Master’s Degree Thesis Thesis Supervisor: Ylva Ekström Department of Informatics and Media Use of New Media during the Kenya Elections Master’s Thesis submitted to the Department of Informatics and Media at Uppsala University, in June 2013, in order to obtain a Master’s Degree in Social Science with a specialization in Media and Communication Studies. Christa Odinga 19850502-2981
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Master’s Degree Thesis
Thesis Supervisor: Ylva Ekström
Department of Informatics and Media
Use of New Media during the Kenya Elections
Master’s Thesis submitted to the Department of Informatics and Media at Uppsala
University, in June 2013, in order to obtain a Master’s Degree in Social Science with a
specialization in Media and Communication Studies.
Christa Odinga
19850502-2981
2
“Torturing bodies is less effective than shaping minds.”
(Castells 2007a, 238)
Abstract
This master’s thesis contributes to the development of Manuel Castells theory of
power and counter-power. The theoretical framework also consists of current
research within the area of new media in the promotion of democratic action. The
thesis looks into the emergence and development of new media during the
2007/2008 post-election violence and the progression made within the social
media realm in terms of information dissemination and monitoring of speech
online during the 2013 election through the use of social media together with open
source software for information collection and dissemination.
The aim of this thesis is to illustrate, using the Kenyan case, the power of the
masses and how this power can be exercised for both good and evil. The thesis
looks into the role of social media during the post-election violence in 2007/2008
and the elections of 2013. The main source of information is through primary and
secondary data. Particular emphasis is given to tools of social media and the
manner in which interaction took place in these platforms. Analysis is conducted
on the amalgamation of citizen journalism and how this offered an alternative
medium for communication for citizens.
The thesis concludes that there is indeed power in mass communication online
to drive mass action. New media increased political participation and dialogue in
the Kenyan case that was not present before and in turn empowered Kenyans to
take part in political processes but it cannot be said that it increased the level of
democratization.
Key words: New media, Democratization, Power and Counter-power, Hate-
1.2 Methodology and Material ................................................................................. 2
1.3 Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................... 4 1.3.1 The context of Castell’s theory .................................................................. 5
for the eviction of other ethnic communities from a particular area. It was noted
that that there was a difficulty in monitoring such local vernacular stations since
the language used was often quite subtle and obscure (IRINnews 2013).
According to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR)
which monitored hate speech in the countdown to the elections, there were some
obvious claims such as on Kass FM, there were references to the need for "people
of the milk" to "cut grass" and complaints that the mongoose has come and
"stolen our chicken". The Kalenjin call themselves people of the milk because
they are pastoralists by tradition and the mongoose is a reference to Kikuyus who
have bought land in Rift Valley. On another occasion, a caller emphasized the
need to “get rid of weeds”, which could be interpreted as a reference to non-
Kalenjin ethnic groups (IRINnews 2013).
Vernacular music played on the radio stations were also used to raise ethnic
tensions. The two Kikuyu stations, Kameme and Inooro, played songs "talking
very badly about beasts from the west", a veiled reference to opposition leader
Raila Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) colleagues, who
come from western Kenya and in retaliation, the Radio Lake Victoria played a
Luo-language song which referred to "the leadership of baboons". By allowing
such sentiments to be voiced on air, observers mentioned that they eventually
earn some degree of legitimacy that can be used to justify attacks on other ethnic
groups (IRINnews 2013).
Given the role that hate speech is believed to have played in inciting violence
in 2007 – radio executive Josua Arap Sang is one of four people currently indicted
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by the ICC for the violence – monitoring of hate speech in the media, particularly
on the radio had been planned well in advance. Kenya’s National Cohesion and
Integration Commission, for example, developed guidelines for media houses on
hate speech and engaged directly with them to encourage more “peaceful
reporting,” deploying monitors to watch and listen to the news for inciting
language. In tandem with such efforts, another Ushahidi endeavor emerged:
Umati, “crowd” in Kiswahili, is a project designed using a methodology
developed by Dr Susan Benesch of American University to define and monitor
“dangerous speech online.” When Umati finds incidents of what is considered to
be “extremely dangerous speech,” it is passed along to the authorities and added
to the Uchaguzi map (Marchant 2013).
As much as social media might be on the forefront of the shift towards
participatory political culture, established media outlets still have a more
prominent presence also online (Loader and Mercea 2011). According to data
collected during a period of a month before to after the elections, the highest
number of impressions on Twitter were from the prominent media organizations
these being Aljazeera with 1,10379719 impressions followed by BBCWorld,
BBCAfrica and a number of local and international media organizations.
