USSBS, Summary Report, European and Pacific War

8/8/2019 USSBS, Summary Report, European and Pacific War

1/126


2/126

THE

UNI TEDSTATES

STRATEGC

BOMBING

SURVEYS

EuropeanWar)

( P a c i f i c

War)

t

EppfPgff

R~aRCH

Repr i nt ed

by

Ai r

Uni ver s i t y Pr ess

Maxwel l Ai r

For ce

Base, Al abama

36112- 5532

Oct ober

1987


3/126

I SBN1 58566 18 3

i r st r i nt i ng October 1987

Secondr i nt i ng

March 1991

Th rd

r i nt i ng J une 1995

Fourthr i nt i ng J une 1996

i f t h r i nt i ng

August 1997

i xt

r i nt i ng

August 1998

Seventhr i nt i ng March2 1


4/126

FOR WOR

Thi s

vol ume

cont ai ns an i d e n t i c a l r e pr i n t

of t he

Summary

Repor t s Eur ope and

t he Pa c i f i c of t he

s t r a t e g i c

bombi ng sur veys

conduct ed a s

Wor l d War I I w s comng t o

a

cl ose Al t hough

o r i g i n a l l y

publ i shed over

f our

decades

ago,

t hey

cont ai n val uabl e

l essons

f o r

modernai rmen and

a r e wel l

wor t h

anot her l ook

The

Bl ue

Ri bbon

S t r a t e g i c

Bombi ng

Sur vey

Team

w s

t asked

t o ent er

t hose

a r e a s struck by

our

s t r a t e g i c

bomber s

a s soon a s

possi bl e a f t e r

t he

bombi ng t o

a s s e s s t he

ef f ect i veness

of

t he

bombi ng e f f o r t and

i t s cont r i but i on

t o

t he Al l i ed vi ct or y

he

r e s u l t

of

each

sur vey

w s

a

de t a i l ed

mul t i vol ume r e p o r t

t h a t examnes

ever y

aspect of

t he

bombi ng campai gns

The

Summary

Repor t s

r e p r i n t e d

her ei n

a r e

e s s e n t i a l l y

execut i ve

summar i es

of t he

e n t i r e

st udy

he

l essons f o r

ai rmen

a r e he r e

and

t h e r e

much

t o

be l ear ned

i n

t hese

f ew

pages about t he successf ul

empl oyment

of

ai r power

r

Nm

5 WC~54

TRUM N

SP NGRU

Li eut enant

Gener al , USAF

Commander

Ai r Uni ver si t y


5/126

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


6/126

THEUNTE

ST TES

STR TEGC

OM NG

SURVEY

SUMM RYREPORT

Eur opean

War

Sept ember

30 1945


7/126

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK


8/126

THEUNTEDST TESSTR TEGCOM NGSURVEY

FOR WOR

The Uni t ed St a t e s St r a t e gi c Bombi ng

Sur vey

was est abl i shed by

t he Secretary

of

War

onNovember

1944 pur suant

t o

a

d i r e c t i v e

f r o m

t he

l a t e

Pr esi dent

Roos evel t

The o f f i c e r s

of t he

Sur vey

wer e

Fr ankl i n D Ol i er Chai rman

Henr y C

Al exander

Vi ce Chai rman

Geor ge WBal l

Har r y

L Bowman

J ohn

K

Gal br ai t h

Rens i s L i kert

Frank

McNamee

Paul

H

Ni t z e

Robert

P Russel l

Fred

Sear i s

J r

Theodor e P

W i ght

Drectors

Charl es

C

Cabot

Secretary

The Tabl e

of

Or gani zat i on pr ovi ded f o r 300 c i v i l i a n s 5

o f f i c e r s and 500 en l i s t ed men The Sur vey operated

f r o m

headquarters

i n

London

and

est abl i shed

f or war d

headquarters

and

r egi onal

headquarters

i n

Germany i mmedi at el y

f ol l ow ng t he

advance

of t he Al l i ed armes

t

made

a

c l o s e

exam nat i on and

i nspecti on of s e v e r a l hundred

German

p l an t s

c i t i e s

and a r e a s amas s ed vol umes

of

s t a t i s t i c a l and

document ar y

mat er i a l i nc l udi ng

t op

German

gover nment

doc ument s

; and c onduc t ed i nt er vi ews and

i n t e r r o g a t i o n s of

t hous ands of

Ger mans i nc l udi ng

v i r t u a l l y al l of t he

sur vi vi ng

p o l i t i c a l and

mi l i t a r y l eader s

Germany

was scoured

f o r

t s war

r e c o r d s

whi ch wer e f ound

s omet i mes

but r a r e l y

i n

pl aces

wher e

3


9/126

they

ought

t o

have been

somet i mes

i n saf e deposi t v a u l t s often

i n

p r i v a t e

houses

i n

bar ns

i n

caves

on one occasi on i n

a

hen

house

and

on

t wo

occasi ons

i n c o f f i n s

Targets

i n

Russi an hel d

t e r r i t o r y

wer e n o t

a v a i l a b l e t o

t he

Sur vey

Some

w

hundr ed de t a i l e d

r e p o r t s wer e

made

i ncl udi ng

an

Ov er a l l

Repor t

of whi ch t h i s a

summary

Dur i ng

t he course of

t

wor k

t he

Sur vey rendered i n t e r i mreports

and submtted

s t udi e s

and suggest i ons

i n connect i on

w t h t he

ai r oper at i ons

agai nst J apan

Whi l e

t he

Eur opean Wr was

goi ng o n

t

was necessar y i n

many

c a s e s t o

f o l l o w

cl osel y

behi nd

t he

f r o n t

ot her w se

v i t a l

records

mght

have been i r r e t r i e v a b l y

l o s t

Sur vey per sonnel

suffered s e v e r a l c as ua l t i e s i ncl udi ng

f our

k i l l e d

The

Sur vey

nowst udyi ng t he

e f f e c t s

of t he

ai r a t t a c k

upon J apan

When t h a t st udy i s compl et ed

f u r t h e r

reports w i l l be submt t ed

t o t he

Secretary

of Wr and t he

Secretary

of t he avy


10/126

THE

UNTED

ST TES

STR TEG

OM INGSURVEY

SUMM RY

REPORT

he new r e l a t i o n

of

ai r power t o

s t r a t e g y

present s

one

of t he

di s t i ngui shi ng

c o n t r a s t s

bet ween

t h i s

war and

t he

l a s t

Ai r power i n

t he

l a s t

war

was

i n

t s

i nf ancy

he

new

r o l e

of t hr eedi mensi onal

war f are

was even

t hen f oreseen

by

a

f ew

f arsi ght ed

men

but pl anes

wer e

i n s u f f i c i e n t

i n qual i t y and quant i t y

t o per m t much

more

t han

occasi onal

b r i l l i a n t as s i s t anc e t o

t he

ground f o r c e s

Ai r

power i n

t he

European

phase of

t h i s

war reached

a s t a g e of

f u l l

adol escence

a

st age mar ked by

rapi d devel opment i n pl anes

ar mament

equi pment

t a c t i c s

and

concept s of

s t r a t e g i c

empl oyment

and

by

an

ext raordi nary i ncrease

i n

t he

e f f o r t

a l l oc at ed t o

t by al l t he

maj or

contestants

Engl and

devot ed

40

t o

50

percent of

her war

product i on

t o her ai r f o r c e s

Germany 40

p e r c e n t

and

t he

Uni t ed S t a t e s

35

percent

Nevert hel ess at t he

end

of

h o s t i l i t i e s

i n Eur ope weapons

t a c t i c s

and s t r a t e g y

wer e s t i n

a

s t a t e

of

rapi d devel opment Ai r

power

had

no t ye t reached

mat uri t y

and

al l concl usi ons

dr awn

f r o m

exper i ence

i n

t he

European

t h e a t r e

mus t

be

consi der ed

subj ect

t o

change

No

one

shoul d

ass ume

t h a t

because c e r t a i n

t h i ngs

wer e

e f f e c t i v e

or

not

e f f e c t i v e

t he same

woul d be t r u e

under ot her

ci r cumst ances

and

ot her condi t i ons

n

t he Eur opean

war

Al l i ed

ai r power was c a l l e d upon t o

pl ay

many

r ol es- par t ner

w t h

t he Navy

over

t he sea l anes

part ner

w t h

t he rmy i n

ground

b a t t l e

part ner

w t h

bot h

on

t he i nvasi on

beaches

r econnai ssance

phot ogr apher

f or

al l

mover

of

t roops

and

c r i t i c a l suppl i es and

a t t a c k e r

of t he enemy s

v i t a l

s t r e n g t h

f ar

behi nd

t he

b a t t l e l i n e

n t he a t t a c k by

Al l i ed

ai r

power

al mos t

2 700 000

tons

of

bombs wer e dropped

more

t han

1 440 000 bomber

s o r t i e s

and

2 680 000 f i ght er

s o r t i e s

wer e

f l own henumber

of

combat

pl anes

reached

a

peak

of

some 28 000

at

t he

maximum1 300 000

men


11/126

wer e

i n

combat

commands

The

number

of

men l o s t i n

a i r

a c t i o n

was 79 265

Amer i cans

and 79 281

B r i t i s h

More

than

18 000

Amer i can

and

22 000

B r i t i s h

pl anes

wer e

l o s t

o r

damaged

beyond

r e p a i r

I n

t he

wake of

these a t t a c k s t h e r e a r e gr e a t

pat hs of

destruct i on

I n

Ger many

3 600 000 dwel l i ng

u n i t s

approxi mat el y 2

of

t h e

t o t a l wer e

destroyed

or heavi l y

damaged

Survey est i mates

show

some

300 000

c i v i l i a n s

k i l l e d and

780 000 wounded

The

number

made

homel ess aggregat es 7 500 000

The

pr i n c i pa l

German c i t i e s

have been

l a r g e l y

r educed

t o

hol l ow

wal l s

and

p i l e s

of r ubbl e

German

i ndust r y

br ui sed

and

t empor ar i l y

par al yzed

These a r e

t he

s c a r s

across t he

f ace

of t he

enemy

t he

pref ace

t o

t he vi ctory

t h a t f ol l owed

Howa i r supr emacy was achi eved and

t h e r e s u l t s whi ch

f ol l owed

f rom t

e x p l o i t a t i o n a r e t h e subj ect of

t h i s

summary report

The

use of

a i r power

cannot

pr oper l y be consi dered however

except

i n

conj uncti on w th t h e br oad pl ans

and

s t r a t e g y

under whi ch

t he

war

was conduct ed

TheGermanSt r at egi c Pl an

I n t e r r o g a t i o n

of

H i t l e r s survi vi ng

conf i dants

and General S t a f f

and

Fi el d

General s

of t he

Wehrmacht conf i r ms

t he

