University of Buckingham Humanities Graduate Centre. Advanced Studies Seminars 2013 Thursday 25 April 2013 How immigration is changing Britain and other European societies David Coleman, University of Oxford d[email protected]http:// www.spi.ox.ac.uk/oxpop
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University of Buckingham Humanities Graduate Centre. Advanced Studies Seminars 2013 Thursday 25 April 2013 How immigration is changing Britain and other.
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University of Buckingham Humanities Graduate Centre. Advanced Studies Seminars 2013
Thursday 25 April 2013
How immigration is changing Britain and other European societies
Uncertain magnitude and effects of Saxon invasions 5th – 7th centuries, Danes 8th – 9th.
Relatively small contributions from Romans, Normans and others.
Later arrivals episodic, more impact on culture and economy than on population.
Post-war immigration to Europe and the rise of ethnic minority populations.
Historically, Europe a region of emigration.Large-scale immigration in peacetime mostly from 1960s:
Guest-workers to some countriesEasy entry from former colonies – for a time.Subsequent entry of dependants and new spousesChain migration from non-European countries helped by ‘familist’ culture, large family size, revolutions in information, transport, rights.EU expansionRenewed recent interest in skilled migration, age structure.
Policy important but erratic; many now restrictive
Some facilitating factors for migration
Unequal pace of economic development and demographic transition in ‘North’ and ‘South’.
Political / historical connections.Post-war ‘revolutions’ in transport, information and
rights.State policy in sending and receiving countries.Expansion of EU and its powers.International conventions / human rights.The ‘migration industry’ and trafficking.
Peculiar characteristics of migration to UKLabour migration not organised by state – no ‘guest worker’ scheme except in 1940s.
Foreign immigration controlled since 1905, immigration of ‘British subjects’ not until 1962 / 71.
Some persistent electoral privileges for Commonwealth
Low levels of immigration from EU15, high from A8.
No significant organised return migration or repatriation.
Prominence of ‘ethnic’ classifications, not ‘immigrant ‘ or ‘foreigner’, multicultural policies.
Consensus on relatively restrictive migration policy 1963 – 1997, new pro-migration policy since 1997 – 2010, PBS.
(Vague) numerical target for first time since 2010.
Weak data, no register, but only country with emigration data.
Turkey and Western Europe 1950-2050 – an illustration of demographic disparity
Population trends and projections, selected European countries and Turkey 1950-2050 (millions). Source: United Nations 2004-based estimates.
Migration flows to European Union and USA, 1960 – 2011 (nb EU data include movement from one EU country to another; about 40%)
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
Net immigation to EU-15, EU27 countries, gross inflow to the USA, 1960 - 2011 and net inflow to USA 2001-2011 (thousands). Sources: Eurostat, US Dept of Homeland Security.
Net immigration to EU-15 countries
Persons accepted for permanent residence, USA (gross inflow)
Net immigration to EU27 countries
Gross migration flow to France 2005, by reason for admission (%).
France 2005. Immigration (gross inflow) according to reason for admission (percent).
PercentStudent Worker Family Other All by area
EEA 3 37 10 50 100 21Non-Europe 26 5 50 19 100 79
All 21 11 42 25 100 100Source: INED
Note: 'Other' includes inactive, retired, refugee. Percent by purpose excludes minors (about 8% of total).Switzerland and Turkey omitted. 12% of total; mostly Turkey, 39% for family reasons.
Long-term migration trends to the United Kingdom 1967 – 2011, UK and non-UK citizens.
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
UK net migration by citizenship 1967 - 2011 (thousands). Note: there are discontinuities in this series from 1991. Source: ONS International Migration Statistics Series
MN, ONS Statistical Bulletin, Migration Statistics 2019.
Foreign citizens
Foreign citizens (post 1991)
UK citizens
UK Citizens (post 1991)
Net migration to selected European countries 1997 – 2011
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Net migration, selected European countries 1997 - 2011, thousands. Source: Eurostat
Denmark
Germany
France
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Net migration to Italy and Spain 1997 – 2011. Note: increase primarily due to illegal immigration and regularisation of illegal
residence through amnesties.
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Net migration, Spain and Italy, 1997 - 2011 (thousands). Source: Eurostat.
Spain
Italy
Net migration can go down as well as up. Germany 1954 – 2011.
Migration to Germany 1954 - 2011, by citizenship. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. Up to 1990 German Federal Republic only.
- 300 000
- 200 000
- 100 000
-
+ 100 000
+ 200 000
+ 300 000
+ 400 000
+ 500 000
+ 600 000
+ 700 000
+ 800 000
1954
2)
1956
2)
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
Net migrationGermans including aussiedlerForeignersGermans without aussiedler net flow
Net migration per thousand population,
selected European countries. Source: Eurostat
Net immigration per thousand population, selected European countries 1990 - 2009. Source: Eurostat.
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Net
imm
igra
tion
per
tho
usan
d po
pula
tion
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Germany
Czech Republic
Relative importance of migration and natural change in population growth and decline, Europe 2011.
Crude rate of natural change and crude rate of net migation plus statistical adjustment, selected European countries 2011.
Source: Eurostat.
Ukraine
Russia
Moldova
Georgia
BelarusSerbia
Switzerland
Norway
Iceland
Mac.
Croatia
UKSweden
Finland
Slovak.
Slovenia
Romania
Portugal
Poland
Austria
Netherlands
Malta
Hungary
Italy
France
SpainGreece
Ireland
Estonia
Germany
DenmarkCzech Rep.
Bulgaria
Belgium
-8.0
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
-6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0
Rate of natural increase per 1000
Rat
e of
net
mig
rati
on p
er 1
000
European comparisons – effect of projected migration levels on projected population size, 2010 compared with 2060. Western and Southern
Europe. Source: Eurostat.
Effect of migration on projected population growth 2010-2060, percent, selected Western and Southern European countries, by descending order of growth without migration.
Source: data from Eurostat 2008 convergence scenario
14.7
35.6
27.3
3.0
24.1
13.7
7.7
-18.8
8.97.2
2.8
-5.2 -5.3
-18.3
-25.3
-28.9
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
France Norway UK Netherlands Belgium Spain Italy Germany
percent population change to 2060 withmigration
percent population change to 2060without migration
European comparisons – effect of projected migration levels on projected
population size, 2010 compared with 2060. Eastern Europe. Source: Eurostat.
Projected percent population change 2010-2060, selected Eastern European countries, with and without migration, sorted by descending order of projected
population size without migration. Source: data from Eurostat 2010 projection.
-17.3
-19.3-20.0
-22.3
-24.7-26.0
-26.7
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
Poland CzechRepublic
Slovenia Romania Bulgaria Hungary Latvia
percent projected population change2010-2060 with migration
percent projected population change2010-2060 without migration
Demographic consequences to the UK of projected levels of migration, 2011 - 2061
UK population 2011 - 2061. 2010-based Principal projection and high and low migration variants