USAID/OTI MALAYSIA PROGRAM

This publication was produced by the USAID/OTI Malaysia Program – Malaysia Reform Initiative (MARI) Project under Contract NoAID-OAA-I-14-00010/7200AA19F00003 at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. This document is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author or authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the U.S. Government.

USAID/OTI MALAYSIA PROGRAM – MALAYSIA REFROM INITIATIVE (MARI)

Semi-Annual Report (October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020)

This publication was produced by the USAID/OTI Malaysia Program – Malaysia Reform Initiative (MARI) Project under Contract NoAID-OAA-I-14-00010/7200AA19F00003 at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. This document is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author or authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the U.S. Government.

USAID/OTI MALAYSIA PROGRAM – MALAYSIA REFORM INITIATIVE (MARI)

Semi-Annual Report (October 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020)

Program Title: USAID/OTI Malaysia Program

Sponsoring USAID Office: Office of Transition Initiatives

Contract Number: AID-OAA-I-14-00010/7200AA19F00003

Contractor: DAI Global, LLC

Date of Publication: April 2020

Author: DAI Global, LLC

USAID.GOV SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT (OCTOBER 1, 2019 – MARCH 31, 2020) | 2

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 3

INTRODUCTION 5

PROGRAM STRATEGY 5

POLITICAL CONTEXT 7

Progress and Challenges During PH’s Administration 7

The new government and the global PANDEMIC 9

ACTIVITIES TO HIGHLIGHT 12

Objective 1: to assist the Malaysian government in enhancing standards of transparency,

accountability, and responsiveness to the public 12

Sub-objective 1.1: Increase technical capacity of government reformers to advance democratic

reform 12

Providing technical support to government institutions 12

Communications to the People Workshop 13

Sub-objective 1.2: Strengthen coalitions of support to help government reformers prioritize

democratic change 14

Cross partisan consultations on electoral code of conduct 14

National Consultation on FOI Bill 15

Objective 2: to empower voices to engage more meaningfully on issues important to the people 16

Sub-objective 2.1: Increase target actors’ capacity to act in expanded political space 16

Transparent Consultation: Whistle-Blowing & Beneficial Ownership Forums 16

Race and Religion Commission 17

Supporting Regional CSOs to Address Corruption in Sabah and Sarawak 18

CSO Support for Parliamentary Select Committees 19

Sub-objective 2.2: Increase potential actors’ motivation to act in expanded political space 20

Seeds for Democracy Camp for Youths 20

Campus Presidential Debates 21

PROGRAM BUDGET QUICK FACTS 22

CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED 23

PROGRAM EVALUATION AND NEXT STEPS 25


ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BERSATU Parti Pribumi Bersatu

BHEUU Prime Minister’s Law Department

BN Barisan Nasional

CIJ Centre of Independent Journalism

CR Country Representative

COR Contracting Officer’s Representative

CSO Civil Society Organization

DAP Democratic Action Party

EC Election Commission

ERC Electoral Reform Committee

FOI Freedom of Information

GBM Gabungan Bertindak Malaysia

GIACC National Centre for Governance, Integrity and Anti-Corruption

IPCMC Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission

JAKIM the Religious Affairs Department

JPNIN National Unity and Integration Department

MACC Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission

MARI Malaysia Reform Initiative

MCCHR Malaysian Centre for Constitutionalism and Human Rights

MCM Ministry of Communications and Multimedia

MCO Movement Control Order

MP Member of Parliament

NSC National Security Council


NUCC National Unity Consultative Council Blueprint

PAS Malaysian Islamic Party

PH Pakatan Harapan

PKR Parti Keadilan Rakyat

PN Perikatan Nasional

PPPA Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984

PSC Parliamentary Select Committees

RPO Regional Programming Order

RTI Right to Information

SOSMA Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012

SRS Strategic Review Session

STTA Short Term Technical Assistance

SWIFT Support Which Implements Fast Transitions

UM Universiti Malaya

UMNO United Malays National Organization

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USAID/OTI USAID Office of Transition Initiatives

USG United States Government


INTRODUCTION

In October 2018, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition

Initiatives (OTI) responded to a request from the US Embassy to launch a limited engagement program

to work in partnership with Malaysian government, civil society and media counterparts to build upon

the momentum generated by the historic May 2018 elections. USAID/OTI activated the Regional

Programming Option (RPO) for Malaysia under the Kann Let OTI Burma Task Order, awarded to DAI

Global LLC under the SWIFT IV IQC. The RPO, later named the Malaysia Reform Initiative (MARI – or

“let’s go!” in Bahasa Malaysia), allowed for initial engagement and assessment of local partners, socio-

political dynamics, and operational landscape to inform a full OTI program for Malaysia, launched in

February 2019.

Through small-scale, strategically targeted assistance to local partners, MARI aims to support Malaysians’

aspiration for a more democratic society by working through three program objectives:


accountability, and responsiveness to the public

o Sub-objective 1.1: Increase technical capacity of government reformers to advance

democratic reform

o Sub-objective 1.2: Strengthen coalitions of support to help government reformers

prioritize democratic change

Objective 2: to empower voices to engage more meaningfully on issues important to the people

o Sub-objective 2.1: Increase target actors’ capacity to act in expanded political space

o Sub-objective 2.2: Increase potential actors’ motivation to act in expanded political

space

Objective 3: Other compelling activities that support the goal

MARI is implemented by DAI Global LLC under the SWIFT IV IQC and Task Order 7200AA19F00003

through January 14, 2022. As of March 31, 2020, DAI has received $7,500,000.00 in obligated funds.

PROGRAM STRATEGY

The Malaysia Reform Initiative (MARI) fosters partnerships with the Malaysian Government, civil society,

and other interested stakeholders across diverse sectors to contribute to the momentum generated by

the historic May 2018 elections. The peaceful transition of power between Prime Minister Najib Razak

and Mahathir Mohamad provided a strong example of democratic leadership in a region of the world

that has recently witnessed pronounced trends towards authoritarianism. Although Malaysia is an upper-

middle income country and not a traditional recipient of foreign assistance, the U.S. Government (USG)

and USAID recognized a timely window of opportunity to support genuine reformers both inside and

outside of government to effect changes that could have a lasting impact on Malaysia’s democracy. All


activities are developed and implemented in close collaboration with Malaysian government, civil society,

and USG partners.