v i ew t h a t p r i o r

t o t he

w nt er

of 1941 H i t l e r hoped t o r e a l i z e Ger many s

ascendancy

over

Eur ope and possi bl y

t he wor l d l argel y

by s k i l l e d s t r a t e g y

Ti me and

t i mng

wer e

t he

s e c r e t

weapons

i n

t h e Germanwar

pl an

t h a t

t ook

shape a f t e r 1933 H i t l e r hoped

t o

bui l d Ger many s

s t r e n g t h more

qui ckl y

than

t h a t

of

any po t e nt i a l opponent

By rapi d

mobi l i zat i on of

a

power f ul s t r i k i n g

f o r c e

by expl oi t i ng

t h e

p o l i t i c a l

and

i deol ogi cal s t r a i n s

t h a t

he

concei ved t o exi s t

i n t he r e s t

of t he

wor l d

and by over whel m ng

separatel y

i n

l i g h t n i n g

campai gns

such

of

hi s enemes a s chose t o r e s i s t

he

hoped t o

secure f o r

Germany

an

i nvul ner abl e posi ti on i n Europe

and

i n

t h e

wor l d

ote l l R s t a t i s t i c s are

pre l i m nary

or

t entati ve

6


12/126

What Germany l acked

i n number s

of

d i v i s i o n s ,

i n r aw mat er i al s

and

i n

basi c

i n d u s t r i a l s t r e n g t h ,

t

pl anned

t o compensat e

w t h

hi ghl y

t rai ned

ground

u n i t s

of

g r e a t

s t r i k i n g

power

These

wer e

t o

be equi pped

and

ready

t o march

whi l e Ger many s

enemes

wer e

mer el y

prepar i ng

Essent i al i n t h i s s t r a t e g y

was

a

t echni cal l y wel l -

devel oped

a i r

force

i n

bei ng

Emphasi s

was

not pl aced

upon

t he

devel opment

of an

ai r

force

t h a t woul d

dest roy t he

sust ai ni ng

resources of

t he

enemy s

economy

I n

t he

German

pl an

t was

a nt i c i pa t e d

t h a t an

enemy s

e n t i r e

count ry woul d

be s o

qui ckl y

over - run

t h a t

l t t l

concern

need be

had

f or

i n d u s t r i a l

and

war

product i on

t h a t was merel y pot ent i a l

he ai r

force was pri mari l y

an

ar m

of

t he

b l i t z k r i e g

The

success

of

H i t l e r s s t r a t e g y , u n t i l

t he

b a t t l e

of

B r i t a i n , was

compl et e

hi s

more

caut i ous

advi sers and general s

s t l l

conf ess of

t h e i r

ast oni shment

And by common report

of

t he

survi vi ng

Nazi

l ea de r s even t he set back

over Br i t ai n was consi dered

of

mnor

i mpor t ance

he

a t t a c k on

Russi a

was

next

on

t he

cal endar - t he

deci si on

t o

make t h i s a t t a c k

was

t aken

i n

t he

aut umn of

194 and

t h i s ,

accordi ng

t o

pl an

was

t o be a b r i e f

f our

mont hs

advent ure

There

woul d

be t i me t h e r e a f t e r , i f

necessary t o deal

w t h

Br i t ai n

By

Sept ember

1941 H i t l e r

was

so conf i dent

t h a t he had succeeded

i n

Russi a

t h a t he

ordered l a r ge s c a l e

cut - backs

i n war product i on

The

Germanr Economy

St udy

of

German

war

pr oduct i on

dat a

as

wel l

as

i nt errogat i on of

t hose

who

wer e

i n

charge of

r ear mament

at t he t i me

l eaves

no

doubt t h a t

u n t i l

t he def eat

at

Moscow German i ndust ry was ,

i ncompl et el y

mobi l i zed and t h a t i n

f a c t

Germany

di d not f o r s e e

t he

need f o r

f u l l

economc

mobi l i zat i on

German ar ms pr oduct i on

dur i ng

1940

and

1941 was general l y

bel ow t h a t

of

Br i t ai n

When

he

f u l l

meani ng

of

t he

reverses at Moscow

became apparent

the

German l eaders c a l l e d

f or a l l - o u t product i on

he conquest s

of the

previ ous

years

had

g r e a t l y

st rengt hened

Ger many s

economy w i t h ,

t he

except i on

of

oi l

and

rubber

suppl i es

of

v i r t u a l l y al l

the ,

previ ousl y

scarce

i mpor t ed

mat er i al s

wer e

or

had become


13/126

access i bl e Great

reserves

of

f or ei gn l abor

onl y

awai t ed

vol unt ary

o r

forced r ecr ui t ment

he i n d u s t r i a l pl a nt

of

France, t he

Low

Count r i es,

Pol and

and

Czechos l ovaki a had

been

added

t o

t h a t

of

Germany After

t he

defeat at Moscowe a r l y i n

1942, ar mament

product i on i ncreased rapi dl y However ,

such

i n c r e as e

was more

t he

r es ul t of

i mpr ovement s i n i n d u s t r i a l ef f i ci ency

t han of genera l

econom c

mobi l i zat i on St udi es of German

manpower u t i l i z a t i o n

show

t h a t t hr oughout

t he

w r

a

g r e a t deal

of

German

i ndust ry was

on

a s i n g l e s h i f t bas i s r e l a t i v e l y f ew

German

women l e s s than

i n

t he

r s t

war

wer e

dr awn

i n t o

i ndust r y

and

t he

average

work

week

was be l ow B r i t i s h standards

Ger many s ear l y commtment t o

t he

doct r i ne

of t he s hor t

war

was a

cont i nui ng

handi cap

ne i t her pl ans

nor

s t a t e of

m nd wer e

adj ust ed t o

t he

i dea

of

l ong

w r

Near l y al l German

sources

agree

t h a t

t he

hope

f o r a qui ck

vi ctory

l a s t e d

l ong

a f t e r t he s h o r t

war

became a l ong

one Ger many s

ar mament

m ni s t er

Al ber t

Speer,

who

as s umed

o f f i c e

i n

e a r l y

1942,

r a t i o n a l i z e d German

war

pr oduct i on and

el i m nat ed

t he wor s t

i n e f f i c i e n c i e s

i n

t he pr evi ous

c ont r o l s

t hr eef ol d

i ncrease i n

ar mament

pr oduct i on

occurred

under

hi s

d i r e c t i o n

bu t t he i ncrease cannot

be consi der ed

a

t est ament

t o t he ef f i ci ency

of

d i c t a t o r s h i p

Rat her suggests

t he

degree of

i n d u s t r i a l under mobi l i zat i on

i n

t he e a r l i e r years

n

exc el l en t

cas e can be

made t h a t t hr oughout

t he

war

t op

gover nment

management

i n

Germany

w s

not

e f f i c i e n t

he

Fuehrer coul d not

stand

t he c l i mat e of Russi a

he compl ai ned

of

constant

headaches

J o d l Chi ef of

Staff

of

German

H gh

Command t o Survey I nt err ogator s

Because t he

German

economy

through

mos t

of

t he

w r

was

s u b s t a n t i a l l y under mobi l i zed,

w s r e s i l i e n t under ai r

a t t a c k

C i v i l i a n

consumpt i on

w s hi gh

dur i ng

t he ea r l y years

of

t he

w r

and

i nv ent o r i es both i n

t r a d e

channel s

and consumer s

poss essi on

wer e a l s o

hi gh

These

hel ped cushi on t he peopl e

of

t he

German

c i t i e s f r o m

t he

e f f e c t s

of bombi ng Pl ant

and

machi ner y

wer e

8


14/126

p l e n t i f u l

and

i ncompl et el y used

hus

t

was compar at i vel y

easy

t o

s u b s t i t u t e

unused

or

p a r t l y

used

machi ner y f or

t h a t whi ch

was

destroyed

Whi l e

t h e r e

was

constant pr essur e t hr oughout f or

erman

manpower f o r t he

Wehr macht ,

t he

i n d u s t r i a l l abor suppl y,

as augment ed by f or ei gn

l ab o r

was s u f f i c i e n t t o permt

t he

d i ve r s i o n

of l a r g e number s t o t he

r e p a i r

of bomb damage

or t he

cl ear ance

of de b r i s w t h

r e l a t i v e l y

smal l

s a c r i f i c e

of

e s s en t i a l

pr oduct i on

The Al l i ed St r at egi c Pl an

I n

both t he

R and

t he

Uni t ed

S t a t e s

rmy Ai r Forces t h e r e

wer e somewho

bel i eved

t h a t ai r power

coul d

del i ver

t he

knockout

bl ow

agai nst Ger many, and f o r c e

c a p i t u l a t i o n

Thi s vi ew,

however , was

not c o n t r o l l i n g

i n

t he

ove r a l l Al l i ed s t r a t e g i c pl an

hedom nant el ement i n t h a t

pl an

was i nvasi on

of t he

Cont i nent t o

occur

i n t he

spr i ng

of 1944

Pl ans

c a l l e d f or e s t a b l i s h i n g ai r

s u p e r i o r i t y p r i o r t o

t he

dat e of

t he i nvasi on

and

t he

e x p l o i t a t i o n of

such

s upe r i o r i t y i n

weakeni ng t he

enemy s

wi l l

and capaci t y t o

r e s i s t

The

devel opment

of

t he ai r

f o r c e s

opposi ng Germany

was

heavi l y

i nf l uenced

by t he

f a c t t ha t

vi ct or y

was pl anned t o

come

t hr ough i nvasi on

and

l and

occupat i on

I n

t h e e a r l y year s of t he war ,

t o

be

s u r e

t he R

had

t he i ndependent m ssi on

of

s t r i k i n g

a t

German

i n d u s t r i a l

centers i n

an

e f f o r t

t o

weaken t he German

peopl e

However ,

t he

wei ght

of

t he R e f f o r t

compar ed

w t h

t onnages l a t e r empl oyed, was very smal l - 16, 000 t ons

i n

1940

and

46, 000

t ons

i n

1941

compar ed

w t h

676, 000 t ons i n 1944

Soon

a f t e r

t he

Uni t ed

S t a t e s entered t he

ai r

war

i n

1942,

r epl acement s

f o r

t he

new

and

s t

s ma l l

Ei ght h

Ai r

Force

wer e

di ver t ed t o

suppor t

t he North

Af r i can

i nvasi on

Dur i ng

1943,

t a r ge t s e l e c t i on

f o r

t he

Ei ght h

Ai r

Force and

t he F i f t e e n t h

Ai r

Force

based

on

t he

Medi t er r anean)

