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There has been muchdiscussion ecentlyof the encounter etweenThrasymachus and Socrates in Book I of Plato's Republic.
I am not hereconcernedwith whetherThrasymachus'arguments
and Socrates' replies are valid, interesting and important though that
problem is, but with the fundamental problem of deciding what
exactly Thrasymachus is saying about so 81x%ctov, ustice. Clearly,
this is a necessary preliminary to the raising of any other question
about Thrasymachus' arguments. Such an investigation may also
contribute to our understanding of The Republicas a whole: given
the structure of the dialogue, to know what Plato dissents from can
providevaluableclues to what he assentsto.
In brief, my aim is to supportProfessorKerferd's nterpretationthat
Thrasymachus'doctrine is that justiceis the advantage of another .2
Kerferd's view has not been generally accepted. I shall argue that the
standard view found in most commentaries, that Thrasymachus
thinks justice is the advantage of the ruler(s) , is open to major
objections, and that Kerferd's interpretation is to be preferredbe-
cause it avoids these objections. I shall argue further that some of
the implications of Kerferd's interpretation provide additional
1
I am grateful to John Gould, W. H. Greenleaf, Dale Hall, G. B. Kerferd,Hugh Price, and J. C. Rees for their comments.2 G. B. Kerferd The Doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic Durham
University Journal n.s. 9 (1947) 19-27.
Since I shall be using the single word advantage throughout, it must be
stressed that Thrasymachus uses two words, speaking of sY -oi xpe'rrovo
kubtupkpove.g. 338 C) but of X6-rptov &Tayokve.g. 343 C). Advantage and
interest are the common translations of E,u,uqppov,lthough good has very
occasionally been used; good is the usual translation of &ya&6v.Now, in both
cases advantage seems to me the word best suited to Thrasymachus' meaning
and to his nuances, ambiguities, and word-plays, despite the risk of making his
position more uniform in appearance than it is. I shall therefore write of theadvantage (vb kt4pipov) of the ruler and of the advantage (&yc&6v) f an-
other .
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reasons for thinking that it comes nearer the mark than any other.
With Kerferd as guide, Thrasymachus' arguments can be exhibitedas both consistent and coherent, once it is understood that he is
concerned to characterise and not define, that he prefers to do this
by his own method of argument, and that he presents his case in an
unexpected order.
II
According to most commentators in English, Thrasymachus sees
justice as a political relationship between rulers and subjects, andasserts that justice is the advantage of the stronger,i.e., of the ruler(s).3On the face of it, this means that Thrasymachus is only discussing
justice in the political sphere, since rulers' enactments cover a limited
range of the conduct which can be called just or unjust. However far
one stretched his terms like rule (&px&)r law (v6qos),so that
they included not only legislation but also social regulation such as is
attributed to Lycurgus, they still would not encompass all moral
conduct. This interpretation, that Thrasymachus means that justice
is the advantage of the ruler(s), is open to two objections: (1) it seemsnot to fit properly into the development of the argument of The
Republic; and (2) it is not a doctrine which Thrasymachus holds
consistently.
(1) It is, to say the least, odd and surprising to find the discussion
* E.g. R. L. Nettleship Lectures on the Republic of Plato (London 1901) pp. 28-9;E. Barker Greek Political Theory. Plato and his Predecessors (London 1918)
p. 180; P. Shorey What Plato Said (Chicago 1933) p. 210; G. M. A. GrubePlato's Thought (London 1933) pp. 265-6; A. D. Lindsay The Republic of Plato
[Translated] (London 1935) p. xxxi; M. B. Foster Masters of Political Thought.Volume I Plato to Machiavelli (London 1942) p. 47; T. A. Sinclair A History ofGreek Political Thought (London 1951) p. 74; I. M. Crombie An Examinationof Plato's Doctrines. Volume I Plato on Man and Society (London 1962) p. 81;G. F. Hourani Thrasymachus' Definition of Justice in Plato's RepublicPhronesis 7 (1962) 110-20; L. Strauss Plato in Strauss and J. Cropsey (eds)History of Political Philosophy (Chicago 1963) pp. 11-12; R. S. BrumbaughPlato for the Modern Age (New York 1964) pp. 86-7; R. C. Cross and A.D.Woozley Plato's Republic. A Philosophical Commentary (London 1964) pp.
