No. 18-36082 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KELSEY CASCADIA ROSE JULIANA, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants-Appellants. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon (No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA) APPELLANTS’ OPENING BRIEF Counsel for Defendants-Appellants JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK Assistant Attorney General ERIC GRANT Deputy Assistant Attorney General ANDREW C. MERGEN SOMMER H. ENGELS ROBERT J. LUNDMAN Attorneys Environment and Natural Resources Division U.S. Department of Justice Post Office Box 7415 Washington, D.C. 20044 (202) 514-0943 [email protected]Case: 18-36082, 02/01/2019, ID: 11176886, DktEntry: 16, Page 1 of 82
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No. 18-36082
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KELSEY CASCADIA ROSE JULIANA, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon (No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA)
APPELLANTS’ OPENING BRIEF
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants
JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK Assistant Attorney General ERIC GRANT Deputy Assistant Attorney General ANDREW C. MERGEN SOMMER H. ENGELS ROBERT J. LUNDMAN Attorneys Environment and Natural Resources Division U.S. Department of Justice Post Office Box 7415 Washington, D.C. 20044 (202) 514-0943 [email protected]
I. The district court lacked jurisdiction over this action ................................... 12
A. Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. ...................................................... 12
1. Plaintiffs cannot identify any injury to a concrete and particularized legally protected interest because their grievance is universally shared and generalized ....................... 13
2. Plaintiffs have not established that their injuries are caused by the Defendants’ actions ............................................ 17
3. A favorable order cannot redress Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries ....................................................................................... 22
B. Plaintiffs’ action is not otherwise a case or controversy cognizable under Article III ................................................................ 24
II. Plaintiffs were required to proceed under the APA but concededly did not ............................................................................................................ 27
III. Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims fail on the merits ......................................... 35
A. There is no fundamental right to a “stable climate system” ............... 35
B. Plaintiffs’ state-created danger claims fail .......................................... 38
C. All of Plaintiffs’ constitutional theories are before this Court in this appeal, and none has merit ............................................. 42
IV. No federal public trust doctrine creates a right to particular climate conditions .......................................................................................... 47
A. There is no federal public trust doctrine that binds the federal government .............................................................................. 48
B. Any federal public trust doctrine is displaced by statute, primarily the Clean Air Act ................................................................. 53
C. Any public trust doctrine would not apply to the “climate system” or the atmosphere .................................................................. 54
Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) .......................................................... 50-51
Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 Fed. Appx. 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ................................................................ 51
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011)........................................................................... 18, 53-54
Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364 (1926)....................................................................................... 49
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015) ....................................................................... 30, 32-34
Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ........................................................ 14
Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273, 2015 WL 12591229 (Or. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2015), aff’d in relevant part, 295 Or. App. 584 (2019) ............................................ 56
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320 (1958)....................................................................................... 29
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013)................................................................................. 12, 27
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006)....................................................................................... 25
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) ................................................................. 38, 42
District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ......................................................... 48, 50, 55
Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012) ........................................................................................... 29
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) ................................................................................... 47
Filippone v. Iowa Department of Natural Resources, No. 12-0444, 2013 WL 988627 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013) ...................................................................... 56
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997)....................................................................................... 47
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) .................................................................... 26
Lake v. City of Southgate, No. 16-10251, 2017 WL 767879 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2017) ............................................................................ 37
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) .................................................. 13-14
Long Sault Development Co. v. Call, 242 U.S. 272 (1916)....................................................................................... 49
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).......................................................... 12-13, 15-18, 22, 25
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)....................................................................................... 28
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) ........................................................................ 26
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980)....................................................................................... 41
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479 (1976)....................................................................................... 45
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)..................................................................... 14, 16, 23, 30
Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2013) ....................................................................... 40
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986)....................................................................................... 52
Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. v. Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., 423 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) ....................................................................... 11
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) ......................................................................................... 26
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978)....................................................................................... 53
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)....................................................................................... 35
Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Department, 227 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) ................................................................. 40-41
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) ............................................................................... 48
National Sea Clammers Ass’n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated in part sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, | 453 U.S. 1 (1981) ........................................................................................... 37
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................................... 18, 53
Navajo Nation v. Department of Interior, 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2017) ....................................................................... 33