r eckoned al ways w t h

t he

f ac t t hat maximum

cont r i but i on must be

made

t o

t he i nvasi on

i n

t he

com ng

year

nd

t he Ni nt h

Ai r

Force

i n

West er n

Eur ope and

t he

Twel f t h

Ai r Force

i n

t he

Medi t er r anean wer e devel oped w t h

t he

pr i mar y m ssi on

of

9


15/126

secur i ng

t he

sky i n

t he

t h e a t r e

of

combat

and

c l ear i ng

t he

way f o r

gr ound

operat i ons I n

t he s pr i ng

and

e a r l y

summer of 1944

al l ai r

f o r c e s

based

on Engl and wer e used

t o

prepare

t he

way

f o r t he

i nvasi on I t w s

not i ntended

t h a t

t he

ai r a t t a c k s agai nst

Germany

pr oper

and

t he

German

economy

woul dbe

a subor di nat e

operat i on

but

r a t h e r

a

par t

of a l a r ger

s t r a t e g i c

pl an one

t h a t cont empl at ed

t h a t

t he

deci si on woul d

come

through t he

advance of

gr ound

armes

r a t h e r

than

through ai r power

al one

Ear l y

Ai r

Oper at i ons- Ci t y

rea

Rai ds

The

pi oneer

i n

t he

ai r war agai nst

Germany

was

t he

R F he

R F exper i mented b r i e f l y i n 1940 w t h dayl i ght

a t t a c k s

on

i n d u s t r i a l

t a r g e t s i n

Germany

but

abandoned

t he e f f o r t when l o s s es

proved

unbear abl y heavy Ther eaf t er

i t

at t empt ed t o

f i n d and

a t t a c k

such

t a r g e t s

as

o i l

l umnum

and

a i r c r a f t

pl ant s

at

ni ght

Thi s

e f f o r t

t oo

was abandoned

w th

ava i l abl e

t echni ques

i t

w s

not

possi bl e t o l o c at e

t he

t a r g e t s

o f t e n enough

hen

t he

R Fbegan i t s

f amous r a i d s on

German ur ban

and i n d u s t r i a l centers

On t he ni ght

of

May 30

1942

i t

mount ed i t s f i r s t thousand pl ane

r a i d

agai nst

Col ogne

and t wo

ni ght s

l a t e r

struck

Essen w t h

al most equal fo rce

On t h r e e

ni ght s

i n l a t e

J u l y

and e a r l y August 1943

i t

s t r u c k

Hamburg i n

per haps

t he

most

devast at i ng

s i n g l e

c i t y

a t t a c k

of

t he

war about one t h i r d of

t he

houses

of

t he c i t y

wer e

destroyed

and

German

est i mates show 60 000 t o

100 000 peopl e

k i l l e d

No

subsequent c i t y r a i d shook

Germany

as

di d

t h a t on Hamburg

document s

show t h a t

German

o f f i c i a l s wer e

t hor oughl y al ar med

and t h e r e i s some

i ndi cati on

f r om

i nt er r ogat i on of

hi gh o f f i c i al s t hat

H i t l e r hi mel f thought t h a t

f u r t h e r

a t t a c k s

of si m l ar w~

i ght

mght

f o r c e Germany

out of

t he

w r

he

R F

pr oceeded

t o

destroy

one

maj or ur ban c e n t e r

a f t e r

another

Except

i n

t he

ext r eme

eastern

p a r t

of t he Rei ch t h e r e

i s no

maj or

c i t y t h a t does

not

bear

t he

m rk

of

these

a t t a c k s

However

no

subsequent

a t t a c k had

t he shock

e f f e c t

of t he

Hamburg r a i d

10


16/126

reported

f or t he

i r s t t i me o r a l l y t o

t he

Fuehr er t h a t i

these

s e r i a l

a t t a c k s

cont i nued

a r api d

end of

t he war

mght be

t he

consequence

Speer

t o

Sur vey

I nt er r ogat or s

on

t heHamburg

a t t a c k s

I n

t he l a t t e r hal f

of

1944 ai ded by newnavi gat i onal t echni ques

t he R F returned wi t h

p a r t

of

t s

fo rce

t o

an

a t t a c k on

i ndus t r i a l

t a r g e t s

These a t t a c k s

wer e

not abl y

success f ul

but

t

s

wi t h

t he

a t t a c k s

on ur ban a r e a s t h a t

t he

R F i s

mos t

pr om nent l y

i d e n t i f i e d

he

c i t y

a t t a c k s

of

t he

R F

p r i o r t o t he

aut umn

of

1944

di d not

s ubs t ant i a l l y a f f e c t

t he

course

of

Germanwar

pr oduct i on

German

war pr oduct i on as

a

whol e cont i nued t o i ncr ease

Thi s i n i t se l f s

not concl usi ve but t he

Sur vey has

made de t a i l e d a na l y s i s of t he

course of

pr oduct i on and

t r a d e

i n

10

German c i t i e s t h a t wer e

attacked

dur i ng

t h i s

per i od

and

has made

more

gener al

anal yses i n

o t h e r s

These

show t h a t

whi l e pr oduct i on r ecei ved a

moder at e

set back

a f t e r

a

r a i d

t

recovered

s ubs t ant i a l l y

wi t hi n

a

r e l a t i v e l y

f ew

weeks

s

a

r u l e

t he

i ndus t r i a l

p l a nt s wer e l ocat ed ar ound t he

per i met er of German

c i t i e s and

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y these wer e

r e l a t i v e l y undamaged

ommenci ng i n

t he

aut umn

of

1944

t he

t onnage

dr opped

on c i t y

a r e a s pl us s p i l l o v e r s

f r o m

a t t a c k s

on

t r anspor t at i on

and

other

s p e c i f i c t a r g e t s mounted g r e a t l y I n

t he

course

of

t h e s e r a i ds

Ger many s

s t e e l

i ndust r y

was

knocked

o u t

i t s

e l e c t r i c

power

i nd us t r y

was s ubs t ant i a l l y i mpai r ed and i ndust r y gener al l y i n

t he

a r e a s attacked was

di sor gani zed

There

wer e

so many f o r c e s

maki ng

f o r t he

col l apse of pr oduct i on dur i ng t h i s per i od however

t h a t t

s

no t

poss i bl e separ at el y t o assess

t he

ef fect

of

t h e s e l a t e r

area

r a i ds on war pr oduct i on Ther e s no doubt however t h a t they

wer e s i gn i f i c ant

The

Sur vey

has made ext ensi ve

s t udi e s

of

t h e r e ac t i o n

of t he

German peopl e

t o

t he

ai r

a t t a c k

and especi al l y t o c i t y r a i d s These

s t ud i e s

wer e c a r e f u l l y desi gned

t o

cover

a

compl et e cross sect i on of

t he Germanpeopl e

i n

west er n

and

southern

Germany

and t o

r e f l e c t

wi t h

a

mnimum

of

b i a s t h e i r

a t t i t u d e

and

behavi or

dur i ng

t h e r a i ds

These s t ud i e s

show t h a t

t he

mor al e

of t he German peopl e

11


17/126

det er i o r at ed

under aer i a l

a t t a c k

he ni ght

r a i d s wer e

f eared f a r

mor e

than

dayl i ght

r a i d s

he peopl e l o s t

f a i t h i n

t h e prospect of

v i c t o r y

i n

t h e i r

l eader s

and

i n t h e

promses

and

pr opaganda

t o

whi ch t hey wer e subj ect ed

Most

of

a l l t hey

want ed

t h e

war

t o

end

hey resor t ed i ncreas i ngl y

t o bl ack

r adi o

l i s t e n i n g

t o

c i r c u l a t i o n of r umor

and f a c t i n

opposi t i on

t o

t h e

egi me

and

t h e r e

was some

i ncrease i n

a c t i v e

