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Briefing17 March 2015
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research ServiceAuthor: Eric
PichonMembers' Research Service
ENPE 551.329
Understanding the rise of ISIL/Da'esh(the 'Islamic State')
SUMMARY
Already in control of a third of Syrian territory (most of it
uninhabited), the jihadistterrorist group that has declared itself
'the Islamic State' (known variously as IS, ISIS orISIL, and by the
Arabic acronym 'Daesh' or 'Da'esh'), also seized large portions of
Iraqiterritory in a matter of days in summer 2014.
Beyond the daily account of atrocities committed by ISIL/Da'esh,
analysts have tried tofathom how this group, now boasting tens of
thousands of fighters and several billioneuros in resources,
emerged on the international scene and made its claim to powerwith
such sweeping assertiveness.
Syria and Iraq's neighbours now find themselves on the
frontlines of furtherexpansion: a US-led international coalition,
including countries in the region, is tryingto halt the ISIL/Da'esh
advance.
The conflict has triggered considerable EU humanitarian effort,
and a review of theEU's counter-terrorism strategy to better
address the global dimension of the terroristthreat.
In this briefing: Origins What are ISIL/Da'esh's resources?
Spillover at the Syrian and Iraqi borders EU response
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Origins
Sunnis–Shiites; Jihadists Soon after the Prophet Muhammad's
death (632 AD), a conflict erupted over who should be his successor
('caliph' in Arabic). Although some of his companions were in
favour of his cousin and son-in-law Ali, the majority decided to
nominate Abou Bakr, who was not of Muhammad's bloodline but was
deemed more fit for the task. After years of successive battles,
Ali was killed in 661 AD, and Hussein, his son and the grandson of
Muhammad, was beheaded in 680 AD by the caliph's supporters. Since
then, Muslims are seen as divided between the Sunnis, who recognise
the caliphs succeeding Muhammad as legitimate, and the Shiites, and
Shi'a, the partisans of Ali, who believe the true leaders ('imam'
in Arabic), should have been his descendants.
Sunnis make up 87-90% of Muslims, 10-13% are Shiites; the latter
live predominantly in an area between southern Lebanon and Bahrain,
commonly known as the 'Shiite Crescent'. A third branch of Islam
(the Kharadjites), produced the Ibadis, who are in the majority in
Oman. In addition, there are also Muslims who identify themselves
as 'just Muslim'.
Sunnis and Shiites live peacefully together in many parts of the
world, but their religious divergences have also pitched them into
power conflicts with each other for many centuries. There is also
great diversity within these two main groups: in particular, among
the Sunnis, Salafis believe that the only way to be a 'good Muslim'
is to adhere, in the strictest possible way, to the code of
behaviour of Muhammad and his immediate successors. A fraction of
them claims it is their duty to fight against those who believe
anything else. These violent extremists are often referred to as
'Salafi jihadists' or 'Jihadi Salafis' – although violence is not
implied in the word 'jihad', which simply refers to 'efforts to be
a "good Muslim" or believer, as well as working to inform people
about the faith of Islam'. Traditional Salafis deny that these
violent extremists are entitled to call themselves Salafis.
The 'Islamic State' and the 'Caliphate' Among Salafi jihadists,
ISIS or ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham/Levant) was
originally a branch of Al-Qaeda, known as 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq',
founded in 2004 to resist the US invasion and the Shiite-led
government it imposed. Political and theoretical differences led to
a split after Osama Bin Laden's death. After the beginning of the
Syrian uprising, ISIL entered Syria and, unsuccessfully, tried to
take over the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda's Syrian branch. The two
groups have been fighting each other for control of Syrian
territory, but cooperate on some battlefronts.
On 29 June 2014, the group renamed itself 'the Islamic State'
('Da'esh' is the Arab acronym used by those fighting against it),
to mark its will to restore an institution weakened and
subsequently abolished by Turkey's secular leader, Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk, in 1924: the 'Caliphate', i.e. theocratic rule of a
territory where all inhabitants should abide by 'Sharia' – the
Islamic law. Current ISIL/Da'esh leader Abou Bakr Al-Baghdadi
declared himself the new caliph, with an ambition to govern the
lives of all Muslims in the world. This act of self-declaration has
not been recognised by Muslim authorities, or by the Muslim
community, and is even rejected by other Salafi jihadists. More
generally, support for ISIL/Da'esh in the Arab world is not
high.
