United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 15-2507 ___________________________ Jassmine D. Adams lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee State of Minnesota, Department of Human Services; UCare Minnesota; Medica Health Plans lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Toyota Motor Corporation; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; Toyota Motor North America, Inc.; Toyota Motor Engineering and Manufacturing North America, Inc.; Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.; Calty Design Research, Inc. lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellants ___________________________ No. 15-2516 ___________________________ Quincy Ray Adams lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee State of Minnesota, Department of Human Services; UCare Minnesota; Medica Health Plans lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor Plaintiffs - Appellees v.
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United States Court of Appeals of unintended acceleration (OSIs) and Toyota’s motion to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs’ mechanical engineering expert, John Stilson.2 The
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United States Court of AppealsFor the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 15-2507___________________________
Jassmine D. Adams
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
State of Minnesota, Department of Human Services; UCare Minnesota; MedicaHealth Plans
Toyota Motor Corporation; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; Toyota Motor NorthAmerica, Inc.; Toyota Motor Engineering and Manufacturing North America, Inc.;
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.; Calty Design Research, Inc.
Toyota Motor Corporation; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; Toyota Motor NorthAmerica, Inc.; Toyota Motor Engineering and Manufacturing North America, Inc.;
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.; Calty Design Research, Inc.
State of Minnesota, Department of Human Services; UCare Minnesota; MedicaHealth Plans
lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor Plaintiffs
v.
Toyota Motor Corporation; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; Toyota Motor NorthAmerica, Inc.; Toyota Motor Engineering and Manufacturing North America, Inc.;
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.; Calty Design Research, Inc.
Bridgette Trice, as trustee for the heirs and next of kin of Devyn Bolton, deceased
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
Koua Fong Lee; Nhia Koua Lee; Nong Lee; Panghoua Moua; Jemee Lee, a minorchild; American Family Mutual Insurance Company, as subrogee of Koua Fong
Lee; State of Minnesota, Department of Human Services; UCare Minnesota;
Medica Health Plans
lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor Plaintiffs
v.
Toyota Motor Corporation; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; Toyota Motor NorthAmerica, Inc.; Toyota Motor Engineering and Manufacturing North America, Inc.;
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.; Calty Design Research, Inc.
American Family Mutual Insurance Company, as subrogee of Koua Fong Lee;State of Minnesota, Department of Human Services; UCare Minnesota; Medica
Health Plans
lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor Plaintiffs
v.
Toyota Motor Corporation; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; Toyota Motor NorthAmerica, Inc.; Toyota Motor Engineering and Manufacturing North America, Inc.;
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.; Calty Design Research, Inc.
State of Minnesota, Department of Human Services; UCare Minnesota; MedicaHealth Plans
lllllllllllllllllllllIntervenor Plaintiffs
v.
Toyota Motor Corporation; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; Toyota Motor NorthAmerica, Inc.; Toyota Motor Engineering and Manufacturing North America, Inc.;
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc.; Calty Design Research, Inc.
(discussing Minnesota law); see Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105,
1106 (8th Cir. 1996). Toyota argues that, even assuming Stilson’s opinions and the5
OSI evidence were properly admitted, the plaintiffs failed to prove that a defect
existed or that the alleged defect was the proximate cause of the accident. We
disagree.
The plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that
the 1996 Camry contained a design defect. A significant portion of this evidence is
discussed in detail above. For example, the plaintiffs presented Stilson’s expert
testimony, supported by tests he conducted pursuant to Toyota’s recommended
The district court instructed the jury that, in order to recover on the basis of5
a design defect, the plaintiffs had to prove that the “defective condition in the car wasa direct cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries.” The court instructed the jury that a “‘directcause’ is a cause that had a substantial part in bringing about the accident.” Neitherparty challenges the district court’s instruction.
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protocol for thermal testing. Cf. Fireman’s Fund, 394 F.3d at 1058–59 (insufficient
evidence of defect and causation when expert failed to propose a specific defect or
conduct testing in accordance with industry standards); Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 521
(expert not qualified to testify to conclusions as to product failure given inexperience
with the relevant products). Stilson told the jury that he concluded that the
susceptibility of the throttle pulleys to heat-induced sticking constituted a defect and
explained in great detail the bases for his conclusion. Additionally, the plaintiffs
offered Lee’s testimony and that of his wife, explaining that Lee attempted to apply
the brakes to no avail and that the car continued accelerating on its own; evidence that
Toyota had failed to conduct standard heat-related safety testing on the 1996 Camry’s
throttle mechanism; and OSI evidence.
