1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DETROIT INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE COMPANY and THE CANADIAN TRANSIT COMPANY, Plaintiffs, -vs.- THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, JOHN KERRY, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, THE CANADA-UNITED STATES-ONTARIO- MICHIGAN BORDER TRANSPORTATION PARTNERSHIP, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, VICTOR MENDEZ, in his official capacity as Administrator of the United States Federal Highway Administration, RAY LAHOOD, in his official capacity as Secretary of Transportation, THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, THE WINDSOR-DETROIT BRIDGE AUTHORITY, THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, ADM. ROBERT J. PAPP, JR., in his official capacity as Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants. Docket No. 10-cv-476-RMC THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT As and for their Third Amended Complaint, plaintiffs Detroit International Bridge Company (“DIBC”) and the Canadian Transit Company (“CTC”) state as follows: Case 1:10-cv-00476-RMC Document 105 Filed 05/29/13 Page 1 of 116
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DETROIT INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE COMPANY and THE CANADIAN TRANSIT COMPANY, Plaintiffs, -vs.- THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, JOHN KERRY, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, THE CANADA-UNITED STATES-ONTARIO-MICHIGAN BORDER TRANSPORTATION PARTNERSHIP, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, VICTOR MENDEZ, in his official capacity as Administrator of the United States Federal Highway Administration, RAY LAHOOD, in his official capacity as Secretary of Transportation, THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, THE WINDSOR-DETROIT BRIDGE AUTHORITY, THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, ADM. ROBERT J. PAPP, JR., in his official capacity as Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, JANET NAPOLITANO, in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants.
Docket No. 10-cv-476-RMC
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
As and for their Third Amended Complaint, plaintiffs Detroit International Bridge
Company (“DIBC”) and the Canadian Transit Company (“CTC”) state as follows:
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NATURE OF THE CASE
1. This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief to declare, define, and
enforce the franchise rights held by plaintiffs DIBC and CTC to build, own, and operate the
international bridge crossing between Detroit, Michigan and Windsor, Canada. This action also
seeks to set aside and declare invalid actions taken by United States officers and agencies that
have breached the franchise rights of DIBC and CTC, and have otherwise been contrary to law,
arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise in violation of the standards set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
This action also seeks a declaration and injunction against the Government of Canada for actions
taken in the United States to further its commercial venture to build a new bridge between
Detroit and Windsor, which seeks to usurp plaintiffs’ ability to maintain their franchise by
building a new span to their existing Ambassador Bridge, and thereby violates the special
agreement that created the plaintiffs’ Ambassador Bridge franchise, which is enforceable against
Canada through the legislation Canada enacted to create that special agreement (i.e., the “CTC
Act,” as further defined below).
2. For over 80 years, the plaintiffs and their predecessors have held and exercised a
perpetual and exclusive franchise right, granted by statute and treaty, to construct, own, operate,
and maintain the toll bridge franchise across the Detroit River between Detroit, Michigan, and
Windsor, Ontario; to collect tolls from vehicles crossing the bridge; and to exercise other
specified powers in connection with these rights.
3. Plaintiffs’ bridge, known as the Ambassador Bridge, carries more than one
quarter of the total commercial traffic between the United States and Canada. The Ambassador
Bridge, like all other toll bridges, is a commercial enterprise. Plaintiffs’ principal revenue source
consists of tolls collected from vehicles passing in each direction across the bridge. Plaintiffs
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also earn additional revenue through leases at the Ambassador Bridge. Plaintiffs’ expenses
include, among other things, expenses for maintenance and operation of the bridge and the
associated facilities. The Ambassador Bridge competes for traffic and toll revenue with the
nearby Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, rail tunnels and ferries, and other international border crossings,
including the Blue Water Bridge between Port Huron, Michigan and Sarnia, Ontario.
4. The franchise granted to DIBC and CTC to construct, maintain, and operate the
Ambassador Bridge between Detroit and Windsor was created by concurrent and reciprocal
legislation enacted by the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament in 1921,
expressly identifying DIBC’s predecessor company and CTC as the sole entities receiving the
franchise. That legislation constituted a “special agreement” between the United States and
Canada under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. Under that treaty, no bridge may be built over
the boundary waters between the United States and Canada except as specified in the treaty.
Neither the Boundary Waters Treaty nor the United States and Canadian legislation creating a
special agreement to allow for the construction of the Ambassador Bridge has ever been repealed
or amended. In addition, the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament have never
purported to grant a second franchise for a bridge between Detroit and Windsor, or to enter into a
new special agreement that would allow for the construction of a new bridge between Detroit
and Windsor that complies with the terms of the Boundary Waters Treaty.
5. As the United States Congress and the United States Department of State have
both recognized, the franchise granted to DIBC and CTC includes the right to repair, replace, and
enlarge the Ambassador Bridge, including by building a twin span right next to the existing span.
This right to expand or twin the Ambassador Bridge is subject only to general regulatory
requirements (relating to navigation and environmental issues). Subject only to those
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requirements, DIBC and CTC have the right to build a new span to the Ambassador Bridge
without obtaining any additional franchise rights, without needing to seek Presidential or
Congressional approval, and without requiring any further action to satisfy the requirements of
the Boundary Waters Treaty.
6. For over a decade, DIBC and CTC have been attempting to build a new span
(“New Span”) to the Ambassador Bridge that would upgrade the existing facility, reduce costly
and disruptive maintenance required for the existing facility, and substantially improve the
efficiency with which traffic can be funneled into specialized lanes in the customs plazas on
either side of the border. While the New Span would be a desirable upgrade and modernization
to the Ambassador Bridge, it is not needed to address traffic levels: indeed, overall traffic levels
have been decreasing over the past decade, and the existing crossings between Detroit and
Windsor are more than adequate to meet any reasonable projection of traffic demands for the
next several decades. The economic justification for the New Span is therefore not found in
increased traffic levels, but instead in reduced maintenance costs and enhanced efficiency in the
transit process through customs. DIBC and CTC intend to finance the construction of the New
Span entirely with private financing.
7. The defendants are violating, or threatening to violate, plaintiffs’ franchise rights
in the Ambassador Bridge, including the right to build the New Span. Specifically, in violation
of plaintiffs’ exclusive franchise rights, and in an effort to frustrate and preclude plaintiffs from
exercising their right to build the New Span, the Canadian Government has entered into an
agreement (the “Crossing Agreement”) with the Governor of Michigan, the Michigan
Department of Transportation (“MDOT”), and the Michigan Strategic Fund (“MSF”) to build a
new bridge between Detroit and Windsor that is to be located in the immediate vicinity of the
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Ambassador Bridge (less than two miles away). The new bridge is known variously as the
Detroit River International Crossing (“DRIC”) and the New International Trade Crossing
(“NITC”) (referred to hereinafter as the “NITC/DRIC”).
8. The construction of the NITC/DRIC will infringe and violate the franchise rights
conferred upon DIBC and CTC by the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament. The
United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament have not entered into a special agreement
granting a franchise for the construction of the NITC/DRIC, and therefore the construction of the
NITC/DRIC would violate both the Boundary Waters Treaty and the franchise rights conferred
upon DIBC and CTC. Studies published by Canada and its United States partners that support
construction of the NITC/DRIC estimate that up to 75% of the Ambassador Bridge’s truck traffic
and up to 39% of its passenger traffic will be diverted to the NITC/DRIC. Thus, the NITC/DRIC
threatens to destroy the economic viability of the Ambassador Bridge: at a minimum, it will
destroy the economic viability of the New Span that the plaintiffs have an acknowledged
franchise right to build.
9. In addition to violating plaintiffs’ franchise rights, the NITC/DRIC Crossing
Agreement is also an unconstitutional agreement between agents of a U.S. State, on behalf of
that State, and a foreign power. Article I, § 10, clause 3 of the United States Constitution
provides that “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . . . .” The United States Congress has not
provided its consent to the Crossing Agreement entered into between the Michigan Governor,
MDOT, MSF, and the Government of Canada. Thus, the Crossing Agreement is
unconstitutional and should be declared to be illegal, invalid, void, and unenforceable.
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10. The Crossing Agreement invokes Article I, § 10 of the Constitution, but fails to
comply with it. The Crossing Agreement makes no reference to the requirement that it be
approved by Congress. Instead, it provides that it will become effective once approved by the
Secretary of State. This is apparently based upon a section of the International Bridge Act of
1972 (“IBA”), which provides that Congress consents to a State government entering into an
agreement with a foreign government regarding the construction of an international bridge if
(and only if) the Secretary of State approves that agreement. 33 U.S.C. §§ 535a. But the State
Department has admitted that the IBA provides no principle, much less an intelligible principle,
for the Secretary of State to apply in determining whether to approve such an agreement between
a State and a foreign power. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit have repeatedly held that Congress may not delegate to an Executive agency a
power assigned to Congress under the Constitution unless Congress provides an “intelligible
principle” for the Executive agency to apply. Because the IBA fails to provide such an
intelligible principle, the Secretary of State may not constitutionally exercise the Congressional
power and responsibility for approving the Crossing Agreement pursuant to Article I, § 10 of the
Constitution. Thus, the IBA fails to satisfy the constitutional requirement that Congress must
consent to the Crossing Agreement.
11. Defendants have also violated plaintiffs’ franchise rights by thwarting plaintiffs’
ability to exercise their right to build the New Span, and by attempting to accelerate the
approvals of the NITC/DRIC to prevent plaintiffs from exercising their right to build the New
Span. Defendants know that there is no economic justification or need for the NITC/DRIC,
which is likely to cost hundreds of millions, if not billions, of federal dollars. They also know
that there is a sound economic justification for upgrading and modernizing the Ambassador
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Bridge through construction of the New Span (which will be privately financed and will not cost
any government money), but that this economic justification will be destroyed if the NITC/DRIC
is constructed right next to the Ambassador Bridge, thereby capturing the minimum traffic flows
needed to justify further investment in the Ambassador Bridge.
12. Thus, in an effort to ensure that plaintiffs will not be able to exercise their right to
build the New Span, defendants have sought to accelerate the approval of the NITC/DRIC and to
delay the regulatory approvals for the New Span. In particular, some or all of the defendants
have engaged in the following conduct:
Without any rational basis or explanation, the United States Coast Guard has refused to grant DIBC’s application for a navigational permit, which was first submitted to the Coast Guard in 2004, and was deemed “complete” by the Coast Guard in the summer of 2006.
The Coast Guard initially announced that the New Span was exempt from the requirement to conduct an environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). It then reversed course in 2006 and decided that an environmental assessment under NEPA was required. In February of 2009, the Coast Guard issued a proposed Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”), but over the past three and a half years, the Coast Guard has refused to finalize this FONSI, despite express sign off from the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), and despite the absence of any evidence of the New Span causing any significant environmental impact.
In contrast, the U.S. Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”) accelerated the NEPA process for the NITC/DRIC. The NITC/DRIC is a far larger and more environmentally impactful project, yet the FHWA managed to push through its NEPA process in just three years, as compared to the six years in which the smaller New Span project has been stalled as a result of the Coast Guard’s refusal to finalize its NEPA review.
Similarly, the Government of Canada has refused to process the plaintiffs’ 2007 application for environmental approval for the New Span. By contrast, the far more environmentally problematic NITC/DRIC received its environmental approval in less than a year.
In legislation passed in December 2012, the Canadian Parliament exempted
the NITC/DRIC from the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, the Canadian Port Authority Environmental Assessment Regulations, the
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Statutory Instruments Act, and numerous other statutes and regulations, and provided that after the NITC/DRIC is constructed, all relevant permits and authorizations shall be “deemed to have been issued.” Canadian officials have publicly stated that the goal of this legislation is to “insulate” the NITC/DRIC, an extraterritorial commercial endeavor; expedite its construction, including in the United States; and prevent the owners of the Ambassador Bridge from any ability to challenge any related unfair treatment toward the NITC/DRIC.
13. As the foregoing demonstrates, defendants have taken a series of steps to
discriminate in favor of the NITC/DRIC and against the New Span. These actions reflect a
longstanding desire on the part of the Canadian Government to eliminate private ownership of
the Detroit-Windsor bridge crossing, and an ongoing effort by Canada to persuade United States
government agencies to create a government-owned bridge that will substantially replace and
destroy the privately-owned Ambassador Bridge franchise. Indeed, in an October 13, 2004
email, an official of the Canadian Government admitted that building the NITC/DRIC would
enable Canada to appropriate the Ambassador Bridge for less than its fair market value: Canada
“might be in a much stronger position to negotiate a reasonable price [for the Ambassador
Bridge] if the new crossing [i.e., the NITC/DRIC] is operational and capture[s] a substantial
share of the market of the existing operations [i.e., the plaintiffs’ Ambassador Bridge].” To that
end, Canada has taken a number of steps to undermine plaintiffs’ ability to compete with the
proposed NITC/DRIC, including by insisting on placing the proposed NITC/DRIC in a location
that would prevent the Ambassador Bridge traffic from using any new road improvements
constructed for the Canadian side of the NITC/DRIC.
14. Moreover, the United States Department of State is now contributing to the
violation of plaintiffs’ franchise rights. On July 11, 2012, the Department of State published a
notice in the Federal Register informing the public that on June 21, 2012, the Governor of
Michigan had submitted an application for a Presidential permit to build the NITC/DRIC
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(“NITC/DRIC Application”). [77 Fed. Reg. No. 133 (July 11, 2012) (the “State Department
Notice of Application”)]. The NITC/DRIC Application also sought approval for the Crossing
Agreement. In response to this State Department Notice of Application, plaintiffs submitted a
Comment on August 9, 2012 and a Supplemental Comment and an Executive Summary on
September 10, 2012. Plaintiffs asked the State Department to confirm that it would not consider
the NITC/DRIC Application due to the Application’s numerous legal infirmities, but the State
Department was unwilling to give such confirmation. Instead, it indicated that it would consider
the NITC/DRIC Application and use its own “broad discretion” in deciding whether to approve
the Crossing Agreement.
15. The fact that the State Department would consider approval of the Crossing
Agreement and the NITC/DRIC was evidence of defendants’ infringement of plaintiffs’
franchise rights. First, as alleged above, the State Department does not have the constitutional
authority to approve the Crossing Agreement for the purposes of Article I, § 10 of the
Constitution. Second, as also alleged above, the Crossing Agreement sought to violate plaintiffs’
franchise rights established by United States statute and treaty, but the State Department has no
authority to abrogate those rights. Third, the State Department has previously stated that the
NITC/DRIC and the Crossing Agreement could not be considered for approval unless and until
the Michigan Legislature approved the project. The Michigan Legislature has not only failed to
approve the project, but also affirmatively rejected the project on numerous occasions. In
particular, on October 20, 2011, the Michigan Senate’s Economic Development Committee
voted not to report to the Michigan Senate proposed legislation that was necessary to authorize
the building of the NITC/DRIC. (It was this legislative rejection, which should have terminated
the NITC/DRIC project, that caused plaintiffs to withdraw all but one of the claims contained in
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their First Amended Complaint filed June 6, 2011.) Given that the Michigan Legislature has
refused to provide the required approval for the NITC/DRIC, the State Department should not
have even considered the Michigan Governor’s unauthorized request that it approve the
NITC/DRIC.
16. Indeed, on four different occasions, the Michigan Legislature has enacted statutes
providing that MDOT and MSF “shall not commit the state to any new contract related to the
construction planning or construction of the Detroit River International Crossing.” [See Act of
June 29, 2012, 2012 Michigan Pub. Acts 236, § 402(1), 2012 Mi. ALS 236 (2012); Act of Jun.
26, 2012, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 200, § 384(1), 2012 Mi. ALS 200 (2012); Act of Jun. 21, 2011,
2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 63, § 925(a), 2011 Mi. ALS 63 (2011); Act of Sep. 30, 2010, 2010 Mich.
Pub. Acts 191, § 925(a), 2010 Mi. ALS 191 (2010)]. By executing the Crossing Agreement,
both MDOT and MSF have blatantly violated Michigan state law. It is likewise well-established
that the Governor does not have the authority under the Michigan Constitution to enter into an
agreement with a foreign power absent legislative approval.