During the first quarter of 2013, Google was actively involved in leveraging
its social media platform, Google+, to promote access to information useful to the
electorate, and to drive peace and goodwill messages. Google Kenya collaborated
with the United Nations System in Kenya, and other partners to encourage
Kenyans to ‘Shabikia Amani na Kura Yako’ (Support Peace with Your Vote),
using Google+ Hangouts as a cornerstone for the campaign. The national
interactive campaign was aimed at engagingKenyans to promote peace before,
during and after the March 4, 2013 general election. Sports personalities from
football, rugby and athletics, took part in the campaign, dubbed the “Sports 4
Peaceful Elections” campaign using Google+ Hangouts as the main social media
platform. The initiative came after Google Kenya launched its elections hub, a
portal where voters, journalists and campaigns were able to easily track news,
trends information related to the elections, and its elections YouTube channel,
which allowed Kenyans to follow the latest news and trends on the political scene,
and engage with each other (Techmoran 2013).
According to Umati, a project launched by Ushahidi to monitor and report the
role of new media in the election, found that majority of the people that were
considered to have used hate speech and incitement were people that could easily
be identified meaning these people left comments Facebook posts, online news
articles, forums and blog posts and often used their own names or in some cases
pseudo names. The lack of caution when speaking online, according to Umati,
suggests that the speakers did not consider the impact of their statements.
Majority of the statements were of a discriminatory nature towards other tribes,
religion and political parties (Umati Project Team 2012).
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Figure 7.(Umati Project Team 2012).
According to Figure 6, identifiable commentators showed a clear lead with
statements that exhibited a call to kill another group; this was interesting because
the most serious call of action was highest among speakers that could be
identified either by their Facebook names or pseudonames used on public blogs
and forums. Umati goes further in their report to mention that anonymous
commenters reduced as the severity of hate speech increased with the number of
identifiable commenters increasing with the severity of hate speech. This can tell
us that as much as social media may be deemed to provide an opportunity of
anonymity, this is not necessarily the case in other part of the world (Umati
Project Team 2012) .
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Picture 1. (Gado 2013)
Many online comments featured derogatory metaphors historically used to belittle
members of other tribes (Pflanz 2013).
Table 4. (Kretchun 2013).
The hate speech statements and calls for action collected by Umati that required
intervention, were forwarded to Uchaguzi, the multi-stakeholder initiative
coordinated through an ICT platform built by Ushahidi, which enables Kenyans to
keep an eye on the vote and provide avenues through which they can report any
incidences significant to the elections (Umati 2013).
Umati and other similar organizations also mobilized in a more engaged way
to disseminate messages of peace in online and other creative platforms both
before and after the election. An organization called Youth Agenda encouraged
voters to select candidates based on issues instead of along tribal lines by
disseminated SMS messages leading up to the vote, and PeaceTXT in
collaboration with its field partner Sisi Ni Amani (“We Are Peace”) monitored
SMS rumors of hate and engaged to disseminate messages correcting them and
promoting peace. Flashcast Kenya, probably the most innovative of the three,
used its “location-aware dynamically refreshing text displays” in buses and
mobilized them to display texts for peace that riders could submit via SMS. These
texts can also be seen on their Facebook page or aggregated on the FlashCast
Peace Feed website and Twitter feed (Marchant 2013).
During the hate speech-monitoring period, some questions arose over the
viability of the hate speech monitoring when social media has led to the
identification of MP Ferdinand Waititu as an alleged inciter of ethnic violence
through a popular video clip taken by a rally witness on his mobile phone. And
yet, he remained the candidate for the governorship of Nairobi. This raised the
question on whether there is any tangible point of monitoring hate speech if the
government would not do anything with the information (Hopkins 2013).
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4.3 The Power of Mass Self- Communication
Whether overlooked internationally or not, Kenyans were indeed extremely vocal
and frequently creative on social media throughout the election. Besides elections
related news, Kenyans on Twitter took issue with a CNN reported indicating that
Kenyans were once again preparing for violence ahead of the election reminiscent
of 2007. In fact, much of the international media coverage leading up to the
election had indeed been focused on such “ethnic tension” and the likelihood of
violence. Kenyans took issue with this characterization, not because there was no
such tension, but because of the lack of coverage of the peace promoting
initiatives that had been created to combat such tension that many saw as an
integral part of the reality on the ground (Marchant 2013).
Aside from Kenyans were seen to be very vocal in preserving the country’s
image especially when it came to articles written by foreign journalists that may
have depicted the country in a negative manner. The online community witnessed
massive online attacks from the Kenya Twitter community. The most popular
cyber attack led to the resurgence of the #someoneTellCNN hashtag was a top
trending topic on Twitter which was targeted at a journalist who aired a segment
on a bus station bombing with the graphic ‘violence in Kenya’. Twitter users in
Kenya complained so loudly about the allegedly misleading banner that the
hashtag trended worldwide and CNN’s David Mckenzie apologized for the
graphic (Dewey 2013).
