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I

CONFIDENTIALDIPARTMINT OF THE ARMY@PPIMCW 7MTH ADUAMNO' GENERL

WAIHINST"t, D.C. MIS1

lot UPLty OHM TOr

AGAM-P (M) (2 May 69) FOR OT UT 691303 7 M~ay 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps,P'eriod Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

SEE DLSTRIBUTIOV'i"'

S 1. Subject report is forwArded for review and evaluation in accordancewith paragraph 5bp AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions shouldbe reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, with~n 90 daysof receip~t of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriatebenefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations andmay be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE-ARMY:

as Vajor Consralt USAas The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:Commanding Generals

US Continental Army CommandUS Army Combat Developments Command

CommandantsUS Army War CollegeUS Army Commnand and General Staff CollegeUS Army Air 'Defense SchoolUS Army Armor School i 9 I.

US Army Field Artillery SchoolUS Army Combat Surveillance School __

US Army Chaplain School09US Atkmy Aviation school

Regroado uncdassiflod when sepuratolfromt cassified Inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL IIEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY MAJ Sanderson/rrm/2506

HEADQUARTERS, XXIV CORPSAPO San Francisco 96308

AVII-GCT 4 March 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 31January 1969. RCS CSFOR-65 (Ri) (U)

Ccmmanding GeneralUnited States Army, VietnamATTN: AVHGC-DSTAPO 96375

The inclosed Operational Report - Lessons Learned is forwarded in compliance

with USARV Regulation 525-15 and AR 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl H. R. TA9'as CPT, AGO

Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:

A Plus

2 USARPAC (ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558)5 USARV (ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96375)2 III Marine Amphibious Force2 101st Abn Div (AM)2 3d Mar Div2 Task Force Clearwater2 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)1 CDC LNO1 31st Military History Detachment

DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED WHEN

SEPARATED FROM CONFIDENTIAL INCL.

so R9 TrUT CONFIDENTIALG91-303Inclosure

CONFIDENTIALSection- 1. OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

A.o CO02MMAND

1. (U) On 15 Deb 68, an award ceremony was held for MG Leo if, Schweiter,SXXIV Corps'Chief of Staff, departing for a CONUS assignment with the United States

Army Combat Developments Command, MG Schweiter was presented the Distinguishedecrvice Medal by LTG Stilwell and the Vietnamese Army Distinguished Service Order,

1st Class with fourragere, by MG Truong, CG, 1st ARVN Division.

2. (U) COL Harry L. Givens, Jr., USMC,served as Acting Chief of Staff from15 Dec 68 until BG Alexander R. Boiling Jr. arrived on 18 Jan 69 to assume theduties of Chief of Staff. BG Boiling formerly commanded the 3d Brigade., 82dAirborne Division.

B, INTIELLIGENGE ,ND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1, (C) Intelligence Planning: During the report period, no specificintelligence plans were published. During the previous report period, the "North-east Monsoon 1968-1969" operations order was published with special emphasis ontargeting and aestruction of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). Included was aspecial annex titled "Attack Against the Infrastructure". The plan is still ineffect.

2. (C) B-52 Bombing Program: During October 1968, a B-52 strike supporteda 1 st ArtVN Division operation in the southern portion of the DMZ, leaving enemyforces 4isorganized and confused. The enemy yielded readily to ARVN ground for-ces, ..Iho reported 17 NVA killed by the B-52 strike and 95 NVA KIA by ground con-tact, Two thousand 82mm mortar rounds and one metric ton of rice were discoveredand destroyed. In October 1968, enemy activity in the Thor area of the DMZ neces-sitated t argeting the area for B-52 strikes. Bomb damage assessment (BDA) re-vealed numerous secondary, explosions, destruction of enemy supply areas, weapons,and crew-ser'ied weapons positions. The DMZ area has not been struck by B-52's.-ince the 1 Nov 68 bombing halt. During November 1968, B-52's supported the 1stCavalry Division (AM) as they withdrew from. enemy contact in the vicinity of BaseArea 101, Ground follow-up revealed 18 enemy killed by air (KBA), several sec-ondary explosions: destrnction of enemy defensi-re positions and structures, anddisrupted lines of communicaLion (LOC's)o In December 1968, B-52 strikes sup-ported 3d Marine Division operations that permitted the landing of heliborneforces -.without casucalties or aircraft losses. Ground follow-up revealed doc-uments. supplies and several enemy killed. Since October 1968p enemy activityin the A Shau Valley prompted B-52 strikes in the valley and adjacent Base• rea 611. BDA revealed several secondary explosions, sustained fires, de-struction of enemy supplies and disrupted LOC'so

3. (C) Counterintelligence:

a. Liaison. Increased emphasis was placed on personal liaison visitsto obtain timely information regarding activities conducted by Vietnamese civilagencies. The agencies, Phung Hoang Committees, Police Special Branch, and

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

CONFIDENTIAL DOD DIR 5200.10

* ~ ~~ i~l/o SL. 0

Oonstis Gr,•vance, are 1)ritwiri.y involved in 01Imninating VCI and local L ucrSllao,A, delay oxicted in the information flow from Vietnumonc, augoncies [linc@ roportuwere submitted in Vietnameve to province lovol, Lranclated into 4n/,liah, and thendisseminated to interested US agencies. Liaison vio'lt:, axro now inde weekly toUS advisory personnel at each district within XXIV CorpiJ, irhlih hav resultedin an accelerated flow of information and has produced a groator understandingof district level operations.

b. Volunteer Informant Program (VIP). Reports of VC/NVA intt'ntionn toinfi] trate agents au workers on allied baeoo to conduct espionago and cnhotaf,.tclvitios, and to outfit personnel in AIVN and National Police unIforms haveincroased. Consequently, attention was focsed on security procedurev for in-digenous employees. A VIP for Phu Bai Combat Base As preoontly being developedto encourage employees to provide information of VC/!VA activities. aocirdshave been offered to employees who provide information. Leaflets htvt, boon pro-parod for the Phu Bai Combat Base, and plans exint to distribute other VIPleaflets and display posters and notices at pass control points and on unitbulletin boards. All these publications request employees to furnish infor-matior on the enemy.

4. (C) Gonnrul Enemy Situation:

a. In Quang Tri Province during the report period, action was c1.e:•ctor-.iid by light to moderate contacts with enemy ground forces,. usually company.sizoor smaller. Since I Nov 68 bombing halt, the onomy han maintained a continualbuild-up of supplies, personnel and facilitieu north of the Ben 110i River. The27th NVA Regiment's Area of Opepablon (AO) was extended to cover the void cre~tedby the withdrawal of the 320th 9VA Division from the central DMZ. The 27th NVARegiment continues to employ mortar fire, ambushes, small unit probes, and •niypfro.In the remainder of the DUZ, the enemy has concontratod on mortar and rocket at-t.cksa, mlnings, and small-size ground probes. There have been no attacks in QuangTri Province by artillery fire since 10 Nov 68. The 246th NVA ktegimr.cnt has beonidentified as operating in the Kho Sanh arca. PW's have stated the activIties,of -the 246th NVA Regiment are concentrated. on transporting suppliet; throughoutthe Khe'Sanh area and providing security for local supply caches. Offensiveactivities by the 246th NVA iAcgiment have been limited to attacks by fire and =malleale onncounters with friondly roconnaissance teams., Theri:, is evidence that organ-

ic battalions of the 246th NVA Regiment periodically rotat, A09. E1ements of the2d Battalion presently operate in the Kho Sanh area; the remainder of the regimentis ruported to be In Vinh Linh Secret Zone, NVN. There were no major changes inthe status of enemy units operating in the vicinity of Base Area 101. 7th Frontelements continue to resupply, train, regroup and replace personnel. Except forambushoo, thece elomentn avoided direct contact with Allied foreos, primarilyconcentrating on ,rosetyting, propagandizing, conducLing atl:.%.ckv by firo, snipingand interdicting LUC's. A general offonsirve, prudictod for Decemnbor, did notmaterialize; however, therq are hndicationt. of an onomy propazratibn fot possible"Winter-Spring" or "Tet Offensive." Enemy units operating from the DMZ and KheSanh area are capable of initiating and sustaining a-limited offensive, Anoffensive would probably not be launched except in coordinatior. aith tLa•,ks byunits located in the vicinity of Base Area (BA) 101. The units in BA 101 have

C V V " A CONFIDENTIAL Best Available CopY

CONFIDENTIAL

difficulty operating, even on a day-to-dny basis. Harsh living conditions and lackof proper medical attention cause much sickness. Rice fr. .the lowlands cannomt btobtained in ample quantities. Artillery and air strikes harass the enemy, and pop-ular support from local inhabitants falls short of enemy desires. Though the enemyis capable of launching an attaick from BA 101, it is doubtful tnat he could sus-tain an offensive at this time.

b. Thua Thien Province. Enemy activity has been 6xtremely light through-out the report p2riod. Heaviest enemy activity occurred during early November 1968and steadily decreased. The 4th NVA Regiment remained in southern Thua ThlenProvince and was active throughout Phu Loc District. While he avoided decisivee.g:Zgements; several attAcks by fire and ambushes were executed, Elements of the4th NVA Regiment were primarily concerned with rice-gathering and reinforcing theVCI. Captured PW's indicated that the 4th NVA Regiment might launch an attack onTruoi River Bridge and PhuILoc district headquarters, possibly in concert with amulti-regiment "Tet Offensive." The 5th NVA Regiment has, to date, avolded con-tact. In early November 1968, the K32 Rocket .Lrtillery Battalion !aunchL i attacksagainst Phu Bai Combat Base and Camp Za• e -nd then remained inactive until 1Jan 69, when Camp Eagle was hit by six 122mrrn rocket. In the Hue - coa.stal low.-lands, the frequency of rocket attacks increased the last week of the reportperiod as Hue City and Camps Eagle and Evans, all received 122mm rocket attacks.During December 1968, several members of Lhe K4 Bn/5th NVA Hepiment were naotiredin the lowlands, south and east of Hue City. Their mission was to reconnoiter thsarea for a future attack. While the attack has not mater.Lalized to date, it couldstill be initiated as part of a country-wide "Tet Offensive." Overall, activity bythe 5th NVA Aegiment has been limited to avoiding detection and contact by AHIdforces. There are indications that battalions of the 5 NVA Regiment are under-strength and short of food. Troop morale is reported to be low. Sensor readingsreflect possible enemy activity in the vicinity of BA 14. In addition, captursddocuments combined with recent agent reports, indicate that elements of the 6th NVARegiment have been located in that vicinit(•. In the A Shau Valley, the enemy con-tinues to repair and improve ioute 548 ir. JVN and Route 922 in laos. Traffic onAioute ,922 ,as considered light during November 1968, but increased to a modcra elevel in January 1969. Traffic on Route 548 remained light throughout the reportpericd. This was attributed to the choke points on Route 548 which required theenemy to ccnstxuct by-passes. In the lowlands, cordon operations sapped the dwin-dling strength of enemy local force units by eliminating the VCI. Rice denialoperations kept the enemy from replenishing food supplies. Several large rice cacheswere found in the lowlands south of Hue City and smaller caches were found in thevicinity of the "Graveyard" and in BA 114. In southern Thua Thien Province, ?4'sand captured documents indicate the enemy is critically shcrt of rice. Alli:doperations make it increasingly difficult for the enemy to move into coastal lo,-lands. The 4th and 5th NVA Regiments remain in southern Thua Thien Province avoid-ing contact when possible. Documents and interrogations indicate the 6tih NVARegiment may have moved into the area west of BA 114. Other forces in Thua ThienProvince, consisting of eight local force uuits, are gross2y understrength and con-sidered combat ineffective.. The enemy retains the capability to attack by fire,interdict LOCOs and conduct limited ground attacks against specific objectives.Enemy forces will probably continue to avoid contact, receive replacements, trainand resupply in preparation for a "Tet Offensive."

3CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALC o PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. (C) The XXIV Corps Area of Operation (AO) remained the same during thereport period. Bundaries of t 3- Division and the 101st ,•irbo.ne D-nisior (AM) were changed to compensate for the ist Cavalry Division (A;.L) deploymentto III CTZo

2. (C) Operation Comanche Falls (Phase III) comryenced on 2 Nov 68 southeastof Quang Tri City in the My Chan area, Two battalions of the Ist Cavalry Division(AM), a tank battalion from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (MeCii) and three1st ARVN Division battalions conducted air and ground a ssaults into the area J-

forces established a cordon, and GVN forces searched the cordon area, isi ý,vnlryDivision (AM) units were phased out of the operation by 112 Nov 68, Tho opviationcontinued until 1 5 Nov 68. Results were:

FhIEIJDLY E NE 1Yf

KIA WIA EVAC KIA PW¾ ^S d.i±No .N. 'Cr,US 2 4 3 20 r 10 0

ARVN 2 18 I5 62 34 68 9TOTAL 4 22 18 82 34 '78 9

3. (C) Operation Jeb Stuart III: The 1st Cavalry Division (A".) aggressivelypursued the enemy along the coastal plain in northern Thua Thien and s -uthern ýuangTri Provinces by conducting clear and search/cordon operations in coordination ,wthGVN forces. Jeb Stuart III terminated on 7 Nov 68 as elements of the ist Cava~ryDivision (AM) departed XXIV Corps AO,, Results from 1-7 Nov 68 follow.

FRIENDLY M.

KIA W IA EVAC KIA PW7S WPINS iND~•.L 43 9 7 14 0 2 0

4. (C) Operation Lancaster II: The 3d Marine Regimen: .conducted extensiveclear and search operations from the Rockpile north to the DMZ and west to theLaotian Border, preventing elements of the 320th NVA Division from massing troopsand supplies south of the DYZ. Lancas er II terminated on 23 Nov 68 Results from1-23 Nov 68 were:

FRIENDLY ENEM_ Y

KIA W iAi lNAC Xit, FW 23 WEIS !ND /CaLýw

12 64 61 22 1 7

5. (C) Operation Napoleon/Saline: Elements of the 1st Brigade 5th InfantryDivision (OECH) and ist Amtrack Battalion conducted! clear and searoh/cordon/{t!'operations in the vicinity or Quang Tri City and the coastal. platn area north to theDMZo IZ forces, in close coordination with GVN forces, successfully, kept the CuaViet LOG secure and greatly enhanced the Revolutionary Development Program in thearea. Napoleon/Saline terminated on 9 Dec 68. Results from 1 Nov - 9 Dec 68 arebelow:

4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALFRIMLYENEMYf

KIA WIA EVAC KIA FW_1'q 'FS! ThD/ W10 63 55 20 11 19 5

6. (C) Dawson River: Task Force Hotel of the 3d Marine Division deployed the9th Marine Regiment on 28 Nov 68 into the area previously encompassed by Scotland IIand extended the southern boundary through BA 101 to the Quang Trl/Thua Thien Prov-ince Boundary. The 9th Marine Regiment conducted clear and search operations in thecentral portion of this AO; in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, Lang Vei and the LaotianBorder in the west; and along the Ba Long Valley in the east. Several large an-'o/supply caches were discovered. Ground contacts and attacks by fire decreasedslightly during the report period. Operation Dawson River terminated on 27 Jan 60with the following resultst

FRIEDLYENEMYf

K_. WIA EVAC KIA DET PWIS 4PNS IND/CRTW

3 56 44 86 10 0 69 12

7. (C) The following operations remain in progress with the results for thereport period listed in subparagraph g below:

ao Scotland II: Task Force Potel of the 3d Marine Division deployed the4th Marine Regiment into the area previously occupied by Lancastcr TI, This area isbounded by Camp Carroll, the Rock Pile and thie Laotian Border on the soutY., withthe DMZ from Laos to a point due north of Camp Cari'oll as a northern boundary. Bx-tensive clear and search operations were conducted throughout the AO wi th the en-phasis on the area along the DMZ and the Laotian Border. Several large amao/supplycaches were discovered in well constructed bunker complexes. Ground contacts andattacks by fire were light.

b. Kentucky: Elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Divi!,Oon (OlCH) andthe 3d Marine Regiment conducted clear and search/RIF/cordon operations in the areasirrounding Cam Lo, Con Thien and north to the DMZ. On 10 Dec 68) the Army elementredeployed leaving the 3d Marine Regiment in the AO. In mid-December 1968, 3d MarireRegimental Headquarters' and the first and third battalions, along with appropfiatecombat support and 'combat service support moved to SICTZ. Task Force Bravo, con-sisting of an infantry battalion, a tank battalion and the 1st Amtrack Battalion, assum-ed responsibility for the Kentucky AO, enlarged to include the Cua Viet River. TheCam Lo and Con Thien areas were primary targets for US/GVN efforts related to the Ac-celerated Pacification Campaign. Significant results were achieved. Ground contactsand attacks by fire decreased during the past quarter.

c. Marshall Mountain: On 10 Dec 68, the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division(MECH) deployed to an area in the eastern portion of Quang Tri Province south of theCua Viet River.. Extensive clear and search/cordon operations were conducted through-out the area with US forces establishing cordons and GVN forces clearing and searching.Pacification efforts were highly successful in -the many fishing villages locatedalong the coastal plain. Light ground contacts and sporadic attacks by fire continued.The enemy's use of mines and booby traps increased significantly.

5CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(I. Operation D)ewey Canyon comtenced on 22 Jan 6c, wlith TF Bouri deploying

elements of t1- PtIh Marine Rcgimcnt sciuthwest toward the Da Krong Valley to consti uctFSB's. The 3d Battalion, 9th Mirine Regiment and the 1st and 4th Battalion. 2d APV_Re.imen.t asaults on 26 and 30 Jan 69, respectively. The operationcontinces with tle entire 9th Marine Regiment participating along With the 1st mnd4th Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment.

e. Nevada Eagle: Due to the departure of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), the101st Airborne Division (A;4) extended its northern boundavy to the Thua Thien/QuangTri Province Boundary° The 101st Airborne Division (AM) effectively user' its nir-mobile capabilities in conjunction with ARVN, RF/PF, NPFF and US and GVN n.'val forcesto ferret out the VCI and destroy enemy combat forces, Continuous clear and searchoperations along the coastal area prevented the enemy from massing troops and equip-ment for future operations. A determined effort by US/GVN forces achieved remark-able res-ults in the Accelerated Pacification Campaign during this report periodGround contacts and a~itacks by fire decreased measurabl, since the last, rerort. Ex-tensive RIF operations in the s'outhern portion of the AO frecuently harassed t~e 4Thand 6th NVA Regiments. Falling in this category, and su-i-iarized beleh., arc naciedoperations whose results are integrated with totals for Nevada Eagle,

(1) Operation Rawlins Valley contnenced on 17 Dec 69 with two UJ air-borne and two ARVW battalions combat arsaulting into BA 114 te clear and searct ,relements of the 6th ',NVA Regiment, The operation terminated or. 23 Dec 6I 'iSEcitsignificant results

(2) Opr:ation Todd Forest, employing one US airborne and two ARV1. bat-talions, commenced with combat assaults into BA 101 on 31 Dec 68E Todd Forest term-inated on `3 Jan 69 with the following results:

FRLENDLY ENEMY

KIA WIA EVAC KIA PW WPNS .LD Z E,,

0 6 !! 21 0

(3) Operation Platte Canyon commenced on 8 Jan 69 in the RvorLf" RuengValley southeast of Phu Loc. inclement weather caus~d delay of combat assaults andan airborne battalion was moved overland into the Ann Platte Cany.:n continueF, at. t41end of the report period witlhout significant results.

(4) Operatie-n Ohio Rapids is a clear and search operation being con-ducted by the 3d 1rig"n 101st Airborne Division (AM) and two 1st ARVN Division ltt-talions south and east ,if PA 101 in Thua Thien Province, The operatir,n com'enced on24 Jan 609 and ccntinues with the fo-lowing results:

FRIENDIX F E!,Y

KIA IA_ 'EVAC KIh P14 WsPNS IND /CREQ1

US 2 , 2 6 0 27 5

ARVN 0 C 0 15 0 10 2

TOTAL 2 21 0 3? 76

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(5) Operation Sherman Peak commenced on 25 Jan 69 south of BA 114 along

Route 547. It is a clear and search operation employing a battalion from the 2d'Brigade, 101st Air1nr~ b D4Iision (AM) and a 1st Divino be......- L U,., Diva Lvision 'battalion. The operationcontinuee without significant results.

f. STATISTICAL DATA (1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69)

FRIENDEYEMY

OPERATIONS KIA WIA EVAC KIA DET NW S IYD/CREW

SCOTLAND II 28 111 95 197 52 2 191 11

KENTUCKY 24 155 146 110 117 6 29 2

14ARSHALL MOUNTAIN 2 52 34 41 88 26 38 0

DEWEY CANYON 5 18 15 28 1 0 38 .