From program inception through June 2019, MARI worked toward three initial key program objectives

derived from the RPO:

Support the Government’s implementation of priority reforms;

Facilitate civic engagement in the reform process;

Consolidate post-election gains for free media.

Employing OTI’s programming model of ‘Act, Assess and Adapt’, in July 2019, the MARI team

considered shifts in the political landscape and analyzed program results to date at a three-day Strategy

Review Session (SRS). The MARI team articulated a program goal and revised and condensed its three

previous program objectives into two. With the goal to support Malaysians’ aspirations for a more

democratic society, the team articulated two issue-focused (rather than actor-focused) objectives:


accountability, and responsiveness to the public

Objective 2: to empower voices to engage more meaningfully on issues important to the people

To focus efforts, the team actively pursued the following issue areas: parliamentary reform; supporting

amendments to arbitrary detention laws; labor rights; anti-corruption initiatives; and freedom of

expression and preventing government censorship of information.

In November 2019, the program held a Rolling Assessment (RA) to again assess shifts in context and activity progress, producing further-defined sub-objectives as follows:

o Sub-objective 1.1: Increase technical capacity of government reformers to advance

democratic reform

o Sub-objective 1.2: Strengthen coalitions of support to help government reformers

prioritize democratic change

o Sub-objective 2.1: Increase target actors’ capacity to act in expanded political space

o Sub-objective 2.2: Increase potential actors’ motivation to act in expanded political

space

In March 2020, the MARI team convened DAI Home Office and OTI Washington Corners with the field

team to participate in a Strategic Review Session (SRS). The team reviewed first-year activity outcomes,

analyzed achievements to date aligned with sub-objectives and considered prospective partners for

future engagement. At the SRS, the team determined it was in the best interest of the program to forgo

sub-objective 2.2 to focus on capacity building to advance political engagement.

Between the program’s inception in February 2019 and March 2020, MARI has concluded 31 activities,

continues to implement 30, and has 13 in pending status.


POLITICAL CONTEXT

During the reporting period October 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020, Malaysia faced a significant political

shift, including the resignation of Mahathir Mohamad as the Prime Minister (PM) and the collapse of the

Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition. On February 29, Muhyiddin Yassin, President of the Parti Pribumi Bersatu

(BERSATU) political party, was constitutionally appointed by the King as the 8th PM of Malaysia, leading

the new coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN). The political uncertainty is further impacted by the global

COVID19 pandemic, in which Malaysia has recorded the highest number of cases in the Southeast Asia

region. The entire country was placed under Movement Control Order (MCO), starting from March 18,

and at the time of writing, has been extended three times to May 12, 2020.

PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES DURING PH’S ADMINISTRATION

Prior to the change of government, Malaysia saw several key wins and other progress demonstrating

democratic momentum. The parliament showed commitment to a more inclusive check and balance

framework by holding five consultations with various stakeholders nationwide on the contentious

Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC) Bill, after it received resistance

from opposition lawmakers during the October 2019 parliament sitting. 37 recommended changes to the

Bill were collected by the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) for Consideration of Bills, with plans of

tabling it at the March 2020 parliamentary sitting. Although the leadership has delayed the sitting to May,

the new Minister in the PM’s Department (Parliament and Law), Takiyuddin Hassan, said that they will

review the Bill and continue to engage with relevant stakeholders.1

Gains in the government’s effort to combat corruption are reflected in Malaysia’s improvements among

global indices, including jumping nine places (up to 43 among 167 countries) in the 2019 Democracy Index

by the Economist Intelligence Unit and ten places (up to 51) in Transparency International’s Corruption

Perceptions Index (CPI). Increased public perception of public sector corruption could be attributed to

the ongoing 1Malaysia Development Bhd (1MDB) investigation, as the country watches the former PM,

Najib Razak, and his affiliates brought to trial. In January, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission

(MACC) released nine phone recordings exposing former PM Najib and high-profile individuals of

entrenched political corruption occurring throughout his tenure. Additionally, supportive statements

made by the Legal Affairs Division in the Prime Minister’s Law Department (BHEUU) in amending key

legislation prove a commitment to advancing democratic reform efforts: these include the 2010

Whistleblower Protection Act, and MACC’s ongoing efforts in enhancing transparency and accountability

among corporate ownership.

The press media gained new freedom through the repeal by the Senate of the 2018 Anti-Fake News Bill

(the second time it was tabled to the Upper House) in December 2019. Following the lack of beneficiary

power from the political party United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the oldest Malay-language

daily newspaper, Utusan, ceased operations on October 9, a direct repercussion of the dissolving political

ownership of media. Acknowledging the government’s promise for an expanded press freedom, the

Ministry of Communications and Multimedia (MCM) pushed forward the long-awaited Malaysian Media

Council by convening and appointing 17 representatives from newspapers and online media, journalist

1 “Cabinet wants IPCMC Bill reviewed before further action” (https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/03/18/cabinet-wants-ipcmc-bill-

reviewed-before-further-action


unions and associations, academics, and civil society as members of its pro-tem [sic] committee. The

committee was tasked with drafting operational guidelines, a code of ethics, and a framework of the self-

regulatory body with the aim of establishing the Media Council by the end of 2020. In tandem, CSOs and

journalist groups continue to advocate for the repeal of the Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA)

1984, in which the Home Minister is given the discretion to impose bans on media.

However, advancements were often overshadowed by the increasing racial and religious polarization,

exacerbated by government missteps and voiced opposition party resistance. For example, in October

2019, then Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad delivered a speech at the Malay Dignity Congress, jointly

organized by conservative Malay organizations and academic institutions including the Universiti Malaya

(UM). Non-Malays criticized the congress’s strong resonance with Malay supremacy and Malays found

Mahathir’s speech disparaging in its apparent attempt to foster greater unity between different classes of

the Malay community. The non-Malay political party in the PH coalition, Democratic Action Party (DAP),

sustained heavy criticism when a former member issued a comic book supporting China’s Belt and Road

Initiative. The book was distributed to select schools and later banned by the Home Ministry under the

PPPA, claiming it promotes communism and disrupts social harmony.