17. Despite these infirmities, which plaintiffs raised with the State Department
numerous times, the State Department published a notice in the Federal Register on April 18,
2013 announcing that it had issued the NITC/DRIC a Presidential Permit. This Presidential
Permit said nothing about any approval of the Crossing Agreement. However, in response to a
request from plaintiffs’ counsel, lawyers for the United States provided a letter (which was
apparently not ever made public) dated April 12, 2013, purportedly sent by the State Department
to legal counsel for the Governor of Michigan, reporting that the State Department had granted
approval of the Crossing Agreement.
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18. The fact that the State Department considered and approved the illegally-executed
Crossing Agreement, which directly violated express prohibitions enacted by the Michigan
Legislature, is further evidence that defendants are committed to discriminate against the
privately-owned New Span and in favor of the government-owned NITC/DRIC: based on that
discriminatory intent, defendants have taken a series of actions to accelerate the approval of the
NITC/DRIC no matter what legal infirmities may exist, to delay the regulatory approvals of the
New Span no matter what its legal merits, and thereby to defeat plaintiffs’ ability to exercise
their established franchise right to build their New Span.
19. Accordingly, to protect their rights from further infringement, plaintiffs file this
Third Amended Complaint seeking a judicial declaration that (a) the State Department’s granting
of a Presidential Permit for the NITC/DRIC was contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and
otherwise in violation of the standards set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), and should be set aside by
this Court and/or declared to be unenforceable and invalid; (b) the State Department’s purported
approval of the Crossing Agreement was contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and otherwise
in violation of the standards set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), and should be set aside by this Court
and/or declared to be unenforceable and invalid, including because the United States
Constitution did not authorize the State Department to approve the Crossing Agreement, and the
IBA’s purported authorization of such approval is unconstitutional; (c) even if section 3 of the
IBA is constitutional, the IBA does not authorize the approval of any new bridge between Detroit
and Windsor, and does not impliedly repeal or otherwise modify plaintiffs’ statutory and
contractual franchise rights to operate the Ambassador Bridge and to build the New Span; (d) the
franchise rights conferred upon DIBC and CTC were violated by the approval of the
NITC/DRIC; (e) DIBC and CTC have the right to build the New Span to the Ambassador Bridge
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and any government action by defendants that seeks to favor the NITC/DRIC over the New Span
to prevent plaintiffs from exercising their right to build the New Span is a breach of plaintiffs’
franchise rights and an unlawful discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection clause of the
Constitution; and (f) the Coast Guard has unlawfully, arbitrarily, and capriciously refused to
grant DIBC its navigational permit to build the New Span. In addition, plaintiffs seek injunctive
relief to protect the foregoing rights.
PARTIES
20. Plaintiff Detroit International Bridge Company (“DIBC”) is a corporation
incorporated under the laws of the State of Michigan, having its principal place of business at
12225 Stephens Road, Warren, Michigan 48089.
21. Plaintiff Canadian Transit Company (“CTC”) is a Canadian Special Act
corporation having its principal place of business at 4285 Industrial Drive, Windsor, Ontario,
N9C 3R9, Canada.
22. DIBC and CTC, respectively, own the United States and Canadian sides of the
Ambassador Bridge. They operate the Ambassador Bridge in cooperation with each other
pursuant to a joint operation agreement.
23. Plaintiff DIBC is the successor in interest to the American Transit Company
(“ATC”) and another company also known as Detroit International Bridge Company (“Old
DIBC”). ATC and CTC were the original grantees, in 1921, of the rights to build and operate a
toll bridge across the Detroit River, together with the associated toll-collection and other rights.
Pursuant to statutory authorization, ATC transferred all of its rights and assets to Old DIBC in
1927. Old DIBC merged into the present-day DIBC in 1979. This Complaint refers to plaintiff
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DIBC, and where applicable, its predecessors in interest ATC and Old DIBC, collectively as
“DIBC.” DIBC and CTC together are referred to as “plaintiffs.”
24. Plaintiff DIBC is a privately held company, which is owned, through another
company, by United States citizens.
25. Plaintiff CTC is, and has been since 1927, a wholly owned subsidiary of DIBC.
26. Defendant United States Department of State (“State Department”) is an agency
of the United States government with its principal offices located at 2201 C Street NW,
Washington, DC 20520.
27. Defendant John Kerry is the United States Secretary of State. Defendant Kerry is
sued in his official capacity. Defendant Kerry or his successor in office is the officer who would
be responsible for compliance with any judgment of this Court against the State Department in
Partnership (“NITC/DRIC Partnership” or “Partnership”) is composed of representatives from
Transport Canada (“TC”), the FHWA, Ontario Ministry of Transport (“MTO”), and the
Michigan Department of Transportation (“MDOT”). The Partnership was created through a
framework agreement in 2001 and adopted a charter on February 2, 2005. The Partnership’s
charter states that the Partnership was “formed for the purpose of improving the safe and
efficient movement of people and goods across the U.S./Canadian border at the Detroit River,
including improved connections to national, provincial and regional systems such as I-75 and
Highway 401.”
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29. Defendant FHWA is an agency of the United States Department of
Transportation. FHWA is sued both in its own capacity and as one of the partners in the
Partnership.
30. Defendant Victor Mendez is the Administrator of FWHA. Defendant Raymond
H. LaHood is the United States Secretary of Transportation. Defendants Mendez and LaHood
are sued in their official capacities. Defendants Mendez and LaHood or their successors in office
are the officers who would be responsible for compliance with any judgment of this Court
against FHWA in this action. This Complaint refers to defendants FHWA, Mendez, and LaHood
collectively as the “FHWA defendants.”
31. Defendant the Government of Canada (“Canada” or “Government of Canada”), as
sued herein, should be understood to mean and include the Canadian federal government and
Crown, which is sometimes sued under the name “Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada.”
Canada is a foreign state.
32. Defendant the Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority (the “Authority”) is an entity
created by an act of the Canadian Privy Council Office, PC Number 2012-1350, on October 9,
2012. The Privy Council action creating the Authority states that under the Crossing Agreement
entered into on June 15, 2012 by Canada and representatives of Michigan, “a crossing authority
is to be established by Canada pursuant to and subject to the laws of Canada.” Accordingly, the
Privy Council issued letters patent of incorporation “for the establishment of the Windsor-Detroit
Bridge Authority, a corporation without share capital, for the purpose of the corporation
constructing or operating an international bridge across the Detroit River between Windsor,
Ontario and Detroit, Michigan.” (The Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority is at times referred to
as the “Crossing Authority,” including in the Crossing Agreement.) Thus, the Authority is a
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corporation that does not have shares owned by Canada or anyone else, created for the sole
purpose of constructing or operating the NITC/DRIC. The letters patent provide that “all
contracts, documents and instruments in writing so signed, including the Crossing Agreement,
shall be binding upon the Crossing Authority without any further authorization or formality” and
that the Authority “shall have the capacity, rights and powers of a natural person.”
33. Defendant United States Coast Guard (the “Coast Guard”) is an agency of the
United States Department of Homeland Security.
34. Defendant Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr. is the Commandant of the Coast Guard and
the successor in office to Admiral Thad W. Allen, who was named as a defendant in the original
complaint in this action, and is substituted for Admiral Allen pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant Janet Napolitano is the United States Secretary of
Homeland Security. Defendants Papp and Napolitano are sued in their official capacities. This
Complaint refers to defendants the Coast Guard, Papp, and Napolitano as the “Coast Guard
defendants.” Defendants Papp and Napolitano or their successors in office are the officers who
would be responsible for compliance with any judgment of this Court against the Coast Guard in
this action.
35. The United States of America is also named as a defendant in this action.
36. The United States, the Secretary of State, the State Department, the FHWA
defendants, and the Coast Guard defendants together are referred to herein as the “U.S.
defendants.”
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
37. The Partnership is neither a foreign state nor an organ or instrumentality of a
foreign state, and therefore it is not immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
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(“FSIA”). It is instead a partnership comprised equally of United States and Canadian entities
that is acting in violation of plaintiffs’ rights under United States statutes and the United States
Constitution, and therefore is subject to suit in United States courts. In addition, the Partnership
has engaged in the same commercial activity as the Government of Canada, as described below,
and therefore would not in any event be eligible for sovereign immunity.
38. The Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority is not an agency, instrumentality, or organ
of Canada. Rather, it is a corporation created for the sole purpose of taking over the construction
and operation of the NITC/DRIC, which is a commercial endeavor. In any event, as alleged
below, even if the Authority is an agency, instrumentality, or organ of Canada, it is engaged in a
commercial activity and therefore is not immune under the FSIA.
39. As against defendant Canada, this action is based upon (a) a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by Canada, (b) an act performed in the United States in
connection with commercial activity of Canada within the territory of Canada, and (c) an act or
acts outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of Canada
within the territory of Canada, causing a direct effect in the United States. For these reasons,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), Canada is not immune from the jurisdiction of the Court. This
Third Amended Complaint challenges only those commercial actions by Canada taken in the
United States, or commercial activity taken elsewhere that has a direct effect in the United
States. It does not challenge any official conduct of Canada taken within Canada.
40. As plaintiffs’ construction and operation of the Ambassador Bridge demonstrate,
the construction, maintenance, and operation of a toll bridge like the NITC/DRIC is an activity
that private parties as well as governments can carry out. As a result, it constitutes commercial
activity within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
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41. In addition, acts taken toward the planning and construction of the NITC/DRIC
are themselves either commercial activities or acts taken in connection with the commercial
activity that is the planned NITC/DRIC.
42. Canada has engaged in extensive commercial activity in and affecting the United
States in connection with and preparation for the planned construction and operation of the
NITC/DRIC. For example, in an April 29, 2009 letter from Transport Canada Minister John
Baird to Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm, Canada offered to “increase its financial
participation up to a maximum of US$550 million, for project components in Michigan . . . .”
The letter further stated that Canada “would expect repayment from the anticipated toll revenues
to be derived from the operation of the new bridge.” This offer to invest $550 million to fund
construction of the NITC/DRIC within the United States was conditioned on “the Michigan
Legislature adopting all of the authorizing legislation for the implementation of the DRIC Project
. . . .” Governor Granholm publicly announced the offer the same day she received the letter.
After making the initial $550 million offer in a letter, Minister Baird and Associate Assistant
Deputy Minister Helena Borges visited Lansing, Michigan on June 22, 2010 to promote the
NITC/DRIC and Canada’s investment proposal to the Michigan Senate Transportation
Committee. Months later, Minister Baird’s successor, Chuck Strahl, confirmed that the offer of a
$550 million investment remains available.
43. Canada’s commercial activity in the United States, and/or acts performed in the
United States in connection with the commercial activity in Canada, concerning the subject
matter of this action include each of the following:
(a) The planned construction and preparation for construction of the NITC/DRIC, approximately one-half of which will be within the territory of the United States;
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(b) The planned construction and preparation for construction of the NITC/DRIC’s U.S. plaza and the other associated structures wholly within the territory of the United States;
(c) Canada’s involvement as a shareholder and partner in the operation, direction, planning, and design of the U.S. portion of the NITC/DRIC;
(d) Meeting with U.S. officials and others and other preparatory activities that have taken place in the United States in connection with the planned constructions and operation of the NITC/DRIC, or in connection with the review of plaintiffs’ proposed New Span of the Ambassador Bridge, including an October 19, 2005 meeting in Detroit at which David Wake from the Ontario Ministry of Transportation, representatives from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Coast Guard, and possible other U.S. and Canadian officials formed an agreement that if Canada rejected the Ambassador Bridge New Span, the U.S. would drop it from consideration;
(e) The negotiation of a proposed $550 million investment to finance construction of U.S. highway approaches to the NITC/DRIC, as set forth in an April 2009 letter from minister John Baird to Governor Jennifer Granholm and elaborated upon in a meeting between Baird and Michigan officials;
(f) The hiring of lobbyists and consultants within the United States;
(g) The promotion of the NITC/DRIC and hindrance of the Ambassador Bridge New Span through publications in the United States and by sending Canadian officials to speak to the Michigan legislature, Congressional staffers, administrative agency officials, and the public within the United States;
(h) The execution of the Crossing Agreement with the Governor of Michigan, MDOT, and MSF, to further implement the plans referenced above for the construction of the NITC/DRIC, including the promise of Canadian financing for the construction of the U.S. portion of the NITC/DRIC; and
(i) The issuance of letters patent for the incorporation of the Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority to carry out the plans articulated in the Crossing Agreement for the construction of the NITC/DRIC, including its U.S. portions.
44. In addition, Canada’s acts within Canada, in connection with the commercial
activity in Canada of constructing and operating or preparing to construct and operate the
NITC/DRIC, have direct effects in the United States. The direct effects include, among others,
each of the following:
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(a) Constructing and undertaking preparatory work to construct the proposed NITC/DRIC, half of which will be in the United States and which, according to the FHWA, will impact traffic patterns throughout the United States;
(b) Depressing the value to plaintiffs of the Ambassador Bridge as a whole, which is partly in the United States and partly in Canada, by interfering with plaintiffs’ rights arising under treaty, statute, and contract;
(c) Causing FHWA, the Michigan legislature, and others in the United States to make particular decisions relating to the construction, financing, and siting of the proposed NITC/DRIC, or relating to the proposed New Span of the Ambassador Bridge;
(d) A proposed $550 million investment to finance the construction of approach roads to the proposed NITC/DRIC inside the United States, conditioned on a favorable vote by the Michigan legislature on legislation to approve the NITC/DRIC;
(e) Facilitating the construction of the approach roads to the proposed NITC/DRIC inside the United States; and
(f) Breaching plaintiffs’ rights under a 1990 settlement agreement between plaintiffs and Canada (described in more detail below) settling U.S. litigation brought to resolve a dispute over the ownership of the Ambassador Bridge and the judgment entered in that U.S. litigation.
45. The claims pleaded herein are based on these and other commercial activities and
acts in connection with commercial activities, as further alleged below in this ThirdAmended
Complaint.
46. Further, through its activities in the United States set forth in this Third Amended
Complaint, Canada has waived sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
JURISDICTION
47. As set forth above, Canada is not immune from the jurisdiction of this Court.
48. As against Canada, this is a nonjury civil action against a foreign state with
respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity, and therefore this Court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claims against Canada under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
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49. Because this Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and because Canada has
accepted service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), the Court has jurisdiction over the
person of defendant Canada under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
50. As against the U.S. defendants, this is an action for nonmonetary relief against
officers and agencies of the United States, in addition to an action by persons suffering legal
wrong or aggrieved or adversely affected because of agency action, and based on the action or
failure to act of an agency, officer, or employee of the United States in an official capacity or
under color of legal authority. For these reasons, under 5 U.S.C § 702, the U.S. defendants are
not immune from the jurisdiction of this Court.
51. The claims against the U.S. defendants arise under the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States and seek to compel the U.S. defendants to comply with their legal
duties. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of those claims under 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1361.
VENUE
52. Defendant Canada is a foreign state. Venue is therefore proper in this District
under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4) as to the claims against Canada.
53. As federal agencies, the State Department, FHWA, and Coast Guard are deemed
to reside in the District of Columbia. Defendants Kerry, Mendez, LaHood, Papp, and Napolitano
perform their official duties in the District of Columbia and are therefore deemed to reside in the
District when sued in their official capacities. Venue is therefore proper in the District under 28
U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) as to the claims against the U.S. defendants.
54. In addition, a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims
occurred in the District of Columbia. Venue is therefore proper in the District against the U.S.
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defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) and against Canada under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(1).
Venue is also appropriate against Canada under 28 U.S.S. §1391(f)(4).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiffs’ Rights Under The Special Agreement Created By Reciprocal U.S. And Canadian Legislation.
(1) Enactment Of U.S. And Canadian Legislation Constituting A Special Agreement Under Article XIII Of The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty.
55. In 1909, the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
which at the time was responsible for Canada’s foreign affairs, signed and ratified a treaty
regulating, among other things, the construction of bridges and other impediments to navigation
across the waters separating the United States and Canada. Treaty Relating to Boundary
between the United States and Canada, U.S.-U.K., Jane. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448 (the “Boundary
Waters Treaty”).