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)....................................................................................... 52
Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1997) ......................................................................... 41
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988)................................................................................. 49, 55
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) ........................................................................... 36
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995)....................................................................................... 24
PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576 (2012)................................................................ 48-49, 51-52, 55
Presbyterian Church (USA) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989) ......................................................................... 33
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997)................................................................................. 12, 17
Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) ......................................................................... 34
Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) ............................................................ 56
Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 2013) ......................................................................... 50
Scharff v. Raytheon Co. Short Term Disability Plan, 581 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2009) ......................................................................... 11
Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)....................................................................................... 13
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) ......................................................................................... 30
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) ........................................................................................... 49
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) ......................................................................................... 22
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010) ...................................... 55
Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986) ................................................................... 45, 51
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Commission, 466 U.S. 198 (1984)....................................................................................... 55
United States v. 32.42 Acres of Land, 683 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2012) ....................................................................... 50
United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391 (1903)....................................................................................... 55
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) ....................................................................... 49
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) ............................................................. 24
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)....................................................................................... 18
Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2013) ...................................................... 16-17, 19-20
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)........................................................................... 35, 37, 52
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988)....................................................................................... 32
West Indian Co. v. Government of Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir. 1988) ........................................................................ 50
Western Radio Services Co. v. U.S. Forest Service, 578 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2009) ....................................................................... 27
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 795 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2015) ....................................................................... 20
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007)....................................................................................... 27
Defendants to cease their permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing of fossil fuels and, instead, move to swiftly phase out CO2 emissions, as well as take such other action necessary to ensure that atmospheric CO2 is no more concentrated than 350 ppm by 2100, including to develop a national plan to restore Earth’s energy balance, and implement that national plan so as to stabilize the climate system.
1 E.R. 90 (quoting complaint).
On the merits, the district court held that Plaintiffs had stated a claim under
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 1 E.R. 90-98. The court found in the
Fifth Amendment’s protection against the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law” a previously unrecognized fundamental right to a
“climate system capable of sustaining human life,” and the court determined that
Plaintiffs had adequately alleged infringement of that right. 1 E.R. 94. The court
also concluded that Plaintiffs had stated a viable “danger-creation due process
claim” based on the government’s alleged “failure to adequately regulate CO2
emissions.” 1 E.R. 98.
The court further held that Plaintiffs had adequately stated a claim under a
federal public trust doctrine, which the court held imposes a judicially enforceable
prohibition on the government’s “depriving a future legislature of the natural
resources necessary to provide for the well-being and survival of its citizens.” 1
E.R. 99 (quoting amicus brief in support of Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs’ claims under this
public trust rationale, the court concluded, are also “properly categorized as
The government petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus to halt these
proceedings. The Court denied the petition without prejudice. In re United States,
884 F.3d at 838. It explained, however, that “[c]laims and remedies often are vastly
narrowed as litigation proceeds,” and that it had “no reason to assume this case will
be any different.” Id. The Court observed that the government could continue to
“raise and litigate any legal objections [it may] have,” id. at 837, and it added that
the government remains free to “seek[] mandamus in the future,” id. at 838.
Consistent with this Court’s opinion, in May 2018, the government filed two
new dispositive motions. The government moved for judgment on the pleadings,
arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed in their entirety. 3 E.R. 385-86.
The government separately moved for summary judgment, arguing that the district
court should enter judgment in favor of the government on all of Plaintiffs’ claims.
3 E.R. 383-84. The court issued an opinion largely denying the government’s
dispositive motions in October 2018. 1 E.R. 1-62.1
1 While the two dispositive motions were still pending and after the district court had denied the government’s motion for a protective order barring discovery, the government sought relief from both this Court and the Supreme Court. This Court denied the petition without prejudice. In re United States, 895 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court likewise denied the government’s application “without prejudice” on the ground that it was “premature.” As quoted above, the Supreme Court observed that the “breadth of [Plaintiffs’] claims is striking, however, and the justiciability of those claims presents substantial grounds for difference of opinion.” 2 E.R. 193.
I. The district court lacked jurisdiction over this action.
A. Plaintiffs lack Article III standing.
To demonstrate the requisite Article III standing, Plaintiffs must establish
that they “have suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”;
that the injury is “fairly [traceable] to the challenged action of the defendant,” and not the result of “the independent action of some third party not before the court”; and
that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The purpose of these requirements is “to prevent the
judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). “In keeping with
[that] purpose,” a court’s inquiry must be “ ‘especially rigorous when reaching the
merits of the dispute would force [it] to decide whether an action taken by one of the
other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.’ ” Id. (quoting
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997)). Under that rigorous standard (or any
plausible standard), Plaintiffs have failed to establish any of the three requirements
1. Plaintiffs cannot identify any injury to a concrete and particularized legally protected interest because their grievance is universally shared and generalized.
Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the first standing requirement because they assert
“generalized grievance[s],” not the invasion of a legally protected interest that is
concrete and particularized. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 575 (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord, e.g., Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125, 127 n.3 (2014). The Supreme Court has made
clear that “standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest . . . which is held
in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature
of the injury all citizens share.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974). “Vindicating the public interest (including the
public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the
function of Congress and the Chief Executive,” not private plaintiffs. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576.
Plaintiffs’ asserted injuries are archetypal generalized grievances. They arise
from a diffuse, global phenomenon that affects every other person in their
communities, in the United States, and throughout the world. No one disputes that
the issue here is global climate change. 1 E.R. 4-5 (summarizing undisputed facts
in this matter concerning global impacts of climate change). Plaintiffs’ declarations
are likewise clear on this point: one of their experts explained that the “risks” from
climate change “to some extent, will affect everybody, some groups are especially
vulnerable, and children comprise one such group.” 2 E.R. 300 (emphasis added).
Indeed, the “very concept of global warming seems inconsistent with” the
“particularization requirement,” because “[g]lobal warming is a phenomenon
harmful to humanity at large.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 541 (2007)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). The D.C. Circuit has
explained that alleged injury based on global climate change is too generalized to
establish injury in fact:
[C]limate change is a harm that is shared by humanity at large, and the redress that Petitioners seek — to prevent an increase in global temperature — is not focused any more on these petitioners than it is on the remainder of the world’s population. Therefore Petitioners’ alleged injury is too generalized to establish standing.
Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 478
(D.C. Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs’ concerns about global climate change are the exact sort
of “generalized grievances” that are “more appropriately addressed in the represent-
ative branches.” Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs submit that they “exemplify [the] vulnerabilities” resulting from
global climate change, 2 E.R. 300 (Plaintiffs’ expert), but that does not convert their
generalized grievance into a sufficiently particularized one. Though climate change
might injure the individual Plaintiffs in different ways, see, e.g., 1 E.R. 30-31, those
differences are unresponsive to the generalized grievance problem. Because the
these are the very types of challenges that Congress envisioned proceeding under the
APA. See SUWA, 542 U.S at 62 (explaining that the APA provides for review of
“agency action” as comprehensively defined in the Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13), which
definition includes an agency’s “failure to act”).2
Plaintiffs contend that they need not rely on the cause of action provided by
the APA (and may therefore disregard the APA framework), because the
Constitution itself provides them a cause of action. 3 E.R. 525, 604-12; 1 E.R. 20-
23. But neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has held that the Constitution itself
provides an across-the-board cause of action for all constitutional claims — and
especially for the sweeping constitutional claims concerning governmental
regulation that Plaintiffs advance or for the sweeping relief they seek. To the
contrary, the Supreme Court recently ruled that “the Supremacy Clause does not
confer a right of action,” a decision that conflicts with the district court’s assertion
2 Plaintiffs’ complaint identified one specific agency action, but the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Although they did not state it as a separate claim, Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of an order of the Department of Energy authorizing the international export of liquefied natural gas from a proposed facility in Oregon. 3 E.R. 584-86, 607-08; cf. 3 E.R. 460-75 (DOE Order 3041). The particular order was issued under Section 201 of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c), which makes import/export approvals reviewable exclusively in the courts of appeals, id. § 717r(b). The district court did not address the order or its merits in its summary judgment opinion — nor could it, given the Energy Policy Act’s limits on judicial review. See id.; City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 357 U.S. 320, 336 (1958); see generally Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 12-13 (2012) (holding that a provision vesting review in a court of appeals barred district court from exercising jurisdiction over facial challenge to constitutionality of a statute).
government. No court has held that the climate system or atmosphere is protected
by a public trust doctrine. Indeed, the concept has been widely rejected.3
Although their operative complaint confirms that Plaintiffs seek to hold the
federal government responsible for alleged mismanagement of the entire “climate
system” — and not any particular tidelands, waters, or oceans — the district court
sidestepped this fact, holding that Plaintiffs had stated a viable claim because they
“alleged violations of the public trust doctrine in connection with the territorial sea.”