p o l i t i c a l di ss i dence- i n

1944

one

German

i n

every

t housand was

a r r e s t ed f o r

a p o l i t i c a l

of f ense

I f

t hey

had

been

at l i b e r t y t o

vot e t hemel ves

out of t h e

war

t hey

woul d

have

done

so wel l bef ore

t h e

f i n a l surrender

I n a

det ermned

p o l i c e

s t a t e however

there i s a

w de

di f f erence

bet ween

d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n

and

expressed opposi t i on Al t hough

examnat i on of

o f f i c i a l

records

and

t hose of

i ndi vi dual

p l an t s

shows

t h a t

absent eei sm

i ncr eased

and

product i vi t y di mni shed

somewhat

i n

t h e l a t e s t a g e s

of t h e

war by and l a r g e

wor ker s

cont i nued t o work

However

d i s s a t i s f i e d

t hey

wer e

w t h

t h e war t h e

German

peopl e

l acked e i t h er t h e

wi l l

or t h e

means

t o

make

t h e i r

d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n

evi dent

he c i t y

area r a i d s have l e f t

t h e i r

markon t he German

peopl e as

wel l as

on t h e i r c i t i e s

Far

more

than

any

ot her m l i t a r y

act i on

t h a t

preceded

t h e ac t ua l

occupat i on

of

Germany

i t s e l f

t hese

a t t a c k s l e f t

t h e

German peopl e w t h

a

s o l i d

l esson

i n

t h e di sadvant ages

of war

was

a

t e r r i b l e

l esson

concei vabl y

t h a t

l esson

bot h

i n Germany

and

abroad

coul d be

t h e

most

l a s t i ng s i ng l e

e f f e c t

of

t h e

ai r war

The Fi r s t

ayl i ght

Operati ons

When

Pearl

Har bor

came t he Fuehrer

and mysel f

of course

showed

t o

t he out si de

wor l d

a

happy

f a c e

but

we

wer e

not pl eased

Ri bbent hrop

t o Survey

I nt er rogat ors

he S

rmy

Ai r

Forces

ent ered

t h e

European

war

w t h t h e

f i r m vi ew t h a t

s p e c i f i c

i n d u s t r i e s and

s er v i c es

wer e

t h e

most

pr omsi ng

t a r g e t s

i n t h e

enemy

economy

and

t hey bel i eved

t h a t i f

12


18/126

t h e s e

t a r g e t s

wer e

t o

be

hi t

a cc ur a t e l y t he

a t t a c k s had t o

bemade

i n

dayl i ght

word

needs

t o

be

s a i d

on t he pr obl em of

accuracy

i n

a t t a c k

Bef or e

t he

war

t he

S

Army

Ai r

Forces

had

advanced

bombi ng

t echni ques

t o

t hei r hi ghest

l ev el

of devel opment

and

had

t r a i ned

a

l i m t ed number

of

cr ews

t o

a hi gh

degree of

preci si on i n

bombi ng under

t a r g e t

range condi t i ons

t hus

l eadi ng

t o

t he

expressi ons pi n

poi nt

and

pi ckl e bar rel

bombi ng

However

t was

not

possi bl e t o approach such st andards

of

accuracy

under

b a t t l e

condi t i ons

i mposed

over Europe Many

l i m t i n g

f a c t o r s

i nt ervened

t a r g e t

obscurat i on

by

cl ouds

g o f

smoke

screens

and

i ndus t r i a l haze enemy f i ght e r opposi t i on whi ch

nec es s i t a t e d

def ensi ve bombi ng f ormat i ons t h u s

r e s t r i c t i n g f r eedom of

maneuver

ant i a i r c r af t a r t i l l e r y def enses demandi ng mnimum

t i me

exposure o f

t he

at t acki ng f o r c e i n

order

t o keep l o s s e s

down

and

f i n a l l y

t i me

l i m t a t i o n s

i mposed

on combat crew t r a i n i n g a f t e r

t he

war

began

t

was

consi dered

t h a t

enemy

opposi t i on made

f ormat i on

f l y i n g

and

f ormat i on a t t a c k

a

necessary

t a ct i ca l and

t ec hn i c a l

procedure

Bombi ng p a t t e r n s r esul t ed- onl y a

por t i on

of

whi ch

coul d f a l l

on

smal l pr e c i s i o n t a r g e t s he r e s t

s p i l l e d

over on adj acent pl ant s

or

b ui l t up a r e a s o r

i n open f i e l d s

Accuracy ranged f r om poor t o

exc el l en t

When

v i s ua l

condi t i ons wer e f avorabl e

and

f l a k

def enses

wer e

no t

i nt ens e

bombi ng r e s u l t s

wer e

at

t h e i r b e s t

Unf or t unat el y

t he

maj or

por t i on

of

bombi ng

operat i ons

over

Germany

had

t o

be

conduct ed

under weat her

and

b a t t l e condi t i ons t hat r es t r i c t ed

bombi ng t echni que

and

accuracy

s u f f e r e d accordi ngl y

Convent i onal l y

t he

ai r

f o r c e s desi gnat ed

as

t he

t a r g e t area a

c i r c l e havi ng

a r a di us of

1000 f e e t

around

t he

ai m ng

poi nt

of

a t t a c k

Whi l e accuracy i mproved

dur i ng t he

war

Survey

s t ud i es

show

t h a t i n

t he

o v e r a l l

onl y about

2

of t he

bombs ai med at

pr e c i s i o n

t a r g e t s

f e l l w t hi n

t h i s t a r g e t

area

A

peak

accuracy

of

7 was reached

f o r t he

month

of

February 1945 These ar e

i mport ant f a c t s

f o r t he reader

t o keep i n mnd es pec i a l l y

when

consi der i ng t he t onnages

of

bombs del i vered by

t he

ai r

f o r c e s

Of

nec es s i t y

a

f a r

l a r g e r

t onnage was c a r r i ed

t han

hi t

German

i n s t a l l a t i o n s


19/126

Al t hough

t he Ei ght h Ai r Force began oper at i ons

August

17

1942 wi t h t he bombi ng of mar shal l i ng yar ds

a t Rouen

and

S o t t e v i l l e

i n

northern Fr ance

no

oper at i ons dur i ng

1942

or

t he

r s t

ha l f

of

1943 had

s i g n i f i c a n t

e f f e c t

The force was

smal l

and i t s

r ange l i m t e d Much

t i me i n t hi s

per i od

was

devot ed

t o t r a i n i n g and

t e s t i n g t he force under combat

condi t i ons

I n

November

and ecember

1942 t he

U- boat a t t a c k on Al l i ed

mer chant

shi ppi ng was

i n

t s most

successf ul phase

and

submar i ne

bases

and

pens

and

l a t e r const r uct i on

yards

became t he chi ef

t a r g e t

and r emai ned

s o

u n t i l

J une

1943

These

a t t a c k s

accompl i shed

l t t l

he submar i ne pens wer e protected and bombs

d i d n o t

penetrate

t he

1 2 - f o o t concrete roofs he a t t a c k on

t he

const r uct i on yar ds

and

sl i pways

was

not

heavy enough t o

be

more

t han

t r oubl esome

I n

J anuar y

1943

a t

Casabl anca t h e o bj ec t i v e

of t he s t r a t egi c a i r

f o r c e s was est abl i shed a s t he dest r ucti on

and

d i s l o c a t i o n of t he

German

Mi l i t a r y i n d u s t r i a l and

economc system

and

t he

undermni ng

of

t he

mor al e

of

t he

German

peopl e t o

t he poi nt wher e

t h e i r capaci t y

f o r

ar med

r es i s t a n c e

s

f a t a l l y weakened

.

