Understanding the dynamics of WMD weapons and control With thanks to friends at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), and the work of Matt Bunn.

Understanding the dynamics of WMD weapons and control

With thanks to friends at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), and the work of Matt

Bunn at the Atom Project (Harvard University)

[Presentation_06]

(2) 5 Paths to the Bomb:

Allowed by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT: 1968)

(1) No non-weapons obligation, material produced in dedicated military facilities with no safeguards

* All 5 NPT weapons states (US; UK; France; Russia; China) and India, Pakistan, Israel (though some non-verified peaceful/deterrence only use assurances in the latter cases: see articles in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists: India; Pakistan; Israel)

(2) Join the NPT, accept safeguards, build needed facilities, then withdraw from treaty and expel the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors

* N. Korea (sort of – never had full safeguards); Iran in the future?

(3) 5 Paths to the Bomb: (contd.)

(3) Join the NPT, accept safeguards, divert material from declared, safeguarded facility

- This is the only path traditional IAEA safeguards were designed to detect

(4) Join NPT, accept safeguards, build covert facilities- Iraq; N. Korea (U program); Iran? (see Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists articles: Iran; Middle East)- an Additional Protocol(1998) was designed to help detect states choosing this path

(5) Purchase, steal weapon, or weapon material (see the case of Libya and the ‘father’ of Pakistan’s nuclear program, the A.Q. Khan network)

(4) IAEA Safeguards - 2004-5 Statistics:

> 1100 nuclear installations in 77 states;

thousands of tons of material (>130,000 significant quantities) under safeguards

11,300 person-days of inspection/yr;

~$130 million IAEA safeguards budget (same as Indianapolis police department)

Sources: IAEA - Safeguards and VerificationIAEA - Safeguards Statement for 2005

(5) Current considerations

Governments and publics unlikely to accept such a massive nuclear expansion unless convinced that the expansion will not lead to additional spread of nuclear weapons

How can nuclear energy be greatly expanded, deployed far more widely, without contributing to weapons programs – significant focus of current research and development - R&D (Gen IV, AFCI)?

Cost, safety, waste management must also be addressed for large expansion to be acceptable

(6) IAEA Safeguards:

Designed to detect diversion of materials for weapons – however, they cannot prevent the state, or subnational parties, from removing material for weapons

Primarily implemented in non-nuclear-weapon states; a few facilities in weapon states under “voluntary offer”’; some facilities in non-NPT states safeguarded when supplier required it

NPT member states have repeatedly expressed confidence that IAEA safeguards do verify whether states are complying

(7) Proliferation-resistance: one key to acceptable expansion

Civilian nuclear energy system has already made major contributions to spread of nuclear weapons

To make a major contribution to meeting 21st century carbon-free energy needs, nuclear energy would have to grow 3-10 times over next 50-100 yrs (Future of Nuclear Power, MIT: 2003) with most new electricity demand in the developing world

(8) Steps to reduce proliferation impact of the civilian nuclear energy system

Reduce demand More successful than often realized (Sweden, Italy,

Argentina, Brazil, S. Africa… see IAEA) Secure all nuclear materials and facilities Beef up controls on technology transfers Strengthen verification (safeguards) Establish international ownership, control of key facilities Improve technical proliferation-resistance

(9) The vision: where do we want to be in 10-20 years?

Nuclear weapons and stockpiles of nuclear explosive material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium - HEU) drastically reduced worldwide

All nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive material worldwide sustainably secured and accounted for, to stringent standards

(10) The nonproliferation vision (cont.)

A strengthened safeguards system in place, capable both of detecting diversions from declared activities, and detecting covert activities

Effective export control systems in place worldwide, greatly reducing proliferators’ access to technology to support a nuclear weapons program


Nuclear complexes reconfigured to size appropriate to post-Cold War missions, with budgets sufficient to sustain them, excess nuclear experts sustainably re-employed (to avoid further technological leakage)

Sufficient monitoring and transparency to confirm above steps have been taken


Sustained or expanded energy contribution from nuclear power, with reduced proliferation impact – including reduction in proliferation-sensitive activities; no spread of such activities to additional states

Political and security measures taken to reduce states’ demand for nuclear weapons and strengthen the nonproliferation regime

Steps on the Pathway: NTISource: http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/path.asp

Blocking the Terrorist Pathway to the Bomb

http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/path.asp

(14) Terrorism-resistance

1st priority: ensuring potential nuclear bomb material cannot fall into terrorist hands:

minimize use of separated plutonium and HEU;

develop & implement stringent security for stocks that continue to exist

(15) Terrorism-resistance (cont.)