56. The Boundary Waters Treaty prohibits the construction of new bridges over the
boundary waters between the United States and Canada, other than as specified in the treaty.
One of the ways the treaty authorizes the construction of new bridges is pursuant to a “special
agreement” authorizing construction of bridges and other uses, obstructions, or diversions of the
boundary waters between the United State and Canada. Id. Art. III. The Boundary Waters
Treaty further specifies that “concurrent or reciprocal” legislation by the United States Congress
and the Canadian Parliament would constitute such a “special agreement.” Id. Art. XIII. The
Boundary Waters Treaty provided that any new uses, obstructions, or diversions of boundary
waters would require the approval of an International Joint Commission, except where
authorized by a “special agreement.” Id. Art. III.
57. In 1921, the Canadian Parliament and the U.S. Congress adopted such a special
agreement in the manner contemplated by the Boundary Waters Treaty. They did so by passing
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reciprocal legislation granting to CTC and DIBC, respectively, a perpetual right to construct,
operate, and collect tolls on an international bridge between Detroit, Michigan and Sandwich
(now part of Windsor), Ontario, among other rights. Act of Mar. 4, 1921, 66th Cong., ch. 167, 41
Stat. 1439 (“1921 DIBC Act,” and, with subsequent U.S. legislation (the 1925 DIBC
Amendment and 1926 DIBC Amendment cited below), the “U.S. Act”); Act of May 3, 1921, 11-
12 Geo. V Ch. 57 (Can.) (“1921 CTC Act,” and, with subsequent Canadian legislation (the 1927
CTC Amendment cited below), the “Canadian Act”).
58. The effectiveness of the U.S. Act was expressly conditioned on the passage of
reciprocal legislation by Canada, and the effectiveness of the Canadian Act was expressly
conditioned on the passage of reciprocal legislation by the U.S. Congress.
59. From 1922 to 1927, both the U.S. and Canada amended the Acts to expand and
clarify plaintiffs’ rights. See Act of June 28, 1922, 12-13 Geo. V. ch. 56 (Can.) (“1922 CTC
Amendment”); Act of April 17, 1924 68th Cong., ch. 125 43 Stat. 103 (“1924 DIBC
Amendment): Act of Mar. 3, 1925, 69th Cong. 448, 43 Stat. 1128 (“1925 DIBC Amendment”);
Act. Of May 13, 1926, 69th Cong. ch. 292, 44 Stat. 535 (“1926 DIBC Amendment”); Act of Mar.
60. In an April 1927 letter, the U.S. Department of State advised DIBC that the U.S.
Act and Canadian Act constituted “a special agreement of the kind defined by Article 13 of the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between the United States and Great Britain, authorizing
construction of the bridge . . . . and that in view of such special agreement, under Article 3 of the
Treaty the matter of the construction of the bridge will not require the approval of the
International Joint Commission.”
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61. In a July 1927 letter to CTC’s Canadian attorneys, the Department of External
Affairs in Canada similarly advised that no approval of the International Joint Commission was
required under the Boundary Waters Treaty.
62. As an agreement between nations, consented to in the manner specified in the
previously ratified Boundary Waters Treaty, the special agreement formed by the U.S. Act and
Canadian Act (the “Special Agreement”) itself constitutes a binding international agreement.
This international agreement constitutes a treaty under international law. The agreement has
been incorporated into U.S. and Canadian domestic law by virtue of the U.S. Act and the
Canadian Act.
63. The original 1921 CTC Act stated that CTC had “the powers, rights and privileges
of a railway company” and that it “may purchase, lease or otherwise acquire and hold lands for
the bridge, tracks, terminal yards, accommodation works and facilities” as well as “expropriate
and take an easement in, over, under or through any lands without the necessity of acquiring a
title in fee simple thereto.” The later amendments to that Act provided that CTC had the power
“to construct, maintain and operate a railway and general traffic bridge across the Detroit River
[that] may be exercised by the Company in the construction, maintenance and operation of a
bridge for both railway traffic and general traffic purposes” and that CTC was subject to “the
provisions of The Railway Act, 1919.” As a result, among other rights, CTC has condemnation
powers.
64. In addition, the Appendix to the Bridge Act of 1906, under which the Ambassador
Bridge was built, states that “any bridge built in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall
be a lawful structure and shall be recognized and known as a post route . . . .”
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(2) Plaintiffs’ Franchise And Contract To Build, Operate, And Maintain The Ambassador Bridge Between The United States And Canada In Exchange For Perpetual Rights Under The Special Agreement.
65. To induce plaintiffs to undertake the risk and expense of constructing and
operating the bridge, the United States and Canada passed the legislation constituting the Special
Agreement, which granted plaintiffs a perpetual and exclusive right of franchise to build,
operate, maintain, and collect tolls on a bridge across the Detroit River, subject to the conditions
specified in the Special Agreement.
66. Plaintiffs’ rights under the U.S. Act and the Canadian Act were conditioned on
the commencement and completion of construction of the bridge by certain deadlines. See 1921
DIBC Act § 2; 1921 CTC Act § 17. These deadlines were subsequently extended. 1924 DIBC
149. Nonetheless, Canada and FHWA have delayed and obstructed the construction of
the New Span by delaying approval under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and
interfering with DIBC’s application to the United States Coast Guard for a 1906 Bridges Act
permit (a “navigation permit”) for the New Span.
150. Plaintiffs submitted an environmental impact statement to Transport Canada for
the Ambassador Bridge New Span on December 4, 2007. Because the Ambassador Bridge New
Span will be constructed directly alongside the existing span and will connect to the existing
Ambassador Bridge plaza, any environmental impact will be insignificant or nonexistent.
However, no decision has been received to this date, over four years later.
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151. By way of contrast, the agencies constructing the NITC/DRIC submitted their
Ontario Environmental Assessment Report in December 2008 and received a Notice of Approval
from the Ontario Minister of the Environment in August 2009, just nine months later, despite
serious concerns about the impact of the NITC/DRIC on the surrounding community, wetlands,
and species-at-risk in Canada. The Federal Screening Report under the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act for the NITC/DRIC and plaza was released in July 2009 and approved just four
months later in December 2009.
152. On the U.S. side, the Coast Guard is the only agency that might have any relevant
permitting authority, because DIBC is building the Ambassador Bridge New Span without public
funds, and as noted, the Ambassador Bridge New Span is not subject to permitting requirements
of the International Bridge Act of 1972. The Coast Guard’s permitting authority is limited under
the 1906 Bridges Act to determining whether the Ambassador Bridge New Span would
negatively affect navigation on the Detroit River.
153. DIBC applied to the Coast Guard for a navigation permit for the Ambassador
Bridge New Span in 2004. The Coast Guard’s approval of the navigation permit should have
been a quick, routine process because the New Span will not create any new obstructions to
navigation: it will be placed directly next to the existing Ambassador Bridge span, it will be at
the same height as or higher than the existing Ambassador Bridge span at all points, and it will
not have any piers in the water.
154. The Coast Guard has taken the view that, before it may issue a 1906 Bridges Act
permit, the Ambassador Bridge New Span must satisfy the requirements of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4370h. Initially, the Coast Guard appeared to be on track toward prompt approval of the
Ambassador Bridge New Span under both NEPA and the 1906 Bridges Act.
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155. On July 28, 2006, the Coast Guard issued public notice 09-03-06, which took the
initial position that the Ambassador Bridge New Span was entitled to a Categorical Exclusion on
the basis of the prior NEPA assessments of the Ambassador Bridge Gateway Project. However,
the Coast Guard then reversed course and took the position that the Ambassador Bridge New
Span required an Environmental Assessment, which would lead to either a Finding of No
Significant Impact (“FONSI”) or a finding that a full-blown Environmental Impact Statement
was required.
156. The Environmental Assessment commissioned by the Coast Guard found no
reason to deny a FONSI and was accompanied by a proposed FONSI dated February 4, 2009.
The earlier public hearings on the proposed FONSI and environmental review process had
provided no reason for the Coast Guard to change its view. From DIBC’s initial submission of
its application in 2004 through the issuance of the proposed FONSI, the Coast Guard had
consistently maintained that “the ABEP [New Span]” will not introduce significant impacts on
the natural or man-made environment” and that environmental impacts, including on air quality,
would remain below the de minimis threshold.
(4) The Coast Guard’s Delay Of DIBC’s Application Under Pressure From Canada, FHWA, And Other NITC/DRIC Supporters.
157. The Coast Guard’s initially favorable treatment of the Ambassador Bridge New
Span application was altered by pressure from FHWA, Canada, and other NITC/DRIC
supporters seeking to derail the Ambassador Bridge New Span application, without good cause,
to favor the NITC/DRIC. As a result of this interference, the Coast Guard delayed action on the
application and ultimately denied it, without lawful justification, on March 2, 2010.
158. Although it issued a proposed FONSI in February 2009 and completed the thirty-
day review period required by NEPA, the Coast Guard did not issue the final FONSI. Rather,
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the Coast Guard took the extraordinary step of scheduling a new public hearing on March 17,
2009 at the request of Congressman Dingell, at which the opponents of the Ambassador Bridge
New Span had been organized to appear, while supporters of the Ambassador Bridge New Span
were not given a fair opportunity to be heard. The Coast Guard then claimed that the concerns
raised at that public hearing justified delay in issuing, and ultimately a refusal to issue, the
FONSI.
(a) Air Quality Impacts.
159. The Coast Guard initially attempted to justify its delay largely based on erroneous
claims by FHWA that the Ambassador Bridge failed to conduct an appropriate air-quality
analysis. In direct contradiction to the position that FHWA is now taking with the Coast Guard,
DIBC had no difficulties receiving environmental approval from FHWA for its construction
projects supporting the Ambassador Bridge New Span before Canada had enlisted FHWA in its
campaign against the Ambassador Bridge. Between 1997 and 2004, FHWA had issued an
environmental assessment and three FONSIs for the Ambassador Bridge Gateway Project, based
on FHWA’s projected traffic volumes of 18 million vehicles a year across the Ambassador
Bridge. As discussed above, the Ambassador Bridge Gateway Project was the project to create
direct connections to the U.S. highway systems and to accommodate the New Span to the
Ambassador Bridge. The alleged air-quality impacts of bridge traffic were not a concern to
FHWA then; yet once FHWA had joined Canada in opposing the New Span, FHWA raised
alleged air-quality impacts with the Coast Guard in opposition to the new Span.
160. In response to FHWA’s stated concerns about the air-quality impacts, DIBC
contacted the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) office in Chicago for guidance on
whether any further air quality analysis was required. The EPA addressed this issue in its
comments to the Coast Guard on the draft FONSI, stating that additional “hot spots” analysis
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might be done but acknowledging that it was not required by statute. In response, DIBC
developed an Addendum to the initial Air Quality Modeling Analysis Report. This Addendum,
which DIBC submitted to the EPA and the Coast Guard on June 5, 2009, provided further detail
on possible air-quality impacts addressing the FWHA’s stated concerns.
161. The Coast Guard, however, instructed the EPA not to review the Addendum,
stating that the Coast Guard had not authorized any additional air quality analysis.
162. Yet, on June 15, 2009 – a week after making the statement that additional air
quality analysis was not authorized – the Coast Guard stated that it was placing all work on
DIBC’s application for the New Span into abeyance based, in part, on “concerns over air
quality.”
163. Then, despite its statements that it had not requested additional air quality analysis
and that it was putting all work in abeyance, the Coast Guard submitted the Addendum to
MDOT for review on July 14, 2009. MDOT responded on August 5, 2009 that it did not have
the authority to review air quality analyses for the project.
164. Two months later, the Coast Guard forwarded the Addendum to FHWA for
review. On December 1, 2009, FHWA responded that the Addendum was still inadequate to
model the worst-case scenario for the New Span.
165. The Coast Guard’s treatment of the alleged environmental impacts of the
Ambassador Bridge New Span contrasts sharply with FHWA’s treatment of the environmental
impacts of its own project, the NITC/DRIC. Any air-quality concerns applicable to the U.S. side
of the Ambassador Bridge New Span would also apply to an even greater extent to the
NITC/DRIC, because the NITC/DRIC will have additional, very significant construction work
and adverse impact on a local community that the New Span will not have. For example, the
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NITC/DRIC will require a new plaza in the United States (in close proximity to the existing
Ambassador Bridge plaza), and because other new highway connections would have to be built
for the NITC/DRIC at taxpayer expense (adjacent to the existing highway connections for the
Ambassador Bridge). Moreover, the NITC/DRIC will have serious adverse environmental
impacts on a community in the Detroit area, which, according to FHWA’s own study, includes
displacing approximately 257 occupied residential dwelling units, forty-three active businesses,
five places of worship, and four government facilities in Detroit’s only majority-Hispanic
neighborhood. Yet, despite these significant impacts, and in contrast to the concerns it voiced
relating to the New Span, FHWA granted expedited environmental approval for the NITC/DRIC.
The entire set of approvals for the NITC/DRIC is subject to an interagency “streamlining
agreement” designed to speed the project through the U.S. approval process and to prevent the
agencies from revisiting key issues about the NITC/DRIC even in the face of public opposition.
After the NITC/DRIC’s Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”) was released on
November 26, 2008, FHWA issued its Record of Decision and bragged about its own haste,
announcing that the entire review process for the NITC/DRIC was completed in “about half the
time needed for similar projects of this size.”
166. It has been more than three years since FHWA completed its FEIS for the
NITC/DRIC. Recently, plaintiffs asked FHWA whether it has prepared or is preparing a written
re-evaluation of the NITC/DRIC FEIS. FHWA’s own regulations require it to prepare a re-
evaluation of the over-three-years-old FEIS before it or any other agency may grant further
approvals related to the NITC/DRIC. Moreover, as plaintiffs pointed out to FHWA, the
NITC/DRIC FEIS relied on traffic projections based on data that is almost a decade old and has
been proven to be substantially overstated by more recent actual traffic data. The corrected data
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calls into question whether the NITC/DRIC is needed in light of the substantial environmental
impact it will have and the fact that the Ambassador Bridge and its projected New Span will
satisfy capacity needs with far less environmental impact. Nevertheless, FHWA responded that
it has not prepared such a re-evaluation and does not plan to.
167. In considering the NITC/DRIC proponents’ application for a Presidential permit
and issuing that Permit, the State Department relied upon this more-than-three-years-old
NITC/DRIC FEIS, in direct conflict with FHWA’s regulations.
(b) Opposition By Canada.
168. In addition, the Coast Guard took the position that it should not proceed to issue
either a FONSI or a 1906 Bridges Act permit for the Ambassador Bridge New Span because the
Coast Guard was advised by Canada that Canada did not want the Ambassador Bridge New Span
to be built. The Coast Guard indicated that it would not proceed with U.S. approval until it
received assurances from its Canadian counterparts that there were no impediments to Canadian
approval. The Coast Guard maintained this position until, according to deposition testimony by
the Coast Guard’s designated witness in this action, the Coast Guard received a direct instruction
from White House officials that the Canadian process should not be permitted to interfere with
the U.S. process for the permit application.
(c) Land Acquisition.
169. Having been deprived by the White House of its ability to use Canada’s
opposition to plaintiffs’ plans as an excuse for its inaction, the Coast Guard ultimately attempted
to justify its refusal to proceed because of a need for DIBC to acquire property on the U.S. side
of the river to build the Ambassador Bridge New Span. Property ownership, however, is not and
has never been a requirement to proceed under NEPA. FHWA granted environmental approval
for the NITC/DRIC despite the fact that it and MDOT had not yet acquired all the necessary
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land. And on multiple previous occasions, before Canada and FHWA began their campaign
against the Ambassador Bridge, DIBC received environmental approvals for its improvements
on the Ambassador Bridge before it had acquired the necessary land.
