US Public Perspectives on Privacy, Security, and Unmanned ...

US Public Perspectives on Privacy, Security, and Unmanned

Aircraft Systems

Kerry G. Herron, Ph.D.

Hank C. Jenkins Smith, Ph.D.

Carol L. Silva, Ph.D.

March 2014

Center for Risk and Crisis Management Center for Applied Social Research

University of Oklahoma 2 Partners Place, 3100 Monitor, Suite 100

Norman, Oklahoma 73072

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Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable assistance in survey develop-ment of our colleagues at the University of Oklahoma: Matthew Henderson, Aaron Fister, Joe Ripberger, Kuhika Gupta, Nina Carlson, and Deven Carlson. We also express our appreciation to David Craig and Edward Sankowski who provided insightful reviews and suggestions. Kelvin Droegemeier and Marilyn Korhonen generously provided valuable institutional support without which this project would never have been undertaken. Will Bolton at Sandia National Labo-ratories (CA) provided excellent technical advice on drone capabilities. For all errors or omissions, we alone are responsible.

Abstract

his report presents selected key findings from a nationwide Internet survey of 1,364 respondents conducted January 16–17, 2014, investi-gating relationships among privacy, security, and unmanned aircraft

systems (UAS). Results suggest that public receptivity to domestic uses of drones will be influenced by: (a) the purposes for which the UAS are to be em-ployed; (b) who is operating and controlling the UAS; (c) who will receive and retain the UAS data (including collateral information); and (d) for what pur-poses those data are to be used.

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Participants judged the benefits of UAS to outweigh their risks for such ap-plications as search and rescue, disaster response, selected law enforcement purposes, border surveillance, monitoring suspected terrorists, and prevent-ing crime. The private sector was more trusted than government to protect sensitive personal information. For law enforcement or surveillance pur-poses, judicial authorization was important for perceived legitimacy.

Because debate on UAS is in its early stages, respondents saw merit in both sides of balanced arguments for and against widespread domestic applica-tions, suggesting that public opinion is labile and open to debate. How those arguments are presented, and how drones are managed to afford public safety and to protect privacy, will figure importantly in public support or opposition to domestic applications of UAS.

Contents

Front Matter Abstract 2 Contents 3 Executive Summary 5

Chapter One: Introduction and Overview 8 Section 1.1: Research Goals and Objectives 8 Section 1.2: Conceptual and Methodological Considerations 8 Section 1.3: Organization of the Report 12

Chapter Two: Privacy–Security Policy Context 14 Section 2.1: Level of Concern and Salience of Privacy 14 Section 2.2: Sources of Concerns about Privacy 16 Section 2.3: Perceptions of Terrorism, Crime, and Security 19 Section 2.4: Balancing Privacy and Security 22 Takeaway Points 25

Chapter Three: Public Predispositions on UAS 27 Section 3.1: Assessin the Plicy Environment and Its Maturation 27 Section 3.2: Views on Military vs. Domestic Uses of UAS 28 Section 3.3: Perceptions of Risks and Benefits of Domestic Uses 29 Section 3.4: Trust in Protecting UAS Collateral Data 33 Section 3.5: UAS-Mounted Sensors vs. Ground-Mounted Sensors 34 Section 3.6: Purposeful Misuse of UAS 37 Takeaway Points 38

Chapter Four: UAS Scenarios, Debate Parameters, and Policy Directions 40 Section 4.1: UAS Scenarios 40 Section 4.2: UAS Debate and Policy Preferences 47 Takeaway Points 51

Appendix 1: Research Methodology 53

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Section 1: Background 53 Section 2: Sampling 54 Section 3: Demographic Representativeness 55 Section 4: Data Collection 57

Appendix 2: Data Summaries 58

References 81

Executive Summary ur primary research goal is to establish a baseline of opinion regard-ing considerations of privacy, security, and UAS preceding the widespread introduction of drone operations within the US. Specific

objectives include: (a) assessments of national security, including terrorism and other crimes; (b) beliefs about individual privacy, including preferred and perceived balances between security and privacy; and (c) views on po-tential domestic uses of UAS.

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In the views of our respondents, privacy occupies a prominent place among other major policy issues, and, on average, concerns about privacy exceed those about security, including terrorism. Recent revelations about US gov-ernment monitoring of domestic communications are increasing public sen-sitivities about privacy. Greater public support for and tolerance of govern-ment surveillance is afforded to those policies that undergo judicial review and are court authorized.

In weighing tradeoffs between security and privacy, participants were con-cerned that the US government is unnecessarily compromising individual privacy for the purposes of enhancing security to a degree that exceeds normative preferences. Unmanned aircraft systems are being introduced into a policy environment that is being conditioned by increasing public concerns about threats to privacy.

While acknowledging the growing proportion of business transactions tak-ing place via the Internet, and the risks to privacy associated with Internet use, respondents still trusted businesses, corporations, and industries to pro-tect and to not misuse sensitive personal information more than they trusted governments to do so.

Because UAS policies are in an early stage of maturation, most respondents were just beginning to gather information, form impressions, and weigh risks and benefits of potential domestic UAS operations. Accordingly, opin-ion on UAS remains labile and open to debate. But when asked to express initial impressions and beliefs about potential domestic applications, most considered benefits to exceed risks when using UAS for: search and rescue; disaster response; unarmed law enforcement (or operations in which UAS

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are armed with non-lethal weapons); monitoring US borders, seashores, and harbors; monitoring suspected terrorists and other criminals; and monitoring cities and neighborhoods to prevent crime. Risks and benefits were seen as relatively balanced for using UAS to transport air freight or to provide me-dia coverage of breaking news events. Risks were perceived to outweigh benefits for law enforcement using UAS armed with lethal weapons or for using unarmed UAS to deliver small packages to residences or to monitor traffic and enforce traffic laws.

While potential economic benefits associated with an American drone in-dustry were valued, concerns exist that UAS might be used for nefarious purposes such as crime or terrorism, and respondents were worried that UAS may be used for domestic spying. Even when the objectives were pub-lic safety, UAS platforms were not considered equally acceptable platforms for surveillance compared to ground platforms used for the same purposes.

When presented with a detailed scenario in which UAS were used to con-tinuously monitor a high-crime area in a major US city in order to prevent crime and enhance security for residents, participants generally were sup-portive if (a) it was authorized by a court order and (b) the operations were favored by most affected residents.

When presented with a detailed scenario in which UAS were routinely used to monitor electrical transmission lines, and those systems captured unin-tended data that were important for secondary law enforcement purposes, respondents heavily favored sharing collateral information for humanitarian purposes, but were reluctant to volunteer secondary information to law en-forcement agencies unless directed to do so by court order.

Respondents were receptive to balanced arguments both for and against widespread domestic applications of UAS, suggesting that firm public views have yet to form and attitudes are open to debate. Similarly, when presented with alternative policy options, support was within one point of midscale for (a) greatly expanding UAS applications by business or government sectors and (b) limiting UAS only to government approved purposes in order to pro-tect privacy. Receptivity to pro and con arguments and similar levels for support for expanding domestic UAS operations (while also being cautious of privacy concerns) illustrates labile opinion that is in an early stage of

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maturation, and has not yet begun broadly to organize into supporting or op-posing coalitions.

Public support for specific policies for widespread UAS operations within the US likely will depend on four key questions: (a) For what purposes are the UAS to be employed? (b) Who will operate and control the UAS? (c) Who will receive the UAS data (including collateral information)? and (d) For what purposes will those data be employed?

Chapter One Introduction and Overview

his report presents findings from a nationwide Internet survey of US residents 18 years of age or older conducted January 16–17, 2014, in-vestigating the dynamics of public beliefs and preferences concerning

privacy, security, and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS / drones). Data have been weighted to national demographic parameters for age, gender, Hispanic ethnicity, race, and census region. Financial and institutional support for this study was provided by the University of Oklahoma, and the study was con-ducted by the OU Center for Risk and Crisis Management.

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Section 1.1: Research Goals and Objectives

ur primary research goal is to establish a baseline of opinion regard-ing considerations of privacy, security, and UAS before the introduc-tion of widespread domestic drone operations within the United

States. As UAS operations become more extensive, and as opinions about drone applications and operations mature, future policy studies can quantita-tively measure opinion and policy evolution against data from this study.

OSpecific objectives are organized along three interrelated research tracks in-volving perceptions of: (a) national security, including terrorism and domes-tic crimes; (b) individual privacy, including preferred and perceived balances between security and privacy; and (c) potential domestic uses of unmanned aircraft systems, including the acceptability of various drone applications, perceptions of related risks and benefits, and expected institutional bias and trust for UAS operations.

Section 1.2: Conceptual and Methodological Considerations

Opinion and Issue Maturation

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ssue maturation dynamics are influencing contemporary debates on pri-vacy–security and unmanned aircraft systems. Domestic applications of UAS currently are in what Daniel Yankelovich (1991) terms the con-

sciousness raising stage, in which members of the public are becoming aware of an emerging issue or technology and are still gathering information and forming impressions. Public opinion in this stage typically is labile and open to arguments as people attempt to understand the questions and tradeoffs in-volved. How emerging technologies and their applications are introduced to the public and how they are managed and controlled can have important im-plications for how related policies evolve. But new technologies and new policies for their uses seldom are introduced into a neutral policy environ-ment. In almost all cases, preexisting policies, debates, and beliefs set the context for emerging issues. In the case of expanding domestic uses of UAS, the policy environment will be influenced by a broader and more long-standing debate on liberty and security, one aspect of which is balancing in-dividual privacy with societal security in an age of terrorism.

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The relationship and interaction between security and privacy (as well as other liberties) has its roots in arguments among the Founding Fathers about how to balance freedom and security that have remained relevant and dy-namic. This crucial balance has been challenged repeatedly throughout American history.1 Most recently these arguments have been invigorated by ongoing revelations about how agencies of the federal government—such as the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation—may be employing sophisticated tech-nologies and techniques to gather and analyze telecommunications patterns not only outside but within the US in an ostensible effort to provide security from the ongoing threat of terrorism. To the extent that ordinary Americans perceive government to be intruding into their private lives, they are influ-enced by deeply held normalized beliefs about how their security and pri-vacy should be balanced. This ongoing debate is today in what Yankelovich 1 The liberty-security relationship emerged as a matter of national debate with the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 and has been revisited many times, including: (a) suspension of habeas corpus and other executive actions during the Civil War; (b) the Espionage and Sedition Acts of World War I and the great “red scare” of 1919–1920; (c) martial law in Hawaii and internment of Japanese Americans during World War II; (d) the so-called McCarthy era and other anticommunist excesses of the Cold War period; and (e) suppres-sion of domestic opposition to the war in Vietnam. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, and the sustained struggle against terrorism and advances in surveillance technologies, Americans are reassessing their beliefs about the preferred vs. the current and evolving balance between freedom and security.

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terms the working through stage, where assessments are being made, de-bates are being conducted (most often at the level of policy experts, elites, scientists, etc.), and coalitions are being formed. As new technologies and other stimuli emerge—even amid long-standing controversies such as lib-erty and security—debate is reinvigorated and decisions are made about how previous preferences may need to evolve.

The final stage in Yankelovich’s description of policy maturation is termed the resolution phase where the public comes to judgment. This is where firm policy preferences are reached, and opinion is most mature. Issues such as abortion, tobacco usage, and the advisability of wearing seat belts in per-sonal vehicles are examples of issues for which most adults probably have reached firm preferences. Sometimes relatively old policy tensions, such as that between liberty and security, can be heightened by new technologies, capabilities, and polices, causing people to reassess their preferences and reengage in new iterations of long-standing policy debates. The effects of constantly advancing technological capabilities to surveil telecommunica-tions patterns is today causing some Americans to consider their beliefs about acceptable levels of government intrusion, and are reinvigorating de-bate about privacy and security. Previously reached judgments are being questioned in light of new challenges, new technologies, and new tensions.

Popular Polling vs. Opinion Survey Research

onsumers of this research who may not be familiar with differences in popular polling and academic quality opinion survey research may be skeptical of survey work done so early in the process of

evolving policies for the development and domestic application of UAS. But there are important conceptual and methodological differences between polling done to support such venues as advertising, marketing, mass media, and political campaigning—which we term popular polling—and academic quality opinion survey research done to advance general knowledge and inform policy processes.

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Popular polling usually prioritizes responsiveness, which is enhanced by shorter, simpler designs using questions whose responses are categorical: yes–no; for–against; support–oppose. These kinds of response categories simplify analysis and make it easier to report poll results. Because such polls

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represent snapshots in time, the emphasis is on reporting results quickly and in simple formats that lend themselves to easy interpretation. Replication of findings usually is not of great concern, since competing polls tend to support or challenge results, and findings are perishable. The objectives usually are to address “what,” “who,” “when,” and “where.” Such polls are ill-suited for understanding “how” or “why.” They are well suited for application via any form of data collection, including wireless phones. The objective is a snap-shot of opinions that can be reported simply and quickly.

Academic quality opinion survey research prioritizes quantitative analysis, reliability, and replicability. Question formats more often use continuous scales that support relational analytical techniques providing statistical in-ference. This kind of investigation is better suited to complex issues that are not easily reduced to categorical preferences. Such surveys typically em-ploy longer and more complex questions, allow more subtle response varia-tions (sometimes including verbatim responses in the participant’s own words), and can require much more attention and thought from respondents than do many popular polls. These kinds of surveys are better suited to ex-ploring complex issues of public policy that require addressing the “how” and “why” of policy preferences, and the findings they yield are less perish-able. Such surveys are not well suited to data collection via cell phones be-cause of their length and complexity.

This project employs academic quality opinion survey research methods to yield data that can help explain not only which policy options are preferred, but how and why policy preferences are formed and evolve over time. We not only seek to understand policy preferences at a given point in time, we also attempt to better understand belief structures that underlie opinion formation and main-tenance. To do that, we designed all phases of this study to support multidi-mensional analyses, including quantitative methods such as descriptive and relational analyses that can provide baselines for future comparative studies. This report is primarily descriptive, but our data support more relational analy-ses that will be published separately. Specific methods employed are described in greater detail in Appendix 1.

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Section 1.3: Organization of the Report

hapter Two describes respondent perceptions of the contemporary privacy–security dynamic, including concerns about privacy and how they relate to other selected issues such as the economy, healthcare,

national security, and the environment. Additionally, we report: (a) assess-ments of government monitoring of domestic communications; (b) concerns about Internet privacy; (c) relative levels of trust in the government and pri-vate sectors to protect and to not misuse sensitive personal information; (d) perceptions of the risks of terrorism and crime; and (e) beliefs about balanc-ing privacy and security.