Following the constitutional change of the voting age from 21 to 18 in July 2019 (despite the fact that they

still cannot register to vote), university students became visibly more vocal in challenging the status quo.2

During a convocation ceremony in UM in October, an engineering graduate student publicly protested

the UM Vice Chancellor’s involvement in the Malay Dignity Congress. In response, the university lodged

a police report against the graduate and barred a fellow student supporter from receiving their graduation

scroll.3 This sparked a debate among the general public and academics on tertiary institution’s authoritative

measures and the Ministry of Education’s role in safeguarding or limiting university students’ participation

in political discourse. Further, in November’s Tun Perak debate tournament for secondary school

students, two university student debate coaches were arrested under the state’s Islamic Religious Affairs

Department for tabling religiously-controversial motions. The probing of delicate religious topics within

higher education, as well as social media regulation, caused widespread uneasiness among both Muslims

and non-Muslims students across university campuses and on social media.4

Despite the availability of alternative legislation, the government continued using controversial laws

including the 2012 Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) to address potential “terrorism.”

In October 2019, twelve individuals, including two leaders from the Chinese-majority political party DAP

and two assemblymen, were arrested over suspected links with the now defunct Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Civil society demanded authorities reveal criteria used to legitimize the arrests, as

they suspected that they were politically motivated. Requests went unanswered.5 However, the Federal

Court ruled on November 29, 2019 that judges can consider bail applications for those charged with a

terrorism-related offence, noting the judiciary is an independent arm of the government that exists to

2 However, the process could only be implemented once the Electoral Commission has established the automatic registration mechanism

online, which is still in in development. 3 The Star, Oct 15 2019. UM graduate barred from convocation for supporting protest.

https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2019/10/15/um-graduate-barred-from-convocation-for-supporting-protest 4 On February 4, Islamic Affairs Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, Mujahid Yusof Rawa, urged the Malaysian Communications and

Multimedia Commission (MCMC) to probe social media postings by controversial entrepreneur Nur Sajat, indicating that MCMC has the power to monitor and bar social media content which causes unease among Muslims. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/509454

5 SUARAM’s executive director was questioned by the Bukit Aman police on December 17 under Section 505 (b) of the Penal Code, referring

to “statements conducing to public mischief” for the forum “The LTTE conundrum and SOSMA as a draconian law” held on November 25.


check any excesses of authority by the executive branch. The Ministry of Home Affairs also announced

that they are interested in reviewing SOSMA by reducing the 28-day detention period to 14 days, followed

by possibility of 14-day extension application to the court.6

The public’s waning approval of PH was reflected in by-election losses in two federal constituencies,

Tanjung Piai and Kimanis districts. The greatest public concern regarding the government’s trajectory was

the coalition’s ambiguous plan for Prime Ministerial succession. Although the stakes at the time were

between Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) Chief Anwar Ibrahim and Minister of Economic Affairs Azmin Ali,

no successor was explicitly named, and the coalition was offered the verbal assurance that Mahathir would

step down “sometime” after the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Summit in November 2020.

Maszlee Malik’s sudden resignation from the position of the Education Minister as advised by Mahathir on

January 3, 2020 however, raised speculation of a looming Cabinet reshuffle. Throughout his term,

Maszlee’s policies, statements and actions were often clouded by criticisms of the Minister, condoning

mainstream racial sentiments from the public and from his own coalition. Mahathir took on the role of

acting Education Minister and made a unilateral decision to reinstate the policy of teaching Mathematics

and Science in English (PPSMI) without consulting the Cabinet.

Mahathir’s use of his executive power ignited criticism from his own party, signifying further entrenchment

of PH’s internal struggles.7 On February 20, news outlet Malaysiakini reported two ongoing initiatives to

secure sworn statements from PKR’s Members of Parliament (MPs), with one supporting Mahathir to

serve full term as a PM, and another reaffirming PH’s agreement on transitioning of power from Mahathir

to Anwar, illustrating inconsistency across the coalition.8

THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE GLOBAL PANDEMIC

On February 23, 131 cross-party MPs, including key players from the PH coalition, the political party Parti

Pribumi Bersatu (BERSATU), Azmin Ali and several representatives from PKR, as well as opposition parties

including Barisan Nasional (BN) and Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) attended a dinner at Sheraton Petaling

Jaya. Dubbed the “Sheraton Move,” the gathering raised the suspicion of toppling PH by creating a new

alliance. Mahathir, who did not attend the Sheraton meeting, resigned from his position as PM the next

day. Soon after, Bersatu also renounced PH affiliation, causing the ruling coalition to lose its majority in

Parliament.

Mahathir, who was soon appointed interim PM by the King, alluded to the formation of a unity government

with himself at the helm. The BN opposition coalition, on the other hand, suggested holding snap elections.

The media was swamped with reports of MPs and party leaders crossing alliances, swinging between

support to Mahathir or Anwar as the next prime minister – or jumping to the opposition. PKR, or what

was left of it, announced that they fully supported Anwar Ibrahim as the next PM.

However, the nation was taken by surprise when the King selected Muhyiddin Yassin, president of

BERSATU, as the 8th PM. On March 1, 2020, Muhyiddin was sworn in to lead a new coalition Perikatan

6 At the time, Muhyiddin Yassin was the Minister of Home Affairs. He had affirmed that Pakatan Harapan’s manifesto on SOSMA is to amend,

not abolish it. https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/11/536928/amended-sosma-will-be-more-effective-ensuring-security 7 PKR leaders had also accused Mahathir, the BERSATU leader, for picking his Cabinet without full consent from the coalition

https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/02/02/pakatan-leaders-were-not-consulted-about-ppsmi-suggests-dap-man/1833729 8 This was gathered from individual interviews with PKR MPs. https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/511580


Nasional (PN), consisting of BERSATU, Azmin Ali and his 10 supporters, BN coalition, and PAS, supported

by Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS), Gabungan Bersatu Sabah (GBS) and independent MPs. The newly-

appointed Cabinet introduced several new positions and added five additional ministers in the Prime

Minister’s Department, featuring some of the old guard personalities from the BN administration. To

stabilize the PN coalition, the PM took the unconventional approach of removing the Deputy PM position

and, in its place, established four senior ministers to take up major portfolios – International Trade and

Industry, Defense, Works, and Education. Notably, two non-politician technocrats were appointed to

coveted positions; former CIMB Group chief executive as finance minister and Federal Territories mufti

(religious leader) as the minister in charge of religious affairs. Muhyiddin’s Cabinet marks the first time

that the Islamist Party PAS holds a Cabinet position in the Federal government. The civil service continued

serving as usual even during the change of the executive.