2441; A. Bloom The Republic of Plato. Translated with Notes and an InterpretiveEssay (New York 1968) pp. 326-8; W. K. C. Guthrie A History of Greek Philo-
sophy. Volume III The Fifth Century Enlightenment (Cambridge 1969) pp. 88-90;and K. Dorter Socrates' Refutation of Thrasymachus and Treatment ofVirtue Philosophy & Rhetoric 7 (1974) 25-46, especially section II.
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of justice narrowed down to politics at this point. Very early on
(330 E ff) justice is spoken of as a general quality relevant to allconduct and not simply to political activity; and the discussion con-tinues in the same vein after the Thrasymachusdebate until Socratesmakes a point of diverting it into the political channel (368D-369 A).It is true that the specificallypolitical aspect is first raisedby Thrasy-machus, yet considering the dialogue'sstructure, it would be strangeif he were concerned exclusively with politics. Since the subject ofThe Republic s justice at large, it is natural to expect Thrasymachus,like Cephalus, Polemarchus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus, to be intro-
duced in order to present a contrasting account of it. Moreover,it can be argued that Thrasymachus is expressing a version of thetraditional values of the ordinary Greek. Adkins has elaborated thiskind of view, and writes for instance, scratch Thrasymachus andyou find King Agamemnon ,and Thrasymachus s merely drawingout what appearto him to bethe logicalconsequencesof Greekvalues .'But as the traditional Greek conception of justice did not confineitself to political obedience,' once more one would not expect Thrasy-machus to limit himself to justice in a political context. In fact, when
he comes to give examples of just and unjust actions (343D-344 B),only some concern one's relations with rulers (e.g. paying taxes),whilst others concern one's relationswith fellow-subjects(e.g. business
dealings).And he sees the crucialissue as being which of the two lives,the just or the unjust man's is superior (e.g. 347 E): meaning by
life a man's total imputableconduct not merelyhis politicalactivity.More will be said about this aspect later. I leave it now forthe secondobjection to the standard interpretation of Thrasymachus.
(2) There is apparently a major inconsistency in Thrasymachus'account of justice. Initially, he says that it is the
advantageof the
stronger, i.e. the ruler(s) (338 C-341A), but later that it is the advan-
tage of another (343 C-344C). But to assert both propositions canlead to contradiction, because only for the weaker is the advantage
' A. W. H. Adkins Merit and Responsibility (Oxford 1960) p. 238, and MoralValues and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece (London 1972) p. 119. Cf.
Bloom, op. cit. p. 336: Thrasymachus gives voice to common opinions whichare usually kept quiet.
' As Barker puts it, 8LxaCXoa7 is an ethical as well as a legal term, and has
the overtones and suggestions of our own word 'righteousness '. The Politicsof Aristotle. Translated with an Introduction Notes and Appendices (Oxford 1946)p. Lxx.
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of the stronger synonymous with the advantage of another .