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In Chapter Three, we describe public predispositions on UAS, including the policy environment and its maturation as well as views on military and do-mestic uses of UAS. We report perceptions of risks and benefits associated with a wide variety of potential domestic uses of UAS, latent expectations of institutional bias in assessing UAS risks and benefits, and comparative levels of trust in government agencies to protect collateral data acquired by UAS. We address beliefs about UAS by comparing support for ground-mounted vs. UAS-mounted cameras used for the same purposes and by test-ing responses to a series of assertions about UAS. The chapter closes with assessments of the potential misuse of UAS for nefarious purposes.

Chapter Four presents two operational scenarios in which UAS are described in the context of very different applications: one in which UAS are used to surveil a high-crime area of a major city; and one in which UAS are used for monitoring utility lines. Each is designed to place UAS in more specific con-texts than were provided in the preceding chapters and to assess respondent reactions to how those operations are conducted and preferences for how data from them should be used. We then present balanced arguments for wide-spread domestic uses of UAS and gage support for policy directions.

Appendix One describes sampling, data collection, and associated research methods. We also provide illustrations of the demographic representativeness of respondents compared to US national population parameters.

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Because there are more survey questions than are analyzed in this report, Ap-pendix Two provides a comprehensive listing of all questions used in the sur-vey, and displays response frequencies and central tendencies for each.

Chapter Two Privacy-Security Policy Context

n this chapter we assess respondent perceptions and preferences about ten-sions between individual privacy and national security in the contemporary policy environment by addressing the following key topics: (a) views on rela-

tive issue salience and concerns about privacy; (b) views on government surveil-lance within the US; (c) concerns about Internet privacy; (d) comparative meas-ures of trust in government vs. private sectors to safeguard sensitive personal in-formation; (e) assessments of the current threat of terrorism and crime; and (f) beliefs about balancing privacy and security.

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Section 2.1: Level of Concern and Salience of Privacy

e address two useful dimensions for better understanding how ordinary Americans view privacy today. One insight is gained by measuring concerns about privacy in an absolute sense. But placing an absolute

measure in context with concerns about other contemporary policy issues is needed to provide relative issue context. So to help assess concerns about indi-vidual privacy and their salience among other selected issues, we posed the fol-lowing questions.

WFor each of the following issues, please rate your level of concern about the issue us-ing a scale from zero to ten, where zero means you are not at all concerned and ten means you are extremely concerned. How concerned are you about (random order):

• p8: Threats to national security, including terrorism?

• p9: The delivery and cost of healthcare in the US?

• p10: Protection of individual privacy in the US?

• p11: The effects of human activities on the environment?

• p12: The state of the economy, including jobs and inflation?

Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of responses to the absolute question of concern about privacy, and in Figure 2.2, we compare mean responses to illustrate the sa-lience of privacy concerns relative to the other specified issues.

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Figure 2.1: Concern About Protecting Privacy in the US

Figure 2.2: Mean Issue Concerns: Saliency of Privacy

In absolute terms, fully 89 percent of respondents expressed concern over the pro-tection of individual privacy in the US (Figure 2.1). Note that the modal response was the highest scale value and that mean concerns about privacy (Figure 2.2) were statistically significantly higher than mean concerns about national secu-rity—including terrorism—or the environment (p < .0001 in each case).1 These

1 Throughout this study, we report the results of analyses of variance in terms of p-value, which is a measure of the probability that differences in means would have occurred by chance. In two-tailed tests (direction of change not hypothesized), statistical significance is attributed to those differences that would have occurred by chance fewer than five times in 100 (equivalent to a 95 percent confidence level). However, statistical significance does not always equate to policy rele-vance. The importance of statistically significant differences in means must be judged in the con-text of the variables being measured and the groups or samples being compared.

7.17

6 7 8 9 10

Environment

National Securit 7.67

8.12

8.46

8.48

0 1 2 3 4 5

y

Privacy

Healthcare

Economy & Jobs

Not At All Concerned

ExtremelyConcerned

ExtremelyConcerned

Not At All Concerned

%

2 0 1 2 2 48

0

10

20

30

40

50

0 1 2 3 4 5

Mean = 8.12

1317

14

37

6 7 8 9 10

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results suggest that concerns about privacy are prominent relative to other major national issues, and among our respondents, concerns about individual privacy exceeded those about national security.

Section 2.2: Sources of Concerns about Privacy

Government Monitoring of Domestic Communications

o investigate views on potentially intrusive domestic policies justified on the basis of preventing terrorism, we asked participants to rate four ran-domly ordered types of domestic surveillance when implemented with and

without a federal court order. The acceptability of each policy was expressed on a scale from one (strongly oppose) to seven (strongly support). We summarize grouped responses and compare means in Table 2.1.

TTable 2.1: Public Views on Domestic Surveillance Policies for Preventing Terrorism

(1 = Strongly Oppose—7 = Strongly Support)

Policy

Court Order

% Oppose

% Unsure

% Support

Mean

No 44 16 40 3.85 Recording content of phone calls or texts be- tween persons within the US if any participant is suspected of terrorist activities (p25) Yes 9 10 81 5.74

No 42 15 43 3.98 Tracking the location of cell phones within the US if the owner or user is suspected of terror-ist activities (p26) Yes 10 10 80 5.80

No 68 15 17 2.69 Collecting “meta data” for most phone calls or text messages within the US (only phone numbers, dates and duration) (p27) Yes 37 12 51 4.28

No 45 15 40 3.86 Recording email or Internet communications between persons within the US if any partici-pant is suspected of terrorist activities (p28) Yes 11 10 79 5.71

Notice the pronounced differences in the acceptability of domestic surveillance by government when it is authorized by executive agencies without judicial review versus the same surveillance authorized by a federal court order. For each of the four types of surveillance, a majority of respondents supported the action if it is conducted with judicial authorization, with means all above midscale and statisti-cally significantly higher than the comparable policy if conducted without a court order (p < .0001 for each paring). Notice also that the broad collection of meta data for most phone calls and text messages without regard to suspicion of terror-

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ist activities received significantly less support than the other surveillance policies (p < .0001 for each comparable pairing). Clearly, our respondents were generally supportive of some invasive government surveillance policies to prevent terrorism when authorized by judicial review, but were skeptical and generally unsuppor-tive of such antiterror policies without court oversight.

Concerns about Internet Privacy

e also investigated concerns about privacy when the threat is not asso-ciated with government agencies and policies by asking participants to respond to five randomly ordered questions about Internet privacy. For

each, respondents were instructed to express their concerns on a scale from zero (not at all concerned) to ten (extremely concerned). We show the questions, grouped distributions, and means in Table 2.2.

WTable 2.2: Concerns about Internet Privacy

(0 = Not At All Concerned—10 = Extremely Concerned)

How concerned are you that …

% Low Concern

(0–3)

% Unsure

(4–6)

% High Concern

(7–10) Mean

Your identity may be stolen?2 (p95) 6 20 74 7.82

Personal information you supply to companies online may not be adequately protected? (p92)

5 20 75 7.79

Information you provide for online services may be shared with others without your knowledge? (p93)

7 21 72 7.63

Digitized medical records for you or members of your immediate family may be accessed by persons other than authorized medical professionals? (p96)

15 27 58 6.80

Your use of the Internet (such as information you pro-vide for online services, or a record of your Internet searches, or your email exchanges) may be collected by the federal government? (p94)

18 24 58 6.67

Substantial majorities were concerned about each of the Internet privacy issues, and mean concerns all were well above midscale, indicating that our respondents were sensitive to potential intrusions into their privacy associated with Internet activities.

So who can the public trust to protect their privacy? To help gage relative levels of trust among our respondents for government vs. private sectors, we posed the following randomly ordered questions: 2 Of course identity theft is not a risk only through Internet transactions, but because of the lead-in and the other questions in this series, identity theft relating to Internet usage was implied.

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Thinking broadly about privacy in the United States, please rate your level of trust in each of the following to protect and to not misuse sensitive information about you and your immediate family on a scale from zero (no trust) to ten (complete trust).

• p13: The US federal government

• p14: US businesses, corporations, and industries

We chart responses in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3: Trust to Protect and Not Misuse Sensitive Personal Information

On average, our respondents expressed significantly greater trust in the private sector than the federal government to protect and not misuse sensitive personal information (p < .0001). To investigate potential demographic differences, we compare mean levels of trust in government and private sectors by demographic categories in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3: Mean Trust by Demographic Categories

Demographic Attributes

Federal Government

Private Sector

p-Value

Age

18–29 years 4.33 4.64 .0207

30–49 years 4.23 4.69 .0004

50 years and above 3.63 4.09 .0010

Gender

Women 3.88 4.20 .0014

Men 4.13 4.66 < .0001

0

5

10

15

20

25

0 1 2 3 4 5 6No

Trust

7 8 9 10 Complete

Trust

Means: Fed Gov’t = 4.00 Business = 4.43

%

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Table 2.3 (continued): Mean Trust by Demographic Attributes

Demographic Attributes

Federal Government

Private Sector

p-Value

Education

< College Graduate 4.02 4.45 < .0001

Bachelor’s Degree or Higher 3.97 4.39 .0014

Race / Ethnicity

Majority (White) 3.66 4.25 < .0001

Minorities 5.14 5.05 .5580

Household Income (2013)

< $50,000 3.96 4.32 .0005

$50,000–$99,999 4.00 4.43 .0023

$100,000 or More 4.21 5.03 .0053

Political Ideology

Liberal 4.85 4.14 .0001

Moderate 4.17 4.43 .0036

Conservative 2.65 4.68 < .0001

Results show that mean perceptions of trust were higher for the private sector across all demographic categories except racial/ethnic minorities, and differences in means also were statistically significant across all demographic categories ex-cept for racial minorities. Thus as a group, and across important demographic sub-groups, our respondents trusted the business sector to protect and to not misuse sensitive private information significantly more than they trusted the federal gov-ernment to do so. This is especially striking given the concerns those same respon-dents expressed about the security of Internet interactions, which represent an in-creasing share of business transactions for a large segment of the US public.

Section 2.3: Perceptions of Terrorism, Crime, and Security

M ost government policies that are perceived to threaten privacy are ra-tionalized to the American people as necessary to help prevent terror-ism or domestic crime, resulting in enhanced national and individual

security. This rationalization produces tension between privacy and security, though the relationship is not necessarily zero-sum.

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It is problematic to attempt to measure security directly because it is an essentially contested concept (Buzan 1991; Freedman 1992; Gallie 1962; Rothschild 1995). One of the most useful conceptualizations of security is provided by Arnold Wolf-ers (1952, 485): “security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.” Thus perhaps security can be best understood as the inverse of risk/threat, and to provide baseline indications of today’s threat perceptions of ter-rorism and domestic crimes, we posed the following series of questions.

Lead-in: The next several questions ask about your assessment of the threats from crime and terrorism. We want to know about your perceptions and beliefs, so don’t worry about being right or wrong when answering. For each question, please con-sider both the likelihood of a terrorist or criminal event and its potential conse-quences. Please respond to each on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no threat and ten means extreme threat.

• p15: Remembering to consider both the likelihood and potential consequences, how do you rate the overall threat of terrorism of all types throughout the world today?

• p16: Focusing more specifically on our own country, and considering both for-eign and domestic sources of terrorism, how do you rate the threat to society of all kinds of terrorism in the United States today?

• p17: Thinking now about your personal situation, how do you rate the risk of all forms of terrorism to you and your immediate family in the United States?

___________________________________________________________________

• p18: Thinking now about all forms of violent crimes that are not considered acts of terrorism, such as assault, murder, rape, car-jacking, armed robbery, kidnap-ping, etc., how do you rate today’s threat of all forms of violent crimes to you and your immediate family in the US?

• p19: Now, please consider all forms of non-violent crimes that are not considered acts of terrorism, such as property theft, burglary, fraud, corruption, identity theft, etc.; how do you rate today’s threat of all forms of non-violent crimes to you and your immediate family in the US?

• p20: Finally, remembering to consider both the likelihood and potential conse-quences, how do you rate the risks of all forms of crime—including violent and non-violent crimes—to American society today?

We compare grouped distributions and mean response values for the three terrorism questions in Figure 2.4 and grouped distributions and means for responses to the three questions on crime are shown in Figure 2.5. Judgments of perceived security from terrorism and from domestic crime can be approximated by reversing the threat scales.

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Figure 2.4: Terrorism Threat Perceptions (p15–p17)

Figure 2.5: Crime Threat Perceptions (p18—p20)

Respondents assessed the mean threat of terrorism worldwide to be significantly greater than the threat of terrorism within the US, and both of the larger contexts were seen as posing significantly greater threat than that felt personally (p < .0001 for each). Similarly, the mean threat of crimes other than terrorism to the US soci-ety as a whole was perceived to be significantly higher than the threat of either violent or nonviolent crimes to the individual respondent (p < .0001 for each). It is interesting to note that, even when prompted to consider both probability and consequence, respondents judged the average direct threat of nonviolent crimes to

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66

2233

7

40

60

80

100

Low (0-3) Medium (4-6) High (7-10)

%

0 = No Threat—10 = Extreme Threat 11

8

59

373332 31

20

0

Worldwide7.36

Within US6.81

To You and Your Family4.97

Means:

You–Crimes: 6.02

Violet

6

2818

36

12

0

20

40

60

80

100

Low (0-3) Medium (4-

%

0 = No Threat—10 = Extrem

USA–All Crimes: 7.21

66

46

32

56

6) High (7-10)

e Threat

You–Nonviolent Crimes: 6.61

Means:

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them and their families to be significantly higher than the threat of violent crimes (p < .0001).

When the scales are reversed, we see that participants rated their own personal security from terrorism significantly higher than their fellow US residents or those residing outside the US. Similarly, respondents considered themselves to be rela-tively more secure from crime than other Americans, but less secure from nonvio-lent crimes than from violent ones.

Section 2.4: Balancing Privacy and Security

n this section, we describe two metrics used to assess respondent concerns and preferences about balancing privacy and security today. First, we asked the following question, responses to which are charted in Figure 2.6.

p29: Considering the full range and scope of existing domestic policies to prevent terrorism, on a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all concerned and ten means extremely concerned, how concerned are you that data currently collected by government agencies about the communications, activities, and movements of peo-ple within the US may be unnecessarily compromising liberties and privacy?