NEVADA EAGLE 45 384 323 688 1 ,548 162 458 31

TOTALS 104 720 613 1,064 1,806 196 754 46

g. RICE CAPTURED:

(1) Quang Tri Province: 75q tons

(2) Thua Thien Province: 171½ tons

8. (C) Tabk Force-Clearwater.

a. During the report period, Task Force Clearwater detected 66,555 vesselson the inland waterways within the XXIV Corps AO. Sailors boarded and searched31,234 vessels or appfoximately 48% of all vessels detected, and inspected 21,656vessels without boarding or approximately 32%. Vessels were searched for weapons,unmanifested cargo, improper ID cards and draft dodgers. There were 535 individualsdetained for the following violations: suspected VC-2, curfew vlolators-174, im-proper ID cards-149, restricted area violators-28. on Black List-93, draft dodgers-9,evading patrol-5, and 75 others for suspicious actions. There were 12 NVA/VC killedin action and 1 NW captured. The patrol craft of the River Security Groups alsoconducted an active PSYOP program. The best measure of the effectiveness of thePSYOP program is found in the results of the Voluntary Informant Prograr;,. From 26Dec 68 to 31 Jan 69, a total of 123,780 $VN was paid to children along the Cua VietRiver for weapons and munitions turned in.

b. The enemy has increased efforts to close the Cua Viet LOC duiring thisperiod by mining. Losses have been one LCPL (patrol craft) destroyed with six men

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALkilled in action, one PBR damagedP"1&*i FU logistics craft sunk and two LCM-8logistics.craft damaged. Cargo loss has boon three pallet;; of C-Rations lost, andone 6 x 6 truck damaged. The threat has been countered by an intensive trainingprogram to make all River Secruity'Group personnel "mine conscious" and theemployment of two new sweop'n by mine countermeasures craft, a bottom drag and acatenary drag 1-2 feet below the surface by two minesweepIng LOM-6's,, In additionit was determinod bhat the concussion grenade, MlK-3A9, is the most effectiveweapon against the mines being used, and they are used extensively for clearingUmh channel. A total of 23 mining incidents were initiated 1; the enemy of which18 wore countered without losd. The LOC's have not been blocked and the Cua VietRiver has been closed only 10 hours due to enemy action.

c. Tho Patrol Bost liver (PMlt) and Patrol t•ir Cushi,.-n V-z'!le;L ( '.XCV) ofLho Hue River ý$,ciirity Group have shifted from a defensive to an cff.An.ive posnturod1uin% this period, su:,ortin; vwricus -w'•eep/search and clear oportiten8 conductedby i0lst Airborrin DivJrion .(.I) and Ist ARVN Divivicr. fore( z. The Ictir. of the .'CV'sin Oc®combc. 1968 dbTe t. ,r9.tt rial cLur.slties has sericuLly hindered thM,. jA;rol esl ortof a•im Cau %lai which J.i now iptrolled only on a randon bauif. by MbL's. due t6 the ex-tensive distance to that area and the reqw.rc.monts for the PHR's "a .j - cr e t;r.eof the AO (D,.m Sam, Pha Tam Giang and Thuy Thien)..

1. (C) During the period covered by this rcport, the l.g.stjr-- F:upport cap,-biJitios in the UIV Corps AO improved con_.rudcrbly', Adds6 rup:ort units-,;, relign-munt of support missicns, new facilities .:2nd input of now typrE of equLpmcnt all a0Ci-ed to tho attachment of effective logiztical support. Major stipc•rt .units new in theCorps A(0 are thu 259th Quartermaster BL and the 0O02d Supply and 9ervice Co, both ofwhich became fully operational during the period. ThM transportation support in theCorps AO was realigned with one battalirn. headquart-erw and two companies moving fromthe AO and one company deactivated. Duis tG redistribution of truck assets very littleactual tranpr'ortation capability was lost. Construction, that provided additionallogistics storage, included a new ASP at Camp Evans with a 3apacity of 1935 shorttons, and new POL storage tanks which raised.the storage capacity frcm 6.6 milliongallons to (7,3 million gallons. Construction ccmpleted aL Tat. My improved cargo hand-ling capability at that port. This construction inclided an amm%-'.intion revetmcnt area,office space. covered storage space and facilities for repacking broken cargo. Theprimary items of new equipment introduced xere A.H-I.G and CH-47C helicopters andM4VA3 tanks. This equipment plus purification oz PLL'1 and ASL's during the xeportperiod iesulted in an improved maintenance posture.

20 (C) Significant Activities.'

a. Du•inC the period 27 Oct - 13 Nov 68, the lot Cavalry Division (AM) movedfrom I4ICTZ to III CTZ during Operation Liberty C.nyon. Aerial ports of departurewere Quang Trip Camp Evans and Phu Pa!. Aerial pc.rts of arrival were Bien Hoa, PhoucVinh, Tan Ninh4 An Khe, Long Than North, Quam Loi, Vung Tau, Phu Cat and Dan Thien.A total of 185 sorties of C-130 aircraft were used, lifting 11,550 passengers and3,396.3 short'.tons of cargo. Sealift required 31 LST's, 3 LSD's and 3 LPD's departirgfrom Tan My to Newport; 2 IST's from Da Nang to New'port; and 1 LPH from Da Nang toVung Tau. Tru:ck ai.sets of the 26th General Support Group were used tc move personneland equipment to dep .rture airfle~ds and to thd port of Tan My. Major unit phase-outdates were: 3d Bde, 31 Oct 68; 1st Bde, 5 Nov 68;' 2d Bde, 11 Nov 68; Division CMM.ndand Control and Fire Support Elements, 12 Nov 68 and Sup:,ort Ccmi.nd, 13 Nov 68.

8

Best Available Copy CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALb. Rapid departure of the IisV Cavalry Division (AM) from base camps was

facilitated by employing two principal methods of proper-ty tra-nsfer. The mostexpeditious method proved to be the direct turnover in plac, of the isV; Cavalry Div-ision (.0") suppLies and equipment to relieving units. The relieving vait inventoriedthe stocks and returned supplies excess to their requirements to the 26th General'Support Grcup for redistribution. In other instances, when, time perw.±tteds 1st Cav-alry Division (AM) supply assets not accompanying them on the move, were turned overto the 26th General Support Group by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

n, l)uring the first week of November 1968, HQ 259th Quartermaster Battalioncompleted its move from Quang Tni Combat Base to Phu Bai Combat Base. The bsttalion'ssubordinate units ecopleted the takeover of POL support responsibility from Force Log-istics Support Group - Alpha. The 259th Quartermaster Battalion assumed resportsibil-ity for POL support to the southern half of the Corps AO) in addition to their pre-vious mission of POL support in the Quang Tri area.

d. Significant developments in highway acces., ibJ'.3ty led to Increaf;d high-way traffic during this report period. QL-1 from lang Co t-3 DonLg Ha, TL-1, ( 1 :,-hwray551) fromr Hlue to Tan My., Route 547 from Hue to LZ Boyd and QL-9 from Dong Pa to thedistrict capitol at Cam Lo are now rated GREEN duari-ng daylight h:ýursl The Hall. VanPass was opened on 8 Nov 68 to both northbound and souti bound- ~ii-0tary and civiijantraffic, Monday. through Saturday and to civilian tr..ffic or. 6unday. Military Vehiclesnot previously in an organized convoy are escorted through the Hasi Van Pass by acavalry platoon of the 101st Airborne Division (All) which provides conirvand, cortrolI,and security. A northbound convoy departs Nam 0 Bridge, AT927842, t'ct-,,eon CQ30 -rnr11100 hz,urs. I southbound convoy departs lang Co Bridge, iTL8869558, k-ct-a.(rn 1 500 hoursand 1700 hc-i-rs,

e, Or. 6 Dec 68, the ACofS,, G4, assumed staff rssponsibý'Jty for T-Day plan-ning, i -:-ries of meetings have been conducted to develop firm T-Day plans. .ic Lionsthat lead to a better T-Day posture without inhibiting opet'atiornal requirern.).-s ha--V0been initiated.

f0L, On 11 Dec 68; the NICTZ s-upply support for Class I -a reorg;anized, hMarines' Fcrce Logistics Lupport Group - Bravo, Clah-s I Supply Pcirit at Dong Ha Coeuhbt,Base assumed respon~sibility for supplying Class I items to all US tr.!oops north of CIV.npE~vans. The 1002d Supply and Service Companyp Class I Supply Point at Phu Bai CombatBase, assumed responsibility for supplying Class I items to all US troop_- at CamipSvans and south, T~he Class I supply point previously located at Quang Tri Comtbat Basei.ras eliminated .

- g. During the period 9-14. Dec 68, elemenzs of the 31d Mar-Ine 1tagi-liernt :-aevedfrom base areas In the vicinity of Bong Ha to SICTZ fer Operation Taylor CcTrnop, Theair movement consisted of 49 sorties of C-130 aircraft, movipg 2ý45,3 prassengers arnd265,5 short tons of cargo. No sig,.nificant problems wore ancountereO.

h. The Tan INr/Quang Tri Combat Base pipolino vas co1.2oted, for Sir'i1e 1-ro-*duct operation on 19 Dec 68.. Operation and maintenance responsibility was a~ccpvr'dby the Army on 10 Jan 69. This line is expected to be completed for multi-prcduetope.ration during Feb 69,

I. Reconstruction of the Da Nang-Hue railroad was completed o-i 8 Jan 69,and t1-he railroad resumed operations on 15 Jan 69. The intitial capacity of this line

9

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALis 200 shoi-t tons per day; fifty percent of which may be devoted to US Forces, asreqiiired, um! fif ty percent devoted to ARVN/civilian needs. Security Is provided bysix comp-,nicv- of Regional Forces for the rail facilities and eleme~nts of a militarysecurity baLtalion provide on--train "eourity. Although no US3 Force.0 cargo wastransport(.d during -thi s report period, plans are beingi mac~h fcnr f uturwe _'zC of ra IlJ*to muove rock from Phu'Loc to J-hu Bai. The following is the published dally trdinsch,,'Kule offcctive 15 Jar, 69.

SUT11 NCRTH

Hue L-7 0800 Ar 1633

Da Nang Ar 1448 LV 09,30

j. A pre-booking systorn for passengers departing f rorr Phu Ba-' Airpor-t onofficij.1 orders was inotiTuted or. 14 Jan 69. Pre-.bzoking can be made Up to seven daysin advance for trips to An Rhe, 2a'-igon, Dong Ha and Da Nang.

k. The new Hue Rmmip opened on 18 Jan 69. The rated capacit~y .)f this rampis 865. short tons daily. Another ramp for retrograde cargo is still un:construct-ion. The old Hue Ramp returned to ARVN control.

