University of New Hampshire

Port Security Monitoring for Portland, ME and Portsmouth, NH as Case Studies

University of New HampshireElectrical and Engineering Department

Course 777/877 Fall 2005

AbstractThis document focuses on the chief security concerns of marine ports.

According to these concerns, the document presents a concept of a state-of-the-art

security system that monitors commerce patterns and supports port authorities with

automated processes such as fast communication and data exchange. The system also

addresses best-effort threat identification that minimizes human interaction in

identifying these threats. There is also a brief summary of risk assessment where the

critical infrastructure of two marine ports, Portsmouth, NH and Portland, ME, is

determined.

Table of ContentsAbstract..........................................................................................................................2Introduction....................................................................................................................4Security Concerns and Aspects......................................................................................5Risk Assessment.............................................................................................................7Countermeasures............................................................................................................8

Introduction...............................................................................................................8Automatic Identification System (AIS)................................................................9Radar...................................................................................................................11Sonar...................................................................................................................15Screening Technologies (X-ray..........................................................................20

Design Specification....................................................................................................24Introduction.............................................................................................................24Detection..................................................................................................................25AAA: Authentication, Authorization, Accounting..................................................25Inspection.................................................................................................................26Prevention................................................................................................................27

C4 = Command, Control, Communication and Computers.........................................28Data Center..............................................................................................................28Monitoring systems.................................................................................................29Near-time data warehousing....................................................................................30

Appendix A – Port of Portsmouth................................................................................33Appendix B – Port of Portland.....................................................................................43References....................................................................................................................53

Introduction

Since September 11, 2001, the notion of security means more than ever before.

The world is faced with the concerns of terrorism and the weaknesses of current

security systems. Research and development for several security projects has been

started in many countries in order to improve the security of transportation and object

defense. As the primary target of terrorism, the United States has to be prepared for

prospective attacks.

Besides object defense, the US has to pay prominent attention to the

transportation entry points of the country, namely the airports and marine ports. In

these facilities, special care has to be taken of access control, where not just the entry

of facility objects but the entry of the whole port facility has to be secured.

In this report we propose a security system that focuses on three different phases

of security. The system is able to monitor maritime and land commerce entering port

facilities, it has to be able to highly reduce the possibility of intrusions, and it supports

effective and fast response to possible threats and alerts. First, we introduce the

concerns of marine port security. Then we present the methodology of risk assessment

we used for assessing the critical infrastructure of two ports on the eastern coast:

Portsmouth and Portland. Finally, we present several countermeasure techniques to

reduce the threat of these ports and propose an integrated system design for these

ports coupled with system concerns and restrictions.

Security Concerns and Aspects

Beyond airports, marine ports are the main entry points of the US. They conduct

huge amount of international cargo traffic which has to be extensively surveyed and

controlled to reduce the infiltration of contraband into the country. Not only is

contraband a problem, but marine ports can be a target of terrorism as well. Massive

ships traveling in large volumes of traffic is a very good hiding place for illegal

immigrants, terrorists, weapons, drugs, or hazardous materials. Besides the possibility

to use regular cargo traffic for the purposes of terrorism, a marine port is composed of

several facilities that have high role in the economical life of domestic areas. There

are oil and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) tanks that store a large amount of flammable

substance. The attacking and successful blowing of which may result in severe

devastation. Most of the marine ports also have bridges that are highly loaded with

public and commercial transportation and certainly most have ferry services or other

public transportation terminals that again can be a point of attack. Overall, the ports

have to be secured from three directions. First is from waterborne vehicles

(underwater or on the surface) which may bear the threat of contraband, hazardous

materials, terrorism, and illegal immigrants. Second is land transportation as the huge

amount of cargo stored at port facilities are accessed by trucks. These trucks may be

another threat for critical port facilities. The third is human intrusion. Both the objects

that play important role in the life of the port and the public transportation services

and terminals have to be secured against malicious human access. We have excluded

airborne attacks as an attack vector simply because the defense of airspace is the task

of the air force and air-defense is out of the scope of port security.

The defense of objects can be split up into three sub security aspects. Firstly, an

object has to be secured by perimeters and measures that make prospective intruders

keep out the restricted area. This aspect of security is important to control and stem

access of unauthorized personnel and vehicles. Secondly, those who want to gain

access have to go through a screening or inspection process that may record data and

is able to recognize and filter unacceptable or hazardous materials carried on a

vehicle. These first two principles relate to the notion of access control. Thirdly,

reaction on detected intrusion or detection of undesirable materials is a crucial aspect

of security.

The three security aspects mentioned have to be applied both for object defense

inside the port and for the defense of the port as a whole. The security of the port

territory has to be separated into two sub tasks. On one hand, critical infrastructure

should be secured; on the other hand, the entrance of the whole port area has to be

well monitored and controlled. While the former can be solved with regular

perimeters, intrusion detection systems and deterrent systems, the latter requires the

usage of state-of-the art security, data recording, and monitoring solutions. The

greatest challenge of the latter is how to monitor and install a surveillance system that

is able to operate on a spread area while keeping the ships under control of the

designated authorities. A further challenge would be to install such access control

systems that are able to effectively monitor and report without generating adverse

effects on the pace of commerce and transportation.

Design Specification“The weak have one weapon:

the errors of those who think they are strong”Georges Bidault

Introduction

This chapter describes the general concepts of security process which should be

implemented in the port. The chapter present the whole cycle of monitoring: starting

form detection, authorization, authentication and accounting (AAA), throughout

inspection and prevention. Also, it distinguishes the human aspect in the process of

monitoring.

A A A

D etec tio nP reventio n

Inves tigatio n

The general purpose of security monitoring is to protect the port. A very

important objective is also to build the port security monitoring system by keeping in

mind that the whole process of monitoring should be as little detrimental to the

customers (ships, vehicles, passengers) as possible. In our design we introduce an

automated system, called smart gate, which detects ships and vehicles entering a port,

then conducts an AAA process to decide the authority of the incoming ship or vehicle.

The smart gate system takes the characteristics of the supported traffic into

consideration e.g., ships use different smart gate system components than land

vehicles; furthermore, the profile of ships or the AAA method may differ as well.

Technology can bring a huge effort in current day security aspects, but there is also a

human aspect which is very important in the whole security monitoring process. It can

bring significant advantages as well as disadvantages. The first human aspect is the

awareness of regular people who live in port area. The common sense of these people

and knowledge of normal situation in port area makes them the best countermeasure.

The only thing that needs to be implemented is the communication process so that

there would be an easy way to contact an institution who is responsible for the port

security. Another concern about the human aspect is the lack of competence and

awareness of staff. The results of ignoring information provided from the

countermeasures could be catastrophic. All of the best technologies and the fastest

detection are useless when they are operated inadequately. Trainings and procedures

provide basic, effective, and cost efficient countermeasures.

AAA: Authentication, Authorization, Accounting

The method of AAA is a feasible way to prevent the port from unacceptable

ships, vehicles, personnel, and cargo. In our system, we propose an automated

computer and communication system, called smart gate, which serves the functions of

AAA. The concept of the smart gate can be used either for ships or for land vehicles,

but the system components will differ.

The smart gate has several components that together compose the whole

functionality of the system.

Smart gate: communication system at the entrance of the port. Its

objective is fast ship inventory checking and relaying instructions of the

security center to ships.

Smart buoys: they communicate with the ships by an appropriate and

feasible RF system, so buoys are equipped with this RF interface (e.g.,

RFID) and supporting computing technology. They are also connected

to port security center by wire, so smart buoys may gain energy from the

wire link and can quickly transfer recorded information to the center.

iBoat (intelligent boat): remote controlled boat with the same equipment

that smart buoys have. It is a mobile extension of smart buoys in order to

have the smart gate operated in for example special weather conditions.

It can move to ships passing by the smart gate and can approach buoys

to transfer recorded information.

AIS (automated information system): good for ship identification, and

important data exchange before a ship gets into the range of the smart

gate. But it is inadequate for inventory exchange due to the narrow

bandwidth, and the lack of security.

Cargo monitoring software – certainly the security center needs software

that can handle the huge volume of incoming information, so effective

visualization is important, which means that security officers can easily

perceive the monitoring information and can detect the unacceptable.