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Figure 2.6: Concern that Government Is Unnecessarily Compromising Privacy

3 2 36

3

12 13

16

13

8

21

0

5

10

15

20

25

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not At All Concerned

ExtremelyConcerned

%

Mean = 6.76

Note that the modal response was the highest scale value of ten, the mean was sub-stantially above midscale, and fully 72 percent of respondents expressed concern that government may be unnecessarily compromising privacy and other liberties ostensibly to help combat terrorism in the US. These responses are consistent with concerns previously described at the beginning of this chapter, as well as the rela-tive ranking of privacy concerns compared to other major issues—including secu-

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rity from terrorism. These response patterns also are consonant with perceptions of relative threats/security from terrorism and crime shown above. To further investi-gate how these perceptions varied across major demographic categories, we com-pared mean responses by the same demographic categories previously identified in Table 2.3. Means were remarkably consistent and above 6.5 for all demographic subgroups. Statistically significant differences were noted for three categories. On average, respondents 50 years of age or older were significantly less concerned (6.51) than younger participants. Women reported significantly less mean concern at 6.52 than men at 7.02. And mean concern among political conservatives (7.21) was significantly higher than either liberals (6.66) or moderates (6.65).

These kinds of suspicions about government intrusions are reinforced by responses shown in Figure 2.7 to the following more generalized question about trust in gov-ernment.

p99: On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means none of the time and ten means all of the time, how much of the time do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right for the American people?

Figure 2.7: Trust Federal Government to Do What is Right for American People

The mean was well below midscale, and a majority of 58 percent of respondents distrusted the federal government to do the “right thing” for the American people. Fewer than one-third of participants expressed a level of confidence in the gov-ernment in Washington that was above midscale.

We close this chapter by reporting respondent perceptions of how they thought privacy and security ought to be balanced versus how they perceived that balance in contemporary policies.

14 14 1413

9 810

8

5

2 3

0

5

10

15

20

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 None of the

Time All of the

Time

%

Mean = 3.90

23

p97: Providing security for Americans sometimes requires compromising individual privacy, and finding the right mix of security and privacy is a matter for public de-bate. For this question, assume that black marbles represent the level of emphasis placed on the security of Americans, and white marbles represent the level of em-phasis placed on the privacy of Americans. In your view, how many of each color should be in a total combined mix of 100 marbles?

p98: Again using the marbles example where black marbles represent the level of emphasis placed on the security of Americans, and white marbles represent the level of emphasis placed on the privacy of Americans, how many of each color do you think represents the way the US government is balancing considerations of security and privacy today?

Figure 2.8 compares responses to both questions.

Figure 2.8: Balancing Privacy and Security in the US: Preferences vs. Perceptions

Privacy 48.8%

Security51.2%

Mean Preferred(Normative)

Balance

Privacy

39.8% Security

60.2%

Mean Perceived Current Balance

On average, participants preferred that security be given slight weight over privacy in an idealized balance (about 51 to 49 percent), but most respondents perceived that today security is being emphasized by about a 60/40 percent ratio. Again, we find a high level of consistency in this comparison of preference vs. perception and the levels of concern expressed above in other questions. In the view of those we surveyed, government was intrusively diminishing privacy for the ostensible purpose of further enhancing security to a degree that was not supported by the majority of participants. Furthermore, respondent perceptions of their personal security from terrorism and crime seemed not to warrant current government emphasis on security at the cost of privacy.

24

These sensitivities to government intrusions into personal privacy, justified by government assessments of security needs that were not necessarily shared by our participants, are helping shape the security–privacy environment into which widespread applications of unmanned aircraft systems must be introduced. In the absence of additional large-scale terror attacks within the US, public receptivity to UAS and attendant privacy concerns may condition support or opposition for various UAS applications. In other words, domestic applications of UAS (drones) are not being introduced into a neutral policy environment. They are entering one in which many Americans perceive their privacy to be eroding, and to the degree that UAS are perceived to pose additional threats to privacy, public resistance should be anticipated.

Takeaway Points

• Privacy occupies a prominent place among other major policy issues of con-cern to the public today. Our respondents reported higher levels of concern about privacy than about security—including security from terrorism. This is-sue is part of the long-running debate on how best to balance liberty and secu-rity, with privacy currently representing that aspect of liberty being most com-promised in the pursuit of security.

• Technical capabilities to monitor digital telecommunications in the US and other countries are making it possible to gather previously unimaginable amounts of information about Americans (and citizens of other countries). Re-cent revelations about US government monitoring and collection of domestic communications ostensibly for the purpose of enhancing security from terror-ism and other crimes is increasing pubic consciousness of threats to their pri-vacy. Legitimacy and relatively broad support is generally afforded to those security policies that undergo judicial review, but intrusive policies that are or-dered by executive or administrative authorities are viewed with much greater skepticism and distrust.

• Respondents recognized that the Internet poses very substantial risks to pri-vacy, and even though the portion of US commerce involving Internet transac-tions is growing at a rapid pace, participants to this survey trusted US busi-nesses, corporations, and industries more than the US federal government to protect sensitive information about them and their immediate families.

• Participants rated the worldwide risks of terrorism to be significantly higher than the risks of terrorism within the US, and they considered the domestic risks of terrorism to be higher than specific risks of terrorism to themselves and

25

26

their immediate families. Similarly, risks of non-terrorist forms of crime to US society were rated significantly higher than perceived risks of either violent or nonviolent crimes to themselves and their families. When asked to separately rate the personal risks of all forms of violent and nonviolent crime, on average, the risks of nonviolent crime were seen as more threatening.

• In weighing the tradeoffs between security and privacy, participants reported high levels of concern that government is unnecessarily compromising individ-ual privacy, rationalized by enhancing security from terrorism and other crimes, and they reported low levels of trust in the federal government to do what is right for the public. Perceptions are that current policies emphasize security more heavily than privacy to a degree that exceeds normative preferences. Un-manned aircraft systems are being introduced into a policy environment that is being conditioned by increasing public concerns about threats to privacy.

In the following chapter, we explore emergent public views on UAS before drones are introduced in widespread domestic applications.

Chapter Three Public Predispositions on UAS

Section 3.1: Assessing the Policy Environment and Its Maturation

s briefly described in Chapter One, during the consciousness raising stage the general public gradually becomes aware of new technologies and their possible applications. This stage is characterized by sometimes slow but

increasing public awareness as new information is gathered and assimilated. In the case of UAS, people will need to understand the differences between the military applications with which they have been at least superficially apprised and potential domestic uses of different kinds of the same families of technologies for peaceful purposes. Today, as regulatory guidance is being developed for how UAS can be operated safely within the US, potential uses are receiving some attention from media sources and prospective manufacturers as limited applications begin to be introduced for specific purposes. For example, civilian versions of unarmed mili-tary drones currently are being used by the US Customs and Border Patrol to help secure US northern and southern borders. In some cases, law enforcement agencies have requested limited uses of those drones to assist ongoing operations near the borders (Johnson 2013; Whitlock and Timberg 2014). But to date, the American public largely is unaware of these or other limited domestic drone applications, such as disaster assessments or search and rescue. Government agencies responsi-ble for managing the national airspace are only now beginning to conceptualize how UAS may be employed and controlled safely (U.S. Department of Transporta-tion 2013). So the policy stage for domestic applications of UAS is in an early phase of maturation that could be termed consciousness raising.

A

The working through stage encompasses wider public distribution and assimila-tion of factual information about new technologies and their possible applications. Regulatory bodies develop rules, restrictions, and conditions for the safe operation of new technologies. The risks and benefits of potential applications are debated as policy coalitions form, scientific opinion is marshaled, and alternative policy choices are debated. Investment opportunities are offered as entrepreneurs seek development and production capital. Infrastructure and support systems are de-veloped. Widespread domestic applications of UAS have yet to reach this stage in policy maturation, but the privacy–security debate, partially addressed in the pre-ceding chapter, most likely has progressed to this policy stage. Privacy advocates have aligned against security advocates to challenge the relative balance that is

27

preferred versus that which is perceived to exist. Increasing numbers of the public are paying attention to the issues and debates, and some are actively engaging in the ongoing policy debate about how to balance privacy and security.1 This is im-portant to recognize because while UAS technologies and policies have yet to reach this stage, they likely will be conditioned by policy debates over privacy and security that are further along in the policy maturation process.

By the resolution stage of policy evolution, public opinion generally has moved to firm policy preferences. Resolution certainly does not imply unanimity or even con-sensus of judgment, it just recognizes that firm choices have been reached by most members of the public. Neither the privacy-security dynamic nor emerging policies for domestic applications of UAS have reached this stage of policy evolution.

This means that the questions we posed to participants in this survey are not likely to reflect firm, resolved, inflexible policy preferences. In the case of the privacy-security dynamic discussed in Chapter Two, they represent more considered opin-ions that are further along in maturation than are the initial opinions we report in this chapter on public predispositions on domestic uses of UAS. But just because opinions are sampled early in the policy development process does not mean they are either without policy relevance or so unformed as to be unreliable pointers for policy evolution. One important utility is that they reflect early impressions and suggest where public receptivity or reluctance is likely to form. Another is that they indicate deficits in public understandings of the science and technologies involved. Importantly, they provide what can prove to be an extremely valuable baseline against which evolving opinions can be compared as UAS policies develop, are de-bated, and move toward public judgments. It is for those utilities and ends that we report our respondents’ early views on what is almost certain to become an increas-ingly important policy domain—the use of unmanned aircraft systems within the United States.

Section 3.2: Views on Military vs. Domestic Uses of UAS

ost Americans have been introduced to UAS through the use of US drones employed for a variety of missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries where American and coalition military forces have engaged in

combat against terrorists and other indigenous forces. Among those applications M 1 While we cannot quantify the degree of influence any single policy or revelation has had in stimu-lating debate on privacy–security, it is not unreasonable to suggest that recent publicity surrounding newly revealed details of electronic surveillance of telecommunications by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other US federal government entities may have been a crucial catalyst.

28

have been two predominant uses: surveillance/intelligence gathering and the applica-tion of lethal force against enemy combatants and suspected terrorists. In this section we briefly compare respondent views on the uses of UAS for security purposes in other countries versus within the US. For each of the following randomly ordered applications, participants indicated their views on a scale from one (strongly oppose) to seven (strongly support). We compare grouped distributions and mean responses in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Comparative Views on Using UAS Abroad and at Home to Enhance Security

(1 = Strongly Oppose—7 = Strongly Support)

How do you feel about using …

% Oppose

(1–3)

% Unsure

(4)

% Support

(5–7) Mean

Unarmed drones to monitor suspected terrorist activities in other countries? (p30) 11 15 74 5.49

Armed drones to attack terrorist activities or to kill sus-pected terrorists with bombs or missiles in other coun-tries? (p31)

18 17 65 5.12

Unarmed drones to monitor the behaviors and move-ments of persons within the US suspected of terrorist activities? (p33)

20 18 62 4.89

Unarmed drones to monitor US cities and neighbor-hoods for suspicious activities in an effort to prevent crime? (p32)

31 21 48 4.29

Strong majorities of our respondents supported the use of either unarmed or armed UAS in other countries—even when lethal force is applied—to help pre-vent terrorism. A smaller, but still substantial majority (62 percent) were in favor of using unarmed drones for preventing terrorism within the US. But support was significantly lower for using unarmed drones to help prevent crime within the US. Notably, support for both policies for using UAS in other countries was statisti-cally significantly higher than support for either domestic application (p < .0001 for all foreign vs. domestic comparisons).

Section 3.3: Perceptions of Risks and Benefits of Domestic Uses

Prior to investigating more specific views on the domestic uses of UAS, we provided the following introductory paragraph to illustrate some of the po-tential domestic applications of drones and to identify some of the concerns

that have been expressed about widespread domestic uses (Calo 2011; Schlag 2013). The purpose of the information was to help respondents focus on domestic

29

applications versus military ones, and to introduce them to some of the reserva-tions that may accompany domestic uses before we asked participants to assess the risks and benefits of specific applications of UAS within the US.

Drones (unmanned aircraft systems) are being developed in many different sizes and designs for a wide variety of non-military uses within the United States. For exam-ple, drones have been used to assess and monitor the extent of wildfires, to assist in search and rescue missions, to monitor US borders, to assist in various law enforce-ment activities, and other information gathering roles. Also the development and employment of drones within the US may create thousands of new jobs and be eco-nomically beneficial. But some people argue that, depending on how drones are used and who controls the information they collect, drones may threaten individual privacy, pose a hazard to manned aircraft, create a public nuisance, and could cause damages to people and property.

Next we identified a wide variety of potential UAS applications within the US and asked participants to provide their initial reactions in terms of perceived risks and benefits. Responses were on a zero to ten scale where zero meant that potential risks were perceived to far outweigh potential benefits, five meant that expected risks and benefits were equally balanced, and ten meant that potential benefits were expected to far outweigh associated risks. For each of the specified uses, we chart distributions of grouped responses and show mean values in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Assessing Risks and Benefits of Domestic Uses of UAS

(0 = Risks far outweigh benefits— 10 = Benefits far outweigh risks)

Using …

% Risks >

Benefits (0–3)

% Risks ≈

Benefits (4–6)

% Risks <

Benefits (7–10)

Mean

Unarmed drones to assist search and rescue efforts on land or at sea (p35)

5 20 75 7.95

Unarmed drones to assist relief efforts in response to natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, torna-does, and hurricanes (p41)

6 26 68 7.59

Unarmed drones to assist law enforcement activities such as tracking vehicles, rescuing hostages, and capturing fleeing suspects within the US (p40)

9 30 61 7.00

Unarmed drones to monitor US borders and sea-shores for illegal immigration (p34)

11 32 57 6.95

Unarmed drones to monitor the behaviors and move-ments of persons within the US suspected of terrorist activities (p37)

13 35 52 6.59

Unarmed drones to monitor the behaviors and move-ments of persons within the US suspected of criminal activities not related to terrorism (p38)

24 37 39 5.57

30

Table 3.2 (continued): Assessing Risks and Benefits of Domestic Uses of UAS

(0 = Risks far outweigh benefits— 10 = Benefits far outweigh risks)

Using …

% Risks >

Benefits (0–3)

% Risks ≈

Benefits (4–6)

% Risks <

Benefits (7–10)

Mean

Unarmed drones to monitor US cities and neighbor-hoods for suspicious activities in an effort to prevent crime (p36)

27 37 36 5.40

Drones armed with non-lethal weapons such as rub-ber bullets or tear gas to assist law enforcement ac-tivities against persons within the US suspected of criminal activities (p45)

27 39 34 5.21

Large, remotely controlled unarmed drones to move freight such as mail and packages if approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (p43)

30 43 31 4.96

Unarmed drones to provide media coverage of break-ing news events (p42)

30 40 29 4.94

Unarmed drones to monitor vehicular traffic and en-force traffic laws within the US (p39)

32 39 29 4.76

Small, pre-programmed drones to quickly deliver light-weight packages to private residences within the US if approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (p44)

34 36 30 4.69

Drones armed with lethal weapons such as guns (but not bombs or missiles) to assist law enforcement ac-tivities against armed fugitives within the US (p46)

34 36 30 4.68

Large numbers of low-flying unarmed drones to allow tourists to make their own videos of wilderness areas and national parks (p47a)

44 33 23 4.03

Large numbers of low-flying unarmed drones to allow tourists to make their own videos of major US cities and urban areas (p47b)

56 29 15 3.10

Without respondents having more than superficial knowledge of prospective do-mestic UAS applications, they initially judged the benefits of drones to outweigh their risks for the following purposes:

• Search and rescue

• Disaster response

• Unarmed law enforcement

• Monitoring borders for illegal immigration

• Monitoring persons suspected of terrorist activities

31

• Monitoring persons suspected of criminal activities

• Monitoring cities and neighborhoods to prevent crime

• Assisting law enforcement using drones armed with non-lethal weapons

Risks and benefits were perceived to be roughly balanced for drone operations to move air freight and to provide media coverage of breaking news events.