For instance, if a tyrant levies a tax to pay for his orgies, is he actingjustly or unjustly, according to Thrasymachus?Justly, if justice is
the ruler's advantage, unjustly if justice is another's advantage.Those commentators who have paid attention to this problem have
reacted in a vanety of ways. Some accept that Thrasymachus is
inconsistent, offering a number of different explanations. Jowett
depicts Thrasymachusas a vain clown and amerechild in argument ,implying that consistency was beyond him.6 Sidgwick does not think
Thrasymachus' arguments are to be taken too seriously, believing he
defines justice as a rhetorician,possessing the cultivated omniscienceto which ancient rhetoricians commonly laid claim, and so able to
knock off a definition of Justice, as of anything else. That 'Justice is
the interest of the stronger' is a plausible cynical paradox which a
cultivated person might naturally and prosperously maintain in a
casual conversation .7 Crossand Woozley conclude that Thrasymachushasadvanced two different criteriaof justice ... without appreciating
that they do not necessarily coincide .8And Maguirecontends that
only some of the argumentsThrasymachus states are his own, others
not consistent with them being falsely attributed to him by Plato.9However, we should not accept any explanation of Thrasymachus'
inconsistency before asking whether his arguments will stand being
treated seriously, and whether they can be taken as a whole and
renderedinternallyconsistent. Accordingly,I shall next considerthreedifferent interpretations (without claiming that they exhaust the
possibilities) each alleging that Thrasymachus' two statements can be
made consistent, and this second objection met.
(i) It might be argued that the advantage of another is simply a
synonymous expression for the advantage of the stronger, i.e. the
ruler(s) , for at 343 C Thrasymachustells Socrates you don't know
that justice and the just are literally the other fellow's good - the ad-vantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all hisown of the subject who obeys and serves... '1' However, it is clear
6 B. Jowett The Dialogues of Plato Translated into English with Analysis andIntroductions (Oxford 1871) vol. II p. 6.7 H. Sidgwick The Philosophy of Kant and OtherLectures (London 1905) p. 370.8 Op.cit. p. 41.
' J. P. Maguire Thrasymachus ... or Plato? Phronesis 16 (1971) 142-63.'I The Loeb translation, by P. Shorey (London 1930). This is the translationused throughout.
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by the ruler(s)to their advantage 13 it might simply be said that Thra-
symachus believes that the observance of moral rules, however theyhave been determined, always works out to the advantage of the
ruler(s). In this way, every just act is necessarily to the advantage of
the ruler(s),though it may also be to the advantage of someone else.14But the difficulty with this interpretation is to see how the text can
support it. It involves sophisticated and contentious ideas, yet Thra-
symachus provides no special explanation of them such as he giveswith other unusual ideas, for example that of the ruler who makes no
mistakes. On the contrary, what he does say runs counter to this
interpretation, for whereas many moral rules are the same underdifferent constitutions, what Thrasymachus stresses is the diversityof the ruler(s)'enactments underdifferentconstitutions. His emphasisis upon the limited number of rules which vary correspondinglywith
the differentformsof government (338 D, E). Even if we acceptedthatThrasymachus means, although he does not say, that all just actsare sooner or later to the advantage of the ruler(s), the difficultyremains that an act could then be to the advantage both of anothersubject, directly, and of the ruler(s), indirectly; whereas Thrasy-
machus conceives of advantage in terms of private goods which canbe enjoyed only by one person exclusively (343 D-344 B).(b) Even if it is felt that the first obstacle can be overcome, theproblem remains of what justice is for the ruler himself, if Thrasy-machus is only talking about everybody other than the ruler(Barker, above). Barker's interpretation implies that if justice is theruler's advantage, then for the ruler, justice must consist in pursuinghis own advantage. As Kerferd points out, nowhere does Thrasy-machus say, hint or imply that this was his view. 15In fact, Thrasy-machussays the reverse: that the rulerwho pursueshis own advantageis unjust (344 A-C). And this last passage also shows that Thrasy-machus is not thinking solely of what is just for subjects, but for rulerstoo.
(iii) This is the converse of the last interpretation; it takes as pri-mary Thrasymachus' second account of justice ( advantage of an-other ), and subordinates to it his first account ( advantage of thestronger, i.e. ruler(s) ). This is in effect what Kerferd does, and,
I' H. D. P. Lee Plato. The Republic Translated with an Introduction (Harmonds-
worth 1955) P. 71.This view was put to me by Dale Hall.16 Op. cit. p. 22.