Speci f i c

t a r g e t

system wer e named

I n t he

spr i ng of 1943 Al l i ed naval

and

a i r

power

scor ed a

d e f i n i t e

vi ct or y over German

submar i nes

Surface

c r a f t t eamed

wi t h l ong- r ange

p a t r o l bomber s

equi pped wi t h r adar

r a i s e d German

submar i ne

l o s s es

t o

c a t a s t r ophi c l e v e l s

i n

t he

s p r i n g of

1943

I n t e r r o g a t i o n

of

members

of

t he

Hi gh

Command

of t he German

Navy

i ncl udi ng

Admr al

Doeni t z has

conf i r med

t he scope of

t h i s

v i c t o r y When t he

Combi ned

omber Of f ensi ve Pl an was i ssued

i n

J une of

1943 t o

i mpl ement t he

Casabl anca di r e c t i v e

submar i nes

wer e

dr opped

f r om

r s t p r i o r i t y and

t he

German a i r c r a f t

i ndust r y

was

s ubs t i t u t ed

heGerman bal l - bear i ng

i n du s t r y t he

suppl i er

of

an i mpor t ant

component was sel ected a s a compl ement ar y

t a r g e t

The

Bal l - Bear i ng ttack

he German a n t i - f r i c t i o n

bear i ng

i ndust r y was heavi l y

concentrated

When

t he

a t t a c k

began

approxi mat el y hal f

t he

14


20/126

out put came

f r o m

pl ant s

i n

t he v i c i n i t y of Schwei nf ur t

An

adequat e

suppl y of bear i ngs

was c o r r e c t l y

as sumed

t o be

i ndi spensabl e

f o r German

war

product i on

I n

a

s er i es

of

r a i ds

begi nni ng on

August

17

1943,

about

12, 000

t o n s

of

bombs wer e dropped on t h i s target-about one- hal f

of

one

per

cent of

t he t o t a l

t onnage

del i vered

i n

t he ai r

war

I n

an

a t t a c k

on

August

17

by

200 B- 17 s

on

Schwei nf urt ,

t h e pl ant s wer e severel y

damaged Records

of t he

i ndust ry

t aken

by

t he

Survey

and

suppl ement ed and

checked by

i n t e r r oga t i on

show

t h a t

product i on

of beari ngs

at

t h i s

cent er

was

reduced

shar pl y- Sept ember

pr oduct i on

was 5

of t he

pre- rai d

l ev el

I n

t h i s

a t t a c k 36 of t he

200

at t ac k i ng

pl anes

wer e

l o s t

I n

t he

f amous

and

much di scussed

second

a t t a c k

on

Oct ober

14

1943,

when t he

pl ant s wer e

agai n

severel y damaged, one

of t he

deci si ve ai r

b a t t l e s

of

t he

war took

pl ac e The 228

bomber s

p a r t i c i p a t i n g

wer e

st rongl y attacked by

German f i ght e r s

when

beyond

t he range

of t h ei r f i g h t e r

e s c o r t

Losses

t o

f i g h t e r s

and

t o

f l a k

cost

t he

Uni t ed

S t a t e s f o r c e s

6

pl anes

wi t h anot her

138 damaged i n var yi ng

degree, somebeyond

r epai r

Repeat ed

l o s s es of

t h i s

magni t ude coul d not

be sust ai ned deep

penet r a t i ons wi t hout

e s c o r t

of

whi ch t h i s was among

t he

e a r l i e s t

wer e suspended and

a t t a c k s

on

Schwei nf ur t

wer e

not

r enewed

f o r

four mont hs TheGermans

made

good

use of

t he breat hi ng s pel l

czar

was appoi nt ed

wi t h unl i m t ed

pr i o r i t y f or

r e q u i s i t i o n i n g

men

and

mat er i a l s

Ener get i c

s t e p s

wer e

t aken

t o

di sperse

t he

i ndust ry

Rest orat i on was

ai ded

by

t he ci r cumst ances- whi ch Survey

i nv es t i gat i ons showt o have been f a i r l y commont o al l such r ai ds -

t ha t machi nes

and machi ne t o o l s

wer e damaged f ar l e s s severel y

t han factory s t r u c t u r e s German

equi pment

was r edesi gned t o

s ubs t i t ut e ot her t ypes

of bear i ngs

wherever

poss i bl e

And

t he

Ger mans

drew

on

t he

s ub s t ant i a l stocks t h a t

wer e

on

hand

Al t hough

t h e r e

wer e

f u r t h e r a t t a c k s

product i on

by

t he

aut umn

of

1944 was back t o

p r e - r a i d

l e v e l s Fromexamnat i on

of t he records

and per s o na l i t i es and

t he

t est i mony

of

war product i on o f f i c i a l s

t h e r e s

no evi dence t ha t

t he

a t t a c k s on

t he

bal l - bear i ng i ndust ry had

any measurabl e e f f e c t on es s e nt i a l war product i on


21/126

TheAttack

onerman

Ai r cr af t Pl ant s

The

heavy

l os s es

over

Schwei nf urt

caused

an

i mpor t ant

r e v i s i o n

i n

t he t a c t i c s of

dayl i ght bomi ng Unt i l t hen i t had

been

bel i eved

t h a t

unescor t ed

bomber s,

heavi l y

gunned and

f l y i n g

i n

wel l

desi gned f or mat i ons,

coul d penet r at e t h i s deepl y over

t h e

Rei ch

At

l e a s t

s o

f a r

as a smal l

forcewas concer ned, t h i s was

pr oven

wr ong

For

t h e

r emai nder

of

1943 a f t e r

t h e

Schwei nf urt

r a i d s dayl i ght

penet r a t i ons

beyond f i g h t e r

e s c o r t

wer e shar pl y

ci r cumscr i bed

Meanwhi l e

t he

S

heavy

bomer

force

i ncreased

substant i al l y

i n

s t r e n g t h

I n ecemer

of

1943, t he

P- 51 Must ang) l ong- r ange

f i g h t e r f i r s t became

a v a i l a b l e

and

i n

t h e ear l y

mont hs

of

1944

t h e

number s

i ncreased Wth

t h i s

pl a ne

i n

som

respects

t he

most

i mpor t ant addi t i on

t o

a l l i e d

a i r power

dur i ng t h e Eur opean war ,

augment i ng t h e

P- 47

Thunder bol t ) e s c o r t s whi ch

i n

t he meant i me

had mat er i al l y

i ncr eased

t h e i r

r ange,

dayl i ght

oper at i ons

i n

dept h

wer e

agai n

l aunched

The

a t t a c k

on

t h e erman a i r c r a f t

i ndustr y- pr i mar i l y on

ai r f r ame pl ant s- was opened i n

t he

summr

of

1943 Theerman

a i r c r a f t

i ndust r y had

been wel l d i s t r i b u t e d

over

t h e Rei ch

wi t h

a

vi ew t o t he p o s s i b i l i t y of a i r

a t t a c k

I s o l a t e d

r a i d s ear l y i n

1941

and

1942

had caused some

f u r t h e r s h i f t i n pr oduct i on t o eastern t e r r i t o r y

but onl y

l i m t ed s t e p s

had

been

taken

t o di sper se i ndi vi dual pl ant

u n i t s

i n

order

t o

reduce

t h e i r

v u l n e r a b i l i t y

The

i ndustr y

was

f ound

t o have

had

s ubs t a nt i a l

excess

capaci t y The ef f i ci ency of

t he

i ndustr y was

l ow

Unl i ke ot her ar mament s,

pr ocur ement was

not

under t h e

d i r e c t i o n

of t h e Speer

M ni st r y

but under t h e

Luf t waf f e

Pr oduct i on

i n

t h e

e a r l y

year s

of

t he

war

was

s ma l l

pr i mari l y

because Luf t waf f e

r equi r ement s

wer e mdest i n 1941

accor di ng

t o

capt ured

m nut es

of

erman s t a f f

conf er ences,

Gener al

J eschonnek,

t hen

chi ef

of

t he

a i r s t af f

opposed

a

suggest ed

i nc r ea se

i n f i g h t e r

pl ane

pr oduct i on

wi t h t he

r emar k t h a t

he

woul dn t

know

what t o do wi t h

a mont hl y

pr oduct i on

of

mor e

t han

6 f i g h t e r s

However , i n

t h e

aut umn

of

1943 pl ans

t hen

current

c a l l e d

f o r

a s t e a d i l y

i ncreasi ng

out put

of f i g h t e r s

6


22/126

I n t he

1943 a t t a c k s ,

5, 092

tons

wer e

dropped

on

14

pl ant s ,

pri mari l y

on

ai rf rame p l ant s

The

records showt ha t accept ance

of

t he

Me 109

Ger many s

st andard si ngl e- engi ne

f i g h t e r ,

dropped

f r o m 725 i n

J u l y

t o 536 i n Sept ember

and t o a l ow of 357 i n

December Accept ance

of

Focke- Wul f

190 s

dropped

f r o m

325 i n

J u l y t o 203 i n

December

s a r es ul t of t h e a t t ac k s

t he Germans

began a more vi gor ous

program

of subdi vi di ng

and di spersi ng

a i r c r a f t

p l ant s

and t h i s caused p a r t

of t he reduct i on

i n pr oduct i on

f u r t h e r

but undet er m ned

p a r t

was

t he r e s u l t of poor

weat her

whi ch

c ut

down

accept ance

f l i g h t s

t

pr obabl e

t h a t

some

pl anes

produced

but

not

accept ed

dur i ng

these

mont hs

wer e

added

t o

accept ance

f i g u r e s i n

t he

mont hs f ol l ow ng

The Germans as

a

r e s u l t of these

a t t a c k s deci ded t o

pl ace

i ncr eased

emphas i s on t he

pr oduct i on

of f i ght e r

pl anes

The

cul m nat i ng

a t t a c k s on

t he

German a i r c r a f t

i ndust ry

began

i n

t he l a s t week of February

1944

W t h

t he

prot ect i on

of

l ong- r ange

f i ght er es c or t ,

3, 636

tons

of

bombs

wer e dr opped

on

German

a i r c r a f t

pl ant s

agai n, ai rf rame

r a t h e r

than engi ne

pl ant s

dur i ng

t h a t week

I n t h a t

and succ eedi ng weeks

every

known a i r c r a f t pl ant

i n

Germany

was

hi t

Det ai l ed

pr oduct i on

data

f o r t h i s per i od,

as

f a r

o t h e r s , wer e

t aken

by t he Survey, and

German ai r

general s,

pr oduct i on

o f f i c i a l s , and

l eadi ng

manuf act urers,

i nc l udi ng

Mess er schm t t

and Tank

o f

Focke- Wul f )