Risks were perceived to outweigh benefits for these types of drone operations:

• Monitoring vehicular traffic and enforcing traffic laws

• Routine delivery of small packages to residences

• Assisting law enforcement using drones armed with lethal weapons

• Allowing tourists to use large numbers of small drones to take video of wilder-ness regions or metropolitan areas

These kinds of initial perceptions suggest that most respondents were relatively open to a wide variety of potential UAS operations, especially when societal value was perceived to be gained and drones were not armed with lethal weapons.

In addition to gaining insight into public expectations of risks and benefits associ-ated with various UAS operations, it also can be helpful to better understand how members of the public think key institutions that may be involved in the oversight or adjudication of policies for domestic drone operations may be predisposed to assess risk–benefit relationships. To assess expectations of institutional risk/benefit bias, we posed the following query.

Using a scale from one to seven, where one means exaggerate risks, four means ac-curately assess risks and benefits and seven means exaggerate benefits, please rate how you expect each of the following organizations would evaluate the risks and benefits of using unarmed drones within the United States.

We compare respondent expectations of how selected US institutions may evalu-ate risks and benefits of UAS domestic operations in Figure 3.1.

32

Figure 3.1: Expected Institutional Risk–Benefit Bias in UAS Operations

4.84

3

.46

3.83

1 2 3

4.37

4.27

4 5 6 7

Department of Homeland Security

American Civil Liberties Unio

xaggerate

n

Federal Aviation Administration

US Supreme Court

Media

Risks

Accurately AssessRisks / Benefits

ExaggerateBenefits

E

These indicators of public expectations are more useful as directional pointers than as precise calibrations, but they suggest that respondents expect the media and the ACLU likely may emphasize the risks of UAS, while the FAA and the DHS may emphasize the benefits of UAS. Though the magnitude is small, par-ticipants seemed to anticipate a welcoming judicial attitude toward UAS.

Section 3.4: Trust in Protecting UAS Collateral Data

he process of collecting information for most purposes by UAS likely will involve collecting unintended collateral data or data not relating to the primary purpose for which the UAS are employed. To get a feel for par-

ticipants’ trust in various institutions to protect data relating to innocent persons, we posed the following introduction.

TNow we want you to consider who controls drones and the information they may collect. Assume that drones are used to help prevent terrorism within the US by monitoring the movements and activities of persons suspected of terrorist activities. In the process of doing so they may unintentionally collect information about the ac-tivities and movements of innocent persons. Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means no trust and ten means complete trust, please rate the level of trust you have in each of the following entities to protect the privacy of innocent persons by using the information collected by drones only for preventing terrorism.

In Figure 3.2 we show mean reported levels of trust in each of seven institutions and agencies to protect data inadvertently gathered about innocent persons by drone operations intended to prevent terrorism.

33

Figure 3.2: Institutional Trust in Protecting Data on Innocent Persons

4.66

4.83

5.04

5.13

5.23

5.29

0 2 4 6

National Security Agenc

5.75

8 10

y

Central Intelligence Agency

Dept. of Homeland Security

Local Law Enforcement

Fed. Bureau of Investigation

State Law Enforcement

Department of Defense

NoTrust

CompleteTrust

Means

While the Department of Defense was viewed as the most trustworthy of the listed entities by a statistically significant margin (p < .0001 for each pairing), and the National Security Agency was rated lowest, notice that all the ratings are rela-tively near midscale (5.0). The fact that, on average, none of the security entities received high trust ratings suggests substantial skepticism among our respondents that in the process of using UAS to gather information about suspected terrorists, collateral information gathered on innocent persons will be adequately safe-guarded. This is broadly consistent with the concerns about privacy and lack of trust in government to protect sensitive information about individuals reported in Chapter One. It also helps illustrate how UAS employed by government ostensi-bly for security purposes are not entering a neutral policy environment. Our find-ings show deep concerns about the contemporary privacy–security relationship and skepticism about how government protects sensitive information about its citizens. Certain UAS systems used by various levels of government for security purposes likely will have to overcome latent public prejudices and suspicions about mission objectives and privacy protections.

Section 3.5: UAS-Mounted Sensors vs. Ground-Mounted Sensors

o investigate whether our respondents considered UAS to be just another platform for sensors or whether UAS sensors used for the same purposes as ground-mounted sensors would be viewed differently, we posed the follow-

ing introduction and stipulated five different surveillance objectives. T

Please think about the uses of cameras to monitor public spaces and activities for the purposes of law enforcement, preventing terrorism, or other efforts to enhance secu-

34

rity. For these questions, assume that the cameras are being operated and the images are being used by state or local police authorities within the US. We want to know how you view the use of cameras that are: (a) mounted on ground-based structures such as buildings, utility poles, towers, etc., or ground-based vehicles, such as cars or trucks, versus (b) cameras carried by drones. For each question, please respond on a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly oppose and seven means you strongly support the proposed policy.

Table 3.3 compares grouped distributions and mean levels of support for ground-mounted vs. drone-mounted cameras employed for the same purposes in five stipulated scenarios presented in random order.

Table 3.3: Comparing Ground-Mounted Cameras to UAS-Mounted Cameras for the Same Surveillance Purposes

(1 = Strongly Oppose—7 = Strongly Support)

How do you feel about using …

% Oppose

(1–3)

% Unsure

(4)

% Support

(5–7) Mean

Ground cameras to continuously monitor streets and businesses? (p60a)

24 18 58 4.81

Drone cameras to continuously monitor streets and businesses? (p60b)

46 20 34 3.77

Ground cameras to enforce traffic laws such as stop-lights or speeding? (p61a)

34 18 48 4.33

Drone cameras to enforce traffic laws such as stoplights or speeding? (p61b)

53 18 29 3.41

Ground cameras to monitor public transportation such as train terminals, bus stations, and airports? (p62a) 13 17 70 5.39

Drone cameras to monitor public transportation such as train terminals, bus stations, and airports? (p62b)

34 20 46 4.21

Ground cameras to monitor large public gatherings such as sporting events (p63a)

17 17 66 5.16

Drone cameras to monitor large public gatherings such as sporting events (p63b)

30 23 47 4.37

Ground cameras to search for or to track suspected criminals or terrorists (p64a)

13 13 74 5.46

Drone cameras to search for or to track suspected crimi-nals or terrorists (p64b)

20 16 64 5.05

The fact that mean levels of support were statistically significantly higher (p < .0001) for using ground-mounted cameras than for UAS-mounted cameras for each of the five specified purposes strongly suggests that participants did not view drones as sensor platforms that were equally acceptable to other types of sensor

35

platforms. While we cannot identify the underlying rationales, we might speculate that survey participants were more familiar with ground-based cameras used for public surveillance, but that alone may not sufficiently explain the observed differ-ences. It seems at least possible that respondents held other additional motives for considering UAS surveillance to be fundamentally different from and significantly less acceptable than other forms of surveillance used for the same objectives.

Some of those reasons may be related to public predispositions about UAS, and to further probe some of those beliefs, we posed the series of randomly ordered statements shown in Table 3.4. and asked participants to respond using a scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). Again, we provide grouped distributions and mean responses for each.

Table 3.4: Beliefs About UAS

1 = Strongly Disagree—7 = Strongly Agree %

Disagree (1–3)

% Unsure

(4)

% Agree (5–7)

Mean

Regulating drones will require some of the same kinds of operating rules applied to other forms of civil aviation in order to provide public safety, but because of the poten-tial for drones to be used for spying on the public, they will require special regulations limiting their uses. (p67)

7 15 78 5.66

Because drones do not have to be large enough to carry human operators, they can be very small, and their po-tential for invading privacy and other civil liberties is much higher than that of manned aircraft. (p66)

9 19 72 5.42

It should be illegal for anyone to take drone imagery of me on my own property without my permission. (p71)

15 16 69 5.34

Drones are very much like manned aircraft because they are still operated by humans; the primary difference is that the drone operators are on the ground.

16 22 62 5.00

Drones and their associated technologies represent im-portant economic potential for the US, and we should increase our lead over other countries in developing and exploiting drone technologies and their peaceful applica-tions. (p68)

20 29 51 4.63

We Americans already are under too much surveillance, such as cameras in cities and buildings and at traffic lights and in police vehicles, so we should not allow drones to provide even more public surveillance. (p69)

31 33 46 4.35

If a drone flies over my property, I should have the right to shoot it down. (p70)

54 16 30 3.34

36

Reactions to these statements about UAS suggest that respondents held predispo-sitions that made them cautious about widespread uses of UAS for surveillance purposes. However that caution does not suggest that broad support is unlikely for other kinds of applications for socially beneficial purposes such as some of those previously enumerated in Table 3.3. In fact, the relative risk–benefit relationships reported in that table suggest that there may be many UAS applications that the public views favorably, but responses to the statements in Table 3.5 suggest that there are underlying concerns about privacy that likely will help shape public re-ceptivity to proposed UAV applications.

Section 3.6: Purposeful Misuse of UAS

ew UAS technologies or advances in existing ones not only provide po-tentially beneficial positive applications within legal parameters, but they also present the possibility of purposeful misuse by those who may want

to apply UAS capabilities for illegal objectives. To see how participants viewed the potential for UAS to be used for nefarious purposes, we asked them to rate the risks of the following two misapplications on a scale from zero (no risk) to ten (extreme risk).

N• p72: How do you rate the risk that drones might be used by criminals to support

criminal activities with the US (such as drug smuggling)?

• p73: How do you rate the risk that drones might be used by terrorists to support terrorism within the US (such as gathering sensitive information or attacking high value targets)?

We show distributions and mean responses in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.

Figure 3.3: Risk that UAS May Be Used for Criminal Purposes

30

35

Mean = 6.77 No

Risk Extreme

Risk

%

42

4 4 4

14

8

1416

7

23

0

5

10

15

20

25

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

37

Figure 3.4: Risk that UAS May Be Used for Terrorist Purposes

3

1 2 3 3

13

912

1411

29

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10No

Risk Extreme

Risk

%

Mean = 7.30

Clearly, our respondents considered the risks that UAS may be used by criminals or terrorists to be substantial. While the mean risk of terrorism was judged statis-tically significantly higher than that of criminal uses (p < .0001), notice that the modal response for both types of risk was the highest scale value of ten, and dis-tribution patterns generally were similar.

Takeaway Points

• The public is in the very early stages of considering widespread domestic ap-plications of UAS for peaceful purposes. Most of our respondents were suppor-tive of using UAS for military purposes in other countries, but may not have been aware of adaptations of existing technologies and development of entirely new UAS for use within the US. This means that UAS policies are in an early stage of maturation in which most members of the public are gathering infor-mation, forming impressions, and open to debate about domestic applications. Opinion appears to be labile and probably malleable.

• When asked to express initial impressions and beliefs about the risks and benefits of domestic applications of UAS for a wide variety of purposes, respondents generally considered benefits to exceed risks when using UAS for search and rescue; disaster response; unarmed law enforcement (or law enforcement opera-tions in which UAS are armed with non-lethal weapons); monitoring US borders, seashores, and harbors; monitoring persons suspected of terrorism and other criminal behaviors; and monitoring cities and neighborhoods to prevent crime. Risks and benefits were seen as relatively balanced for using UAS to transport

38

39

air freight or to provide media coverage of breaking news events. Risks were judged to outweigh benefits for law enforcement using UAS armed with lethal weapons, delivering small packages to residences, and for monitoring traffic and enforcing traffic laws.

• Initial expectations of institutional risk/benefit bias suggests that the media and the ACLU are perceived as likely to exaggerate risks; the FAA and DHS are seen as likely to exaggerate benefits; and the courts are perceived as likely to adopt a welcoming view of UAS.

• UAS platforms are not yet seen as equally acceptable platforms for surveillance compared to ground platforms with which participants are more familiar. The ac-ceptability of cameras mounted on drones was significantly lower than cameras mounted on ground platforms when used for the same purposes.

• Incipient beliefs that we tested suggest that developing UAS industry in the US is seen as offering potentially important economic benefits. However, UAS ap-plications also are seen as posing greater threats to privacy than other types of platforms, and respondents believed that domestic uses of UAS will require care-ful oversight and specialized regulation to protect privacy.

• Participants expressed concern that UAS could be used for nefarious purposes, and rated the risks high that UAS may be adapted for illegal purposes such as smuggling drugs or supporting terrorism.

The UAS applications stipulated thus far have been presented in generalized ab-stract terms without detailed contexts. In the next chapter, we describe UAS opera-tions in two specific scenarios designed to allow participants to weigh and consider their views on UAS applications with greater situational awareness.

Chapter Four UAS Scenarios, Debate Parameters, and Policy Directions

n our closing chapter we have three objectives: (a) to assess views of UAS operations in two detailed scenarios; (b) to provide balanced ar-guments for and against the widespread use of UAS within the US and

compare reactions; and (c) to measure preferences for broad UAS policy directions.

I Section 4.1: UAS Scenarios

We introduced participants to this portion of our survey with the following.

Now we want you to consider some specific conditions in which drones could be employed and think about how their use might be authorized and how in-formation they gather might be used. Please read the following scenario de-scription and then answer the questions as they relate to the specified use of drones. (The two following scenarios and associated questions were presented in random order.)

Scenario-1: Security Application

Unarmed drones are being used to monitor a high-crime area in a major city in the US. Each drone is equipped with high resolution video cameras that can identify and track specific vehicles and can identify individuals using face recognition software. The drones also carry infrared cameras for use at night, and a radar than can “see” inside certain kinds of buildings or structures to de-termine if they are inhabited. All of the imagery is fed in real-time to a central monitoring facility on the ground. Each drone can stay airborne for 24 hours, and by rotating additional drones, continuous surveillance can be maintained around-the-clock. The primary purpose of the drones is to help prevent and control criminal activities and enforce the law.