1. In December 1968, USARV announced a poli~cy for disposition of excessmaterial. Implementation has begun in Loth the 101st Airborne Division (AM) and the1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (W-CH). A large amount of excess equipmeant wasproduced in the 10-1--L Airborne Division (AM), as it reorgarnized to an airmnebile con-f 1 uration . 0O-er 60 excess trucks and 30 excess trailers were turned in. In a dd-ition, the ;01st Airtorre Division (AMI) submitted requests for disposition of 50-60line items of TA 50 material and tentage, Additional requests for disposition arebeing prepared on these large volumne itsms. The 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Divirion(1'ECH) is currently studying severa: handr-ed lI.4ne items in an attempt to idealtifyand dispose of excesses.

E. Kat$OINNEL, ADMI11nITRTION, NMaAIt1.& DISCIPLINE AND ILDICAL

1. (U) Military Personnel M1aragement. During the repo~rt period., there was anincrease in per!,ornel administrative activities to include processing of personnelactions, promotions, pergonnei1 requisitions, R&R allcocations, awardz and decf~ratioris,etc, with the assignment of the 2d Battalion, '3811h Artillery. The respz-nsib-ilityfor reviewing and processsing recomndanrdtions for awurds and dýc ýra tions 3f all TIS..rmy personn.el ass~_tned- to MX1CV *advisory teams in the )CTZ was a'lso assuinýd by theCorps AG Secticm- The Chief of Staff, XXYV Corps is a~sisted by the Corps AG '13cct-ion in the r:oviow of 0EFR-s of advisory officers located within the Corps AO.

2. (U) Civilian Personnel Management. The authorize tion fo ~t, hire Viet-namose Nationals ir the command remained at 52 The num~ber of da-ily hire VietnameseNationals V-3 in-ro.-sed in the 3d Quarter FY69 in order to provide assistUAnce in areaconstruction to ,!(- assigned artilThry battalions An increase in the assistance-in-kind funds xz-As rcq-,r ý;tod ain(: -pproved for this pUrpose.

3. (U) Sp,.cial Services. During the pcrizod special services activities in-creased considerably with the acquisition oil a Butler building for use as a Mrm.-nasiuzn, the es-tablishmant of an area field librarý and the opening of a newly con-structed handball court, A swimming pcol i3 under construction and other outdoorathletic facilities are planned for construction in the near future4s' In addition.

to

CONFIDENTIAL

two mobile libraries and a mobile photo lab have been requisitioned and are reportedenroute to Phu Bai Combat Base. These units will greatly increase the recreationalfacilities available to personnel assigned to the area.

4, (U) Religious Activities. The comparative stability of units in the XXIVCorps AO facilitated adequate religious coverage. Continued cross service supportbetween Army, Navy and Marine Corps chaplains ues most effective in providingadequate religious coverage for all units. Individuals in units at rear echelonswere able to observe the Sabbath in accordance with the dictates of the individual'sfaith. For units in forward areas and those directly involved in military operations,observance of the Sabbath generally coincided with the visit of the chaplain. The1 iited number of Catholic and Jewish chaplains during the period required thoroughpi.anning and coordination to insure religious cover:tge for personnol of these faiths.

5. (U) Discipline, law and Order. The 504th Military Police Battalion, lessCompany B, moved to Northern I Corps Tactical Zone (NICTZ) during November 1•8. The504th Military Police Battalion (-) provides non-tactical, area military police sup-port to include convoy escort, traffic enforcement and accident investigation on mainsupply routes; evacuation of prisoners of war from division collecting points to theCombined Division Interrogation Center in Hue City; discipline, law and ord-r in thecities of Quang Tri and Hue; and investigation of criiinal offenses involving non-divisional troops.

6. (U) Medical. During the report period excellent medical support was providedArmy units in the XXIV Corps AO. The 1st Medical Laboratory (Mobile) arrived at PhuBai Combat Bose on I Nov 68 and became operational.on 16 Dec 68. This unit providesall medical laboratory procedures and greatly adds to the medical support capabilitiesin NICTZ. The US Army Hospital Phu Bai (Provisional) was redesignated the 85th Evac-uation Hospital on 5 Dec 68 with a planned capacity of 400 beds. Construction of anew facility to provide this capacity beg-an on 21 Jan 69. Relocation of the 18thSurgical Hospital from Quang Tri Combat Base to Camp Evans took place during theperiod 23-26 Dcc 68 and became operational in this location on 1 Jan 69?. This moveprovides hosrital facilities at three central locations which are readily accesdibleto all umits w,,ithin the Corps AO.

F. INSPECTOR GLNLhAL

None.

G. INECRMATION

1. (U) General. On 31 Dec 68, negotiations wore completed for the establish-mentof a Stars and Stripes Book Store at Phu Bai Combat Base. The bookstore opened on15 Jan 69. The method of delivery of free issue Stars and Stripes newspapers wasamended. Papers for all imits located in the vicinity of Phu Bai Combat Base aretraashipped in bulk under the supervision of the Information Office. The InformationOffice is now on distribution of DOD Newsclips.

2. (U) Command Information. Official photo coverage uas provided for VII visitsto include the Christmas Service of Dr. Billy Graham at Phu Bai Combat Base.

3. (U) Public Information.

1*1

!Ia. The Commanding General and key staff members granted interviews or conduct-E ed briefings for thirteen members of the press.

SCamp. b. 528 news media representatives used the services of the Phu Bai Press

C. 11 feature stories were prepared and released by the Information Office.

H. COUCND HISTCRIAN

1. (U) Historic.!l Study 4-68 iras corn ,leted during th-- report p%.riod, and willbe forwarded to the Office of the Chief of Military Histoiy, Department of the Army.

2, (W) historic overview of military operations in Northern I Corps TacticalZone during 19b8 was prepared during the report period.

3. (U) A Department of the Army, Letter of A'prcciation for Historic'1 ý'uiy5-68 Operation Vinh Loc was received by the 31s. Military Nistory Detichment.

I. AV1ICIN

None

J. SIGN_ L

1. (U) Activation of Mode V ATODI,'h Termdnals at Camp Engle and Cump 'Evans.During the first week of this report period, Mode V AiUTODIN terminals w:.ere instAll-ed at Camp Eagle AACC (Army Area Communicution Center) and Camp Evans AACC. Theseterminals and associ.,ted communications centers supported the llst Airborne Div-ision (AM) and the Ist Cavalry Division (AM), respectively. Each Mode V AUTODINterminal, prov dlg lOC word-p..r-minutc full duplex service, was norknected to theNha Trang *%utomatic Switching Center, Activation of these terrinals was- accomplishedwithout difficulty.

2. (U) Army Area Commutnications System Upgrade. On 5 Nov 68 an upgrade progr-rnof the Army Area Corbaunication Syst3m in XXIV Corps AO 'as completcd. This upgridoconsisted of several distinct phases, :as Indicated below:

a. Installation of an AN/TRC-129 tropospheric-sc,-tter system between PhuBai Combat Bse and Camp :gle (101st -- irborne Division). This system improved thequality of long distance telephone scrvýce, pending installaLion of th, 40)-n irtie cable betwu.n Phu Bai Comabt Base, Gia Le Combat Base and Camp Eagle.

b. A 12-channel VHF system was installed betwnen Phu Bai Combat Base andGia LI. Combat Base to increase the trunking capability and to provide two XXIV CorpsArtillery battalions with direct access to HQ, XXIV Corps. This syst-m w-,s inztall-ed pending completion of the 400-pair tie cable mentioned above.

c. Installation of a 12-channel VHF system between Phu Bai Combat Base andHue Citadel i-nproved the service between XXIV Corps and 1st ARVN Division, and nowprovides direct communications betw'en HQ, 1st ARVN Division, HQ, XXIV Corps and the

12

I

CONFIDENTIALHue Combined Division Interrogation Center.

d. A 12-channel VIF system between Phu Bai Combat Base and Tan M4y Army Post,YD815310, was installed to improve the quality and quantity u^ service provided pre-viouaiy by an ANi/GRC-163, a 4-channel system.

3. (U) Operation Liberty Canyon.

a. During the first days of the report period, Operation Liberty Canyon,movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) to III CTZ, produced many communicationsactions. These included the iimediate installation of voice and teletype circuitsfrom Camp Evans to the new command post location in III CTZ. A voice circuit wlasinstalled from Camp Evans to the Tan My Army Port to facilitate the sea movement ofdivision elements.

b. By mid-November 1968, the last elements of 1st Cavalry Division (AM) de-parted the Corps AO. The narrow band AUTOSEVOCOM terminal accomyanie the 11th SCg-

nal Bcttalion, Ist Cavalry Division (AM), and the Mode V AUTODIN tormi:-al wias de-activatoed and returned to Ist Signal Brigade assets.

c. The co:wranications aspects of Operation Liberty Canyon were accomplft-Iedwithout difficult;y and contributed significantly to the overall smooth execution ofsuch a large undertaking.

4. (C) Issue of TSEC/KY-38 Speech Security Equipment to Ist ARVN Division Advi-sors. As a result of pending MACV and XXIV Corps OPLANS, an urgsnt need arose forIst ARVY Division advisors to obtain TSEC/IKY-38 speech security equipment. Due tothe nature of the equipment and associated cryptographic Taterial, considerable dif-ficulty was encountered in establishing the channels for issue, obtaining release ofequipment and m-aterial, verifying security clearances and cryptographic access, andissuance of KY-38. After coordination and the pro.mulgation of USARV Reg 380-21,"Military Sbcurity - Control and Accountability of COMSEC Material Issued to .'U-CV Ad-visors" 38 KY-38 security devices were issued to 1st ARVN Division advisors on 4 Dec68. As a result of this action, communications security within Ist URVN Division hasincreased i nn;easurably.

5. (U) SEAB.S-ICS Overbuild Program in XXIV Corps AO.

a. During the report period, an extensive overbuild of the Sout!enact AsfaWideband System - Integrated Comuan! cations System (SEAWBS-ICS) was activated. Twoobjectives were met by this program.

(1) Replacement of the AN/TRC-66 Tropospheric-Scatter Systems, oprrated

by 7th Air Force personnel on rotating 90-day TDY basis.