2nd priority: protection from catastrophic sabotage: Terrorist attacks will clearly be a factor for utility companies,

publics, and governments as they consider choosing energy options

Strengthens case for [developing/implementing?] “inherently safe” systems

Designs must ensure against catastrophic release BOTH in the event of external attacks AND internal sabotage (harder problem)

External attack could include: Groups of armed terrorists attacking by land, boat or

helicopter Truck bombs, boat bombs Large aircraft crashes Small aircraft packed with explosives


Current situation of anti-terrorist nuclear protection:

Most civilian nuclear facilities worldwide (and even some military facilities) are not secured against demonstrated terrorist and criminal threats. [Potential such scenarios include]:

9/11[-repeat]: 4 teams of 4-5 well-trained, suicidal terrorists each, striking without warning, from group with access to heavy infantry weapons and sophisticated explosives

10/02, Moscow: 41 well-trained, suicidal terrorists, with automatic weapons and explosives, striking without warning

Crimes all over the world: multiple insiders conspiring together


Nuclear material theft leading to a terrorist bomb anywhere in the world would be a disaster for the nuclear industry going far beyond Chernobyl – successful nuclear sabotage with Chernobyl-scale effects would also be a disaster

Nuclear industry, in its own self-interest, should work to make sure all facilities are secure – as they have done on the [dimension of material processing safety]

(18) Nuclear facility and material security

Designed to detect, deter, and prevent theft of material, or sabotage of facilities by unauthorized insiders or outsiders (not diversion by host state, which is what international safeguards are supposed to do)

Physical protection: Goals: designed to detect, slow, and interdict any theft or

sabotage attempt How: fences, alarms, access control, locked vaults,

response forces

(19) Nuclear facility and material security (cont.)

Material control: Goals: designed to monitor and control material in real

time How: cameras, seals, tags, alarms, two-person rule

Material accountancy: Designed to reveal thefts after they occur, or confirm that

they have not occurred (and to support international safeguards)

Nuclear safety systems make sabotage more difficult

(20) The threat of nuclear theft

A well-organized terrorist group could plausibly make at least a crude nuclear explosive if they had enough HEU or plutonium. Most states could do so.

There are hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in dozens of states, with widely varying levels of security

A particularly urgent problem in the former Soviet Union – but insecure material exists in dozens of other countries as well

IAEA has 16 documented cases of seizure of stolen HEU or plutonium in last decade (1993-2005)

Potential bomb material could fall into the hands of a terrorist group or hostile state at any time

(21) “Loose Nukes” in the former USSR

Security system designed for a single state with closed society, closed borders, pampered nuclear workers, close surveillance by the KGB (state’s security apparatus).

Now facing multiple states with open societies, open borders, desperate, underpaid nuclear workers, culture of crime, corruption, and theft

Old system based on “guards, guns, and gates” – to prevent American spies getting in, not material getting out – which is the current type of security threat

(22) “Loose Nukes” in the former USSR (contd.)

Monitoring: Many facilities have no portal monitors to detect removal of material – or security cameras to monitor the storage areas

Accounting: Few facilities have accurate, measured inventory of material on hand – they don’t know how much they have

Control: Still widespread use of wax seals – ineffective in detecting tampering by authorized workers

(23) Closing the Art. IV (NPT) loophole:

Article IV of the NPT guarantees all parties access to civilian nuclear technologies

Each party is allowed to build enrichment and reprocessing facilities, even produce HEU and plutonium, as long as it is under safeguards. This allows states to come right up to the edge of a weapons capability while staying within the regime

(24) Consequences & Responses to the Art. IV-NPT loophole:

Iran case (see below) demonstrates the dangers: signed the NPT and started its nuclear program apparently

for peaceful nuclear energy usage. Now, it seems that it is fast developing the capacity to produce materials and facilities for building the bomb

Government-backed commercial consortium could offer a “new deal”:

Guaranteed lifetime of fuel supply and spent fuel management to any state that agrees no enrichment, no reprocessing of their own, combined with the signing of the Additional Protocol to confirm that commitment

Some states would say “yes” – those that said “no” would immediately be the focus of international concern