We began by asking a generalized question designed to test reactions to the scenario and measure support for such operations when conducted with and

40

without a court order. We compare grouped distributions and means in Figure 4.1.

p74: On a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly oppose us-ing drones like this, and seven means you strongly support it, how do you feel about using drones in this scenario with and without a court order authorizing the surveillance?

Figure 4.1: Support for Using UAS in Scenario-1

The difference is support when the proposed UAS operation is authorized by a court order was substantially greater (70 percent) than when the opera-tion was administratively ordered without judicial review (29 percent). No-tice that the modal response for each authorization was the polar opposite scale value, and means were statistically significantly different (p < .0001). These response patterns are consistent with the perceived legitimacy of various other surveillance policies when conducted with and without judi-cial review summarized in Chapter Two, Table 2.1.

Next we investigated confidence in federal (FBI), state, and local law en-forcement agencies to conduct the UAS operations specified in the scenario. Ratings were provided on the same scale from one (strongly oppose) to seven (strongly support), and we compare grouped responses and means in Figure 4.2.

29

6

36

15 17 15

38

0 10 20 30 40 50

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Oppose

StronglySupport

%

Means: With Court Order = 5.34

12 1317

13

5

11

W/O Court Order = 3.33

41

Figure 4.2: Support for Who Controls UAS Operators in Scenario-1

A clear hierarchy of preference was indicated for who should control these types of UAS operations, with the FBI (blue) being the most supported, fol-lowed by state law enforcement agencies (red), and local law enforcement agencies (green) being least supported. Differences in means among all three groups were statistically significant (p < .0001).

What role should the members of the public most affected by these UAS operations have in stopping or preventing the surveillance? We investigated this question in two ways. First we tested how respondent support was af-fected by stipulating varying levels of opposition by affected residents. To do this, we used a split design in which 250–300 participants were ran-domly assigned one of five different levels of resident objections and asked to respond to the following statement using a scale from one (strongly dis-agree) to seven (strongly agree).

p78: Authorities should stop the drone surveillance if (random: 5, 25, 51, 75, 90) percent of area residents object.

In Figure 4.3 we show the percentages of respondents who agreed that UAS operations should be halted given each specified level of objections by af-fected residents of the area.

19 19

62

33

19

48

0

20

40

60

80

100

Oppose Unsure Support

%

Means: FBI = 4.86 Local = 4.25

2520

55

State = 4.54

42

Figure 4.3: Preferences for Stopping UAS Operations in Scenario-1 at Varying Levels of Objections from Area Residents

Clearly, respondents thought that those affected by the UAS surveillance should have a voice in whether or not the operations were conducted. Re-sponse patterns suggest that majority preferences should be heeded. Notice that a majority of survey participants thought UAS operations should be halted if a bare majority of 51 percent of affected residents objected. Even at very low levels of objection, substantial numbers of respondents were sympathetic to residents’ complaints.

The second way we investigated the issue of privacy vs. security in Sce-nario-1 was to the pose the following assertion that forced respondents di-rectly to weigh the tradeoffs involved. Responses were provided on a scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree).

p79: Authorities should not stop the drone surveillance regardless of com-plaints. Helping to provide security for all the residents trumps worries by some that their privacy will be violated.

4146

57

0

20

40

60

80

100

25% 51%5%

%

Levels of Objections to U

Agree Drone Surveilla

6471

75% 90%

AS Surveillance

nce Should Stop

43

Figure 4.4: Community Security Trumps Individual Privacy in Scenario-1

Notice that when forced directly to weigh community security against indi-vidual privacy in this scenario, opinion was broadly distributed, and the modal response was at midscale (unsure). While a plurality of 41 percent disagreed that community security trumps individual privacy, 35 percent thought that UAS surveillance and the security it might provide outweighed privacy con-cerns, and nearly one in four respondents were unsure. Again, these findings from a specific UAS employment scenario are generally consonant with the notional preferred balance of privacy and security reported in Chapter Two, Figure 2.8, which was almost evenly balanced. So whether asked notionally or whether asked to decide in a specific set of conditions involving UAS opera-tions, our respondents demonstrated substantial consistency in the very diffi-cult matter of balancing privacy and security.

Scenario-2: Private Utility Application

n our second scenario, we investigated attitudes about using data for secondary law enforcement purposes from a routine UAS application intended to monitor the condition of power lines. We began with the

following introduction and scenario description.

In some cases, the use of drones for commerce or research may capture data that are not intended, but have value for what are termed “secondary law en-forcement purposes.” In other words, drones intended for one use may inad-vertently capture data that also are of value for law enforcement. The question

I

19

8

14

23

0

10

20

30

1 2

Strongly Disagree

% 16

811

3 4 5 6 7

StronglyAgree

Mean = 3.79

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then becomes whether or not the unintended data should be provided to law enforcement authorities.

For example, consider this scenario. A drone is being used by a private utility company to inspect electrical transmission lines outside of major cities. The video is streamed in real-time to a monitoring station on the ground and re-corded. In the course of looking for problems with electrical transmission lines, the drone identifies what might be an injured hiker who may need medical atten-tion. Also, the drone captures video of an area near the power lines indicating that marijuana is being grown illegally. Finally, purely by chance, the drone flies near a small rural community at the time that a local bank is being robbed, and the drone films the robbers as they flee in a vehicle. The utility company’s employees who are monitoring data from the drone are unsure of what they should do about the information they gathered unintentionally.

We then posed the statements shown in Table 4.1 and asked participants to respond using a scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). For the third assertion (p82), participants were asked to respond in two ways, depending on whether or not a court order had been issued.

Table 4.1: Using Collateral UAS Data for Secondary Law Enforcement Purposes

1 = Strongly Disagree— 7 = Strongly Agree %

Disagree (1–3)

% Unsure

(4)

% Agree (5–7)

Mean

The utility company employees are morally obli-gated to report the possibility of a hiker who may need help to law enforcement authorities, even though they are not sure if the hiker is injured. (p80)

9 15 76 5.56

Marijuana is not legal in the state where this scenario takes place, so the utility company should be required to report the suspected mari-juana plants to law enforcement authorities even though the plants were not on land owned by the utility company. (p81)

29 19 52 4.54

If the utility company is asked by a local law enforcement agency to allow access to the drone video because it may have captured in-formation about a bank robbery, the utility com-pany should provide the requested video if a court order is issued. (p82a)

8 9 83 5.99

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Table 4.1 (continued): Using Collateral UAS Data for Secondary Law Enforce-ment Purposes

1 = Strongly Disagree—7 = Strongly Agree %

Disagree (1–3)

% Unsure

(4)

% Agree (5–7)

Mean

If the utility company is asked by a local law enforcement agency to allow access to the drone video because it may have captured in-formation about a bank robbery, the utility com-pany should provide the requested video even if a court order is not issued. (p82b)

38 16 45 4.13

Three out of four respondents agreed that the utility company has a moral obligation to report video of what may be an injured hiker to law enforce-ment authorities. A much smaller majority (52 percent) also agreed that the utility company should voluntarily report to law enforcement the evidence of suspected marijuana being grown illegally. Notice that for this issue, about one in five respondents were undecided, and that almost one in three thought the utility company should not be required to report the suspected illegal activity.

For our final statement in this scenario, opinion was strongly divided about whether video of a bank robbery should be yielded to law enforcement au-thorities, depending on whether it was administratively requested (45 per-cent) or whether it was ordered to be surrendered by a court (83 percent). Of course the distributions yielded statistically significantly different means as well (p < .0001).

These response patterns illustrate just three of what is likely to be a much larger variety of conditions that widespread uses of drones may present for how collateral information is used. If unintended video may help serve hu-manitarian purposes, the public may consider the UAS operator to be mor-ally obligated to provide collateral data to proper response agencies. If unin-tended data about suspected non-violent illegal operations are gathered, opinion may be much more divided about the obligation to provide those data to law enforcement authorities. When unintended data may provide information about a serious crime, and those data may be used in the prose-cution of suspects, our respondents were much more cautious about yielding the data for secondary law enforcement purposes. If judicial review resulted

46

in a legal order to surrender the collateral data, support was high enough to represent consensus. If the data were administratively ordered by law en-forcement agencies to be surrendered without judicial authority, opinion was much more divided. These findings about using data collected by UAS for law enforcement and criminal prosecution were consistent with the views described in Chapter Two, Table 2.1 about domestic surveillance policies. Significant differences in public support may be expected when UAS data are employed for secondary law enforcement purposes depending on whether judicial review is involved. These findings also suggest poten-tial implications for liability considerations under civil law. For policy pur-poses, they suggest that the collection of collateral information by UAS will be an important issue in widespread domestic operations.

Section 4.2: UAS Debate and Policy Preferences

ublic debate about the future domestic uses of UAS currently is in a very early stage of development, and it is likely to evolve impor-tantly as coalitions opposing and supporting widespread development

and employment present and sharpen arguments for and against UAS uses. But as previously noted, early stage policy debate is not without value for illuminating levels of understanding, for informing the public about issues involved, for pointing to areas of potential division, and for establishing baselines against which opinion evolution can be measured to help inform debate and policy.

P

To gain an early insight into how our participants responded to key argu-ments likely to emerge in public debate, we presented (in random order) condensed but balanced arguments for and against development and wide-spread employment of UAS within the US. We asked participants to indi-cate their reactions to each argument using a scale from one (strongly dis-agree) to seven (strongly agree).

Arguing Against Widespread Domestic Uses of UAS

Drone opponents are concerned that the widespread use of drones within the US will invade our privacy and infringe on other civil liberties. They argue that because drones will be cheaper to develop and buy, and because they can be much smaller than manned aircraft, miniaturized sensor technologies on

47

drones will make surveillance more affordable and invasive than using manned aircraft. Also drones can be designed to have long flight endurance, and when used in rotation, they can maintain continuous surveillance. As a result, opponents argue that drones should be prohibited for mass surveillance or spying within the US. They think drone usage should be limited only to: (a) court-authorized law enforcement activities; (b) assistance with emer-gency situations such as disaster control and search and rescue; or (c) use by non-law enforcement agencies where privacy will not be compromised and the surveillance will not be used for law enforcement purposes.1 Opponents argue that the risks that drones pose to civil liberties are greater than the benefits of their widespread uses.

We show responses to this argument in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5: Responses to Arguments Against Widespread UAS Employment

A plurality of 48 percent agreed with the arguments against widespread domestic employment of UAS, while about one in four disagreed. Impor-tantly, the modal response was at midscale (unsure).

Arguments For Widespread Domestic Uses of UAS

We organized arguments in support of widespread UAS employment as follows.

1 These three uses are condensed from more detailed arguments presented by Stanley and Crump (2011) in an ACLU report titled “Protecting Privacy from Aerial Surveillance: Rec-ommendations for Government Uses of Drone Aircraft,” pp. 15–16.

6 7

11

28

20

12

16

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree

StronglyAgree

Mean = 4.46

%

48

Drone supporters think that there are too many beneficial uses of drones to limit their application to just a few situations. For example, drones can help assess weather, monitor US borders, measure climate and agricultural condi-tions, monitor US coastlines and harbors, enhance public safety, and provide many more potentially beneficial uses that will evolve as drone technologies are advanced—and some of those uses also may assist law enforcement. They note that a multi-billion dollar American industry can be built to develop and support widespread applications of drones not only in the US but for sale around the world. Supporters see drones as just another emerging technology that was first used in the military, but when adapted for peaceful purposes can improve American lives, provide jobs, and enhance public safety. They think the uses of drones within the US can be regulated to protect privacy and other civil liberties without severely limiting drone applications. Supporters argue that the benefits of drone technologies are greater than the risks of their widespread uses.

Figure 4.6: Responses to Arguments For Widespread UAS Employment

Notice the striking similarity of response distributions to both arguments. Again, we see that the modal response was midscale (unsure), and a plural-ity of 46 percent agreed with the stated arguments for widespread UAS em-ployment, while only 27 percent disagreed. The difference in mean re-sponses to the two pro and con arguments was on the border of statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed t-test (p = .0482). This suggests that arguments for more limited domestic UAS appli-cations and arguments for more widespread uses both resonate with respon-dents, and that the still forming public opinion on UAS within the US is la-bile and receptive to debate for and against widespread applications. While this is not surprising in the early stages of new and emerging technologies,

8 6

13

2724

11 11

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Strongly Disagree

StronglyAgree

Mean = 4.31

%

49

it suggests a public that is open to debate. Given these kinds of openness to both sides of arguments on UAS, we expected to find labile opinion about future policy options, to which we next turn.

Testing Policy Options

fter considering the pros and cons about UAS, we asked partici-pants to indicate how they felt about the three randomly ordered policy options shown in Table 4.2 on a scale from one (strongly

oppose) to seven (strongly support). We compare grouped responses and mean values below.

ATable 4.2: Early Indicators of Directional Policy Preferences

(1 = Strongly Oppose—7 = Strongly Support)

How do you feel about …

% Oppose

(1–3)

% Unsure

(4)

% Support

(5–7) Mean

Greatly expanding the future use of drones within the US by federal and state government agencies for enhancing safety, preventing ter-rorism, and providing other public benefits? (p85)

23 20 57 4.65

Greatly expanding the future use of drones within the US by businesses, corporations, and other private enterprises to provide economic benefits, improve efficiencies, and increase cus-tomer benefits? (p86)

41 25 34 3.80

Preventing widespread use of drones within the US by limiting their employment only to gov-ernment approved purposes in order to protect privacy? (p87)

23 23 54 4.59

Again, the response patterns indicate labile opinions with roughly one in four or five respondents indicating that they are unsure about each policy option. However, responses do indicate that at this stage of the UAS domestic policy process (which is barely underway) expanding domestic employment of UAS by government agencies received significantly greater support than expand-ing UAS operations by the business sector. While we cannot know all the underlying rationales for that preference, we suggest that two points could have been salient in respondents’ choices. First, these policy options involve

50

confidence in the government and in the private sector to employ and control UAS, which includes operational and safety considerations. Most of our par-ticipants may have trusted government to more safely operate large numbers of drones domestically than they trusted a competitive and relatively uncon-trolled business sector. Second, societal benefits of UAS applications for border security, preventing crime, combating terrorism, disaster relief, etc. may have been more easily imagined than benefits of commercial applica-tions such as package delivery, influencing participants to lean toward gov-ernment management, even though they distrusted government to protect and to not misuse sensitive private information (Chapter Two, Figure 2.3).

But when responses to the third policy choice are considered, it appears that a small majority (54 percent) prefer that domestic uses of UAS be monitored and limited in order to protect individual privacy. Again, this finding sup-ports concerns about privacy previously described, and serves to illustrate how ongoing debate about balancing privacy and security likely is condi-tioning public receptivity to expanded uses of UAS within the US.

