Unit Two: Realist Theory and IPE Dr. Russell Williams
Jan 03, 2016
Unit Two: Realist Theory and IPE
Dr. Russell Williams
Outline:1. Realism – the Basics
2. Implications of Realism for State Behavior
3. Realist Approaches to IPE
4. Modern Realism and IPE - Hegemonic Stability Theory
5. Conclusion
6. Further Reading
Required Reading: Cohn, Global Political Economy, Ch. 3.
Class Discussion Reading: Susan Strange, “The Future of the American
Empire,” Journal of International Affairs, Fall 1988, Vol. 42 Issue 1, pp. 1-17.
1) Realism – the Basics: Dominant approach to the study of IR, but less important in
IPE?
States are key actor E.g. IO’s and MNC’s often only “extensions” of state
power
States are: “Unitary” - Domestic politics and interests less important “Rational” - States pursue predictable strategies based
on calculations of self interest “Survival” “Power” “Sovereignty” - Internal and external
Global politics is a “self help” system – states must look after themselves
“Politics” more important than economics Economics only important topic when it relates to state
power
Skepticism about international law, rules, regimes and values Rules are for the “weak”. . . .
Skepticism about cooperation States only cooperate when then they gain more than
others = little cooperation under normal circumstances?
Realism “parsimonious” Has few variables and leads to clear predictions
Realist Theories of International Relations (IR):
Avoid overgeneralization – not one single theory
i) Classical Realism: (Machiavelli to Morgenthau) Human nature is bad - hard to trust others Reject liberal views of human nature
Therefore, other states are an inherent threat
E.g. Hobbes’ “State of nature” Makes a virtue of pursuit of power Other theories seen as “idealism” (E.H.
Carr)
ii) Structural Realism (1970-Present) Waltz, Grieco and Mearsheimer More scientific - explored where threats came
from Three “images”
Human nature? Domestic Politics? International Structure – lack of
Government?
= International Structure matters!!! Global anarchy means states have to be
amoral in the pursuit of power Only two independent variables:
Anarchy Distribution of power in the interstate system
Large impact on policymakers in US More role for economics . . . (E.g. Thucydides)
2) Implications for State Behavior:
a) The “Security Dilemma”: Security and pursuit of power is a “zero sum” game
Any increase in my security or power means a decrease for others . . .
= Cooperation unlikely
b) “Relative gains” more important then “absolute gains”
States only cooperate to pursue relative advantages over others=E.g. IO’s seen as tools of powerful states which hurt
the interests of weaker states
c) State policy driven by international structure and position in the global “balance” of power
Powerful states will pursue different strategies from weak – try to ensure the status quo
=E.g. Only economically powerful support free trade
Bottom Line: Cooperation difficult States unlikely to expose themselves
to interdependence
3) Realist Approaches to IPE
a) Proto-realism and economics: Most classical realists integrated international
economics in their analysis. Economics seen as a source of conflict and war
E.g. Imperialism
Economy important to state power E.g. Thucydides and the Athenians E.g. Machievelli
b) “Mercantilism” (16th to 18th Century)
Classical mercantilism: States’ power dependent on “treasure” Gold is key to power of emerging sovereign
states States seek to increase their holdings of gold
and silver through: Conquest and colonies Increase exports, decrease imports
Problems?
c) Economic Nationalism and Neo Mercantilism: 19th and 20th century and beyond . . .
Industrialization seen as key economic goal Necessary to independence (sovereignty) Essential to military power (security)
States need industrial development to survive (Friedrich List) States should:
Adopt high tariffs (protectionism) Encourage development of national industries
4) Modern Realism and IPE:
Post War Period:
Liberal free trade collapsed prior to WWII “Economic nationalism”
Post War Realists believed economic cooperation had to be enforced by dominant states Could reduce threats and conflict
Breton Woods system and free trade possible because: US military and economic dominance Threat of the Soviet Union = other states had no choice but to
cooperate
1970’s - Post War System under stress: Economic crises = Post War liberal economic order
under threat???? US decline?
US economy relatively smaller Economic success of Germany and Japan
OPEC Global economic slowdown Financial instability = end of dollar standard
“Détente” – decline of the cold war Result: Realists begin to pay more attention to
economics=Declining economic cooperation in north and era of
the “new protectionism”
“Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)”:
1980s realists argue, “politics” still dominant over economics=Economic “cooperation” becoming more difficult because
of declining US power
“Hegemony” (in Realism): Leadership, or dominance, of international system by single state
HST assumes: Like liberalism, free trade and globalization good in
theory, but unlikely to occur because states mistrust one another under conditions of anarchy
“Free trade” and economic cooperation seen as “public goods”
Non excludible and non rival=“Free riders” = collective action problems
“Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)”:
Hegemonic state can either: Provide public goods itself - So dominant economically
that it is in its interest to do so . . . . Force “free riders” to “pay” for public goods
Key claim: Hegemony = Liberal economic order
Problems:
What is hegemony???? Economic or military? “Soft Power” or ideology?
How do we know when a state is hegemonic, or the world is uni-polar?
“Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)”:
Problems:
1) Risk of tautology “Reading off the “dependent variable”
2) Empirical record? If US had declined by 1980s, why globalisation?
Contemporary Realism: Retreat to “High Politics”?
Post 9/11 return to emphasis on security and military conflict
Economic issues have been “securitized”
Conclusions :
a) Strengths of Realism: “Parsimony’ (?) Focus on distributional outcomes – who gains
what . . . . Rejection of idealistic prescriptions of how the
world should be
b) Weaknesses of Realism:
Domestic politics? Under emphasis of importance of wealth and
economics? Empirical problems? There seems to be a lot more economic
cooperation then realists assumed likely . . . . Does HST overcome this problem?
Further Reading:
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, 78-2 (March/April 1999), pp. 35-49. Example of realist analysis of contemporary US challenges.
Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization, 42-3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507.
John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, 19-3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49. Examples of realism’s critiques of liberal challengers
For Next Time:
Unit Three: Thinking Liberally - Diversity and Hegemony in IPE
Required Reading: Cohn, Ch. 4.
Class Discussion Reading: Eric Helleiner, “Economic Liberalism and Its
Critics: The Past as Prologue?,” Review of International Political Economy, 10-4 (November 2003), pp. 685-696.