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AGNA Daily Intelligence Update for Kabul Province, Kabul City
Date: Monday 01 September 2008 Prepared by: Jimmy Lemon ArmorGroup,
NA Kabul - Afghanistan 0797868706 [email protected] AGNA
Assessed Route Status - Kabul Province for Monday 01 September
2008: Route Status Notes Abbey Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED
Threat(s) IVO junction of Airport Circle. Aqua Caution Off limits
to AGNA Blair Caution Blue Caution Bottle Extreme Caution Threat 24
to 30 August (+ or -) Brown Caution Off limits to AGNA Chestnut
Caution Crimson Extreme Caution Off limits to AGNA Ongoing SVBIED
Threat(s) Desperado Caution Edelweiss Caution Off limits to AGNA
Ferrari Caution Off limits to AGNA Four Peaks Caution Off limits to
AGNA Freedom Extreme Caution Off limits to AGNA Exercise caution
IVO PEC Prison. Green *Caution *Ongoing SVBIED Threat Grey Caution
Off limits to AGNA Horseshoe Extreme Caution Threat 24 to 30 August
(+ or -) Indigo Caution Jeep Caution Off limits to AGNA Kara
Caution Lincoln Caution Off limits to AGNA Maroon Caution North
Caution Off limits to AGNA Orange Caution Pegasus Extreme Caution
Off limits to AGNA Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) Purple Caution Exercise
caution IVO KAIA East Gate and IVO Route Violet. Quattro Caution
Red Extreme Caution Exercise Extreme Caution IVO District 5. Red
Two Caution Off limits to AGNA Retirement Caution Off limits to
AGNA San Diego Caution South Caution Off limits to AGNA Sword
Caution Off limits to AGNA Tomis Caution Toyota Caution Roadway is
very narrow. Use only in emergencies. TV (TV Hill) Caution
Upperland Extreme Caution Off limits to AGNA Exercise caution IVO
PEC Prison. Violet Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) CP V-1
to CP V-7. All travel east of CP V-8
should be considered EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. White Extreme Caution
Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) Masood Circle to Airport Circle. Wings
Caution Yellow Caution Exercise caution IVO MOI HQ Traffic
Circles/Gate Status Notes Abdul Haq Circle Extreme Caution Ongoing
SVBIED Threat(s) Route Violet CP V-1 to CP V-7 Airport Circle
Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s) Masood Circle to Airport
Circle. Masood Circle Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s)
Masood Circle to Airport Circle. Camp Sullivan Gate Caution Drop
bars and outer pedestrian gate padlocked at all times. KAIA A-POD
Gate Caution USE NVCP Extreme Caution Ongoing SVBIED Threat(s)
Masood Circle. USE SVCP Caution SAFE AGNA personnel may utilize the
Route(s) with complete freedom of movement. CAUTION AGNA personnel
may utilize these routes while exercising prudent precautions.
EXTREME CAUTION AGNA personnel restricted to mission essential
movements only along these routes. OFF LIMITS Routes are Off Limits
to AGNA personnel. No known reason for AGNA travel.
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Kabul Area Route Map
Route White
Route Violet
Route Toyota
Route Kara
Route Indigo
Route Quattro
Masood Circle
Route Crimson
TV Hill Area
Route Abbey
Route Blair
Route Blue
Route Green
Route Violet
Route Purple
Route Blue
Route Yellow
Route Yellow
Airport Circle
Abdul Haq Circle
Un-Named Road Behind Camp
Sullivan
Route Quattro
Route TV
Route Green
Route San Diego
Route Tomis
Crash Road
Current AGNA Assessed INS Threats IVO Kabul Province, Kabul
City: Threat Probability Notes Small Arms Fire Attack LOW
(Kabul City) Low IVO Kabul City. High in Sorobi, Musayi, &
Chahar Asyab Districts of Kabul Province.
Ambushes (Simple or Complex)
LOW (Kabul City)
Low IVO Kabul City. High in Sorobi, Musayi, & Chahar Asyab
Districts of Kabul Province.
IED Variants HIGH Of particular concern is Route Violet, Route
White and all of the major traffic circles and intersections along
those routes.
Direct Attacks (Complex) HIGH Current reporting suggests targets
are IRoA, although possible CF targets cannot be discounted
ATT.