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be unjust, as Kerferdclaims. The issue is complicated by our holding
different conceptions of moralobligation from the Greeks; n partic-ular, it has been suggested that they did not make a clear distinction,
as we do, between morality and prudence.20 But even by Greek
standards, it seems doubtful whether Thrasymachuswas thinking in
terms of morality at all.2' He calls injustice not a virtue but sound,
good ,judgement, zu43ovka.348 C, D). EU'ouALocs usedin Thucydides
of expedient judgements.22Likewise, iuicpgpov nd cyo 6 are words
often connected with prudence,efficiency, success, and the production
of desiredresults; they are, writes Adkins, part of a system of values
based on calculation .23 Nor is it clear whether Plato introducesThrasymachusin order to contrast his own moral theory with a dia-
metrically opposed moral theory or a completely non-moral theory.
However, there is no need for my present purposesto settle whether
Thrasymachus' ideal of injustice is a moral theory or not. Since
Kerferd's classification of Thrasymachus'doctrine in terms of moral
theories is quite distinct from his interpretationof what Thrasymachus
says, one could reject the first whilst accepting the second. I consider
Kerferd's nterpretationof what Thrasymachussays to be an important
contribution to our understanding of both Thrasymachus and TheRepublic.Only Houranihas confronted Kerferddirectly and dissented
from his interpretation: I shall not discuss Hourani, because I regard
Kerferd's reply as conclusive.24Instead, I aim to show how, with
Kerferd's interpretation in our hands as the vital clue, it is possible
to unravel Thrasymachus' arguments, and reach a better under-
standing of the whole courseof his debate with Socrates.
'? E.g. E. F. Carritt An Ambiguity of the Word 'Good ' Proceedings o/ theBritish Academy 23 (1937) 51-80, H. A. Prichard Duty and Interest (Oxford 1929)
and Moral Obligation (Oxford 1949) chs 1, 3, and 5, and Adkins Merit and
Responsibility especially ch. xi. Cf. R. G. CollingwoodAn Autobiography (Oxford
1939) pp. 634, and chs IV, V, and VII passim.
21Cf. Maguire op. cit. pp. 158-9, who is sure Thrasymachus does not assert a
moral obligation.si E.g. Peloponnesian War iii 40 and 42-8. It is used in this way by Kleon and
Diodotus.2 Merit and Responsibility p. 223.
24Hourani loc. cit.; Kerferd Thrasymachus and Justice: a Reply Phronesis 9
(1964) 12-16. One of Kerferd's points, that Thrasymachus is not a legalist,is further supported by D. J. Hadgopoulos Thrasymachus and Legalism
Phronesis 18 (1973) 204-8.
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and keeping promises. None of the other participants can object to this
extension, since it follows their own principle that to be just is -toobey social rules. Whether these are also legal rules or not is surely
secondary, and so Socrates is right to add these further examples.
We may note in passing that if we assume, as seems legitimate, that
Thrasymachus too would accept Socrates' list of just actions, then his
doctrine cannot possibly be reducedto justiceis the advantage of the
ruler since some of Socrates' additional examples have nothing at all
to do with the ruler.Be that as it may, clearly in their debate Thrasy-
machus and Socrates agree on which acts are to count as just.27
The disagreement between them concerns the characterisation ofjustice, in particular, whether the just man's acts are advantageous
to him. Once again, although they differ in their answers, the partic-
ipants all agree that this question is central. Cephalus has said that
the chief service of wealth is that it enables him to act justly, and
Glaucon and Adeimantus require Socratesto show that justice pays .
What we must expect Thrasymachus to do, therefore, is to give us
such an account of the characteristicsof justice as will enable us to see
whether it pays to be just.28
Now to turn to the text itself. Thrasymachus'first wordsare mainlyabout the methodof argument hat has been adopted until then (336
C, D). First be condemns Socrates, and the others, not only for talking
nonsense, but also for using the question and answer method: why
do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? He next
demands that Socrates give his own answer, and finally tries to pre-
scribe the kind of answeradmissible: anddon't you be telling me that
[justice] is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable
or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely
whatever you say . What exactly is Thrasymachus telling Socrates to
do: and what therefore is he implying he will himself do instead?