1 E.R. 102. The court misstates Plaintiffs’ complaint: Plaintiffs might allege that
3 See, e.g., Sanders-Reed ex rel. Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1225 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (“Plaintiffs have cited no cases — and we have found none — where another jurisdiction’s appellate court has concluded that common law public trust principles independently apply to management of the atmosphere.”); Filippone v. Iowa Department of Natural Resources, No. 12-0444, 2013 WL 988627, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013) (holding that the defendant “does not have a duty under the public trust doctrine to restrict greenhouse gases to protect the atmosphere”); Aronow v. Minnesota, No. A12-0585, 2012 WL 4476642, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012) (explaining that “no Minnesota appellate court has held that the public-trust doctrine applies to the atmosphere”); cf. Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273, 2015 WL 12591229, at *7 (Or. Cir. Ct. May 11, 2015) (“This Court, based on its understanding of the history of the public trust doctrine in Oregon, cannot conclude that the atmosphere is a ‘resource’ to which the public trust doctrine is applicable.”), aff’d in relevant part, 295 Or. App. 584, 598 (2019) (holding that even if the atmosphere were protected by a public trust, “the Oregon public trust doctrine is rooted in the idea that the state is restrained from disposing” or impairing public trust resources and affords no basis “for imposing fiduciary duties on the state to affirmatively act to protect public-trust resources”); Kanuk ex rel. Kanuk v. Alaska Department of Natural Resources, 335 P.3d 1088, 1102 (Alaska 2014) (holding that even if the atmosphere were protected by a public trust, the “past application of public trust principles has been as a restraint on the State’s ability to restrict public access to public resources, not as a theory for compelling regulation of those resources”).
the territorial seas were harmed by the government’s alleged failure to protect the
climate system, but they contend that that the atmosphere is burdened by a federal
trust. 3 E.R. 612-13. That the federal agency action and inaction challenged by
Plaintiffs might indirectly affect the territorial seas does not mean that Plaintiffs have
identified a protected trust.
In sum, the district court should have dismissed Plaintiffs’ public trust claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the district court should be reversed,
and this case should be remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
Dated: February 1, 2019.
Counsel for Defendants-Appellants
Respectfully submitted, s/ Eric Grant JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK Assistant Attorney General ERIC GRANT Deputy Assistant Attorney General ANDREW C. MERGEN SOMMER H. ENGELS ROBERT J. LUNDMAN Attorneys Environment and Natural Resources Division U.S. Department of Justice
(13) “agency action” includes the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act; and
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the United States: Provided, That any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the Federal officer or officers (by name or by title), and their successors in office, personally responsible for compliance. Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall —
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be —
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
Any person, State, municipality, or State commission aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in a proceeding under this chapter to which such person, State, municipality, or State commission is a party may apply for a rehearing within thirty days after the issuance of such order. The application for rehearing shall set forth specifically the ground or grounds upon which such application is based. Upon such application the Commission shall have power to grant or deny rehearing or to abrogate or modify its order without further hearing. Unless the Commission acts upon the application for rehearing within thirty days after it is filed, such application may be deemed to have been denied. No proceeding to review any order of the Commission shall be brought by any person unless such person shall have made application to the Commission for a rehearing thereon. Until the record in a proceeding shall have been filed in a court of appeals, as provided in subsection (b), the Commission may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued by it under the provisions of this chapter.
(b) Review of Commission order
Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States for any circuit wherein the natural-gas company to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the order of the Commission upon the application for rehearing, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part. A copy of such petition shall forthwith be transmitted by the clerk of the court to any member of the Commission and thereupon the Commission shall file with the court the record upon which the order complained of was entered, as provided in section 2112 of title 28. Upon the filing of such petition such court shall have jurisdiction, which upon the filing of the record with it shall be exclusive, to affirm, modify, or set aside such order in whole or in part. No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection
shall have been urged before the Commission in the application for rehearing unless there is reasonable ground for failure so to do. The finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. If any party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce such evidence in the proceedings before the Commission, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Commission and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as to the court may seem proper. The Commission may modify its findings as to the facts by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and it shall file with the court such modified or new findings, which is supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, and its recommendation, if any, for the modification or setting aside of the original order. The judgment and decree of the court, affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any such order of the Commission, shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28.
(c) Stay of Commission order
The filing of an application for rehearing under subsection (a) shall not, unless specifically ordered by the Commission, operate as a stay of the Commission's order. The commencement of proceedings under subsection (b) of this section shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Commission's order.