170. The Coast Guard has no basis to conclude that the property issue that it has cited
will not be promptly resolved once the Coast Guard permit is in place. Although the City of
Detroit wrote a letter to the Coast Guard stating that it was not interested in selling the parcel of
the land in question, the letter was plainly an attempt by the City of Detroit to gain bargaining
leverage by holding up the Coast Guard navigation permit. The parcel consists of fallow ground
that the City has designated as an annex to a park but which is not suitable for park use because
of toxic waste contamination. Indeed, at one point the City of Detroit allowed DIBC to use the
land for storage of material and equipment. In any event, the plans for the Ambassador Bridge
New Span do not call for placement of any structures on land currently owned by the City of
Detroit. Thus, DIBC does not need to acquire the land itself but only the air rights for the
Ambassador Bridge New Span to cross above the land.
171. Obtaining approval before spending the money to buy the land or easements for a
project is a sensible and common approach and is the sequence also adopted by the agencies
promoting the NITC/DRIC. In fact, plaintiffs or their affiliates currently own much of the land
that FHWA or MDOT needs for the NITC/DRIC’s landings on the U.S. side of the Detroit River.
The cooperating agencies have not yet sought to acquire that land from plaintiffs or their
affiliates. Yet that has not stopped FHWA from proceeding to issue a NEPA Record of Decision
for its own NITC/DRIC Project, a clear instance of discrimination against the privately-owned
New Span and in favor of the government-owned NITC/DRIC.
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(5) The Coast Guard’s Denial Of DIBC’s Application.
172. Following receipt of the June 15, 2009 letter from the Coast Guard placing its
permit application into abeyance, DIBC complained to the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”), of which the Coast Guard is a part, that the Coast Guard was refusing to process
DIBC’s Environmental Assessment for inappropriate reasons. Janet Lesher, then Chief of Staff
for Secretary Napolitano, chaired a meeting in December 2009 between the Coast Guard and
DIBC and instructed that a follow-up meeting be held one week thereafter at which the parties
should resolve their differences. The Coast Guard caused the second meeting to be cancelled
because the Coast Guard claimed that it needed additional time to prepare. The holidays then
intervened, and in February 2010, Ms. Lesher resigned from DHS. DIBC repeatedly sought
further meetings through DHS to no avail.
173. The Coast Guard never contacted DIBC to propose a substitute meeting date.
Instead, it advised DIBC by letter on March 2, 2010, that it was discontinuing consideration of
DIBC’s applications for a navigation permit and a FONSI for the Ambassador Bridge New Span
and returning the applications. The Coast Guard’s letter claimed that there had been “no
movement” by DIBC or its related entities on the supposed “issues” that FHWA and the other
proponents of the NITC/DRIC had raised in an attempt to derail the construction of the
Ambassador Bridge New Span.
174. By returning DIBC’s application and discontinuing consideration for a navigation
permit and a FONSI, the Coast Guard made clear that the agency process was complete. Any
further action would require DIBC to resubmit the application in its entirety or to submit a new
application. No mechanism for an administrative appeal is available. Coast Guard regulations
require the Coast Guard to either grant or deny an application, see 33 C.F.R. § 115.60(a), thus
the return of the application necessarily constitutes a denial.
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175. The Coast Guard’s denial of the application constitutes final agency action.
Plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedies, if any, to the extent required.
(6) Status Of The Current Litigation And The Coast Guard’s Failure To Follow This Court’s Explicit Orders.
176. Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this court on March 22, 2010 and a First Amended
Complaint on June 6, 2011, both of which asserted (as did plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint and as does this Third Amended Complaint), among other claims, a claim against the
Coast Guard defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act for their failure to process and
approve DIBC’s application for a permit for the New Span.
177. On May 10, 2012, this Court ordered DIBC to re-submit its application to the
Coast Guard with a revised Environmental Assessment and explicitly ordered the Coast Guard to
“consider and process the application, at least until the Coast Guard decides whether an
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact would satisfy NEPA, 42
U.S.C. § 4321, et seq, without respect to whether or not Plaintiff owns land or air rights to
expand the Ambassador Bridge as set forth in its permit application” (emphasis added).
178. On July 17, 2012, the parties appeared before this Court for a status conference, at
which point the Coast Guard identified the only two issues that remained before it could issue a
final FONSI, concluding the NEPA process: (a) the EPA had to finalize its assessment of certain
air quality studies and determine whether to impose a new requirement based on a regulation not
yet in force; and (b) the Michigan State Historic Preservation Office (“SHPO”) had to provide an
assessment of whether the slight re-design of the New Span would cause SHPO to re-assess the
project. Before the next status conference on August 24, 2012, both issues were resolved: in
August 22, 2012 and August 23, 2012 emails, the EPA informed the Coast Guard that the New
Span’s air quality documentation “demonstrates conformity” with the existing environmental
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standard and “will not cause or contribute to a violation” of that standard, and in a July 20, 2012
email, SHPO confirmed that the New Span re-design did not trigger any re-assessment of the
project. There was therefore no remaining basis for the Coast Guard to refuse to issue the
FONSI.
179. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard moved the goalposts yet again. Contrary to this
Court’s explicit order, the Coast Guard stated at the August 24, 2012 status conference that it is
not able or willing to complete the NEPA process until DIBC and CTC can demonstrate there is
no issue with respect to the “air rights” because “we don’t have a completed application” and
therefore the New Span project is only “hypothetical.”
180. It has now been over six years since the Coast Guard deemed the New Span
permit application complete on July 13, 2006. The Coast Guard’s openly defiant position is yet
another way to delay granting the FONSI and has no legal basis.
D. Canada’s And FHWA’s Proposed NITC/DRIC.
(1) The NITC/DRIC Partnership.
181. In December 2000, Transport Canada (part of the Canadian Ministry of Transport,
Infrastructure, and Communities), FHWA, MDOT, and the Ontario Ministry of Transportation
formed a working group called the Ontario-Michigan Border Transportation Partnership, which
later became the Detroit River International Crossing (“DRIC”) Partnership, in order to study
transportation needs in the area. (As explained above, the “Detroit River International
Crossing,” or “DRIC,” was the original name for the NITC/DRIC and these terms are now used
interchangeably.)
182. The construction of the Ambassador Bridge New Span and the completion of the
Canadian portion of the Ambassador Bridge Gateway Project had initially been on the DRIC
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Partnership’s agenda as a way to improve traffic flow and commerce in the Detroit-Windsor
area.
183. Within a few years after the DRIC Partnership was formed, however, Canada
realized that the DRIC study project created a new opportunity to attempt to force the transfer of
the Ambassador Bridge to ownership and control by Canada, this time by proposing to build a
new bridge, the NITC/DRIC, between Detroit and Windsor, planned and sited so as to take
nearly all the traffic revenue from the Ambassador Bridge.
184. The members of the DRIC Partnership entered into a number of contractual
agreements to further their purpose, including by agreeing to the Ontario-Michigan Border
Transportation Partnership Framework on February 7, 2001, and by adopting the Canada-United
States-Ontario-Michigan Border Transportation Partnership Charter on February 2, 2005. In
2007, the departments of the United States and Canada that oversee the DRIC Partnership
members entered into the Memorandum of Cooperation Between the Department of
Transportation of the United States of America and the Department of Transport of Canada on
the Development of Additional Border Capacity at the Detroit-Windsor Gateway (2007).
185. Each of these agreements constituted agreements between MDOT and both
Canada and Ontario. As such, each of these agreements were prohibited by Article I, §10, clause
3 of the Constitution, absent consent from Congress. Yet none of these various agreements were
ever approved by Congress. Nor were any of these agreements ever approved by the Secretary
of State. As such, these agreements all constituted invalid agreements between a State and a
foreign power.
186. As described in a communication from the American Consulate in Toronto to the
Secretary of State, U.S. and Canadian officials, including David Wake from the Ontario Ministry
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of Transportation and representatives from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Coast
Guard, attended an October 19, 2005 meeting in Detroit at which the “meeting participants
agreed that, if the bridge span twinning proposal is rejected by Canada, the U.S. side will drop it
from consideration.” There appeared to be no limitation on this agreement, for example
requiring that Canada only reject the New Span proposal for valid environmental, navigational,
or regulatory reasons.
187. This communication confirms that agents of the Canadian government took
actions in the United States to prevent DIBC from exercising its right to build the New Span,
including by persuading U.S. government agencies to block DIBC’s ability to obtain approval
for the New Span on grounds unrelated to navigational, environmental, or regulatory issues.
Instead, Canada acted in the United States to persuade U.S. agencies to block DIBC’s right to
build the New Span solely to advance Canadian commercial interests and on the basis of
Canada’s longstanding hostility to the existence of a privately owned bridge between Detroit and
Windsor.
188. In addition, under the Treaty clause of the U.S. constitution, Article 2, § 2, clause
2, the FHWA does not have the authority to enter into an agreement with a foreign power. Thus,
the FHWA’s participation in the DRIC Partnership agreements was also unauthorized and
invalid.
189. Indeed, members of the DRIC Partnership recognized that they were not
authorized to enter into agreements with Canada. For example, James Steele of the FHWA
admitted this in a March 28, 2006 email: “The groups [sic] original intent was to develop a
charter, or document of some kind that described how we intended to operate. . . . Pretty soon the
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legal folks got involved and it got pretty complicated and we realized we were creating a treaty.
It was then that we shifted to a more informal gentleman’s agreement . . . .”
190. But the DRIC Partnership agreements are not mere “gentlemen’s agreements.”
They reflect a commitment to form a partnership, with its own charter, to build a government-
owned bridge, and thereby displace and destroy the right of plaintiffs to build their New Span.
(2) Canada’s Opposition To The Twinning Of The Ambassador Bridge.
191. The DRIC Partnership identified fifteen potential crossing sites across the Detroit
River for the location of a possible new bridge. These were designated X1 through X15, with
“X” standing for “crossing.”
192. The potential crossing sites identified by the DRIC Partnership included a site
designated as X12, which would have been a twinning of the existing Ambassador Bridge.
193. At the outset of its consideration of alternatives, the DRIC Partnership professed
to be open to various ownership structures. In an official position statement regarding the
ownership of a new crossing issued in August 2005, the DRIC Partnership stated that the
additional border crossing would be “subject to appropriate public oversight in both countries,”
and the alternative governance models included, but were “not limited to: Government
ownership . . .; a concession agreement in which the private sector designs, builds, finances, and
operates the facilities under a long-term lease arrangement with the governments; [and] other
options that may be appropriate and developed by the partners.” FHWA, at least initially,
recognized the benefits of private ownership, as the minutes of a May 2006 DRIC Partnership
Steering Committee meeting describe James Steele of FHWA asking “why spend government
money if the private sector is willing to spend money to solve the problem?”
194. Location X12, which was a twinning of the Ambassador Bridge, was thus
consistent with the construction and ownership of the Ambassador Bridge New Span as proposed
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by plaintiffs. Indeed, the FHWA noted in its Draft Environmental Impact Statement analyzing
the different alternatives that it had received four alternatives proposed by private companies,
and it included among them the X12 location proposed by DIBC.
195. Although these public statements suggest that all ownership and governance
options, including a privately built bridge, were being considered, internal documents show that
Canada had already firmly concluded that it would not allow plaintiffs to own any new crossing,
whether or not it was a twin of the existing Ambassador Bridge. In a series of internal emails
drafted by Andrew Shea, a Policy Advisor for Transport Canada, Mr. Shea described Canada’s
position, as endorsed by the Ontario Ministry of Transportation, as follows: “regardless of where
the new crossing is located, there will, implicitly, be public control of that crossing. Therefore
this would not preclude a twinned Ambassador Bridge from [being] chosen under the [DRIC
Partnership process], except that the Ambassador Bridge wouldn’t control it . . . .”
196. FHWA ranked X12, the twin of the Ambassador Bridge, very high among the
various alternatives under consideration.
197. Canada realized, however, that even if the new crossing were to be publicly
owned, selection of a site at the location of the Ambassador Bridge would necessarily require the
new crossing to share a highway connection with the Ambassador Bridge, which in turn would
allow the Ambassador Bridge to compete with the new crossing on a fair basis. Moreover, any
environmental or other regulatory approvals obtained by the DRIC Partnership for a new
publicly owned bridge at the X12 site would equally support an application for approval of
plaintiffs’ privately owned option at the same site. For these reasons, the consideration and
potential approval of the X12 crossing location would have been a direct threat to Canada’s long-
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term goal of acquiring control of plaintiffs’ franchise by building a new bridge and preventing
plaintiffs from competing.
198. For these reasons, the Canadian government resolved to drop site X12 as an
alternative as soon as practicable, though it recognized that it did not have any justification for
rejecting that site within the stated criteria governing the DRIC project. In an email reporting on
a DRIC Partnership Working Group Meeting held September 28, 2005, Tim Morin, a Transport
Canada project engineer, observed that “X12 ranks high on the US side and not so high on
Canadian side,” but recognized that “in order to maintain the integrity of the environmental
assessment X12 will most likely have to remain based on the technical data at the moment . . . .”
Reporting on a DRIC Steering Committee meeting held in October 2005, a Transport Canada
official, Sean O’Dell, recounted that Canada had “argued strongly that the twinning option was
not acceptable,” while acknowledging FHWA’s arguments that “eliminating this option could
not be done on the basis of the strict [environmental] analysis” and that the DRIC Partnership
“would be better off to delay a likely court challenge from the twinning proponents by keeping
[X12] on the short list and strengthening the case for dropping it through further analysis . . . .”
199. Canada’s own technical consultants and the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario
(“MTO”) took the position that X12 should be given further consideration. As recounted by Mr.
O’Dell in an October 2005 email, “[b]oth MTO and our consultants were strongly of the opinion
that X12 could not be ruled out at this point on the basis of the technical criteria used in the
assessment of the alternatives.” This conclusion was compelled by the fact that none of the
objections raised by Canada to X12 formed “part of the terms of reference of the accepted
criteria for this phase of the assessment,” and left Canada “as the sole partner arguing that [X12]
should be dropped now.” Yet later that month, Mr. O’Dell sent an email to FHWA objecting to
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the publication of a FHWA study on the NITC/DRIC because Canada did “not agree that X12
should proceed.”
200. In response to the position taken by MTO and its own consultants that X12 could
not be eliminated based on technical criteria, Canada pressured its consultants in a discussion
held on October 28, 2005 to “‘carefully review’ all of the material, in light of all of the concerns
that have been raised, so that they can be confident in making a recommendation.” A
supplemental report prepared the next week altered key findings about the impact of the X12
crossing—including increasing the projected number of homes to be displaced by the project,
purporting to find new deficiencies with respect to impacts on the natural environment and
regional mobility, and increasing the projected price tag of the crossing by C$200,000,000.
201. In particular, Canada assumed that X12—the twin of the Ambassador Bridge—
would require a new 120-acre plaza on the Canadian side based upon its false assumption that
X12 would have to be a publicly-owned bridge. This was erroneous for at least two reasons:
first, the construction of a bridge at X12 would be the privately-owned New Span, and would not
be publicly-owned (and certainly would not need to be publicly-owned); second, even if X12
were publicly-owned, that would not require a 120-acre new customs plaza. There is ample
room at the existing plaza to accommodate a new span at X12 without the need for the massive
expansion assumed by Canada. This erroneous assumption was adopted by Canada purely as a
pretext for rejecting X12, which it had no justification for rejecting. Indeed, in April of 2013,
Transport Canada issued a Draft Environmental Assessment confirming that the construction of
the New Span would not create any significant environmental or community impacts.
202. Moreover, Canada’s proposed 120-acre plaza would be more than six times the
size of the current plaza on the Canadian side of the Ambassador Bridge, which currently has
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significant excess capacity. Even the Canadian Border Services Agency, which would be
responsible for customs operations at the plaza, had indicated that no more than 40 acres would
be needed. As noted above, the community impacts projected by Canada for the hypothetical
new plaza at the X12 site stemmed largely from Canada’s deliberately inflated, false assumptions
as to the appropriate size of the plaza.
203. In rejecting the site of a twinned Ambassador Bridge as a practical alternative for
a new crossing, Canada also argued that building a highway connection to the new crossing
would cause “unacceptable negative environmental impacts on Windsor.” Any landing site
would require additional highway infrastructure, however, and the preferred alternative crossing
ultimately chosen by NITC/DRIC Proponents itself requires the construction of a new highway.
