Understanding the Response of the Federal Reserve to the Recent Financial Crisis Sandy Krieger April 14, 2010 This presentation presents preliminary findings.

Understanding the Response of the Federal Reserve to the Recent

Financial CrisisSandy Krieger

April 14, 2010

This presentation presents preliminary findings and is being distributed to stimulate discussion and elicit comments. The views expressed in the presentation are those of the author and are not necessarily reflective of views at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author.

2

Motivation

All of Fed’s actions were directed at protecting the American people from a more severe downturn.

Fed’s goal was to foster access to credit by businesses and individuals to met critical needs and keep the economy moving during a very critical period.

3

Federal Reserve’s Responsibilities

Conduct the nation’s monetary policy Influence monetary and credit conditions in the economy in

pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates

Supervise and regulate banking institutions Ensure safety and soundness of the nation’s banking and

financial system Protect the credit rights of consumers

Maintain the stability of the financial system and contain systemic risk that may arise in financial markets

Provide financial services to depository institutions, the US governments and foreign official institutions, including playing a role in operating the nation’s payment system

4

Federal Reserve Governance

The Fed’s authority and structure is defined by Congress (Federal Reserve Act)

Fed structure Board of Governors in Washington, DC

7 Governors, appointed by Congress- Responsible for bank supervisory and payment system risk policies, approving

discount rate change requests

12 Regional Reserve Banks Independent corporations Responsible for the loans to Dis in their districts

- “Secured to their satisfaction”

Monetary Policy: FOMC The Governors Reserve Bank presidents

5 voting members; 4 on a rotational basis

5

Basic ABCP Conduit Structure

Seller

Credit Enhancement

Provider

Liquidity Provider

ABCP Conduit

Administrator Owner

Issuing Payment

Agent

Investor

Maturity Payments Price of ABCP

Maturity Payments Price of ABCP

Fees Dividends

Fees Credit Support Liquidity Support Fees

Cash Collections Cash Advances

Source: Moody’s

Placement Agent

Collateral Agent

Hedging Agent

Cost of Hedge

HedgeSecured Assets and Fees

6

Institutional Composition of Each Sector

Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds

$-

$5.00

$10.00

$15.00

$20.00

$25.00

1989Q4 Inside 1989Q4 Shadow 2009Q4 Inside 2009Q4 Shadow

depository institutions insurance companies pensions

money market funds other funds gses

abs issuers finance companies reits

broker-dealers funding corporations

7

Funding Sources by Sector Type

Inside institutions benefit from explicit guarantees and have access to official sources of liquidity

Shadow institutions do not benefit from explicit guarantees and do not have access to official sources of liquidity

$3,258.60

$7,002.40

$8,112.70

$564.70

$618.30

$4,650.20 Money Fund Shares

Mutual Fund Shares

Agency Debt and MBS

Federal Funds and Repo

Commercial Paper

Term Debt and ABS

$7,319.00

$1,989.90

$13,008.40

$820.60

$60.80 $1,164.80

Insured Deposits

Wholesale Deposits

Reserves

Federal Funds and Repo

Commercial Paper

Term Debt and ABS

8

Credit Market Debt Holdings by Institution Type

Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, Table L1

$-

$5.00

$10.00

$15.00

$20.00

$25.00

1980

Q1

1981

Q2

1982

Q3

1983

Q4

1985

Q1

1986

Q2

1987

Q3

1988

Q4

1990

Q1

1991

Q2

1992

Q3

1993

Q4

1995

Q1

1996

Q2

1997

Q3

1998

Q4

2000

Q1

2001

Q2

2002

Q3

2003

Q4

2005

Q1

2006

Q2

2007

Q3

2008

Q4

Inside Institutions Shadow Institutions

(credit market debt is defined as loans and fixed-income securities)

9

Evolution of the balance sheet through the crisis

0.5

11

.52

(tri

llio

ns

of

do

llars

)