Picture 2. (Dewey 2013).
#picturesforStuart which took an aim at Stuart Norval an anchor on France 24
who tweeted of ‘dramatic pictures’ of ‘huge crowds falling over each other to
vote’ Kenyans tweeted back their own ‘dramatic pictures’ (Dewey 2013).
Picture 3. (Dewey 2013).
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An examples of some of the retaliations to the tweet are:
Picture 4 (Dewey 2013)
Picture 5. (Dewey 2013)
Other popular hashtags targeting foreign media were #someonetellBBC,
#someonetellFrance24, #someonetellBotswana and #someonetellNigeria (Umati
2013)
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These different strategies of counter power witnessed indeed confirms Castells
theory that states that counterpower is exercised in the network society by fighting
to change the programs of specific networks and by theeffort to disrupt the
switches that reflect dominant interests, in this case the western media, and
replace them with alternative switches between networks (Castells 2011, 773).
Marshall Ganz, a leading practitioner and scholar, argues that social
movements emerge as a result of the efforts of purposeful actors, in this case
being individuals and organizations, to form new relationships, assert new public
values, and mobilize political, economic, and cultural power to translate these
values into action. They differ from fashions, styles, or fads in that they are
collective, strategic and organized (Etling, Faris, and Palfrey 2010, 7).
Theorists such as Yochai Benkler provide useful language to help us begin to
understand the place of digital media in society. Benkler’s notion of the
networked public sphere describes two ways that digital technologies enable
different kinds of communication than their analog antecedents. Benkler writes,
“The first element is the shift from a hub-and-spoke architecture with
unidirectional links to the end points in the mass media, to distributed architecture
with multidirectional connections among all nodes in the networked information
environment. The second is the practical elimination of communications costs as a
barrier to speaking across associational boundaries (Goldstein and Rotich 2007,
3).
Social movements differ from mobs in a number of ways. First, they are
focused on a single, long-term goal in Kenya in 2007/2008 crisis it was focused
on providing information that the main stream media could not and in 2013 it was
focused on hate speech and creating a state of vulnerability as well as calling for
peace. Second, they may take years to achieve that goal, so they are far more
persistent and focused than smart mobs or one off political protests. Third, they
will have more identifiable leadership to drive the agenda and mobilize
participants this is evident with Ushahidi and Mashada spearheading the course of
citizen journalism (Etling, Faris, and Palfrey 2010, 8).
A question that may come up in this paper is what is then the relevance of
social media and citizen journalism in the processes of democracy? In Kenya, the
social media proved to have a remarkable role during the media ban and the
national crisis. Social media tools have opened up new possibilities for citizens to
share their views in public and discuss the situation with other citizens and people
globally. Mobile phones and Web applications have enabled many Kenyans to
contact and help relatives in risky areas (Mäkinen and Kuira 2008, 333).
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5 Conclusion
To many in the developed world, the ‘networked public sphere’ connotes the
potential for a more plentiful public discourse, increased transparency, and
positive cooperation of all kinds. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, where artificial
borders and legacies of ethnic strife have yet to solidify many countries into
nations, the narrative is more complicated (Goldstein and Rotich 2007, 9).
Social media tools supplement, rather than replace, conventional media.
Because they serve as channels of expression that could not be easily controlled
by the ruling power, they widen and diversify public discussion. They offer
critical assessments and unmediated perspectives (Mäkinen and Kuira 2008, 333).
However, the issue of whether discussions flowing from the grassroots affect
power and the state of democracy remains unexplored.
In the evolution of the Kenyan media, it is clear that it was not only limited to
covering the election campaign and informing the citizens. Certain groups or
editorials clearly took sides with the candidates in the race. Newspapers and
radios were seen to be created by political parties to offer support to their
candidates.
During the 2007/2008 and 2013 elections period, web traffic vastly increased
and bloggers reached even further audiences when the main stream media picked
up on their publications and relayed them on radio. We see social media and blogs
during the two incidents being used as spaces for discussion.
New ICT’s have been seen to offer political actors direct contact with citizens
and thereby an advantage over existing or traditional media. This in Kenya was
especially evident for smaller and less established parties and those that did not
receive as much attention in the mass media. We see citizen journalism through
social media as an important means of information dissemination in both election
periods (Römmele 2003, 9).
However the question still lies on whether digital technology matters in the
struggle for democracy. The crises in Kenya both in 2008 and the elections in
2013 are an insight in the emerging power of new media tools. In the Kenyan
context, whether aspiring to promote an ethnic-based hate crime or a global
human rights campaign, the Internet and mobile phones have lowered the barriers
to participation and increased opportunities for many-to-many communication.