wer e

i nt err ogat ed

at

l engt h

Pr oduct i on

was

not

knocked out f o r

l ong On

t he c ont r a r y , dur i ng t he

whol e

year of

1944

t he

German ai r force

report ed

t o

have accept ed a

t o t a l

of

39, 807

a i r c r a f t

of

al l types compared

w t h 8, 295

i n

1939,

or

15, 596 i n

1942

bef ore t he p l ant s

suf f ered

any

a t t a c k Al t hough t

i s

d i f f i c u l t

t o

det er m ne

exact

pr oduct i on

f o r

any s i n g l e

mont h,

accept ances

wer e

hi gher

i n Mar ch,

t he

month

a f t e r

t he

heavi est

a t t a c k ,

than

t hey

wer e

i n

J anuary,

t he

month

bef ore

They

cont i nued

t o r i s e

Part

of t he expl anat i on

was

t he excess

capaci t y

of t he

ai rf rame

i ndust ry whi ch,

as

not ed,

was

consi derabl e

Excess capaci t y i n

ai r f rames was

consi derabl y

great er than

i n

engi nes St udi es of

i nd i v i dua l

p l ant s by t he

Survey

show

t h a t al t hough

bui l di ngs

wer e

17


23/126

destroyed t h e

machi ne

t o o l s showed r emar kabl e d u r a b i l i t y

nd t h e

Ger mans

s howed

capaci t y

f o r i mpr ovi si ng

t h e i r way

out

I mmedi at el y

a f t e r

t h e

a t t a c k s ,

r e s po n s i b i l i t y f o r

pr oduct i on

was

s h i f t e d

f r o m t h e Luf t waf f e

t o

t h e Speer

Mi ni s t r y

s p e c i a l s t a f f

was

or gani zed f o r t h e r e c o n s t i t u t i o n

and

d i s p e r s a l of t h e

i ndust r y

Thi s

s t a f f

t h e J aeger st ab

or

F i g h t e r - S t a f f )

appear s

t o have

done

an

e f f e c t i v e

j ob of

mobi l i zi ng unused

capaci t y and undamaged

machi nes

r eor gani zi ng

i n e f f i c i e n t

management s r educi ng

t h e

number

of

types

of

pl anes

and

mos t

i mpor t ant of a l l ,

i n

subdi vi di ng

pr oduct i on

i n t o

smal l

u n i t s

t h a t

wer e

compar at i vel y

i mmune

f r o m

a t t a c k

t was

ai ded

by

pr evi ous

pl ans f o r

expansi on

and

t c u t shar pl y

i n t o

a v a i l a b l e

i nvent or i es

of

p a r t s

Al t hough t h e

t est i mony

on t h e

poi nt

s c o n f l i c t i n g ,

t h e

J aeger st ab

may have

s a c r i f i c e d

q u a l i t y

and an adequat e compl ement

of spare p a r t s , f o r

quant i t y

pr oduct i on Never t hel ess t h e a t t a c k

on

t h e a i r c r a f t

pl a nt s ,

l i k e t h e

a t t a c k

on

t h e

bal l - bear i ng pl a nt s ,

s howed t h a t

t o knock

out

a

s i n g l e

i ndust r y

w t h

t h e

weapons

a v a i l a b l e

i n

1943

and

e a r l y

1944

was

a

f or m dabl e e n t e r p r i s e demandi ng

cont i nuous a t t a c k s t o

e f f e c t

compl et e r e s u l t s

Recover y

was i mpr ovi sed

al mos t

a s

qui ckl y

a s

t h e p l a n t s

wer e knocked

out

Wth t h e s h i f t

i n pr i o r i t y

f o r

s t r a t e g i c

at t acks- t he

f i r s t

t o

mar shal l i ng

y a r d s ,

and

br i dges

i n

Fr ance i n

pr epar at i on

f o r

i n v as i o n ,

i mmedi at el y f ol l owed by

t h e

ai r campai gn

a ga i n s t o i l - t h e

cont i nued a t t a c k s on

t h e

a i r c r a f t

i ndust r y wer e

suspended

The

Def eat of t he German

i r

orce

The

seem ng par adox

of

t h e a t t a c k on t h e a i r c r a f t p l a n t s

i n

t h a t ,

al t hough

pr oduct i on

recovered

qui ckl y

t h e

German ai r force

a f t e r

t h e a t t a c k s

was

n o t

agai n a

s e r i o u s

t h r e a t

t o

Al l i ed

ai r

s u p e r i o r i t y

he a t t a c k s i n

t h e w nt er

of

1944 wer e escorted by P- 5

I s and

P- 47 s and

w t h t h e

appear ance

of

these

pl anes

i n

force a s har p

change had

been

ordered

i n

e s c o r t

t a c t i c s

Pr evi ousl y t h e e s c o r t

pl anes

had t o p r o t e c t

t h e

bomber f o r c e

a s t h e i r pr i mar y

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

hey wer e nowi n s t r u c t e d

t o i nv i t e opposi t i on f r o m

1 8


24/126

German

f i g h t e r

f o r c e s

and t o

engage

t hemat

ever y oppor t uni t y

s

a

r e s u l t German f i g h t e r

l os s es

mount ed shar pl y

The cl ai med

l os s es

i n

J anuar y

wer e

1 115

German

f i g h t e r s

i n

Febr uar y

1 118

and i n March 1 217 The l os s es

i n

pl anes

wer e

accompani ed by

l o s s es i n exper i enced p i l o t s and di sor gani zat i on and l os s

of

t he

combat

s t r e n g t h of

squadr ons and

gr oups

y t he spr i ng

of

1944

opposi t i on

of t he

Luf t waf f e

had

ceased

t o

be

e f f e c t i v e

bel i eve t he

Fuehr er

was not

very much

el at ed t t he l o s s of

ef f i ci ency

of

our

ai r

f or ces

Kessel r i ng t o

Sur vey

I nter r ogator s

German

ai r gener al s r esponsi bl e

f o r

oper at i ons i n Fr ance s t a t e d

under i nter r ogat i on

t h a t on D day

t he

Luf t waf f e had onl y 80

oper at i onal pl anes

w t h

whi ch

t o oppose

t he i nvasi on

t no

t i me

bet ween

D day and

t he

br eakt hr ough at

St

o

di d r ei nf or cement s

o f f s e t l os s es

and

i ncrease

t he

s i z e

of

t h i s

force

German

f i g h t e r

pr oducti on

cont i nued t o i ncrease

dur i ng

t he

summer

of 1944

and

acceptances

r eached

a peak of 3 375

i n

Sept ember Al t hough t

has

st udi ed

t he

pr obl emw t h

consi der abl e

c a r e

t he

Sur vey

has

no c l ea r answer as t o what happened t o t h e s e

pl anes

t he

di f f er ences of opi ni on

bet ween

German ai r

gen er a l s

t

mght be added

a r e

a t l eas t as g r e a t

bet ween

those who have

sear ched

f o r t he

expl anat i on

Cer tai nl y

onl y

a mnor i t y of

t he

pl anes appear ed i n combat

Poss i bl y

t he r emai nder wer e l o s t i n

t r a n s i t f r o m

factory t o combat bases

dest r oyed

on

t he f i e l d s or

gr ounded

because

of shor tage

of gasol i ne or p i l o t s

Concei vabl y

some

ar e

p a r t s

of

an i n f l a t i o n

of

German pr oducti on f i g u r e s The

answer

not

c l ear

The more

have

been

asked

about

these

t hi n gs

the

c l ear e r

t hey

become

Goer i ng t o Sur vey

I nter r ogator s

Af t er Sept ember German

a i r c r a f t pr oducti on

decl i ned

gr adual l y

u n t i l December when 3 155

pl anes

wer e

accepted and i n J anuar y

9


25/126

1945

because

of

t he

shor t age of

ga s ol i ne pr oduct i on

of

al l

except

j et

t ypes

was v i r t u a l l y

di scont i nued

he j et pl anes especi al l y t he

ME-262

wer e

t he

most modern pl anes

whi ch

any

bel l i ge r ent

had

i n gener al

oper at i on

at

t he

end

of

t he

war

Accor di ng t o

manuf act ur er s

and ot her

compet ent

observers

t h e i r pr oduct i on w s

del ayed because

of

t he f a i l u r e

of t he

Luf t waf f e t o

r ecogni ze

i n t i me

t he

advant ages

of t he type

t

was

a l s o

del ayed

because

H i t l e r

i nt er vened

i n

1944 w t h an i l l t i med

order

t o

conver t t he

ME-262

t o

a

f i ght er - bomber

V i r t u a l l y

every manuf act ur er pr oduct i on

o f f i c i a l and ai r f o r c e gener al i nt er r ogat ed by

t he

Sur vey

i ncl udi ng

Goer i ng hi msel f

cl ai med

t o have

been

appal l ed

by t h i s order By

May

1945

1 400

j e t s

had been pr oduced Had these

pl anes

been

a v a i l a b l e s i x mont hs e a r l i e r w t h good qual i t y p i l o t s

t hough

they

mght not

have a l t e r e d

t he course of t he

war

they

woul d have

shar pl y

i ncr eased

t he

l os s es

of t he a t t a c k i ng f o r c es

At every conver sat i on w t h

t he

Fuehr er used t o a s k

When

w i l l

t he

Luf t waf f e

ar r i ve?