2007q3 2007q4 2008q1 2008q2 2008q3 2008q4 2009q1 2009q2 2009q3 2009q4 2010q1

Federal Reserve System Balance Sheet

US Treasury Debt Agency Debt and MBS

Discount Window, TAF, and Swaps Repo and PDCF

AIG and Maiden Lanes AMLF, CPFF, and TALF

10

Problems addressed by new lending facilities (preview) Term Auction Facility : illiquid term markets and the stigma that accompanies

discount window borrowing

Swap lines: illiquid money markets that became segmented across countries and time zones

Primary Dealer Credit Facility: the lack of market-based back-stop credit in repo markets

Term Securities Lending Facility : illiquid functioning in repo funding markets—illustrated by abnormal rates and high haircuts

ABCP Money Market Liquidity Facility: illiquidity in money markets (including the ABCP) that prevented money funds from meeting demands for redemption

Commercial Paper Funding Facility: illiquid functioning in short-term commercial paper funding markets

Money Market Investor Funding Facility: lack of confidence that money market investors cannot extend terms of investments beyond overnight and remain adequately liquid

Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: lack of available credit due to frozen ABS market

11

The first phase of the financial crisis

0.2

.4.6

.8(t

rilli

on

s o

f d

olla

rs)

2007q3 2007q4 2008q1





(August 2007 through February 2008)

12

What happened in August 2007?

Severe pressure on ABCP and term dollar LIBOR markets Some ABCP issuers had subprime exposure Investors ran on the entire sector Sponsoring banks provided explicit and implicit support Need to bring assets on balance sheet pressured term dollar market

13

Shadow Bank Entities Assets TypesLiquiditySupport

Numberof Entities

Amount$ Billion

Percentof Total $

Multi-seller Receivables and loans Full 98 525 45

Hybrid and Other Combination n.a 84 210 18

Securities Arbitrage Highly-rated long-term ABS Full 35 148 13

Non-Mortgage Single-seller Credit card and auto loans Implicit 40 126 11

SIVs Highly-rated long-term ABS None 35 84 7

CDO Highly-rated long-term ABS Partial 36 47 4

Mortgage Single-seller Mortgages and MBS Implicit 11 23 2

Total 339 1163 100

ABCP Funding of Shadow Banks

13

Source: Covitz, Liang, Suarez (2009); June 2007

14

SIV Example: Cheyne Finance PLC

10 billion us/euro portfolio managed by Cheyne Capital Management (hedge fund)

WAL of assets (liabilities) was 2.9 (0.48) years in August 2007

US exposure of 78% vs 56% for the Moodys-rated SIV sector

SIV only had $775 million in committed liquidity (liquidity facilities/breakable deposits)

Cheyne folded quickly, defaulting on ABCP in October 2007, and ultimately its MTN issue.

14

15

Initial Policy Response to Illiquid Term Markets

Lower discount rate and offered term credit at Discount Window

But depository institutions borrowed using cheaper term funding from the FHLB system

And, limited access of foreign institutions to term dollar funding meant continued pressure on LIBOR-OIS

16

Why not the Fed (at least not right away)?

All-in-Cost Spread, Discount Window LESS FHLB NY Advance

17

Funding: ABCP, FHLB Debt and FHLB Advances

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV

2006 2007 2008 2009

Advances Asset Backed Commercial PaperFHLB Debt

$ B

illio

ns

18

Policy Response to Illiquid Term Mkts & DW Stigma

Lower discount rate and offered term credit at Discount Window

Introduced Term Auction Funding and FX swaps in December 2007 to address term dollar funding needs of foreign institutions and stigma associated with DW use

19

Pressure in Term Dollar Markets

… some improvement in late 2007

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

1/2/2007 1/2/2008 1/2/2009 1/2/2010

1-month LIBOR-OIS spread

ABCP crisis

Bear Stearns

Lehman

20

The second phase of the financial crisis

0.2

.4.6

.8(t

rilli

on

s o

f d

olla

rs)

2008q1 2008q2 2008q3





(March 2008 through August 2008)

21

What happened in March 2008?