This software should be capable to transfer communication from the

officers to the ships through smart gate or other RF system. It should

also present operating authorities with common operating picture, to

have some functionality so they can keep their eye on the port

operations.

Near-time data warehousing – A special database system. Besides you

can load data into it, in case having enough data from the past, the

database can support the users with anomaly detection by comparing

data of past and actually loaded data, and everything happens in a preset

time. Good for identifying possible threats.

The most important building block of the system is the process of

Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA). The data displayed by the

cargo monitoring software is useless if it is not authentic. The process of

authentication should be done when loading the cargo of a vehicle or ship, and before

inspecting and downloading the inventories. Authorization is done when the port

security center personnel approved the clearance of the ship or vehicle. The decision

they make is based on the inventories and the data warehousing anomaly detection.

These two sub procedures determine the level of security which should be used at the

port or the arriving terminal when receiving the incoming ship or vehicle. The final

step in AAA is accounting. Accounting is the process of recording data about the

inspected ship or vehicle. The data is moved to the database system, where the data

will be used for further inspections in the future.

Figure 1.: Block diagram and layout of secure port monitoring system

Intrusion Detection and Prevention

The aim of intrusion detection is to stop any kind of attempt of physical

intrusions. A reasonable approach is best-effort prevention. The technology helps

increase the radius of regular human senses such as sight, hearing, smell or even

thermoception. It also gives us the ability to utilize totally new ones. A system that

extensively supports the task of intrusion detection should us the following

techniques:

Radar systems

Sonar systems (for either underwater or on-water threats)

Closed circuit television (CCTV)

Perimeters

High-tech door locks (biometric systems)

Supporting communication and software that can handle alarms

Screening

X-ray systems

Backscatter

Transmission (standard)

CBRNE detection

Nuclear detector based on muon

Response

One of the primary aims of our port security system should be to minimize

human interaction in responses on alerts. We are able to reduce the factor of humanity

by introducing technology in the field of intrusion detection, but we should invest the

same efforts in automating the process of alert handling.

C4 = Command, Control, Communication and Computers.

Data Center

Data Center - overview:

The Data Center is mainly designed to prioritize the access to the monitoring

and management application of the Ports of Portland and Portsmouth (PPP) and

secure them from unauthorized utilization.

Data Center - objectives:

guarantee of data safety

efficient services for all transmissions

guarantee of operational continuation

possibilities of adding new monitoring countermeasures without adding or

changing existing equipment

possibility of monitoring whole Data Center traffic for safety reasons

Data Center - is divided for two equivalent main zones: one for control and the other

for public network. The whole Data Center is divided in several zones:

Access zone - provides access to the system from a certain network group (Internet or

extranet)

Service zone - place where service for external network users are located. Mostly web

servers, probes, monitors and AAA servers. These servers connect external network

users to the data bases.

Interior zone - location of data bases, applications engines and storage places

Management zone - management of whole system, servers this zone has access to

every place in the Data Center

Monitoring systems

Technology introduction

Monitoring systems are responsible for integration of all incoming information

from all monitoring elements. They also provide an interface between collected data

and staff, and passengers and port community.

There are a few basic components used in monitoring systems:

Probes, monitors, and adapters – responsible for communication and data

management between detectors, sensors and main processing system

Main processing system

Report system

Presentation application

Web based information portal for personnel, staff, passengers and port

community

Design Parameters

The design should be scalable, redundant and secure.

Scalability

Adapters, monitors, and probes should be easily extended.

Redundancy

The whole monitoring system should be developed in two different physical

locations.

Secure

The monitoring system elements with upon to the secure level should be placed

in appropriate zones of Data Center.

Concerns and Restrictions

The main concern will be integration of whole alarms from a variety of different

vendor’s detectors. This will be necessary to develop adapters which can

communicate and decode this information.

COTS

There are several management systems of the shelf for this. The most popular

and complex are:

– Comarch InsighNet - http://www.comarch.com/en/Markets/Telecommunications/Network+Service+Management/

– Hewlett Packard OpenView - http://www.managementsoftware.hp.com/

– Micromuse Necool - http://www.micromuse.com/sols/gov_homeland.html

Near-time data warehousing

Technology Introduction

Data warehouses play an integral part of business intelligence. Their primary

role is in enterprise decision-making. They store a huge amount of data related to the

operation of the organization, then systematize, and finally provide decision makers

with tools that enable more efficient decision-making based on stored data and their

transformations. Traditional data warehousing is used for strategic decision-making

and has several days of information delay.

In recent years, a new data warehousing paradigm appeared called “soft real-

time” or “near-time” data warehousing. The main features, which are more relevant to

a port security integrated system, are exposing data from a transactional or an

operational system in real-time, tracking of selected or deviant events, and active

sending of system alerts for the users of the data warehouse system. The notion of

“real-time” is not literal. It means that the data warehousing system is able to provide

the users with information within a preset time. That is why it is called “soft real-

time” or “near time.” Usually, the shorter the response time, the more expensive the

system implementation is.

A “near time” data warehousing system may have a key role in a port security

system. In case engineers develop data exchange interfaces through which authentic

data of ships, crew, and cargo can be recorded, the system will provide the port with

an efficient anomaly detection function. This detection functionality can notify cost

guard officers and authorities in case a certain ship has some change in cargo

according to the data recorded in the past. Certainly, in order to have an efficient

anomaly detection system, huge amount of data is needed from the past. By detecting

anomalies, the coast guard is able to direct ships to appropriate terminals, order

security officers to be in alert around a the receiver terminal. The main advantage of

such a system would be to learn about the ships, prepare for their arrivals, or to keep

them away from the port. It is worth to note that the most important premise of such a

system would be the authentic inventories or manual data recording on ships that

provides data for the data warehouse through some communication system.

Design Parameters

In order to install a data warehousing system for a port, several premises must

be assured. Two important sub-system components must be installed. First of all,

ships need an authentic inventory system that stores several data about the ship, its

crew, and cargo, or in case this inventory system is unavailable, specially trained

coast guard crew should screen the cargo and the ship, and provide information for

the data warehouse about the ship. Unfortunately, the latter solution is quite time

consuming, so the question of authentic data source is a delicate matter.

Secondly, the collected inventory data should be forwarded to the data

warehouse by a fast communication system. This communication system can be

composed of either wired or wireless technologies, but the most efficient solution

would be a mixture of them exploiting the mobility capabilities of wireless systems

and the reliability and speed of wired systems.

Reliability, redundancy, and availability are very important features of a data

warehousing system. Usually, these features are supported by the solution provider

company, so these questions are out of scope. However, finding a good physical

location for the computer tools that provides the flawless work of the data warehouse

is an important but very flexible problem due to the fast networking technologies of

our days.

Concerns and Restrictions

The main concern about the usability of the data warehouse is the feasibility of

the authentic ship inventory system, or the manual ship screening procedure. Without

legal ship registrars there is no sense to compare the data of the present with the data

of the past.

Another concern is to draw the correct database queries by which alerts are

generated. By this way, system users can detect anomalies with high efficiency.

COTS

Near-time dataware housing is still a new and evolving technology. Currently,

Hewlett-Packard has a working solution based on Oracle database systems. They

implemented a reference system to prove the viability of near-time dataware housing

which detects credit-card tricks.

Countermeasures

When you can see danger – it is too late...

Introduction

Today’s market is exploding with new and better possibility of security

measurement. Huge amounts of countermeasures make a possibility to fulfill each

area of port security, starting with physical security, intrusion detection and

monitoring systems. It is important during the design process to find equilibrium

between cost of the system components and time of the process from one site and

quality of the security from the second.

This triangular of these parameters and cross dependency on each other limits

the possible implementation.

One of our biggest concerns was to design a secure port entrance in an

automated, time efficient and secure way. This implementation called smart gate

utilizes existing of the shelf technologies and integrates them into secure entrance

both for ships and vehicles. The goal of design process was to find a compromise

between commerce delay and the quality of the security. Moreover the process of

crossing secure gates both for vehicles, ships as well as customers, should be as less

complicated and intrusiveness.

