Use of Honey-pots to Detect Exploited Systems Across Large Enterprise Networks Ashish Gupta Network Security May 2004 .

Use of Honey-pots to Detect Exploited Systems Across Large

Enterprise Networks

Ashish Gupta

Network Security

May 2004

http://project.honeynet.org/misc/project.html

Overview

• Motivation• What are Honeypots?

– Gen I and Gen II

• The GeorgiaTech Honeynet System– Hardware/Software– IDS– Logging and review

• Some detected Exploitations– Worm exploits– Sage of the Warez Exploit

• Words of Wisdom• Conclusions

Why Honeynets ?

An additional layer of security

Security: A serious Problem

Firewall IDS

A Traffic Cop

Problems:

Internal Threats

Virus Laden Programs

Detection and Alert

Problems:

False Positives

False Negatives

The Security Problem

Firewall IDS

HoneyNets

An additional layer of security

• Captures all inbound/outbound data

• Standard production systems

• Intended to be compromised

• Data Capture– Stealth capturing– Storage location – away from the honeynet

• Data control– Protect the network from honeynets

Two types

Gen I Gen II

Good for simpler attacks

Unsophisticated targets

Limited Data Control

Sophisticated Data Control : Stealth Fire-walling

Gen I chosen

GATech Honeynet System

Huge network

4 TB data processing/day

CONFIG Sub-standard systems

Open Source Software

Simple Firewall Data Control

IDSInvisible SNORT Monitor

Promiscuous mode

Two SNORT Sessions

Session 1 Signature Analysis Monitoring

Session 2 Packet Capture DATA CAPTURE

Data Analysis

One hour daily !

Requires human resources

Forensic Analysis

SNORT DATA CAPTURE

All packet logs stored

Ethereal used

Detected Exploitations

16 compromises detected

Worm attacks Hacker Attacks

Honey Net traffic is Suspicious

Heuristic for worm detection:Frequent port scans

Specific OS-vulnerability monitoring possible

Captured traffic helps signature development

DETECTING WORM EXPLOITS

SAGA of the WAREZ Hacker

Helped locate a compromised host

Honeynet

IIS Exploit Warez Server

+ Backdoor

Very difficult to detect otherwise !

Words of Wisdom

• Start small

• Good relationships help

• Focus on Internal attacks

• Don’t advertise

• Be prepared to spend time

Conclusion

• Helped locate compromised systems

• Can boost IDS research– Data capture

• Distributed Honey nets ?

Discussion

• The usefulness of the extra layer ?

• Dynamic HoneyNets

• Comparison with IDS: are these a replacement or complementary ?

HONEYNET

IDS