The plaintiffs also presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
that the throttle defect was “a substantial factor in creating the harm.” Thompson,
456 F.3d at 812. Stilson described the components housed beneath the dust cover
that generated heat, and explained that other parts would transmit heat to the throttle
pulleys. He also noted that heat from components outside the throttle— namely the
exhaust manifold and ambient heat—likely entered and got trapped under the dust
cover, subjecting the pulleys to additional heat. Stilson explained that there was a
“high probability” that heat would remain trapped under the dust cover for a period
of time because there was little opportunity for ventilation. He opined that the
pulleys overheated, stuck together, and ultimately caused the accident at issue in this
case.
Toyota sought to refute the plaintiffs’ theories of defect and causation through
the testimony of its expert, Steven MacLean. MacLean did not dispute the fact that
the relevant throttle pulleys would expand and stick if subjected to a temperature of
165 degrees Fahrenheit, or that the dust cover containing the pulleys was only seven
inches away from the 900 degree exhaust manifold. Instead, he asserted that Lee’s
vehicle never reached the temperature necessary to cause sticking. MacLean testified
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that he drove a 1995 Camry in a route simulating Lee’s. During this simulation, the
temperature in the test Camry never reached 165 degrees and the throttle pulleys did
not bind together. MacLean opined that the accident was, therefore, not caused by
the alleged defect. Toyota argued alternative theories of causation, including that the
accident was caused by a dirty throttle body or by pedal misapplication—both of
which the plaintiffs attempted to discredit. Toyota argues that MacLean’s testimony,
combined with the fact that the one test Stilson performed with the cruise control
lever in the unmodified position did not result in a stuck throttle, mandates the
conclusion that a reasonable jury could not have found that Lee’s Camry ever got hot
enough for the throttle pulleys to stick. As a result, according to Toyota, the plaintiffs
failed to establish that the alleged defect caused the accident at issue here.
The jury heard testimony from two qualified experts with competing opinions
regarding the cause of the accident. Both of them testified extensively about their
respective theories of defect and causation and both were subjected to lengthy and
detailed cross-examination. See Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, 754 F.3d
557, 562 (8th Cir. 2014) (“As long as the expert’s scientific testimony rests upon
‘good grounds, based on what is known’ it should be tested by the adversary process
with competing expert testimony and cross-examination, rather than excluded by the
court at the outset.” (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596)). Though Toyota disagrees
with Stilson’s opinions and conclusions—including his explanation that moving the
cruise control lever did not affect the validity of his testing—“questions of conflicting
evidence must be left for the jury’s determination,” Bonner, 259 F.3d at 930 (quoting
Hose v. Chi. Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1995)), and we will not re-
weigh the evidence, Arabian Agric. Servs., Co., 309 F.3d at 482 (citation omitted).
The jury’s verdict was not based on “sheer speculation,” and instead is supported by
reasonable inferences drawn from the plaintiffs’ evidence. Rients v. Int’l Harvester
Co., 346 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of that
verdict, we conclude that this evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to
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find that the Camry’s design defect was the proximate cause of this accident. See
(finding sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on causation when
plaintiff offered evidence of what level of toxin is generally harmful and expert
testimony that the plaintiff was exposed to harmful level); cf. Rients, 346 N.W.2d at
362 (insufficient evidence of causation in product liability case when uncontroverted
evidence established numerous other potential causes).
D. Award of Prejudgment Interest
Finally, Toyota argues that the district court erred in awarding prejudgment
interest pursuant to Minn. Stat. Ann. § 549.09 on plaintiff Bridgette Trice’s damages
award. “[W]hether the district court had authority to grant prejudgment interest is a
question of state law which we review de novo.” Children’s Broad. Corp. v. Walt
Disney Co., 357 F.3d 860, 868–69 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Trans. Cas. Co. v.
Selective Ins. Co. of the S.E., 137 F.3d 540, 546 (8th Cir. 1998)).
