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1 CAMRI Global Perspectives Monthly digest of market research & views Issue 15, JulyAugust 2014 US Economic Pull, Push or Let Go? The Case of Asia By Brian Fabbri Visiting Research Fellow, CAMRI & President, FABBRI Global Economics The US needs to find an economic strategy to reverse its relative declining economic role in Southeast Asia. Acceleration in US GDP growth used to be good news for the Rest of the World (RoW) as it meant greater US demand for the RoW’s exports, especially from emerging markets. However, in the past decade US growth has slowed, and its external deficit has narrowed significantly. Moreover, exports from China began to satisfy a greater share of US import demand reducing the market share from other economies. As a consequence, the proportion of GDP in Southeast Asian economies that is driven by exports to the US has decreased sharply. It is hence reasonable to expect that even when US GDP growth does accelerate, it will not have the same positive pull on emerging economies (exChina) as it did in the past. As a result, the US will need a new economic strategy if it wants its diplomatic policy pivot to the Pacific region to succeed. US Economic Growth to Stay Low for Longer At the beginning of 2014, many prognosticators believed that US economic growth was on the threshold of finally accelerating back to its historical annual growth path of 3% to 3.5%, this after several years of belowpar growth. For example, the IMF forecasted that US growth in 2014 would accelerate to 3% Q4/Q4 from a dismal 1.8% in 2013. Even the Federal Reserve Board of Governors forecast that US growth would accelerate in 2014 to 3% at their December 2013 FOMC meeting. The IMF has recently sharply revised down their forecast for US GDP growth in 2014 to 1.7%. Ultra low interest rates were perceived to be a major stimulus to the economy, and the housing industry appeared well along the way towards a sound recovery. It was expected to be a contributor to US economic growth.
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US Economic Pull, Push or Let Go? The Case of Asiabschool.nus.edu/Portals/0/images/CAMRI/Thought Leadership/CAMRI... · Monthly digest of market research & views Issue 15, July‐August

Apr 21, 2018

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Page 1: US Economic Pull, Push or Let Go? The Case of Asiabschool.nus.edu/Portals/0/images/CAMRI/Thought Leadership/CAMRI... · Monthly digest of market research & views Issue 15, July‐August

  

 

 1 

CAMRI Global Perspectives Monthly digest of market research & views           Issue 15, July‐August 2014  

 

US Economic Pull, Push or Let Go? The Case of Asia 

 

By Brian Fabbri 

Visiting Research Fellow, CAMRI & President, FABBRI Global Economics 

 

The US needs to find an economic strategy 

to  reverse  its  relative  declining  economic 

role in Southeast Asia. 

Acceleration  in US GDP growth used  to be 

good news for the Rest of the World (RoW) 

as it meant greater US demand for the RoW’s 

exports, especially  from emerging markets. 

However, in the past decade US growth has 

slowed, and its external deficit has narrowed 

significantly. Moreover, exports  from China 

began to satisfy a greater share of US import 

demand  reducing  the  market  share  from 

other economies.    

As a consequence, the proportion of GDP in 

Southeast Asian economies that is driven by 

exports to the US has decreased sharply. It is 

hence reasonable to expect that even when 

US GDP growth does accelerate,  it will not 

have  the  same  positive  pull  on  emerging 

economies (ex‐China) as it did in the past. As 

a  result,  the US will need a new economic 

strategy if it wants its diplomatic policy pivot 

to the Pacific region to succeed.  

US Economic Growth to Stay Low for Longer 

At  the  beginning  of  2014,  many 

prognosticators believed  that US economic 

growth  was  on  the  threshold  of  finally 

accelerating  back  to  its  historical  annual 

growth path of 3% to 3.5%, this after several 

years of below‐par growth. For example, the 

IMF  forecasted  that  US  growth  in  2014 

would accelerate to 3% Q4/Q4 from a dismal 

1.8%  in  2013.  Even  the  Federal  Reserve 

Board of Governors forecast that US growth 

would  accelerate  in  2014  to  3%  at  their 

December 2013 FOMC meeting. The IMF has 

recently sharply revised down their forecast 

for US GDP growth in 2014 to 1.7%. 

Ultra low interest rates were perceived to be 

a major  stimulus  to  the economy,  and  the 

housing  industry  appeared  well  along  the 

way  towards  a  sound  recovery.  It  was 

expected to be a contributor to US economic 

growth.  

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Adverse winter weather stymied economic 

activity early in 2014 

Unfortunately  severe,  adverse  weather 

stymied growth in the first quarter, and the 

expected  growth  rebound  in  the  second 

quarter  did  not  materialize  as  much  as 

expected.  Consequently,  US  economic 

growth this year is now expected to remain 

well below an estimated 2%.  