The formation of what some parts of civil society have detrimentally termed a ‘backdoor government’

received mixed reactions from the public. While progressives, civil society organizations and activists

criticized the move as highly nondemocratic, the Malay majority defended it for upholding the royalty’s

supremacy and for following the Federal Constitution.9 Civil society also voiced reservations in working

with the new government, suspecting that doing so would legitimize the nondemocratic move and that

the PN coalition will return to BN’s limiting reforms. This was evident when some activists were called

for questioning under the Sedition Act and the Communications and Multimedia Act for propagating online

and offline protests in early March 2020. Several officers and chiefs, including Attorney-General Tommy

Thomas and MACC chief Latheefa Koya, resigned from their politically-appointed positions. The new

government also announced delaying the first parliament sitting, initially planned for March 9, to May 18,

2020.

Simultaneously, the COVID-19 outbreak impacted communities across Malaysia. In February, under the

helm of PH’s Dr Dzulkefly Ahmad, the Ministry of Health attempted to contain the first wave of cases

while debunking disinformation on social media.10 The situation was still under control with only 23 cases

reported at the time. The second wave of infections began on February 27 via two large outbreak clusters,

one of which was the dubbed the “tabligh cluster” which began at a religious event attended by 16,000 in

Kuala Lumpur. The outbreak has been a critical test for the PN government to form a cohesive plan,

especially when it announced the MCO, a partial lockdown in which the public is ordered to practice self-

quarantine and only essential services operate. 11 Although the National Security Council (NSC) is the

designated secretariat of the MCO, it initially struggled to establish proper communication channels. News

reports offered conflicting directives which led to situations where large crowds gathered at borders and

police stations to obtain interstate travel permission. Relevant ministries also struggled to play their roles

effectively; the Ministry of Women, Family, and Community Development courted backlash from

Malaysians and found international ridicule when it released controversial statements on women’s role at

home in the lockdown. The Health Minister, Adham Baba, who is a medical doctor, was asked to take a

back seat when he promoted false information on how to minimize the threat of COVID-19 virus. All

9 The King was required to make a judgment call to appoint an MP who is likely to command the confidence of the majority of MPs as required

under Article 43 (2)(a) of the Federal Constitution. 10

A journalist was charged under Section 505(b) of the Penal Code on February 5 for three statements on her personal Facebook account for causing disruption of public peace, which critics say were disproportionate.

11 Essential services, as of the Federal Government Gazette dated March 18, include supermarkets and stores selling essential goods, banking

and finance, port, dock and airport services, e-commerce and postal services, petrol stations, telecommunications, public transport, prisons


health updates are now steered by the Director General of Health. The number of total cases reported

as of March 31 is 2,766, with 537 recovered cases and 43 deaths.

To address economic uncertainty, the PM unveiled a RM250 billion economic stimulus package for

COVID-19 relief on March 27, which provided support for workers in the lower-income groups and those

employed in industries including small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The stimulus package, however,

was critiqued for not sufficiently addressing the needs of small and medium enterprises.12 Senior Defense

Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob also announced that the army will assist the police to enforce the order, with

certain locations receiving enhanced measures to contain a high number of cases. As of March 31, there

has been 3,627 arrests, with more than 1,200 charged for failure to abide by the MCO.13

With a new government in place, immediately faced with a combined health and economic crisis, the

reform agenda remains to be seen.

12

Many were perplexed over the one-off payment to civil servants who are grade 56 and below (earning close to RM9,000 per month) while businesses are not getting any assistance from the stimulus. https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2020/03/30/smes-vent-out-on-stimulus

13 All arrests were taken under Section 7(1) of the Prevention and Control of Infection Diseases (Measures within Infected Local Areas)

Regulations 2020. The offender could be charged RM1000 or jail term up to six months. http://www.federalgazette.agc.gov.my/outputp/pua_20200318_PUA91_2020.pdf


ACTIVITIES TO HIGHLIGHT

OBJECTIVE 1: TO ASSIST THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT IN ENHANCING STANDARDS OF TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND RESPONSIVENESS TO THE PUBLIC

SUB-OBJECTIVE 1.1: INCREASE TECHNICAL CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENT REFORMERS TO ADVANCE DEMOCRATIC REFORM

PROVIDING TECHNICAL SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS The Malaysian Parliament’s establishment of six Parliamentary Select Committees (PSCs) in November

2018, under the leadership of the honorable Speaker Tan Sri Mohamad Arif Md Yusof, was a marked

step in parliament’s efforts to provide detailed governance and oversight of public policy. Their role was

specified to provide clause-by-clause scrutiny of bills before adoption and oversight of public activities

and expenditures. In their infancy, however, the PSCs lacked a legal mandate, resourcing, staffing and

procedures to conduct business. These gaps were identified by a Senior Parliamentary Advisor an early

STTA in the program who reported directly to the Speaker. In the absence of standard operating

procedures (SOPs) to review bills, PSCs rely on relevant existing provisions in the Standing Orders of

the Malaysian Parliament. In consultation with the Speaker and other international parliamentary reform

best practices, MARI undertook the development of SOPs through a targeted STTA activity to identify

and outline procedures in expectation of the upcoming contentious IPCMC bill, the first piece of

legislation to be tasked to the Consideration of Bills Committee in October 2019.

Building on the previous work with the Parliament of Malaysia in July 2019, MARI again deployed the

Senior Parliamentary Advisor to engage with committee members in advance of, and to observe

hearings of, the IPCMC Bill by the Considerations of Bills Committee held in Kuala Lumpur (for the

Central region) and Kuala Terengganu (for the East Coast region). The STTA observed and reported

that the hearing sessions provided ample opportunity for stakeholders and citizens to discuss the bill

substantively. The STTA also noted that although the hearings were well-organized, SOPs would be

needed to ensure a robust and replicable process for future legislative reviews. From his research and

interviews with committee members, he provided a “menu” of 42 SOPs for the Speaker, who

subsequently requested all to be drafted in detail. Two STTAs (one international and one Malaysian)

drafted and submitted these to the Speaker in April 2020 for further consideration and adoption.

