8/14/2019 US Federal Reserve: 1000 http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/us-federal-reserve-1000 1/26 Foreword Section 1000.0 The Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual has been prepared by Federal Reserve supervision personnel to provide guidance to examiners as they conduct on-site inspections of bank holding companies (BHCs) and their non- bank subsidiaries. The manual is a compilation of formalized procedures and Board supervisory policies that supervision and inspection person- nel should follow. The manual includes new concepts and keeps pace with the ever-changing industry.AnintegralpartoftheFederalReserve’s overall program to supervise banking organiza- tions operating under a holding company struc- ture, the manual enhances the staff’s ability to implement the Board’s inspection and monitor- ing efforts. The manual is designed to provide guidance to examination and supervision personnel. It should not be considered a legal reference. Questions concerning the applicability of and compliance with federal laws and regulations should be referred to appropriate legal counsel. The Federal Reserve System conducts risk assessments and a full-scope inspection pro- gram for BHCs. At a minimum, full-scope inspections should include sufficient procedures to reach an informed judgment on the assigned ratings for the factors included in the bank hold- ing company RFI/C(D) rating system. The pro- cedures of a full-scope inspection focus in part on assessing the types and extent of risks to which a BHC and its subsidiaries are exposed. Some of these types of risks include credit, market, liquidity, operational, legal, and reputa- tional risks. Inspections also focus on evaluating the organization’s policies and procedures for identifying, managing, and controlling such risk exposures and on determining whether the man- agement and directors are actively involved in the oversight of the organization’s risk- management program. To determine whether the organization’s policies and procedures for risk management are fully effective and being followed, inspections or reviews also generally include transaction and compliance testing The inspection process commences with a preliminary risk assessment. The risk assess- ment highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the holding company and is the basis for deter- mining the procedures to be conducted during an inspection. Risk assessments identify the organization’s principal business activities and the types and quantities of risks associated with the activities (including those conducted off- balance-sheet). The quality of management and the control of risks are factored into the initial risk profile of the holding company. Sources of information for the risk assessment include prior bank and BHC inspection reports and workpa- pers, surveillance program reports, and regula- tory reports. In addition, other relevant supervi- sory materials derived from within the Federal Reserve System or other federal and state bank- ing supervisors, as well as from other respon- sible regulatory agencies (for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission and state insurance authorities) are used. Other sources for the risk assessment may include the banking organization’s publicly available reports, such as annual and other periodic reports and infor- mational releases; strategic plans and budgets; internal management reports; information pack- ages for the board of directors; correspondence; the board of directors executive and audit com- mittee minutes; internal audit workpapers and reports; and stock-analysis reports. The activi- ties, transactions, and identified areas having the most significant risks, inadequate risk- management processes, or rudimentary internal controls will represent the banking organiza- tion’s highest risks. The risk-assessment process culminates in a formalized and structured super- visory strategy, which examination staff will follow when conducting an inspection. The banking organization’s highest risks are expected to undergo the most rigorous scrutiny, analysis, and transaction testing by examiners and supervisors. Transaction testing is a reliable and essential inspection technique for assessing the banking organization’s condition and verify- ing its adherence to internal policies, proce- dures, and controls. Transaction testing alone, however, is not sufficient for ensuring safe and sound operations in a highly dynamic banking environment. The changing nature of financial instruments and markets allows institutions to rapidly reposition their portfolio risk exposures. To ensure that banking organizations have sys- tems in place to identify, measure, monitor, and control their changing risk exposures, inspec- tions further focus on evaluating the banking organization’s risk-management processes.These risk-management evaluations determine the extent to which the banking organization’s man- agement processes can be relied on. The full-scope inspection may be conducted at a point in time or through a series of targeted or limited-scope reviews conducted on an ongo- ing or continuous basis for the largest and most BHC Supervision Manual July 2005 Page 1
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The Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual has been prepared by Federal Reservesupervision personnel to provide guidance toexaminers as they conduct on-site inspections of bank holding companies (BHCs) and their non-bank subsidiaries. The manual is a compilationof formalized procedures and Board supervisorypolicies that supervision and inspection person-nel should follow. The manual includes newconcepts and keeps pace with the ever-changingindustry. An integral part of the Federal Reserve’soverall program to supervise banking organiza-tions operating under a holding company struc-ture, the manual enhances the staff’s ability to
implement the Board’s inspection and monitor-ing efforts.The manual is designed to provide guidance
to examination and supervision personnel. It should not be considered a legal reference.Questions concerning the applicability of andcompliance with federal laws and regulationsshould be referred to appropriate legal counsel.