It has been variously suggested that Thrasymachus is trying to rule
out stale and barren platitudes ,29 synonyms ,30and slogans...
27 The same view is taken by D. Sachs A Fallacy in Plato's Republic Philo-
sophical Review 72 (1963) pp. 142-3, (reprinted in A. Sesonske [ed.] Plato's
Republic : Interpretation and Criticism [Belmont 1966] and in G. Vlastos
[ed.] Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays [New York 1971] vol. II), and byHenderson op. cit. p. 219.28 A similar conclusion is reached by Sparshott op. cit. pp. 422-3.
29 J. Adam The Republic of Plato. Edited with Critical Notes, Commentary andAppendices (Cambridge 1902) vol. I. p. 24.30 Shorev in his translation. p. 39.
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giving his own iocxpoXoyocl.hat is surprising,is that he does not im-
mediately launchinto his Focxpo?oyEo,n which we find later that he is athis clearest and most forceful,but instead expresses his view partially
and very briefly, and, moreover, at once allows Socrates to cross-
questionhim about it. What has happened?Is Thrasymachusso angry
that he has lost his head, and thrown away all his advantages? On
the contrary, his action is not impetuous but deliberate: he does not
plunge in, but pauses to arrange his fee, and to repeat his complaints.
He does have a pocxpoXoyEa.i.e. 343-344C),but he apparently wants to
make a stir by presenting its essential point (justice is the advantage
of another, so it is better to act unjustly) in its most striking applica-tion, the conduct of the ruler.35We may suppose that he feels free to
abandon his normal methodof presentationtemporarilybecause he is
confident that he can handle Socrates' questions. Socrates tied Pole-
marchus into knots, reducing him to saying that he no longer knew
what he meant (334 B), and twisted his words to suit himself; but
then, from Thrasymachus' point of view, Polemarchus suffered two
grave disadvantages: he did not know what he was talking about, and
he was preparedto defer to Socrates. Whereas Thrasymachus thinks
that he knows the essential characterof justice, and that he is able to
prevent Socrates confusingor trickinghim - heis not a SimpleSimon
(341 A-C).36He succeeds in keeping his end up remarkably well, but
seems to feel that Socrates is steering the course of the discussion too
much in his own direction and away from Thrasymachus' thesis (i.e.
in the discussions 341 C-342 E), and this is why he shows reluctancein
answering, and at last breaks up the discussion (343 A), abuses
Socrates, and opens his t=xpo?oyEa..hat completed, he is about to
depart, since he does not think there is anything else he can do to
convince Socrates (345 B). He cannot be said to participate properly
when Socrates questions him after this: perhapshe sees that they can
never agree. When Socrates later justifies his use of question and
answer instead of the set speech which might have been expected as
a counter to Thrasymachus', t is noticeable that the point is settled by
Socrates and Glaucon without reference to Thrasymachus himself
(348 A, B). In the dialogue that follows, Thrasymachus is made to
*6 There is a measure of agreement that Thrasymachus is out to impress:
Kerferd The Doctrine of Thrasymachus p. 26, Hourani op. cit. p. 112.
I6 We note here that Thrasymachus uses the same word, -6s?uz, for the simpli-city of those who accept and succumb to Socrates' elenchus (336 C) and for the
simplicity of the just man (348 C). He implies that he has seen through both.
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his case in reverse. Next, I shall say something about the connection
between the earlier and later parts of Thrasymachus' account ofjustice, stating my understanding of his main thesis and showinghow the opening formula follows from it. This may help to explainwhy Thrasymachusplaces so much emphasison that formula.