(2) Completion of Phase III of the overall SEAWBS-ICS program.

b. This overbuild progran resulted in the extension of the SEA14BS to QuangTri, and Dong Ha Combat Bases with technical control facilities located throughoutXXIV Corps AO at Phu Bai Combat Base, Hue City, Quang Tri City and Dong Ha CombatBase. In addition to a considerable expansion in quantity of circuits available forboth long-haul and intra-corps AO use, the quality of service has improved as a re-sult of the overbuild program.

13

CONFIDENTIAL

COGNFIDENTIAL6. (U) Activation of 400-Pair Tie Cable, Phu Bai Combat Base-Gia Le Combat

Base-Camp Eagle. The completion of the 4%-pair cable project on 21 Jan 69 culminat-ed a long and c-'nt~nuing effort to provide telephone service to the Phu Bai CombatBase-Gia Le Combat Dase-Cam. Eagle mnLA:Y comilex on other than multi-channelradio systems. This 1st Signal Brigade cable construction proJect provides 200-pairsbetw-en Phu Bai Combat Base and Gia Le Combat Base, 200-pairs between Gia le CombatBase and Camp Eagle, and 200-through pairs between Phu Bai Combat Base and Camp Eagl,The cntire project constitutes the most extensive long-distance cable installation i:XXIV Corps.

7, (U) Switchboard ANA4TC-9 Installation at Camp Eagle. Concurrent with thecompletion of the above mentioned 400-pair cable project, was the rctivation of anAN/MTC-9 switchboard at Carap Eagle. This installation provides a 600-line capabil-ity to Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division (AM) and other tenant units at C-irnpEagle, in contrast to the previous 200-line switchboard capability.

K. ENGITI.ER

1. (C) During the report period the Corps Engineer Section, in ccordinitionwith the Quang Tri and Thua Thien Province Chiefs and Sen-or Advisors, developed aproposed secondary LOC upgrading program. This program, planned for accomplishmentby ARVN Engineers sup.)orted by US Army Engineer units, will re-establish the roadnetwork emanating from the cultural and market centers of Quang Tri City and Hue City..1 total of 186 miles of road in the two provinces are programmed for upgrading asthe initial segment of the project.

2. (C) The follcwing majzr c nstruction projects w re completed during the re..

port pericd.

a. Construction of 1,146 Seahuts and 44 messhalls throughout the Corps Ac.

b. POL tank farm at Quang Tri Combat Base.

c. Bridge 1,1, YD519348.

d. Bridge 1.-. 3.: YD4'77377.

e, Bridge 9-'2, YD0265"'.

fo South Hue LCU ramp, YD773225.

g. ASP at, Quang Tri Combat Base.

h. RelocaUion of the 18th Surgical Hospital from Quang Tri Combat Base toCamp Evans.

i. Repair of Fhu Lo3 railroad bridge, ZD099008.

j. Repair of railroad roadbed Hue-Da Nang.

k. Repair of Camp EiXans airfield,

3. (C) The follcing major construction projects w re started during the reportperiod.

Pit

wpnUrInrIITIAt

CONFIDENTIALa. North Hue LMU ramp, YD760250

b. 85th Evac Hospital at Phu Bai Combat Base.

c. UH-I hangars at Camp Eagle and Camp Evans.

d. Redecking of the Hue City hlghway/railroad bridge, YD751209-YD749213.

4. (C) Tactical bridging.

a. 300 ft ct M4T6. installed in 0O-tober 1968 is still in service at Cam Lo,YD1 48604.

b. 1,140 ft. of M4T6/M4 float bridge was installed in the Perfume River iHue City, YD766218. The bridge ws opened to traffic on 2k Jan 69.

c. 100 ft. of M4T6 was installed at YD336549 on 25 Jan 69.

5. (C) Design* of the following major highway bridges wetre developed dzringthe report period. Construction is currently scheduled on the dates indicated.

a. Cam Lo YD148604 1 Feb 69

b. lang Co YD886957 1 Feb 69

c. Dong Ha YD242611 I Apr 69

d. Quang Tri YD329519 I May 69

e. Hue Bypass YD773249 I May 69

6. (C) Reconstruction of the following railroad bridges was tasked to theSeabees during the report period. Repais should commence during the next reportperiod.

a. An Hoa YD737228

b. Song Bo YD614278

c. Pho Trach YD519348

d. My Chanh YD461399

e. Bau Vit YD325520

AG5 ACTIVITIf S

1. (U) Civic Action:

a. Civic Action progress.

(1) During the report period. civic action activities reached their highesttempo of the year. This is attributed to the intensity of major combat operations,

I5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALand an increased emphasis on military c-vic action activities in sup, ort of theAccelerated Pacification Campaign (APC)o A mnjor shift in civic action areas ofresponsibility occurred in e.!rly November 1968 when the 1st C.avalrý Division (:.N)deployed to the III Corps Tactical Zone. ..t Cavalry Division (A"1, projects were*Ausorbed by the 3d Marine Division and the 101st Airborne Division (AM). Self-helpwas again the keynote to the civic action activities within XXIV Corps. XXIV Corps'units ccnsistently re. orted that more than 50% of the.work on projects was accomplish-ed by self-help labor, During the quarter, units OPCON to XXIV Corps spent over5 ,70Q man-days (ten hour days) in civic action work. Over 1,600 MEDCAPS were helddiu'ing the quarter with nearly 140.00patieiats tr,. ted. These totals morr thandouble tho totals of any previous qiurter. XXIV Corps units used and/or made avail-able ap, roximately 35 tons of commodities per w.-ek during the report pe-riod. Thtecommodities included soap, food items, medicJ.l supplies, CARE kits, and constructionmaterials such as sand, gravel, tiles, bricks, and both salvage and qualit, lumber.Civic action programs sup-orted nearly 400 projects (to include schools, orphanages,hospitals and dispensaries) with funds and technical advice.

(2) XXIV Corps received additional civic action assets during the quar't,.r.The 29th Civic Affairs Company, headquartered in Da Nang, provides four Civic ActionPlatoons to the XXIV Corps AO. The 53d and 54th Civic Affairs Platoons arrive> fromthe 95th Civil Affairs Group in CONUS and support the Senior Advisors of Thua Thienand Quang Tri Provinces, with a primary mission of refugee support. The llth Platoonof the 2d Civil Affairs Company, a new arrival from II Field Force Vietnam, and the10th Platoon, created from personnel already on hand, were also designated as re-fugee support units at Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. This brings the total ofcivil affairs platoons in the XXIV Corps AO to nine.

(3) XXIV Corps civic action projects covered a broad spectrum.

(a) 3d Marine Division Area of Operations.

lo A program of instruction was instituted for assigned personnel ithich

provides information conerining civil affairs and psychological operations. Theinstruction vras held initially for all concerned personnel, and will be presentedquarterl, for newly arrive"• staff member's and commanders. The instruction includes:political or- knizýtion: .t .rovince and district level and the US advisory effort;the status of pacification and tha role of UJ/FWMWAFo

2. The division has been active in numerous county fairs and cordon andsearch op-rations. They have provided transportation, food, MEDCAPS, DENTCAPS, andentertainment.

SThe sawmil' in Quang Tri City has reopened. The timbers are floateddown rivers from the mountains in the western portion of the division's AO or air-

lifted by sup,iy heliccpters returning frozmw various fire support bases and landingzones. The 3d Marine Division, when possibleý provides security, transporta6tion,supplies and1 c uiment for the workers.

4. The 3d Marine Division G5 Section publishes a monthly newsletter torecognize cucc0. ses, give direction to projects, and pass along ideas and comments.

•. The Dong Ha Children's Hospital continued its successful operationduring the report period. Since the hospital opened in early September 1968, 5,000

16

CONFIDENTIAL

outpatients have been treated and the hospital has well over 2,000 inpatient days.Since the hospital grows more and more successful, evidenced by -he increasingpatient load, a new wing is planned. A relatively nrew undertking at t+he -hospItalis t.h Cleft Plat Program. Children with this malady, and oth.r children who canbe a. Asted through minor surgery, are being treated at hospit 1. The program isbeing advw::rtised through PSYOP media and by 3d Marine Division MLDCAP and DI.,TCAPpersonnel. Treated children are the best adve;. tisement for program,

(b) 101st Airborne Division (aM) Area of Operations.

1. In support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign the 101st AirborneDivision (AM) conducted "soft" cordon operations, in which maxlimrn emphasis isplaced on CA/PSYOP effort. Aerial loudspeakters are used to broadcast informationand instructions to the citizoens. After tha citizens are movw'1 to a sicure area,WOWCAPS are conducted, food prcvided, and games, toys, and recreation equipment weremade available. An audio-visual team provides movies and television and the 101stAirborne Division Band often provides enterta-inment.

R. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) conducts forty-five m-inwte cdiseus• ornson the importance of Vietnamese-Ameri-can rolationships each week to companies re-turning to th! "?ivision headquarters for a stand-down. Each discussion is followedby an appropriate film, e.g. "The Unique War".

2. The 101st Airborne Division (AM) civil affairs pei-sounel, working trithdistrict chiefs and district senior advisors, have developed their programs to com-.,Iement ,.nd supplement other agencies, In January, the 101st Airborne Division (AM)ws participating in 41 major projects, the largest number it has had since itsarrivail in Vietnam.

4. Lumber is in short supply throughout Thua Thien Province. The 101stAirborne Division (AM), from its scrap lumberyards at Camp Eagle and Phu Bai CombatBase, supplies the bulk of the lumber used in all civic action prcjects in ThuaThicn Province, over 80,000 board feet per month. Projects are occasionally threat-ennoO rith delays due to shortage of lumber and other building materials. To keenthese projects moving, the 101st Airborne Division (AM) supplies cement, tin, andreinforcing bars from its resources on a "loan" basis. Once the province receivesthe sup:.lies through government channels, the division is reimbursed.

=. Coordination between the 101st Airborne Division Surgeon and the ThuaThien Province Medical Chief established a regularly scheduled MEDCAP throughout theprovince. Villagers know exactly when a MEDCAP will be held in their area. Thisprovides better medical assistance and prevents duplication of effort by differentunits within the province. Additionally, a program for maintaining health recordswas established. Each MEDCAP is accompanied by Vietnamese medical technician whoposts these records and receives medical training,

(c) The ist Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (NECH) reported during the quarterthat a mobile clinic ws used during MDCAPS. This clinic covers the 1st Brigade,5th Infantry Division (I&CH) Area of Operations on a regularly scheduled basis, andprovides the doctor with a small laboratory, a pharmacist, and a trained laboratorytechnician. Vietnamese health workers meet the mobile clinic at each of its stopsfor on-the-job draining. Another feature of the clinic is a referral system. Eachpatient receives a card on which his medical history is recorded in both Vietnameseand English. This provides the MEDCAP doctor with an aid to his diagnosis and treat-

17

ment, and enables natients to be rel',!rred to tht) prov~rncial hospital wheic% Iforeserious ailments can be treated. The hospital's physicians then have a me-.Icalhi~story and diag;nosis to :itthem.