Clay Shirky gets to the heart of the matter: “The current change, in one sentence,
is this: most of the barriers to group action have collapsed, and without those
barriers, we are free to explore new ways of gathering together and getting things
done.” However, the effectiveness of social media to actually bring about social
change is highly contested (Goldstein and Rotich 2007, 9; Haider 2011).
The Kenyan 2013 elections, was a sign that although social media allows for
the development of community and collective identity at low cost, this does not
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necessarily translate into street action, which is necessary for the success of a
protest movement. New technologies might actually make citizens more passive,
‘by leading them to confuse online rhetoric with substantial political action,
diverting their attention away from productive activities’ Instead of attending
meetings, workshops and rallies, uncommitted individuals can join a Facebook
group or follow a Twitter feed at home. This may not motivate them to leave the
comfort of their homes to join the chaos of street action (Haider 2011, 5).
Looking at the case study, we can agree with Castells that the emergence of
mass self-communication offers an extraordinary medium for social movements
and rebellious individuals to build their autonomy. In this case we see social
media as a medium and not simply a tool and it is a social construction with its
own implication. In addition to this, through the increase of people partaking in
hate speech, we see that the public sphere becomes an increasingly contested
terrain as it is not only defined as a space for communication but also a space in
which a new form of society is given birth and as all other societies, through
conflict, struggle, pain and often violence (cf. Castells 2007a, 249, 258).
Due to the high level of participation in the social media arena before and
during the elections, we can say that the internet to some degree acts as an arena
for political participation especially for those people who would otherwise be
unengaged in politics. Given the evidence that that social media is especially
popular amongst younger people in Kenya, ages 25 – 34, we can conclude that
social groups that would otherwise be politically marginalized are more likely to
become active through the internet and that their political actions would most
likely unfold on social media platforms (Loader and Mercea 2011, 764– 765).
In this study, we have witnessed the internet’s ability in allowing new voices
to enter the debate by reducing the influence of gatekeepers and by permitting the
rise of citizen journalists to engage in previously expensive journalistic,
transparency, or fact-checking endeavors. Bloggers, online forums and other
forms of new media have been seen to provide alternative sources of news and
information. During the elections, we witnessed more voices on more alternative
platforms enabling citizens to criticize the government leaders and policies.
However, the issue of whether discussions flowing from the grassroots affect
power and the state of democracy remains unexplored. Ideally, social media tools
could increase transparency in politics and enhance citizens’ participation through
enabling people to follow decision-making processes and hold discussions about
issues of common concern. For most Kenyans, however, tapping the Internet for
the latest news in crisis is not a real option. Internet access is prohibitively
expensive for the majority. There is a need for making new media tools more
accessible to those who are less fortunate (Etling, Faris, and Palfrey 2010, 3;
Mäkinen and Kuira 2008, 333).
After analysis of the data collected, I feel, at least in the Kenyan case, social
media had a limited potential for democratic innovation. The activities online
were not as different as the activities offline. It is easy to reject the democratic
potential of social media in the case of the Kenya elections especially since social
media only seemed to spread hate speech thus negative campaigning and
extremism resulting into the sensationalization of the public sphere. Moreover we
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see, the network individualism which characterizes social media is regarded as
further evidence of the social fragmentation which is seen as corroding collective
action and social responsibility (Loader and Mercea 2011, 761–762).
Divisions in the Kenyan media have become blurred with the mainstream
media increasingly reliant on political blogs and citizens user content almost
lending to the claim that social movements are beginning to stand in a more equal
footing with media organizations in their capacity to depict their actions in their
own desired light. The Kenyan case also raises questions about the role of the
media in fragile states. It is clear that some parts of the local language media
played a role in fanning tension and violence. It is also unrealistic to hold the
media in Kenya up to a set of ideal standards that exist nowhere else. Most media
in most societies are politically biased or aligned in some way (Loader and
Mercea 2011, 762 – 763; Ismail and Deane 2008, 326).
Far from all Kenyans are online, but already millions of citizens are debating
using social media. As long as journalists actively follow it, the social media
debate can always feed into traditional print and broadcast media coverage and
reach a wider part of the population. More and more people, however, go online
to voice their opinions and we’ve seen far from the full magnitude of the social
media phenomenon in Kenya (Orring 2013).
The 2013 election only proved that offline activities can be carried online. In
2007/2008 incitement to violence was conducted through mainstream media as
well as in part new media platforms however in 2013, incitement for violence was
conducted online resulting into an online battle. In this case the new media
provided a larger platform to incitement rather than democratic development.
In conclusion; A significant number of Kenyans are excluded from internet
and even though this thesis may show that there was significant activity, this was
only made by a fraction of Kenyans. I feel, putting the research conducted into
account, Castells theory of power and counter power was supported. Online
activities that are generated by mass action or communication can indeed
accumulate attention if communication is made for a similar cause. The 2013
election only proved that offline activities can be carried online.
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