(25) Terrorism-resistance: latest international developments

2006: Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (US & Russia) Treaty for a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone: despite US, UK, & French opposition

2004: UNSC Resolution 1540: criminalize WMD proliferation + institute effective export and financial controls

Global Threat Reduction Initiative (US initiative): among others, retrieval & conversion of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) Biodefense for the 21st Century (US)

(history & reactions: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) 2003: Proliferation Security Initiative (US initiative): impede and stop shipments of

WMD, delivery systems, and related materials 2002: Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons & Materials of Mass

Destruction: raise up to USD $20 billion over 10 years to combat the threat of WMD; standardize nonproliferation principles

Ongoing removal of HEU: so far, HEU has been removed from Serbia; Romania; Bulgaria; Poland; Latvia; Libya; Argentina; Uzbekistan; Czech Rep.(map; why HEU is dangerous)

For a review of these developments and more: White House

(26) Case I: Iraq

Iraq purchased the “Osiraq” research reactor from France – Israel destroyed it in an air strike, so it could not be used to produce plutonium

Pre-1991 Iraq was an NPT member in good standing Its nuclear experts were trained in U.S. and Europe, as well

as sent to work at IAEA to learn how to evade inspections

Image courtesy of: www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/flagsoftheworld.html

http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/flagsoftheworld.html

(27) Case I: Iraq (cont.)

Iraq had a serious secret nuclear weapons program – with a web of procurement agents and front companies to buy technology illegally from sources around the world (for example centrifuge technology from civil programs in Europe)

After invading Kuwait, Iraq launched a “crash program” to build one bomb using French-supplied and Soviet-supplied HEU fuel for its safeguarded civilian research reactors

For more details, see articles in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists:Khidhir Hamza: “Inside Saddam's secret nuclear program” (1998)David Albright & Mark Hibbs: “Iraq's shop-till-you-drop nuclear program” (1992)Walter C. Uhler: “Preempting the truth” (2004)



(28) Case II: Iran

Iran started both an open civilian nuclear power program and a secret nuclear weapons program under the Shah – both were dormant for a period after the 1979 Islamic revolution

Large numbers of nuclear experts trained in U.S. and Europe (esp. MIT) in the pre-revolutionary period



(29) Case II: Iran (cont.)

In early 1990s, Russia agreed to complete a power reactor the Germans had begun at Bushehr. Throughout the 1990s, there were constant U.S.-Russian disagreements over this deal and more sensitive transfers, as hundreds of Iranian experts trained in Russia

We now know that Iran was receiving centrifuge technology from the AQ Khan network (Pakistan). This technology originated in Urenco, and was implemented with components from all over the world. In 2002, Iran’s Natanz enrichment facility is revealed.

Images courtesy of: www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/flagsoftheworld.html



Iran has always claimed that its program is entirely for peaceful purposes – using the civilian program as a cover for technology purchases and facility construction whose weapons purpose would otherwise be obvious

Iran has remained within the NPT, but violated its safeguards agreement by lying to the IAEA for decades




U.S. has sought to cut off all civilian nuclear cooperation with Iran, arguing that any such cooperation will contribute to a bomb program – Russia and Europe do not agree

October 2003: European foreign ministers negotiate a deal – Iran agrees to an Additional Protocol, suspends enrichment and reprocessing, in return for trade deal, possible nuclear technology access

Then Iran states it still has a right to enrich, and may choose to do so




To and fro this continues until final aspect of major deal concluded in September 2004

US supportive but skeptical Now all eyes on new Iranian leadership as regards its intentions, real actions

and policies Earlier this year (2006), Iran withdrew from the Additional Protocol it had

signed in 2003, aimed to provide safeguards that the country does not have undeclared nuclear materials or facilities

For more information, see some of the articles in the Bulletin:Jack Boureston & Charles D. Ferguson: “Schooling Iran's atom squad” (2004)David Albright & Corey Hinderstein: “Iran, player or rogue?” (2003)David Albright: “When could Iran get the Bomb?” (2006)Walter C. Uhler: “Engage or enrage” (2005)and Iran’s Nuclear Facilities (GlobalSecurity.org)



For further reading… Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials

http://www.nti.org/cnwm http://www.thebulletin.org http://www.carnegieendowment.org http://www.managingtheatom.org http://www.fourthfreedom.org

Understanding the dynamics of WMD weapons and control With thanks to friends at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago), and the work of Matt Bunn.

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