The US is not as open as it used to be 

The  days  of  mammoth  US  external  trade 

deficits are past. The US had  trade deficits 

averaging over US$700 billion between 2005 

and 2008, and they eventually amounted to 

5.5%  of  US  GDP.  Such  huge  trade  deficits 

supported  economic  activity  in  many 

emerging  markets  throughout  the  world. 

Subsequently,  the  US  external  deficit  has 

declined to US$476 billion in 2013, and now 

accounts for only 2.8% of US GDP. Moreover, 

imports  have  shrunk  slightly  to  15.9%  of 

gross  domestic  purchases  from  a  peak  of 

16.5% of GDP in 2008.  

 

The reduction  in the trade deficit has been 

shared  by  a  significant  increase  in  the 

services  surplus  (accounting  for 

approximately  52%  of  the  decline),  and  a 

sizeable decrease in the goods deficit (48%).  

 

China  becomes  the  major  non‐NAFTA 

trading partner 

The  pattern  of  trade  has  also  changed 

markedly over  the past 15 years. All of  the 

US’s major trading partners lost some share 

of total US imports to China, and surprisingly 

OPEC. The surprise  in OPEC’s rising share  is 

primarily due  to  the belief  that  the US has 

begun to develop its own energy source and 

become  less  dependent  upon  OPEC  oil.  

These  new  domestic  sources  will  soon 

US Trade Deficit is Shrinking

‐6.0

‐5.0

‐4.0

‐3.0

‐2.0

‐1.0

0.0

‐800

‐700

‐600

‐500

‐400

‐300

‐200

‐100

0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Billions of $; le

% of GDP; right

US Imports from Major Economic Regions (% of Total)

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

EU

ROW

JAPAN OPEC

NEC

China

NAFTA

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 3 

reduce  the  US  need  for  foreign  oil,  and 

OPEC’s exports to the US will account for a 

smaller share in the near future.  

China is by far the largest trade exporter to 

the US of any single country in the world. It 

is only exceeded by two trade blocks: NAFTA 

and  the  European  Union  (EU).  China’s 

absorption  of market  share  of US  imports 

over  the  past  15  years  has  been  quite 

dramatic, rising from 10% in 1999 to 17% last 

year. Japan lost the largest share, slipping to 

6% of imports to the US. 

The Newly Industrialized Countries (the four 

Asian Tigers, one being Singapore) only lost 

1 percentage point, and now account for 6% 

of imports to the US. Imports from the RoW 

(which  includes  non‐OPEC  Africa  and 

Middle‐East, non‐EU Europe, and the rest of 

Asia),  remained  approximately  the  same 

over the past 15 years: 13%. 

US  importance  to  Southeast  Asian  trade 

decreases 

Disentangling the Southeast Asian countries 

from  this  broad  assortment  of  countries 

(RoW) adds to the picture of their lessening 

involvement with US  trade. Although  total 

exports  from  the  big  five  Southeast  Asian 

countries  (Thailand,  Malaysia,  Singapore, 

Indonesia,  and  Philippines)  increased  over 

the past 7 years, it fell sharply from 16.3% in 

2005  to  11.9%  in  2013  as  a  share  of  their 

total GDP. Exports to the US declined in all 5 

of  these  economies over  the past 7  years. 

The  total  rate of  growth  in  their  collective 

GDP  also  declined  significantly  over  the 

same time period as shown in chart 5, albeit 

not  necessarily  because  of  this  lost  trade 

with the US. 

 Economic  Trade’s  relevance  to  the  US 

Strategic Policy 

The success of the current US strategic shift 

to  emphasize  the  Pacific  region  and  place 

less emphasis on  the older  relationships  in 

the Atlantic region is quite dependent upon 

lifting  economic  ties  with  the  Southeast 

Asian countries. As discussed, trade with the 

Asian  economies  (apart  from  China)  is 

diminishing.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to 

create  new  initiatives  to  raise  the  level  of 

SE Asian country Exports to US (% of GDP)

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Indonesia

Philippines

Singapore

Malaysia

Thailand

SE Asian Regional GDP Growth Slows as Exports to US Diminish

‐5.00

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

2007.00 2008.00 2009.00 2010.00 2011.00 2012.00 2013.00

Blue: % exports to US Red: GDP annual growth

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 4 

trade with the Southeast Asian countries to 

improve political connectedness.   

The Importance of the TPP  

One of  these  initiatives  is  the Trans‐Pacific 

Partnership  (TPP).  The  TPP  is  a  proposed 

regional  free  trade  agreement  that  is 

currently  being  negotiated  by  twelve 

countries throughout the Asia‐Pacific region. 

Its  passage would  fundamentally  alter  the 

trade  relationships  between  the  US  and 

these  countries.  However,  it  is  in 

competition with another regional free trade 

agreement:  the  Regional  Comprehensive 

Economic  Partnership  (RCEP),  which  has 

been proposed by China. The Chinese  free 

trade proposal excludes the US.  