The Federal Reserve System conducts risk assessments and a full-scope inspection pro-gram for BHCs. At a minimum, full-scope
inspections should include sufficient proceduresto reach an informed judgment on the assignedratings for the factors included in the bank hold-ing company RFI/C(D) rating system. The pro-cedures of a full-scope inspection focus in parton assessing the types and extent of risks towhich a BHC and its subsidiaries are exposed.Some of these types of risks include credit,market, liquidity, operational, legal, and reputa-tional risks. Inspections also focus on evaluatingthe organization’s policies and procedures for
identifying, managing, and controlling such risk exposures and on determining whether the man-agement and directors are actively involved inthe oversight of the organization’s risk-management program. To determine whetherthe organization’s policies and procedures forrisk management are fully effective and beingfollowed, inspections or reviews also generallyinclude transaction and compliance testing
The inspection process commences with apreliminary risk assessment. The risk assess-
ment highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the holding company and is the basis for deter-mining the procedures to be conducted duringan inspection. Risk assessments identify theorganization’s principal business activities andthe types and quantities of risks associated withthe activities (including those conducted off-balance-sheet). The quality of management andthe control of risks are factored into the initial
risk profile of the holding company. Sources of information for the risk assessment include priorbank and BHC inspection reports and workpa-pers, surveillance program reports, and regula-tory reports. In addition, other relevant supervi-sory materials derived from within the FederalReserve System or other federal and state bank-ing supervisors, as well as from other respon-sible regulatory agencies (for example, theSecurities and Exchange Commission and stateinsurance authorities) are used. Other sourcesfor the risk assessment may include the bankingorganization’s publicly available reports, suchas annual and other periodic reports and infor-
mational releases; strategic plans and budgets;internal management reports; information pack-ages for the board of directors; correspondence;the board of directors executive and audit com-mittee minutes; internal audit workpapers andreports; and stock-analysis reports. The activi-ties, transactions, and identified areas havingthe most significant risks, inadequate risk-management processes, or rudimentary internalcontrols will represent the banking organiza-tion’s highest risks. The risk-assessment process
culminates in a formalized and structured super-visory strategy, which examination staff willfollow when conducting an inspection.
The banking organization’s highest risks areexpected to undergo the most rigorous scrutiny,analysis, and transaction testing by examinersand supervisors. Transaction testing is a reliableand essential inspection technique for assessingthe banking organization’s condition and verify-ing its adherence to internal policies, proce-dures, and controls. Transaction testing alone,
however, is not sufficient for ensuring safe andsound operations in a highly dynamic bankingenvironment. The changing nature of financialinstruments and markets allows institutions torapidly reposition their portfolio risk exposures.To ensure that banking organizations have sys-tems in place to identify, measure, monitor, andcontrol their changing risk exposures, inspec-tions further focus on evaluating the bankingorganization’s risk-management processes. Theserisk-management evaluations determine the
extent to which the banking organization’s man-agement processes can be relied on.
The full-scope inspection may be conductedat a point in time or through a series of targetedor limited-scope reviews conducted on an ongo-ing or continuous basis for the largest and most
complex banking organizations. Irrespective of the duration of the inspection, planned supervi-sory activities should be coordinated well inadvance with other responsible bank, thrift, andfunctional regulators in order to avoid duplica-tion of effort and to minimize burden on thebanking organization. Supervisory findings of inspections should be communicated to the bank-ing organization’s management or boards of directors, as well as to the banking organiza-tion’s other bank supervisors and functionalregulators, when relevant.