According to Thrasymachus' 1iocxpoXoy(c343 B-344 C), men are in
competition for scarce resources (all his examples concern money inone way or another). There are times when one is in a position of trustand could take advantage of another person to one's own profit, e.g.in a business partnership, or when holding public office. The rules
that make up justice forbidone to do that. But if you do not do whatis to your advantage, your inaction must be to someone else's ad-vantage; your loss is his gain. Thereforejustice is another'sadvantageand your own detriment, and injustice, being the contrary, is yourown advantage and another's detriment. The rules of justice thusfavour those who break them. Consequently, the unjust man has theadvantage over the just, for the latter does the work but the formertakes the profit. The simple-mindedjust man's efforts make happynot himself (as he thinks) but the unjust man. The unjust man is thusin control of (&px&)he just man. He is
using the just man, who isunaware of it. (Thrasymachus seems to imply that men are just onlyunwittingly: anyone who canconsider he choice will see the advantagesof being unjust.) Here the question of strength arises. If we considernot, say, a random or occasional thief, but a professionalcriminal orpersistently dishonest shop-keeper, we see that they are living offtheir just fellows through a policy of injustice. This latter seems to bethe kind of situation of which Thrasymachus says that injusticeon a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and more masterfulthing than justice (344 C). The consistently unjust man comes offbetter than the consistently just man: and he is therefore called
stronger ,referringto both his strength of mind (i.e. his knowledge)and the strength of his consequent position (i.e. the advantages hegains). Physical strength does not come into it (338 D). Every ruler ,i.e. man in control, whether or not in a political context, is stronger :presumably because control implies knowledge. But we should notethat stronger is not a synonym for another . Justice is alwaysthe advantage of another, but it is only the advantage of the strongerwhen someone has the strength to refuse to be just and seek his own
advantage instead. Thrasymachus is justified in speaking loosely(though it does seem to be a bad habit of his, e.g. 340 C-E) as if the
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have slipped through the loop-hole which Cleitophon had provided
(340 B),189and that Plato is again falsely attributing a position to him.'0None of this is acceptable to those who deny that the advantage of
the ruler(s) is Thrasymachus' main view of justice.41And they areright to reject the traditional interpretation of his response to Clei-
tophon's interjection. It can be argued that Thrasymachus' is not an
empirical thesis, that he is not refuted by Socrates, that Cleitophon's
formula is quite different from and indeed in several ways opposed to
Thrasymachus',and that, given the context of his tLaxpoXoyEa,here is
no reason to think that he is saying anything other than what he wants
to. Above all, there is no need to assume that Thrasymachus istrapped or manipulated into a false move. On the contrary, the
perfect ruler is a crucial and logical deliberate step in the unfolding
of his ideas. By taking it, Thrasymachushas raised the whole argument
to a higherlevel.
Having reached the culmination of Thrasymachus' view in his
V=uxpoXoyEa.,nd having considered his progresstowards it, let us turn
back to his originalstatement. Some of those who interprethis positionas being that justice is the advantage of the ruler,and especially those
who see him as a Legalist ( justice is obedience to the law ), are aptin my view to miss part of what he is saying here. Maguire or instance
interprets Thrasymachus'position very narrowly: (a) only the subject
can be either just or unjust; and (b) in relation to some laws only,viz. those ensuring the stability of the particular regime in power;from which he concludes that Thrasymachus is not, at the outset,
talking about moral rules at all, but only about political arrange-
ments .'3 If this were so, then there would indeed be a disjunction
between Thrasymachus' two discussions of justice. However, if we
read thetaxpoXoyEa
first, and then considerThrasymachus' openingremarks about rulers as an application of its doctrine, we see that his
initial views are not Legalist. It is true that at first he explains him-
self by speaking of the rulers maldingv6suOL338 E), but rulers do far
ag E.g. Joseph op. cit. p. 17, Sinclair op. cit. p. 75, Cross and Woozley op. cit.
p. 46, Bloom op. cit. p. 329, Guthrie op. cit. pp. 95-6, and Maguire hc. cit. p. 145.'I Hourani loc. cit. p. 115, Harrison loc. cit. pp. 30-2, and Maguire loc. cit. p. 146.41See Kerferd The Doctrine of Thrasymachus pp. 20-1, Sparshott hc. cit.
section III, and Henderson loc. cit. pp. 2234.42
There is not the space to develop these points here.43 Loc. cit. pp. 146-7. Cf. Sparshott's opinion that the law which Thrasymachusequates with the ruler's advantage is only consitutional law, loc. cit. pp. 426-7.