These patterns of responses to debate about UAS and to alternative policy options may appear flexible and inconsistent—and that should not be sur-prising at this information gathering stage of policy evolution—but they are broadly consistent with both openness to debate about UAS and to underly-ing worries that widespread UAS employment will further threaten privacy.

Takeaway Points

• When presented with a detailed scenario in which UAS are used to con-tinuously monitor a high-crime area in a major city in order to prevent crime and enhance security for residents, participants generally were supportive if (a) it was authorized by a court order, and (b) the operations were favored by most affected residents. Support for such operations was highest if they were conducted by the FBI, followed at significant lower levels of preference for state and local law enforcement agencies.

• After considering the specific conditions of the proposed UAS security operations, opinion was broadly divided over the assertion that under these circumstances community security trumps individual privacy, with

51

52

41 percent agreeing, 35 percent disagreeing, and 23 percent unsure. This level of division in opinion, even when specific employment conditions are described, is consistent with more generalized preferences expressed about the difficult task of balancing privacy and security.

• When presented with a detailed scenario in which UAS are routinely used to monitor electrical transmission lines, and those systems capture data that have importance for secondary law enforcement purposes, respon-dents heavily favored sharing collateral information for humanitarian pur-poses. But they were reluctant to volunteer secondary information to law enforcement agencies when the observed activity involved non-violent po-tential criminal behavior. And they were even more cautious about volun-tarily surrendering collateral information potentially relevant to more seri-ous crimes upon executive or administrative request, but were strongly supportive of doing so when judicially reviewed and ordered.

• When presented with balanced arguments for and against widespread domestic uses of UAS, participants were receptive to both arguments, suggesting that firm views have yet to form, and attitudes are welcoming of debate. The logic of both pro and con considerations resonated, sug-gesting that the public is open to reasoned argument and not strongly predisposed either for or against using UAS within the US.

• Similarly, when presented with three policy options, support was within one point of midscale for (a) greatly expanding UAS applications by fed-eral and state governments; (b) greatly expanding UAS applications by businesses, corporations, and other private enterprises; and (c) limiting do-mestic UAS applications only to government approved purposes in order to protect privacy. While government operations of UAS were, on average, favored over private sector operations, these kinds of indeterminate early-stage opinions are consistent with a public that is open to the potential for UAS but concerned that such systems could further threaten privacy. Sup-port for specific policies likely will depend on (a) for what purposes the UAS are to be employed; (b) who is operating and controlling the UAS; (c) who will receive the UAS data (including collateral information); and (d) for what purposes those data will be used.

Appendix 1 Research Methodology

This study is based on a nationwide Internet sample of 1,364 respondents from all fifty states conducted January 16–17, 2014.

Section 1: Background

Technological developments and telecommunications trends, such as the declining number of wired phones, the increasing use of cellular phones, and the continuing expansion of high speed Internet services, have made probabilistic (often referred to as “random”) sampling of the US national population for the administration of lengthy surveys on complex issues in-feasible for several reasons.

• The total universe of households without phone service of any kind is un-known.

• Wired telephony no longer includes a sufficient number of US households to represent the national population, and members of households that do have wired service differ systematically from households without wired phones.

• The number of households with wired phones that are used almost exclu-sively for other then routine phone calls, such as home alarms or medical alert services, is unknown.

• The numbers of individuals and households having both a wired phone and a cell phone or those having more than one cell phone are unknown.

• The number of households and individuals having access to Internet ser-vice suitable for taking Internet surveys is unknown.

• The numbers of individuals who have access to Internet services from their place of employment is unknown, and of those, the number of individuals who are allowed to take surveys while at work is unknown.

• Cellular telephony is unsuitable for lengthy surveys that may distract re-spondents who are otherwise occupied, and surveys conducted using cell

53

phones may incur costs to prospective respondents that discourage survey participation.

• Face-to-face interviews or printed postal surveys of the US general public require long collection periods and are prohibitively expensive for many research projects.

Increasingly, academic quality opinion survey research of the US public on complex subjects, such as privacy and security, are being conducted via the Internet. These factors present special challenges for probabilistic sampling because insufficient information exists about rapidly evolving telecommu-nication patterns, Internet accessibility, and the demographic composition of those who have suitable Internet access.

With increasing Internet access, the demographics of the online population are becoming more representative of the US population as a whole, but sam-ples recruited to participate in Internet surveys cannot be truly random sam-ples of the US public. All surveys, regardless of collection methods, include an element of self-selection because even if a perfectly random sample could be constructed, the final decision to participate must be made voluntarily by each respondent, and thus some degree of self-selection is unavoidable. This means that even when derived from a theoretically perfectly random sample the demographic characteristics of survey respondents may not perfectly re-flect US population parameters. Non-probabilistic samples, such as those used to administer surveys of the general public via the Internet, involve greater degrees of self-selection because participants first voluntarily agree to enter a pool or stream of citizens willing to take surveys on-line, and then each member of that group who attempts to take an online survey must de-cide whether or not to participate in a given survey opportunity. This requires the administration of Internet surveys that are as demographically representa-tive as possible, and it warrants caution in presenting findings as statistically representative of views of the entire adult US population.

Section 2: Sampling

Sampling for this survey was accomplished by Survey Sampling Interna-tional (SSI) using a proprietary methodology known as Dynamix, which provides direct access to millions of potential survey respondents, including members of 34 standing panels plus a variety of online communities, social

54

media, and affiliate partnerships to build a constantly evolving stream of potential survey participants. Prospective survey respondents access SSI’s website directly or through trusted partnerships or via social media or nu-merous other Internet portals where invitations are posted to maximize di-versity. Each individual is screened and dynamically profiled. Rather than being sampled for specific individual surveys, respondents are offered one of various available projects for which they qualify at the time they choose to participate in a survey. This increases the probability of survey engage-ment, reduces dropout rates, and allows prospects to take a survey at a time of their convenience.

If certain demographic categories are underrepresented during the dynamic sampling process, email invitations are employed to bring the sample into balance with key population parameters. Assuming a sample size of 1,000, the sample frame and selection process would achieve comparable results within a + 3 percent range 19 times out of 20. Security checks and quality verifications are used on all sources before respondents can begin any sur-vey. All external sources undergo a partner verification process that scores individuals based a series of quality control checkpoints, including digital fingerprinting to prevent duplication, spot checking via third party verifica-tion to prove identity, benchmarking against known external data points, and an algorithm that dynamically monitors the sample on a number of per-sonality and psychographic measures.

A variety of incentives from SSI or from affiliate organizations are employed based on the nature and length of surveys and progress of the dynamic sam-pling process. This sampling process broadens access beyond standing panel memberships by including individuals who are not interested in joining a re-search panel and who may only rarely choose to participate in online survey research. It does not limit the sampling process to one or a few sample sources, one or a few modes of contact, or a single selection method.

But regardless of its advantages, neither Dynamix nor any other Internet sampling methodology provides a probabilistic sample that can be repre-sented as truly random. While the possibilities of systematic bias can be re-duced to minimum levels that allow replication of survey findings, they cannot be eliminated entirely. One source of systematic bias that can be minimized is demographic representativeness.

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Section 3: Demographic Representativeness

Table A1.1 compares key national and regional population parameters to the demographic characteristics of respondents to this survey. Notice that ages 18–29 were slightly underrepresented, while ages 30–49 were slightly overrepresented. Educational attainment also was higher among our respon-dents than for the national population as a whole. But overall, the demo-graphic attributes of respondents to this survey have a high level of compa-rability to national population demographics.

Table A1.1: Demographic Representativeness of Respondents

Demographic Category

% US Population (Ages 18+)

% Survey

Gender1 Women 51.4 52.6 Men 48.6 47.4

Age2

18–29 22.0 17.5 30–49 34.6 39.1 50 and above 43.4 43.4

Education3

High School Graduate or higher 86.8 97.1 Bachelor’s Degree or higher 28.2 38.3

Ethnicity4

Hispanic 14.8 12.4 Non-Hispanic 85.2 87.6

Race5

White alone 79.3 82.1 Black or African American alone 12.5 12.3 American Indian / Alaska Native alone 1.1 0.6 Asian alone 5.2 2.5

1 U.S. Census Bureau 2013a. 2 Ibid. 3 U.S. Census Bureau 2013b. 4 U.S. Census Bureau 2013a. 5 Ibid

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Table A1.1 (continued): Demographic Representativeness of Respondents

Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander alone 0.2 0.1

Two or more races 1.7 2.4

Household Income6

$0–49,999 48.6 58.2 $50–99,999 29.9 32.0 $100–199,999 17.0 9.0 $200,000 or more 4.6 0.8

Census Region7

Northeast 18.2 16.0 Midwest 21.4 22.6 South 37.2 38.1 West 23.2 23.3

Section 4: Data Collection

For the protection of participants, both the survey questions and the survey protocol were approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Oklahoma. The instrument was programmed to allow the survey to be self-administered at the preferred time and pace of each respondent within clearly defined time constraints. To afford continuity of attention and to make best use of factual information provided to each respondent during the course of the survey, a maximum of 45 minutes was allowed for completion of any sin-gle Web page in the survey (typically containing one to three survey ques-tions), and a maximum total elapsed time of two hours from start to finish was allowed to complete the survey. Average completion time was 27.8 minutes. Participation was restricted only to individuals 18 years of age or above. Each respondent who completed the survey received points credited by SSI or in-centives from affiliates equal to a five dollar stipend. Decisions to participate were entirely voluntary. Of those participants who met age qualifications and time constraints, 80.6 percent completed the survey.

6 U.S. Census Bureau 2012. 7 U.S. Census Bureau 2013a.

Appendix 2 Data Summary

Web: n = 1,364; 16–17 January 2014; Avg. Time = 27.8 min Non-Demographic Data Weighted to National Population for:

Age, Gender, Race, Ethnicity, Region

p1_age: How old are you? Mean Median 2014 web (unweighted) 45.52 45 p2_edu: What is the highest level of education you have completed?

% 2014 web (unweighted) 1. < High school graduate 3 2. High school graduate 23 3. Some college/vocational school 36 4. College graduate 26 5. Some graduate work 3 6. Master’s degree 7 7. Doctorate (of any type) 2 p3_gend: Are you male or female? Female Male 2014 web (unweighted) 52.6 47.4 p4_state: Using the dropdown list, please select the state where your primary residence is located. % Northeast Midwest South West 2014 web (unweighted) 16 23 38 23 p5_zip: What is the five digit zip code at your residence? (This information will only be used to compare grouped differences, not to identify you.) [verbatim] p6_rural: Which of the of the following categories best describes the location of your primary residence?

1 – Urban: within the incorporated boundaries of a city or town that provides emergency services such as fire, rescue, and storm warnings for your residence

2 – Suburban: near or in a suburb or town that provides emergency services such as fire, rescue, and storm warnings for your residence

3 – Rural: not within the incorporated boundaries of a city or town; emergency services such as fire, rescue, and storm warnings for your residence usually are provided by county, state, or federal entities Urban Suburban Rural % 1 2 3 2014 web (unweighted) 36 44 20

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p7_now: Please indicate which of the following statements applies to you.

0 – I am completing this survey from my primary residence.

1 – I am completing this survey from a location that is not my primary residence. Not Primary Residence Primary Residence % 0 1 2014 web (unweighted) 18 82 For each of the following issues, please rate your level of concern about the issue using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means you are not at all concerned and ten means you are extremely concerned. How concerned are you about: [p8–p12 randomized] p8_concern1: Threats to national security, including terrorism Not at All Extremely Concerned Concerned % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 1 1 2 2 4 8 9 12 16 15 30 7.67 p9_concern2: The delivery and cost of healthcare in the U.S. Not at All Extremely Concerned Concerned % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 1 0 1 1 2 4 5 11 14 18 43 8.46 p10_concern3: Protection of individual privacy in the U.S. Not at All Extremely Concerned Concerned % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 2 0 1 2 2 4 8 13 17 14 37 8.12 p11_concern4: The effects of human activities on the environment Not at All Extremely Concerned Concerned % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 2 1 3 3 4 10 10 14 18 14 21 7.17 p12_concern5: The state of the economy, including jobs and inflation Not at All Extremely Concerned Concerned % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 0 0 1 1 2 4 5 10 17 19 41 8.48

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Thinking broadly about privacy in the United States, please rate your level of trust in each of the following to protect and to not misuse sensitive information about you and your immediate family on a scale from zero to ten where zero means no trust and ten means complete trust. p13_fedgov: The U.S. federal government No Complete Trust Trust % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 19 9 9 8 8 15 7 9 8 3 5 4.00 p14_bus: U.S. businesses, corporations, and industries No Complete Trust Trust % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 12 5 9 12 9 19 11 8 8 3 4 4.43

(p13_fedgov vs. p14_bus: p < .0001)

The next several questions ask about your assessment of the threats from crime and terrorism. We want to know about your perceptions and beliefs, so don’t worry about being right or wrong when answering. For each question, please consider both the likelihood of a terrorist or criminal event and its potential consequences. Please respond to each on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no threat and ten means extreme threat. p15_terr_wrld: Remembering to consider both the likelihood and potential consequences, how do you rate the overall threat of terrorism of all types throughout the world today? No Extreme Threat Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 1 1 2 2 3 11 10 20 19 11 21 7.36 p16_terr_US: Focusing more specifically on our own country, and considering both foreign and domestic sources of terrorism, how do you rate the threat to society of all kinds of terrorism in the United States today? No Extreme Threat Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 1 1 3 3 5 14 14 18 16 11 14 6.81 p17_terr_you: Thinking now about your personal situation, how do you rate the risk of all forms of terrorism to you and your immediate family in the United States? No Extreme Threat Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 5 7 10 10 9 18 10 10 9 4 8 4.97

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p18_vcrime: Thinking now about all forms of violent crimes that are not considered acts of terrorism, such as assault, murder, rape, car-jacking, armed robbery, kidnapping, etc., how do you rate today’s threat of all forms of violent crimes to you and your immediate family in the U.S.? No Extreme Threat Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 1 3 7 7 8 15 12 14 11 9 12 6.02 p19_nvcrime: Now, please consider all forms of non-violent crimes that are not considered acts of terrorism, such as property theft, burglary, fraud, corruption, identity theft, etc., how do you rate today’s threat of all forms of non-violent crimes to you and your immediate family in the U.S.? No Extreme Threat Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 1 2 4 5 6 14 12 16 16 12 12 6.61 p20_society: Finally, remembering to consider both the likelihood and potential consequences, how do you rate the risks of all forms of crime—including violent and non-violent crimes—to American society today? No Extreme Threat Threat % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 1 1 2 2 4 12 14 16 18 12 18 7.21 Next we want you to consider selected foreign and domestic policies intended to prevent terrorism. Each of the next several questions are answered on a scale from one to seven, where one means you strongly oppose the policy, and seven means you strongly support it. How do you feel about agencies of the U.S. federal government taking the following actions to monitor communications in an effort to combat terrorism? [p21–p24 randomized] p21_forgnph1: Recording phone conversations or text messages between persons in other countries if any participant is suspected of terrorist activities Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 7 5 6 14 17 21 31 5.18 p22_interph: Recording phone conversations or text messages between persons in the United States and persons in other countries if any participant is suspected of terrorist activities Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 7 5 6 15 17 19 30 5.09

