Unit 1: Process Knowledge Management Slides

Copyright ©American Institute of Chemical Engineers 2016. All rights reserved.

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SAChE® Certificate Program

Level 2, Course 10: Understanding Hazards and Risks

Unit 1: Process Knowledge Management

Narration:

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Getting Started

Narration (female voice):

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Case Study

Narration (male voice):

The piping and instrument diagram (or P&ID) for this hot fuel oil tank included only a single fuel

oil line. Not shown was a second line leading to a diesel source.

When a valve on this undocumented line was inadvertently opened, diesel flowed into the hot

oil tank and, partially vaporized by the heat, caused the tank to rupture.

Fortunately, there were no injuries, but the incident could have been prevented had the

information on the P&ID been accurate, up-to-date, available to the operators, and used in their

training.


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Objectives


This is the first of two units in the Understanding Hazards and Risks course. By the end of this

unit, titled “Process Knowledge Management,” you will be able to:

• Understand the function and importance of the Process Knowledge Management

element in the Process Safety Management (or PSM) System;

• Understand the most important items of process knowledge;

• Be able to distinguish some key process related diagrams;

• Understand the major PSM elements which interact with Process Knowledge

Management; and

• Identify useful metrics to assess the effectiveness of Process Knowledge Management.


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SECTION 1: The Process Knowledge Management Element

Narration:

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Section 1


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The Process Knowledge Management Element


The Process Knowledge Management element is also known as Process Knowledge and

Documentation and, more commonly, Process Safety Information (or PSI).

In this section, we’ll describe a number of important items of process safety knowledge and how

they are integrated into the PS management system.


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Questions to Ask About the Facility’s Performance


At the highest level, the overall question to ask about the facility’s performance of this element

is: “Does complete and accurate written information exist pertaining to the technology of the

process?”


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Additional Questions to Ask


The overall mission of the technology information element is to answer these questions:

• Is the facility’s process safety information complete?

• Are the piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) at as-built status?

• Are equipment, facility, and process changes incorporated into the technical

documentation as they occur?

… and …

• Do operators have access to the latest version of this information and do they use it?


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Methodology and Responsibility Varies


Depending on the structure and culture of each company, the methodology and responsibility of

maintaining process knowledge and documentation will vary. For example, some files will be at

one location in a central file for several plants; others will be maintained at each individual plant.

An extremely important issue is to make certain that sponsorship and responsibility for

maintaining the information are clearly defined, communicated, and understood throughout the

organization.


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Technology Information – Materials


Important elements of technology information relating to the materials include:

• Chemical identification data;

• Physical property data;

• Thermodynamic data (including reaction heat, latent heat, heat capacity, and thermal

conductivity);

• Reactivity and stability data;

• Flammability data (such as flammable concentrations);

• Exposure limits;

• Regulatory classifications;

• Toxicity data; and

• Storage requirements.


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Technology Information – Process


Important elements of technology information relating to the process include:

• Block flow or simple process flow diagram;

• Process chemistry;

• Kinetics data;

• Normal operating limits for continuous and batch processes;

• Process operating data;

• Maximum intended inventory;

• Safe upper and lower processing limits;

• Material inventories required;

• Description of general control philosophy;

• P&IDs;

• Materials of construction; and

• Electrical classifications.


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Toxicity Related Items


The following are the most commonly encountered toxic parameters in process safety:

• Threshold Limit Value (TLV);

• Short Term and Permissible Exposure Limits (STEL and PEL);

• Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH);

• Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs);

• Odor Thresholds; and

• Probit Values.

A detailed study of these toxicity items is beyond the scope of this course. Descriptions and use

of these are covered in further detail in other SAChE modules.


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Flammability Related Items


The following are the most commonly encountered flammable parameters in process safety:

• Upper Flammable Limit (UFL);

• Lower Flammable Limit (LFL);

• Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE);

• Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC);

• Minimum Explosible Concentration (MEC);

• Explosion Severity Index (Kst);

• Flash Point; and

• Flame Speed.

Again, descriptions and use of these are covered in further detail in other SAChE modules.


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Can you think of an example of a wide ranging safety document that encompasses both toxicity

and flammability information?


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The Safety Data Sheet (SDS)


The Safety Data Sheet (SDS; formerly known as a Material Safety Data Sheet, or MSDS) is an

excellent example; it’s one of the most common safety documents found in plants and labs.


Take a few minutes now to scroll through and read this SDS.


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The Safety Data Sheet (SDS) (continued)


The SDS is a detailed information bulletin prepared by the manufacturer of a chemical that

describes the:

• Physical and health hazards;

• Routes of exposure;

• Precautions for safe handling and use;

• Emergency first-aid procedures; and

• Control measures.

In the U.S., the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or OSHA, requires that

employers maintain a complete and accurate SDS for each hazardous chemical that is used in

their facility. Manufacturers of the chemicals must keep this information up to date.


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SECTION 2: Process Related Diagrams

Narration:

[None]

Section 2


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Process Related Diagrams


In this section we’ll examine common process related diagrams. These include:

• Block flow diagrams;

• Process flow diagrams (or PFDs);

• Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams, (or P&IDs); and

• Equipment layouts.


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Block Flow Diagrams


Block flow diagrams are one of the simplest ways to present the sequence of units in a process.

They often serve as background to describe a project to a wider audience not necessarily

conversant in all process details.

Block flow diagrams can more easily be used for training, product transfers between facilities,

and for a process hazards analysis (or PHA) team with different technical backgrounds

(frequently prior to more detailed level of assessment).


An example block flow diagram is shown here. You can click the image for a closer look.