Kessel r i ng t o Sur vey I nt er r ogat or s

TheAttack

on

Oi l

Wt h

t he

r educt i on

of

German ai r power oi l bec me

t he

p r i o r i t y

t a r g e t

i n

t he German economy

he bomber force f or sever al

mont hs had

been adequat e

f o r

t he

t a s k

pr el i mnar y a t t a c k

was

l aunched on May 12 1944 f ol l owed by anot her

on

May

28

t he

mai n

bl ow w s

not

s t r u c k however unt i l af t er D- day

I n

t he

mont hs

bef or e

D- day and

f o r

a

shorter

per i od

i mmedi at el y

f ol l ow ng

al l

av ai l ab l e

ai r

power

based

on

Engl and

w s

devot ed

t o

i ns ur i ng t h e success

of

t he

i nvasi on

V i r t u a l l y compl et e

r ecor ds of

t he Germanoi l i ndust r y

wer e

t aken

by t he Sur vey

I n addi t i on

maj or

p l ant s

t ha t wer e subj ect t o a t t a c k

and

t h e i r records

wer e

st udi ed

i n

det ai l

heGerman oi l

suppl y

was

t i g h t t hr oughout t he war

and

w s a

c o n t r o l l i n g

f a c t o r

i n

mi l i t a r y

oper at i ons he chi ef

sour ce of

20


26/126

suppl y

and

t he onl y source f o r av i a t i on

gas o l i ne

was

13

s ynt het i c

p l ant s t oget her

w t h a smal l

pr oduct i on f r om

t h r e e addi t i ona l ones

t ha t s t a r t e d

operat i ons

i n

1944

The

maj or

sources

of

product s

r ef i ned f r om

crude

oi l wer e

t h e P l oes t i

oi l

f i e l d s

i n Rumani a

and

t he

Hungar i an

f i e l d s

whi ch

t oget her

account ed f o r about a quar t er of

t he

t o t a l

suppl y of

l i q u i d

f u e l s i n

1943

I n

addi t i on t her e

was

a

smal l

but

s i g n i f i c a n t

Aust r i an

and

domest i c

pr oduct i on

The

r e f i n e r i e s

at P l oes t i

wer e

a t t a c k e d

begi nni ng w t h

a dar i ng

and

c o s t l y l ow l evel at t ac k i n August 1943 These

had

onl y l i m t e d

e f f e c t s

d e l i v e r i e s

i ncr eased

u n t i l

Apr i l

1944

when

t he

attacks

wer e

r es umed

The 1944 a t t a c k s t oget her w t h

m ni ng

of

t he

Danube

mat er i a l l y r educed Rumani an d e l i v e r i e s

I n

August

1944

Russi an

occupat i on

el i m nat ed

t h i s

sour ce of suppl y

and

dependence on t he

s ynt het i c

p l ant s

became even g r e a t e r

t han bef or e

Pr oduct i on

f r om

t he s y nt het i c p l ant s decl i ned

s t e a d i l y and by

J u l y

1944

every

maj or

pl ant

had been hi t

These p l ant s

wer e

pr oduci ng

an

aver age

of 316 000

t ons

per

month

when

t he

attacks

began Thei r pr oduct i on f e l l

t o

107 000

t ons i n J une and 17 000

t ons i n Sept ember Out put of av i a t i on

gasol i ne f r om

s ynt het i c

pl ant s

dr opped

f r om

175 000 t ons

i n

Apr i l

t o

30 000 t ons i n

J u l y

and

5 000 t ons i n Sept ember Pr oduct i on

recovered

somewhaf

i n

November

and

December

but f or t he

r e s t

of

t he year

was

but a

f r a c t i o n

of pre-attack

out put

The

Ger mans

vi ewed

t he a t t a c k s as c at as t r ophi c

I n a

s e r i e s

of

l e t t e r s t o

i t l er among

document s sei zed by

t he

Sur vey i n

devel opi ng c r i s i s out l i ned

mont h by month i n det ai l On J une

30

Speer wr ot e

The

enemy

has

succeeded

i n i ncr easi ng

our

l o s s es of

a v i a t i o n

gasol i ne up t o 90

per cent

by J une 22d Onl y t hr ough

speedy r ecover y of

damaged

pl ant s

has

t been possi bl e t o r egai n

p a r t l y some

of t he

t e r r i b l e l os s es

.