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p23_intermail: Recording email or other Internet communications between persons in the United States and persons in other countries if any participant is suspected of terrorist activities Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 7 6 5 15 17 20 30 5.10 p24_celltrk: Tracking the locations of cell phones outside the U.S. (but including Americans who are traveling in other countries) if the owners or users are suspected of terrorist activities Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 6 5 7 13 18 20 31 5.16

Focusing more specifically on monitoring communications within the United States to prevent terrorism, how do you feel about each of the following actions that may be taken by the U.S. federal government if the actions are or are not authorized by a federal court order? For each question, under the columns labeled “WITHOUT A FEDERAL COURT ORDER” and “WITH A FEDERAL COURT ORDER,” please use the dropdown boxes to select a number from one to seven, where one means you strongly oppose and seven means you strongly support the proposed action. [p25–p28 randomized] p25_domph1: Recording the content of phone conversations or text messages between persons within the U.S. if any participant is suspected of terrorist activities Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 (w/o) 26 9 9 16 12 8 20 3.85 2014 (with) 4 2 3 10 14 18 49 5.74

(p < .0001)

p26_domph2: Tracking the location of cell phones within the U.S. if the owner or user is suspected of terrorist activities Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 (w/o) 24 8 10 15 12 9 22 3.98 2014 (with) 4 2 4 10 13 17 51 5.80

(p < .0001) p27_meta: Collecting “meta data” for most phone calls or text messages within the U.S., even if the participants are not suspected of terrorist activities. The information recorded would include the originating and receiving phone numbers, date, and duration, but would not include the content of conversations or messages. Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 (w/o) 46 10 12 15 6 3 8 2.69 2014 (with) 20 7 10 12 15 9 27 4.28

(p < .0001)

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p28_dommail: Recording email or other Internet communications between persons within the United States if any participant is suspected of terrorist activities Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 (w/o) 24 10 11 15 13 8 19 3.86 2014 (with) 4 3 4 10 15 16 49 5.71

(p < .0001) p29_terpriv: Considering the full range and scope of existing domestic policies to prevent terrorism, on a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all concerned and ten means extremely concerned, how concerned are you that data currently collected by government agencies about the communications, activities, and movements of people within the U.S. may be unnecessarily compromising liberties and privacy. Not at All Extremely Concerned Concerned % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 3 2 3 6 3 12 13 16 13 8 21 6.76 Now we want you to consider the potential uses of unmanned aircraft systems, more commonly known as “drones.” Some drones are unarmed and employed primarily for gathering information using a variety of cameras and sensors; others are armed with weapons and can be used to shoot guns, drop bombs, or fire missiles. Using a scale from one to seven, where one means you strongly oppose and seven means you strongly support, how do you feel about each of the following policies? [p30–p33 randomized] p30_forgndrn: Using unarmed drones to monitor suspected terrorist activities in other countries Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 4 2 5 15 17 20 37 5.49 p31_killdrn: Using armed drones to attack terrorist activities or to kill suspected terrorists with bombs or missiles in other countries Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 7 4 7 17 14 20 31 5.12 p32_domdrn1: Using unarmed drones to monitor U.S. cities and neighborhoods for suspicious activities in an effort to prevent crime Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 14 8 9 21 18 13 17 4.29

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p33_domdrn2: Using unarmed drones to monitor the behaviors and movements of persons within the U.S. suspected of terrorist activities Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 8 6 6 18 19 17 26 4.89 Drones (unmanned aircraft systems) are being developed in many different sizes and designs for a wide variety of non-military uses within the United States. For example, drones have been used to assess and monitor the extent of wildfires, to assist in search and rescue missions, to monitor U.S. borders, to assist in various law enforcement activities, and other information gathering roles. Also the development and employment of drones within the U.S. may create thousands of new jobs and be economically beneficial. But some people argue that, depending on how drones are used and who controls the information they collect, drones may threaten individual privacy, pose a hazard to manned aircraft, create a public nuisance, and could cause damages to people and property. For each of the uses of drones within the U.S. listed below, please indicate your assessment of the potential risks and benefits on a scale from zero to ten where zero means the risks far outweigh the benefits, five means the risks and benefits are equally balanced, and ten means the benefits far outweigh the risks. There are no right or wrong answers; we want to know your initial impression of the balance of potential risks and benefits of using drones for the indicated purposes within the U.S. [p34–p40 randomized] p34_imigdrn: Using unarmed drones to monitor U.S. borders and seashores for illegal immigration Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 4 1 2 4 4 21 7 10 9 10 28 6.95 p35_SARdrn: Using unarmed drones to assist search and rescue efforts on land or at sea Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 2 1 1 1 2 15 4 9 11 12 43 7.95 p36_deterdrn: Using unarmed drones to monitor U.S. cities and neighborhoods for suspicious activities in an effort to prevent crime Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 10 4 5 8 6 24 7 10 7 6 13 5.40

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p37_terrdrn: Using unarmed drones to monitor the behaviors and movements of persons within the U.S. suspected of terrorist activities Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 5 2 3 3 5 22 8 10 11 9 22 6.59 p38_crimedrn: Using unarmed drones to monitor the behaviors and movements of persons within the U.S. suspected of criminal activities not related to terrorism Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 10 3 4 7 5 22 10 11 9 5 14 5.57 p39_traffdrn: Using unarmed drones to monitor vehicular traffic and enforce traffic laws within the U.S. Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 16 6 6 4 7 25 8 8 6 4 11 4.76 Again, for each of the following uses of drones within the U.S., please rate the balance of risks and benefits on the same zero-to-ten scale. [p40–p47b randomized]

p40_arestdrn: Using unarmed drones to assist law enforcement activities such as tracking vehicles, rescuing hostages, and capturing fleeing suspects within the U.S. Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 3 1 3 2 4 18 7 13 12 10 26 7.00 p41_disasdrn: Using unarmed drones to assist relief efforts in response to natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 3 0 1 2 2 16 8 9 13 12 34 7.59 p42_TVdrn: Using unarmed drones to provide media coverage of breaking news events Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 14 4 7 5 5 28 7 7 8 5 9 4.94

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p43_UPSdrn: Using large, remotely controlled unarmed drones to move freight such as mail and packages if approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 13 4 7 6 7 26 6 9 6 4 12 4.96 p44_amazdrn: Using small, pre-programmed drones to quickly deliver light-weight packages to private residences within the U.S. if approved by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 17 4 7 6 6 24 6 8 7 6 9 4.69 p45_gasdrn: Using drones armed with non-lethal weapons such as rubber bullets or tear gas to assist law enforcement activities against persons within the U.S. suspected of criminal activities Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 11 5 6 5 7 24 8 9 8 5 12 5.21 p46_gundrn: Using drones armed with lethal weapons such as guns (but not bombs or missiles) to assist law enforcement activities against armed fugitives within the U.S. Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 15 6 7 6 6 23 7 9 7 5 9 4.68 START SPLIT DESIGN A/B GROUP-A (50%): Wilderness areas p47a_wild: Using large numbers of low-flying unarmed drones to allow tourists to make their own videos of wilderness areas and national parks. GROUP-B (50%): Populated areas p47b_metro: Using large numbers of low-flying unarmed drones to allow tourists to make their own videos of major U.S. cities and urban areas. Risks > Risks = Risks < Benefits Benefits Benefits % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014-Grp-A 21 9 8 6 5 22 6 6 4 6 7 4.03 2014-Grp-B 34 8 7 7 5 21 3 5 4 2 4 3.10

(p < .0001) END SPLIT A/B

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Using a scale from one to seven, where one means exaggerate risks, four means accurately assess risks and benefits, and seven means exaggerate benefits, please rate how you expect each of the following organizations would evaluate the risks and benefits of using unarmed drones within the United States. [p48–p52 randomized] p48_FAA: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Exaggerate Accurately Exaggerate Risks Assess Benefits % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 4 3 9 49 15 9 11 4.37 p49_media: News media organizations Exaggerate Accurately Exaggerate Risks Assess Benefits % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 17 13 13 22 13 9 13 3.83 p50_ACLU: The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Exaggerate Accurately Exaggerate Risks Assess Benefits % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 20 11 14 33 9 6 7 3.46 p51_homsec: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Exaggerate Accurately Exaggerate Risks Assess Benefits % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 6 3 6 30 18 14 23 4.84 p52_supcrt: The U.S. Supreme Court Exaggerate Accurately Exaggerate Risks Assess Benefits % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 6 4 8 49 15 9 9 4.27 Now we want you to consider who controls drones and the information they may collect. Assume that drones are used to help prevent terrorism within the U.S by monitoring the movements and activities of persons suspected of terrorist activities. In the process of doing so they may unintentionally collect information about the activities and movements of innocent persons. Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means no trust and ten means complete trust, please rate the level of trust you have in each of the following entities to protect the privacy of innocent persons by using the information collected by drones only for preventing terrorism. [p53–p59 randomized]

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p53_FBI: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) No Complete Trust Trust % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 12 4 6 6 7 18 10 10 11 9 7 5.23 p54_CIA: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) No Complete Trust Trust % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 15 5 7 7 7 17 9 9 11 6 7 4.83 p55_NSA: The National Security Agency (NSA) No Complete Trust Trust % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 17 5 7 7 7 18 8 7 11 6 7 4.66 p56_DHS: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including immigration, customs, border security, and drug enforcement No Complete Trust Trust % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 13 4 6 7 7 20 9 9 11 7 8 5.04 p57_DoD: The Department of Defense (DoD), including U.S. National Guard forces No Complete Trust Trust % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 10 2 4 5 6 19 9 12 14 8 11 5.75 p58_statecops: State law enforcement authorities in your area No Complete Trust Trust % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 10 3 7 6 8 18 9 12 14 6 7 5.29 p59_localcops: Local law enforcement authorities in your area No Complete Trust Trust % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 11 4 6 9 6 18 10 13 11 5 7 5.13

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Now please think about the uses of cameras to monitor public spaces and activities for purposes of law enforcement, preventing terrorism, or other efforts to enhance security. For these questions, assume that the cameras are being operated and the images are being used by state or local police authorities within the U.S. We want to know how you view the use of cameras that are: (a) mounted on ground-based structures such as buildings, utility poles, towers, etc., or ground-based vehicles, such as cars or trucks, versus (b) cameras carried by drones. For each question, under the columns labeled “GROUND-MOUNTED CAMERAS” and “DRONE-MOUNTED CAMERAS,” please use the dropdown boxes to select a number from one to seven, where one means you strongly oppose and seven means you strongly support the proposed policy. [p60–p64 randomized] p60_routine: Using cameras to continuously monitor streets and businesses Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 (grd) 10 5 9 19 16 13 29 4.81 2014 (drn) 21 12 13 20 10 8 16 3.77

(p < .0001) p61_traffic: Using cameras to enforce traffic laws such as stoplights or speeding Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 (grd) 17 6 11 18 14 9 25 4.33 2014 (drn) 31 10 12 18 8 6 15 3.41

(p < .0001) p62_trans: Using cameras to monitor public transportation such as train terminals, bus stations, and airports Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 (grd) 5 3 5 17 16 14 40 5.39 2014 (drn) 15 9 10 20 14 10 22 4.24

(p < .0001) p63_games: Using cameras to monitor large public gatherings such as sporting events Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 (grd) 6 4 7 17 19 13 34 5.16 2014 (drn) 14 7 9 22 14 10 23 4.37

(p < .0001) p64_find: Using cameras to search for or to track suspected criminals or terrorists Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 (grd) 5 3 5 13 17 15 42 5.46 2014 (drn) 8 4 8 17 17 12 35 5.05

(p < .0001)

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Please respond to the following statements on a scale from one to seven, where one means you strongly disagree and seven means you strongly agree. [p65–p71 randomized] p65_same: Drones are very much like manned aircraft because they are still operated by humans; the primary difference is that the drone operators are on the ground. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 6 4 6 22 20 18 24 5.00 p66_invade: Because drones do not have to be large enough to carry human operators, they can be very small, and their potential for invading privacy and other civil liberties is much higher than that of manned aircraft. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 4 2 3 18 18 21 33 5.42 p67_regula: Regulating drones will require some of the same kinds of operating rules applied to other forms of civil aviation in order to provide public safety, but because of the potential for drones to be used for spying on the public, they will require special regulations limiting their uses. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 3 1 3 15 17 20 41 5.66 p68_econ: Drones and their associated technologies represent important economic potential for the U.S., and we should increase our lead over other countries in developing and exploiting drone technologies and their peaceful applications. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 6 5 9 29 19 15 17 4.63 p69_watched: We Americans already are under too much surveillance, such as cameras in cities and buildings and at traffic lights and in police vehicles, so we should not allow drones to provide even more public surveillance. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 10 10 11 23 15 13 18 4.35

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p70_shoot: If a drone flies over my property, I should have the right to shoot it down. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 33 13 8 16 9 7 14 3.34 p71_nopics: It should be illegal for anyone to take drone imagery of me on my own property without my permission. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 5 4 6 16 14 16 39 5.34 p72_drncrime: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no risk and ten means extreme risk, how do you rate the risk that drones might be used by criminals to support criminal activities within the U.S. (such as drug smuggling)? No Extreme Risk Risk % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 4 2 4 4 4 14 8 14 16 7 23 6.77 p73_drnterr: How do you rate the risk that drones might be used by terrorists to support terrorism within the U.S. (such as gathering sensitive information or attacking high value targets)? No Extreme Risk Risk % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 3 1 2 3 3 13 9 12 14 11 29 7.30

(p72_drncrime vs. p73_drnterr: p < .0001)

Now we want you to consider some specific conditions in which drones could be employed and think about how their use might be authorized and how information they gather might be used. Please read the following scenario description then answer the questions as they relate to the specified use of drones. [the two following scenarios were randomized] [Scenario 1] Unarmed drones are being used to monitor a high-crime area in a major city in the U.S. Each drone is equipped with high resolution video cameras that can identify and track specific vehicles and can identify individuals using face recognition software. The drones also carry infrared cameras for use at night, and a radar that can “see” inside certain kinds of buildings or structures to determine if they are inhabited. All of the imagery is fed in real-time to a central monitoring facility on the ground. Each drone can stay airborne for 24 hours, and by rotating additional drones, continuous surveillance can be maintained around-the-clock. The primary purpose of the drones is to help prevent and control criminal activities and enforce the law.

