US – IRAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE FACE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUILD UP

US – IRAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE FACE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BUILD UP

Submitted to:

Prof. Victor Emmanuel H. Enario

Submitted by:

Damaris Joyce S. Torcal

October 5, 2012

INTRODUCTION

Following the devastating World War II was the mid-1940s to

late 1980s intense rivalry between the two great blocs of power

and political ideologies: democracy and capitalism in the United

States, and Communism in the Soviet Union – the Cold War Period.

Editors of the eJournal USA in the March 2005 issue of Foreign

Policy Agenda, Today’s Nuclear Equation, states that since the

end of the Cold War, the main barrier enclosing the nuclear

nightmare has been the 35-year-old Nuclear Proliferation Treaty

or NPT, as a review conference held every five years is done in

assessment to the status of nuclear proliferation dangers and

nonproliferation progress.

The establishment of this Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

kept the worry and anxiety of a global nuclear devastation down

to a minimum, and along with the countries bound to it, it has

tried to exert, at its best, all efforts to keep things that same

way, in order to avoid such massive nuclear threats to global

security and peace.

THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Negotiations regarding a global treaty to halt the further

spread of nuclear weapons arose during the 1960s when concerns

regarding the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons

escalated. More intensified by the accelerated nuclear arms race

between the US and the Soviet, these negotiations paved way to

the establishment of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, which was opened for ratification in 1968 and entered

into force by the year 1970 (Spector, 2008). Furthermore, under

the treaty, the nuclear weapon states party to the agreement

pledges not to transfer nuclear weapons or any other nuclear

explosive devices to any recipient, including such possible

peaceful nuclear explosives for large-scale excavations, or to

“assist, encourage, or induce” any nonnuclear weapon state to

manufacture nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive

devices. The nuclear weapon states, however, are not required by

the treaty to give up nuclear weapons.

This 1968 treaty was one of the many important agreements on

Arms Control to limit the global consequences of a world war. The

signatories have pledged to restrict the development, deployment,

and testing of nuclear weapons to ensure that weapons, materials,

or technology would not be transferred outside the five countries

that had nuclear weapons then, namely: Great Britain, France,

China, the United States, and the USSR. By the year 1995, more

than 170 countries agreed to permanently extend the treaty

(Luttwak, 2008).

US AFFIRMATION TO NPT COMPLIANCE

In a statement issued 7th of March 2005, President George W.

Bush reaffirmed the American commitment to carry out its

obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, urging

NPT members to “close the loopholes that allow states to produce

nuclear materials that can be used to build bombs under the cover

of civilian nuclear programs.”

The United States of America is distinct on its resolve to

the commitment to the treaty, and expresses assuring

reaffirmations on its loyalty to compliance in the execution of

its responsibilities for the realization of a peaceful nuclear-

free world.

THE NEED FOR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY

On January 28, 2003, President George W. Bush said: “The

American flag stands for more than our power and our interests.

Our founders dedicated this country to the cause of human

dignity, the rights of every person, and the possibilities of

every life. This conviction leads us into the world to help the

afflicted, and defend the peace, and confound the designs of evil

men.” This was the global vision that Bush had envisioned for the

entire world. The very beliefs and principles that stood

foundation to their country’s strength and power would foster the

broadening of America’s scope of interest into the entire world –

extending help to those in need, putting right what was wrong,

and most importantly, defending the most needed and desirable

global peace. With the entire world driven of conflict, people

may live the way as they wish, freely exercising their inherent

rights, and upholding the dignity of the human race.

In the face of modern technology today, the greatest threat

before humanity is the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass

destruction proliferation. Rogue states, with close ties to

terrorist organizations, also seek to acquire these destructive

weapons (Rademaker, March 2005). Hence, it must be in the line of

interest of NPT Parties to take strong action to confront the

threat of noncompliance with the NPT in order to preserve and

strengthen the treaty’s nonproliferation undertakings.

Members of the NPT cannot afford to allow rogue states that

violate their commitments and defy the international community to

undermine the NPT’s fundamental role in strengthening

international security. Closing any loopholes in the treaty would

provide them great help in avoiding states to produce nuclear

materials that can be used to build bombs in the guise of

civilian nuclear programs (Foreign Policy Agenda: Today's Nuclear

Equation, 2005).

Hence, for international norms to be effective, they must be

enforced. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assumes

responsibility in uncovering banned nuclear activity and to

report such violations. Furthermore, as an intergovernmental

organization and as part of the United Nations, it exists for the

very purpose of working “for the safe, secure, and peaceful use

of nuclear technology” (Microsoft Corporation, 2009). Its

safeguards system then proves an important means of detecting and

preventing NPT violations.

