UN STATEBUILDING AT A TURNING POINT Touko Piiparinen FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 144 • November 2013 ULKOPOLIITTINEN INSTITUUTTI UTRIKESPOLITISKA INSTITUTET THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 144 WHAT’S NEW ABOUT THE INTERVENTION BRIGADE AND PEACEKEEPING DRONES?
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UN statebUildiNg at a tUrNiNg poiNt
touko piiparinen Fiia brieFiNg paper 144 • November 2013
U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I
U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T
THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S
• The Intervention Brigade andUAVs have been hailed as a turning point inUN peacekeeping.However,theyshouldnotbeperceivedascompletelyneworstandaloneinstrumentsofUNconflictmanagement.Theycouldinsteadbebestunderstoodasacontinuumandextensionofthelong-heldstatebuildingdoctrineappliedbytheUN.ThesenewinstrumentsenabletheUNtoperformoneofitskeyfunctionsofstatebuildingandprotectionofcivilians,namelycontrollingandpolicingthewholeterritoryofastatewhereaninterventionhasbeenundertakenmoreeffectivelythanbefore.
• The Intervention Brigade andUAVs can potentially help theUN to resolve that mismatch byenhancingtheUN’s statebuildingandprotectioncapacities.However, theycannotresolvetheothermajordisadvantageofstatebuilding,namelycollateraldamageinflictedinstatebuildingwars,andmayevenaggravatethatproblem.
UN statebUildiNg at a tUrNiNg poiNt
Fiia briefing paper 144
November 2013
What’s NeW aboUt the iNterveNtioN brigade aNd peacekeepiNg droNes?
Global Security research programme
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I
U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T
THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S
touko piiparinen
Reseacrher
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs
the FiNNish iNstitUte oF iNterNatioNal aFFairs 3
TheUNpeaceoperationintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,MONUC(Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo),wasestablishedin1999bySecurityCouncilResolution1258asanobserverandmonitoringmis-siontoassistintheimplementationandmonitor-ingoftheLusakaCeasefireAgreement,whichhadtemporarilybroughtanendtotheSecondCongoWar.ThisfirstphaseofMONUCentailedfunctionsoftraditionalUNpeacekeepingsuchastheobservationandmonitoringofceasefires.
Inthesecondphase,MONUC’smandate,providedinSecurityCouncilResolution1856(2008),wassig-nificantlyexpandedtoenableittoundertakemuchmoredemandingandambitiousstatebuildingtasks,includingtheprotectionofcivilians,thepromotionof the ruleof law,and theextensionof the stateauthorityofthecentralgovernment–byforce,ifnecessary.TheSecurityCouncilauthorisedMONUCtoperformcomprehensivereformsandreconstruc-tionoftheDRC,expandingitssizeto19,815militarypersonnel.ThestabilisationofthesecuritysituationintheDRC,particularlyinitsEasternpart,becametheprimaryaimofthemission.
InJune2010theSecurityCouncildecidedtoestab-lish the UN Organization Stabilization Mission(MONUSCO,Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en RD Congo) tocon-tinueMONUC’swork.ThenewmandateprovidedinSecurityCouncilResolution1925(2010)putsfurtheremphasisontheprotectionofcivilians,authorises
MONUSCOprovidesatypicalexampleofthestate-buildingdoctrinewhichhasevolvedinUNpeace-keepingsincethe1980s.Statebuildingisprimarilyaimedatfacilitatingthehostgovernmenttoextendits state authority and judicial control over sub-stateactors,includingmilitiagroups,tocoverthewholeterritoryofthetargetstatebyallnecessarymeans,includingtheuseofforce.
Extendingtheadministrativecontrolofastate isexpectedtoimprovecomprehensivehumansecuritybyenabling thewholepopulation toaccessbasicsecurity,healthcareandpublicservicesprovidedbythegovernment,evenintheremotestareas.Inthisway, statebuilding operations aim to ensuremoresustainableandlong-termhumansecurityforcivilians.Themeansappliedtoachievethatobjec-tive includecomprehensiveandmulti-functionalreconstructionandpeace-buildingofweak,fragileandfailedstates,includingsecurityandjusticesec-torreform,theextensionoftheirstateauthority,andthestrengtheningoftheirruleoflaw.1
The purpose of this briefing paper is to examinewhether the adoption of two new instrumentsbyMONUSCO during recentmonths, namely theInterventionBrigade andUAVs (unmanned aerialvehicles),signifiesadeparturefromtheUN’sstate-buildingdoctrinetowardsanewtypeofUNpeaceoperation, or merely constitutes a statebuildingcontinuum.