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Process Flow Diagrams


PFDs and their related process descriptions also have the same need as P&IDs for real time

accuracy. They are the basis for:

• Operating Procedures (another process safety management, or PSM, element);

• Process control design;

• Emergency relief sizing;

• Dispersion modeling;

• Hazard analysis;

…and others, all of which are based on an accurate representation of current operations.


An example process flow diagram is shown here. You can click the image for a closer look.


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Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs)


P&IDs typically reflect a specific portion of the overall process flow diagram and are much more

detailed and equipment oriented than PFDs and block flow diagrams. As such, they are

generated and maintained by a company’s Engineering Department. The original version was

most likely developed by contracted engineering during the design and construction of a project.

The P&ID is an essential document in the development of a hazard identification exercise,

particularly a HAZOP (or Hazard and Operability Study). A P&ID’s accuracy and up to date status

are critical to the reliability and comprehensiveness of those studies.


An example P&ID is shown here. You can click the image for a closer look.


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Equipment Layout Drawings


Equipment layout drawings can serve many purposes. In addition to their role in the actual

design and construction of a facility, they provide a starting point for siting studies.

Consequence modeling of toxic and flammable releases are overlaid on layout drawings.

Electrical area classification designations (for flammability control) use layout drawings to depict

requirements.


An example layout drawing is shown here. You can click the image for a closer look.


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Living Documents


The items covered under Process Safety Information are living documents. That is, they must

reflect the current process conditions, equipment design, vessel assignments, materials and

quantities expected on site, among other items.

This is particularly crucial for P&IDs. These are typically used as the basis for detailed hazard

analyses and those exercises would be compromised if the P&ID doesn’t accurately reflect “as-

built” status of the equipment being analyzed.


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SECTION 3: How PSI Interfaces with Other Elements

Narration:

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Section 3


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PSI Interfaces with Other PSM Elements


The PSI element interfaces significantly with a number of other PSM elements, most frequently:

• Hazard Analysis (due to the obvious need to be analyzing accurate and representative

information);

• Operating Procedures (such as upper and lower limits and set points of safety systems);

Asset Integrity and Reliability (the information in PSI enables the scheduling and content

for maintenance tasks);

• Training (these programs are developed using the knowledge of the process and

equipment); and

• Management of Change, or MOC (these reviews require in depth knowledge of the

process and equipment; we’ll learn more about MOC on the next slide).


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Management of Change (MOC)


On the previous slide, you learned that one of the other PSM elements that the process safety

information element interfaces with is Management of Change.

The MOC element requires that when some equipment on a P&ID has changed, this change

needs to be captured and recorded. For practical and document control reasons, process

diagrams do not necessarily have to be updated on the computer, but can be kept current by

red lining (that is, using a red pencil with a dated note of the change). Then the diagrams can be

formally changed in the computer file as time permits.


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Leading Metrics


There are leading metrics that an organization can use to assess how effectively they’re applying

any of the PSM elements. Several useful metrics for Process Knowledge Management include:

• The number of corrections to P&IDs and other process safety information identified

during process hazard analyses;

• Accuracy of process knowledge during periodic reviews;

• Results of periodic opinion surveys to determine if users of process knowledge believe

that it’s current and accurate;

• Results of random checks of MSDS files to determine if they are complete, current, and

accurate;

• Number of incident investigations that include an element of discovery;

• Percentage of technical document changes meeting the target cycle time for update;

• Number of change requests initiated to "correct” process knowledge;

• Engineering staff time spent recreating process knowledge; and

• The number or percent of blank records in the process knowledge database.


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Participating on an Audit Team


During your chemical engineering career, you may be part of an audit team assessing process

safety performance at one of your company’s plants.

Carefully examine the process safety knowledge requirements found in the procedures of the

company or facility being audited. These could be interpreted as compliance requirements by

regulators and subject to citations if they’re not being followed.

The Center for Chemical Process Safety (or CCPS) has published useful guidance on how to

conduct such an activity. You can learn more about the CCPS Guidelines for Auditing Process

Safety Management Systems resource by clicking the book icon.


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SECTION 4: Examples of Ineffective Process Knowledge Management

Narration:

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Section 4


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Examples of Ineffective Process Knowledge Management


To conclude this unit, we’ll look at a couple of examples where ineffective process knowledge

management led to problems.


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Example 1: T2 Laboratories Inc. Reactive Chemical Explosion


In the example illustrated in this video, a lack of understanding of reactive hazards led to a

catastrophic incident and resulted in fatalities.


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Example 2


Consider the following situation:

A field operator contacts the control room about a leaking connection on a heat exchanger.

[Field operator] “Hey, Carlos…Connection B1 appears to be leaking on the exchanger.”

The control room operator instructs the field operator to bypass the heat exchanger using the

upstream manifold.

[Control room operator] “OK, Sam. Glad you noticed that leak. Go ahead and bypass using the

upstream manifold.”

[Field operator] “Roger that, Carlos. I’m doing that now.”

Unknown to the control room operator, an auxiliary bypass was recently installed upstream of


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the heat exchanger and was not recorded on the P&ID.

When the field operator opens the bypass, the process stream is routed to an alternative and

unintended location.

The inaccuracy of the technical information could have led to a serious incident. There were also

deficiencies in the management of change and training elements here.


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Unit 1 Summary


We’ve reached the end of the first unit in the Understanding Hazards and Risks course. Having

completed this first unit on Process Knowledge Management, you should now be able to:

• Understand the function and importance of the Process Knowledge Management

element in the Process Safety Management System;

• Understand the most important items of process knowledge;

• Be able to distinguish some key process related diagrams;

• Understand the major PSM elements which interact with Process Knowledge

Management; and

• Identify useful metrics to assess the effectiveness of Process Knowledge Management.