Indirect Fire (Rockets) MEDIUM There has been a slight increase
in the frequency of IDF (rocket) attacks IVO Kabul City 2008 versus
2007 (11 X 2008 9 X 2007 YTD). The area IVO KAIA seems to be to the
most likely target of these attacks. A sudden increase in the
frequency of IDF attacks cannot be discounted.
Indirect Fire (Mortars, other)
LOW (Kabul City)
IVO Kabul City. High in Sorobi, Musayi, & Chahar Asyab
Districts of Kabul Province.
Surface to Air (MANPADS)
LOW
Surface to Air (Other) LOW Low IVO Kabul City. Medium outside of
Kabul City. Reported Surveillance Activities
HIGH EXTREMELY HIGH along Route’s White and Violet.
Criminal Activity (Robbery, Assault, etc)
MEDIUM Criminal Activities and the MOI/ANP targeting of
PSC’s.
Criminal Activity (Kidnapping)
HIGH Current and valid threat reporting.
LOW No known current threat at this time. MEDIUM Current threat
reporting. Prudent precautionary measures should be taken. HIGH
Current and credible threat reporting. Appropriate defensive
measures must be taken. IMMINENT Ongoing attack or knowledge of an
imminent attack is known.
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AGNA Priority Intelligence Requirements: 1. When and where will
INS conduct surveillance on AGNA convoys or facilities? 2. When and
where will INS target AGNA convoys or facilities for attack? AGNA
Information Requirements: 1. Are there any ongoing activities
designed to slow, stop, harass, or to attack AGNA convoys? 2.
Report the description and location of any suspected mobile
surveillance and/or fixed point surveillance to the AGNA TOC. 3.
Report the location and description of any possible suspicious
activities such as questionable construction, disabled vehicles,
vehicles that appear to be abandoned, or anything else that appears
to be out of the ordinary to the AGNA TOC. 4. Report the absence of
civilians in any area that normally has a consistent concentration
of civilians to the AGNA TOC. 5. Where are the best possible INS
locations to conduct surveillance and attacks against AGNA convoys?
AGNA Priority of Effort: 1. Determining INS threat actions that may
be aimed at attacking AGNA convoys or facilities. 2. Predicting
possible INS attack sites along AGNA convoy routes of travel. 3.
Determining possible disposition, composition, strength, and
capabilities of INS along AGNA convoy routes of travel and
facilities. Current AGNA Intelligence Gaps: Lack of timely INS
Incident reporting IVO Kabul Province, Kabul City. Lack of
Intelligence cooperation and information sharing among PSC’s, CF’,
ISAF, NATO, or IRoA units or agency’s. Grammatical and spelling
errors on Intelligence reports. Due primarily to the “phonetic”
spellings of Afghan names and locations. Lack of credible
information on short and mid-term INS intentions and/or plans as it
relates to Kabul City. INS/AGE/ACF MLCOA IVO Kabul Province for the
next 60 – 90 Days: 1. Two or more SVBIED occupants and Female or
Female “dressed” BBIED’s in order to confuse current profiling. 2.
INS/AGE personnel wearing and utilizing IRoA ANA and ANP uniforms
and vehicles. May also have IRoA Identification Cards. 3.
Kidnapping of International Citizens, LN’s employed by CF’s, as
well as wealthy Afghan Citizens. 4. High profile or spectacular
type attacks against western and IRoA targets IVO Kabul City. 5.
Continued utilization of IED Variants and occasional IDF (rockets)
IVO Kabul City. 6. Concerted INS efforts against MSR’s. MSR’s of
concern are Kabul to the Torkum, PAK Border crossing and Kabul to
Kandahar. 7. The INS will attempt to consolidate their power and
influence in the immediate areas outside of Kabul City. Current and
Valid Threat Warnings, Kabul Province, Kabul City: 1. PSC personnel
being harassed, arrested and/or detained by the IRoA MOI/ANP. 2.
Criminal activities to include robbery, murder, intimidation, and
kidnappings IVO Kabul. 3. High profile, complex, or spectacular
type attack(s): IRoA Government Office’s; CF, ISAF, and NATO
Compounds, as well as Western Diplomatic Missions or Embassies. 4.