.(4) During the re-port period the Civil Affairs Divh.ion of tho AX(!V CorpsG-5 ...ection assisted and coordinate8d t number of civic action activities. The fol-'toidnj~' renrr ntutivo of these activities:

(a) With the movement of th-i 1st Cavalry Division (.,M) from th': XXIV CorpsA&U in rily Nov 68, the Corps Civil af fairs Division convened a con~'err'nce atý Ca~ippEvainc to insurwe continizity of civic action activities in the lbt C;Lvalry Division'sza0. Reprn.eintatives from Qu~ang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces and from the 3d MarineDivision, 1st £rigadr', 5th Infantry Division (MECH) and 101ot Airborne Divis-ion (AM)

* attucndcQ. Supplies, information, rcsponzibilities and future pluns we're tra'rSf-rred*and di~scuiý.c&. aidditionally, ove,-r 300,000 $VN in the General ;ialt Sholamzlhip Fund

were trar,-fl-r: ed alongy with all of the scholarship records on each of ovler 2-00stuidents. .ýs a rosult of this conference., and tlii dilige-Cnt work of those in atte-nd--n'oc, thL'vc was a smooth transfer of civic action a~vtcs

(b) During Nov 68, XXIV Corps was alloc:--tcd V'0,000 "X"p ~niat in CA/* ~~PSYWAR fwinds. Thnse funds sup: ort thn civric action activiti .., of n'I~'(u.non-di~v-

isi-onal units within the Corps .AO and relieve the divi sion- of' tht.. burdz:n of curport-ing Lhose actf~itiecs which are of a corps-wide na~ture. Initial Cxp fdt~c fror.the funad supp.'orted Thua Thien and Quang Tni Provinces a-,d 1st ha~V', Di v' _iori Chrictý-mas ce~ubr_-tions, pllovidcd channel-- mark-crb for thc: Gia Dang, Fishing i *__in ',1111=lgTri Prov! nceý and suf. lind materials for well casing molds of selected -.PC hurlekts.Th- e :s to this fuiid has bce'n so overwholming that on 1.8 Jan 69, a rt,(q'! ,L forat, additional 400,000 v as subr~itted to MVICV.

(c) The G-5 Section cc,ntinueed to serve. as a clearing house for inform ~tionand matorial for various civic action activities throughout the XXIV Corps ,i0. Exami-ples inrcludzý tentage and food comarodities for CA Platoons in ý-efugrtc ass-istancework, f ood comm oditics an~d administrative a dvice f or cordon and be-arch oror,;.ti cns ,ti-ansportdtion assistonce for ev,-rythiJng from 1 ,')00 pallets of cemcnt to 250 BOYbccuts, ..nd quick reaction sutyport f'or victims of a flash fire- in Rue City. Add-itionally, the section provrided coord~nation. a.-sistancc. for Englisb class at th,;,~m:,j-icua Cultural Ccntci' in Hue City ana the Iline Univ-i sity ~chooJ. of Peda,;oQ.. .,n-

other -majov !vcnt in which the G5 Section took part wras tha; reo'amption of tou.rs,* thrciiý;h thý; Imperial City of Hue by US servicemen. Civic action personnel prolide

Jl~2jAori betwoon Corps' units and the XXIy Corps Special 3crvices Offic.-~~ the CityOf :1hl, tours.

(d) The, G5 Section helped coordlinate the'visits of ovL;'. 1,000 Vietnan-olsr'to Lhno rh1u Bai Combat Base dut'inC late Dec 68 to visit grd.vcs of their ancestoro andpro\'i~ck coordination and controll for a visit at Christ- -Us time by over 200 citi.%ensof Hae, City who wished tto express thc-ir thanks, and besit withbs to IXIV Gor-'s. Theactivities included a high school -student chorus which sung carols in Vietnameseand English, a performance by' the Impcerial Ballet, and a presentation to the CorpsCo'imander of a symbolic gift for the entire Corps expressing best wishes for theholiday period.

(e) During thi Christmas Holidayrs, the G5 Section provided the Corps* Commandor with gifts for distribution and has prepared documents, cards, and

suggestions f'Lr his activities during the Tet Holidays.

18

(f) The monthly G5 Conference and G5 Civil Affairs Information Papers

continued during the report period.

b. Civic Action Effectiveness

(1) Intelligencc of VC/NVA activities continues to be given to unitsthroughout the XXIV Corps AO. The local populace reflects a more responsive at-titude toward Amnrican soldiers and Vietnamese government representatives. Theirwill to rebuild, vnd the effort invested in constructing permanent buildings, in-dicate faith in tho ability of the government to protect and lead them.

(2) In Nam Hoa District of Thua Thien Province the citizens are grow-ing moro szlf-confidcnt and self-sufficient due to the work they perform to re-build their homes with supplies provided by province and US/FUNIF sources. Suc-cess it, self-help projects is reflected throughout the XXIV Corps AO.

(3) NEDCAPS continue to be the most effective Civic Action pi-)Jects.since they allow individuals to see immediate results in their state of health.,MEDGAFS also bring Vietnamese and American medical personnel together and allowb eachto learn from the other.

2. (U) Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

a. The XXIV Corps, G5 PSYOP Officer continued tc monitor ond super-vise PSYOP conducted by units OPCON to XXIV Corps, and to coordinate PSYOP ac-tivities with ARVN, Provincial, and III Marine Amphibious Forde PSYOP agencies.

b. Throughout the repot pýriod, the PSYOP effort was directed pri-marily against two targets: NVA/VC units located within the XXIV Corps AO,and the Viet Cong Infrastructure. Primary means of PSYOP Attack against theVCI has been the Denounce Viet Cong Infrastructure Campaign and the Third PartyChieu Hoi Rewards Program.

c. The number of Hoi Chanhs decreased during the report period to234 from a high of 708 during the preceding quarter. The bombing halt, pracetalks, possible withdrawal of main enemy foirces and tightening of VC/NVA con-trol of their troops are factors contributing to the downward trend. Thetotal "oi Chanhs for the year, however, remained well above that for 1967,with -t .tal of 1718 as op,,osed to a 1967 total of 509.

d. During this quarter the XXIV Corps PSYOP section processcd some3,000 requests for leaflets and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts from units OPCONto XXIV Corps. In response to these requests, approximately 161,901,765 leafletswere dissenin.ated and 969 hours of messages were broadcast over aerial and geoundloudsp'iake's.

e. During the report period the YXIV Corps G5 PSYCP Section .sivudresponsibility for the PSYOP effort in the A Shau Valley. More than 2,596,1'0.leaflets were dropp:ed on known or suspected NVA/VC infiltration and supplyroutes. The PSYOP Section developed and disseminated t3 units OPCON to XXIVCorps and related PSYOP agencies at province headquarters, texts for posters,leaflets, and radio announcements.

19

f. The Corps PSYOP section continues to assist the Thua Thien ProvinceArmed Propaganda Teams by obtaining servicable field equilment (uniforms, helmets,web gar, etc) from field and evacuation hospitals. This headquarters continuedto emphasize the importance of Armi p nd Teau, and the necessity of theirbeing adequately equipped in order to improve their effectiveness and capabilJties.

20

CONFIDENTIALSECTION 2. L.SSONS _OARNED: COMA DER,'S ObSERVATIONS .EVALUATIONS, ANDREgOMOENDATIONS

A. GOMND

None.

B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. (0) ITEM: PN Unit Identification

a. OBSERVATION: Reports indicate that political officers of VC units haveinstructed their personnel to identify themselves as NVA soldiers if captured byallied forces. Guerrilla leaders believe the NVA main force NW captured byallied forces receive better treatment.

b. EVALUATION: Several instances of deception have been reported involvingTrieu Phong District guerrillas.

c. REC0.MENDATION: Although identification of NVA units is of high priority,interrogators should maintain caution in accepting unit identification from PWs.

2. (0) ITEM: Hani-Hold Interpretation Reports.

a. OBSERVATION: Hand-held aerial photography taken from light observationaircraft has greatly improved the reaction time for engagement of transient targetsInformation from hand-held photographs is available within 4-6 hours after comr le-tion of the mission as opposed to 48 hours for normal rec(Mmissance missions.However, hand-held photography can overtax available reproduction facilities andcreate a problem of disseminating intelligence from the photographs. To over-ccme the undesirable aspect of hand-held aerial photography, XXIV Corps re-q•dred subordinate organizations to prepare hand-held aerial photo interpretationreports, which are disseminated to all XXIV Corps major commands. The reportscontain necessary identifying data to include location of the negatives.

b. EVALUATION: Hand-held interpretation reports allow intelligence ac-quired by hand-held aerial photography to be made available to XXIV Corps majorcommands and expedites reproduction and dissemination of requested photographs.The report ulso curtails indiscriminate use of hand-held cameras, which reducesp.•oto production requirements.

c. RECOMMeNATION: That units extensively using hand-held aerial photog-raphy adopt the interpretation reports.

3. (C) ITEM: Allocation of 0.1 Aircraft for Visual Reconnaissance.

a. OBSERVATION: Under the system of 0-1 aircraft allocation in use priorto August 1968, a specific number of aircraft hours were allocated to supportNICTZ units based upon steted requirements in accordance with established pri-orities. A study showed full, productive use of aircraft was not being made.Upon completion of a mission, aircraft capable of conducting additional missionswould frequently engage in nonessential activities or return to base. A newsystem has been inaugurated wherein aircraft are held in general support, andsupported units submit requirements to the Visual Aerial Reconnaissance andSurveillance Area Coordination Center (VARSACC) on a daily basis. Under thissystem a single sortie often completes several missions, frequently in support

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALof more than one unit. Also, aircraft are allocated during the day to meetadditional requirements caused by changing situations. Procedures are establishedfor inflight diversions to cover higher priority missions that develop,

b. EVALMITION: The aircraft allocation system, instituted five months ago,has improved aerial reconnaissance support to NICTZ tactical units and has per-mitted regular surveillance over areas not covered under the old system.

c. :xLCOI',MNDATION: That other corps-sized units in RVN consider using thissystem to provide more effective use of aircraft resources.