Indeed, it is essential in these times of great challenge to

international security, particularly rogue states and terrorists

seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, that the

international community work together to confront the dangers of

nuclear proliferation.

IRAN’S NONCOMPLIANCE

With thoughts of securing global peace, the US has

undertaken its own efforts to keep away threats to such peace. It

is known that the unscrupulous black marketers seek to supply the

lucrative demand for weapons of mass destruction (Rademaker,

March 2005). Threats of global proportion require a global

response. Hence, President Bush made this core principle clear in

the National Security Strategy of the US, indicating that they

are “guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer,

better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can

multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations.”

For the NPT members, according to Stephen Rademaker,

Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Acting

Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, they “cannot

stand by and allow North Korea and Iran to… arm themselves with

nuclear weapons…” Furthermore, Rademaker asserts that the two

regimes “abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions and return to

compliance with the NPT.” For the most part, it is difficult to

believe that it is possible to control the world’s most dangerous

weapon.

While Iran and North Korea are not part of the countries who

were allowed to accommodate devices and weapons which are nuclear

in nature, Iran had been able to hide its NPT violations from the

world for nearly two decades in an effort to master the

technology necessary to build nuclear weapons. Despite the

knowledge of such violations, and with much strong international

disapproval and criticism, the country refuses to abandon this

effort.

With very little reason to believe that Iran might not be

playing with fire in defying the treaty, Henry Sokolski,

Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education

Center, states that the best chance for nations seeking to

prevent further nuclear proliferation is to enforce the original

presumption of the NPT’s Article IV, presuming “against the

unnecessary spread of unsafeguardable nuclear activities and

materials.” In the case of Iran, Sokolski writes that “Tehran’s

operation of an enrichment plant… should be regarded as being

neither peaceful nor protected under Article IV of the NPT.”

Iran’s claim that it has a “peaceful” right to acquire all

it needs to come within days of having a bomb should remind us of

what the NPT was meant to avoid. Diplomat Irish Foreign Minister

Fred Aiken, the first to propose the treaty, explained in 1959

that a world of nuclear-ready states would resemble a town full

of armed residents pointing guns at each other’s heads, where at

some point, mutual suspicion and the advantage of firing first

would give way to mayhem. This was what the NPT was supposed to

prevent. It was in 1965 that the UN General Assembly resolved the

NPT to be “void of loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-

nuclear power to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear

weapons in any form.” As a result, the treaty’s negotiators

rejected the proposals by Mexico and Spain to make the nuclear-

weapon states’ sharing of “the entire technology of reactors and

fuels,” means to produce nuclear weapons-usable materials, a

“duty” under the NPT. The treaty’s negotiators understood that

although nations should be free to develop “peaceful” nuclear

energy under the NPT, this criterion depended upon a number of

factors. Whether or not such a criterion was met, the activity in

question cannot be guaranteed as safeguarded, as required by the

NPT, to prevent it from being diverted “from peace uses to

nuclear weapons.” Furthermore, there is no guarantee either that

the NPT’s watchdog, the IAEA, can monitor it in a manner that

could reliably detect the loss or theft of enough nuclear

material to make a bomb before this material could actually be

fabricated into an explosive (Sokolski, March 2005).

Undeniably, there are many aspects to which the

international community perceives the nuclear activities in Iran.

Most of them, and with the firm backing from the US, is in strong

disapproval of such, for the very reasonable grounds of keeping

peace within the international interest. Because of Iran’s

defiance to the treaty, it now faces numerable censures.

IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

In early 2006, the issue of Iran’s nuclear program

threatened to become the cause of a major international crisis

threatening world peace. Its resumption of nuclear activities

previously suspended, and the decision of the IAEA to report Iran

to the UN Security Council have set the stage for a serious

confrontation at the United Nations involving the world

community. This unique crisis demands a serious examination of

the nature of Iran’s nuclear program from an objective and social

scientific perspective, critical on the key aspects of Iranian

nuclear crisis, and the nature of nuclear policy-making.