Repo market Brokers-dealers relied heavily on repo funding, but they had

significant residential and commercial exposure on their balance sheets, which made investor nervous

Bank-affiliated dealers had indirect access to official liquidity (23A waivers), but stand-alone brokers had no liquidity backstop, making them vulnerable Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Goldman

Sachs In March, repo investors ran on the weakest stand-alone dealer

Policy response (term dollar liquidity for broker-dealers) Maiden Lane LLC - 13(3) loan Primary Dealer Credit Facility - 13(3) lending Term Securities Lending Facility – 13(3) lending Single tranche OMOs

22

Repo market is an important money market for broker-dealers

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

5000Ju

ly-9

4

July

-95

July

-96

July

-97

July

-98

July

-99

July

-00

July

-01

July

-02

July

-03

July

-04

July

-05

July

-06

July

-07

July

-08

July

-09

$Bln

Overnight Repo Term Repo Total Repo

23

Primary Dealer Credit Facility

The PDCF provides an alternative source of financing to a dealer that has difficulty financing a security in the market.

It was necessary to provide such an alternative in the unusual and exigent circumstances surrounding the near-failure of Bear Stearns.

24

PDCF usage high after Bear Stearns and Lehman failures

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

160000O

ct-0

7

No

v-07

Dec

-07

Jan-

08

Feb

-08

Mar

-08

Ap

r-08

May

-08

Jun-

08

Jul-0

8

Aug

-08

Sep

-08

Oct

-08

No

v-08

Dec

-08

Jan-

09

Feb

-09

Mar

-09

Ap

r-09

Primary Credit

PDCF

$Mln

25

Term Securities Lending Facility

The TSLF addresses the illiquid functioning in various repo financing markets, including abnormal rates, wide bid-ask spreads, and large and increasing haircuts on collateral.

Adds Treasuries to dealers’ portfolios, reducing their scarcity in the repo market

Reduces the roll-over risk for dealers in their financing of the alternative assets used as collateral

Format assists in setting the right price for the Treasuries lent

Avoids any reserve management problems

26

High overnight agency and MBS spreads to Treasury

Source: Bloomberg

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Jan-08 Mar-08 May-08 Jul-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Jan-09 Mar-09

MBS-TSY

AGY-TSY

BPS

First TSLF operation

27

The Rise and Fall of Shadow Institutions’ Funding

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009

Overnight Repo

Financial CP

M2

Mar 19 2008

Dec28 2009

Aug 8 2007

2.43

(The vertical axis scaled to 1.0 in 1994)

28

The third phase of the crisis

(September 2008 through December 2008)

0.5

11

.52

(tri

llio

ns

of

do

llars

)

2008q3 2008q4





29

What happened - Fall 2008?

Failure (or near failure) of at least eight large financial institutions in matter of weeks Break-down in Agency debt and MBS markets accelerates demise of

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Run by repo counterparties pushes Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy,

sending shock waves through repo, money, and term ABS markets Merrill Lynch sold to Bank of America Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley become bank holding companies

Liquidity crisis pushes AIG to brink of bankruptcy Large securities lending program which funded non-agency RMBS with

repo counterparties under pressure as the lenders wanted out Potential downgrade action by rating agency would trigger the need to post

massive amounts of collateral against financial guarantees, which the company did not have

Run on Money Funds: Reserve Fund breaks the buck

Washington Mutual is closed and Wachovia is taken over

30

Spread: One-Month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to O/N Index Swap (OIS) Rate

30

June 1, 2007 – October 23, 2009

Source: Financial times, Bloomberg, Haver Analytics

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

1-Jun-07 23-Nov-07 16-May-08 7-Nov-08 1-May-09 23-Oct-09

Basis Points

Reserve Fund breaks the buck (9/17/08)

Citigroup bailout (11/24/08)BNP

Paribas suspends hedge funds (8/9/07)

Basis PointsBasis Points

Lehmanbankruptcy (9/15/08)

Iceland Financial System Collapse(10/9/08)

Northern Rock bailout (9/12/07)

AIG Bailout (9/17/08)

US takeover GSEs (9/7/07)

Bailout of US financial system (10/3/08)Citigroup

receives $7.5 bn from Abu Dhabi (11/29/07)