UN engagement in the DRC:
Two contradictions of statebuilding
MONUSCO provides a classic example of theUNstatebuilding doctrine and its sheer ambitious-ness.TheUNCapstoneDoctrinepublishedin2008,whichconstitutestherulebookforcontemporaryUNpeacekeeping,outlines themainobjectivesofstatebuilding.TheCapstoneDoctrinearguesthatthedeploymentofUNtroopsandcivilianpolicemustbeaccompaniedbyinternationaleffortstorestorethestate’smonopolyoverthelegitimateuseofforce,tore-establishtheruleoflaw,tostrengthenrespectforhumanrights,tofostertheemergenceoflegiti-mateandeffectiveinstitutionsofgovernance,andtopromotesocio-economicrecovery.
However,MONUSCOalsoprovidesaclassicexam-ple of the ubiquitous potential of statebuildingoperationstospilloverintostatebuildingwars,inwhichtheUNsupportsandfacilitatesthenationalarmytooccupyterritoriesfrominsurgencygroupsinorder to (re-)establishtheostensiblyresponsi-ble stateauthority in thoseareas– in thecaseofMONUSCO,particularly intheEasternpartof thecountry. Jointmilitary operations conducted byMONUC/MONUSCOandthenationalarmy,FARDC(Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo), againstdiversemilitia groupshaveocca-sionallyprovedcounterproductiveintermsoftheoverall improvementofhumanitarianconditionsonthegroundbecauseofthelackofhumanrightstraininganddisciplineofFARDCsoldiers,andcol-lateral civilian casualties resulting from the jointoperations.
OperationKimiaII,thejointoperationbetweentheCongolesegovernmentandMONUCagainsttheFDLR(Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda)rebelgroup,launchedinMarch2009,causedpar-ticular controversy on moral and humanitariangrounds.AstheUNinvestigationconcludes,“Ina
bleakcalculationbythecoalition,foreveryrebelcombatant disarmed during the operation, onecivilianhasbeenkilled,sevenwomenandgirlshavebeenraped,sixhousesburnedanddestroyed,and900peoplehavebeenforcedtofleetheirhomes”.2
Thesecondself-contradictionofMONUSCOrelatestothemismatchbetweenitsambitiousstatebuildingfunctions,ontheonehand,andthelackofmaterialcapacitiestoperformthosefunctions,ontheother.InspiteofthelargenumberofdeployedUNpeace-keepers, MONUC/MONUSCO has been unable tofulfilitsinitialobjectivetotransformtheDRC.Thatispartlybecauseofthelackofanadequatelogisticalbaseandaerialsupportcapacitytoconductopera-tionseffectivelythroughouttheterritoryoftheDRC–thesizeofallWesternEurope.Themissiontendstoresort toshort-sighted ‘peacekeepingthroughremote-controlling’tactics,occupyingandpolicingareasforalimitedtimeandprotectingciviliansinthoseareas,andremovingtroopstonewhotspotswheretheyareneededmoreurgently.
AlthoughSecurityCouncilResolution1856(2008)providesMONUC/MONUSCOwiththehighestprior-itisationfortheprotectionofciviliansofanyCouncilmandategrantedtoUNpeaceoperationstodate,itsactual impactsonbringingabouthumansecurityinitsareaofresponsibility(AOR)remainwantingtodate.In2011,forexample,thelackofhelicoptercapacity inMONUSCOwas considered so criticalthattheoperation“isnolongerabletoimplement
2 VictoriaHoltandGlynTaylor,Protecting Civilians in the
Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Set-
On theonehand, the remote-controlling tacticsapplied byMONUSCO provide it with flexibility,mobilityandagility,allowingtherapiddeploymentoftroopstoareasofpriorityintermsoftheprotec-tionofcivilians.Whenthelevelofthreattohumansecurityinthoseareassubsidesordecreases,theUNtroopsarerelocatedtonewareaswherethethreatisassumedtobehigher.Ontheotherhand,aUNreportrevealsfatalflawsinthatmodeofaction.AttheheadquarterslevelofMONUC,oneseniormili-taryofficernoted:“Youcandominateasmallareaforamonthorsixmonthsandchangenothingintheoverallpicture”.4Thereportsummarises:“[I]ntheabsenceofastrategytoconsolidatethemedium-tolong-termsecurityinthefirstareaofdeployment,thethreatoftenintensifiesaftertheyarerelocated.Oneformermilitaryofficerdescribedthisas‘agameofcatandmouse’.”5
Themetaphorofacat(theUNoperatingalongsidethe central government) chasingmice on a vastandruggedsweepoflawn(approximately30illegalarmedgroupsoperating in theEasternDRC)per-fectlycapturesthedynamicsoftheUNstatebuildingwarintheDRC.Inthecaseinpointhere,the‘cat’isequippedwithattackhelicoptersandSpecialForces,buteventhosespecialisedassetsandformedunitshave at least thus far failed to sustainMONUC’s/MONUSCO’scontroloverthewholeterritoryoftheDRC,andtopoliceit.