The nature of the problem with Iran’s Nuclear Program,

notwithstanding the possibility of tilting the balance of “rights

and obligations” enshrined in the NPT by enhancing the scope of

safeguard and verification standards, lies in the question of how

to stop Iran’s incremental march toward nuclear weapons, where

such is discussed in larger context in strengthening the

nonproliferation regime. Such strengthening is perceived to be

necessary and is definitely pursued so that certain NPT member

states considered “rogue” by the West cannot exploit the NPT

license to develop peaceful nuclear technology for the “dual use”

purposes. In other words, Iran as a “symptomatic of a larger

problem” that needs to be addressed, must be ensured that the

NPT-sanctioned uranium enrichment programs are not channeled

toward weaponization. Iran at this time was involved in a two-

track negotiation with the IAEA and the so-called EU3 (i.e., the

trio of Germany, France and UK), complying with the IAEA’s demand

for a temporary cessation of this nuclear enrichment program as a

“confidence-building measure,” and yet threatening to resume the

program at the end of the promised period. In turn, the Bush

Administration had increased the stakes by promising UN Security

Council backlashes against Tehran in case it refuses to bargain

away its enrichment program for economic incentives, namely

Iran’s entry tot eh World Trade Organization (WTO) and spare

parts for Iranian civil aviation. The negotiation climate has

been marred by rabble-rousing news of Israel’s plans to attack

Iran’s nuclear facilities, Washington’s refusal to rule out the

military option, and Ukraine’s sale to Iran of Russian-made

cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Meanwhile,

Russia has continued its nuclear cooperation with Iran. By

February 2005, Moscow and Tehran signed an agreement on the

return of ‘spent fuel’ from the Bushehr reactor to Russia. Per

this agreement, Iran shoulders the financial responsibility of

the spent fuel’s storage and re-processing , much to the chagrin

of some Iranian parliamentarians who complain of “overcharging”

by Russia. This is despite the fact that Russia at present is

Iran’s sole nuclear partner and it’s about to sign lucrative

deals with Tehran for possibly three to five more power plants.

Since Russia does not share Western alarm about Iran’s

imminent capability to reach the “nuclear weapon threshold,” the

West’s options on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program appear

to be rather limited, particularly since the various IAEA

inspections of Iran’s facilities have, so far, found no “smoking

gun.” On the other hand, on November 2004, the talks of Iran and

the EU3 have smoothed over and culminated in the historic “Paris

Agreement,” where Iran had agreed to cease all enrichment

activities, and EU3, in return, “recognizes Iran’s rights under

the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the

Treaty, without discrimination.” (Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, 2006)

In the midst of all negotiations, there is still the

question of how Iran intends to join the nuclear club – or

rather, become a nuclear weapons state. There can be many

factors: economic, military, national interest and national

defense, foreign relations and the like. But even with national

security, it still doesn’t see reason enough to understand why

they pursue nuclear activity. When the US invasions happened in

Afghanistan and Iraq, it destroyed two major national security

threats for Iran – rightly interpreted as “boons for Iran,” –

considerably improving, as a matter of fact, the overall

strategic environment of the country and enhancing Iranian

national security and confidence. So, why the need for nuclear

power?

THE IRANIAN NEED FOR NUCLEAR POWER

It is often heard that Iran’s real purpose for pursuing

nuclear technology is to develop nuclear weapons, and that with

its huge oil and gas reserves, it has no real need for nuclear

energy. However, these claims lack substance.

There are several reasons why Iran is in need of nuclear

power. First, it is important to bear in mind that Iran’s nuclear

history pre-dates the current Islamic government, originating in

the mid-1970s when plans to purchase several nuclear reactors

from Germany, France and the US were revealed to enable Iran to

generate electricity. At the time, the US encouraged Iran to

expand its non-oil energy base, after a study conducted by the

Stanford Research Institute concluded that Iran would need, by

the year 1990, an electrical capacity of about 20,000 megawatts.

Hence, in recognition of Iran’s energy needs, the final draft of

the US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement was signed in July 1978. The

agreement stipulated, among other things, American export of

nuclear technology and material and help in searching for uranium

deposits.

Second, Iran’s electrical requirements are far larger than

had been predicted. With growing population and demand for

electricity, Iran cannot possibly rely exclusively on oil and

gas. The aging oil industry, denied substantial foreign

investment largely because of American sanctions, has not been

able to even reach the needed production level per day.

Third, opponents of Iran’s nuclear program often argue that

Iran should opt for the more economically efficient electricity

from natural gas-fired power plants. Such arguments are also not

valid, in that, a study conducted indicated that the cost of

producing electricity from gas (and oil) is comparable with what

it costs to generate it using nuclear reactors – not to mention

the adverse effects of carbon emissions of the need to preserve

Iran’s gas reserves to position Iran in 20 or 30 years as one of

the main suppliers of gas to Europe and Asia.