The section below consists list of possible of the shelf countermeasures which

can be integrated in port security system. In each section there will be Technology

Introduction, Design Parameters, Concern and Restriction and Commercial Off The

Shelf (COTS) technologies. In each we tried to answer for basic questions such as:

Technology Introduction

What is the technology? What is it usually used for? In what context it is used?

Where can it fit into integrated architecture?

Design Parameters

What technical parameter should you consider when installing it? (Operation

characteristics, features, range, robustness) Design parameters that will guide you

when you install - do not install it yet to a specific port just inform us about input

parameters that can help find ideal physical locations for the techs.

Concerns and Restrictions

What concerns and restrictions the technology has? Operating conditions?

Vulnerabilities?

COTS

What COTS provide the services of the given technology and companies? How

are they able to ship and install these technologies?

Automatic Identification System (AIS)

Technology Introduction

The Automatic Identification System (AIS) provides a means for ships to be

identified from ports or other ships with no human action. The system consists of a

transceiver on every large ship as well as ports. The transmitter portion of this unit is

aware of the ships location, direction and speed through GPS. Also the ships size,

classification, call sign and registration number among other things are transmitted.

The receiver is therefore able to track nearby ships and give information about them

to aid with navigation and communication.

The usefulness of AIS as a component of a security system is mostly as a simple

and reliable means of identification. It could be used as a method of authentication to

access the smart gate of a port.

Design Parameters

The working range of AIS is the same as normal marine VHF radio range. The

reliable range of this system is greater than standard detection systems such as radar

and sonar because the targets should be actively transmitting. Typical range is about

20 nautical miles. Bad weather will reduce the range, similarly to radio, but no more

than radar or sonar. High locations close to the ocean with high-gain antennas will

optimize the range. Most likely this system can be installed alongside other marine

communications equipment, possibly sharing an antenna.

In addition to location and identification, AIS can provide speed, direction and

turn information. The turning information comes directly from the steering system of

the ship, and will allow for the course of the ship to be predicted more reliably than

other detection systems.

Currently, all internationally faring vessels other than passenger and fishing

boats over 65 feet entering US waters must use AIS. In addition, all international

passenger ships over 150 tons entering US waters must use AIS.

Concerns and Restrictions

The largest restriction of this technology is that it requires cooperation of the

operator of the ship. Equipment must be installed and running on a ship for it to be

tracked in this method. All location and direction data could for a ship could be faked

by feeding the transmitter incorrect data. Information on the security of transmitted

data is not readily available. The safe assumption from this is that as the system

currently operates, it would be readily possible to forge identification information

with this system as well.

On the upside, AIS provides an additional method in which to identify a ship.

Though it may be possible to misrepresent a ship via AIS, it is more difficult than

simply reporting false data over voice radio or changing the registration painted on

the ships hull. AIS does use time-based information, so it would be possible to add

non-reversible time-based encryption to the system if it does not currently have this.

With this addition, AIS would be a very reliable source of identification data.

COTS

Kongsberg is a major supplier of AIS equipment. They have several complete

systems available for sale and rent. Their basic installable system is the AIS 200.

This system consists of a transceiver module, a control unit and an antenna. GPS data

should be provided to the system by the ships main GPS receiver, but the AIS 200

also contains a backup GPS receiver which can only function if the unit is installed

with a clear “view” of the sky. All basic AIS functions are supported by this unit.

The control unit contains a keypad and a text display. It is used to enter ship data

such as crew count, destination, etc. The display can be used to show rudimentary

information about nearby vessels. For more complete display of nearby vessel data,

the AIS 200 can be interfaced with electronic chart displays and radar systems that

support the AIS interface. On a graphical display, AIS can display the visual location

as well as the size and heading of nearby vessels. Depending upon the display used, it

may be possible to select a vessel graphically to access all available AIS information

for it.

Kongsberg also makes a portable AIS unit, the AIS 200 P. This unit is designed

to be carried by the pilot and interfaced into whichever ship he currently is piloting.

Both the transceiver and the control unit are housed within a water tight, floatable

case. It only requires being connected to power and VHF and GPS antennas to be

operational. It does allow for connection to all of the same ship systems that the

standard AIS 200 allows for more complete AIS data.

Pricing information for both of these systems is available by contacting

Kongsberg directly. AIS fees are $75 per year, with an additional $375 registration

fee for US ships.

Radar

Technology Introduction

RADAR stands for Radio Detection and Ranging. It is a system used to detect

the range of particular objects. It works by transmitting radio waves then detecting the

signal that is reflected off an object back to the receiver. The radar signal can be

easily multiplied thus is suited to detecting objects at very large ranges where other

reflections would be to weak. Using radio frequency provides us less attenuation than

light in many conditions such as through clouds, fog, and smoke thus enabling

detection and tracking in such conditions.

The amount of power Pr returning to the receiving antenna is given by the radar

equation:

where

Pt = transmitter power,

Gt = gain of transmitting antenna,

Ar = effective aperture (area) of receiving antenna,

σ = Radar Cross Section, or scattering coefficient of target,

Rt = distance from transmitter to target,

Rr = distance from target to receiver.

In the common case where the transmitter and receiver are at the same location,

Rt = Rr and the term Rt² Rr² can be replaced by R4, where R is the range. This yields

This shows that the received power declines as the fourth power of the range,

which means that the reflected power from distant targets is very, very small.

The table below [5] provides the list of radar depended on the frequency range, and wavelength range.

Radar Frequency Bands

Band Name Frequency Range

Wavelength Range

Notes

HF 3-30 MHz 10-100 m coastal radar systems, over-the-horizon (OTH) radar; 'high frequency'

P < 300 MHz 1 m+ 'P' for 'previous', applied retrospectively to early radar systems

VHF 50-330 MHz 0.9-6 m very long range, ground penetrating; 'very high frequency'

UHF 300-1000 MHz 0.3-1 m very long range (e.g. ballistic early warning), ground penetrating, foliage penetrating; 'ultra high frequency'

L 1-2 GHz 15-30 cm long range air traffic control and surveillance; 'L' for 'long'

S 2-4 GHz 7.5-15 cm terminal air traffic control, long range weather, marine radar; 'S' for 'short'

C 4-8 GHz 3.75-7.5 cm a compromise (hence 'C') between X and S bands; weather

X 8-12 GHz 2.5-3.75 cm missile guidance, marine radar, weather, medium-resolution mapping and ground surveillance; in the USA the narrow range 10.525GHz ±25MHz is used for airport radar.

Ku 12-18 GHz 1.67-2.5 cm high-resolution mapping, satellite altimetry; frequency just under K band (hence 'u')

Band Name Frequency Range

Wavelength Range

Notes

K 18-27 GHz 1.11-1.67 cm From German kurz, meaning 'short'; limited use due to absorption by water vapour, so Ku and Ka were used instead for surveillance. K-band is used for detecting clouds by meteorologists, and by police for detecting speeding motorists. K-band radar guns operate at 24.150 ± 0.100 GHz.

Ka 27-40 GHz 0.75-1.11 cm mapping, short range, airport surveillance; frequency just above K band (hence 'a') Photo radar, used to trigger cameras which take pictures of license plates of cars running red lights, operates at 34.300 ± 0.100 GHz

Mm 40-300 Ghz 1 - 7.5mm 'millimetre' band, subdivided as below

V 40-75 GHz 4.0 - 7.5 mm

W 75-110 GHz 2.7 - 4.0 mm used as a visual sensor for experimental autonomous vehicles, high-resolution meterological observation

AESA

AESA stands for an Active Electronically Scanned Array. It is a type of radar

composed with numerous small antennas with two dimensional transmitter and

receiver functions. The combination of phase and the amplitude of signals in the

structure of antennas allow the AESA to be immobile. It simplifies the mechanical

design which uses less space than typical radar. The distributed transmit function also

eliminates the most common single-point failure mode seen in a conventional radar.

Concerns and Restrictions

The main advantages over mechanically scanned arrays are extremely fast

scanning rate, much higher range, tremendous number of targets being tracked and

engaged (multiple agile beams), low probability of intercept, ability to function as a

radio/jammer, simultaneous air and ground modes, and Synthetic Aperture Radar.