The proposed route of that new highway passes within a mile of the Ambassador Bridge plaza,
and for most of its length, it follows the same route that would be followed by an improved
highway connection to the Ambassador Bridge. That new highway to the NITC/DRIC also
imposes numerous community and environmental impacts, including (according to Canada) the
displacement of approximately 370 homes, changes to cohesion and character in some
neighborhood communities, the displacement of over fifty businesses, the displacement of a
church, a school, and other cultural institutions, the displacement of wildlife, and potential
mortality to species at risk.
204. Even before Canada received its manipulated “analysis” of the impacts of X12,
Canada was stating in its internal briefing papers relating to the selection of the “practical
alternatives” for the DRIC Project that X12 had been eliminated and that “the study team is
confident that the decision is consistent with the process identified in the [Terms of Reference],
and that there is adequate data to support such a decision”—precisely the opposite of what
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Canada’s study team had just advised. Canada’s decision to reject X12 had already been made
before a purported justification to do so was found.
205. For these reasons and others, it is clear that Canada chose its assumptions
regarding the impacts of the X12 location to manufacture a pretext for insisting that the other,
United States members of the DRIC Partnership accept its rejection of the X12 location.
206. Canada and its U.S. partners subsequently announced that X12 would not be
included among the practical alternatives that would undergo further evaluation. This decision to
reject location X12 ensured that the NITC/DRIC would be separate from the Ambassador Bridge
and that the highway connection—which had been promised to the Ambassador Bridge as
Canada’s half of the Ambassador Bridge Gateway Project—would funnel traffic solely to the
NITC/DRIC.
(3) FHWA’s Acquiescence In Canada’s Rejection Of The Twinning Of The Ambassador Bridge.
207. While these internal communications were taking place within Canada, Canada
was simultaneously engaged in discussions with FHWA to influence FHWA’s analysis of
location X12. In a document titled the “Evaluation of Studied Alternatives and Determination of
Practical Alternatives,” signed on November 10, 2005 but not made public until over two years
later as an appendix to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement issued by FHWA in February
2008, FHWA confirmed that “the twinning of the Ambassador Bridge (X12), [was] ranked high
on the U.S. side due to its minimal direct environmental impacts and its high regional mobility
ranking” but noted that “the Canadian Partners have stated their intent not to continue the study
of their portion of this alternative.” After endorsing the Canadian evaluation of X12, and noting
again “that the Canadian partners have firmly stated their objections to alternative X12 and their
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unwillingness to consider this alternative further,” FHWA concluded that X12 would not be
considered a practical alternative for further study on the U.S. side.
208. In his deposition testimony in this action, the U.S. defendants’ designated witness
from FHWA confirmed that FHWA relied entirely on the Canadian “analysis” to make a
decision under NEPA to eliminate site X12, rather than performing its own analysis. He further
confirmed that the sole reason why X12, the twin of the Ambassador Bridge, was rejected during
the U.S. review process was Canadian opposition. Recognizing that it had no reasons of its own
sufficient to reject location X12, FHWA noted to MDOT on February 4, 2008, in the context of
commenting on the draft Environmental Impact Statement for the DRIC, that “[i]t would be
helpful if we had something in the record from Canada saying officially that they hated this
alternative and it was a ‘dealbreaker.’”
209. In rejecting the X12 alternative to accommodate Canada’s wishes, FHWA closed
its eyes to Canada’s assumption, in conducting its “analysis,” that any new bridge had to be
publicly owned and would not make use of the Ambassador Bridge’s existing facilities.
Canada’s assumption was contrary to FHWA’s and the DRIC Partnership’s official neutrality as
to ownership and governance issues. By refusing to examine Canada’s assumptions and other
relevant issues independently, FHWA improperly abdicated agency authority to the Government
of Canada.
210. In 2008, having been pressured by Canada to reject the X12 solution that would
twin the Ambassador Bridge, and having dropped several other sites at the request of the
Governor of Michigan, the members of the DRIC Partnership were left only with locations in
downtown Detroit in close proximity to—but not directly twinning—the Ambassador Bridge. At
the site ultimately selected (location X10B), the new customs and toll plaza for the NITC/DRIC
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on the U.S. side is planned nearly to abut the existing plaza for the Ambassador Bridge and to
use the existing highway connections that were built for the Ambassador Bridge Gateway
Project. On the Canadian side, the planned site for the NITC/DRIC is less than two miles from
the Ambassador Bridge, but—as Canada intended when it rejected X12—the planned highway
connection bypasses the Ambassador Bridge and instead steers traffic to the site of the proposed
NITC/DRIC.
211. Moreover, the FHWA continues to take actions to discriminate in favor of
approving the costly and unnecessary NITC/DRIC and to oppose the privately financed
Ambassador Bridge New Span. For example, as alleged above, FHWA personnel have
interfered with the Coast Guard’s evaluation of the DIBC application for a navigational permit,
causing a meritless delay in that process.
212. In addition, in January and March 2011, the FHWA sent letters to MDOT
confirming that the $550 million that Canada has proposed “donating” to the State of Michigan
to help finance the construction of the NITC/DRIC will qualify as the non-federal share for
federal aid programs under Title 23 of the United States Code. In other words, FHWA has
committed to provide federal “matching funds” to Michigan based on the “donation” of money
that Canada is making to support the irrational and unnecessary NITC/DRIC. These letters were
included as an exhibit in support of the NITC/DRIC Application that was submitted to the State
Department.
213. Furthermore, because the NEPA review of the NITC/DRIC is more than three
years old, the FHWA is legally required to conduct an additional evaluation of the environmental
impacts of the NITC/DRIC, which it is currently refusing to conduct.
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214. FHWA is also required to conduct further reevaluations of the NITC/DRIC in
response to future requests by MDOT and other Michigan state entities for federal matching
funds.
215. Thus, through all of the foregoing actions, the FHWA has acted and continues to
act in a manner that is designed to discriminate in favor of the NITC/DRIC and to defeat
plaintiffs’ ability to construct the New Span.
(4) Lack Of Public Need For The NITC/DRIC.
216. Each of the reasons cited by Canada and FHWA for pursing the NITC/DRIC and
refusing to support the Ambassador Bridge New Span is merely a pretext and lacks any
reasonable or rational basis.
(a) Alleged Traffic Needs For A Second Bridge.
217. Canada and FHWA have contended that the NITC/DRIC will serve traffic needs.
Traffic levels in the Southeast Michigan and Southwest Ontario transportation corridor, however,
are not sufficient to support an additional bridge in the Detroit-Windsor area, an area known as
the “Central Corridor.” For that reason, if the proponents of the NITC/DRIC build the
NITC/DRIC, at least one of the two bridges—the Ambassador Bridge or the NITC/DRIC—is
destined for economic failure. State Department officials internally acknowledged this in
communications from the American Consulate in Toronto to the U.S. Secretary of State, saying
in December 2006 that “The financial feasibility of constructing a new separate bridge will be
undermined if Ambassador Bridge owners construct a new six-lane twin span; particularly if, as
now seems likely, the existing four-lane bridge span can be refurbished and kept in operation for
many years to come” and in April 2007 that “The intense political machinations of the Windsor
border crossing chess game continue. The race is on to see whether the DIBC can complete its
twin span before the bi-national DRIC project is ready.”
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218. As Canada and FHWA knew or should have known, a large portion of the traffic
across the Detroit River consists of trucks transporting automobile parts between factories in
Ontario and Michigan. Over many years, as the American auto industry has continued to
decline, so has traffic across the Ambassador Bridge and other crossings. Traffic has been
adversely affected by the loss of manufacturing in the American Midwest to low-cost foreign
manufacturers, the loss of U.S. market share of American automobile manufacturers and hence
their suppliers, the general downturn in the auto industry, and the loss of the formerly significant
numbers of Americans traveling to Caesar’s Windsor Casino to gamble before the explosion of
casinos operating in Michigan and Ohio.
219. At its height in 1999, traffic crossing the existing Central Corridor crossings (the
Ambassador Bridge and the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel) reached a maximum of approximately 22
million vehicle crossings per year (12.3 million vehicles at the Ambassador Bridge and 9.5
million vehicles at the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel). In 2010, the traffic volume was less than half
that: only about 10.7 million vehicle crossings per year (7.2 million vehicles at the Ambassador
Bridge and 3.5 million vehicles at the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel). Canada, FHWA, and the other
NITC/DRIC Proponents have not articulated any rational reasons to expect that this trend would
reverse or traffic would increase.
220. Nonetheless, Canada, FHWA, and the other NITC/DRIC Proponents publicly
took the position in the Planning/Needs Feasibility Study (“P/NF Study”) issued in January 2004
that the NITC/DRIC was needed to serve increased traffic needs, based on a projection that
crossings would rapidly increase, rising to 23.5 million vehicle crossings in 2009. To attempt to
justify this conclusion, the NITC/DRIC Proponents in the P/NF Study adopted a conclusion from
a report that had been prepared outside the public consultation process and that drew a straight
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line extrapolating upward from a brief, small increase in traffic around the time of the study,
ignoring what was otherwise a general downward trend in traffic patterns. The P/NF Study
offers no economic or other reasons to expect that such an increase would occur.
221. In contrast to their public statements relying on the P/NF study, internal
communications indicate that both FHWA and Canada recognized that there was no necessity for
another crossing. In an internal FHWA briefing paper from June 2006, FHWA recognized that
the Ambassador Bridge New Span was likely to “preclude the need for another publicly
controlled crossing for 30 years,” even if the inflated traffic projections set forth in the P/NF
Study proved accurate. Even if the NITC/DRIC were built, FHWA projected that the best
alternatives would only result in 3% fewer Vehicle Hours of Travel for border crossings in the
Central Corridor. A confidential memorandum regarding border infrastructure, drafted in March
2004 for the Canadian Minister of Finance, acknowledged the decrease in traffic across the
Ambassador Bridge and attributed it, in part, to a decrease in American visitors to Windsor
following the opening of new casinos in Michigan and long-haul truck traffic traveling across
alternative routes.
222. Canada and FHWA further acknowledged that observed border delays at the
Ambassador Bridge were the result of the shortage of customs staff supplied by the U.S. and
Canadian governments rather than any shortage of capacity of the bridge and associated
facilities. Even the 2004 P/NF Study acknowledged that “one of the key challenges facing
border processing agencies, particularly on the U.S. side of the border, is having sufficient
staffing available,” and an undated draft of an FHWA report titled “The Northern Border” was
even more explicit: “one of the most critical issues the crossing is facing is the lack of staffing.”
The same report noted that the present level of staffing at the border was less than half what was
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actually needed. According to the 2004 confidential memorandum for the Canadian Minster of
Finance, “most delays at the [U.S.-Canadian] border are not caused by inadequate
infrastructure,” noting a 2003 study that found delays “were mainly the result of inadequate
customs’ staffing levels, particularly on the U.S. side.” An independent review and assessment
prepared by Dr. John C. Taylor for the Ontario Ministry of Transportation’s consultant in July
2004 confirmed that “existing border backups and delays are a function of inadequate border
processing infrastructure and staffing, and not a result of bridge roadbed capacity problems.”
223. In fact, the traffic projections in the P/NF Study, on which Canada and FHWA
publicly relied despite their private doubts, have turned out to be completely wrong. The traffic
data in the intervening seven years since the P/NF Study shows a decline in traffic in accordance
with the general trend, not the sharp increase predicted by the P/NF Study. In 2010, only about
7.2 million trucks, buses, and passenger vehicles crossed the Ambassador Bridge, not the 14.7
million that the P/NF Study predicted.
224. The economic changes in the automobile and other manufacturing industries and
the loss of cross-border traffic to casinos in Windsor continue to have a major adverse effect on
bridge traffic today. Canada’s and FHWA’s projection of increased traffic based on the P/NF
study, however, assumes these changes never occurred. Subsequent traffic projections published
by NITC/DRIC proponents are similarly outdated, speculative, and incomplete, and are contrary
to observed trends in traffic volume.
225. Moreover, even if traffic levels do recover, plaintiffs have demonstrated through
their investments at the Ambassador Bridge that technological improvements can produce
substantial reductions in customs processing times, thereby increasing capacity without
additional bridge infrastructure. Plaintiffs have recently constructed state-of-the-art customs
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preclearance facilities in Canada, where trucks headed toward the Ambassador Bridge can
transmit their customs paperwork electronically to U.S. customs inspectors hours before the
trucks even arrive at the bridge. As a result of this advance, the average number of trucks
diverted to secondary inspection decreased from approximately 800 per day in 2008, prior to the
opening of the preclearance facility, to fewer than twenty four per day in 2011. Plaintiffs plan to
construct similar facilities in the United States for trucks planning to cross the Ambassador
Bridge into Canada. These improvements, paid for by plaintiffs’ private funds, have greatly
improved the speed of customs clearance across the border and have served as a model that
customs border officials have made a future requirement for all international crossings between
the United States and Canada.
226. David Jacobson, the U.S. Ambassador to Canada, acknowledged in a speech
delivered in Ottawa on Tuesday, March 9, 2010, that border crossings between the United States
and Canada are faster than they were before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, despite
greatly heightened security requirements, because of technological improvements. In 2010, the
average delay for vehicles crossing into Canada on the Ambassador Bridge at the peak traffic
hour during the afternoon was only ten minutes.
227. Even if additional bridge capacity were needed, it could be served more cheaply
and efficiently—and consistently with plaintiffs’ legal rights—by twinning the Ambassador
Bridge with the goal of keeping both spans open after renovations on the original span. The
FEIS for the NITC/DRIC, prepared by FHWA based on FHWA’s inflated traffic projections,
concluded that ten lanes of roadway will be required to handle the traffic anticipated in 2035.
There are four lanes in the current span of the Ambassador Bridge, six lanes proposed for the
New Span of the Ambassador Bridge, two lanes at the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, the equivalent of
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two lanes in the form of the two Canadian Pacific rail tunnels under the Detroit River, the
equivalent of two additional lanes in the form of a proposed double-stacked Canadian Pacific rail
tunnel under the Detroit River, and the equivalent of one lane in the form of the Detroit-Windsor
Truck Ferry. Together, these existing and anticipated crossings will provide more than ample
capacity across (or under) the Detroit River. These crossings are in addition to the six lanes of
the twinned Blue Water Bridge between Port Huron, Michigan and Sarnia, Ontario, the
equivalent of two lanes in the form of the Canadian National double-stacked rail tunnel in Port
Huron, Michigan, the equivalent of two lanes in the form of the ferries operating between Port
Huron, Michigan and Sarnia, Ontario, and the equivalent of one lane in the form of a ferry
between Algonac, Michigan and Ontario.
228. As explained above, Congress and the State Department have already confirmed
that DIBC has the right to expand or twin the Ambassador Bridge by adding the New Span,
which DIBC is actively trying to do. Despite this, FHWA’s traffic projections fail to take into
account the increased traffic capacity that the New Span will provide.
(b) Alleged Community Impacts Of Ambassador Bridge Improvements On The Canadian Side Of The River.
229. Canada has also suggested that the NITC/DRIC is necessary and that any
expansion of the Ambassador Bridge is inappropriate because of the Ambassador Bridge’s
alleged impacts on the surrounding community, based on the assumption that the construction of
an Ambassador Bridge New Span would require an expanded bridge plaza in Windsor.
230. However, as Canada and FHWA know or should know, there is no need for an
expanded Ambassador Bridge plaza, and plaintiffs’ plans to connect the New Span to the
existing plaza do not require an expansion of the plaza. As discussed, the requirement for an
expanded plaza on the Canadian side, analyzed by Canada in rejecting twinning of the
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Ambassador Bridge as part of the DRIC Project, assumed that the new crossing would be
publicly owned, that the existing facilities owned by plaintiffs would not be available for the new
crossing, and that the newly constructed plaza would be much larger than required.
231. As noted, plaintiffs have already constructed the ramps that would connect the
New Span to the existing plazas on the U.S. and Canadian sides. All the land between the
connection ramps and the river on the Canadian side is already owned by CTC, so no additional
land acquisition on the Canadian side would be required to complete the New Span and connect
it to the existing plazas.