Fourth, it is a debated idea on why Iran should deplete its

nonrenewable oil and gas sources when it can, much like the

energy-rich US and Russia, resort to renewable nuclear energy.

Sadly, however, with the fear of an Iranian bomb, the US and some

of its Western allies have failed to acknowledge Iran’s

legitimate quest for nuclear energy.

The essence of Iran’s six-point proposal would be:

(1) Iran pledges that its nuclear program is for peaceful

purposes, not nuclear bombs.

(2) Iran pledges that it will get the legislative approval

in its majlis (parliament) of the Additional Protocol to the

nuclear NPT and will continue with IAEA inspections.

(3) Iran pledges to stay within the NPT.

(4) Iran pledges that it will not resume enrichment prior

to the next IAEA meeting.

(5) Iran pledges that its nuclear research will be under

monitoring by the IAEA.

(6) Iran will continue negotiating with the EU-3 regarding

enrichment issues for two years, and after two years, if the

negotiations fail, will resume enrichment activities.

There is no doubt that Iran is going to join the nuclear club

– whether it be either a de facto nuclear-weapons state or a

major supplier of civilian nuclear fuel cycles. The decision

between the two is yet to be taken by the Iranian leadership and

the result greatly depends on the outcome of the negotiations

between the EU and Iran – but more importantly, on how the US

deals with Iran (Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, 2006).

US APPROACH TO IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

The international community is engaged in a long term

campaign against terrorism, as it goes side by side with the

issue on weapons of mass destruction, linking itself to the

matter on nuclear proliferation. Along with many other

international organizations and countries collaborated in the

fight against the threats to global peace, the UN and its member

states are obligated to apply sanctions against designated

terrorists, international law violators, and those who pose as

threats to the global security (Wayne, 2004). As countries act in

a collaborative effort to suppress such issues, the US, along

with its international partners, plays its part in addressing the

matter by providing substantial assistance to other governments

to help them attain the technical ability and skills to clamp

down the roots of terrorist activity, thereby, granting means of

suppressing nuclear proliferation. The scope of US efforts

extends to the tools in combating terrors in the global

community, namely intelligence, law enforcement, designation and

asset freeze, and various diplomatic initiatives.

President Obama, in his speech addressing the US undertaking

in prevention of a nucear-armed Iran last March of 2005, said:

“We do not want to see a nuclear arms race in one of the most

volatile regions in the world.  We do not want the possibility of

a nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorists… that's why

we have worked so diligently to set up the most crippling

sanctions ever with respect to Iran.  We do believe that there is

still a window that allows for a diplomatic resolution to this

issue, but ultimately the Iranians' regime has to make a decision

to move in that direction, a decision that they have not made

thus far.  And as I emphasized, even as we will continue on the

diplomatic front, we will continue to tighten pressure when it

comes to sanctions… and my policy here is prevention of Iran

obtaining nuclear weapons."

The US-Iran (then called Persia) diplomatic relations had

already been established in 1883. It was only in 1980 when the

United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran after the

seizure of the U.S. Embassy and 52 Americans by Iranian students.

Despite such, the US has long-standing concerns over Iran’s

nuclear program, sponsorship of terrorism, and human rights

record. With such, numerous sanctions have been imposed on Iran

by the US and the international community, particularly

addressing the concerns over its nuclear program. Iran has still

not recognized Israel’s right to exist and has hindered the

Middle East peace process by arming militants. Regardless though,

communication between the two countries went on, but the US

provides no development assistance to Iran. The US Government,

through executive orders from the President as well as

congressional legislation, prohibits nearly all trade and

investment with Iran. Its bilateral economic relations rest on

the sanctions imposed due to Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism,

refusal to comply with international obligations on its nuclear

program, and its human rights violations. Furthermore, regarding

Iran’s membership in International Organizations, both US and

Iran belong to a number of the same international organizations,

including the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF),

and World Bank (WB). Iran, however, remains as an observer to the

World Trade Organization (U.S. Relations with Iran, 2012).