Mechanical steering may be added to AESA radar for increased radar field of

view, however, no such equipped AESA radars currently exist. The movement

performance of the antenna would not need to be nearly as great as that of traditional

radar, as the radar sweep is not integral to the contact update rate.

COTS

Below is the list of well known radar producers.

Radwar www.radwar.com.pl PIT www.pit.gda.pl Raytheon www.raytheon.com Northrop Grumman www.northropgrumman.com BAE Systems www.baesystems.com EADS www.eads.com

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION COMPAREMENT

Vendor Radar Raytheon

Product N-22 Mobile Medium-Range Surveillance Radar

NSC 18 Radar(with 9 inch PPI)

Frequency agility band Band S Band S, X

Instrumented range:100 km range and 7 km height

Remote operation- distance- remotely available functions

up to 300 mup to 300 mswitching on/off,operating modes,BITE status,synthetic picture,target tracker commands,

PC based radar processor; High quality TFTs in 15, 19 and 23.1”;

Table Top, Deck Stand or Black Box versions for installations into own consoles

IFF equipment option

Land navigation systemwith GPS built-in option

Antenna type cosec26ft, 7ft, 9ft X-Band, 12 ft S-Band antennas available

Automatic target extractionand tracking

72 tracks Up to 70

Communication radio, wire or fibre optic

Other

Radio communication equipment according to customer’s need;Two stands: for operator and commander (for air-defense subsystem coordination);Extensive BITE, easy repairs, line replaceable spare PCBs;Built-in radar situation simulator (optionally);Data recording capability: detected plots and tracks can be registered during radar operation

Superior target detection and clutter suppression;

In compliance to latest IMO requirements such as IMO Ras.A823 (19), MSC 64 (67) Annex A and A.820 (19);

High Speed Code

Case study

It is quite difficult from the security point of reason to find some references in

maritime area. Raytheon Canada provides one existed system which integrates four

technologies:

a) Long-Range HF Surface-Wave Radar (HFSWR);

b) Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS) Systems;

c) Other sensor systems;

d) Multiple-Sensor Data Fusion and displays.

Integrated Maritime Surveillance Systems – IMS is an economical, shore-based

system providing continuous, all-weather surveillance of the 200 nmi Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ). More information is provided no the Raytheon Canada

website [3].

Sonar

Technology Introduction

SONAR stands for sound, navigation and ranging. It uses sound waves to track

objects underwater. There are two things that we could track underwater that would

violate security: a diver or an underwater vehicle such as a submarine. Divers are a

threat because they can swim up to critical infrastructure to place bombs. Submarines

are a threat because of weapons such as torpedoes and mines. We will focus more on

divers because we are securing the port more against terrorists than against other

nations with submarines. We will let the Navy take care of defending against

submarines.

We will use sonar to survey the areas immediately surrounding the top five

vulnerabilities in each port. There will have to be either a human or a computer

system in place to monitor the sonar and then to alert command and control if there is

an abnormality in the water. Command and control would then have to take necessary

action. Since divers are very difficult to spot, there is a potential for false alarms. This

makes SONAR very difficult to monitor and professionals would need to be hired.

Design Parameters

There are many design parameters to be covered. First, there are different

frequencies that can be used. One particular company chose to use either 192 kHz

signals or 50 kHz signals. There are advantages and drawbacks of each. The table

shows these advantages and drawbacks.

192 kHz 50 kHz

shallower depths

narrow cone angle

better definition and target separation

less noise susceptibility

deeper depths

wide cone angle

less definition and target separation

more noise susceptibility

192 kHz is the recommended frequency for almost all fresh water and salt water

applications.  It gives the best detail, works best in shallow water and at speed, and

typically shows less "noise" and undesired echoes. Target definition is also better with

192 kHz.  This is the ability to display two objects as two separate echoes instead of

one blob on the screen. Although the port of Portland is a rather deep port, we do not

need to use the 50 kHz frequency. This is because we are not tracking the sea floor.

We are only concerned with the 20-30 feet below the surface where a diver would

potentially be. The cone angle is not an issue either because we can just use more

SONAR transmitters to compensate.

Concerns and Restrictions

Not only do you need to choose the more suitable frequency, you need to take in

account other factors when choosing a SONAR system. Each port has a certain

salinity. This makes it necessary to choose SONAR that can project its pulse through

higher or lower salt levels. Also, temperature plays a role. SONAR needs to be able to

work in cold temperatures during the winter. Finally, the location of the SONAR is

important. It needs to be effectively monitoring the key infrastructure. The angle of

the projected pulse needs to be taken into account as well as the current. A SONAR

system needs to be securely placed so that a strong current will not wear it out over

time. You also do not want to place it in a location that will be in the way of moving

vessels.

COTS

There are many SONAR products to choose from. The first product is from a

company called C-Tech Ltd. They have created a harbor security system called the

CSDS-85 Omni® Surveillance Sonar and it is designed for the detection of

underwater intruders such as divers with open and closed breathing apparatus, diver

delivery vehicles, mini submarines, and submarines. The sonar has 360 degree field of

view, operates at 80 kHz and has ranges from 250 meters to 2000 meters. It also has

an automatic as well as manual tracking feature and a video recorder. It has automatic

system status updates. Finally, it can be mounted on a ship if necessary. It is perfect

for what we are looking for [17].

Next, the Swimmer Detection System Cerberus 360 was designed by a company

called Qinetiq. They claim that this system can detect and track up to 50 threat targets

automatically in depths of up to 2,100 feet and through 360°. They also say that is

simple to use and easy to manipulate with limited training. This would be perfect so

we could hire non-professionals [18].

Next, Westminster International has developed a swimmer detection system that

has viewing angles of 90 degrees to 360 degrees. It can detect a diver up to 700

meters away. It also has automatic detection of jamming and automatic target

detection. This product can zoom and display previous areas of detection for

reference. Finally, it can resist .5 kg blast of TNT underwater [19].

Remotely Operated Vehicle

Technology Introduction

Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) have become an integral tool in modern

day naval operations. From Oil rig construction to deep sea exploration, ROVs have

allowed humans to go places and do things that were thought impossible not more

than 20 years ago. They range from huge robotic monsters capable of lifting

staggering loads; to miniature devices made up of little more than a camera and

propeller that can navigate though ship wrecks that are miles away from the ocean

surface.

The most popularly known use of ROVs is ocean exploration. This can range

from searching the deepest parts of the ocean for signs of life, to investigating ship

wrecks in the open ocean. ROVs were used to navigate a maze of steal and iron

through the inside of the Titanic, recovering some extremely valuable artifacts in the

process. These exploration ROVs tend to be small and maneuverable, to better

accomplish the task of operating in tight spaces. Generally they are wireless so as not

to get tangled up inside a ship wreck. Some have robotic arms that can lift reasonable

loads (under 100 lbs), but are usually used for taking pictures.

ROVs are also commonly used by oil companies during the construction and

repair of ocean drilling equipment. These industrial ROVs tend to be larger than their

Titanic searching counterparts. ROVs used by the oil industry can lift thousands of

pounds with huge robotic arms that are manipulated by humans through remote

control. Their larger size, however, comes with consequences. The shear weight of

the devices makes them more cumbersome to control, and their large surface areas

makes them unstable in strong currents. To compensate for these draw backs, prices

are increased due to the sophisticated drive units that come with automated stabilizers

to keep the large submersivals in the same spot for long periods of time.

Design Parameters

ROVs for port security will be used in a variety of operations. Most of the time

they will only be used for visual investigation of ships below the water line and the

sea floor for explosive devices. If upon investigation an explosive device has been

found the ROV must have the capability to remove the device with out setting it off.

The design specifications for this project, therefore, should combine attributes

of both exploration ROVs and industrial ROVs. Our ROVs need have enough

maneuverability to be able to negotiate strong currents while remaining stable, small

enough to fit into tight spaces around ships at port, yet strong enough to carry

explosive devices without running the risk of dropping them to the bottom. ROVs for

port security need to be wireless so as not to run the risk of having a cable become

entangled in the screws of a ship under investigation. They should be able to endure

the punishment of operating in a variety of climates as New England is not known for

its predictable weather. They also need to be extremely reliable as the lives of many

people may rest in its ability to accomplish its tasks.