31

Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Rate

31

0

2

4

6

8

2-Jan-07 8-May-07 11-Sep-07 15-Jan-08 20-May-08 23-Sep-08 27-Jan-09 2-Jun-09 6-Oct-09

1-Day AA Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Rate

Percent

Source: Federal Reserve Board/Haver Analytics

June 1, 2007 – October 23, 2009

32

Public Sector Responses

GSEs Conservatorship with keep-well agreement UST MBS purchase program Limited Fed purchases of Agency debt and MBS

AIG credit facility

Money markets US Treasury guarantee Fed special liquidity programs: AMLF, MMIFF

Large systemically important institutions TARP Capital Purchase Program Citigroup and Bank of America ring-fence transactions Term Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP)

Commercial Paper markets Fed liquidity program: Commercial Paper Finance Facility (CPFF)

33

AIG - a $1 Trillion Company

In Sept. 2008, AIG was the largest insurance company in the world, comprising 223 companies, operating in over 130 countries, and servicing 76 million customers

AIG Commercial Insurance insured over 175,000 entities, employing over 100 million people in the US, including comercial, military and other organizations

In the financial markets, AIG was a large issuer of CP and a mortgage lender and guarantor

AIG FP was a large participant in the market for a wide variety of derivatives and other financial products At its peak, AIG FP insured assets worth $2.7 trillion across a wide

range of asset classes

ILFC was the largest commercial customer of Boeing (order value of $12.5Bn), GE, Honeywell, Rockwell International and United Technologies

34

Potential Consequence of AIG Failure With a massive surrender of insurance policies resulting from an AIG bankruptcy, there might

have been insufficient capital or liquidity to pay all policyholder claims, and existing AIG policyholders might have been unable to obtain insurance coverage from other insurance companies

Based on experience of prior failures of insurance companies significantly smaller than AIG, the sudden loss of AIG insurance capacity would have seriously disrupted the market, potentially resulting in a shortage of market capacity and significant price increases for numerous businesses and financial institutions

Seizure of insurance subsidiaries by state regulators would have had an adverse impact on state guarantee funds, which are unfunded, resulting in assessments against other insurance companies

An AIG failure could have de-stabilized confidence in other insurers and possibly triggered a devastating global “run on the industry”

The scope of the failure could have put retirement savings significantly at risk Rapid unwinding and liquidation of AIG’s many investment portfolios would likely have caused

enormous downward pressure on valuations across all asset classes held by AIG Default by AIG on its commercial paper could have harmed the money markets (AIG had

issued approximately $20 billion in commercial paper, roughly 4 times as much as Lehman) More than 1,400 counterparties of AIGFP would have been affected; losses would be suffered

by municipalities, pension plans and investors in $34Bn of purportedly conservative Stable Value funds, potentially triggering a run on plans with 4400 Bn of assets

35

Policy Objectives with Respect to Lending to AIG

Stabilize markets Post-Lehman bankruptcy Severe financial market distress

Stabilize AIG with sufficient liquidity

Enable AIG to dispose of certain assets over time Maximize value Avoid undue disruptions to markets Reduce risk of loss to Federal

Reserve, the government, the taxpayer

Ultimately, render AIG systemically “unimportant”

Operates in more than 130 countries

Over 76 million customers globally

One of the largest domestic insurance companies – 24 million customers and 50,000 employees in the U.S.

Customer base includes commercial, institutional and individual customers

AIG Commercial Insurance protects and insures operations of over 180,000 entities that employ 106 million people in the U.S.

AIG’s domestic insurance subsidiaries are in 19 states and Puerto Rico

ILFC is the largest commercial customer of Boeing (order value of $12.5 billion), GE, Honeywell, Rockwell International and United Technologies

AIG Facts

36

Money Funds: The Problem

The Reserve Primary Fund, a Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) “breaks the buck” on September 16, 2008. Heavy redemptions are related to investor concern about $785MM in holdings of Lehman Brothers commercial paper.

A “run” on other MMMFs is created. Redemptions for the week ending September 23, 2008 are $120.5 billion.