232. Canada also has claimed that the twinning of the Ambassador Bridge is
inappropriate because of the absence of a direct highway connection from the Ambassador
Bridge to Highway 401 in Canada. The reason there is no highway connection to the
Ambassador Bridge is because Canadian officials diverted the C$300 million that had been
allocated to building such a connection to other uses. As a result, the improvement to the access
route to the Ambassador Bridge, which was designed to complement the Ambassador Bridge
Gateway Project on the U.S. side, never occurred. And, as noted above, the impacts of a
highway connection to the Ambassador Bridge are similar to those of the proposed highway
connection to the NITC/DRIC, most of which follow the same route as would a highway
connection to the Ambassador Bridge.
(c) Alleged Need For Redundancy.
233. Canada, FHWA, and the other NITC/DRIC proponents have also cited
“redundancy” as a reason for building the new NITC/DRIC, meaning that having two bridges
(the NITC/DRIC and the Ambassador Bridge) would avoid traffic interruption in the event that a
natural or manmade disaster or other incident shut down one of the bridges. FHWA has
variously described the need for “redundancy” as related to ensuring “fiscal security” and
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“physical security,” but has stated that both refer to the risk to transportation that would result
from the disruption of a crossing.
234. However, once the decision was made to site the proposed NITC/DRIC in the
near vicinity of the Ambassador Bridge, any “redundancy” justification ceased to apply.
Building a new bridge in close proximity to the existing Ambassador Bridge in the Central
Corridor would not provide materially greater redundancy in the system than would a second
Ambassador Bridge span, because a problem such as a natural disaster or terrorist attack at one
bridge would almost certainly affect the other. In 2005, the U.S. Department of State sent a
letter to FHWA advising them “that the proximity of any new crossing to the existing crossings
may mean that a problem at any one crossing may affect all the centrally-located crossings.”
235. Moreover, in addition to the Ambassador Bridge, several other border crossings
are already in operation between eastern Michigan and southwestern Ontario. In the Central
Corridor alone, international traffic has at least two alternatives to the Ambassador Bridge. The
Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, operated by the cities of Detroit and Windsor, has been in operation
since 1930, providing a second road connection for cars and trucks less than three miles from the
Ambassador Bridge. The Detroit-Windsor Truck Ferry, operating since 1990, provides another
alternative for trucks just two miles from the Ambassador Bridge.
236. Other crossings are available a short distance from the Central Corridor. The
Blue Water Bridge, which connects Port Huron, Michigan and Sarnia, Ontario across the St.
Clair River about 60 miles north of the Ambassador Bridge, provides a third road connection for
cars and trucks. Traffic from Chicago to Toronto travels almost exactly the same distance
whether it uses the Ambassador Bridge or the Blue Water Bridge. The publicly owned Blue
Water Bridge has been open since 1938 and was twinned in 1997 with public funds from Canada
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and the U.S. to increase its traffic capacity, without any objection by Canada or FHWA that
twinning would not contribute to redundancy.
237. Twenty miles south of the Blue Water Bridge, the St. Clair River ferries provide
connections for cars and trucks between Marine City, Michigan and Sombra, Ontario, and
between Algonac, Michigan and Walpole Island, Ontario. Moreover, there are two railway
connections in the area: the Canadian Pacific Railroad has a tunnel between Detroit and
Windsor, built in 1910 and located a mile from the Ambassador Bridge, which is currently being
modified to allow double-stacked railcars; and the Canada National Rail Tunnel provides a
railway connection between Port Huron and Sarnia. Each of these crossings would provide an
additional means of transportation between the United States and Canada in the greater Detroit-
Windsor area in the event that traffic is ever interrupted at the existing Ambassador Bridge span,
the proposed Ambassador Bridge New Span, or both.
(d) Alleged Need For Public Governance.
238. Canada, FHWA, and the other proponents of the NITC/DRIC have often cited
governance concerns as a reason for rejecting private ownership of any new crossing. According
to FHWA, public ownership of the bridge, preferably through a public-private partnership with a
long-term concession agreement to a private entity, is justified by the public policy goals of
minimizing the use of public taxpayer funds while providing a safe and secure crossing.
239. Unlike the proposed NITC/DRIC, the Ambassador Bridge New Span would not
use any public funds at all and thus would be a superior means of meeting the goal of minimizing
the use of public taxpayer funds.
240. Moreover, defendants have not disputed that plaintiffs and their predecessors have
provided travelers a safe and secure crossing for nearly 82 years. Since 2008, expenditures by
plaintiffs on security and safety have averaged approximately $700,000 annually. In addition,
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DIBC has obtained assessments of the Ambassador Bridge applying the National Bridge
Inspection Standards, and the bridge has consistently been judged to be far safer than many
publicly owned crossings. Border security at the Ambassador Bridge is also state of the art and
constantly improving. In 2002, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Jean Chretien
lauded steps taken by DIBC, CTC, and customs authorities to tighten border security through the
Free and Secure Trade initiative and expanded use of photo identification.
241. Any safety and security concerns of defendants regarding a privately owned
bridge can be addressed by reasonable safety and security regulations. In fact, over 85% of the
country’s critical infrastructure, as determined by the Department of Homeland Security, is
owned by the private sector. Moreover, if plaintiffs’ operation of a crossing ever became
unsatisfactory, Canada and the U.S. could exercise their powers of eminent domain. They have
never attempted to do so.
(e) Canada’s Continued Effort To Discriminate Against The New Span And In Favor Of The NITC/DRIC.
242. As alleged above, Canada has provided prompt regulatory approvals for the
NITC/DRIC project, even while delaying unreasonably and indefinitely any approvals for the
much smaller and less environmentally impactful project of allowing plaintiffs to exercise their
right to build the New Span to the existing Ambassador Bridge.
243. Another glaring example of Canada’s discrimination against the New Span and in
favor of the NITC/DRIC can be found in Canada’s development of a highway connection
between the location of the proposed NITC/DRIC (which does not exist and has not even been
approved yet), and its refusal to build similar highway connections to the Ambassador Bridge.
244. Specifically, in 2005 (and subsequent years), Canada deliberately altered its road
construction plans to avoid improving the roads accessing the Ambassador Bridge. First, Canada
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committed itself to building a new bridge (the NITC/DRIC) that would be owned and operated
by the Canadian Government (or a private concessionaire chosen by the Canadian Government),
not by DIBC. Second, Canada created a plan to build a highway connection from Highway 401
to the chosen location for the NITC/DRIC (but not to the Ambassador Bridge). This new
highway connection is called the Windsor-Essex Parkway.
245. Canada deliberately designed the Windsor-Essex Parkway to avoid improving the
connection between the Ambassador Bridge and Highway 401. Initially, Canada adopted a
circuitous design that was wholly impractical, and that had as its sole justification the desire to
avoid connecting with the road that leads up to the Ambassador Bridge, because Canada was
committed to undermining the viability of the American-owned Ambassador Bridge.
246. After it became infeasible for Canada to embark on its original design of the
Windsor-Essex Parkway, it adopted a modified design that expanded and improved the roads
connecting Highway 401 along a route that led to both the Ambassador Bridge and the proposed
site of the NITC/DRIC. However, Canada deliberately stopped improving the connections just
two kilometers short of the Ambassador Bridge, choosing instead to develop and improve its
roads in a way that veered off the route to the Ambassador Bridge, towards the proposed site of
the NITC/DRIC. Thus, the end result is that the Windsor-Essex Parkway is approximately 11
kilometers long in total; over this total length, approximately 9 kilometers cover the route
between Highway 401 and the Ambassador Bridge. The final two kilometers to the Ambassador
Bridge were then deliberately left undeveloped, even while the remainder of the Parkway was
built in a different direction, away from the existing Ambassador Bridge, toward the site of the
unauthorized NITC/DRIC. Again, the only reason for Canada’s refusal to develop the Windsor-
Essex Parkway in a manner that covered the entire connection between Highway 401 and the
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Ambassador Bridge was its desire to undermine the American-owned Ambassador Bridge.
There is no other rational explanation.
247. Moreover, as noted above, Canada has used the fact that the final 2 kilometers of
the Windsor-Essex Parkway run to an unauthorized bridge rather than to the New Span as a
reason to refuse to authorize the New Span.
248. In December 2006, the American Consulate in Toronto noted in a communication
to the Secretary of State that “Windsor city officials, including recently re-elected Mayor Eddie
Francis, have retained high-caliber legal counsel who will certainly continue to pursue every
avenue to obstruct construction of a privately-owned twin span by the Ambassador Bridge that
would put more traffic on connecting city streets.”
249. Canada has recently taken additional steps in its effort to discriminate against the
New Span and in favor of the NITC/DRIC. In December 2012, the Canadian Parliament passed
legislation called the “Bridge to Strengthen Trade Act” that exempted the NITC/DRIC from a
number of Canadian regulatory approval requirements, either by granting the NITC/DRIC
automatic approval or by explicitly exempting the NITC/DRIC from the requirement. The
regulatory approvals the NITC/DRIC is no longer required to meet include the Fisheries Act, the
Navigable Waters Protection Act, the Species at Risk Act, section 6 of the IBTA, the Port
Authorities Operations Regulations, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, and any
additional requirement under any Canadian federal act to obtain a permit, license, approval, or
other authorization in relation to the construction of the NITC/DRIC or any related work from
which the Governor in Council decides to exempt the NITC/DRIC.
250. The Bridge to Strengthen Trade Act does not exempt the Ambassador Bridge
New Span from any requirements of Canadian law. Rather, as described in the Windsor Star and
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Detroit Free Press, Canadian officials have explained that this legislation was intended to
“insulate the DRIC (Detroit River International Crossing) from any future lawsuit on the
Canadian side by exempting the DRIC from any laws under which it would have to get permits
and permissions and things like that.”
251. Thus, the recent legislation is additional evidence of the effort Canada is making
to prevent the plaintiffs from exercising their right to build the New Span, and to ensure that the
NITC/DRIC is built before the New Span can be built.
252. Terrence Corcoran, the editor of the Canadian Financial Post, explained the
motivation behind Canada’s continued discrimination against the New Span in favor of the
NITC/DRIC: “[Prime Minister] Harper is the heavy-handed statist trying to cripple a private
entrepreneur. What Mr. Harper is really doing is using government power to do what Canadian
governments have wanted to do for at least five decades: thwart the private ownership – and if
possible take control – of the Ambassador Bridge.” Responding to a statement by Prime
Minister Harper that it is “ludicrous” that the Ambassador Bridge is privately owned, Mr.
Corcoran wrote: “If there’s anything ludicrous taking place here, it’s the great public-policy con
job around the need for a brand new bridge that in the end will require U.S. and Canadian
government spending of $4 billion – all to build a bridge for which there is no market.” He
concludes: “The Harper plan puts Canadian and U.S. taxpayers at risk. And all for – what? To
expand the role of government at the expense of private industry.”
E. The Crossing Agreement.
253. As described above, the Governor of Michigan, MDOT, MSF, and Canada
recently entered into a “Crossing Agreement” setting out the process for building the
NITC/DRIC. The Crossing Agreement commits Canada to a number of commercial activities in
the United States.
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254. The United States has previously contended in litigation with DIBC that DIBC’s
operation of the Ambassador Bridge, an international crossing between Canada and Michigan,
constitutes a “commercial enterprise.” In a separate case, the Sixth Circuit found that the State
of Michigan “takes the role of a market participant when it joins” with a private company to
construct ramps up to a privately-owned international crossing, even when using public funds to
complete its share of the work. In addition, of the 33 international bridges and tunnels between
the United States and Canada, 11 are privately owned. The operation of an international toll
bridge constitutes a commercial activity that a private party can engage in and continues to
constitute a commercial activity when a public party engages in it.
255. The Crossing Agreement admits that it “provides a framework for a Crossing
Authority established by Canada to design, construct, finance, operate, and maintain a new
International Crossing between Canada and Michigan . . . .” It requires Canada to “establish the
Crossing Authority” and provides that “The members of the Crossing Authority shall consist of
Canada and, at the discretion of Canada, Ontario.” The Crossing Authority is required to engage
in commercial activity in the United States because it is deemed to be “responsible for” a number
of aspects of this commercial enterprise, including “the design, construction, financing, operation
and maintenance” of the entire NITC/DRIC, half of which is located in the United States. The
business of planning, designing, constructing, financing, and operating the bridge is a
commercial activity, and activities related to those responsibilities that take place in the United
States are commercial activities in the United States.
F. The State Department’s Presidential Permit Application Process and Approval.
256. On July 11, 2012, the State Department published in the Federal Register an
application for a Presidential permit for the NITC/DRIC. The NITC/DRIC Application sought
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(1) a Presidential permit to build the NITC/DRIC and (2) State Department approval for the
Crossing Agreement entered into by the Governor of Michigan, MDOT, MSF, and Canada.
(1) The State Department Did Not Have The Constitutional Power To Approve The Crossing Agreement.
257. The Supreme Court has long held that Congress may not delegate the legislative
powers vested in it under the Constitution to the other branches of government unless it provides
an “intelligible principle” to which the party authorized to act under the delegation is required to
conform. Thus, for Congress to constitutionally delegate a legislative power to an administrative
agency, it must provide that agency with a clear and intelligible standard to follow in wielding
that legislative power.
258. Article 1, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “No State shall, without the
consent of Congress . . . enter into any agreement or compact with any other state, or with a
foreign power . . . .”
259. In the IBA, Congress provided its consent “for a State . . . to enter into agreements
(1) with the Government of Canada, a Canadian Province, or a subdivision or instrumentality of
either, in the case of a bridge connecting the United States and Canada . . . for the construction,
operation, or maintenance of such bridge in accordance with the applicable provisions of this
subchapter. The effectiveness of such agreement shall be conditioned on its approval by the
Secretary of State.” This constitutes a delegation of Congress’s Article 1, § 10 power. However,
the IBA fails to provide any guiding principle at all, let alone an intelligible principle, for the
State Department to apply in approving agreements entered into between a State and a foreign
country. The IBA’s purported delegation to the State Department of Congress’s power to
approve such agreements is therefore unconstitutional.
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260. The State Department has admitted in writing that, in delegating to the State
Department the power to approve agreements between a State and a foreign government, the
IBA “does not set forth a particular standard but rather provides broad discretion to the
Secretary of State in considering whether to approve an agreement between a U.S. state and the
government of either Canada or Mexico” (emphasis added). Thus, the State Department has
admitted that the IBA delegates a legislative power to the State Department without providing an
intelligible standard. This confirms that the IBA’s purported delegation is unconstitutional.
(2) DIBC Raised Numerous Reasons Why The NITC/DRIC Application Is Defective And Should Be Rejected; Despite This, The State Department Granted The Permit And Purported to Approve The Crossing Agreement.
261. In response to the NITC/DRIC Application, plaintiffs submitted a Comment on
August 9, 2012 and a Supplemental Comment on September 10, 2012 to the State Department,
both of which explained to the State Department that it should promptly reject the NITC/DRIC
Application for a number of reasons, including that the NITC/DRIC Application sought approval
of an agreement illegally executed by the Governor, MDOT, and MSF. Plaintiffs also
demonstrated that the proposed NITC/DRIC violates the plaintiffs’ exclusive statutory and
contractual franchise rights to construct, maintain, and operate an international bridge between
Detroit and Windsor; that it violates plaintiffs’ right to build a New Span to the Ambassador
Bridge; that there is no need for the NITC/DRIC and, in fact, it is demonstrably unnecessary; and
that the NITC/DRIC is contrary to the national interest for numerous reasons, including the fact
that it involves a public subsidy that is being used to undermine a privately-owned United States
business. In addition, plaintiffs demonstrated that the State Department was required to comply
with NEPA in considering the permit application. This included the need to ensure it had an
environmental analysis that it had independently reviewed and endorsed and which reached
independent environmental conclusions, based on all relevant information available to it at the
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time of its decision (such as up-to-date and correct traffic data), not simply that information
which may have been relied upon in earlier years or by other agencies at earlier moments. This
further included a duty to independently assess the purpose and need for the NITC/DRIC in light
of information known or available at the time of the State Department’s decision, including, for
example, through the consideration of up-to-date and correct traffic and other data (which had
not been considered by the outdated FHWA EIS).