Similarly, MARI provided technical assistance to other institutions, with the intention of supporting

reformers within their institutions to increase accountability and responsiveness to public demand and

adherence to international governance standards. During this reporting period, MARI facilitated

technical assistance to the National Centre for Governance, Integrity and Anti-Corruption (GIACC),

established in 2018 under the Prime Minister’s Department, on institutional reforms for functional

political financing oversight and monitoring, and provided an independent researcher on a proposed

Ombudsman’s service, the first of its kind in Malaysia. MARI similarly provided social media regulatory

advisors to the Ministry of Communications and Multimedia (MCM), who conducted comparative

research to support the Ministry’s exploration on regulating hate speech and disinformation.


COMMUNICATIONS TO THE PEOPLE WORKSHOP In this reporting period, a lack of

communication and

miscommunication to the public

has been noted by some, creating

a potential adverse outcome that

limits support for the reform

agenda. Some of the issues

include misinformation of

policies, unintended fueling of

racial disharmony, and exchanges

of contentious rhetoric.

Identifying the value of clear

communication to the public,

MARI and Institut Reformasi

Politik dan Demokrasi

(REFORM), an organization that

specializes in advocating issues of politics, democracy and civic education, hosted a one-day

communication strategy workshop on

October 12, 2019 at the Parliament

Building, Kuala Lumpur. The session was

intended for media officers, press

secretaries and aides to MPs and State

Assembly-persons from across the political

spectrum. The Speaker of the Lower

House, Tan Sri Mohamad Arif Md Yusof

supported the workshop with hope for

clearer communication between members

of Parliament and reduced contentious

rhetoric. Two prominent ex-journalists,

Tan Sri Johan Jaafar and Suhaimi Sulaiman,

experts in political media coverage, shared

their insights on developing a sound and

respectable public image for policy makers and ways for political figures to improve their relationship

with key players in media.

By providing the media officers strategic communication capacity building and opportunities to

cooperate with media practitioners, MARI enabled the media actors, regardless of political affiliation, to

improve their public messaging and advance democratic reforms more effectively.


SUB-OBJECTIVE 1.2: STRENGTHEN COALITIONS OF SUPPORT TO HELP GOVERNMENT REFORMERS PRIORITIZE DEMOCRATIC CHANGE

CROSS PARTISAN CONSULTATIONS ON ELECTORAL CODE OF CONDUCT Despite a government push to guarantee a

transparent and modern electoral system, the

Election Offences Act (EOA)1954 has not been

amended since 1969 and therefore does not address

current campaigning and potential election offenses in

the internet age. Existing laws that regulate election

offenses are often unenforced.

During the RPO, USAID/OTI supported Bersih 2.0,

the leading civil society coalition on electoral reform,

in consultation with the newly appointed Electoral

Reform Commission (ERC), Election Commission

(EC) and electoral experts from academia, legal

backgrounds and civil society, to draft new guidelines on the parameters of election offenses and a code

of conduct. The guidelines ensure that all political parties have an opportunity to participate in setting

mutual standards on what constitutes fair play for all during elections.

Bersih 2.0, ERC and the EC recognized that the draft electoral code of conduct and the Election

Offenses (Amendment) bill should be reviewed by major stakeholders, including political parties across

the spectrum, to gain support for its tabling in the parliamentary sitting. With MARI support, Bersih 2.0

and the ERC held three regional consultations in Sabah, Sarawak and Kuala Lumpur, and a national

consultation to achieve a consensus among political parties on producing a code of ethics for elections.

Political parties in attendance at the regional consultations, especially those based in Sabah and Sarawak,

reported the process was rewarding. The regional

consultations found active participation from 25 political

parties, including both ruling and opposition parties such

as the Islamist Party PAS, MCA, Ikatan, Gerakan, and

Malaysian Ceylonese Congress. The inclusion of many

parties also helped provide valuable inputs on the

amendments needed for EOA 1954.

The inclusive and comprehensive discussion proved to

be a key step in building support from all stakeholders to

amend relevant sections under EOA 1954. Moving

forward, MARI aims to continue collaboration with

Bersih 2.0 and ERC to conduct a thorough review of the

EOA 1954 and secure further participation and contribution from all political parties.


NATIONAL CONSULTATION ON FOI BILL Freedom of expression, especially via a federal Freedom of Information (FOI) Act or Right to

Information (RTI) Act, a priority reform area of the government. While the legislation exists at the state

level in Selangor and Penang, state-level enactments are hindered by the federal-level Official Secrets Act

1972 (OSA), which can obstruct the flow of information from state governments to citizens by

classifying it as an official secret. This affects the people’s ability to hold government institutions to

account. Following the discussions raised from the RPO-funded National Consultation on Malaysian

Media Council held in March 2019, MARI and the Centre of Independent Journalism (CIJ) identified the

need to expand civil society participation in the consultative policy-making process to improve the

legitimacy of the proposed FOI Bill.

As the current co-chair to the FOI cluster, CIJ has

engaged with the Law Department in the Prime

Minister’s Office (BHEUU) on a draft RTI bill,

slated to be tabled in the May 2020 parliamentary

sitting. The bill was expected to replace OSA but

given well-understood complexities, will require

an in-depth and holistic review to avoid political

opposition contravening existing security laws. To

answer the need for such a process and with

MARI support, CIJ held a two-day national-level

consultation and drafting of an RTI bill on

November 27-28, 2019, which enabled a platform

of various actors to reach consensus on the bill’s

content. The consultation also identified demand among civil society for a non-partisan commission to

ensure transparency and accountability in implementing RTI. Numerous regional experts attended,

including those from Sri Lanka and Indonesia, and provided hands-on guidance and recommendations

based on their experiences developing RTI legislation in line with international standards.

BHEUU’s Policy Division representative stated that all recommendations from the consultation would

be taken into consideration and, confirmed BHEUU would continue working with CIJ. As a result,

MARI helped to create a platform for collaboration between the state and civil society around a shared

interest area. The participation of all parties at the time indicated a strong willingness to achieve

freedom of expression for a democracy that benefits all. Currently, the change of government and need

for BHEUU representatives to await policy direction has prompted a pause in momentum.