Section 549.09 reads, in relevant part:
Subdivision 1. When owed; rate. (a) When a judgment or award is forthe recovery of money, . . . interest from the time of the verdict, award, orreport until judgment is finally entered shall be computed by the courtadministrator or arbitrator as provided in paragraph (c) and added to thejudgment or award.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by contract or allowed by law, preverdict,preaward, or prereport interest on pecuniary damages shall be computedas provided in paragraph (c) . . . except as provided herein . . . . Except asotherwise provided by contract or allowed by law, preverdict, preaward,or prereport interest shall not be awarded on the following:
(2) judgments or awards for future damages;
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(c)(2) For a judgment or award over $50,000, . . . the interest rate shall beten percent per year until paid.
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 549.09.
As an initial matter, Trice argues that the jury awarded no future damages
because they were not instructed on, and Trice did not request, future damages. The
record belies this argument. Though the parties agreed that certain instructions on
future damages were unnecessary, the jury was nevertheless instructed that damages,
including those for Devyn Bolton’s next of kin, “may include past and future injury.”
The jury was instructed to determine “what Devyn Bolton would have provided to the
claimants if she had lived” by considering “her life expectancy at the time of her
death,” “her likely future earning capacity and prospects of bettering herself had she
lived,” and, inter alia, “[t]he advice, comfort, assistance, companionship, and
protection” she “would have given if she had lived.” The special verdict form asked
the jury to award damages to Devyn Bolton’s next of kin to compensate for “loss of
counsel, guidance, aid, advice, comfort, assistance, companionship, and protection
Devyn Bolton would have given to her next of kin . . . had she lived.” The jury was
therefore instructed to consider future damages.
Furthermore, neither party disputes the district court’s finding that it is
impossible to determine which portion of Trice’s award represents pecuniary damages
subject to § 549.09 subdivision 1(c)(2)’s ten percent interest rate and which portion
of the award represents future damages exempt from prejudgment interest under
subdivision 1(b)(2). Because the Minnesota Supreme Court has not articulated how
§ 549.09 applies in such circumstances, we must try to predict “how the state’s
highest court would rule if faced with the same question.” Marvin Lumber & Cedar
Co. v. PPG Indus., 401 F.3d 901, 917–18 (8th Cir. 2005). In making this prediction,
“we may consider relevant state precedent, analogous decisions, considered dicta,
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scholarly works and any other reliable data.” Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d
725, 729–30 (8th Cir. 1995).
“Prejudgment interest is an element of damages awarded to provide full
compensation by converting time-of-demand damages into time-of-verdict damages.
It is designed to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the use of the money owed.”
Simeone v. First Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 73 F.3d 184, 190–91 (8th Cir. 1996); see also
Lienhard v. State, 431 N.W.2d 861, 865 (Minn. 1988). Prejudgment interest is also
intended to encourage settlement. See Burniece v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 398 N.W.2d
for recalculation of interest award where trial court ordered preverdict interest on
compensatory, future, and punitive damages). In this case, the district court did not
fail to consider which portion of the award constituted future damages; instead, it
specifically found that such a determination was impossible. As noted, neither party
challenges this finding, so remanding under these circumstances would be futile.
Taking into account the plain language of § 549.09, lower state court decisions,
and the purpose of the statute, see Leinhard, 431 N.W.2d at 865 (prejudgment interest
is an element of damages), we predict that the Minnesota Supreme Court would
conclude that prejudgment interest is not available for judgments that encompass
multiple types of damages—some of which are subject to interest under § 549.09 and
some of which are not—when it is impossible to differentiate between the types of
damages included in the judgment. We therefore conclude that the district court erred
in awarding prejudgment interest and vacate the award of prejudgment interest to
Trice.
E. Reduction of plaintiff Bridgette Trice’s Award
On cross-appeal, Trice argues that the district court erred in offsetting her
award to account for a prior settlement she entered into with Lee and Lee’s insurance
provider. Whether a pro tanto settlement offset applies is a question of state law
subject to de novo review. See Neb. Plastics, Inc. v. Holland Colors Ams., Inc., 408
F.3d 410, 419 (8th Cir. 2005).
Prior to the filing of this cause of action, while Devyn was still living, Trice
signed a release agreement on behalf of Devyn as Devyn’s mother and natural
guardian. The agreement released Lee and his insurers,
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their officers, employees, representatives, successors, assigns and all otherpersons, firms and corporations from any and all liability, actions, causesof action, claims and demands . . . for any damages, for losses or injurieswhich heretofore have been or which hereafter may be sustained by me inconsequence of the incident which occurred on or about June 10, 2006.