An inspection also measures the financialstrength of a BHC or financial holding company(FHC) and focuses on financial indices of boththe consolidated entity and its component parts.
In addition to the analysis of risk, the otherprincipal indices appraised are quality of assets,earnings, capital adequacy, cash flow and liquid-ity, and the competency of management. Aninspection or supervisory program should alsoassess the banking organization’s program fortransactions between insured subsidiaries andaf filiates. The basic objective of this assessmentis to determine the impact or consequences of transactions between the parent holding com-pany or its nonbanking subsidiaries and the
insured subsidiaries. Of particular importance iswhether intercompany transactions result in adiversion of income (or income opportunity)
away from a federally insured subsidiary to aholding company af filiate.
The competency of BHC management in over-seeing the banking organization’s businessactivities, risk management, and financial condi-tion is also evaluated. The FHC and BHCinspection process provides a vehicle for a com-prehensive assessment of the effectiveness of management, resulting in a more open andinformed dialogue between management andrepresentatives of the Federal Reserve.
In summary, the inspection process is intendedto increase the flow of information to the Fed-eral Reserve System concerning the soundnessof FHCs and BHCs. This information will per-mit the Federal Reserve to encourage sound
banking practices and to take appropriate super-visory action when warranted.This manual is updated periodically to reflect
current supervisory policy and procedures andchanging practices within the industry. Themanual is also available on the Board’s publicweb site at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ supmanual/. We solicit the input and contribu-tion of all supervisory staff and others in refin-ing and modifying its contents. Please addressall correspondence to the Director of Banking
Supervision and Regulation, Board of Gover-nors of the Federal Reserve System, Washing-ton, DC 20551.
3130.4 Informational, Statistical Forecasting, and AdvisoryServices for Transactions in Foreign Exchangeand Swaps, Commodities, and Derivative Instruments
3130.5 Providing Educational Courses and Instructional Materialsfor Consumers on Individual Financial ManagementMatters
3130.6 Tax-Planning and Tax-Preparation Services
3140.0 Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act—Leasing Personalor Real Property
3150.0 Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act—Community WelfareProjects
3160.0 Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act—EDP ServicingCompany
3160.1 EDP Servicing—Network for the Processing andTransmission of Medical Payment Data
3160.2 Electronic Benefit Transfer, Stored-Value-Card,and Electronic Data Interchange Services
3160.3 Data Processing Activities: Obtaining Traveler’s Checksand Postage Stamps Using an ATM Card and Terminal
3160.4 Providing Data Processing for ATM Distribution of Tickets,Gift Certificates, Telephone Cards, and Other Documents
3160.5 Engage in Transmitting Money
3165.1 Support Services—Printing and Selling MICR-EncodedItems
3170.0 Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act—Insurance Agency
Activities of Bank Holding Companies
3180.0 Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act—InsuranceUnderwriters
3190.0 Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act—Courier Services
3200.0 Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act—ManagementConsulting and Counseling
3202.0 Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act—Employee Benefits
Consulting Services
3204.0 Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act—Career Counseling
This manual is designed to aid personnel of theFederal Reserve System in supervising bank holding companies. As such, it will review inconsiderable detail current policies and proce-dures for supervising the financial affairs of these banking organizations and will also dis-cuss statutes, regulations, interpretations andorders that pertain to bank holding companysupervision. Before proceeding, however, it isdesirable to step back and view bank holdingcompanies and their supervision in a broaderperspective. This preface is designed to provide
that perspective.While the holding company form of organiza-tion exists in many industries, it is particularlyprevalent in the regulated industries—telephone,electric and gas utility, railroad, savings andloan, and banking. Regulated industries havelearned that a holding company structure allowscertain entities to avoid some of the constraintsof regulation. For example, regulation often lim-its the geographic area that a regulated firm canserve. By forming a holding company, many
regulated organizations can serve a broader area,thereby potentially benefiting from economiesof scale and risk reduction through geographicdiversification.
A second purpose for the use of a holdingcompany structure by regulated firms is to expandinto other product markets, often ones that arenot subject to regulation.