In the areas ISIL/Da'esh controls, in particular its 'capital'
Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq, it installs its own
administration, by means of coercion and violence, but also by
http://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-2008-6-page-741.htmhttp://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-east#map-13http://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-east#map-13http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-sunni-shia-divide-where-they-live-what-they-believe-and-how-they-view-each-other/http://www.pewforum.org/2012/08/09/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-executive-summary/http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/10938.pdfhttp://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/02/CONESA/52626http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2015/02/CONESA/52626http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/5-jihad-a-misunderstood-concept-from-islam.html?start=9http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493http://orientxxi.info/magazine/le-califat-imaginaire,0689http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/isil-declares-new-islamic-caliphate-201462917326669749.htmlhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/07/syria-iraq-isis-caliphate-egypt-azhar-reaction.htmlhttp://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/commentaries/opinion/most-muslims-dont-care-about-isis-caliphatehttp://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/27/jihadi-salafi-views-of-the-islamic-state/http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/06/How-does-the-Arab-world-view-ISIS.aspxhttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-inside-the-islamic-state-caliphate-life-goes-on--but-beatings-are-frequent-and-punishments-swift-and-savage-9955949.htmlhttp://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-islamic-state-mosul-20150126-story.html#page=1http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/05/how-much-of-a-state-is-the-islamic-state/
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spending money and recruiting its own workforce for courts,
police, and education,Some 6 million people live under ISIL/Da'esh
rules.
What are ISIL/Da'esh's resources?Human resourcesEstimates of the
number of ISIL/Da'esh fighters in Iraq and Syria vary from 9 000
to200 000 (20 000-31 500 as of September 2014, according to the
CIA) – among themchildren. This variation may be explained by the
fact that the highest figures take intoaccount ISIL/Da'esh's core
troops plus allied factions. Despite its record of crime
andviolence, particularly based on ethnic and religious
motivation,1 ISIL/Da'esh enjoys somesupport in Iraq. The country's
former Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, is said by manyobservers to
have pitted Sunni tribal leaders against the regime. Furthermore,
some ofSaddam Hussein's former collaborators see ISIL/Da'esh as a
route back onto the politicaland military scene. The seizure of
Mosul would not have been so swift without the helpof other armed
Sunni factions. Nevertheless, a total sectarian conflict has not
takenplace: a number of Sunni tribes have now taken up arms against
ISIL/Da'esh to combatits violent methods and aspirations for
dominance.
ISIL/Da'esh also recruits its members among radicalised Muslims
globally.2 To reachthem, it has a very sophisticated 'communication
plan', of which the appalling videos ofviolent executions are only
a part. ISIL/Da'esh uses all available channels, from a
papermagazine, Dabiq, to the full range of social media. Social
platforms deliver messages inseveral languages, tailored to a broad
spectrum of target audiences. These are not onlycalls to take up
arms, but also testimonials from Western volunteers, declaring
theyhave found a more meaningful life as ISIL/Da'esh fighters.
Online chat rooms andforums afford ISIL/Da'esh direct contact with
prospective recruits. On the ground,'welcome actions' are
implemented: ISIL/Da'esh has for example allegedly
openedEnglish-speaking schools in Raqqa for foreign fighters'
children.
Since the international coalition's strikes, attracting new
fighters has become moredifficult: ISIL/Da'esh is more prudent in
the use of social media, as some posts or textmessages have helped
the international coalition3 locate its strongholds and identify
itsforces. Recent testimonies also suggest that the bloodshed by
ISIL/Daesh troopsdeterred new local recruitment, and that foreign
recruits are reluctant to go into battle.
Military equipmentAccording to Conflict Armament
Research-iTrace, an EU-funded project, most of themilitary
equipment in ISIL/Da'esh possession was seized from the defeated
Iraqi army innorthern Iraq, or from the Free Syrian Army:
ISIL/Da'esh holds 'significant quantities ofUS-manufactured small
arms'. Jana Hybášková, a former MEP and now head of the
EUDelegation in Iraq, also voiced concerns that arms aimed at
helping the KurdishPeshmerga troops fighting ISIL/Da'esh, may have
been diverted by the jihadists.Turkey's President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan stated that 'some of the weapons' the USdropped to help the
Kurdish forces fighting in Kobanî 'were seized by ISIL'.
Financial resourcesThere are suspicions that ISIL/Da'esh
receives funding from some Gulf States, but itgenerates most of its
income from the territories it occupies, according to the
inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF). For
instance, ISIL/Da'esh has revived apractice once applied by
Muhammad and the early caliphates: the so-called 'jizya' – a
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tax imposed on other 'religions of the Book' (mainly Christians,
as there are very fewJews in Iraq).
Money also flows in from ransoms paid for hostages, from human
trafficking and bankrobbery. In a robbery of the largest bank in
the city of Mosul, ISIL/Da'esh obtained500 billion Iraqi dinars
(around €330 million), and it has also plundered other banks.