Sporadic IDF (rockets), with most likely targets being KAIA or any
CF Facility. 5. IED Variant Threats: Route’s Bottle, Green, Violet,
White, Abbey (IVO Airport Circle), Crimson, and Pegasus. 6. IED
Variant, SAF, Heavy Weapons, and Ambushes along Route Violet from
CP V-8 to the PAK Border. 7. IED Variant, SAF, Heavy Weapons, and
Ambushes along all routes south of Kabul City to the Musayi, and
Chahar Asayb District’s of Kabul Province and all routes south of
Kabul City to the Provinces south, southwest, and southeast of
Kabul Province. 8. Various threats relating to Pol i- Charki Prison
(PEC) and the surrounding areas of Pol-i Charki, to include Route
Violet (IVO CP V-6 to CP V-7), as well as Route’s Upperland and
Freedom. Current AGNA Organized Convoy Movement Policy: All
organized AGNA convoy movements will be conducted in the “buttoned
up” or “sealed” mode. At no time will the vehicle “seal” be broken
unless ordered to do so by the Convoy or Assistant Convoy Commander
or under such tactical circumstances that would warrant vacating
the vehicle without orders to do so. When traveling in an organized
AGNA convoy, all AGNA personnel will wear the required issued
personal safety equipment/gear, to include helmets and protective
vests. Prior to departure on any organized AGNA convoy movement it
is the responsibility of all onboard AGNA Supervisors to personally
check that all personnel fully understand and are in compliance
with any and all AGNA convoy procedures, policy’s, SOP’s, and Rules
of Engagement (ROE). Vary routes of travel as well as departure and
arrival times. Do not become time and place predictable. Follow
published AGNA SOP’s for ECM operations. Ensure ECM’s are turned
off prior to entering sensitive areas. Current AGNA Security
Recommendations: Thoroughly vet all LN employees. Do not allow
personnel to become complacent. Constantly ensure the static guard
force is complying with all policies and SOP’s as it relates to the
proper screening of personnel and vehicles prior to allowing
entrance. Know what the latest Route Status and Current Threats are
before departing on any mission essential road travel. There are no
“expiration dates” when it comes to reported threats in
Afghanistan. Keep all credible threat reporting valid until the
incident in question actually happens or there is credible evidence
that the threat is no longer valid or the threat has been
mitigated. Due to the recent cases of LN employees of “western”
entities being identified, targeted, attacked, kidnapped, or
singled out, ensure your LN employees understand the importance of
practicing prudent personal protection as it relates to travel to
and from their residences to their places of work and that they
report any incident of possible surveillance, harassment, and/or
intimidation. It is further recommended that your LN employees do
not wear any distinguishing clothing or overtly display any
identification cards/badges that would readily identify them as
working for a “western entity” to and from work. All personnel must
practice and be held accountable for OPSEC, COMPUSEC, and
COMSEC.
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Current AGNA Security Assessment for Kabul Province, Kabul City:
The security situation in Sorobi, Musayi, and Chahar Asayb
District’s of Kabul Province is assessed as VOLATILE. Expected INS
activities in these Districts could include but are not limited to
all forms of IED variants, IDF, DF, SAFIRE, simple or complex
ambushes/attacks, kidnapping’s, intimidation, or other INS related
criminal activities. The security situation in Paghman, Khaki
Jabar, Bagrami, and Deh Sabz District’s of Kabul Province is
assessed as UNSTABLE. Expected INS activities in these Districts
could include but are not limited to IED variants (primarily
SVBIED, RCIED’s, and BBIED’s), IDF (rockets), kidnapping’s,
intimidation, or other INS related criminal activities. The
security situation in Guldra, Istalif, Kalakan, Mir Bocha Kot,
Qarabagh, and Shakadara District’s of Kabul Province is assessed as
CALM. Little or no INS activities or threats have been noted or
reported in these Districts of Kabul Province. However, if
traveling to these Districts of Kabul Province all prudent security
precautions should be taken. A lack of reporting does not
necessarily constitute a lack of INS activity or planning. The
security situation in Kabul District and Kabul City of Kabul
Province is assessed as UNSTABLE. Expected INS activities in Kabul
City could include but is not limited to IED variants (primarily
SVBIED and BBIED’s), the occasional high profile spectacular
attack, IDF attacks (rockets), kidnappings, intimidation, or other
INS related criminal activities. All road movements to the
immediate east, south, and southwest of Kabul City should be
considered EXTREMELY DANGROUS and should involve meticulous
pre-trip planning and coordination. Areas of particular concern
within Kabul District - Kabul City include District’s 1, 2, 4, 5,
7, 9, and 12. Places of particular concern within Kabul District -
Kabul City include all Foreign Embassy’s, IRoA Ministry’s, Kabul
International Airport, all venues that cater to westerners, and/or
all CF/ISAF Facilities. Routes of particular concern within Kabul
District - Kabul City include Route’s Abbey, Bottle, Crimson,
Orange, Violet, Freedom, Pegasus, Upperland, and White. IRoA
MOI/ANP corruption remains rampant, widespread, and unchecked
throughout Kabul Province and should be regarded as a potential
threat to all PSC’s, Cash in Transit Operations, NGO’s, and Private
Companies operating in Kabul Province in general and Kabul City in
particular. Numerous reports of personnel wearing ANP uniforms and
operating ANP vehicles involved in various criminal enterprises
including but not limited to, robbery and murder. Current AGNA Off
Base MWR Policy: *NORMAL (with the below exception) * All Off Duty
Personnel restricted to Camp Sullivan 0500 – 0700 and from 1700
until the evening convoy returns. NORMAL MWR off Base travel is
authorized that is consistent with the current AGNA MWR policy.