A third purpose for the use of a holdingcompany structure is to increase the organiza-tion’s financial flexibility, thereby avoiding some
of the financing constraints imposed by regula-tion. These constraints can include limitationson leverage, the types of assets that the firm canacquire and the types of liabilities that it canissue. Another possible financial advantage of the holding company is to obtain tax benefits.
Bank holding companies were created foressentially the same reasons that holding com-panies were created in other industries; to expandgeographically, to move into other product mar-kets, and to obtain greater financial flexibility
and tax benefits. The primary use of the bank holding company device prior to the late 1960’swas to expand banking operations geographi-cally. The holding company form was neededbecause many States either prohibited or sharplycurtailed branching within the State. Moreover,banks generally did not have the authority tobranch beyond the geographic limits of the Statein which the bank was chartered. By employing
the holding company form of organization, sev-eral banking organizations had succeeded by the1950’s in expanding over an entire region of thecountry, operating banks in several States.
During the 1960’s many banks, especially thelargest ones, desired to expand into new lines of activity. In most cases, these new activities werefinancial in nature and were closely related totraditional banking operations. While somebankswere successful in obtaining supervisory ap-proval to enter certain of these new activities,the courts subsequently voided many of theseapprovals. Unable to enter these activities as abank, many of these organizations converted
into the holding company form and enteredthese activities through the holding company.In recent years banking organizations also
have used the holding company device to increasetheir financial flexibility. For example, in orderto avoid the reserve requirements and interestrate ceilings applicable to deposits of their bank subsidiaries, many banking organizations haveutilized the parent company as a vehicle to fundthe organization. Moreover, the holding com-pany structure has allowed organizations to attain
higher leverage levels than otherwise mighthave been permitted.
Historically, the Bank Holding Company Actsought to provide for the separation of bankingfrom commerce. In order to avoid any detrimen-tal effects on the public interest, the activities of bank holding companies have been limited bylaw and regulation and transactions with bank-ing subsidiaries are virtually prohibited. Thisbasic rationale is the cornerstone for regulatingthe financial affairs of bank holding companies.
1020.0.2 POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCESOF HOLDING COMPANYFORMATION
There are two primary ways that a holdingcompany can have an adverse effect on thefinancial condition of a regulated subsidiary.The first is for the holding company (or itsunregulated-regulated subsidiaries) to take ex-
cessive risks and fail. This failure could have a‘‘ripple effect’’ on the regulated firm, impairingits access to financial markets. The classic caseis the Insull empire in the electric utility indus-try, which involved the pyramiding of numeroushighly leveraged holding companies. The col-
lapse of this pyramid during the Depression of the 1930’s severely impacted the regulated elec-tric utility operating companies and impairedtheir ability to service the public.
A second major way that a holding companycan have a harmful effect on the financial condi-tion of a regulated subsidiary is through adverseintercompany transactions and excessive divi-dends. Adverse intercompany transactions typi-cally involve either the purchase and sale of goods and services or financial transactions thatare on nonmarket terms. Concern over the useof the holding company device to transfer finan-cial resources from the regulated firm has beenparticularly prevalent. In this case, there hasbeen a conflict of views between the govern-
ment, and the firms which want to diversify inorder to increase their return on investment.In the mid 1970’s, concern over holding com-
panies forcing regulated firms into adverse trans-actions surfaced in the banking industry. In thisinstance, the objective was not to divert re-sources from the bank to more profitable areas,but rather to use bank resources to save a non-bank affiliate from failure.
1020.0.3 REGULATORY RESPONSETO THE HOLDING COMPANY
Historically, public policymakers have recog-nized that holding companies can have bothpositive and negative effects on regulated sub-sidiaries. The fact that policymakers have per-mitted holding companies to exist in all of themajor regulated industries indicates that theeffects, on balance, have not been decidedlynegative. However, there have been enough
problems over the years that holding companiesin most regulated industries are subject to atleast some form of regulation. This regulationvaries substantially from one regulated industryto another.
