Understanding Northern China's Water Crisis

Understanding Northern

China’s Water Crisis

Christine E. Boyle

Doctoral Student | Fulbright Fellow

Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy

&

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Presentation at B.E.E.R.

Hydrology of Northern China

Water Scarcity in China is

concentrated in the North

Northern China accounts for:

• 19% of China’s water resources

• 46.5% of its population

• 64.8% of arable land

• 42.5% of China’s GDP

• Level of annual per capita available water ranges

from 358 m3 per person to 750 m3 per person.

• < 1000 m3 per person is considered water scarce,

worse than water stressed.

Sources: Liu 2002, Shalizi 2006

Water Use

Source: China Bureau of Statistics (2005) Statistical Yearbook of China 2005

Today’s Presentation

• GETTTING THE FACTS

RIGHT

• RECENT REFORMS

• A FRAGMENTED

INSTITIUTIONAL

FRAMEWORK

• POLICY

RECCOMENDATIONS

Main canal in Jingyuan City, Gansu Province

Water Resources S

ourc

e: Y

ello

w R

iver C

onserv

atio

n C

onserv

ancy

Bulle

tin 2

000; C

olo

rado R

iver C

om

mis

sio

n 2

000

** Includes 4.1 x 103 km

2 irrigated agriculture in Imperial Valley and Coachella Valley, California

Country: People's Republic of China United States

Study Unit: Yellow River Basin Colorado River Basin

Basin Indicators

Length (km): 5,463 2,333

Catchment Area (km2): 795,125 631,960

Population (millions of people): 136 25

Major Urban Areas (> 100,000 people): 9 3*

Mean Annual Discharge (bcm): 185 (at River Delta) 580 (at Fort Lee)

Water Utilization Indicators

Water Available per Capita (m3/year): 553 740

Water Use per Capita (m3/year): 379 660

Cropland Total (106 km

2): 0.28 .011**

Irrigation Area (106 ha): 4.83 1.2

% of water to Agriculture: 80% 80%

Current Storage Capacity (bcm): 57 74

Rate of Population Growth since 1990: 60% 50%

Average Water Price (USD/m3)

Urban: $0.15 $0.35

Industrial: $0.16 $0.28

Agriculture (volumetric): < $0.01 $0.23

Water Resources

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

World China HHH Region

cubic

mete

rs p

er

capit

a

Per capita water availability for Huang Hai Huai River

Basins is well below global standards for water scarcity

Water

scarce

Water Usage

• Increasing demand:

– Agricultural

– Non-Agricultural

sectors

• Sign of depleted

water resources:

-dry river beds

-falling groundwater

tables

Water Utilization from 1949 - 2003

Source: Lohmar (2008)

Water Shortage

0

5

10

15

20

25

1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997

Discharge Trend at Aixinzhuang Station: Lower Haihe River Basin

Dis

ch

arg

e 1

08

m3

Source: Wang, JX (2005) “Evolution of Tubewell Ownership in the North China Plain”

Year

Water Shortage

No-Flow Days in the Lijin Station, downstream in the

Yellow River Basin

0

50

100

150

200

250

19721975197819801982198719891992199419961998200020022004

Days

Year

Source: Ministry of Water Resources (2003)

Map of Yellow River

Response

• Is there a

crisis?

• What is the

government

doing about it?

• What are

farmers doing

about it?

Bazi Village, Ningxia Province. 2008

Fengyuan Village, Ningxia Province, 2008

Policy Response

• Many responses (1988 Water Law, 2002 Water

Law, participatory management reform, 11th

Fifth Year Plan (2006-10), 7 River Basin

Commissions…)

• Almost zero effect on agricultural water use

“Deepen the systemic reform of

water pricing, promote a water

saving society”“

Farmer Response – Rapid increase in

groundwater use

proliferation of privately run tubewells (based

on sample of 400 villages in northern China)

Source: Zhang et al 2008

•Groundwater playing an

increasingly important role in

irrigation in northern China

•Over 3.5 million tubewells

established since the 1960s

•Farmer’s response to

surface water shortage has

been to sink tubewells

•tubewells provide about

68% of the total irrigation

water in northern China

Surface Water Management

• River Basin Management Policies–Implementation of Integrated Water Resource Management

principles in Yellow River Basin

– Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC) Substantial

gains from allocating water to downstream users (roughly US$1

billion/year)

– Confounded by provincial interests

• Irrigation District Management Policies– Seek to resolve cost recovery and promote water conservation

Irrigation District (ID) Reform

• Water User Associations

(WUAs)– Ostensibly farmer organized groups

to elect managers and make joint

irrigation policy decisions

• Canal Contracting– Contracting the management of

lateral canals out to individuals who

make investments, provide delivery

services and collect fees

• Investment & Subsidies–funds channeled from central &

provincial government to ID’s for

installation of water saving

technologies, canal lining, and system

rehabilitation

“Farmers water user association’s five guiding

principles”

Increased Adoption of Reform

in Yellow River Basin

Source: Wang et al (2005) “Incentives to Managers or participation of farmers in China’s

irrigation systems: what matters most for water savings, farmer income & poverty”

Participatory reforms have not

achieved water savings

From surveys in Ningxia, 2001. source: Wang et al (2005) “Incentives to

Managers or participation of farmers in China’s irrigation systems: what matters

most for water savings, farmer income & poverty”

With

reform

Summary of ID – Level Reforms

When effective ID

reform can:

• reduce per hectare

water applications

• not impact incomes or

crop production

Unclear how reforms:

• impact long term

sustainability

• Cost recovery of system

infrastructure

Focus group discussion with farmers in Hunan,

2006

Adoption of Water Saving

Technology is low

Source: Blanke, A , et al (2006) “Water saving technology and saving

water in China”

< 20% of

sown land

Low

adoption

rate!

Water Technology in Ningxia

Plastic sheeting &

burrow irrigation

Branch canal water control point

Institutional Framework

• Economics perspective: misplaced incentives

do not promote water conservation (i.e.

wrong price signals, lack of water rights to

guide rational water allocation)

• Institutional perspective: bureaucratic

conflicts impede integrated water

management and water conservation (i.e.

incomplete legal framework, unwieldy water

management coordination)

Fragmented Authoritarian

Model

Central Government

Province BProvince A

Bargaining Bargainingconsensus

Adapted from Dr. Yok-shiu Lee (2008, “DONG JIANG: WATER RESOURCES CONSERVATION

AND BUREAUCRATIC CONFLICTS”

Bargaining for water

Reform complicates bargaining by decentralizing

resource authority to localities

Central government :Use of coercive means

national policy agenda

Local government units: Resource autonomy (buy, sell, trade)

Bargaining positions

Recommendations

• Implement complementary policies to water price policy to protect

the poor (offset effect of water fee increase on crop production &

incomes);

• Establish secure water rights framework to set conditions for water

users related to rights for utilization of water (withdrawal, consumption,

and return flows;

• Continue to facilitate grassroots institutional reform aimed at

promoting sustainable water use at the irrigation district and village level;

• Establish agricultural extension network of professionals. Embed

trained agriculturists into rural communities to aid in development of soil

management, irrigation, technology adaption, seed & fertilizer use.

Further Work• Explore village-level irrigation fiscal policy to see how

localities are in fact responding to water scarcity;

• Develop better understanding of decision-making

framework for infrastructure investment and water

allocation in response to changing environmental

conditions;

• Further research into training, agricultural

entrepreneurship, agricultural credit and other

grassroots initiatives.