OBJECTIVE 2: TO EMPOWER VOICES TO ENGAGE MORE MEANINGFULLY ON ISSUES IMPORTANT TO THE PEOPLE

SUB-OBJECTIVE 2.1: INCREASE TARGET ACTORS’ CAPACITY TO ACT IN EXPANDED POLITICAL SPACE

TRANSPARENT CONSULTATION: WHISTLE-BLOWING & BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP FORUMS

As part of its response to the 1Malaysia Development Bhd (1MDB) debacle, the government initiated an

ambitious National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP) in 2019, featuring 115 total initiatives under six key

strategies. One of the priority initiatives is a new provision in the Malaysian Anti-Corruption

Commission (MACC) Act 2009, last amended in 2018, establishing a National Financial Crime Centre

(NFCC) whereby businesses in Malaysia had less than a year to comply with the anti-bribery provisions

of the Act. Citing lack of government protections and their personal liability in the law due to the

actions of their employees, business owners voiced concern about potential corruption and the weak

protection mechanisms in the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) 2010.

MARI and Transparency International-Malaysia (TI-

Malaysia) hosted two public forums for its diverse

network of relevant stakeholders, including

government agencies, on beneficial ownership and

whistle-blower protection. By engaging policy

makers, representatives from Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

member countries, and key civil society actors,

participants shared perspectives on updating the

Whistleblower Protection Act to address present

realities. The Minister of the Law Department in

Prime Minister Office (BHEUU), V.K. Liew,

attended the consultation, further demonstrating

his commitment to amend the Act.

In December 2019, MARI and TI-Malaysia facilitated further dialogues with businesses and civil society

organizations on the need to strengthen existing laws under the Companies Act (2016). The Act

governs aspects from statutory duties, Code of Ethics, registration, and corporate restructuring to

shareholders rights. As for now, the Act provides the power to obtain beneficial ownership information

under Section 56. From the forum, TI-Malaysia stated that the Act needs to be strengthened by having in

place a better reporting mechanism, transparent and timely disclosure of beneficial ownership

information and stricter penalties for non-disclosure or false statements. The chief of MACC at the

time, Latheefa Koya, who had shown vigilance in curbing corruption, supported the push on unmasking

ownership behind corporations and stated her agency’s desire to include a provision in the MACC Act

that can strengthen transparency practices.

The success of these two events demonstrated an openness of the government’s commitment and

openness to a civil society actor’s contribution to eroding corruption. TI-Malaysia and MARI’s convening


power enabled engagement across government and public stakeholders on two key issues under the

anti-corruption umbrella, resulting in concrete recommendations to the Government of Malaysia.

RACE AND RELIGION COMMISSION

Despite progress on reform efforts, racial

politics remain a stubborn feature in

Malaysia’s political discourse. International

treatises, such as International Convention

on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination (ICERD) and the Rome

Statute, failed ratification and received

backlash from groups who fear the potential

dilution of privilege for majority ethnic

Malays and royal families. Nevertheless, the

government continued to pursue a National

Unity Consultative Council (NUCC)

Blueprint, announced in October 2018, in

which it proposed a National Harmony and

Reconciliation Commission Bill which aims

to proactively educate, propagate harmony and mediate any racial or religious sentiment. The bill was

also recommended by the Religious Affairs Minister and was favored to be tabled in 2020.

Gabungan Bertindak Malaysia (GBM) is an organization with a reliable working relationship with

government agencies, particularly the National Unity and Integration Department (JPNIN), the Religious

Affairs Department (JKIM), and grassroots leaders representing Malaysia’s diverse communities. With

USAID/OTI’s support, GBM engaged diverse community leaders, civil society and government

representatives to draft a Reconciliation Commission Bill that was successfully presented to the Minister

of National Unity and Wellbeing, Dr Waytha Moorthy. In preparation of the draft, roundtable sessions

in October and December 2019 produced two position papers, which clarified issues around the

creation of the commission and its scope of work and authority. The final workshop in January 2020

presented an opportunity to design a media plan with a counter-messaging strategy to increase public

support towards the bill.

From these roundtables, GBM successfully convened government representatives, including the Minister

of National Unity and Wellbeing’s office, media and civil society actors representing both progressive

and conservative groups, and articulated a mutual understanding on the importance of such a bill. The

collaborative efforts across ideologies aimed to push forward reforms that are beneficial to Malaysia’s

multicultural society.


SUPPORTING REGIONAL CSOS TO ADDRESS CORRUPTION IN SABAH AND SARAWAK Corruption in Sabah and Sarawak, two resource-

rich East Malaysian states, has been perceived to

have driven the cost of living, apart from other

factors such as inflation and productivity, above

the national average. As part of the government’s

commitment to anti-corruption efforts, the

Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC)

aims to make full use of their branches

nationwide, especially in Sabah and Sarawak,

where partnerships with CSOs have not

historically been as strong.

To encourage active participation, MARI supported the Society for Equality, Respect and Trust for All

Sabah (SERATA) to form constructive and collaborative anti-corruption efforts in Sabah and Sarawak,

and to bridge the gap between East Malaysia and peninsular Malaysia. The first event was a three-day

capacity building workshop in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, on December 9-11, 2019 which provided the

opportunity for 18 CSOs to engage with government agencies including MACC Sabah’s Deputy Director

and the current Assistant Minister to the Minister of Law and Native Affairs, Sabah. This session

prodded the issues of corruption that are prevalent within the region and developed better engagement

channels among all parties.

SERATA continued the engagement by hosting a roundtable event in Kuala Lumpur on March 11, 2019

in which twenty participants from Sabah and Sarawak visited MACC and met with established CSOs,

including Bersih 2.0. The participants also had the chance to have a briefing with MP Wong Chen who

encouraged the CSOs to further champion grave anti-corruption issues in their respective states,

especially regarding infrastructure projects. Currently, CSOs from both sides agreed to form a network

and developed multiple partnerships to increase collaboration in combating corruption and Kuala

Lumpur based CSOs offered to provide mentorship on best practices to assist in knowledge transfer.

The roundtable also resulted in MACC’s first offer to the NGO’s in Sabah and Sarawak to develop

training of trainers on Raising Awareness on Anti-Corruption.


CSO SUPPORT FOR PARLIAMENTARY SELECT COMMITTEES Following the change of government in 2018, the appointed Dewan Rakyat Speaker aims to open the

Parliament to receive more substantive input from civil society and the public on bills, policies, and other

matters of national importance. As part of the ongoing efforts to open Parliament, six new PSCs were

established in November 2018, including Budget, Federal-State Relations, Defense & Home Affairs,

Rights & Gender Equality, Consideration of Bills, and Major Public Appointments.