Until the mid-1970’s, Congressional concernswith bank holding companies were primarilyoriented to competition, concentration of finan-cial resources and the proper range of bankingactivities. However, there was also some limitedrecognition of the possible impact of holdingcompanies on the financial condition of banks.The earliest evidence was the Banking Act of 1935,inwhichCongressgavetheFederalReserveBoard authority to issue permits to holding com-panies to vote the stock of their banks. In actingon permit applications, the Board was required
to consider the holding company’s financialcondition, the character of its management, andthe effect of granting the permit on the bank.Congress also gave the Federal Reserve theright to inspect bank holding companies.
About two decades later, Congress passed theBank Holding Company Act of 1956. This leg-islation required the Federal Reserve, in passingon proposed bank acquisitions by holding com-panies, to consider the competitive, financialand managerial implications of the proposal.More recently, the Bank Holding Company ActAmendments of 1970 required the FederalReserve to make a similar determination inapplications by holding companies to acquirenonbanking companies. The amendments also
brought one-bank holding companies into theFederal Reserve’s jurisdiction.Subsequently, Congress and the public be-
came seriously concerned over the possibleadverse impact of holding companies on thefinancial condition of subsidiary banks. Theseadverse developments led to two results; addi-tional legislation and stepped-up holding com-panysupervision. The major Congressionalactionwas to give the Federal Reserve much neededcease and desist powers over bank holding com-
panies. This authority now supplements certainstatutes, such as dividend restrictions and limita-tions on bank transactions with affiliates, thattend to protect banks in a holding companyorganization.
In the mid-1970’s, the Federal Reserve steppedup its supervision and monitoring of bank hold-ing companies in a variety of ways. First, theFederal Reserve increased the scope and fre-quency of holding company inspections, andlater introduced a bank holding company rating
system designed to focus attention on thoseorganizations having the most serious problems.Second, the Federal Reserve began to monitortransactions between bank subsidiaries and therest of the holding company organizationthrough quarterly intercompany transactionsreports. Third, the Federal Reserve imple-mented a computer-based surveillance programdesigned to identify emerging financial prob-lems. Finally, the Federal Reserve began to em-ploy its new holding company cease and desist
powers in an effort to curtail unsafe and unsoundpractices.
The period prior to 1980 marked a gradualdecline in the ratio of equity capital to totalassets within the United States Commercialbanking system, particularly for the nation’slargest banking organizations. In an effort toreverse that trend, the Federal Reserve Systemand the Comptroller adopted guidelines for
national and state member banks and bank hold-ing companies in December 1981. The guide-lines established minimum capital levels andcapital zones. The guidelines provided statemember banks and bank holding companieswith targets or objectives to be reached overtime. As a result, many of the banks and bank holding companies improved their capital posi-tions. However, other developments, includingderegulation of interest rates on bank liabilities,weakening of loan portfolios (asset quality) of some banking institutions occasioned by eco-nomic shocks in certain industries or geographi-cal areas, and increased competition in the finan-cial services areas, combined to place additionalpressures on the profitability of banking institu-
tions and accentuate the potential demands onthe capital positions of those institutions.The Federal Reserve System continued to
stress the importance of the capital guidelines insetting standards of capital adequacy. The Boardthus amended its guidelines in June 1983, to setexplicit minimum capital levels for multina-tional organizations.
In November 1983, congressional concernover existing conditions, prompted the enact-ment of the International Lending Supervision
Act of 1983 (‘‘ILSA’’). The Act directed that thefederal banking agencies cause banking institu-tions to establish minimum capital levels forbanking organizations. In December 1983, theBoard, therefore, published the guidelines asAppendix A to the totally revised Regulation Y(12 C.F.R. section 225). Then in April 1985, theBoard adopted new capital adequacy guidelinesto increase the required minimum primary andtotal capital levels for the larger regional andmultinational bank holding companies and state
member banks. This action, when considered inconjunction with the capital maintenance regula-tions of the Comptroller of the Currency and theFederal Deposit Insurance Corporation, estab-lished uniform minimum capital levels for allfederally supervised bank holding companies,regardless of size, type of charter, primarysupervisor or membership in the Federal ReserveSystem.