Concerns and Restrictions

The biggest concern with regards to the use of an ROV is its ability to remove

an explosive device. In an ideal world ROVs could be used exclusively for the

removal and deactivation of any explosive device found in port. However, it would

be of great concern as to the ability of an ROV to actually handle the removal of such

devices. It can be assumed that such a process would require a delicate touch, and the

ability to react to a variety of situations at a moments notice. Any ROV used in this

process would have to be extremely reliable, not failing to respond to the slightest

command of the human operator as any fault in the system could be catastrophic.

Another concern is the time and logistics required to deploy. If an ROV was

given to each of the three QRF teams, it would still take a considerable amount of

time to get the unit on scene. To ensure the safety of the deploying team, the ROV

would have to be submerged at distance from the suspected target. ROVs are not

known for their speed underwater, and would take a considerable amount of time to

actually get on site (at least with respects to the time needed to detonate an explosive

device).

Other problems of less concern are financial issues to maintain such devices,

training operators to use them, the deployment rigs on QRF boats (and the space they

take up), and upgrades to the devices as technology advances. These concerns,

however, are common to any operation, especially in the military and security sectors.

COTS

HYSUB ATP 50 is typical of what one will find in most ROVs that meet our

criteria.

The HYSUB ATP 50 - 2000 TM is an advanced offshore oil drilling support

and salvage vehicle. This vehicle has been fitted with sophisticated master slave

manipulators.

Length: 251.5 cm / 99 inches

Width: 142.3 cm / 56 inches

Height: 147.3 cm / 58 inches

Weight in air: 1723.5 kg. / 3800 lbs.

Diving Depth: 1828.8 m / 6000 ft.

Payload 90.7 kg (200 lb)

Structure:6061-T6 aluminum with 316 stainless steel fixtures

Flotation: Syntactic foam

Variable Ballast: Optional (hard or soft)

Propulsion:Electro-hydraulic (50 electric HP, 6 hydraulic thrusters)

Power Requirements: 480 VAS, 3-phase, 60 Hz, 100 KW

Control: ISE Advanced Telemetry Control System

Cameras: Colour, B/W optional; Customer's Option

Sonar: Customer's Option

Lights: 5 x 250 watt

Manipulators: 1 x 5 function rate Magnum arm 1 x 7 function SC Magnum arm

Screening Technologies (X-ray)

Technology Introduction

X-ray technology is going to be a very big part of future port security. There

are so many vessels and ships that come through every port each year that sheer

numbers alone make it impossible to inspect every container, bag, vehicle and person

that moves through the seaport. This makes it important to use intelligence factors to

target certain vessels, containers, people etc. due to particular risk factors. Once these

objects have been identified, there are a few different types of X-ray technologies that

can be implemented. X-ray technology is a form of non-intrusive inspection

technology (NIIT) and tends to focus on anomaly detection. This means that the

system is able to alert the operator when there is an anomaly present in the cargo, but

no further detail without further inspection. The best form of NIIT is a mobile unit

allowing it to be deployed anywhere at the port or on docks where cargo is being

unloaded.

Design Parameters and Concerns of COTS

The first type of NIIT that will be discussed is Vehicle and Cargo Inspection

Systems (VACIS). This is used to inspect the contents of trucks, containers, cargo,

and passenger vehicles for hidden contraband. It consists of 2 90 ft tracks, one holds

the radioactive source and the other holds the detector. This can scan up to 70 feet

with in 90 seconds. The scanning of 40 feet can be done in less than 6 seconds by the

manufacturer SAIC. The advantage of gamma rays over X-rays is that it is less

expensive and has a higher reliability. There are three problems with this technology,

though. The first is that it takes a long time (more than a day) to relocate. This means

that Customs Field Inspection Units primarily use it as a fixed unit and it takes up a

lot of space. Next, once a container or vehicle is identified as something that maybe

hold contraband, it must be relocated to another inspection site (wherever that may

be) which is costly and time consuming for the shipper. Finally, VACIS is a high

energy imaging system that requires special radiation training.

The next NIIT is the Mobile Truck X-ray (MTXR). It use used to scan the same

objects as the VACIS but does not require any special training and uses X-rays. It is

manufactured by AS&E and uses both backscatter and transmission technology. It

has a viewing angle of 88 degrees which provides very effective inspection and

detection of drugs and explosives. Since this system only uses a 450keV x-ray

source, it does not have adequate penetration power to view fully loaded containers.

This is a problem unless the container is not fully loaded or if a system with greater

penetration power is designed.

The Fixed Pallet X-ray System (FPXR) uses a single x-ray beam with nominal

energy to inspect cargo on a conveyor belt. It is also manufactured by AS&E and also

uses both backscatter and transmission technology. It can scan up to 1500 parcels an

hour that are up to 64 inches wide. At least two passes are needed for complete

inspection and more than two passes are needed for objects taller than the x-ray field

of view. The problem with the FPXR is that it can not actually scan pallets. For an

effective reading, it has to scan boxes or packages which comprise the pallet. Also,

there are a limitation of the detection of drugs and explosives due to the variety of

container types, the variety of the contents, the amount of clutter, and the weight

shape packing and density if it is a drug being detected.

The Mobile Van X-ray System (MVXR) is a mobile system that has capabilities

similar to the FPXR. It is the same thing except it is mounted in a van and is

“ruggedized.” Calibration and alignment takes less than 10 minutes and can handle

pallets up to three cubic feet and 300 lbs. This system has the same limitations as the

FPXR except it has an even smaller cargo load (AS&E manufactured).

The High Energy Sea Container X-ray (HESC) is a high energy x-ray system

that is used in the seaport environment. It is used to straddle containers and move

from pier to pier under its own power. It will be driven over a row of stationary

targets and can examine the full height of trucks, roll-on/roll-off units, single

containers or containers in a double stack in supposedly less than 15 seconds. Since it

is high energy it can examine the densest of cargoes.

Finally, there is explosive and drug vapor trace detectors. These are handheld

devices shaped like an iron ant the complete set up includes a Pentium computer. It is

used by drilling the detector into a small hole and having the detector sense whether

or not there is any built up vapor concentration. If there is, the container will need

further investigation because it can not detect what the exact vapor is. A problem

with theses particle detectors is that they are very sensitive and may give false alarms

(Scrintex manufactured).

Appendix A – Port of PortsmouthAbstract

The purpose of this document is to give a brief description of the ports of

Portsmouth and its key assets. Bridge, wharf, military, rail and air facilities are

discussed with special emphasis on those that compose the backbone of

communication and transportation between New Hampshire and Maine. Beyond the

description we made assessments on the aftermath of possible terrorist attacks on this

infrastructure. Finally the results of the CARVER2 infrastructure analysis software

appear in this document.

Introduction

The Port of Portsmouth, New Hampshire is located on the south bank of the

Piscataqua River, opposite Seavey Island and the town of Kittery, Maine. The port is

56 nautical miles southwest of Portland, Maine and 61 nautical miles northeast of

Boston, Massachusetts. The river, formed by the confluence of the Salmon Falls and

Cocheco Rivers, flows 13 miles generally southeast to the Atlantic Ocean, and forms

a portion of the boundary between the states of Maine and New Hampshire. The

mouth of the river is known as Portsmouth Harbor. All except three of the waterfront

facilities at the port are located on the south bank along the lower 4.5 miles of the

Piscataqua River [1].

Commerce

The waterways used for this shipping is Portsmouth Harbor and the first few

miles of the Piscataqua River. Petroleum products, liquefied petroleum products

(LPG), gypsum rock, steel cable, lobsters, salt and coal comprise the majority of

waterborne commerce at the ports. The most common ships are oil carriers, both

international and coastwise. These ships arrive frequently, except during the summer.

There are more vessels served: liner, passenger ships, container ships, feeder vessels,

and barges. Gypsum and salt shipments also arrive from other domestic ports with

some frequency.