Negotiations  for  the TTP  therefore need  to 

progress for the political pivot to the Pacific 

to  have  substance,  and  it  has  to  progress 

faster than the RCEP. Consequently, it is up 

to  the  US  Senate  to  recognize  TPP’s 

importance to this political shift. They must 

cast  aside  historic  static  allegiances,  and 

actively negotiate this treaty.  

It’s Up to Congress 

The  political  pivot  is  probably  the  most 

important diplomatic policy initiative by the 

US in the past decade. For the political pivot 

to  succeed,  economic  dependence  with 

Southeast Asia must increase to benefit the 

leadership of  these  countries,  and  to  raise 

the  relevance  for  US  lawmakers  to  begin 

serious  political  and  trade  compromise. 

Without  it,  the  present  economic  trends 

indicate  that  Southeast  Asian  economies’ 

dependence  on  the  US  will  diminish,  and 

trade will  continue  to  decline with  the US 

while their trade with China will rise.  If the 

US does not take a more serious interest in 

this initiative, then the US will have to accept 

the  inevitable  consequence  of  losing 

`relevance’ in the Pacific.  

 

  

 

  

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For more information, please contact 

[email protected]

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 5 

  KEY INDICATORS TABLE (AS OF 28 July 2014) 

INDEX  LEVEL (LC)  %1MO (LC) 

%1MO (USD) 

%1YR  (LC) 

%1YR  (USD) 

INDEX  LEVEL  %1YR 

S&P500  1978.91  1.02  1.02  19.43  19.43  3MO LIBOR  0.23  ‐11.66 

FTSE  6788.07  0.54  0.36  7.61  18.85  10YR UST  2.49  ‐3.01 

NIKKEI  15529.40  2.88  2.40  11.73  7.59  10YR BUND  1.15  ‐31.07 

HANG SENG  24428.63  5.74  5.77  15.66  15.76  10YR SPG  2.49  ‐46.04 

STI  3350.17  2.48  3.13  6.67  8.60  10YR SGS  2.27  ‐8.91 

EUR  1.34  ‐1.53     1.21     US ISM  55.30  5.30 

YEN  101.86  0.43     3.72     EU PMI  51.90  6.10 

CMCI  1460.89  ‐3.25     1.80     JP TANKAN  7.00  450.00 

Oil  101.67  ‐3.85     ‐2.89     CHINA IP  9.20  3.40 

Source: Bloomberg 

APPENDIX 

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS (Source: Bloomberg, with tickers in parenthesis. In US$ where applicable) S&P500: capitalization‐weighted index of the prices of 500 US large‐cap stocks (SPX) FTSE: capitalization‐weighted index of the prices of the 100 largest LSE‐listed stocks (UKX) NIKKEI: capitalization‐weighted index of the largest 225 stocks of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (NKY) HANG SENG: capitalization‐weighted index of companies from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HSI) STI:cap‐weighted index of the top 30 companies listed on the Singapore Exchange (FSSTI) EUR: USD/EUR exchange rate: 1 EUR = xx USD (EUR) YEN: YEN/USD exchange rate: 1 USD = xx YEN (JPY) CMCI: Constant Maturity Commodity Index (CMCIPI) Oil: West Texas Intermediate prices, $ per barrel (CLK1)   3MO LIBOR: interbank lending rate for 3‐month US dollar loans (US0003M) 10YR UST: 10‐year US Treasury yield (IYC8 – Sovereigns) 10YR BUND: 10‐year German government bond yield (IYC8 – Sovereigns) 10YR SPG: 10‐year Spanish government bond yield, proxy for EU funding problems (IYC8 – Sovereigns) 10YR SGS: 10‐year Singapore government bond yield (IYC8 – Sovereigns) US ISM: US business survey of more than 300 manufacturing firms by the Institute of Supply Management that monitors employment, production inventories, new orders, etc. (NAPMPMI) EU PMI:  Purchasing Managers’ index for the 17 country EU region (PMITMEZ) JP TANKAN: Bank of Japan business survey on the outlook of Japanese capital expenditures, employment and the overall economy, quarterly index (JNTGALLI) CHINA IP: China’s Industrial Production index, with 1‐month lag (CHVAIOY) LC: Local Currency Disclaimer:Allresearchdigests,reports,opinions,models,appendicesand/orpresentationslidesintheCAMRIResearchDigestSeriesisproducedstrictlyforacademicpurposes.Anysuchdocumentisnottobeconstruedasanofferorasolicitationofanoffertobuyorsellanysecurities,norisitmeanttoprovideinvestmentadvice.NationalUniversityofSingapore(NUS),NUSBusinessSchool,CAMRI,theparticipatingstudents,facultymembers,researchfellowsandstaffacceptnoliabilitywhatsoeverforanydirectorconsequentiallossarisingfromanyuseofthisdocument,oranycommunicationgiveninrelationtothisdocument.