The strengthening of supervision over banksand bank holding companies is an equally
imposing supervisory concern. The FederalReserve System adopted a number of supervi-sory policies in 1985 that directly affected thesupervision of bank holding companies, such asthe increased frequency and scope of inspec-tions and the communicating of the results of inspections (refer to Manual section 5000). Inaddition,thescopeoftheinspectionwasexpandedto provide for a comprehensive analysis of man-
agement’s ability to direct and control the orga-nization utilizing the basic assumption that thebank holding company is responsible for thedirection and vitality of the organization. Over-seeing the supervision of banking organizationsentails evaluating management’s policies andprocedures, wherever they are established withinthe corporate structure, as part of the examina-tion/inspection process. Such policy areasincludethe consolidated planning process, risk manage-ment, funding, liquidity, lending, managementinformation systems, loan review, and audit andinternal controls.
The Board, concerned with strengthening thesupervision over member banks and bank hold-ing companies, adopted a policy statement
regarding cash dividends not fully covered byearnings on November 14, 1985. The policystatement addressed the situation when cash div-idends are not fully covered by earnings, whichrepresents a return of a portion of an organiza-tion’s capital (refer to Manual section 2020.0for a discussion regarding the policy statement).
The Board adopted a policy statement onApril 24, 1987, also related to the strengtheningof the supervision over subsidiary banks of bank holding companies. The Board reaffirmed its
long-standing policy that a bank holding com-pany should act as a source of financial andmanagerial strength to its subsidiary financialinstitutions. The policy statement provides thata bank holding company should not withholdfinancial support from a subsidiary bank in aweakened or failing condition when the holdingcompany is in a position to provide the support.The Board emphasized that a bank holding com-pany’s failure to provide assistance to a troubledor failing subsidiary bank under these circum-
stances would generally be viewed as an unsafeand unsound banking practice or a violation of the Boards Regulation Y (refer to section 225.4(a)(1)) or both.
Congress limited the expansion of nonbank banks with the passage of the Competitive Equal-ity Banking Act of 1987. The legislation rede-fined the definition of ‘‘bank’’ in the Bank Hold-ing Company Act so that an FDIC-insuredinstitution is a bank. Existing nonbank bankswere grandfathered but certain limitations were
imposed on their operations.In an effort to further strengthen the capital
position in banks and bank holding companies,the Board of Governors of the Federal ReserveSystem, on January 19, 1989, issued final guide-lines to implement risk-based capital require-
ments for state member banks and bank holdingcompanies. The guidelines are based on theframework adopted July 11, 1988, by the BasleCommittee on Banking Regulations and Super-visory Practices, which includes supervisoryauthorities from 12 major industrial countries.The guidelines are designed to achieve certainimportant goals:
• Establishment of a uniform capital frame-work, applicable to all federally supervisedbanking organizations (the guidelines werealso adopted by the Office of the Comptrollerof the Currency, and the Federal DepositInsurance Corporation);
• Encouragement of international banking orga-
nizations to strengthen their capital positions;and,
• Reduction of a source of competitive inequal-ity arising from differences in supervisoryrequirements among nations.
The guidelines establish a systematic analyti-cal framework that: (1) makes regulatory capitalrequirements more sensitive to differences inrisk profiles among banking organizations;
(2) factors off-balance sheet exposures intoexplicit account in assessing capital adequacy,minimizes disincentives to holding liquid, low-risk assets; and achieves greater consistency inthe evaluation of the capital adequacy of majorbanking organizations throughout the world.
The risk-based capital guidelines include botha definition of capital and a framework for cal-culating weighted risk assets by assigning assetsand off-balance sheet items to broad risk catego-ries. An institution’s risk-based capital is calcu-
lated by dividing its qualifying total capital (thenumerator of the ratio) by its weighted risk assets (the denominator).
The guidelines provide for phasing in of risk-based capital standards through the end of 1992,at which time the standards become fully effec-tive. At that time, banking organizations will berequired to have capital equivalent to 8 percentof assets, weighted by risk.