Infrastructure

Military installations

The military installations are Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and the Portsmouth

Harbor US Coast Guard Station. At Fort Point, on New Castle Island, at the mouth of

the Piscataqua River, U.S. Coast Guard Station Portsmouth Harbor keeps a watch on

Portsmouth Harbor, the upriver Great Bay, and all points between Cape Porpoise and

the Massachusetts and New Hampshire border. The Coast Guard Station runs an

important lighthouse for navigation of the port, as well as being the base for 1 cutter

and 1 helicopter.

The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is one of the most important strategic points

within Port of Portsmouth areas. It is located in Seavey Island, in the entry of the

Portsmouth harbor, with access to the mainland by two bridges that connect it to

Kittery, Maine.

It is used for overhaul, repair, modernization, and refueling of LOS ANGELES

Class nuclear powered submarines. It is also the Ship Availability Planning and

Engineering Center for the LOS ANGELES Class.

The Shipyard plant equipment value is approximately $500M.[2]

Bridges

There are several Bridges located in the Port of Portsmouth area. Major bridges

are: The Memorial Bridge, The railroad and U.S. Highway 1 Bypass Bridge and The

Interstate Highway 95 Bridge. Each spans the Piscataqua River between Portsmouth

and Kittery. The I95 bridge is important as the primary conduit for road traffic for

connecting all points north and south on the seacoast.

Two Seavey Island Bridges serves the communication to the Seavey Island

where the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is located.

The Dover PT Bridge connects the Portsmouth area with Western Part of NH

State.

The last Bridge we list in this document we call Railway Bridge. Its function is

to provide the rail transport to and from the Port terminals which are located along the

right bank of the Piscataqua River.

Below is table where all of them are listed with priorities. (1 – most important)

Table 1. Critical Bridges in Portsmouth

Nr Name Type Road Location Priority

1

The Memorial Bridge

Lift U.S. Highway 1 3,5 miles above the mouth of the rive 2

Nr Name Type Road Location Priority

2

The railroad and U.S. Highway 1 Bypass Bridge

Lift U.S. Highway 1 Bypass

4 miles above mouth of the river 1

3

The Interstate Highway 95 Brigde

Fixed Interstate 95 4,5 miles above mouth of the river 1

4

Seavey Island Bridges

Fixed Local Connection to Seavey I from Kittery 2

5

Dover PT Fixed U.S. Highway 4, 16

On the west of Portsmouth along the Piscataqua River, above the Little Bay 2

6

Railway Bridge Fixed Railway connnection to the petroleum facilities located along the right bank of the Piscataqua River

Between Inter. 95 and U.S Hwy 1 Bypass Bridges

along the Piscataqua River

2

Airports

There is one Airport located in Portsmouth area – The Pease International

Airport. It is used to passengers/cargo transportation. It is located on the west side of

Portsmouth. The Airport serves: Passengers transport (Allegiant Air, Pan American

Airways, Boston-Maine Airways), cargo facilities (utilized by Pan Am services),

military base (The KC-135R equipped New Hampshire Air National Guard ).

Port Terminals

The marine terminals of Portsmouth Harbor consist of several cargo, military,

fishing and passenger docks. The principal cargoes handled by the commercial docks

are fuels and minerals. The fuel docks are run by Sprague Energy, PSNH, and Irving

Oil. The mineral docks are run by National Gypsum and Granite State Minerals.

Other cargo docks are run by Simplex Wire and Cable and the NH State Port

Authority. Passenger service is handled by Isles of Shoals Steamship Company and

NE Charter Boats. In the next two subsections we summarize those that handle

hazardous materials, and large number of passengers.

Portsmouth has four active, non public terminals that receive dangerous

materials. The flammability of these materials can be a threat for citizens and other

infrastructures in the surroundings. Sprague Energy Corp., River Road terminal wharf

with 11 petroleum tanks (848500 barrels) is close to the route 4 Dover Bridge, while

Irving Oil Portsmouth Plant Wharf with 6 oil tanks (552000 barrels) is next to the I95

bridge. There are two more notable terminals that need special care due to the

materials they receive. The first is the are the Avery Lane Terminal Wharf that has 5

petroleum tanks operated by Sprague Energy Corp. (466650 barrels) and 2 high

capacity Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) tanks operated by SEA-3 Inc. (587000

barrels). The second is the Gosling Road Wharf that has three Sprague tanks (342000

barrels) , two storage tanks at Schiller Station (195000 barrels), and 2 storage tanks

that serves the Newington Power Plant (566000 barrels) .

Portsmouth has one terminal that is open to public. It is located on the

Piscataqua River, three nautical miles form the open sea. In general the terminal

accept bulk cargo (scrap, salt, wood chips), break bulk (industrial and machinery

parts, construction materials), project cargo (power plant components, vacuum tanks)

and container cargo. [4]

All of the terminals are connected with a rail system.

Table 2. Critical Portsmouth TerminalsNr Name Flammable

materials

CI nearby Densely

Populated area

1 River Road Terminal Wharf yes yes no

2 Avery Lane Terminal Wharf yes no no

3 Gosling Road Wharf yes no no

4 Portsmouth Plant Wharf yes yes yes

5 DPH Market Street Terminal no yes yes

Railways

There is one railway system located in Portsmouth area - Boston and Maine RR

(GuildFord Rail System). It connects terminals from the both sides of Piscataqua

River to the main railway that connects to Boston Maine RR. The first part of the

railway is located along the Piscataqua River on the New Hampshire side. The second

part crosses the river using the railroad and U.S. Highway 1 Bypass Bridge.

Map – Critical Infrastructures – Key Assets

The Critical Infrastructure consists of the fuel docks, military installations, and

the I95 Bridge. The River Road (1), Avery Lane (SEA-3, 2), and Gosling Road (3)

terminals are the furthest from the ocean. They receive mainly oil, LPG, petroleum

products, and coal. Immediately downstream from the I95 Bridge is Irving Oil, which

receives oil and gypsum products (4). Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (12) is located on

Seavey Island in Kittery, ME and houses a submarine repair facility as well as

medical facilities. The I95 Bridge (7) is important as the primary conduit for road

traffic for connecting all points north and south on the seacoast.

The most likely targets for an attack are the Irving Oil storage area (4), the

Memorial Highway Bridge (9), and the Route 1 Bypass Bridge (8). The Irving Oil

terminal has several large oil storage tanks. The proximity of these tanks to the I95

bridge make them the most likely target in the Portsmouth area. A successful attack

on this could cause an explosion or severe fire. This could cause loss of life, disabling

of I95 for months, and loss of petroleum products and much of the ability to receive

petroleum products for this region. Disabling I95 would disrupt trucking as well as

much of the significant tourism industry in Maine. The loss of oil stores combined

with the loss of the point of reception of oil would increase prices and possibly cause

shortages of oil products for the region. This is also true for the Sprague Energy

facilities.

Both the Memorial Highway Bridge and the Route 1 Bypass Bridge are lift

bridges. With clearances of 19 feet and 10 feet respectively, with their lift sections

down, these bridges would block much of the commercial trade out of this port. The

Route 1 Bypass Bridge could block all of the petroleum terminals, and the Memorial

Highway Bridge could block all cargo, passenger and much of the fishing industry.

Disabling a lift section of a bridge is a much less difficult task than taking a bridge

down altogether. Cutting power or damaging the mechanics of the bridge could

accomplish this. The primary impact of disabling either of these bridges would be the

maritime shipping. Road and rail traffic across these bridges is not of critical

importance. The amount of time an attack on one of these bridges could close the

harbor for could range from a few days for disabling the electrical systems, to several

weeks if significant mechanical damage was accomplished.

Other targets that may seem like good targets, but are not significant are the

military installations. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is not active enough to warrant the

risk of an attack. The duties of the Coast Guard Station could mostly be handled by

other nearby stations, and loss of the lighthouse would be more of an inconvenience

than a major danger for ships navigating into the harbor.

Below is attached map of Potential Critical Infrastructures [5] and a table where

all of them are prioritized (1 – most critical).