However, there is a noticeable gap in communication between CSOs and PSCs, which can reduce the

effectiveness of pushing reform efforts. There is a

lack of clarity among PSC members on how civil

society can support reform and improve

government functioning. Similarly, CSOs are not

consistently aware that committees cannot play

an oversight role due to limited resources and

legal structures.

Noticing these gaps, the Institute for Leadership

and Development Studies (LEAD Studies)

organized a one-day training for CSOs on PSC

functions on November 12, 2019. Diverse and

inter-generational CSOs were exposed to

current parliamentary reforms, law-making processes and the role of PSCs, in addition to outlining

methods for effective committee functioning under the helm of parliamentary reform experts. The

session continued at the Parliament Building itself, where CSOs had a chance to discuss ways to

strengthen engagement between all stakeholders with two Select Committee members, including a

member of Consideration of Bills Committee, to further reinforce collaboration between PSCs and

CSOs.

To some CSOs, this is their first step in working with Parliament, and it helped bolster communication

and enable potential reform agendas that are of mutual interest.


SUB-OBJECTIVE 2.2: INCREASE POTENTIAL ACTORS’ MOTIVATION TO ACT IN EXPANDED POLITICAL SPACE

SEEDS FOR DEMOCRACY CAMP FOR YOUTHS A constitutional amendment, passed on July 16, 2019, lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 and

subsequently added 7.8 million voters, a 50 percent increase, into Malaysia’s electoral voting body. The

historic amendment was made possible by Undi18, a movement that empowers youth to engage in

politics. Their success was partly attributed to lobbying politicians from both coalitions who showed a

rare mutual agreement among all parties.

Unfortunately, many youths have expressed hesitation in engaging in civic activism. To help build

interest, several initiatives were launched, including the Ministry of Education’s national curriculum on

civic education and additional democracy-based classes. However, these measures alone may be

inadequate in inculcating meaningful effect due to their academic nature and rigid lecture format.

To gain more active participation by youth

in understanding political dynamics and

policy making, in March 2020, MARI

partnered with Undi18 to organize a three-

day democracy-building camp called “Seeds

for Democracy.” The camp offered its 90

attendees a chance to learn about

government structure and separation of

powers, conduct a simulation of a multi-

issue negotiation and experience the

decision-making process.

In one session, participants examined their

own identities across gender, age, race and

religion to empathize with others and

reflect on leadership qualities. In groups, students shared their experiences of being the victims of

discrimination because of their social identity. One of the Malay participants stated that “she never

realized she is privileged, until listening to her non-Malays group members’ stories” in this session.

Based on the camp’s success, Undi 18 aims to propose a follow-on activity that would further build the

participants’ knowledge on the governance modules introduced in this workshop.


CAMPUS PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES For four decades, university students’ freedom to

express political beliefs were thwarted by the

University and University College Act (UUCA)

1971. Section 15 of the Act explicitly bars

students from showing association or making

statements affiliated with a political party.

Following the mandate to uphold freedom of

expression, the government made amendments to

the Act, increasing the opportunity to expand

students’ freedom in the political space.

The Center for Governance and Political Studies

(Cent-GPS) seized upon the opportunity to

encourage students to exercise their freedom through a series of presidential-style debates on

university campuses, supported by MARI. The first debate was held at the Universiti Malaya, where

students from local public and private universities debated issues such as race-based political parties and

policies, stateless children, financial assistance in elections, and criticism of universities’ institutional

structures. They were prompted by a MARI supported pre-debate workshop that featured journalists,

artists, veteran orators and the MP of Petaling Jaya, Ambiga Sreenevasan, to discuss freedom of

expression in political discourse.

The presidential-style debate continued at

Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin (UniSZA) in

Terengganu, marking the first US-funded program

welcomed into the conservative, Islamic university.

Rather than engaging trained debaters, this session

engaged student council members to express

opinions on topics chosen by the grantee and the

university administration, such as free education at

the university level and international terrorism.

Energized participation from all students, including

those in the audience, showcased student interest

and passion. By providing such platforms, youths

can exercise and challenge their perceptions thus

cultivate forward thinking graduates. CentGPS has

launched a follow-on activity with MARI support to mentor student unions and activists on organizing

similar presidential debates at six other national universities on more current topics relating to

corruption, parliamentary reforms, political financing and government accountability and transparency.

The successful student debates reinforced the enthusiasm and interest of young Malaysians take

advantage of newly established platforms to engage in political discourse.


PROGRAM BUDGET QUICK FACTS

Over the reporting period from October 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020, MARI cleared 50 activities

totaling an estimated $1,962,898.59

TABLE I: MARI ACTIVITIES BY SECTOR (OCTOBER 1, 2019 – MARCH 31, 2020) SECTOR TOTAL VALUE ACTIVITIES

Advocacy $309,923.08 10 Civic Engagement $658,509.63 18 Media $30,796.00 2 CSO/Activist Capacity Building $834,669.88 16 Non-Specified $129,000.00 4 Grand Total $1,962,898.59 50

The chart below reflects the proportion of funding committed during the reporting period based on

programming streams and the distribution of costs across all 50 MARI activities.

16%

33%

2%

42%

7%

COMMITTED FUNDING FROM OCTOBER 1,

2019 TO MARCH 31, 2020 BY SECTOR

Advocacy

Civic Engagement

Media

CSO/Activist Capacity

Building

Non-Specified


CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

The following lessons reflect challenges and learning identified over MARI’s reporting period, as the

program successfully gained a more nuanced understanding of Malaysia’s democratic reforms and

progress.

EVOLVING GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES – MARI and its partner’s efforts to advance key legislative

items frequently stalled at the cabinet endorsement point. Similarly, MARI’s efforts to provide strategic

messaging and communication support to government partners were frequently re-referred. This gave

MARI the opportunity to identify specific ministries (such as Ministry of Women and Ministry of Human

Resources) who vocalized their interest and ability to advance issue-specific legislation in sexual

harassment and labor laws. However, a lack of consensus and an overly-centralized decision-making

process may have contributed to legislative delays as MARI experienced multiple re-referrals.