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p74_court: On a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly oppose using drones like this, and seven means you strongly support it, how do you feel about using drones in this scenario with and without a court order authorizing the surveillance? Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 (w/o) 29 12 13 17 13 5 11 3.33 2014 (with) 6 3 6 15 17 15 38 5.34

(p < .0001) Using the same scale, please indicate your support for each of the following agencies having the authority to operate the drones as described above. [p75–p77 randomized] p75_fed: The FBI Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 9 4 6 18 20 18 24 4.86 p76_state: State law enforcement agencies Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 11 5 9 20 22 14 19 4.54 p77_local: Local law enforcement agencies Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 14 9 10 19 19 12 17 4.25

(p75_fed vs. p76_state: p < .0001; p76_state vs. p77_local: p < .0001; p75_fed vs. p77_local: p < .0001) Some of the residents of the area object to drone surveillance, arguing that they are not criminals and that their individual privacy is being invaded. They are afraid that their lawful personal behaviors and activities will be monitored by authorities, and that they will have no control over how that information might be used. These opponents believe that the potential benefits of preventing or reducing crime are not worth the risks to their privacy. Please respond to the following statements about this scenario on a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly disagree and seven means you strongly agree.

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p78_oppose: Authorities should stop the drone surveillance if _____ percent of area residents object. [randomly insert one value: 5, 25, 51, 75, 90] Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014: 5% 12 11 16 20 19 7 15 4.01 2014: 25% 4 17 10 23 15 11 20 4.41 2014: 51% 7 7 8 21 16 14 27 4.81 2014: 75% 6 4 8 18 17 16 31 5.05 2014: 90% 3 4 4 18 19 17 35 5.36

(5 vs. 25: p = .0246; 25 vs. 51: p = .0200; 51 vs. 75: p = .1494; 75 vs. 90: p = .0579; 51 vs. 90: p = .0008) p79_support: Authorities should not stop the drone surveillance regardless of complaints. Helping to provide security for all the residents trumps worries by some that their privacy will be violated. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 19 8 14 23 16 8 11 3.79 [Scenario 2] In some cases, the use of drones for commerce or research may capture data that are not intended, but have value for what are termed “secondary law enforcement purposes.” In other words, drones intended for one use may inadvertently capture data that also are of value for law enforcement. The question then becomes whether or not the unintended data should be provided to law enforcement authorities. For example, consider this scenario. A drone is being used by a private utility company to inspect electrical transmission lines outside of major cities. The video is streamed in real-time to a monitoring station on the ground and recorded. In the course of looking for problems with electrical transmission lines, the drone identifies what might be an injured hiker who may need medical attention. Also, the drone captures video of an area near the power lines indicating that marijuana is being grown illegally. Finally, purely by chance, the drone flies near a small rural community at the time that a local bank is being robbed, and the drone films the robbers as they flee in a vehicle. The utility company’s employees who are monitoring data from the drone are unsure of what they should do about the information they gathered unintentionally. Please respond to the following statements. p80_hiker: The utility company employees are morally obligated to report the possibility of a hiker who may need help to law enforcement authorities, even though they are not sure if the hiker is injured. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 4 2 3 15 17 18 41 5.56

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p81_pot: Marijuana is not legal in the state where this scenario takes place, so the utility company should be required to report the suspected marijuana plants to law enforcement authorities even though the plants were not on land owned by the utility company. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 15 7 7 18 12 11 29 4.54 p82_rob: If the utility company is asked by a local law enforcement agency to allow access to the drone video because it may have captured information about a bank robbery, the utility company should provide the requested video. [WITH and WITHOUT a court order] Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 (w/o) 23 6 9 16 12 7 26 4.13 2014 (with) 3 2 3 8 10 14 59 5.99

(p < .0001) Now we want you to consider the following two arguments about the overall risks and benefits of drones and indicate your reaction to each on a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly disagree and seven means you strongly agree. [p83–p84 randomized] Drone opponents are concerned that the widespread use of drones within the U.S. will invade our privacy and infringe on other civil liberties. They argue that because drones will be cheaper to develop and buy, and because they can be much smaller than manned aircraft, miniaturized sensor technologies on drones will make surveillance more affordable and invasive than using manned aircraft. Also drones can be designed to have long flight endurance, and when used in rotation, they can maintain continuous surveillance. As a result, opponents argue that drones should be prohibited for mass surveillance or spying within the U.S. They think drone usage should be limited only to: (a) court-authorized law enforcement activities; (b) assistance with emergency situations such as disaster control and search and rescue; or (c) use by non-law enforcement agencies where privacy will not be compromised and the surveillance will not be used for law enforcement purposes. Opponents argue that the risks that drones pose to civil liberties are greater than the benefits of their widespread uses. p83_ACLU: Please provide your reaction to this argument using a scale from one to seven where one means you strongly disagree and seven means you strongly agree. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 6 7 11 28 20 12 16 4.46 Drone supporters think that there are too many beneficial uses of drones to limit their application to just a few situations. For example, drones can help assess weather, monitor U.S. borders, measure climate and agricultural conditions, monitor U.S. coastlines and harbors, enhance public safety, and provide many more potentially beneficial uses that will evolve as drone technologies are advanced—and some of those uses also may assist law enforcement. They note that a multi-billion dollar American industry can be built to develop and support widespread applications of drones not only in the U.S. but for sale around the world. Supporters see drones as just another emerging technology that was first used in the military, but when adapted for peaceful purposes can improve American lives,

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provide jobs, and enhance public safety. They think the uses of drones within the U.S. can be regulated to protect privacy and other civil liberties without severely limiting drone applications. Supporters argue that the benefits of drone technologies are greater than the risks of their widespread uses. p84_advoc: Please provide your reaction to this argument using a scale from one to seven, where one means you strongly disagree and seven means you strongly agree. Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 8 6 13 27 24 11 11 4.31 Considering all the potential pros and cons about drones, and using a scale from one to seven, where one means strongly oppose and seven means strongly support, how do you feel about each of the following policy options? [random order for p85–p87] p85_growgov: Greatly expanding the future use of drones within the U.S. by federal and state government agencies for enhancing safety, preventing terrorism, and providing other public benefits Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 8 6 9 21 24 14 19 4.65 p86_growbus: Greatly expanding the future use of drones within the U.S. by businesses, corporations, and other private enterprises to provide economic benefits, improve efficiencies, and increase customer benefits Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 14 13 14 25 17 8 9 3.80 p87_prevent: Preventing widespread use of drones within the U.S. by limiting their employment only to government approved purposes in order to protect privacy Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 6 7 10 23 22 14 18 4.59 Next we want to turn to the Internet and digital privacy. p88_web: About how often do you access the Internet using a computer or some sort of smart-phone? < Once/ Several Times/ Once/ Several Times/ Once or Several Times/ Never Month Month Week Week Twice/Day Day % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 2014 web NA 5 1 1 6 16 70

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p89_FB: About how often do you use Facebook? < Once/ Several Times/ Once/ Several Times/ Once or Several Times/ Never Month Month Week Week Twice/Day Day % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 2014 web 21 6 5 7 12 19 30 p90_goog: About how often do you use Google? < Once/ Several Times/ Once/ Several Times/ Once or Several Times/ Never Month Month Week Week Twice/Day Day % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 2014 web 7 9 9 6 14 20 35 p91_twit: About how often do you use Twitter? < Once/ Several Times/ Once/ Several Times/ Once or Several Times/ Never Month Month Week Week Twice/Day Day % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 2014 web 65 11 5 5 4 4 6 Please consider some of the ways in which Internet technologies may be influencing your personal privacy and the speed and convenience with which you can conduct transactions. Major Internet services and businesses such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Amazon, Time-Warner, Apple, Microsoft, and many others may use personal information that you provide to tailor advertising or services to more closely match your demographic characteristics, Internet activities, or spending patterns. Some of them hold very large banks of information voluntarily provided by customers who use “cloud” computing services. Without referring to any specific company or service that employs personal information to tailor services or advertising, we want to know your views on the implications of the Internet for your personal privacy. [p92–p96 randomized] p92_websafe: How concerned are you that personal information you supply to companies online may not be adequately protected? Not At All Extremely Concerned Concerned % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 1 1 1 2 4 7 9 13 14 13 35 7.79 p93_webshare: How concerned are you that information you provide for online services may be shared with others without your knowledge? Not At All Extremely Concerned Concerned % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 1 1 2 3 4 9 8 12 15 13 32 7.63

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p94_webgov: How concerned are you that your use of the Internet (such as information you provide for online services, or a record of your Internet searches, or your email exchanges) may be collected by the federal government? Not At All Extremely Concerned Concerned % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 6 3 5 4 4 10 10 11 12 11 24 6.67 p95_identity: How concerned are you about identity theft? Not At All Extremely Concerned Concerned % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 1 1 2 2 3 8 10 13 13 12 36 7.82 p96_medrec: How concerned are you that digitized medical records for you or members of your immediate family may be accessed by persons other than authorized medical professionals? Not At All Extremely Concerned Concerned % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 4 2 4 5 5 11 10 10 10 12 26 6.80 p97_marb1: Providing security for Americans sometimes requires compromising individual privacy, and finding the right mix of security and privacy is a matter for public debate. For this question, assume that black marbles represent the level of emphasis placed on the security of Americans, and white marbles represent the level of emphasis placed on the privacy of Americans. In your view, how many of each color should be in a total combined mix of 100 marbles? % Black (Security) White (Privacy) 2014 web 51.25 48.75 p98_marb2: Again using the marbles example where black marbles represent the level of emphasis placed on the security of Americans, and white marbles represent the level of emphasis placed on the privacy of Americans, how many of each color do you think represents the way the U.S. government is balancing considerations of security and privacy today? % Black (Security) White (Privacy) 2014 web 60.20 39.80

(p97 vs. p98: p < .0001 ) p99__doright: On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means none of the time and ten means all of the time, how much of the time do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right for the American people? None of the All of the Time Time % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 13 9 14 14 8 14 10 8 5 2 3 3.90

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Please rate the degree to which each of the following four groups of statements describes your outlook on life, using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means not at all and ten means completely. You can change your initial selections, but no two of the four descriptions may be given the same numerical rating, and each must be rated before advancing. [p95–p98 randomized] p100_H_rate: I am more comfortable when I know who is, and who is not, a part of my group, and loyalty to the group is important to me. I prefer to know who is in charge and to have clear rules and procedures; those who are in charge should punish those who break the rules. I like to have my responsibilities clearly defined, and I believe people should be rewarded based on the position they hold and their competence. Most of the time, I trust those with authority and expertise to do what is right for society. Not At All Completely % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 5 6 7 7 9 16 13 15 9 7 6 5.36 p101_I_rate: Groups are not all that important to me. I prefer to make my own way in life without having to follow other peoples’ rules. Rewards in life should be based on initiative, skill, and hard work, even if that results in inequality. I respect people based on what they do, not the positions or titles they hold. I like relationships that are based on negotiated “give and take,” rather than on status. Everyone benefits when individuals are allowed to compete. Not At All Completely % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 3 2 4 5 9 10 11 12 16 13 14 6.51 p102_E_rate: Much of society today is unfair and corrupt, and my most important contributions are made as a member of a group that promotes justice and equality. Within my group, everyone should play an equal role without differences in rank or authority. It is easy to lose track of what is important, so I have to keep a close eye on the actions of my group. It is not enough to provide equal opportunities; we also have to try to make outcomes more equal. Not At All Completely % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 web 5 5 9 10 10 12 11 12 12 8 5 5.24 START SPLIT DESIGN C/D GROUP-C (50%): Previous wording p103c_F_rate: Life is unpredictable and I have very little control. I tend not to join groups, and I try not to get involved because I can't make much difference anyway. Most of the time other people make all the rules; I just abide by them. Getting along in life is largely a matter of doing the best I can with what comes my way, so I just try to take care of myself and the people closest to me. It's best to just go with the flow, because whatever will be will be.

GROUP-D (50%): Revised wording

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p103d_F_rate: Life is unpredictable and I have very little control. I tend not to join groups, and I try not to get involved because I can't make much difference anyway. Most of the time other people determine my options in life. Getting along is largely a matter of doing the best I can with what comes my way, so I just try to take care of myself and the people closest to me. It's best to just go with the flow, because whatever will be will be. Not At All Completely % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean 2014 Grp-C 7 7 9 11 8 13 11 13 10 5 6 5.00 2014 Grp-D 11 10 12 10 8 9 7 8 11 9 5 4.62

(p = .0307) END SPLIT C/D p104_party With which political party do you most identify? Democratic Republican Independent Other Party % 1 2 3 4 2014 web 38 26 34 2 p105_iden Do you completely, somewhat, or slightly identify with that political party? Slightly Somewhat Completely % 1 2 3 Mean 2014 web 10 57 32 2.22 p106_tea: How do you feel about the Tea Party? Strongly Strongly Oppose Support % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 21 10 11 35 12 5 6 3.46 p107_ideol: On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal to strongly conservative. Which of the following categories best describes your views? Strongly Slightly Middle of Slightly Strongly Liberal Liberal Liberal the Road Conserv. Conserv. Conserv. % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mean 2014 web 7 13 10 37 14 14 5 4.04 p108_Hisp Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish or to have Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origins? No Yes % 0 1 2014 web (unweighted) 87.6 12.4

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p109_race Which of the following best describes your race? Two or More Other White Black AI/AN Asian NH/PI Races Race % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2014 web 82.1 12.3 0.6 2.5 0.1 2.4 0 (unweighted) p110_inc Please indicate which of the following income categories approximates the total estimated annual income for your household for the year 2012. <$10K $10–20K $20–30K $30–40K $40–50K $50–60K $60–70K % 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2014 web 10 14 13 12 8 11 10 (unweighted)

$70–80K $80–90K $90–100K $100–110K $110–120K $120–130K $130–140K % 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 2014 web 6 3 3 2 1 2 1 (unweighted)

$140–150K $150–160K $160–170K $170–180K $180–190K $190–200K >$200K % 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2014 web 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 (unweighted)

% Median 2014 web $40–50K (unweighted)

Scholars have learned that information often influences the way in which people answer survey questions. With this in mind, we are interested in whether you are taking the time to read the text that precedes each question. So, in order to demonstrate that you have read this text, please ignore the question below and click on the blue dot. p111_instruct Which of the following devices do you typically use to answer surveys on the Internet? 1 – a computer 2 – A tablet (like an iPad) 3 – A smart phone (like a Blackberry or iPhone) Did Not Click Blue Dot Clicked Blue Dot % 0 1 2014 web 78 22 (unweighted)

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