(d) Judicial review
(1) In general
The United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which a facility subject to section 717b of this title or section 717f of this title is proposed to be constructed, expanded, or operated shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for the review of an order or action of a Federal agency (other than the Commission) or State administrative agency acting pursuant to Federal law to issue, condition, or deny any permit, license, concurrence, or approval (hereinafter collectively referred to as “permit”) required under Federal law, other than the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for the review of an alleged failure to act by a Federal agency (other than the Commission) or State administrative agency acting pursuant to Federal law to issue, condition, or deny any permit required under Federal law, other than the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.), for a facility subject to section 717b of this title or section 717f of this title. The failure of an agency to take action on a permit required under Federal law, other than the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, in accordance with the Commission schedule established pursuant to section 717n(c) of this title shall be considered inconsistent with Federal law for the purposes of paragraph (3).
(3) Court action
If the Court finds that such order or action is inconsistent with the Federal law governing such permit and would prevent the construction, expansion, or operation of the facility subject to section 717b of this title or section 717f of this title, the Court shall remand the proceeding to the agency to take appropriate action consistent with the order of the Court. If the Court remands the order or action to the Federal or State agency, the Court shall set a reasonable schedule and deadline for the agency to act on remand.
(4) Commission action
For any action described in this subsection, the Commission shall file with the Court the consolidated record of such order or action to which the appeal hereunder relates.
(5) Expedited review
The Court shall set any action brought under this subsection for expedited consideration.
§ 7607. Administrative proceedings and judicial review
. . . .
(b) Judicial review
(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard or requirement under section 7412 of this title, any standard of performance or requirement under section 7411 of this title, any standard under section 7521 of this title (other than a standard required to be prescribed under section 7521(b)(1) of this title), any determination under section 7521(b)(5) of this title, any control or prohibition under section 7545 of this title, any standard under section 7571 of this title, any rule issued under section 7413, 7419, or under section 7420 of this title, or any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan under section 7410 of this title or section 7411(d) of this title, any order under section 7411(j) of this title, under section 7412 of this title, under section 7419 of this title, or under section 7420 of this title, or his action under section 1857c–10(c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of this title (as in effect before August 7, 1977) or under regulations thereunder, or revising regulations for enhanced monitoring and compliance certification programs under section 7414(a)(3) of this title, or any other final action of the Administrator under this chapter (including any denial or disapproval by the Administrator under subchapter I) which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence a petition for review of any action referred to in such sentence may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia if such action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and publishes that such action is based on such a determination. Any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register, except that if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds arise. The filing of a petition for
reconsideration by the Administrator of any otherwise final rule or action shall not affect the finality of such rule or action for purposes of judicial review nor extend the time within which a petition for judicial review of such rule or action under this section may be filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule or action.
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement. Where a final decision by the Administrator defers performance of any nondiscretionary statutory action to a later time, any person may challenge the deferral pursuant to paragraph (1).
Energy Policy and Conservation Act 49 U.S.C. § 32909
§ 32909. Judicial review of regulations
(a) Filing and Venue.—(1) A person that may be adversely affected by a regulation prescribed in carrying out any of sections 32901-32904 or 32908 of this title may apply for review of the regulation by filing a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the person resides or has its principal place of business.
(2) A person adversely affected by a regulation prescribed under section 32912(c)(1) of this title may apply for review of the regulation by filing a petition for review in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the person resides or has its principal place of business.
(b) Time for Filing and Judicial Procedures.—The petition must be filed not later than 59 days after the regulation is prescribed, except that a petition for review of a regulation prescribing an amendment of a standard submitted to Congress under section 32902(c)(2) of this title must be filed not later than 59 days after the end of the 60-day period referred to in section 32902(c)(2). The clerk of the court shall send immediately a copy of the petition to the Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, whoever prescribed the regulation. The Secretary or the Administrator shall file with the court a record of the proceeding in which the regulation was prescribed.
(c) Additional Proceedings.—(1) When reviewing a regulation under subsection (a)(1) of this section, the court, on request of the petitioner, may order the Secretary or the Administrator to receive additional submissions if the court is satisfied the additional submissions are material and there were reasonable grounds for not presenting the submissions in the proceeding before the Secretary or Administrator.
(2) The Secretary or the Administrator may amend or set aside the regulation, or prescribe a new regulation because of the additional submissions presented. The Secretary or Administrator shall file an amended or new regulation and the additional submissions with the court. The court shall review a changed or new regulation.
(d) Supreme Court Review and Additional Remedies.—A judgment of a court under this section may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court under section 1254 of title 28. A remedy under subsections (a)(1) and (c) of this section is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.