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These do not conflict but, as Kerferdclaims, form a consistent whole.
Though Thrasymachus' doctnrneis formulated in different ways indifferent contexts: (1) if we consider just acts as a single class, thentheir common characteristic is that they are the advantage of an-other ; (2) if we consider the sub-class where the just man's act isto the advantage of the consistently unjust man, justice is the ad-vantage of the stronger ; and (3) if we consider the sub-class of (2)where the just man's act is to the advantage of the stronger who ishis ruler(s), justice is the advantage of the ruler(s) . This perhapsbrings out the crucial importance of getting Thrasymachus'argument
in its right order. As it has now been set out, it is possible to movefrom (1) to (3), but one cannot move from (3) to (1), which is whatwe have to try to do if the text is taken in the order in which it stands.If we take (1) as nothing but an expansion of (3),4f we encounterdifficulties which never arise if we take (3) for what it is, an instanceof (1). Again, if we start from (3), we may find it inconsistent with (1);thus Maguire,nrghtlythinking that between (3) and (1) the meaningsof the key termschange, tries to save Thrasymachus rominconsistencyby arguingthat the incompatible (1) is not his but Plato's. 6Whereas
the principle I have followed is that Thrasymachus is not beinghounded from one position to another, without thinking out theimplications of each, but that before he speaks he already has aconsistent doctrine which, for reasons at which we can only guess,he chooses to revealpiecemeal.
Why then does Thrasymachusplace so much emphasis on the pro-position that justice is the advantage of the ruler?We have mentionedthe suppositionthat he wants to present a striking paradox. But theremay be more to it, surely?Sparshott thinks that thesphere of govern-mental arrangements is indeed that in which justice becomes mostproblematic and questions of justice most pressing: if it is Thrasy-machus' chief interest, it is also Plato's (as the rest of the Republicshows) and Aristotle's and ours ... What Thrasymachus at first
provides can only be, at best, a special case of a general theory. Noone challenges him in these terms because the special case that hechoosesis the most conspicuous and the one most usually debated... 'I should go furtherstill: Thrasymachusbegins with the case of justicebetween subject and ruler because, besides suiting the course of the
4 Hourani oc. cit. p. 117.' Loc. cit. pp. 148-53 and 155-63.47Loc. cit. p. 427.
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speaks loosely and equates another with stronger ,which we saw
is strictly speakingincorrect,but there isnoindicationthat he meansbystronger merely ruler (in the political sense). Neither Glauconnor Adeimantus simply repeats Thrasymachus' attack on justice,
they renewit, expandingsome points and addingothers. For instance,Glaucon adds an account of the origin of justice (358 E-359 B), andexpands Thrasymachus' point (344 C) that men revile injustice onlybecause they are afraid of being unjust, arguing that men are justunwillingly because they cannot be unjust (359 B-360 D). 8 As an-other instance, Adeimantus adds a whole new dimension concerning
the teaching of attitudes towards justice (362 E-367 E). My point isthat though Glauconand Adeimantus do not claim to be urging whatThrasymachus would have said, they do claim it is what he couldhave said (e.g. 367 A). They think their argumentsare consistent withhis. And what their arguments fit, is Thrasymachus'statement thatjustice is the advantage of another.