C. P•AN.,_ PERATIONS AND TRAINING

(U) ITEM: Publishing and Distributing MTOE's and General Orders

a. OBS&E\TAIION: Delays between publishing general orders, reorganizingunits under an M1 OZ, and receipt of the MTOE, result in the units concerned beingunaware of equipment or personnel authorized.

b. EVALUATION: The four and one-half months' delay between reorganizationof HHC, XXIV Corps (15 Aug 68) and receipt of the MMOE (4 Jan 69) preventednormal personnel requisitioning procedures and actions to dispose of excessequipment or to requisition authorized equipment.

c. REC0,1-ENDATION: That MTCE's, and general orders implementing MTOE'sbe published and distributed to reach the unit concerned at approximately thesame time.

D. LOGI6TICS

(U) ITEM: Maintenance of Supplies and Equisment.

a. OBSERVATION: Quarterly Material Readiness Reports, DA Form 2406, in-dicate a large number of major end items of equipment have been deadlined formaintenance or repair parts in excess of 30 days. In some instances, the e-quipment has been deadlined in excess of 90 days.

b. EVALUATION: Unit commanders are hesitant to turn in equipment due tothe shortage of some major end items. They prefer to exercise their prerog-ative under USARV Reg 75cX.1 and wait for the equipment to be repaired. Thisheadquarters has dispatched a message to all subordinate units requesting thatcommanders review all equipment deadlined in excess of 30 days to insure thatall nacassary m as.-rrz hap: been taken to return the equipment to a serviceaiblecondition, or, alternti.vely, turned in. Retention, rather~than turn in, ofequipment down for excessive maintenance or parts causes no demand to be placedon the supply syszem for additional end items.

c. RIOC,;MLNDAT$9N: Recommend the provisions of USARV Reg 750-1, dated 28Jun 68, with change 1, dated 24 Dec 68, be reviewed to determine if the presentlatitude allowed the unit commander with regards to turn in of equipment hin-ders the USARV and MCV operationally ready standards.

22

CONFIDENTIAL

E. P&SONNEL. ADMINISTRATION. MORAIE DISCIPLINE AND MDICAL

(U) MJz: Establishment of an Area Communiations renter/Courier Transfer Station

a. OBSEýVAJTI.N: The 'local communications center performs the functions of acorps communications'center and an arse communications center. All traffic isprocessed through the XXIV Corps AG oecrion and creates an excessive workloadsince the section is not staffed to perform both functions.

b. LVALUATION: Upon establishment of XXIV Corps, the AG Section was staffedto provide mess ge center mail and distribution service for the Corps Staff. Dueto the lack of a separate area communication center courier transfer station, andthe increasing number of units moving into the Phu Bai area, this service had tobe expanded. The XXIV Corps AG Section presently provides message center serviceto units in the Phu Bai area and acts as a courier transfer station for NICTZunits without additional staffing.

c. RECOMIENDATION: Upon establishment of a corps headquarters such as XXIVCorps, a separate communications center providing communications support onlyfor the headquarters should be established. The area communications center/courier transfer station would perform its normal mission of servicing all unitsin the area. This would provide a more efficient system for these services toarea units and would relieve a corps headquarters staff section from a workloadwhich is excessive for the number of personnel authorized.

F. INSPECTCR GEN&RAL

None.

G. IFO±LUiTION

None.

H. COIRAND HISTGY

None.

I. AVIATION

None.

J. SIGNAL

1. (U) IEM_ : Reg•ireMnt for Qualified Cable Personnel in Signal Units.

a. OBSERVATiOM: Increased emphasis on use of distribution cables withinbase camps and combat support bases has shown a serious lack of qualified per-sonnel in area signal units for cable installatimn, splicing and maintenance.

b. EVALUATION: Current TCE's provide personnel trained in tactical spiral-four and 26-pair cable. The distribution cables presently employed range from50-pair to 600-pair, requiring permanent construction and advanced splicing andinstallation techniques. CONARC does not provide instruction in complex splicing

23

and maintenance techniques. The 1ot Signal Brigade, through the US Army South-east Asia Signal Training Facility, provides this required instruction. How-ever, a field school of this nature cannot completely meet all of the require-ments iW V.

c. RECOM14ENDATION: That CONARO initiate an MOS producing course ad-vanced cable splicing for signal maintenance personnel, and that current TOE'sofAppropriate signal units be modified to include personnel in this MOS.

2. (U) ITEM: Requirement for Low LeIJe Ueure Voice System.

a. OBSERVATION: Limited secure voice capability from battalion to brigadeand from brigade to division seriously hampers the ability of commands to passclassified "real-time" information.

b. EVALUATION: At present, secure FM radio is the only means availablefor rapid secure communications. The limitations of range, terrain and avail-ability of secure stations prove that secure FM radio is not the complete an-swer to this problem. Use of low level operations and numerical codes overunsecure circuits is also insufficient due to slow and tedious preperation andtransmission as well as the possibilities of inaccuraicies that could be ex-tremely costly in the combat environment.

c. R-COM4ENDATION: That a tactical secure voice system'be developed whichwould operate on both conventional wire circuits and tactical multi-channel radiocircuits. Such a narrow band secure voice system would enable commands atdivision level and lower to pass classified information promptly and accurately.

K. ENGINEER

None.

L. 05 ACTIVITIES

(U) ITEM: Use of Propa~da Shells.

a. OBSERVATION: During the report period the 3d Marine Division initiateduse of 105mnm propaganda shells. During the test phase, it was found that manyrounds were erratic and ejected leaflets immediately after leaving the howitzertube.

b. EVALUATION: Further testing revealed that the controlling factor Vs thesize of the roll of leaflets placed within the body of the shell. If looselypacked, the leaflets would shift, causing the leaflet roll to shift suddenly tothe rear, forcing out the backplate and premature ejection of the leaflets.

a. RECOMIENDATION: That all personnel responsible for handpacking 105mmpropaganda shells be advised of the necessity for packing the shells in amanner which will not allow the leaflets to shift. This can be done by merelystuffing a few loose leaflets into the shell cavity around the roll of leaflets.

24

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-rBT (4 Mar 69) ist IndSUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period

EiNiing 31! January 19697, R^WS klORu) R) ku)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375ý_ I MAR 1i969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-LessonsLearned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters,XXIV Corps.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning Hand-Held Interpretation Reports,page 21, paragraph B2. Concur with XXIV Corps requirement that subor-dinate units produce photo interpretation reports on hand-held photo-graphy. This procedure appears to work ,ell for XXIV Corps but imple-mentation of this requirement by other headquarters is not recommendedwithout further study of its operational impact. No action by USARPACor DA is recommended.

b. (U) Reference item concerning Publishing and Distributing MTCE'sand General Ctders, page 22, paragraph C; concur. The delay between pub-lication of General Orders and the publication of the implementing YITOEprecludes the requisition of equipment necessary to realign the affectedunit's structure as directed. The delay in MTOE publication has occa-sionally exceeded six months. Action by DA to reduce this delay is re-commended.

c. (U) Reference item concerning Maintenance of Supplies and Equip-ment, page 22, paragraph D; nonconcur. USARV Regulation 750-1 W/Cl doesnot give any commander the prerogative of waiting for the equipment to berepaired. The time limit of 30 days (or the in-country order and ship

time if greater than 30 days) may be doubled by agreement of the supportea

unit commander and the battalion commander of the supporting maintenanceunit. Exceptions to this policy cannot be approved at any level lowerthan support command level. The unit is being so informed by separatecorrespondence.

d. (U) Reference item concerning Establishment of an Area Communi-cations Center/Courier Transfer Station, page 23, paragraph E. Concur

in the recommendation that separate corps and area communications centers

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (4 Mar 69) lst IndSBET ..... . tic.... RGpoI-.• Of Headquarters,, )91-V Gorps for Period

Ending 31 January 1969, RGS CSFOR-65 (Rl) (U)

be established upon activation of a corps headquarters. In the specialcase of the XXIV Corps Headquarters, no corps signal battalion was oris available to supply this support. Under the current situation, theexisting arrangement is economical and has been agreed upon by the XXIVCorps Signal Officer.

e. (T) Reference item concerning Requirement for Qualified CablePersonnel in Signal Units, page 23, paragraph Jl. Concur in recommen-dation that USCONARC initiate an HOS producing course for cable spli-cing. Army personnel are presently trained at Shepard Air Force Base.Current TOE's of appropriate signal units include 11OS 36E personnel.The 17th Heavy Signal Construction Platoon and elements of the 40thSignal Battalion in the XXIV Corps area provide this type of support.

FOR THE COMANDER:

C. D. WILSON1LT, AGCAssistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:XXIV Corps

GPOP-DT (4 Mar 69) 2d Ind (U)SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, XXIV Corps for Period Ending

31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HQUS Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 22 APQ i969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of theArmy, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwearding indorse-ment and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

27

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY5 RSTER OF KEY PERSONNEL

a"&QuARiR Xxiv COtFPs

D NAME GRADS AUTH/ACTUAL

COMMANDING GENERAL RICHARD G. STIIUELL LTG LTG

DEPUTY COM4AMDING GENERAL CLIFFCRD B. DRAKE (USNC) MG m

CHIEF OF STAFF ALEXANDER R. BOLLING, JR. BG BG

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF HARRY L. GIVENS, JR. (USMC) COL COL

SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF EDWARD G. GUNNING 3AJ MAJ

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G1 JOHN W. ARMSTRONG COL COI4

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G2 OLIVER PATTON COL COL

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G3 JOHN L. OSTEEN, JR. COL COL

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF, G4 RICHARD J. GLIKES COL COL

ASST CHIEF OF STAFFo G5 IEROY C. LAND COL COL

STAFF ENGINEER CARROLL N. TRTELLIER COL COL

SIGNAL OFFICER ARIEY C. RICHTER COL COL

PROVOST MARSHALL OSCAR J. WEIBLE COL COL

ihDJUTANT GENERAL WEBSTER PARKER COL LTC

CHAPlAIN CIAYTON E. DAY COL COL

INSPECTOR GENERAL JOHN A.. BRENNEI. COL LTC

SURGEON ROBERT H. MOSEBAR COL LTC

INFORMATION OFFICER WILLIAM A. MCGINNIS LTC LTC

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE JACK M. MARDEN LTC ITC

HEADQUARTERS CONHANDANT JOSEPH B. SESTITO LTC LTC

AVIATION OFFICER ROBZRT L. JONES LTC LTC

Incl 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION (AM)