However, the release explained that it is “not to be construed as a waiver by or as an
estoppel of any parties hereby released to prosecute a claim or cause of action against
any other person, firm, or corporation for damages sustained as a result of the said
accident hereinabove referred to . . . .” When parties execute a release agreement that
does not result in the plaintiff being fully compensated for the harm she
suffered—like the one in this case—the release generally “operates as a satisfaction
pro tanto as to other tortfeasors.” Johnson v. Brown, 401 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987); see also Gronquist v. Olson, 64 N.W.2d 159, 165 (Minn. 1954). Here,
the district court found that Trice’s release agreement with Lee and his insurers fell
within this general rule, and applied a pro tanto offset to Trice’s award in the amount
Trice received from Lee and Lee’s insurers.
Pro tanto satisfaction is based on the principle that “an injured person can have
but one full satisfaction for his injuries,” and cannot recover twice for the same
injury. Id. However, in the instant case, there is no danger of a duplicative award
because the release agreement and the jury verdict benefitted different plaintiffs.
There is a “clear distinction” between a guardian representing the personal interests
of a minor child and a wrongful death trustee as the personal representative of a
decedent’s next of kin. Steinlage ex rel. Smith v. Mayo Clinic Rochester, 435 F.3d
913, 916 (8th Cir. 2006). In executing the release agreement, Trice acted as Devyn’s
“mother and natural guardian.” As such, she executed the agreement and received
benefits on behalf of Devyn. In contrast, as the wrongful death trustee, Trice acted
and received benefits on behalf of Devyn’s next of kin, and was prohibited from
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recovering damages on Devyn’s behalf. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 573.02, subd. 16
(damages awarded under § 573.02 for wrongful death “shall be for the exclusive
benefit of the . . . next of kin” in “the amount the jury deems fair and just in reference
to the pecuniary loss resulting from the death.”); Steinlage, 435 F.3d at 916–17
(“[U]nder current Minnesota law, only a court-appointed wrongful death trustee may
maintain a wrongful death action, and the wrongful death trustee does not represent
the estate of the decedent.”); Johnson v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W. 2d 608,
613 (Minn. 1988) (Section 573.02 “does not allow survival of a decedent’s action, but
rather creates an entirely new cause of action, the beneficiaries of which are third
parties claiming pecuniary loss from the wrongdoer’s act”); Shumway v. Nelson, 107
N.W.2d 531, 533 (Minn. 1961) (explaining that an action under § 573.02 “creates an
entirely new cause of action for the purpose of compensating the next of kin who
have suffered pecuniary loss by reason of the death of the decedent. It is not brought
for the benefit of the decedent”).
The purpose of § 573.02, subdivision 1 is to fully compensate a decedent’s next
of kin for their pecuniary losses. See Gronquist, 64 N.W.2d at 164 (“[I]f [the injured
party] has not received full satisfaction, or that which the law considers such, he is
not barred until he has received full satisfaction.”). Allowing Devyn Bolton’s next
of kin to recover the full amount of the jury award in this case is not inequitable
because Devyn recovered for her own injuries while she was living. See Steinlage,7
The court’s instructions reflected this distinction. The court instructed the jury6
that it could compensate Devyn’s next of kin for “damages arising from DevynBolton’s death,” by awarding an amount that would “fairly and adequatelycompensate [the next of kin] for the losses they suffered as a result of this death,” butinstructed the jury not to consider amounts for “the pain and suffering of DevynBolton before her death.”
The cases cited by Toyota examining other state wrongful death laws do not7
establish otherwise. See Thompson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 760 F.3d 913, 916(8th Cir. 2014) (addressing Missouri law); Huff v. Fibreboard Corp., 836 F.2d 473,
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435 F.3d at 916 (8th Cir. 2006). We therefore conclude that Trice’s award should not
be reduced by the amount that Devyn previously recovered from Lee and Lee’s
insurers.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons articulated above, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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476 (10th Cir. 1987) (interpreting Oklahoma statute to bar a wrongful death actionwhen decedent would not have had a cause of action at the time of his death becausethe applicable statute of limitations had expired); Smith v. Brown & WilliamsonTobacco Corp., 275 S.W.3d 748, 761–80 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that awrongful death action under Missouri statute was not barred by the decedent’s“personal injury action during her lifetime for injuries resulting from the same causeof her death”).