Banking organizations must have at least4 percent Tier 1 capital, which consists of core
capital elements, including common stockhold-er’s equity, retained earnings, and noncumula-tive and limited amounts of cumulative perpet-ual preferred stock, to weighted risk assets. Theother half of required capital (Tier 2), can include,among other supplementary capital elements,
the non-Tier 1 portion of cumulative perpetualpreferred stock, limited-life preferred stock andsubordinated debt, and loan loss reserves up tocertain limits.
The risk weights assigned to assets and creditequivalent amounts of off-balance sheet itemsare based primarily on credit risk. Other types of exposure, such as interest rate, liquidity, andfunding risk, as well as asset quality problems,are not factored into the risk-based measure.Such risks will be taken into account in deter-mining a final assessment of an organization’s,capital adequacy, however.
Congress addressed the recent thrift crisiswith the passage of thrift legislation, the Finan-cial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which was signedinto law on August 9, 1989. The legislationbrought forth a number of important develop-ments affecting bank holding companies. Thelegislation addressed:
1. acquisition of thrifts, in addition to failingones;
2. conversion of thrifts to banks;3. merger of thrifts with banks; and the4. enhancement of enforcement authority.
The Federal Deposit Insurance CorporationImprovement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) was signedinto law on December 19, 1992. It was enactedto require the least-cost resolution of insureddepository institutions, to improve supervisionand examinations, to provide additional re-sources to the Bank Insurance Fund, and forother purposes. It required the federal bankingagencies and their holding companies to pre-scribe standards for credit underwriting, loan
documentation, as well as numerous other stan-dards that are intended to preserve the safetyand soundness of banking organizations.
FIDICIA further amended the InternationalBanking Act of 1978. The Federal Reserve’sauthority over foreign bank operations (includ-ing representative offices in the U.S.) was signif-icantly increased.
FIDICIA required the federal banking agen-cies to adopt standards for undercapitalized finan-cial institutions. The Board, on September 18,
1992, issued Prompt Corrective Action Mea-sures for state member banks.
During 1992, the Federal Reserve issued guid-ance on such issues as the monitoring and con-trolling of risk from asset concentrations, thedisclosure, accounting, and reporting of past due(nonaccrual) loans, and the need for consistentmethods in determining the amount of theallowance for loan and lease losses.
With the FIRREA and FIDICIA legislation,Congress re-emphasized the need for continuedstrengthening of the supervision over financialinstitutions. The strengthening of supervisionover banks and bank holding companies will
continue to be a primary objective of the Fed-eral Reserve. As it is now, it will be continu-ously emphasized during the examination/ inspection of member banks and bank holdingcompanies during the 1990’s and beyond.
The Manual is presented in ‘‘sections’’ whichhave been grouped together into ‘‘parts’’ thathave in common a central theme pertaining toBHC supervision. For example, Part II is com-posed of sections which discuss topics of spe-cial interest for supervisory review. Part III iscomposed of sections which discuss the variousexemptive provisions to the nonbank prohibi-tions of the BHC Act. Part IV presents sectionson the preparation of a financial analysis whilePart V discusses the methods used to preparethe inspection report forms.
In preparing to conduct an inspection andcomplete the inspection report forms, the exam-
iner should review the information requirementspresented in Part V which include a ‘‘section’’for each page within the inspection report. Manyof these sections contain cross-references toother sections within Parts II–IV of the Manualthat present in greater detail the issues to beconsidered during the inspection process. Theexaminer assigned to complete a particular in-spection report page should review the sectionscross-referenced in Part V.
Given that the overall objective of the Manual
is to standardize and formalize inspection objec-tives and procedures that provide guidance tothe examiner and enhance the supervisory pro-cess, the content of the sections within PartsII–IV are grouped into broad categories. Theyare:
Not all of the categories are presented in eachsection. Where a particular topic is exclusivelyfinancially related and does not involve legalconsiderations, the subsection on ‘‘Laws, Regu-lations, . . .’’ may be omitted.
These procedures were designed for a full-scope, comprehensive inspection. It is recog-
nized that in some instances the procedures maynot apply in their entirety to all bank holdingcompanies.
