy reinforces the conditions

that create the Labeling and Strain that contributes to

radicalization, and allows the social networking and Social

Learning that radicalizes VTEs to proceed uninterrupted until the

individual commits a serious enough crime that a lengthy prison

sentence will result. FBI agents have also remarked that they

will often allow a potential terror plot to continue until it the

last opportunity to stop it, in the hopes of discovering co-

conspirators or filing additional charges (Webster, 2012).

The level of surveillance and intelligence gathering

required to maintain the status quo is subject to considerable

criticism. An example of this is the New York Police

Department’s Demographics Unit, an innocuous sounding name for

what is essentially a domestic infiltration and intelligence-

gathering unit. The unit gathers intelligence in all five

boroughs as well as in New Jersey using undercover detectives and

technical surveillance. Detectives are sent into mosques, coffee

houses and other gathering places to listen and develop contacts

(Munson, 2012). Similar tactics are used by the 79 Joint

Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFS), which are FBI led investigative

units that focus only on terrorism or crimes with a terrorism

connection (Webster, 2012).

Much of the work of Federal law enforcement is kept from

even the state and local agencies that contribute investigators


to federal task forces for reasons of official secrecy; the

officers in effect become “free” Federal agents who don’t answer

to the agency that pays them. This is a byproduct of the

officer’s access to classified information. In order to serve on

a JTTF, an officer must undergo a Federal investigation and

receive clearance to have access to classified material. Few

local law enforcement officers undergo this process. It is common

for the officer to not be allowed to discuss his ongoing

investigations with the JTTF with his or her nominal supervisor

at the officer’s home agency due to the supervisor lacking a

required security clearance. This firewall to effective

information sharing effectively makes participation in a JTTF by

a local agency a “one-way street” with the FBI reaping the

rewards of free manpower while local agencies are largely left in

the dark when it comes to the information developed by their

officers (Webster, 2012).

Another criticism is whether or not the accused would or

could have taken their plot as far as they did without the

involvement of Federal agents. In most of the foiled plots

examined, it was undercover law enforcement officers or

informants under their control who either suggested targets or

supplied inert explosive devices, ostensibly to prevent the

accused from obtaining a “live” device on their own (Zuckerman

et. al, 2013) One has to question whether or not intervention and

rehabilitation might have been equally or more effective than a

strategy based solely on developing enough evidence for a

conviction. The experience of practitioners involved in Operation

Cease Fire, the Boston anti-gang initiative, found that early

intervention and community involvement put them in a position to

separate the gang-involved youth who were able to be

rehabilitated from the hard core offenders, who were then more

easily targeted by law enforcement for prosecution (Braga et.

al., 2009). Early intervention therefore makes the job of law

enforcement easier, because they can invest resources on the most

likely offenders.

Recommendations

President Barrack Obama recently proposed several policy

initiatives following a three-day summit on countering violent

extremism held in February 2015. Most of these policies were put


into effect on paper in 2011, but few have actually been

implemented for political and bureaucratic reasons (Empowering

local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States, 2011). Improved

communities policing practices and early intervention to prevent

radicalization were mentioned, but few concrete details emerged.

Meanwhile, the law enforcementpractices that encourage

radicalization continue unabated.

The biggest factor in radicalization is Muslim men feeling

as if they are in an adversarial relationship with mainstream

American culture, and especially the policies of the United

States Government. Takfiri ideology provides an answer to the

strain many Muslims feel at being de facto labeled a potential

enemy due to their religious beliefs. Law Enforcement continues

broad surveillance activity on the daily lives of millions of

Muslim citizens without articulable reasonable suspicion.

Revelations about the extent and scope of warrantless NSA spying

on telecommunications of ordinary Americans damages this

relationship further. These programs need to be rolled back and

only used under conditions where an investigation has revealed an

individual who is suspected of having committed or imminently

committing a crime. In short, we need to stop treating anyone

with the potential to offend as an offender.

Second, in every one of the 49 cases reviewed for this paper

showed clear signs of radicalization to the people who knew them

in the Identification phase, but were allowed to continue to

radicalize until either enough evidence was developed for a

conviction, of an attack took place (Zuckerman et. al., 2013).

In a jurisdiction with strong ties of mutual respect between the

police and community leaders, there is a better chance that

someone close to an individual at risk for radicalization will

contact authorities about it (Docobo, J., 2005). They are also

more likely to ask for help if they believe that their loved one

will be treated fairly, and authorities will intervene to assist

them rather than set them up for conviction (Pelfrey, W., 2005).

Parallels between Community Oriented Policing and the War on

Terrorism: Lessons Learned. Criminal Justice Studies, 18(4), 335-

346.. The best way for this to occur is for local law enforcement

to have strong social ties with Muslim community leaders in their

jurisdiction. Programs like the NYPD Demographics Unit have

broken trust between local police and Muslim communities. Law


Enforcement agencies need to be seen as fair partners who share

common interest in the welfare of the community in order to

reestablish the relationships to develop the information that

will prevent the next terror attack (Tyler, T., Schulhofer, S., &

Huq, A., 2010).

A private/public partnership like the as Sakina project is

an ideal way to counter the ideology behind Violent Takfiri

Extremists. In an ideal world, the United States would partner

with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and set up a domestic version of

this very successful program. An additional benefit is that the

participation of the Saudi ulama would lend instant credibility

to the orthodoxy of the religious message being communicated,

severely undermining the pseudo-religious credibility of Takfiri

ideologues.

Finally, Federal and State corrections officials should take

the best of the KSA MoI rehabilitation program and study it to

see if it can feasibly work in our own prison system. Include

family in the rehabilitative process to create and strengthen

strong social ties with the community. Ethnically Middle Eastern

families are uniquely able to informally control the behavior of

family members when strong social ties are present because of

their social structure and cultural heritage. We should not be

afraid to leverage this informal control due to mistrust of the

community as a whole.

On September 11th, 2001, a small group of extremists

committed unspeakable horrors, in the hope that the backlash

against their actions would demonstrate that the United States

and Western culture is at war with Islam. Our own actions since

that day in the name of security have done more harm to America

than the attackers ever could. We as a nation can fight terror in

a more effective way that is in keeping with the best ethical

traditions of our nation. We just have to have the will to carry

it out.


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Figures

Figure 1. The Radicalization Process (Dyer, McCoy, Rodrigues and Van

Duyn, 2007)

Utilizing Criminological Theory to Counter Violent Extremism

Documents