IRAN SANCTIONS

In response to Iran’s illicit nuclear activities, support

for terrorism, and abuse of human rights, the US and other

countries have imposed sanctions. Acting both through the United

Nations Security Council, and regional or national authorities, a

coalition that includes the US, the member states of the European

Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Canada, Australia, Norway,

Switzerland, and others have put in place a strong, inter-locking

matrix of sanctions measures relating to Iran's nuclear, missile,

energy, shipping, transportation, and financial sectors. These

measures are designed:

(1) To block the transfer of weapons, components,

technology, and dual-use items to Iran’s prohibited

nuclear and missile programs;

(2) To target select sectors of the Iranian economy relevant

to its proliferation activities;

(3) To induce Iran to engage constructively, through

discussions with the United States, China, France,

Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia in the “E3+3

process,” to return to compliance with its non-

proliferation obligations.

These nations have made clear that Iran’s return to

compliance with its international obligations would open the door

to its receiving treatment as a normal non-nuclear-weapon state

under The Non-proliferation Treaty and sanctions being lifted.

The United States has imposed restrictions on activities

with Iran under various legal authorities since 1979, following

the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The most recent

statute, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and

Divestment Act (CISADA), added new measures and procedures to the

1996 Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). The CISADA was enacted July 1,

2010, soon after the United Nations Security Council adopted

Resolution 1929, the fourth U.N. resolution imposing binding

legal obligations and sanctions on Iran.

The ISA, as amended by CISADA, authorizes sanctions on

businesses or individuals engaging in certain transactions

related to Iran’s energy sector and Iranian weapons of mass

destruction and advanced conventional weapons. The ISA provides

for possible exemption of persons from investigations and

sanction if the businesses or individuals qualify under the

“Special Rule” by providing adequate assurances that they will

expeditiously terminate activities that might otherwise be

sanctionable. The CISADA also contains sections responding to

financial transactions for certain designated Iranian financial

institutions and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),

Iranian human rights violations, the diversion of certain

military equipment and technology, and the export of sensitive

technology to Iran.

The Department of State is the agency primarily responsible

for implementing the provisions of ISA and CISADA which relate to

the energy, shipping, and transportation sectors, to the export

of sensitive telecommunications technology, and to non-

proliferation and human rights issues. For example, the Iran

Sanctions Act, as amended by the CISADA, restricts certain

investments in Iran’s energy sector, halting many major

international companies in doing business in Iran’s energy

sector. In addition, the State Department has sanctioned nine

companies under the ISA for doing business with Iran. Five major

companies have also vowed to stop their commercial activities in

Iran’s energy sector under the “Special Rule” in the legislation:

Total, INPEX, Statoil, Eni and Shell.

The Department of the Treasury has primary responsibility

for implementing the financial sanctions contained in the CISADA.

Apart from the ISA and CISADA, the Department of the Treasury

also acts under Presidential national emergency powers, as well

as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls

on transactions and freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction related

to Iran. Many of the sanctions are based on United Nations and

other international mandates, are multilateral in scope, and

involve close cooperation with allied governments.

Moreover, pursuant to the CISADA, the Secretary of the

Treasury has prescribed regulations to prohibit or restrict the

correspondent and payable-through accounts of foreign financial

institutions that facilitate significant financial transactions

for certain designated actors related to Iran’s proliferation or

terrorism activities, including the IRGC. U.S. law also prohibits

the export of most goods and services to Iran and transactions

involving U.S. persons or property subject to U.S. jurisdiction

with certain designated individuals and entities. The United

States also places restrictions on exports and re-exports from

the United States to certain destinations and end-users. Those

restrictions are administered by several U.S. Government agencies

(Iran Sanctions, 2012).

Indeed, the United States Government is adamant in its

pursuit to rid Iran of its nuclear activities and nuclear

intentions for the future. They stand firm in their beliefs that

there is no way something good can come out of a nuclear Iran. To

them, Iran presented themselves a great deal of dishonor by

violating the treaty they have previously committed themselves,

and therefore, should face the consequence and accept punishment.

The sanctions imposed by the US against Iran proves very powerful

and highly influencing, all of which done for the interest of the

global community and to protect global peace, assuring humanity

of a better, brighter future.