ADVISORY STTA ADDRESSES PRIORITY ISSUE AREAS – MARI’s identified priority issue areas are

technically complex, often outstripping the qualifications and experience of MARI team members. In

some activities MARI successfully recruited and deployed local and international experts to advise

government counterparts. In two instances, government counterparts such as Ministry of

Communications and Multimedia (MCM) and Parliamentary Select Committees (PSCs) sought MARI’s

recommendations on potential analyses and initiatives that could advance their reform priorities. MARI

also identified important opportunities of recruiting technical support for initial engagements to assist

counterparts strategize, identify challenges, and plot courses to overcome them. MARI also contracted a

local expert through STTA to help define points of entry for the program’s anti-corruption activities.

The expert identified partners, facilitated introductions, and supported the program team to design five

separate activities to advance our engagement in the issue area, dramatically strengthening the program’s

contribution to reform.

BUREACRATIC OBSTACLES TO REFORM – MARI’s July 2019 strategic framework positioned the

program well to address some of the government’s obstacles to democratic reform, including building

technical capacity and identifying ways to increase political momentum. However, coordination across

ministries, inconsistent reform priorities and lack of resources presented challenges to engaging with

and advancing activities with various counterparts. MARI struggled to identify government partners who

shared the same priorities, and consistently faced evolving sentiments to wide ranging reform efforts.

Navigating these challenges consumed considerable team time and effort throughout the reporting

period. As a result, MARI prioritized activities with the responsive government counterparts who

illustrated enthusiasm and commitment.

WHEN AND HOW TO ENGAGE IN LEGISLATIVE REFORM – MARI is careful to prevent playing a

role propagandizing, meddling in local matters, or swaying opinion on legislative process and discourse,

but similarly cannot await the undetermined schedule for legislation passage to offer support - after

which parties are unlikely to want to compromise or embrace practical implementation challenges.

MARI aims to support activities that yield the greatest democratic dividend for all Malaysians and

therefore will continue to ensure that the program’s contribution to all stages of the legislative process

is informed and based on stakeholder consensus, and facilitates informed, attributable, expert opinion.

Such engagement will require greater investment in the selected issue areas.


ENCOURAGING PROACTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY – MARI’s partnerships with civil society reveal several

engaged, committed and willing actors. However, a pattern among newer entrants is one of reacting to

government, rather than driving change. Their reticence to be proactive members of civil society is

understandable given Malaysia’s long history of manipulating misinformation laws to limit dissent. The

government increased political space for new actors to enter, evidenced by both modest legislative

change (repeal of restrictive portions of UUCA, and the constitutional amendment to lower the voting

age and minimum age of elected representatives to 18) and modest practical action (establishment of a

Media Council, civil society participation in parliamentary committee hearings on the Independent Police

Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC), and including civil society representatives in a

ministerial-led working committee on appropriate punishments to replace the death penalty). However,

the opportunity presented for civic actors to meaningfully participate remains underused. MARI will

continue prioritizing civil society capacity building through priority issue area activities and advocacy

trainings.

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW GOVERNMENT– The new government’s reform agenda has not been

announced, and in the face of addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, it further remains unclear what

policy priorities it plans to address first. The new PM’s past statements, a cabinet that is overwhelmingly

Malay, Muslim and male, and the new government's decision to delay Parliamentary processes, may

suggest movement away from supporting reconciliation and celebrating diversity. However, an early

window of opportunity is with the newly appointed Minister of Communications and Multimedia who

has expressed interest in the recent MARI-funded research study on Malaysia’s current online media

legislative frameworks, regional best practices and mechanisms to counter misinformation and hate

speech. As the new government coalesces and the country grapples with the reality of a post-COVID

society, civil society actors (with MARI support) will need to advance issues while the government forms

its new policies, not in response to them.


PROGRAM EVALUATION AND NEXT STEPS

The program’s transparent, collaborative and consistent engagement with local actors, culminating in a

diverse set of 65 activities (for a cumulative value of $2,783,453.58 to date), has resulted in a wide

recognition and growing trust of the MARI brand. This recognition has subsequently granted MARI

remarkable access to government offices and civil society actors. In the last year, MARI partners have

demonstrably advanced the debate on technically-complex pieces of legislation and deepened the

discourse among a broadening set of actors in an opened political space. It is from this strong foundation

that MARI is set to engage with a significantly different landscape in the months ahead.

The March 2020 SRS was coincidentally well-timed, granting the team opportunity to ask what the political

changes meant for the program and our partners. Drawing on adaptability inherent in OTI programs, the

team questioned MARI’s approaches and concluded that the program’s aim and objectives remained

relevant, particularly with the program’s apolitical stance. MARI is well-positioned to engage with a new

government - whatever it explicitly states as a manifesto. Moving forward, the program will continue to

engage ministers, officers, and agencies to carry on the important work in which we have invested over

the last year. In the face of an almost entirely new government that, at least on the surface, appears to be

a proponent of past, conservative and race-based priorities, MARI’s approaches will have to change.

Acknowledging this, and the inordinate amount of time that government engagement requires, MARI

amended one Program Development Officer’s (PDO) responsibilities to create a “Strategic Adviser” role,

and hired a much needed fourth PDO, supplemented by the technical expertise of short-term technical

assistance (STTA). Under objective 2, MARI is now focused on connecting disparate actors to each other

and to government, and providing them the resources to support persistent, representative, constructive

civic involvement in the months ahead.

The team deftly adapted to Malaysia’s March 18 nationwide COVID-19 MCO, moving to a remote working

model with all meetings held online. The MCO alone has not hindered program processes: program staff

have continued to engage partners and each other on what can be done to hold the democratic space,

even from lockdown, and to plan what actions can be taken to work with the government to dial back

measures used to surveil and control to epidemic, ensuring they do not extend into normal life afterwards.

The operations and programs team has been instrumental in this time, ensuring program continuity and

working with current awardees to support necessary award modifications to accommodate the pause,

and vitally to ensure rapid activity restart after the lockdown. MARI is faced by the third, added, challenge

of entering the inevitable slow-down of Ramadan on April 25, just as the country expects to emerge from

lockdown. This will necessitate further delays to events but not the team’s and partners’ efforts to identify

and advance Malaysia’s aspirations for a more democratic society.

USAID/OTI MALAYSIA PROGRAM

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