RESTRICTED MWR off base travel restricted to certain venues.
CURTAILED All AGNA personnel restricted to Camp Sullivan AGNA
Compiled Current Vehicle BOLO List for Kabul Province (Last 30
Days): Make Model License # Prov. of Reg. Color Date Threat/Notes
Daewoo Damas mini-van 13827 or 14827 IRoA Gov’t White 30 Aug
Surveillance RTE Violet Toyota Corolla 5647 UNK UNK 28 Aug SVBIED
IRoA Gov’t Offices Toyota Corolla *7253 or 7255 UNK Red 27 Aug
SVBIED Toyota Corolla *2251 IRoA Gov’t White 24 Aug SVBIED The
license plate numbers reported for the above 2 vehicles are very
similar. Could be one in the same vehicle with varying
descriptions. Toyota Corolla 445 Herat White 23 Aug SVBIED Threat
Toyota Surf w/red
“stickers or decals” on windows.
UNK UNK Black 21 Aug SVBIED RTE Violet
UNK “Ambulance” UNK or None UNK or None UNK 19 Aug VBIED
District 5 Toyota Corolla UNK end’s in 97 UNK White 19 Aug VBIED
District 5 Toyota Corolla 2696 UNK Silver or Gray 19 Aug SVBIED
*possibly wearing
ANA uniforms Toyota Corolla 64827 UNK White 18 Aug Susp.
Activity RTE Abbey Toyota Corolla w/roof
rack 4497 Kabul White 18 Aug SVBIED
Toyota Surf 13775 Kabul Gray 17 Aug SVBIED Toyota Hilux UNK UNK
Blue w/white top 13 Aug SVBIED Datsun Pickup Truck 17287 UNK Blue
08 Aug SVBIED RTE Violet Toyota Corolla 3158 Kabul Green 07 Aug
SVBIED IRoA Gov’t Offices Toyota Corolla 76532 or 76522 Kabul White
or Black 07 Aug SVBIED IRoA Gov’t Offices Toyota Corolla 69687 or
62687
or 63687 Kabul Green or White 07 Aug SVBIED IRoA Gov’t
Offices
Toyota Corolla 7448 Kabul Red 07 Aug SVBIED IRoA Gov’t
Offices
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Kabul Significant Events –
Previous 2 Months
ComplexIEDIED F/CIDF/RKTSAF
Last Update: 31 Aug 2008
RCIED 8‐03
RKT 7‐26
CPX 8‐04
RKT 7‐18
BBIED 7‐22
UKIED 8‐01
VBIED 7‐07RCIED 7‐30
IED F/C 8‐08
Kabul Significant Events –
Previous 2 Months
VBIED 8‐11
RKT 8‐14
IED 8‐16
RKT 8‐19
RKT 8‐19
IED 7‐11
IDF 8‐17
RKT 8‐21
RKT 8‐30
Kabul Significant Events –
Previous 2 Months
ComplexIEDIED F/CIDF/RKTSAF
Last Update: 31 Aug 2008
RCIED 8‐03
RKT 7‐26
CPX 8‐04
RKT 7‐18
BBIED 7‐22
UKIED 8‐01
VBIED 7‐07RCIED 7‐30
IED F/C 8‐08
Kabul Significant Events –
Previous 6 Months
VBIED 8‐11
RKT 8‐14
IED 8‐16
RKT 8‐19
RKT 8‐19
IED 6‐21
IED 4‐26
IED 5‐05
IED 5‐05
IED 5‐11
IED 3‐13
IED 5‐17
IED 5‐08
SAF 4‐14
SAF 3‐25
RKT 5‐15
IED 4‐27
IED 5‐29
IED 6‐23IED 7‐11
IDF 8‐17
IDF 6‐05
IED 4‐07
IED 5‐15
IED 4‐22
RKT 8‐21
RKT 8‐30
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RKT 01‐02‐08
RKT 08‐21‐08
RKT 05‐15‐08
IDF 04‐27‐08
RKT 07‐18‐08
RKT 07‐26‐08
RKT 08‐14‐08
RKT 08‐17‐08
RKT 10‐13‐07
IDF 06‐13‐07
RKT 12‐17‐07
RKT 11‐13‐07
RKT 08‐11‐07
IDF 12‐06‐07
RKT 07‐17‐07
RKT 07‐07‐07
RKT 10‐03‐07
RKT 08‐17‐07
RKT 06‐26‐07
RKT 04‐28‐07
RKT 05‐11‐07
RKT 08‐24‐07
Key2007 (14) 2008 (11)Last Update: 31 Aug 2008
Kabul Rocket / IDF Attacks 2007‐2008
RKT 08‐19‐08
RKT 08‐30‐08
Weather Forecast – Kabul Province
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Weather:
Description: Sunny. Hot. Sunny. Hot. Sunny. Hot. Sunny.
Pleasantly warm.
High level clouds. Pleasantly warm.
Morning clouds. Pleasantly warm.
Morning clouds. Pleasantly warm.
Low temperature: 59 °F 62 °F 62 °F 61 °F 57 °F 59 °F 52 °F High
temperature: 92 °F 93 °F 93 °F 91 °F 80 °F 82 °F 83 °F Comfort
level: 87 °F 88 °F 88 °F 87 °F 79 °F 80 °F 80 °F Wind Speed: 3 mph
7 mph 11 mph 7 mph 6 mph 4 mph 6 mph Wind Direction: Humidity: 12%
7% 8% 11% 26% 45% 44% UV Index: 7 (High) 7 (High) 7 (High) 7 (High)
7 (High) 7 (High) 7 (High) Chance of Rain: 0% 0% 0% 0% 30% 30% 30%
Amount Rain: - - - - - - -
Weather provided by CustomWeather, copyright 2007
Relevant Quote or Thought of the Day: “It is easier to find a
score of men wise enough to discover the truth than to find one
intrepid enough, in the face of opposition, to stand up for it”.
A.A. Hodge Afghan Proverb of the Day: “A tree doesn’t move unless
there is wind”. Meaning: Where there is smoke there is fire, or
every effect has a cause.
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Current or Newly Released Information – Kabul Province:
UPCOMING: USE WARDEN MESSAGE CONCERNING INS OPTEMPO, Kabul
Province, Kabul City. The U.S. Embassy wishes to inform American
citizens in Afghanistan that insurgent activity is expected to rise
in September. The U.S. Embassy continues to monitor the security
environment for Kabul and all regions throughout Afghanistan. There
is an elevated reporting tempo of general threats for Kabul, and
the immediate outlying areas. Insurgents, criminals and terrorists
remain intent on targeting U.S. and coalition facilities throughout
the country, not distinguishing between military and civilian
personnel. As we approach the beginning of the Islamic Holy month
of Ramadan which begins on/about September 2nd, and the upcoming
anniversary of the attacks on September 11th in the U.S., American
citizens and Westerners are reminded to exercise extreme vigilance
when travelling in Afghanistan. Americans who find themselves in
cases of extreme emergency in Afghanistan may contact the Embassy
receptionist via 0700-10-8001 or the Consular Section via mobile at
0700-20-1908. We take this opportunity to remind the community to
review their safety precautions. Updated information may be
obtained by contacting the American Embassy in Kabul at
[email protected] or by calling the Consular Section at
0700-10-8499. For the latest security information, Americans
traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Internet
web site at http://travel.state.gov where the Worldwide Caution,
and the Travel Warning and Country Specific Information for
Afghanistan can be found. Up-to-date information on security can
also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the United
States and Canada or, for callers outside the United States and
Canada, a regular toll line at 1-202-501-4444. These numbers are
available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through
Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).