ANALYSIS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

There will always be two sides of a story, two faces of a

coin. Much like the saying, “One man’s terrorist, is another

man’s freedom fighter,” there will always be two parties involved

who can tell the story themselves. Presented in this paper are

the two sides of Iran’s Nuclear Program – that of the United

States, and the other, of Iran. The US, acts based on what it

perceives to be of global interest. Iran, on the other hand,

takes action based on its national interest. It is true that

Iran, has in fact, violated its commitment to the Treaty of

Nuclear Non-proliferation, and it is under its duty to observe

such treaty in good faith. It ought to be well within its

judgment and concern to see why the global community undertakes

such action to prevent Iran’s nuclear program. Of course, the

world, that has already witnessed the traumatic devastation a

nuclear war brings, could not afford to see, yet, another

destruction in the same fate. The world knows what a great

struggle it would be towards recovery from the chaos of nuclear

war – and even without a nuclear war just yet, the thought of

nuclear weapon states would not foster peace of mind and

assurance of security among the all the people in the world. When

every country would be equipped with nuclear capacities for war,

nobody is at ease knowing that at any moment, a nuclear war can

break out. Everyone will know that everybody is just waiting, all

too suspicious about everyone plotting against them, and it would

be right and expected to think that anyone who fires the shot

first takes the advantage by wiping out an entire country. This

is how chaotic a nuclear way can be – and this is exactly what

the treaty is doing its best to avoid. Closing all loopholes, it

is within good interest for the international community and the

members in it, that nuclear nature among states must be driven

out, for nothing can safeguard the fact that the purpose of such

nuclear activity is still peaceful within the country.

Indeed, the United States has good reason to want to

eradicate any nuclear activity in Iran. A nuclear Iran poses as a

threat to the entire global community, and it is only within US

interest to protect not only their own people but also that of

the entire human race.

On the other hand, however, Iran also has good reason to

attaining a nuclear state. They claim peaceful rights to acquire

nuclear technology because their country really needs the energy

source. With all the sanctions imposed, limiting their

interactions and relations outside national borders, plus a

growing population, they will most certainly face difficulties in

providing for their own people. They need the resource for them

to survive. Before they must concern themselves with those

belonging outside their borders, they must first address national

interest and problems, giving solutions to such matters, and

finding ways to help the localities. One cannot blame Iran as

well, for desiring to do what is best for itself, for it is,

first and foremost, the number one duty of a government: to look

after its people.

The way I see it, the main issue in the US foreign policy is

the question on what steps should the US take to continue its

negotiations with Iran. Clearly, they want all nuclear activity

eradicated from the entire country, hence, they must continue to

persuade Iran in doing so. However, the US has not taken force

off the table as a possible intervention technique. Intent in

their pursuit, the US would most definitely intend to resort to

military option should the desperate necessity arise. However,

with Iran’s firm stand on pushing through with their plans, the

US military option would not permanently dissuade them, rather,

it would only set Iran back a little in its nuclear program, and

will only spark a reaction from Iran – most probably a negative

one. The best course of action for both sides would be a

diplomatic solution involving compromise on both sides. The

consequences not only for the two parties, but also for those who

might probably be categorized as “collateral damage” should a war

break out, would be very extreme, and from the looks of it, Iran

wouldn’t want to hazard its own future by using a nuclear weapon.

Compromising would be best for the two countries.

You see, US isn’t the only one attempting to tone down

things. A small corrective step has been taken by France, England

and Germany, whose foreign ministers sent a letter to Iran

promising technical cooperation with Iran’s civil nuclear program

in exchange for full transparency. This is wiser than the

coercive approach of the US, seeking only to dispossess Iran of

nuclear technology altogether, and is blind to Iran’s energy and

security worries. If the United States, keeps this approach up,

and Iran continues to feel threatened by these actions, things

will likely turn toward the direction of nuclearization. If

anything, the US should find a particular balance in which Iran

may concede to compromise, seeing positivity in its national

interest and concern for security worries of the global

community. For this reason, the US and its allies should do what

they can to diminish Iran’s fears.

Guaranteeing Iran’s integrity and perhaps undertaking

confidence-building measures would achieve a lot more in the

efforts toward Iranian nuclear nonproliferation than years or

even decades of sanctions! However, this action requires that the

US recognize Iran willingly in its important role in the

stability of some region, and perhaps changing the observer

status of Iran by supporting its bid to join the World Trade

Organization. Furthermore, bargaining might be a better idea than

to demand something from Iran. The US could propose to drop its

objections to Iran’s construction of a nuclear reactor if Iran

would suspend its uranium enrichment program, stop the

construction of a heavy water plant and submit to thorough

inspection – kind of like what the EU did with Iran in the Paris

Agreement.

Of course, while there is no guarantee for this sort of

approach regarding the matter, the current approach of

terrorizing Iran and threatening loads of sanctions will only

push Iran to pursue its nuclear endeavors. Perhaps lifting the

sanctions and providing a combination of security guarantees,

economic benefits, and support for Iran’s legitimate right to

peaceful nuclear technology has a better chance of putting Iran

exactly where the US wanted them to be: Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty compliance.

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