The

t one

of

t he

l e t t e r t h a t

f ol l owedwas

s i m l a r

s i n

t he case of bal l - bear i ngs

and

a i r c r a f t

t he

ermans t ook

t he

most

ener get i c s t e p s t o r epai r and

reconstruct

t he

oi l

pl ant s

Anot her

czar was

appoi nt ed

t h i s t i me Edmund

Gei l enberg

and

agai n

an

over r i di ng

p r i o r i t y on

men and mat er i al s

was i ssued

2


27/126

Gei l enber g used

as

many

as

350, 000men

f o r t he

r e pai r

r ebui l di ng,

and di s per s a l

of

t he

bombed

p l ant s

and

f o r

newunder gr ound

const r uct i on

The

s ynt het i c

oi l

p l ant s

wer e

vast

compl ex

s t r u c t u r e s

and they

coul d

not

be e a s i l y

br oken

up

and

di sper sed The

pr ogr ams of

d i s per s a l

and under gr ound const r uct i on t h a t

wer e

under t aken wer e

i ncompl et e

when

t he

war ended

The

s ynt het i c

oi l

pl ant s

wer e br ought back

i n t o p a r t i a l

pr oduct i on

and i n

r emar kabl y short

t i me

But

unl i ke

t he

bal l - bear i ng

p l ant s

as

soon as

t hey

wer e br ought

back t hey

wer e attacked

agai n

The

s t o r y

of

Leuna

s

i l l u s t r a t i v e

Leuna

was

t he

l a r ges t

of

t he s ynt het i c

p l ant s and pr ot ect ed

by a hi ghl y

e f f e c t i v e smoke

screen

and

t he

heavi est f l ak

concent r at i on

i n Eur ope

Ai r

cr ews

vi ewed

a

mssi on

t o Leuna

as

t he

most

danger ous

and

d i f f i c u l t

assi gnment

of

t he

ai r

war Leuna was hi t on May

12

and

put

out of

pr oduct i on

However ,

i nv es t i ga t i on

of

pl ant r ecor ds and i nt er r ogat i on

of

Leuna s

o f f i c i a l s

es t abl i s hed

t h a t

a

force of several t housand men had t i n

par t i a l

oper at i on i n about

10

days t was

agai n

hi t onMay 28

but r esumed

par t i al

pr oduct i on on J une

3

and reached 75

per cent

of capaci t y i n

e a r l y

J u l y

t was hi t

agai n

on J u l y

7

and

agai n

shut down

but

pr oduct i on

s t a r t e d

2

days l a t e r and reached 53

per cent of

capaci t y

on

J u l y

19 nattack on

J u l y

20

shut

t h e p l ant

down

agai n

but onl y

f or t h r e e days

by

J u l y 27

pr oduct i on

was back t o 35

per cent

of

capaci t y

At t acks

on

J u l y

28

and

29

cl osed t he pl ant

and

f u r t h e r

a t t a c k s on

August

24

Sept ember

11

Sept ember

13 Sept ember 28

and

Oct ober 7 kept t cl osed down

However , euna

got

s t a r t e d

agai n on Oct ober 14

and

al t hough pr oduct i on

was

i nt er r upt ed by a

smal l r a i d on

November

2

t reached

28 per cent of

capaci t y by

November

20 Al t hough t h e r e wer e

6

more

heavy a t t a c k s

i n

November

and

ecember

l a r gel y i nef f ec t i v e because

of

adverse

weat her ,

pr oduct i on

was

br ought

up

t o

15 percent of

capaci t y

i n

J anuar y

and was mai nt ai ned at t h a t

l ev el

u n t i l near l y t he

end

of

t he

war From

he

f i r s t

a t t a c k

t o

t he end,

pr oduct i on at

euna aver aged

9

per cent

of capaci t y

Ther e

wer e

22 a t t a c k s

on

Leuna, 20 by

t he

Ei ght h Ai r Force

and by

t he

R F

ue t o

t he ur gency

of keepi ng

t h i s

pl ant

out of pr oduct i on, many

of t h e s e mssi ons wer e

di spat ched i n d i f f i c u l t bombi ng

weat her

Consequent l y,

t he or der


28/126

of

bombi ng accuracy

on Leuna was

not

hi gh a s compar ed wi t h

o t h e r

t a r g e t s

Town

t he

b a t t l e wi t h Leuna

a

t o t a l

of 6 552

bomber

s o r t i e s

wer e

f l own

a ga i ns t t he pl a nt

18 328

t ons

of

bombs

wer e

dr opped and

an ent i r e

year

was r equi r ed

Today we

have

f i ni shed rebui l di ng the

pl a nt s and t omor r ow

t he

bomber s

w i l l

come

agai n

Sayi ng a t t r i but e d t o

German

wor ker s engaged i n

r ebui l di ng

s y nt het i c

o

pl a nt s

Consumpt i on

of

oi l exceeded pr oduct i on

f r o mMay 1944 on

Accumul at ed s t o c k s wer e r api dl y used up

and

i n

s i x mont hs wer e

p r a c t i c a l l y

exhaust ed The

l o s s

of oi l pr oduct i on

was

shar pl y f e l t

by

t he

ar med

f o r c e s

I n August

t he

f i n a l

r un i n t i me

f or a i r c r a f t

engi nes

was

cut

f r o mt wo

hours

t o

one hal f

hour

For

l ack

of

f u e l

p i l o t

t r a i n i n g

pr ev i ous l y cut

down

was

f u r t h e r c u r t a i l e d

Thr ough

t he

summer

t he movement

of German

Panzer

Di vi si ons

i n

t he

f i e l d

was hamper ed

more

and

more

s e r i ous l y

a s

a

r e s u l t

of

l o s s e s i n

combat and mount i ng

t r anspor t at i on d i f f i c u l t i e s t oget her wi t h

t he

f a l l

i n f uel pr oduct i on

y

December accor di ng t o

Speer t he

f ue l

shortage had r eached

cat ast r ophi c pr opor t i ons When

t he

ermans

l aunched t hei r count er of f ensi ve

on ecember 16

1944

t hei r

r eser ves

of

f uel

wer e

i ns uf f i c i ent t o

suppor t

t he

oper at i on

They

count ed

on

capt ur i ng

Al l i ed

stocks Fai l i ng i n t hi s many panzer

uni t s wer e l o s t

when

t hey

r an out of

gasol i ne I n Febr uar y and

Mar ch of 1945

t he

ermans massed

1 200

t anks on

t he

Bar anov

br i dgehead a t

t he Vi stul a

t o

check t he

Russi ans

They wer e

i mmobi l i zed f or

l ack

of

gasol i ne and overrun

Further

D vi dends f rom

he Oi l ttack

The a t t a c k on

t he

s y nt het i c

oi l

pl a nt s was a l s o

f ound

t o

have

c o s t

ermany t

s y nt he t i c

ni t r ogen

and

met hanol

suppl y and

a

consi der abl e

p a r t

of

t

r ubber suppl y

2

3


29/126

Germany,

l i k e

ot her

i n d u s t r i a l

c oun t r i e s

r e l i e d on

s yn t h e s i s f o r

i t s

suppl y of ni t rogen

and

t he

s ynt he t i c

oi l

pl ant s

were

by

f a r

t he

l a r g es t

producers

Si xt y percent of t he

ni t rogen

product i on

and

percent of t he met hanol

product i on came f r omt wo

s yn t he t i c pl ant s

Mont hl y out put of s yn t he t i c

ni t rogen i n

e a r l y 1944, bef ore t he

s ynt he t i c

pl a n t s were a t t a c k e d

was

about 75, 000

t ons

t had

been

reduced

by

t he

end

of t he year

t o

about 20, 000

t o n s

Ni t rogen,

besi des bei ng i ndi spensabl e f or expl osi ves,

i s

heavi l y

used

i n

ermanag r i c u l t u r e

Al l ocat i on

f or

t he

1943- 44

crop year

was 54

percent of t he

t o t a l suppl y a l l o c a t i o n

f o r 1944- 45

was f i r s t

pl anned

at

25 percent

and l a t e r

el i mnat ed

al t oget her Ni t r ogen

f o r

muni t i ons was

mai nt ai ned

by reduci ng

t he

a l l oc a t i on t o ag r i c u l t u r e

but

by

t he

end of 1944 t h i s cushi on

has

been s u b s t a n t i a l l y

exhaust ed The

suppl y of

expl osi ves

t hen decl i ned w t h

t he

reduct i on i n

suppl y of

ni t rogen t became

necessary

t o i l l

s h e l l s

w t h a

mxture

of expl os i ves

and

non- expl osi ve

rock

s a l t

ext ender

There

was

a

general

shor t age of

ammuni t i on

on al l f r o n t s at

t he

end

of t he

war

There

was an

equal l y

s e r i ous short age

of

f l a k

ammuni t i on

u n i t s manni ng

f l a k

guns were i n s t r uc t e d not

t o

f i r e

on

pl anes unl ess

t hey

were

at t acki ng

t he

i n s t a l l a t i o n s whi ch

t he guns

were

s p e c i f i c a l l y

desi gnat ed

t o

prot ect

and

unl ess t hey were

s u r e

of

h i t t i n g t he pl anes

t i s

of

some

i n t e r e s t

t h a t

a

f ew

weeks

bef ore

t he

cl ose

of

h o s t i l i t i e s t he Germans real l ocat ed

ni t rogen

t o ag r i c u l t u r e

at t he

expense

of

ammuni t i on

Thi s

was t he r e s u l t

accordi ng

t o

Product i on M ni st er Speer, of an i ndependent deci si on

of

hi s own

t h a t

t he

war

was l o s t

and

t he

next year ' s crop shoul d be prot ect ed

Met hanol

product i on, necessary among ot her t hi ngs f o r TNT

hexogen

and

ot her

hi gh expl osi ves, was

a s

severel y af f ect ed as

ni t rogen

product i on

Al l ocat i ons

t o t he pr i nc i pa l

consumers

was

heavi l y

c u t and event ual l y

t he

product i on

of

hexogen

was

abandoned

The l o s s

of

met hanol coupl ed w t h

t he

reduct i on i n

ni t rogen

was f ol l owed by a p r e c i p i t a t e

decl i ne

i n

product i on

of

expl osi ves

The

s ynt he t i c

rubber

i ndust ry a l s o

s u f f e r e d

f r om

t he

a t t a c k on

oi l

f f i c i a l

ermanrecords

on rawmat er i al suppl i es show t h a t

2


30/126

s t o c k pi l es

of

r ubber

wer e

smal l

at

t he begi nni ng

of

t he war at t he

most s u f f i c i e n t

f or onl y two

or

t h r e e mont hs consumpt i on

I mpor t s

through

t he bl ockade

wer e

uni mpor t ant

The

suppl y

came

f r o m

f our

s yn t h e t i c p l an t s

one

of

whi ch was

a smal l

p i l o t pl an t

and

t wo

addi t i onal p l a n t s

wer e

under const r ucti on

dur i ng

t he

war

One

of

t he maj or pl ant s

l ocat ed

at

Huel s

was attacked as a

pr i mar y

t a r g e t

by

t he

Ei ghth Ai r

Force

i n J une 1943 and

cl osed f o r

a

mont h r equi r ed

three mont hs

t o

get

back

t o 72

percent of

capaci t y and

seven mont hs

t o

get

back

t o f u l l pr oduct i on

However

operated

on

gas

f r o m

s ynt he t i c oi l

pl an t s

i n

t he

Ruhr

when these

wer e knocked

out

i n

t he summer of 1944

pr oduct i on was

agai n

r educed s u b s t a n t i a l l y

Pr oduct i on

at

Schkopau t h e l a r g es t of

t he

s yn t he t i c r ubber

pl ant s was l o s t because

was dependent

on

hydr ogen f r om Leuna

I nvest i gat i on of

t he t wo r emai ni ng

p l an t s

r eveal ed

t h a t

pr oduct i on

was

l a r g e l y

el i m nated

because of

a t t a c k s

on

oi l

pl an t s

of

whi ch

they

wer e

a

part

By

t he

end

of

1944 ov er a l l

s t a t i s t i c s

f o r t he

i ndust r y showt h a t pr oduct i on of

s yn t he t i c r ubber

had been

r educed

t o 2 000 tons

a

month or about one- si xth

t he

war t i me

peak Had

t he

war cont i nued Ger many s r ubber

p o s i t i o n

woul d have

become c r i t i c a l No i ndi cati on was f ound however

t h a t

t he

r ubber shortage had become

a l i m t i n g

f a c t o r

of t he

German

ar my

bef or e

t he

war ended

Except

f o r

oi l

and

associ at ed

n i t r ogen

met hanol

and

r ubber

pr oduct i on no p a r t s of

t he

German chem cal i ndust r y wer e

a

pr i or i t y t a r get

of t he Combi ned

Bomber Of f ensi ve

Steel

By

m d- 1944

t he

ai r

war

had

entered a

new

phase

I t s

most

i mpor t ant f e a t u r e apart f r o m

mast er y

of t he

a i r was

t he g r e a t l y

i ncreased

wei ght of t he a t t a c k

t h a t

coul d be

br ought t o

bear

i n

t he

second hal f

of 1944 481 400

tons

of bombs

wer e

dr opped on

Germany

as compar ed

w t h 150 700

i n

al l 1943

The

R F

and

t he

Uni t ed

S t a t e s

rmy

Ai r

Forces

dur i ng

t h i s

per i od

wer e t eamed

i n

a


31/126

f u l l y

coor di nat ed

of f ensi ve and

t he R

was r et ur ni ng

t o

t h e at t ac k

of

s p e c i f i c

i ndus t r i al t a r get s

t a r g et t hat

was attacked

wi t h

poor

r e s u l t s

i n

1943

mght

have

yi el ded

maj or

r e t u r n s

i n

1944

f o r t he

si mpl e r eason

t ha t an

a t t a c k

i n

1944

was

c e r t a i n

t o be enor mous l y

heavi er

W t h

i mpr oved bombi ng

t echni ques

t was a l s o l i k e l y t o

be consi der abl y more accurate

I ncr eased

wei ght

was

a

maj or

f e a t u r e of

t he

r a i ds t h a t

reduced

t he German

s t e e l i ndust r y

Germany began

t he

war wi t h appr oxi mat el y

23 000 000

met r i c

tons

per year of

s t e e l

c ap ac i t y

about 9

per cent of

whi ch was i n

t he

Ruhr

The

1940

v i c t o r i e s

added

anot her

17 000 000

tons

pr i nc i p a l l y i n Lor r ai ne Bel gi um and Luxembourg

However

o f f i c i a l records and

those

of

t he

i ndust r y

f o r t he

war

y e a r s

suppl ement ed

by i n t er r ogat i on show t ha t t he 40 0

USSBS, Summary Report, European and Pacific War

Documents