Examiners may exercise a measure of discre-tion depending upon the characteristics of theorganization under inspection.
References to the ‘‘Examiner’s Comments’’inspection report page throughout this Manualare synonymous with Core Page 1 of the inspec-tion report—‘‘Examiner’s Comments and Mat-ters Requiring Special Board Attention’’—asdiscussed in Part V of the Manual.
Part V of the Manual concerns the inspectionprogram and report forms.
1030.0.2 NUMBERING SYSTEM
The Manual is arranged using a numerical cod-ing system based on the Manual’s parts, sec-tions and subsections. Parts are differentiatedusing‘‘thousands’’ notations, sections using‘‘dig-its’’ notations, and subsections using ‘‘tenths’’placed after a decimal point as follows:
Part II—Topics for Supervisory 2000.0ReviewSection 6—Management Information 60.0
SystemSubsection l—Audit .1
2060.1
1030.0.3 ABBREVIATION
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as
amended, is abbreviated as ‘‘the Act’’ through-out the Manual.
1030.0.4 AMENDMENTS TO THEMANUAL
Amendments will be published periodically asneeded.
Bank Holding Company Examination and Inspection AuthoritySection 1040.0
1040.0.1 BHC INSPECTIONS
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act)amended section 5(c) of the Bank Holding Com-pany Act (BHC Act) pertaining to BHC reportsand examinations (or inspections, in the case of BHCs). The GLB Act provides specific supervi-sory guidance to the Board of Governors of theFederal Reserve System (and the Federal ReserveBanks via delegated authority) with respect tothe breadth of BHC inspections. It also empha-sized the focus and scope of BHC inspectionsand the inspections of BHC subsidiaries. Aninspection is to be conducted to—
1. inform the board of the nature of the opera-tions and financial condition of each BHCand its subsidiaries, including—a. the financial and operational risks within
the holding company system that maypose a threat to the safety and soundnessof any depository institution (DI) subsidi-ary of such bank holding company, and
b. the systems for monitoring and control-ling such financial and operational risks;
and2. monitor compliance by any entity with the
provisions of the BHC Act or any otherfederal law that the Board has specific juris-diction to enforce against the entity, and tomonitor compliance with any provisions of federal law governing transactions and rela-tionships between any DI subsidiary of aBHC and its affiliates.
1040.0.2 FOCUS AND SCOPE OF BHCINSPECTIONS
The focus and scope of an inspection is limited,to the fullest extent possible, to the BHC andany subsidiary of the BHC that could have amaterially adverse effect on the safety and sound-ness of any DI subsidiary of the holding com-pany due to (1) the size, condition, or activitiesof the subsidiary, or (2) the nature or size of thetransactions between the subsidiary and any DI
subsidiary of the BHC.
The Board is to use, to the fullest extentpossible, the bank examination reports of DIsprepared by the appropriate federal or state DIsupervisory authority. The Board also is to use,to the fullest extent possible, the examinationreports for non-DIs prepared by the following:
1. the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) for any registered broker or dealer
2. the SEC or any state for any investmentadviser registered under the Investment Com-pany Act of 1940
3. any state insurance regulatory authority forany licensed insurance company
4. any federal or state authority for any othersubsidiary that the Board finds to be compre-hensively supervised
The Board’s ability to examine a functionallyregulated subsidiary (FRS) is limited. The Board
can examine an FRS only if the Board—
1. has reasonable cause to believe that the sub-sidiary is engaged in activities that pose amaterial risk to an affiliated DI;
2. has reasonably determined, after reviewingrelevant reports, that an examination of thesubsidiary is necessary to be adequatelyinformed of the systems for monitoring andcontrolling the operational and financial risksposed to any DI; or
3. has reasonable cause to believe, based onreports and other available information, thata subsidiary is not in compliance with theBHC Act or any other federal law that theBoard has specific jurisdiction to enforceagainst such subsidiary. This includes provi-sions relating to transactions with an affili-ated DI, when the Board cannot make itsdetermination by examining the affiliated DIor the BHC.