The third way to test the hypothesis is to ask with which of Thrasy-
machus' doctrines does the remainderof the book deal. And again,the answer is that TheRepublicdeals with the doctrine that justice isthe advantage of another, including the idea that
justicefor
subjectsis the advantage of the ruler,and not the latter solely or even mainly.No one is satisfied with Socrates' replies to Thrasymachus,not even
Socrates (354A-C). Thrasymachus himself, as we saw, simply falls
silent, obviously unconvinced. Glaucon and Adeimantus demand afurther defence of justice. When Socrates sets out to reply to their
demandsin the remainderof TheRepublic,he is also makinghis replyto Thrasymachus, and making it by a method that Thrasymachuscannot ignore, that of [LoxpoXoyto.lato, unlike Socrates, seems toagree with Thrasymachus over method. He knows that he cannot
prove Thrasymachuswrong - Sachs' mistake is to suppose that iswhat Plato wants to do - and that to rebut his characterisationof
justice he must resort to Thrasymachus'methods and producea rival
48 Sparshott, loc. cit. p. 431, claims that Glaucon and Adeimantus plainly misin-
terpret Thrasymachus on the issue of the conventionality of justice, for they takehim to hold that the just man would be unjust if he dared (360 C), whereasin fact he had attributed justice to 'an honest simplicity ' in 348 C. If Sparshottis right about Glaucon, then there is an inconsistency in Thrasymachus himself,
since he plainly states that some are not unjust only from fear of the conse-
quences (344 C). But there is no misunderstanding by Glaucon, and no in-consistency in Thrasymachus, if we take Thrasymachus to mean that some men
act justly out of folly (as at 348 C) and others out of fear (as at 344 C).
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and more appealing characterisation. In their debate, Socrates and
Thrasymachusin effect swap definitions of the key terms (art, ruling,wise, strong, happy, advantage, etc). Neither can be confuted provided
that his own set of definitions is adhered to. As a quick illustration
of this, consider art ('ixvy). Thrasymachusclaims that the essence
of rulingis to take advantage of the subjects, Socrates that its essence
is to look to the advantage of the subjects. They agree that ruling is
an art, but each is defining both the art of ruling and art in his
own way; and the ordinary usage of art is sufficiently vague to lend
itself to both definitions, and to others too.49 Socrates could have
repeated the move he makes in the Gorgias (462 ff.) and dismissed aspseudo-arts those which do not fit his definition; but the difficulty
would have remained, namely, why accept his definition and not that
of Thrasymachus?The existence of the rest of TheRepublic s Plato's
tacit admission that more is required.Only when the idea of the Form
of the Good is broached do we finally understand why Plato sees a
necessary connection between arts and justice, via his conception of
Knowledge.
The importanceof the debate with Thrasymachus s that it sets many
themes for the book as a whole (of coursestill
others are set by Glauconand Adeimantus). Socrates and Thrasymachus agree that ruling is
an art, that an art involves knowledge, that the just ruler governs
for the advantage of his subjects, that rulers are stronger, and that
there must be a comparisonmade between the lives of the perfectly
just man and the perfectly unjust man to see which is happier.
Thrasymachus, in fact, has set up an ideal which is the mirror mage
of Plato's (a procedurepursuedin the Gorgiasthrough the opposition
between Socrates and Callicles).That is to say, their ideals are often
the same yet turned back to front at the vital point. For instance,
for both, ruling is an art, but for one it is the art of being unjust, for
the other, of being just. Again, they agree that the man with knowledge
will act on it, but for one this means never being just wittingly, and
for the other, never being unjust wittingly. Overall, Thrasyrnachus'
tyrant is the mirrorimage of Socrates' PhilosopherRuler. And if this
is so, since Plato is concernedwith justice in a general sense and not
4 Varying examples of arts , to show how some fit Socrates' case but not
Thrasymachus', and others the converse, are cited by Tucker op. cit. pp. 1-li,
Joseph op. cit. pp. 224, Cross and Woozley op. cit. p. 50, Sparshott loc. cit.section IV, and Henderson loc. cit. pp. 226-7. Cf. L. Wittgenstein on game ,
Philosophical Investigations (Oxford 1953) I 66.
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