Figure 1. Key asset positions

All critical assets are listed in table below

3. Táblázat: Key assets and CARVER2 scoreNr Name Address Type of CI Priority Carver 2

Score

1 Sprague Energy Corp., River Road Terminal Wharf

126 River Road

Terminal 2 160

2 Sprague Energy Corp., Avery Lane Terminal Wharf (SEA-3)

78 Patterson Lane

Terminal 1 156

3 Sprague Energy Corp., Gosling Road Wharf

29 Gosling Road

Terminal 2 160

4 Gold Bond Building Products,

Michael Succi Drive

Terminal 1 246

Portsmouth Plant Wharf (Irving oil)

5 DPH Market Street Terminal

Market Street Terminal 1 240

6 Dover PT - Fixed Bridge 2 240

7 The Interstate Highway 95 Brigde

- Fixed Bridge 1 290

8 The railroad and U.S. Highway 1 Bypass Bridge

- Lift Bridge 2 150

9 The Memorial Bridge

- Lift Bridge 1 170

10,11 Seavey Island Bridges

- Fixed Brige 2 115

12 Naval Base - Naval Base 2 115

13 The Pease International Airport

- Airport 1 246

Table 4 shows the possible threats for each main critical asset, the asset

vunerability, the consequences of a possible attack, the countermeasures that can be

used against the attacks, and the C4 that integrates countermeasures.

Table 4. Threat, vulnerabilities, consequences and countermeasuresTarget Threat Vulnerability Consequences Countermeasure

sC4

Avery Lane, SEA-3 Terminal

Small Boat High Possible destruction of facility and surrounding area (50 deaths, range 0.5 mile)

Sonar, human security

Sensors -> sensor clusterhead -> command center -> security

By foot Same Same Motion detectors, cameras, fences, human security, explosive detection

Same, and explosive detector -> local security

RPG Same Same Cameras, large perimeter, human security, tank armor

-

Truck/car Same Same Fence, human security, explosive detection

Explosive -> human security

SEA-3 ship Small Boat High Possible destruction of Ship and surrounding area (50 deaths, 0.2 mile)

Cameras, human security

Cameras -> command center -> security

Crew Same Same Screening procedure, limited access to critical areas, cameras, human security

Screening, intrusion detection and cameras-> ship command center -> human security

RPG Same Same Armor -

Irving oil Terminal

Same as SEA3

High Same as SEA3 and possible disabling I95 bridge (1000 deaths, 0.5 mile)

Same as SEA3 Same as SEA3

Irving oil ship

Same as SEA3

Same as SEA3 Same as SEA3 (50 death, 0.2 mile)

Same as SEA3 Same as SEA3

I-95 Bridge Explosives planted at the supporting points of the bridge

High Destruction of I95 bridge (250 deaths, short range)

Explosive and motion sensors, linked to a response team

Sensors -> sensor clusterhead -> command center -> response team

RPG Low Disabling I95 for a while (10 deaths, few hundred feet range)

Armor, bridge structure

-

Truck/car Low Same Armor, bridge structure

-

Lift Bridges Boat Med Blocking of waterway and secondary roads (20 deaths, few hundred feet range)

Cameras as deterrent, move lift systems away from water

Cameras -> security

Truck/Car Med Same Cameras as deterrent, move lift systems away from roadway

Same

By foot Med Same Cameras, motion detectors

Sensors -> sensor

clusterhead -> command center -> security

DPH Market Street Terminal

By foot High Probably many victims (500 deaths, few hundred feet range)

Scanning explosives and biological weapons, cameras, human security

Sensors, intrusion detection, bioweapon detection -> command center -> security

Or directly security

Certainly the defense of terminals and bridges is not just about locally installed

sensors and cameras. These sensing devices usually indicate direct threat for a certain

asset. The installations of prevention technologies that can filter anomalies far-off an

asset, such as authentication and authorization technologies, also have to be integrated

into an efficient system. The sensing devices and the prevention system have to be

assembled into an integrated security solution that is able to process alerts and notify

quickly the responsible security forces.

Conclusion

There is significant critical infrastructure within Port of Portsmouth area,

including military, civil and business area of interests. All of them are located inside

the Portsmouth Harbor, or along the Piscataqua River. The defense of this

infrastructure is an issue that we have to face. The loss of some of this infrastructure

from a possible attack could affect directly the economy of the country. A great step

in prevention would be an integrated system that can protect the entrance harbor of

the Port, and separate terminals, bridges, and other key assets as well.

Appendix B – Port of PortlandAbstract:

This paper is a brief, preliminary report on the Port of Portland, Maine. It

includes a physical description of the port, an aerial photo, a list of key infrastructure,

and a description of probable terrorist targets. This paper is strictly intended to

familiarize the reader with the area and bring to light obvious areas of concern that

will need to be addressed.

Description:

The port of Portland, ME is located at approximately 37 25.8’ N, 122 5.3’ W.

With a city population of 64,000 and a metro population of 230,000 people it is the

largest city in Maine. It sits on the coast of the Atlantic and is approximately a 2 hour

drive from Boston, Mass.

The port itself is technically a part of Cisco Bay, dotted by islands until it gives

way to the Atlantic Ocean. The port is approximately 4.5 miles in length from east to

west, and approximately .7 miles in width from north to south (at its widest point).

An aerial photo of the port can be found in Annex A for a better understanding

of the layout of the port.

Key Infrastructure:

The key infrastructure of the port of Portland fall into three categories: bridges,

port terminals, and air travel.

BRIDGES:

The port of Portland is home to seven bridges, which include:

1. Thompson Point Bridge

2. Veterans Memorial Bridge

3. Vaughans Bridge

4. Portland Bridge

5. Tukey Bridge

6. Martin Point Bridge

7. Makworth Point Bridge

Bridges 1, and 5 are a part of I-295, the major highway which runs through the heart of Portland.

Bridge 1 is in close proximity to the Portland International Jetport, and bridge 4 is in close proximity to the main port terminals.

Bridge 3 is an historical landmark and may not be in use anymore.

PORT TERMINALS:

There are 16 major commercial terminals in the port of Portland. The majority

are located at the entrance of the port on the Northern side. Other terminals are

scattered throughout the port, and range from docks for ferries to tanker docks for the

loading and off-loading of the many petroleum products stored in the holding tanks.

Terminal 4 is the main terminal for cargo ships, located on the northern edge of

the port (see pg 2 of Annex B).

Terminals 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, and 11 are all points to off/on load various petroleum

products. They are also the locations of the many holding tanks (see pg 2 of Annex

B).

The holding tanks themselves are also key infrastructure and are the clusters of

white dots shown on the map found in Annex A. An example of such is circled on the

photo.

For a list of the 16 major terminals, and a brief description of each, refer to

Annex B.

AIR TRAVEL:

There is only one Airport in Portland, the Portland International Jetport. It is

labeled on the photo in Annex A, and is located only a few hundred meters off the

port water line.

TERRORIST TARGETS:

Unfortunately there are many, many open targets for terrorists to attack. As one

can see from the aerial photo, petroleum holding tanks are located throughout the

port. The tanks, upon visual inspection, have little to no security protecting them.

Annex C lists security measures taken after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York.

The Shore-side security may look good on paper, but in reality is next to non-existent.

Many facilities have only a chain-link fence between the tanks and a terrorist.

Terminal 7 from annex B (pg 2) is also the location of tanks that don’t even have a

fence, and worse yet, are located directly on the water line (as are the majority of the

tanks). A small bomb detonated on these containers could cause a huge oil spill into

the port, shutting down operations.

The same can be said for terminal 4(second page of annex B) at the ferry

terminals. Ships carrying people and vehicles boast no visible security, leaving them

open to any number of attacks from land and sea. The seven bridges in the area are

equally unprotected. Any ship or boat could easily stop underneath, plant a bomb,

and destroy all seven bridges.

The Portland International Jetport, which is home to an assortment of airliners,

both commercial and private, also depends on a chain link fence for security. The

main threat here, however, is not the chance of someone breaking into the airport, but

from someone armed with an RPG at the end of the run way or at any point in the

port. The flight patters of outgoing aircraft take them directly over the port, leaving

them exposed to RPG attacks from any number of locations. This fact is particularly

unnerving (and ironic) when one considers the fact than any aircraft inbound to the

North East is diverted to this airport if it is suspected to contain terrorists on board.

