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Ussif Rashid Sumaila ([email protected] )Jackie AlderHeather Keith
Fisheries Economics Research UnitSea Around Us ProjectFisheries CentreUniversity of British Columbia
The cost of being apprehended fishing illegally
OECD IUU Fishing Workshop, April 19-20, 2004
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Global picture of IUU Global picture of IUU incidenceincidence
Global picture of IUU Global picture of IUU incidenceincidence
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Key elements of costKey elements of costKey elements of costKey elements of cost• Detection likelihood; – depends on enforcement & regulation;
• Amount of fine;
• Cost of avoidance; – depends on regulations & budget
allocated to activity;
• Impact on fishers’ moral and social standing in society.
• Detection likelihood; – depends on enforcement & regulation;
• Amount of fine;
• Cost of avoidance; – depends on regulations & budget
allocated to activity;
• Impact on fishers’ moral and social standing in society.
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Perception of risk of IUU fishing by fishers
Perception of risk of IUU fishing by fishers
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Costs and benefit aspects of risks inherent in IUU activity
Costs and benefit aspects of risks inherent in IUU activity
Vessel /
Gear Country
Arresting Country
Fishery Expected Revenue (USD)
Expected Penalty (USD)
Total Cost (USD)
Total Cost / Expected revenue
Deterrence fine when
Ø=0.2
Spain (longline) Australia Patagonian toothfish
504 000 87 000 526 091 1.04 0.75
Russia (pots) Japan Crab 38 256 1 483 31 131 0.81 5.8
Mexico
(bottom trawler)
Mexico Shrimp 22 060 1 091 16 428 0.74 6.2
China
(bottom trawler)
Russia Alaska pollack
8 818 234 4 539 0.51 19.4
Norway (longline)
Mauritius Patagonian toothfish
352 000 480 000 786 667 2.23 0.38
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Case 1: Namibian fisheriesCase 1: Namibian fisheries
• … from
‘IUU Fishing Paradise’
• … to
‘IUU Fishing Hell’
– IUU fishing before independence– IUU fishing after independence
• … from
‘IUU Fishing Paradise’
• … to
‘IUU Fishing Hell’
– IUU fishing before independence– IUU fishing after independence
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Case 2: Patagonian toothfishCase 2: Patagonian toothfish
• … high price of fish - the main attractor to IUU fishing;
• … also, the low detection likelihood - large area to patrol and few resources for the number of vessels fishing is a driver.
• … high price of fish - the main attractor to IUU fishing;
• … also, the low detection likelihood - large area to patrol and few resources for the number of vessels fishing is a driver.
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Case 3: Northwestern AustraliaCase 3: Northwestern Australia
• … poverty among IUU fishers - the main driver of IUU fishing;– despite a high probability of getting caught
and severe penalty the need to generate an income is stronger;
– the alternatives to IUU fishing require even more (hard) work for much less economic benefits.
• … poverty among IUU fishers - the main driver of IUU fishing;– despite a high probability of getting caught
and severe penalty the need to generate an income is stronger;
– the alternatives to IUU fishing require even more (hard) work for much less economic benefits.
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Summary resultsSummary resultsSummary resultsSummary results
• IUU fishing is widespread spatially;
… but fewer IUU activities in the northern hemisphere.
• Current fine levels are not high enough to serve as deterrent to IUU fishing. – Even for a 1 in 5 (10, 20) chance of being
apprehended, current fines need to be increased 24 (74, 173) times on average to serve as a deterrence
• IUU fishing is widespread spatially;
… but fewer IUU activities in the northern hemisphere.
• Current fine levels are not high enough to serve as deterrent to IUU fishing. – Even for a 1 in 5 (10, 20) chance of being
apprehended, current fines need to be increased 24 (74, 173) times on average to serve as a deterrence
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Summary resultsSummary resultsSummary resultsSummary results
• … the probability of detection must be well above 0.2 for current fine levels to serve as a deterrent;
• Outside of EEZs there is no social driver constraining IUU fishing.
• … the probability of detection must be well above 0.2 for current fine levels to serve as a deterrent;
• Outside of EEZs there is no social driver constraining IUU fishing.
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Summary resultsSummary resultsSummary resultsSummary results
• From case studies– Namibia
• it is possible to drive IUU activity close to zero by increasing the cost of being apprehended significantly;
– Patagonian toothfish • when the price of fish being targeted by IUU fishers is
high, a much higher detection probability and fine level are required to stop the activity;
– Northern Australian • when IUU fisher’s are poor, conventional deterrence
models are not capable of explaining and providing solutions to the IUU problem.
• From case studies– Namibia
• it is possible to drive IUU activity close to zero by increasing the cost of being apprehended significantly;
– Patagonian toothfish • when the price of fish being targeted by IUU fishers is
high, a much higher detection probability and fine level are required to stop the activity;
– Northern Australian • when IUU fisher’s are poor, conventional deterrence
models are not capable of explaining and providing solutions to the IUU problem.
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Way forwardWay forward
• Enrich Sea Around Us project database to: – Further develop world incidence maps;– Expand the empirical work presented in table 1;
• More effort at determining the prevailing detection likelihood in IUU fishing hotspots;
• Extend the deterrence model so it can capture and explain IUU fishing when fishers are very poor .
• Enrich Sea Around Us project database to: – Further develop world incidence maps;– Expand the empirical work presented in table 1;
• More effort at determining the prevailing detection likelihood in IUU fishing hotspots;
• Extend the deterrence model so it can capture and explain IUU fishing when fishers are very poor .
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Thanks for Thanks for your attentionyour attention
Thanks for Thanks for your attentionyour attention