International smuggling is yet another important source of
ISIL/Da'esh income. Analystsestimate ISIL/Da'esh already controls
60% of Syrian oil fields; in Iraq, it took control ofseven oil
fields and two refineries. Illicit oil trade might have provided
around€1.5 million a day, but it could now be less, as US
airstrikes have destroyed part of therefineries – and also because
crude oil prices have declined globally. The head of the
EUDelegation in Iraq accused EU countries – without naming them –
of buying oil fromISIL/Da'esh, and the UN Security Council warned
ISIL/Da'esh clients that they could facesanctions.
ISIL/Da'esh communicates widely on its destruction of 'idols of
the past', but it alsomakes a lot of money out of Iraqi heritage.
Smuggling of antiquities from Shiitemosques, Christian churches,
and archaeological sites is probably worth hundreds ofmillions of
euros.
Organ trafficking has also been alleged by Iraq's ambassador to
the UN.
Spillover at the Syrian and Iraqi bordersThe ISIL/Da'esh advance
in Iraq and Syria raises concerns that it will sooner or later
spillover into other countries in the neighbourhood, already
destabilised by the influx ofrefugees. Threats have also been
identified far beyond Iraqi and Syrian borders,especially in Libya,
where attacks have been perpetrated under the ISIL/Da'esh
banner,and Nigeria where Boko Haram4 has pledged allegiance to
ISIL/Da'esh. (This expansion isnot covered in this document, nor
are the Iraqi and Syrian governments' positions.)
In August 2014, ISIL/Da'esh attacked, without success, the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)and Internal Security Forces (ISF) on
the Syria-Lebanon border. To better resistISIL/Da'esh, the
government fostered better cooperation between the LAF
andHezbollah-led forces; it also gave more political
responsibilities to Sunni leaders, inorder to prevent them forming
a tactical alliance with ISIL/Da'esh. Nevertheless,ISIL/Da'esh and
other armed groups still pose a threat on the Syria-Lebanon border,
inthe mountain region of Qalamoun.
Fighting on the Golan Heights has led the UN peacekeeping
mission (UNDOF) towithdraw its troops, de facto removing a buffer
zone between Israel and Syria; however,Israel's military
superiority might thwart ISIL/Da'esh attack. At the UN General
Assembly(UNGA), Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu declared
that 'Hamas and ISIS arebranches of the same poisonous tree' but no
concrete alliance between the two groupshas been identified to
date.
The four month siege by ISIL/Da'esh of the Kurdish-populated
Syrian city of Kobanî,close to the Turkish border, put Turkey's
diplomacy under severe pressure.President Erdoğan, motivated by
domestic policy considerations, was reluctant to helpthe Turkish
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian allies. The Turkish
governmentreluctantly allowed Kurdish forces, led by PKK and its
Syrian ally, the People's ProtectionUnits (YPG), to access the
battlefield via Turkish territory only after the US ordered
http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2014/09/27-isis-oil-funds-terror-alkhatteebhttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-26/islamic-state-now-resembles-the-taliban-with-oil-fields.htmlhttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/28/baghdadis_hillbillies_isis_iraq_syria_oil_terrorism_islamic_statehttp://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/sep/25/pentagon-video-airstrikes-isis-oil-refineries-syria-videottps://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/europe/13893-eu-ambassador-to-iraq-accuses-european-countries-of-purchasing-oil-from-islamic-statehttp://is.gd/wjmBuuhttp://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/commentaries/glance/dont-be-surprised-isis-destroying-historyhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/09/turkey-syria-iraq-isis-artifacts-smuggling.htmlhttp://www.un.org/press/en/2015/db150218.doc.htmhttp://iswiraq.blogspot.com/http://iswsyria.blogspot.com/http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=59268http://is.gd/KKV3L2http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_islamic_state_effect_lebanons_new_security_symbiosis302http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/12/syria-eastern-qalamooun-assembly-point-armed-groups.htmlhttp://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-israeli-weapons-war-isis-should-fear-11331http://youtu.be/Cl1YsJ5V-6whttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/turkey-kurds-kobani-defeat-turkish-policy.html
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airstrikes in support of the Kurdish fighters. Later in
February, to demonstrate its will tofight against ISIL/Da'esh, the
Turkish army entered a Turkish enclave in Syria.
Jordan's army has also blocked several ISIL/Da'esh attempts to
invade its territory. Theimmolation of the Jordanian pilot Moaz
al-Kassasbeh in February 2015 has not deterredKing Abdullah's
engagement against ISIL/Da'esh; on the contrary he pledged to
'wipeout' ISIL/Da'esh and called for a quick delivery of
sophisticated US military materiel. Thisposition is likely to raise
concern among the Israeli leadership and their allies in the
USCongress.
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, suspected of funding Salafi terrorism,
now fear a backlash ontheir territories, and are increasingly
engaged in securing the region and combating theillicit financing
of ISIL/Da'esh. The perception of ISIL/Da'esh as a common risk to
bothSaudi Arabia and Iran did not trigger the expected
rapprochement between the tworival states in the region, embroiled
in other conflicts (in particular in Yemen).