COMMANDING GENERAL MELVIN ZAIS MG 2G

ASST DIVISION COMMANDER ALLEN M. BURDETT BG BG

ASST DIVISION COMMANDER HENRY J. MULLER, JR. BG BG

CHIEF OF STAFF lAWRENCE L. MOWERY COL COL

DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDER LLOYD J. PICOU COL COL

COMMANDING OFFICER, 1ST BDE RICHARD A. BRESNAHAN COL COL

COMMANDING OFFIC-.R, 4ND BDE JOHN A. HOEFLING COL COL

C0401j'NDING OFFICER, 3RD BDE JOSEPH CONMY COL COL

COMMANDING OFFICER, SPT OMD MYRON H. MURLEY COL COL

3RD MARINE DIVISION

f'OMAND%InG T1TL,• , I-I.% R.LG. DAVIS MG MG

ASST DIVISION COIVANDER F, E. GARRETSON BG BG

ASbT DIVISION COMt ANDER R. B. CARNEY BG BG

CHIEF CF STAFF M. J. SEXTON COL COL

C01MANDING OFFICER, 3D MAR REGT P. D. IA FOND COL 00L

COMMANDING OFFICER, 4TH MAR REGT W. F. GOGGIN COL QOL

COMMANDING OFFICER, 9TH MAR REGT R. H. BARROW COL COL

COMMANDING OFFICER, 12TH MAR REGT P. J. MUIRONEY COL COL

XXIV CURPS ARTILLERY

COMMANDING GENERAL ALAN G. PIXTON BG BG

DEPUTY COMMANDER FRANK W. BURPO COL COL

EXECUTIVE OFFICER WILLIAM A. MACLEOD COL COL

FA

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OfFICIAL USE ONLYS........m i- -,-- uviy lurJ (MEH)

COMMANDING OFFICER JAMES M. GIBSON BG COLDEPUTY COMMANDER WILLIAM I. GORDON COL COL

108TH ARTILLERY GROUPCOMMANDING OFFICER ROBERT V. LEE, JR. COL COLEXECUTIVE OFFICER SYLVANUS J. WILLIAMS III LTC IAJ

TF CLEARWATERCOMMANDING OFFICER S. A. SWARTZTRAUBER CPT CDRCHIEF OF STAFF F. X. COLLITON (USMC) LTC LTC

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL.. OOP LIST AS CF 31 JANUARY 1969

HHC, XXIU Corps.

MI Dot (Prov)

PI Det (Frov)

Provisional Trans Co. (Car)

33d Chemical Det

2- Plat, Co A, 504th MP Bn

31st Mil Hist Det

Provisional Corps Avn Co (OPCCH, XXIV Corps)

220th Recon Acft Co (OPCON, XXIV Corps)

3d Sqdn, 5th Armd Cay (Attached from 9th Div)

Co C, 2d Bn, 34th Armor (Attached frcm 25th Div)

XXIV CorDs Artillery

HHB, XXIV Corps Arty

1st Bn, 83d Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

2d Bn, 138th Arty (155mm) (SP)

108th Arty Gv

HHB, 108th Arty Gp

8th Bn, 4th Arty (175mm - 88) (SP)"(Btry B, OPCW lst Mar Div)

6th Bn, 33d Arty (10,%m) (T)

ist Bn, 40th Arty (i05m) (SP)

1st Bn, 44th Arty (Twin 40's)

Btry G, 65th Arty (.50 cal MG)

Btry G, 29th Arty (Searchlight)

Incl 2

3CCONFIDENTIAL

- -.. .. . . ... . . .. • • -SZ < - - -v•m •. • .. -. • -,-2t t- k. r r'ts, ,t •-r•r--,r• y srrr-r.__ s -• - _.E

CONFIDENTIAL2d Bn, 94th Arty (175mm - 8") (SP)

Btry F, 26th Arty (Tgt Acq)

235th FA Radar Dot (AN/pQ..4A Radar)

238th FA Radar Dot (AN/AMP.~4A Radar)

239th FA Radar Dot (AN/MpQ.4A Radar)

240th FA Radar Det (AN/pQ_.4& Radar)

245th FA Radar Dot (AN/M4Q_4A Radar)

250th FA Radar Det (AN/MPQ.4A Radar)

Ist 8" How Btry (FF Pacific-OPCON XXIV Corps Arty)5th 155 Gun Battery (155mm gun - 8" How) (F* Pacific-OPCON XXIV Corps Arty)

101st Airborne Division (AM)

HHC, 101st Abn Div

1st Brilzade

HHC, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div

ist Bn, 327th Inf

2d Bn, 327th Inf

2d Bn, 502th Inf

HHCC, 2d Bde, 101st Abn Div

1st Bn, 501st Inf

2d Bn, 501st Inf

Ist Bn, 502d Inf

3d Brig~ade

HHC, 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div

3d Bn, 187th In&

Ist Bn, 506th Inf

32

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL2d Bn, 506th Inf

Division Artillery

HHB, 101st Abn Div Arty

2d Bn, 319th Arty (105mm) (T)

2d Bn, 320th Arty (105mm) (T)

Ist Bn, 321st irty! 105mm) -4,)

2d Bn, 11th Arty (-) (155mm) (T)

Btry A (OPCON II FFORCEV)

F Btry, 16th Arty (155mm) (T)

4th Bn, 77th Arty (ARA) (_)

160th AvnGG

liMO, 6thAvn i'p

101st Avn Bn, (Asit Hel)

499th, 510th, 516th, 527th Trans Det

159th Avn Bn (-) (Aslt Spt Hel)

625th, 649th Trans Dot

163d Avn Co (Gs)

10th Trans Dot

478th Avn Co (-) (Atch from let Cay Div)Djivginn Troonj

3d Bn', 506th Inf (OPCON Ii FFCRCEV)

2d Sqdn, 17th Cay (-)

Co F, 58th Inf (lRp)

Trp D, 10t Sqdn, 1st Cay (Atch from Americal Div)

326th Engr Bn

501st Sig Bn

101st MP Co

265th R•C33

CONFIDENTIAL

COWFIDENTIAL42th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

47th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

58th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)

557th Inf Plat (Combat Trackers)

Det 16, 1st ANGLICO (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)

10th Cml Plat

20th Cml Det

Det 5, 7th PSYOP Bn (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)

7th AA Plt, 29th CA Co (OPCON, 101st Abn Div)

22d 1iil Hist Det

25th PI Det

34th PI DET

45th PI Det

101st MI Det (Prov)

181st MI Det

TACO #19 (0PCON, 101st Abn Div)

Divislon SuDport Cguuand

HHC & Band

5th Trans Bn

326th Med Bn

426th S&S Bn

801st Maint Bn

3d Marine Division

HQ Bn. 3d Marine Div

Hq Co (-)

Serv Co W-)

HP Co W-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALDet, Co= Co

, r,, " 1ouce T.&rUUALTLon Team

15th Counterintelligence .T*4m

7th Counterintelligence Team

1st PAPlt, 29th CA Co (DS) (0PCON, 3d Mar Div)

2d Det, 7th PSYOP Bn (DS) (OPCON, 3d Mar Div)

3d Marines

HQ Co, 3rd Marine Rogt (OPCON to 1st Mar Div . 9 Dec 68)

ist Bn 3d Mar (OPCON to Ist Mar -iv - 14 Dec 68)

2d Bn, 3d Mar

3d Bn, 3d Mar (OPCON to 1st Mar Div - 14 Dec 68)

ist AMTRAC Bn (FMF Pacific)

TF Hotel

HQ TF Hotel

4th Marines

IIQ Co, 4th Marine Regt

1st Bn, 4th Mar

2d Bn, 4 th, Mar3d Bn, 4 ths Mar

9th Marines

HQ Co, 9th Marine Regt

1st Bn, 9th Mar

2d Bn, 9th Mar

3d Bn, 9th Mar

12th •'arines

H.4 Btry, 12th Marine Regt

1st SIt Btry, (FMF Pacific)

Ist Bn, 12th Mar (105mm) (T)

CONFIDENTIAL

2 CONFIDENTIAIL.L2d Bn, 12th Mar (105mm) (T)

?,d Bn, '12th Mar (105mm) (T)

,Ath Bn, 12th Mar (155am) (T)

1st Armd Amph (105mm LVTH)

3d Tank Bl4

3d Recon Bn

3d Shore Party Bn

9th Motor Transvort Bn

3d Motor Transport Bn

3d Mead Bn

3d Dental Co (FWF Pacific)

3,d Enar Ba

11th Enmr Bn (FmF Pacific)

Force Recon Co (FMF Pacific)

Ist Brigade. 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) (OPCON, 3d Mar Div)

HHC,lst Bde, 5th Inf Div

Ist Bn, 11th Inf

1st Bn, 61st Inf (Mech)

Ist Bn, 77th Armor (Tank)

5th Bn, 4th Arty (155mm) (SP)

Trp A, 4th Sqdn, 12th Cay

Co A, 7th Engr Bn

75th CS Spt Bn

HHC, CS Spt Bn

Co A (Admin)

Co B (Mled)

Co C (S&T)

36

CONFIDENTIALCo D (Mint)

48th P? Dot

86th Cml Dot

298th Sig Co

517th )"1Det

407th RR Dot

Task Force Cloariater

River Div 543

River Div 521

Coastal Div 17

-37

CONFIDENTIAL

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & 0I. ORIINgATIGj ACIV1 a..ffo da f 09pOOIT 99CURmTV G6,A6011ICA fI0f.HQ, OACSFORl DAt Washington, D, C, 20310 -CONFIDMNIAL

8b, GRtOUP 4

Operational'Report -Lessons Learned, Hq, XXIV Corps, Period Ending 31. January1969 (U)

4. 0654nal offts N@ug (1p. 1 vp*agd ine~.g counerie..jeyoorto 1 Nov 68 - 31. Jan 69

11. Au yHORM (Fist anan, Iael *M11 Isar MOW)

CG, XXIV Corps

A. MEPORy 0*15 78. TOTAL. NO, OF PAGESN.ofmr

LL M~tr AQ fib IO c110. C ON T AC T ON *RNAW? No. n0. ORIG'INATori'S NI'P0FT NUMflL#IIUI

PmejeT No.691.303

C.~ N/A sh. CoTmn7P 9mponT NO($) (Any othermautsm,,.r diet may too assignedthis report)

14 d.10). VISYEIOUTION S1ATgmErm

I I. SUPPLEPACNTARY NOTES Il. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

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