MMMFs have difficulty liquidating asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), one of their largest holdings, as financial markets cease normal functioning

Some sponsors provide support for affiliated MMMFs.

37

Understanding the run on money funds

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Jan-08 Jul-08 Jan-09 Jul-09

Government

Billions of Dollars Billions of Dollars

Source: Moneyfundanalyzer Note: Shaded area September 16 - October 21

Prime

Figure 5: U.S. Money Market Fund Assets by Fund Type

Tax-free

38

Money Funds: Solutions The U.S. Treasury Department opened its Temporary

Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds on September 29, 2008, which covers share balances as of September 19, 2008. Termination: September 18, 2009.

The AMLF, managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, began operations on September 22, 2008. Termination: February 1, 2010.

The Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF), managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was announced on October 21, 2008. Termination: October 30,2009.

The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), managed by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, began operations on October 27, 2008. Termination: February1, 2010.

39FRB Boston 39

AMLF Design

Bank

(Borrower)

Cash $1,000

ABCP $1,000

Purchased at

Amortized Cost

FRB Boston MMMF

Cash $1,000

Non Recourse

Note $1000,

ABCP Pledged

Key Design Features: No loss to MMMFs (purchased at amortized cost)

Potential positive spread for borrowing bank (and essentially risk free)No recourse to borrower, but credit risk mitigated by SEC restrictions on MMMFs

FRB Boston monitors ratings of pledged ABCP programs and sponsors

4040

ABCP Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF)

41

Fall 2008 Run on the Prime Funds

FRB Boston 41

MMIFF

Announced

10/21/08

AMLF

Announced

9/19/08

CPFF

Announced

10/7/08

Lehman Announces Bankruptcy

9/15/08

Reserve Fund Breaks the Buck

9/16/08

Source: imoneynet

Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program Announced 9/19/08

and Opened 9/29/08

42

Commercial Paper Funding Facility Funds the purchase of 3-month unsecured CP or ABCP directly

from eligible issuers Restrictions apply

FRBNY lends to an SPV, which purchases CP from issuers through primary dealers

Purchase rates OIS + 300 bps for ABCP OIS + 100 bps for CP, with a 100 bps surcharge for non-TLGP

issuers

43

CPFF

-100

0

100

200

300

400

-100

0

100

200

300

4008

/1/0

8

8/3

1/0

8

9/3

0/0

8

10

/30

/08

11

/29

/08

12

/29

/08

1/2

8/0

9

2/2

7/0

9

3/2

9/0

9

BPSBPS 3-Month CP Rates to OIS

AA Fin - OIS AA Nonfin - OISAA ABCP - OIS Unsecured CPFF SpreadABCP CPFF Spread

Oct27: CPFFLaunch

44

Impact of CPFF on quantities

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

0

400

800

1200

1600

2000

Aug-08 Dec-08 Apr-09 Aug-09

Billions of Dollars Percent

Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors

Total Outstanding in Market

Figure 8: Total Commercial Paper Outstanding

Total Outstanding in CPFF

CPFF as %of Market

CPFF Launch

45

Spread: One-Month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to O/N Index Swap (OIS) Rate

45

June 1, 2007 – October 23, 2009

Source: Financial times, Bloomberg, Haver Analytics

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

1-Jun-07 23-Nov-07 16-May-08 7-Nov-08 1-May-09 23-Oct-09

Basis Points

Reserve Fund breaks the buck (9/17/08)

Citigroup bailout (11/24/08)BNP

Paribas suspends hedge funds (8/9/07)

Basis PointsBasis Points

Lehmanbankruptcy (9/15/08)

Iceland Financial System Collapse(10/9/08)

Northern Rock bailout (9/12/07)

AIG Bailout (9/17/08)

US takeover GSEs (9/7/07)

Bailout of US financial system (10/3/08)Citigroup

receives $7.5 bn from Abu Dhabi (11/29/07)

46

Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Rate

46

0

2

4

6

8

2-Jan-07 8-May-07 11-Sep-07 15-Jan-08 20-May-08 23-Sep-08 27-Jan-09 2-Jun-09 6-Oct-09