262. The NITC/DRIC Application failed to demonstrate the need for the NITC/DRIC,
and relied on outdated and inaccurate traffic projections instead of the actual traffic data showing
far lower levels of traffic that cannot possibly justify the investment required to build the
NITC/DRIC. Moreover, the NITC/DRIC Application did not even discuss the New Span, and
made no effort to demonstrate that the NITC/DRIC would be needed over and above the New
Span. The NITC/DRIC Application appears to have been premised upon the inaccurate
assumption that the New Span would not be constructed, even though the State Department
acknowledged in 2005 that plaintiffs have the right to build the New Span, and even though
plaintiffs have been seeking to exercise that right for almost a decade. Thus, without explanation
or discussion, the NITC/DRIC Application was implicitly premised on an assumption that
plaintiffs would be prevented from exercising their statutory right to build the New Span. In any
event, by failing even to discuss the New Span, the NITC/DRIC Application failed to present an
adequate or accurate discussion of either the necessity for, or the national interest in, approving
and constructing the NITC/DRIC.
(a) The Illegality Of The Crossing Agreement.
263. The State Department does not have the authority to approve an application for a
new bridge that depends upon an illegal agreement. Indeed, the State Department has recognized
that it will not process a Presidential permit application until such “application is complete.” An
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application obviously cannot be “complete” if it seeks approval for an agreement that is illegal or
unauthorized, or otherwise entered into in violation of state law.
264. Plaintiffs notified the State Department in their Comment and Supplemental
Comment that the NITC/DRIC Application was incomplete because, among other reasons, all
three United States parties that entered into the Crossing Agreement on which the NITC/DRIC
Application was based did so in flagrant violation of Michigan law. The Michigan Legislature
has passed multiple statutes prohibiting MDOT and MSF from “expend[ing] any state
transportation revenue for construction planning or construction of the Detroit River
International Crossing” and stating that they “shall not commit the state to any new contract
related to the construction planning or construction of the Detroit River International Crossing.”
Act of Jun. 26, 2012, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 200, § 384(1), 2012 Mi. ALS 200 (2012); Act of
June 29, 2012, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 236, § 402(1), 2012 Mi. ALS 236 (2012).
265. Further, the Michigan Constitution does not permit the Governor to bind the State
to an agreement to build an international bridge absent legislative approval, which was not given
in this case. As noted above, the Michigan Legislature instead expressly prohibited spending any
money or entering any agreements related to the NITC/DRIC and, in each appropriation bill for
the last three fiscal years, prohibited appropriations to the Executive Office from being used “to
support any staff effort, projects, consultant expenses, or any other activity related to the
development, financing, construction, operation, or implementation of the Detroit River
International Crossing.” Act of Jun. 26, 2012, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 200, § 925(a), 2012 Mi.
ALS 200 (2012); Act of Jun. 21, 2011, 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 63, § 925(a), 2011 Mi. ALS 63
(2011); Act of Sep. 30, 2010, 2010 Mich. Pub. Acts 191, § 925(a), 2010 Mi. ALS 191 (2010).
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266. The FHWA itself has recognized that “MDOT does not currently have the
authority to construct the DRIC project. Legislation would have to be enacted to authorize
MDOT to construct the DRIC project.” It has also stated that the NITC/DRIC is “contingent
upon, among other things, approval by the Michigan Legislature” and that “there is no dispute
that the DRIC may not go forward today without the approval from the state legislature.” Recent
documents produced by the Department of Transportation in response to FOIA requests likewise
state that the United States “Recognizes need for Michigan legislation and required US State
Dept. reviews,” in contrast to the Canadian view that incorrectly “Presumes various agreements
between Michigan and Canada can be finalized before needed Michigan legislation.” Similarly,
the State Department has recognized that it is “the Michigan legislature which must approve a
public/private partnership to build the project . . . . If the legislature does approve the project, the
key next step will be an application to the Department of State for a Presidential Permit.” The
Michigan Legislature has refused to provide such approval.
267. Nevertheless, the parties to the Crossing Agreement continue to proceed with
their plans to build the NITC/DRIC under its terms. For example, on October 9, 2012, the
Governor in Council of Canada issued letters patent for the incorporation of the Windsor-Detroit
Bridge Authority for the purpose of constructing the NITC/DRIC pursuant to the terms of the
Crossing Agreement.
(b) The NITC/DRIC Application Was Premature.
268. Plaintiffs also notified the State Department in their Comment and Supplemental
Comment that the NITC/DRIC Application was premature due to the extensive amount of
ongoing litigation related to the legality of the NITC/DRIC, including this suit, and the
Application’s dependence upon the outdated NITC/DRIC FEIS discussed above, among other
reasons.
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269. In addition, the State Department failed to respond to numerous Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) requests submitted by plaintiffs for documents related to the
NITC/DRIC Application. Most glaringly, the State Department has yet to fully produce
documents in response to a FOIA request from as long ago as November 2011.
(c) The State Department Processed The NITC/DRIC Application, Purported To Approve The Crossing Agreement, And Granted A Presidential Permit For The NITC/DRIC.
270. On October 25, 2012, plaintiffs submitted a letter to the State Department asking
it to confirm that it would not process the NITC/DRIC Application due to the legal invalidity of
the Crossing Agreement and the State Department’s lack of constitutional authority to approve
such agreements, as well as for other reasons making the Application invalid, incomplete, and
premature.
271. Based upon prior communications, plaintiffs formed the understanding that the
State Department would not agree to give this confirmation, but instead was reviewing the
NITC/DRIC Application notwithstanding its legal infirmities. Thus, plaintiffs’ letter informed
the State Department that if no response was received, plaintiffs would assume that the State
Department was not agreeing to reject the NITC/DRIC Application as legally invalid,
incomplete, or premature.
272. On November 1, 2012, the State Department indicated that that it would not
respond to DIBC’s request for confirmation that the State Department understands that the
NITC/DRIC Application is based on an illegal and invalid Crossing Agreement, and indicated
instead that it was evaluating the Application and the comments it has received.
273. On April 18, 2013, the State Department published a notice in the Federal
Register informing the public that it had issued a Presidential Permit to the State of Michigan for
construction, operation, and maintenance of the NITC/DRIC. [78 Fed. Reg. No. 75 (April 18,
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2013) (the “State Department Notice of Approval”)]. This Notice did not mention whether or
not the State Department had also granted the separate approval of the Crossing Agreement.
274. On April 19, 2013, counsel for plaintiffs wrote to counsel for the U.S. defendants
to confirm that approval of the Crossing Agreement would occur separately from issuance of the
Presidential Permit and inquiring whether such approval of the Crossing Agreement had also
been granted.
275. On April 26, 2013, counsel for the U.S. defendants responded, confirming that
“the Presidential Permit itself does not include an approval of the Crossing Agreement,” but that
such separate approval of the Crossing Agreement had been granted by a letter dated April 12,
2013 from the State Department to counsel for Governor Snyder of Michigan.
276. The State Department issued the foregoing approvals without engaging in any
independent environmental analysis of the NITC/DRIC or any assessment under NEPA of the
purpose and need for the NITC/DRIC, and failed to give any indication that it considered any of
the up-to-date and accurate traffic data, which would have demonstrated that there are
insufficient traffic levels to justify the NITC/DRIC, and there is no need for the NITC/DRIC.
The failure to recognize current and more updated traffic information showing lower traffic
levels must, in turn, have resulted in a violation of NEPA, which demands that decision-makers
reach final judgments only after they have understood the benefits to be achieved given a
project’s environmental consequences. An analysis that overestimates the benefits for a given
environmental impact that the NITC/DRIC bridge will impose necessarily skews that
assessment: with no traffic justification for the NITC/DRIC, and hence by definition “fewer”
(i.e., no) benefits from the proposed new bridge, it is much more likely that the environmental
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costs of building the NITC/DRIC would not be considered worthwhile to incur. The State
Department’s approach prevented it from engaging in the required, reasoned decision-making.
277. Thus, despite the legal infirmities in the Crossing Agreement and the inadequate
factual presentation contained in the NITC/DRIC Application, the State Department granted
approval to the Crossing Agreement and issued the Presidential Permit.
G. Violation Of Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights
278. As described above, the U.S. defendants have engaged in a consistent and
repeated pattern of conduct that discriminates against the privately-owned New Span in favor of
the government-owned NITC/DRIC, which the U.S. defendants have sought to promote while
attempting to slow down and prevent the construction of the New Span. Such discriminatory
actions include (but are not limited to) (a) the concerted effort by all defendants for more than a
decade to build the government-owned new span (i.e., the NITC/DRIC), and to prevent plaintiffs
from exercising their right to build their New Span; (b) the Coast Guard’s refusal for the past
eight years to grant a navigational permit for the New Span, without any valid justification or
legal basis for that refusal, thereby preventing plaintiffs from exercising their statutory right to
build the New Span during the period that the government-owned NITC/DRIC sought to obtain
its approvals in advance of the previously-authorized New Span; (c) the Coast Guard’s decision
to delay and refuse to finalize its NEPA review of the New Span, even as the FHWA accelerated
the NEPA approvals for the NITC/DRIC; (d) the State Department’s decision to grant the
NITC/DRIC a Presidential permit (which the State Department was aware would eviscerate
plaintiffs’ right to build the New Span), despite the fact that the Crossing Agreement violates
Michigan law, despite the fact that the NITC/DRIC Application relies on inaccurate and outdated
traffic projections, and despite the fact that the NITC/DRIC fails even to attempt to demonstrate
that the NITC/DRIC is needed over and above the New Span (which it clearly is not). Indeed,
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defendants have acknowledged that there is no need for both plaintiffs’ privately-owned New
Span and the government-owned NITC/DRIC. Thus, by discriminating against the approval of
the plaintiffs’ New Span and in favor of the accelerated approval of the government-owned
NITC/DRIC, the defendants have effectively sought to deny plaintiffs their ability to exercise
their statutory right to build the New Span.
279. These discriminatory actions are neither narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest, nor substantially related to an important government interest, nor
reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. They are unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, made applicable to the United States
federal government through the Fifth Amendment.
280. When government entities enter into commerce in order to compete with
privately-owned entities, they must compete on a level playing field, subject to equal treatment
guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause. There is no rational basis for the government to
discriminate in favor of a government-owned commercial venture such as the NITC/DRIC, and
against a privately-owned venture like the New Span. By discriminating against the privately-
owned New Span and in favor of the government-owned NITC/DRIC, the U.S. defendants have
violated DIBC’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
281. There also can be no rational basis for discriminating against a private entity that
has already received Congressional approval for its bridge, and in favor of government entities
that have not received Congressional approval for their competing bridge. Thwarting the will of
Congress cannot be a rational basis for discriminating against a private party and in favor of
government agencies. Thus, there is no rational basis for the U.S. defendants to have
consistently discriminated in favor of a potential government-owned bridge that was never given
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Congressional authorization (the NITC/DRIC), and against a privately-owned bridge that was
already in existence, and that already has a longstanding Congressional authorization, including
for the construction of its planned New Span. Indeed, this discrimination is especially irrational
and unjustified because Congress has appropriated substantial sums of money to improve the
highway connections to the Ambassador Bridge, expressly in order to promote and protect the
plans for the New Span to the Ambassador Bridge.
282. There likewise was no rational basis for the U.S. defendants to have purposely
eliminated consideration of the privately-owned New Span in its alleged consideration of all
alternatives to the NITC/DRIC, as required by NEPA. In particular, there was no rational basis
for the U.S. defendants to have eliminated the New Span from consideration given that it had no
environmental impact and hence was environmentally preferable to the NITC/DRIC, which will
displace approximately 257 private hiomes, 43 businesses, and 9 churches and non-profits. The
New Span was eliminated from consideration solely because of an irrational desire to favor a
government-owned bridge rather than a privately-owned bridge, in breach of the statute
authorizing the privately-owned bridge.
283. There is likewise no rational basis for the U.S. defendants to have deliberately
delayed the grant of a Coast Guard navigational permit to the Ambassador Bridge New Span in
order to allow the NITC/DRIC to receive its necessary approvals first, permitting its construction
to overtake the New Span’s.
284. There is likewise no rational basis for the U.S. defendants to further the efforts of
Canada and the governor of Michigan to enter into commercial competition with plaintiffs by
promoting their publicly-owned bridge to compete with plaintiffs’ privately-owned bridge.
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285. Thus, the actions taken by the U.S. defendants to discriminate against the New
Span and in favor of the NITC/DRIC violate plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
H. Defendants’ Conduct Is Causing Irreparable Harm To Plaintiffs.
286. Plaintiffs have been damaged by the violations of their rights set forth in each of
the claims described below in this Third Amended Complaint.
287. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law for each of the claims set forth in this
Third Amended Complaint and will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not granted.
Money damages would be inadequate, as plaintiffs’ perpetual franchise to own and operate the
Ambassador Bridge and to build the New Span constitutes unique and irreplaceable property
rights.
288. In particular, the fact that the State Department issued a Presidential permit to the
NITC/DRIC and granted its purported approval to the Crossing Agreement causes immediate
and irreparable harm to plaintiffs. By proceeding to assert jurisdiction over the NITC/DRIC
Application and the Crossing Agreement, the State Department is supporting and giving
credence to the efforts of other agencies to delay and defeat plaintiffs’ right to build the New
Span. As alleged above, both the Coast Guard and Canadian authorities have demonstrated a
refusal and unwillingness to process even ministerial applications relating to the New Span,
which reflects, at least in part, their effort to promote the NITC/DRIC instead of the New Span.
If it were clear that the NITC/DRIC Application could not be granted by the State Department,
and that the Crossing Agreement was both unconstitutional and illegal, it would not be possible
for the Coast Guard and Canadian regulatory authorities to continue to delay and obstruct
plaintiffs’ longstanding efforts to obtain what should be non-controversial approvals for the New
Span.
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COUNT ONE
Violation of Foreign Compact Clause; Invalidity of Crossing Agreement: Declaratory and Injunctive Relief – United States Department of State and Secretary of State
289. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
290. Article 1, § 10, clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides that “No State
shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any agreement or compact with any other
state, or with a foreign power . . . .”
291. In the IBA, Congress provided its consent “for a State . . . to enter into agreements
(1) with the Government of Canada, a Canadian Province, or a subdivision or instrumentality of
either, in the case of a bridge connecting the United States and Canada . . . for the construction,
operation, or maintenance of such bridge in accordance with the applicable provisions of this
subchapter. The effectiveness of such agreement shall be conditioned on its approval by the
Secretary of State.” This constitutes an attempted or purported delegation of Congress’s Article
1, § 10 power.
292. The IBA does not provide an intelligible principle for the State Department to
apply in deciding whether to approve an agreement entered into between a State and a foreign
country.
293. The State Department admits that the 1972 International Bridge Act “does not set
forth a particular standard but rather provides broad discretion to the Secretary of State in
considering whether to approve an agreement between a U.S. state and the government of either
Canada or Mexico.”
294. Thus, because the IBA fails to provide an intelligible principle for the Secretary of
State to apply in determining how to exercise the Congressional power to approve agreements
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between States and foreign countries, it is an unconstitutional delegation of that Congressional
power and responsibility. Accordingly, the IBA’s delegation should be declared unconstitutional
and invalid.
295. In addition, the IBA fails to provide the Secretary of State with an intelligible
principle to apply in determining whether to approve agreements between a State and a foreign
power that will directly infringe upon a franchise previously granted by Congress, such as the
franchise conferred upon plaintiffs. Moreover, the IBA does not provide the Secretary of State
with the legal authority (let alone any intelligible principle to apply) to approve an agreement
between agents of a State and a foreign power if the State legislature has prohibited those State
agents from entering into any such agreement. Thus, alternatively and at a minimum, the IBA
fails to constitutionally delegate the power to approve agreements between a State and a foreign
power under the circumstances of this particular case.
296. Because the Crossing Agreement has been entered into between agents of the
State of Michigan and the Government of Canada, and because it may not lawfully be approved
by the Secretary of State and has not been approved by Congress as required by Article I, § 10,
clause 3, the Crossing Agreement should be declared to be an invalid, void, and unenforceable
agreement.