What is even more shocking is the ease of which a terrorist could commit these

attacks, and many more, with the very distinct possibility of not being caught. On any

random Saturday afternoon, in broad daylight, it is entirely possible to plant bombs on

a large number of holding tanks, tankers at dock, and a number of bridges, never the

while being stopped or questioned. Were bombs to be planted at all these targets,

rigged with cell phone detonators (like those being used against US forces in Iraq)

linked to a single number, it is entirely plausible for a terrorist to take down the entire

Port of Portland with a single telephone call while on a plane leaving for the

Bahamas.

This may be a bit of a “dooms day” scenario, but it outlines the vulnerability of

the port itself, let alone the threat due to the vast amount of unchecked cargo

containers that come to port each day. In 2001 the Port of Portland was home to

173,116,302 barrels of petroleum, 31,064 vehicles, 45 cruise ships, and thousands of

containers. If this vast economy of trade and commerce was disrupted in such a way

as described above, or by any number of other scenarios, the impact would be felt

throughout the country.

Terminal description

Map of Portland commercial docks and description of Docks 1-5.

Services Telephone

1. DEAKES WHARF     General Marine Ship Repair,

Commercial Gear207-772-5354

2. BERLIN MILLS WHARF     Gowan Marine Ship Repair,

Commercial Gear207-773-1761

3. PORTLAND FISH PIER     City of Portland Dockage 207-541-6900

     Vessel Services Ice, Fuel, Net Repair, Ship Repair, Electronics,Commercial Gear

800-773-7050

4. UNION WHARF     Brown Ship Chandlery Commercial Gear 207-772-3796

     Maine Liferaft & Inflatable       Service Co.

Commercial Gear 207-772-8095

     Portland Trap Traps 207-774-4896

     Custom Float Docks 207-772-3796

     The Bait Lady Bait 207-871-0551

5. HOBSON'S WHARF

     A.L. Griffin Ship Chandlery Commercial Gear 207-772-0165

6. MAINE WHARF     Chase Leavitt & Co Life Raft Service 772-3751

Map of Portland Terminal Information

Chart not to be used for navigation1. Cargill Petroleum

2. Gulf Oil Terminal

3. International Marine Terminal(click here for a detailed diagram)

4 Maine State Pier (Portland Ocean Terminal, Casco Bay Lines)

5. Merrill Marine Terminal

6. Mobil Oil Terminal

7. Motiva Terminal

8. Portland Fish Pier

9 & 10. Portland Pipe Line Pier One (9) and Pier Two (10)

11. Sprague Energy Terminal

Security Implemented after 9-11

VESSEL SECURITY:

Coast Guard vessels will escort cruise ships, international ferries and tank vessels

with Grade A or B cargo, in the Captain of the Port Portland Zone on a selective

basis. In Portland Harbor vessels will be escorted from inside Cushing Island to their

berths.

Crew and passenger lists will be faxed to the local MSO and MSFO for forwarding to Coast

Guard Intelligence and will continue to be faxed to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization

Service for review prior to clearance.  Faxes should be sent not later than 24 hours prior to the

vessels arrival. 

The following vessels arriving from a foreign port, other than Canada, will be

boarded by a Coast Guard boarding team prior to entry:  Tank vessels carrying a

grade A or B cargo and cruise ships.

Any vessel that arrives from Canada whose voyage originated in the U.S. or has

visited the U.S. previously and has not made any passenger or crew changes may

proceed straight to their terminal.

All cruise ships and vessels carrying a grade A or B cargo will be boarded at the pier

by the local MSO or MSFO prior to offloading/ transferring.

SHORESIDE SECURITY:

All gates in and around waterfront facilities shall remain closed and locked to limit

access and will be immediately secured after every use.

Adequate fencing shall encompass the perimeter and infrastructure of all facilities. 

Fencing will not have holes or come unattached from fence poles.

  Adequate lighting shall be used to illuminate the perimeter and infrastructure of all

facilities as well as  vessels docked at the facility. 

Facilities shall increase their security to ensure that there are two persons on the

facility during hours which the facility is open with a vessel at their pier or during

trucking operations.  One of these persons will monitor incoming and outgoing

traffic.  At least one person must be on the facility at all other times.

Facilities and vessels shall confirm the identification of all individuals entering or

boarding the facility or vessel.

Any facility that has seen evidence of sabotage or subversive activity is required to

immediately report this information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Captain of

the Port, and local authorities.

Stores being loaded on cruise ships and tank vessels shall be opened and inspected

by appropriate facility personnel or licensed officers of the vessel.

A gangway watch will be posted at all times while a cruise ship, international ferry

or tank vessel is moored at a facility.

Shore leave will be permitted for foreign crewmembers on board tank vessels or

freight vessels at the discretion of the respective facility management.  Shore leave for

all crewmembers on foreign cruise ship or international ferries will only be permitted

if type II or III screening is available.  Proper screening will include verifying the

identification of crew members with a picture identification at the entrance to the

terminal and screening of all materials brought onto the facility or aboard vessels.

Access to all waterfront facilities shall be limited to individuals on official business.

PIER WATCH/WATERFRONT SECURITY:

A PIC or vessel crewmember will make rounds of the vessel and may be tasked with

gangway watch in lieu of having two watch standers.  They will remain vigilant to

threats from the waterside and shore side to ensure security of the vessel and terminal.

Vessel patrols* will be required when there are 2 or more vessels in a pre-designated

zone** of which one or more contains a Grade A or B cargo including gasoline and

Jet-A. 

The Coast Guard and Maine Marine Patrol will continue to patrol the harbor.

Security Zones will be placed out to 80 yards from each water front facility and out

to 50 yards around cruise ships, international ferries and tank vessels while they are

moored at a facility.

Pier pilings will regularly be checked at low tide.

* (Vessel patrol crews will be equipped with search lights, flashing amber light or other distinctive light other than blue, VHF radio and cellular phone.)

**(Zone 1 includes Portland Pipeline and Gulf, Zone 2 includes Motiva Enterprise, Zone three included Global Petroleum, ExxonMobil and Sprague Energy.)

The following restrictions have been rescinded as of 1200 September 26, 2001:

1)      Coast Guard vessels will escort cruise ships, international ferries and tank vessels with Grade A or B cargo, in the Captain of the Port Portland Zone

2)       All cruise ships and tank vessels will be boarded outside the port by armed law enforcement boarding officers and marine inspectors prior to entry.  

3)      Two or more vessels carrying a Grade A or B cargo can not be simultaneously docked in a zone.

4)      Facilities shall increase their security to ensure that there are two persons on the facility at all times, 24 hours a day.  One of these persons will monitor incoming and outgoing traffic. 

Captain of the Port representatives will make rounds of all facilities to ensure

compliance with these security measures.  These rounds will include inspecting

facilities and vessels to ensure security measures are in place.  Discrepancies will be

noted and acted upon in an appropriate manner to include shutting down transfers

between vessels and facilities.

Commodities

(The specifications found in Annex C are a product of the Army Corps of Engineers and can be found on their website at www.usace.army.mil)

References1. Statewide Security Assessment of Florida Seaports submitted by Camber Corporation for The Office of Drugs Control Executive Office of the Governor, September 200

2. Security Applications of X-ray Inspection Systems, Bill Baukus, November 2005

3. http://www.raytheon.ca/ATC_Radar_Systems/feature303.asp

4. www.usace.army.mil

5. www.wikipedia.org

6. www.radwar.com.pl

7. www.raytheonmarine.de

8. www.naval-technology.com

9. www.portofportlandmaine.org

10. http://www.uscg.mil/d1/units/msoport/msib7.html

11. http://www.cascobaylines.com/HTML/fr_cruises.htm

12. US Army Corps of Engineers Institute of Water Resources, Ports of Portland, Maine and Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Ports on the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers, Maine, Port Series NO. 1, Revised in 2001

13. http://www.ports.navy.mil

14. http://www.peasedev.org

15. http://www.portofnh.org

16. http://map.google.com

17. http://www.c-techltd.com/harbour.htm

18. http://www.qinetiq.com/home_us/homeland_security/smart_surveillance/

swimmer_detection_system.html

19. http://www.wg-plc.com/international/security/diver_detection.html