1-Day AA Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Rate

Percent

Source: Federal Reserve Board/Haver Analytics

June 1, 2007 – October 23, 2009

47

Fourth phase of the financial crisis

0.5

11

.52

(tri

llio

ns

of

do

llars

)

2009q1 2009q2 2009q3 2009q4 2010q1





(January 2009 through present)

48

Shut-down in term ABS markets

49

Need for a new investor base

50

2009

Implementation of new-issue ABS Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Program (TALF) starting in March 2009

Legacy TALF and securities Public Private Investment Program (PPIP) program announced in March 2009 and implemented over summer 2009

Implementation of Federal Reserve large scale asset purchases (LSAP) throughout the year

Implementation of Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) exercise for large depository institutions

Bankruptcy and re-organization of Chrysler and GM with assistance from UST

51

TALF and New-Issue ABS Spreads

450

957555

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

6/2

8/0

8

7/2

8/0

8

8/2

8/0

8

9/2

8/0

8

10/2

8/0

8

11/2

8/0

8

12/2

8/0

8

1/2

8/0

9

2/2

8/0

9

3/3

1/0

9

4/3

0/0

9

5/3

1/0

9

6/3

0/0

9

7/3

1/0

9

8/3

1/0

9

9/3

0/0

9

10/3

1/0

9

11/3

0/0

9

BPS

Student Loan - Private (3 year)

Equipment (3 year)

Credit Cards (3 year)

Prime Auto (3 year)

Initial TALF Announcement First TALF Subscription

52

TALF and new issue ABS for major asset classes

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000

90000

100000

Aut

o

Cred

it Ca

rd

Stud

ent L

oan

Equi

pmen

t

Aut

o

Cred

it Ca

rd

Stud

ent L

oan

Equi

pmen

t

Aut

o

Cred

it Ca

rd

Stud

ent L

oan

Equi

pmen

t

Aut

o

Cred

it Ca

rd

Stud

ent L

oan

Equi

pmen

t

Aut

o

Cred

it Ca

rd

Stud

ent L

oan

Equi

pmen

t

Aut

o

Cred

it Ca

rd

Stud

ent L

oan

Equi

pmen

t

Auto TALF

Auto

Credit Card TALF

Credit Card

Student Loan TALF

Student Loan

Equpiment TALF

Equipment

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

53

Impact of public sector support for legacy assets

010

0020

0030

0040

00

01jul2008 01jan2009 01jul2009 01jan2010date

AJ AMA4

Fixed-rate conduit CMBSSecondary Market Spread Over Swaps

Super senior

AM

AJ

30%

20%

8%

Typical AAA capital structure

Super senior

54

TALF: Large Impact but Limited Exposure

-

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

($ M

illio

ns)

New Issue Non-TALF ABS

TALF Eligible ABS

New Issue ABS

55

Flight by Foreign Official Accounts from Agency Debt

Change in foreign holdings held in custody by Federal Reserve

(four week cumulative sum)

56

Impact of LSAP on mortgage loan coupons

(Freddie Mac Primary Market Mortgage Survey Conventional Mortgage Rate LESS 10-year UST)

57

What’s Next?

• Expiration of Special Liquidity Facilities

• Conclusion of LSAP

• Portfolio Management

Broader Questions

• Future of Securitization

• Improvements in Regulation and Supervision

• Strengthening Capital Requirements

• Improving Liquidity

• Addressing Too-Big-To-Fail• Resolution Regime for Systemically Important Institutions

58

Summary

All of Fed’s actions were directed at protecting the American people from a more severe downturn.

Fed’s goal was to foster access to credit by businesses and individuals to met critical needs and keep the economy moving during a very critical period.

Understanding the Response of the Federal Reserve to the Recent Financial Crisis Sandy Krieger April 14, 2010 This presentation presents preliminary findings.

Documents

federal reserve system

financial markets

nations payment system

illiquid term markets

illiquid money markets

federal reserve governance

frozen abs market slide

lack of market