Iran has not confirmed ISIL/Da'esh incursions on its territory,
but the Shiite-led IslamicRepublic considers a possible Islamic
state led by Sunni Salafi extremists at its borders asa serious
security threat. For this reason, Iran keeps close connection with
the Iraqigovernment and supports Iraqi unity– with a Shiite
majority – rather than a partitioninto three distinct entities
(Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni).
EU responseThe EU has repeatedly 'condemn[ed] the indiscriminate
attacks, atrocities, killings andabuses of human rights which are
perpetrated by ISIL/Da'esh and other terrorist groups,in particular
against Christians and other religious and ethnic groups'. The
'Elements foran EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as
the Da'esh threat', adopted by theCouncil on 16 March 2015, aims at
setting up a coordinated action of the EU andMember States within
an international framework, provides €1 billion in
additionalfunding for the next two years, 'for essential
priorities: relief, stabilisation anddevelopment in the region, as
well as countering the threat posed by terrorist groupslike
Da'esh'.
Concerning counter-terrorism and military actions, the EU and
Western states faceseveral challenges: they have to stop financial
and human outflows to ISIL/Da'esh5 aswell as coordinate their
actions in the field. The EU Counter-Terrorism/Foreign
FightersStrategy, adopted on 20 October 2014 urges Member States to
enforce measures totackle the financing of terrorism and to deter
citizens from joining the ranks ofISIL/Da'esh as 'foreign
fighters'. On 9 February 2015, the Council pointed out the needfor
an external dimension to policy on counterterrorism, complementing
justice andhome affairs action: 'Close coordination between
internal and external action on theone hand, and between relevant
EU actors and EU Member States on the other hand,will enhance the
impact of our common efforts'.. On the military side, the
ForeignAffairs Council of 15 August 2014 endorsed the supply of
arms by some Member Statesto Kurdish regional authorities. The
coordination of the response to ISIL/Da'esh goesbeyond the EU
framework: at the NATO Wales Summit in September 2014, six EUMember
States (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Denmark, and the UK),
together withAustralia, Canada, Turkey and the US, committed to
'take the necessary steps to helpIraq; to stop the advance of the
terrorist organisation Islamic State'. On 15
September,representatives of the UN, the EU, the Arab League, and
of 26 countries, met in Paris tocoordinate their actions to
'eradicate' ISIL/Da'esh.6
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European Parliament
The European Parliament adopted several resolutions condemning
the human rights abusesperpetrated by warring parties in Iraq and
Syria.7 In particular, in resolution P8_TA(2014)0027(18/09/2014),
the EP approved the implementation of an international coalition
againstISIL/Daesh; it emphasised the need for a better inclusion of
minorities in Iraq; it called for aneffective implementation of
'the arms embargo and assets freeze imposed by UN SecurityCouncil
resolutions' and 'for the referral of those suspected of committing
crimes againsthumanity in Syria and Iraq to the International
Criminal Court'. On 10 February 2015 the'Elements for an EU
regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh
threat'communication was referred to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs (AFET).
Main referencesThe main sources used for this briefing and
further references canbe found in our online 'keysource':
ISIL/Da'esh (The 'Islamic State'):background information
http://wp.me/p2qdgs-4sR.
Endnotes1 See our briefing and the related keysource:
'Minorities in Iraq – Pushed to the brink of existence', EPRS,
11 February 2015.2 See our briefing and the related keysource:
'Foreign fighters: Member States' responses and EU action in an
international context', EPRS, February 2015.3 See our briefing
on the international coalition against ISIL/Da'esh.4 See our
briefing: 'African-led counter-terrorism measures against Boko
Haram'.5 See our briefing and the related keysource on Foreign
fighters (above).6 For further information see our briefing on the
international coalition against ISIL/Da'esh, above.7 Resolutions
adopted since the beginning of the eighth parliamentary term:
2015/2599(RSP); 2015/2559(RSP);
2014/2971(RSP); 2014/2899(RSP); 2014/2843(RSP);
2014/2716(RSP).
Disclaimer and CopyrightThe content of this document is the sole
responsibility of the author and any opinions expressed thereindo
not necessarily represent the official position of the European
Parliament. It is addressed to theMembers and staff of the EP for
their parliamentary work. Reproduction and translation for
non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is
acknowledged and the European Parliament isgiven prior notice and
sent a copy.
© European Union, 2015.
Photo credits: © luisrsphoto / Fotolia
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OriginsSunnis–Shiites; JihadistsThe 'Islamic State' and the
'Caliphate'
What are ISIL/Da'esh's resources?Human resourcesMilitary
equipmentFinancial resources
Spillover at the Syrian and Iraqi bordersEU responseMain
referencesDisclaimer and Copyright