297. Because the State Department does not have the constitutional authority to
approve the Crossing Agreement, the State Department’s approval should be declared invalid,
unlawful, and unenforceable, and the State Department should be enjoined from any further
consideration of any subsequent submission of any NITC/DRIC application that relies on the
Crossing Agreement or any similar agreement.
COUNT TWO
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Declaratory Judgment Regarding DIBC’s and CTC’s Franchise Rights; Injunction Against Violating Those Rights – All Defendants
298. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
299. Plaintiffs have an “actual controversy,” as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
Defendant Canada is seeking to build the NITC/DRIC, which plaintiffs allege violates their
franchise rights. Defendants FHWA and Coast Guard have been assisting Canada in its effort to
build the NITC/DRIC, and thereby to violate plaintiffs’ franchise rights, by accelerating the
regulatory approvals of the NITC/DRIC and delaying the regulatory approvals of the New Span.
Defendant State Department is assisting Canada in its efforts to build the NITC/DRIC, and
thereby to violate plaintiffs’ franchise rights, by willingly considering the approval of the
NITC/DRIC Application and the illegal Crossing Agreement, despite the lack of constitutional
authority to do so and despite the legal impediments to granting such approval, and by purporting
to grant both such approvals. All of the foregoing efforts to construct and approve the
NITC/DRIC are in violation of plaintiffs’ statutory and contractual franchise rights.
300. This actual controversy is within the jurisdiction of this Court, as required by 28
U.S.C. § 2201.
301. The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty provided that any new uses, obstructions, or
diversions of boundary waters between the United States and Canada would require the approval
of an International Joint Commission, except where authorized by a “special agreement,” either
in the form of an agreement between the United States and Great Britain or through “concurrent
or reciprocal” legislation by the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament.
302. Pursuant to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, the United States Congress and the
Canadian Parliament enacted concurrent and reciprocal legislation granting plaintiffs a statutory
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franchise right to construct, maintain, and operate an international bridge between Detroit and
Windsor.
303. Due to the reciprocal nature of this Special Agreement, plaintiffs’ rights under the
agreement are reciprocal as between the United States and Canada.
304. Under Canadian law, plaintiffs’ statutory and contractual franchise rights under
the special agreement are exclusive, and cannot be subjected to any new bridge that would
constitute contiguous or injurious competition or interference with plaintiffs’ franchise.
305. Thus, plaintiffs have an exclusive statutory and contractual franchise right in both
the United States and Canada to construct, maintain, and operate an international bridge between
Detroit and Windsor. Plaintiffs’ franchise rights are enforceable against both the United States
defendants and against Canada because the franchise was created by reciprocal legislation
enacted by the United States Congress and Canadian Parliament, and therefore is enforceable
both as a matter of U.S. law (against U.S. government defendants) and as a matter of Canadian
law (against Canadian government defendants).
306. The United States and Canada have never enacted concurrent or reciprocal
legislation constituting a special agreement under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty that grants
franchise rights to an entity other than plaintiffs to construct, maintain, and operate an
international bridge between Detroit and Windsor.
307. The 1972 International Bridge Act (“IBA”) enacted by the United States and the
2007 International Bridge and Tunnel Act (“IBTA”) enacted by Canada are not concurrent or
reciprocal legislation constituting a special agreement under the Boundary Waters Treaty.
308. Moreover, the 1972 IBA does not authorize the approval of any bridge (or any
international agreement relating to any bridge) that would interfere with the plaintiffs’ statutory
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and contractual franchise rights to operate the bridge crossing between Detroit and Windsor.
The 1972 IBA does not make any reference to the Detroit-Windsor crossing. Instead, it is an act
of general application that simply purports to alter the process for obtaining international bridge
approvals, moving the approval authority from Congress to the State Department. In making this
procedural change, however, Congress made clear that it did not intend for the IBA to be
interpreted to adversely affect the rights of bridge owners who owned bridges that were approved
and built prior to the construction of the IBA. In addition, in the event of any potential conflict
between the general IBA (which makes no reference to the Detroit-Windsor crossing) and the
specific statutory franchise granted to plaintiffs for the Detroit-Windsor crossing, the specific
statutory franchise granted to plaintiffs must govern. Based on established canons of
construction, the IBA also cannot be interpreted to constitute an “implied repeal” or “implied
modification” of the 1921 DIBC Act conferring on plaintiffs their statutory franchise. This is
especially true here, because the plaintiffs’ statutory and contractual franchise was conferred
pursuant to a treaty (the Boundary Waters Treaty), and therefore cannot be unilaterally modified
without violating that Treaty. For all of these reasons, the IBA cannot be construed to adversely
impact the rights of plaintiffs, and the IBA therefore does not authorize the approval of any
bridge between Detroit and Windsor, which would necessarily interfere with plaintiffs’ statutory
and contractual franchise conferred by the DIBC Act and the CTC Act. In order for another
bridge to be approved for the Detroit-Windsor crossing, at a minimum there needs to be express
and specific legislation from Congress modifying plaintiffs’ statutory franchise, which Congress
has not enacted.
309. The Executive Branch has implicitly admitted that, notwithstanding the IBA,
certain bridge crossings, such as those which interfered with existing franchise rights such as
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plaintiffs, require additional Congressional authorization, and are not approved by the IBA. This
can be seen, for example, in Executive Order 13,337, which was promulgated in 2004, long after
the 1972 enactment of the IBA, and which authorizes the Secretary of State to approve
applications for new international bridges only “to the extent that congressional authorization is
not required.” This phrase would have been meaningless to include unless there were certain
bridge crossings, such as the Detroit-Windsor crossing, for which existing Congressionally-
granted franchises already existed, and for which no new franchise could be lawfully granted
without, at a minimum, new legislation from Congress.
310. In addition, the IBA cannot be construed to approve a contract governed by state
law that would trump the plaintiffs’ rights under the federal statute conferring their franchise,
especially when that contract was entered into by agents of a State with a foreign government in
violation of that State’s express legislation, as occurred here.
311. Furthermore, the precise location for the Ambassador Bridge was selected by
Congress and the War Department, not by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were given the franchise to build
the Detroit-Windsor bridge, but the federal Government determined precisely where that bridge
would be constructed. Similarly, over approximately the past 15 years, Congress has
appropriated funds to improve the highway connections to the Ambassador Bridge. In the course
of doing so, Congress has stated that its appropriations are intended to accommodate and protect
the plaintiffs’ plans to develop their New Span at the same location as the existing Ambassador
Bridge, and thereby led plaintiffs to believe that the New Span would be located at that same
location. By approving the construction of a different new span two miles away, the Defendants
are, in effect, seeking to relocate plaintiffs’ statutory and contractual franchise to a new location
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and to new ownership. This violates plaintiffs’ franchise rights, and should be declared unlawful
and invalid.
312. Based on all of the foregoing, Plaintiffs therefore seek a declaratory judgment that
(a) plaintiffs possess a statutory and contractual franchise right to operate an international bridge
between Detroit and Windsor under concurrent and reciprocal United States and Canadian
legislation that constitutes a Special Agreement under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty; (b) that
franchise right is exclusive of all contiguous and injurious competition in the form of any other
bridge between Detroit and Windsor; (c) in the alternative, and at a minimum, that franchise
right is exclusive of any other bridge being built between Detroit and Windsor unless and until
the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament enact concurrent or reciprocal
legislation constituting a special agreement under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty that grants a
franchise right to another entity to construct, maintain, and operate an additional international
bridge between Detroit and Windsor; (d) that franchise right is a perpetual right that prohibits the
government as grantor from building a bridge that would divert toll revenues from DIBC,
especially given that DIBC has taken reasonable steps to build a new bridge span itself between
Detroit and Windsor; (e) the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament have never
enacted such additional concurrent or reciprocal legislation constituting a special agreement
under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty; (f) the 1972 IBA cannot be construed to authorize any
approval of another bridge between Detroit and Windsor; and (g) therefore no entity other than
plaintiffs may construct, maintain, and operate an international bridge between Detroit and
Windsor.
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313. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief enjoining all defendants from taking any
action that infringes upon plaintiffs’ exclusive statutory and contractual franchise rights under
their Special Agreement.
COUNT THREE
Declaratory Judgment of DIBC’s Franchise Right to Build the New Span to the Ambassador Bridge; Injunction Against Violating That Right – All Defendants
314. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
315. As alleged above, Plaintiffs have an “actual controversy,” as required by 28
U.S.C. § 2201.
316. This actual controversy is within the jurisdiction of this Court, as required by 28
U.S.C. § 2201.
317. As alleged above, for over 80 years, pursuant to express legislation enacted by the
United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament, plaintiffs have been the exclusive owners
of the statutory and contractual franchise to construct, maintain, and operate the international
bridge crossing between Detroit and Windsor.
318. As Congress recognized when enacting the IBA, that new legislation “should not
be construed to adversely affect the rights of those operating bridges previously authorized by
Congress to repair, replace or enlarge existing bridges.” H.R. Rep. No. 92-1303.
319. In an August 3, 2005 letter, the State Department acknowledged that DIBC’s
existing franchise included the right to build the Ambassador Bridge New Span: “the
replacement or expansion of existing bridges authorized by Congress prior to passage of the
1972 International Bridge Act did not require a Presidential permit,” and therefore, because
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“DIBC is only seeking to expand (or twin) the operation of the bridge . . . DIBC does not require
a Presidential permit.”
320. Therefore, the United States has recognized that included in plaintiffs’ statutory
and contractual franchise is the right to expand or twin the Ambassador Bridge by building the
New Span.
321. Plaintiffs’ statutory and contractual right to build the New Span is subject only to
generally applicable regulatory requirements, such as those relating to navigation and
environmental regulations. Plaintiffs’ statutory and contractual right to build the New Span is
not subject to any purely discretionary decision of the United States or Canadian Government.
In particular, plaintiffs’ franchise right to build the New Span is not subject to a judgment of
either the United States or the Canadian Government as to whether or not they would prefer to
have a government-owned bridge built instead of the New Span. Plaintiffs’ franchise rights are
enforceable against both the United States defendants and against Canada because the franchise
was created by reciprocal legislation enacted by the United States Congress and Canadian
Parliament, and therefore is enforceable both as a matter of U.S. law (against U.S. government
defendants) and as a matter of Canadian law (against Canadian government defendants).
322. The agencies and officers of the United States and Canada may not take any
actions designed to frustrate or defeat plaintiffs’ right to build the New Span. In particular, the
agencies and officers of the United States and Canada may not seek to accelerate the regulatory
approvals for the NITC/DRIC and/or to delay the regulatory approvals of the New Span in an
effort to defeat or frustrate plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their right to build the New Span.
323. Plaintiffs therefore seek a declaratory judgment that (a) plaintiffs possess a
statutory and contractual franchise right to build the New Span; (b) the agencies and officers of
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the United States and Canada may not frustrate or defeat plaintiffs’ franchise right to build the
New Span and are preempted from doing so; (c) the agencies and officers of the United States
and Canada may not discriminate in favor of the NITC/DRIC over the New Span, and may not
accelerate the regulatory approvals for the NITC/DRIC and/or delay the regulatory approvals for
the New Span; (d) in addition to complying with all of plaintiffs’ franchise rights as outlined in
Count Two, and irrespective of the exclusive nature of those rights as claimed in Count Two, the
agencies and officers of the United States and Canada may not approve the NITC/DRIC unless
they are able to demonstrate that the NITC/DRIC is necessary even after construction by
plaintiffs of the New Span.
324. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief to protect and enforce their franchise right to
build the New Span, including by enjoining (a) the State Department to set aside as unlawful its
approval of the NITC/DRIC Application and the Crossing Agreement, both of which failed even
to attempt to demonstrate the need to build the NITC/DRIC in addition to the New Span; (b) the
FHWA from taking any further action to approve the NITC/DRIC unless and until the New Span
has been fully approved, and unless and until the NITC/DRIC satisfies all regulatory
requirements based on the assumption that the New Span will be constructed first; and (b) the
Coast Guard from any further delay in granting DIBC its navigational permit under the 1906
Bridge Act, and mandating that the Coast Guard promptly issue that navigational permit.
COUNT FOUR
APA Claims – Coast Guard Defendants
325. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
326. The Coast Guard has refused to process and has returned the Ambassador
Bridge’s application for a permit and a FONSI for the Ambassador Bridge New Span for
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improper reasons. Among other things, the Coast Guard has relied on opposition from Canadian
officials and the FHWA rather than the statutory criteria for issuing a permit to build the bridge
under the 1906 Bridges Act, or for issuing a FONSI under NEPA, and has improperly insisted
that DIBC resolve all land use disputes before proceeding, in contravention of the explicit orders
of this Court.
327. The Coast Guard’s refusal to further process and grant DIBC’s application, and its
rejection and return of that application to DIBC constitutes final agency action denying that
application under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, and is in violation of the standards set forth in 5 U.S.C §
706(2).
328. The Coast Guard has no legitimate reasons for denying or delaying a FONSI for
the Ambassador Bridge New Span.
329. Alternatively, the Coast Guard has unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed
agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
330. Such actions by the Coast Guard have also breached plaintiffs’ exclusive statutory
and contractual rights.
331. Further, for the reasons detailed above, the actions and decisions of the Coast
Guard in failing or refusing to issue a FONSI or a 1906 Bridges Act permit are (a) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (b) contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (d) without observance of procedure required
by law, and/or (e) unsupported by substantial evidence or unwarranted by the facts.
COUNT FIVE
Declaratory Judgment of Uncompensated Taking of Private Property - All U.S. Defendants
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332. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if
fully set forth herein.
333. The plaintiffs own a statutory and contractual franchise to construct, maintain,
and operate the Ambassador Bridge and to build a New Span to the Ambassador Bridge.
334. The franchise rights owned by the plaintiffs constitute private property protected
by the Takings Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and
by international law.
335. The U.S. defendants are currently taking actions that will destroy and appropriate
the economic value of plaintiffs’ franchise rights without payment of just compensation to
plaintiffs. In particular, the U.S. defendants have been assisting Canada in its effort to construct
the NITC/DRIC in contravention of the United States Constitution, United States statutes,
Congressional policy, and plaintiffs’ franchise rights. In addition, the U.S. defendants (and
Canada) have favored the construction of the NITC/DRIC over the construction of the New
Span, have discriminated in favor of the NITC/DRIC and against the New Span, and have
attempted and continue to attempt to accelerate the regulatory approvals of the NITC/DRIC and
to delay the regulatory approvals of the New Span – all in an effort to destroy and defeat
plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their franchise right to build the New Span.
336. Over the past decade, plaintiffs have invested millions of dollars based on the
reasonable expectation that they were the exclusive owners of the franchise to own and operate
an international bridge between Detroit and Windsor, and based on the reasonable expectation
that their rights included the right to build the New Span. Plaintiffs reasonably believed that the
U.S. defendants would not attempt to frustrate and destroy those rights by attempting to favor the
construction of the NITC/DRIC over the construction of the New Span.
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337. In addition, plaintiffs relied on the fact that the U.S. Congress had appropriated
money to improve the highway connections to the Ambassador Bridge in order to
“accommodate” and “protect” plaintiffs’ right to build the New Span to the Ambassador Bridge.
Indeed, plaintiffs spent millions of dollars in reliance to improve their portions of the approaches
and connections to the Ambassador Bridge, and to prepare for the New Span, based upon this
Congressional assurance that the highways would be improved in order to accommodate the
New Span at that location (i.e., right next to the existing Ambassador Bridge). Moreover,
plaintiffs also relied to their detriment on this Congressional directive by discontinuing
investments they had been making to acquire land located at other potential crossing points
between Detroit and Windsor (including that which was later selected for the NITC/DRIC),
which plaintiffs had previously started to acquire to ensure their ability to locate their New Span
in whatever alternative location might prove most appropriate. By appropriating money to
improve the highways to the Ambassador Bridge in order to accommodate and protect the New
Span at the location of the existing Ambassador Bridge, Congress induced plaintiffs to rely, to
their significant financial detriment, upon the New Span being located right next to the existing
Ambassador Bridge. The State Department’s approval of the NITC/DRIC at a different location,
and the defendants’ overall effort to block the New Span and to approve and construct the