01 September 0645L, LN PROTEST, Kabul Province, Kabul City,
District 9, IVO intersection of Route Violet CP V-4 and Route
Bottle/Wings. An estimated 400 to 500 LN’s gathered IVO the above
location in protest over what they said was the murder of four
civilians, including two baby boys, in an early morning raid by
“international troops”. LN’s are also reporting 3 LN’s were
arrested. The US-led coalition denied any involvement in the attack
and others, including ANP are claiming this was strictly an ANSF
operation. NFI
Left Intentionally Blank
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OPSEC REMINDER:
Kabul Province Map (with Districts) and surrounding area’s of
interest:
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Glossary of commonly used acronyms and abbreviations:
AA&E – Arms Ammunition AND Explosives ACF – Anti-Coalition
Forces AGE – Anti-Government Elements AKA – Also Known As ANA –
Afghan National Army ANAP – Afghan National Auxiliary Police ANP –
Afghan National Police ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces ASR –
Alternate Supply Route AP – Anti Personnel AQ – Al Qaeda AT – Anti
Tank BAF – Bagram Air Field BBIED- Body Borne Improvised Explosive
Device BDA – Battle Damage Assessment BFT – Blue Force Tracker BOLO
– Be On The Lookout BP – Border Police CAS – Close Air Support
CASEVAC - Casualty Evacuation CF – Coalition Forces CI – Counter
Intelligence CN – Counter Narcotics COA – Course of Action COIN OPS
– Counter Insurgency Operations COMPUSEC – Computer Security COMSEC
– Communications Security CP – Check Point CPX – Complex attack DF
– Direct Fire DIAG – Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups Program
ECM – Electronic Counter Measures EFP – Explosively Formed
Projectile FNU – First Name Unknown EDD – Explosive Detection Dog
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal FOB – Forward Operating Base FW –
Fixed Wing GOA – Government of Afghanistan HCN – Host Country
National HIG – Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin HIK - Hizb-i-Islami Khalis
HQN - Haqqani Network HUMINT – Human Intelligence HVT – High Value
Target IA – Intelligence Analyst IAG – Illegally Armed Group
IAW - In Accordance With IDF – Indirect Fire IED – Improvised
Explosive Device IMF – International Military Forces IMU – Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan INS – Insurgents IOT – In order to IRAM –
Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortar IRC- International Red Cross IRoA
– Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ISAF – International Security
Assistance Force ISI – Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence IVO – In
Vicinity Of KAIA – Kabul International Airport KAIA A-POD – Kabul
International Airport (ISAF Side) KIA – Killed in Action LN – Local
National LEL - Lashkar-e-Islami LeT - Lashkar-e-Toiba LNU – Last
name unknown MANPAD – Man Portable Air Defense System MBIED –
Motorcycle Borne Improvised Explosive Device MEDEVAC - Medical
Evacuation MI – Military Intelligence MIA – Missing in Action MLCOA
– Most likely Course of Action MOD – Afghanistan Ministry of
Defense MOE – Afghanistan Ministry of Education MOF – Afghanistan
Ministry of Finance MOFA – Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOI – Afghanistan Ministry of Interior MSR – Main Supply Route NATO
– North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDS – Afghanistan National
Security Directorate NFI – No further information NFIATT – No
Further Information At This Time NGO – Non-Governmental Agency
NPCC – National Police Command Center NSTR – Nothing Significant
to Report OPSEC – Operational Security OSINT – Open Source
Intelligence PAK - Pakistan PEC Prison - Pol- i Charki Prison POA –
President of Afghanistan POI – Point of impact POO – Point of
origin PRT – Provincial Reconstruction Team PSC – Private Security
Company PSD –Protective Security Detail RC – Regional Command ROE-
Rules of Engagement RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade RW – Rotary Wing
SAF – Small Arms Fire SAFIRE - Surface to Air Fire SAM – Surface to
Air Missile SBF - Support by Fire SD – Surveillance Detection SF –
Security Forces Shura – Afghan local council of elders SIGINT –
Signal Intelligence SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne Explosive Device
TB – Taliban TCN – Third Country National TCP – Traffic Control
Point TNSM - Lashkar-e-Islami TIC – Troops in
contact TOC - Tactical Operations Center TOO – Target of
Opportunity TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures UAV - Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle UI – Unidentified UN – United Nations UNAMA – United
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNHCR – United Nations
High Commission for Refuges USAID – United States Agency for
International Development USE – United States Embassy UXO –
Unexploded Ordnance VBIED – Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive
Device VCP – Vehicle Check Point WIA – Wounded in Action
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