This example demonstrates how the objective of‘policingthespace’inUNstatebuildingoperationsisnever fully realisedbecauseof, interalia, theirchronic lack ofmaterial resources.This, in turn,generates disillusionment with the objectives offull-fledged state-building initially set for thesemissions,aproblemwhichappearsstrikinglysimilartothepredicamentofISAF(InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce)inAfghanistan.Thenextsections
willexaminewhether theUN’snew instruments,namelythe InterventionBrigadeandUAVs,couldsolve these inherentproblemsof statebuilding intheDRC.
The added value of the
Intervention Brigade for UN peacekeeping
InMarch2013theUNSecurityCouncilauthorisedthedeploymentoftheso-called‘InterventionBri-gade’toneutraliseanddisarmmilitiagroupsoper-atingintheEasternDRC,particularlyinNorthernKivu.The Council’s decision has been perceivedasareactiontothefailureofMONUSCOtopreventthecityofGomafromfallingunderthecontrolofanotoriousrebelgroup,Mouvement du 23 mars (M23),inNovember2012.
TheInterventionBrigade,composedofmorethan3,000 troops, is expected to protect the civilianpopulationmoreeffectivelyintheEasternpartofthe DRC, where approximately 30 illegal armedgroups–withatleastfourofthemhavingtiestoneighbouringgovernments–continuetofightoverterritoryandexploitnaturalresources,committingatrocitycrimesagainstcivilians.SecurityCouncilResolution2098establishingtheInterventionBri-gadeisthefirsttimetheCouncilhaseverusedtheterm‘neutralise’6initsmandategiventoaUNpeaceoperation.
The InterventionBrigade iswidelydescribedasasignificantinnovationinUNpeacekeepinginthatit signifies greater willingness and readiness onthepartoftheUNtoapplytheuseofforcefortheprotectionofcivilians.Itisviewedasanindicationorhallmarkofthecurrentparadigmshift,orinter-ventionistturn,ofUNpeacekeepingawayfromtheconservativevisionpromotedbyIndia(alongwithsomeothermembersoftheNon-AlignedMovementat theUN) towards an interventionist approachpursuedbymembersoftheAfricanUnion(AU)andWestern governments.The former vision empha-sisestheprinciplesofneutralityandimpartialityofpeacekeepers,theconsentoftargetstates,respectfortheirsovereignty,andstrictlimitsontheuseof
African governments, notably South Africa andTanzania,playedapivotalroleinlobbyingfortheauthorisationanddeploymentoftheInterventionBrigade in the DRC, while India unsuccessfullycampaignedagainstit.InadditiontotheInterven-tionBrigade,anothermanifestationofthecurrentinterventionistturnofUNpeacekeepinghasbeentheUN peacekeeping operation in Côte d’Ivoire(UNOCI, Opération des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire).InApril2011UNOCIresortedtotheuseofforcetodestroythemilitaryinstallationsandheavyweaponsoftheformerPresidentLaurentGbagbo’sregime.
SecurityCouncilResolution2098emphasises thesui generisnatureoftheInterventionBrigadeandthusattemptstoplaydownitspotentialapplicationasaprecedentinfutureUNpeacekeeping.Ontheonehand,theInterventionBrigadehasaclearandinnovativeconceptualframeworkandmodality:itenvisages a rapid reaction forcedesigned to con-duct‘targetedoffensiveoperations’againstmilitiagroupsinaflexibleandswiftmanner,whichcouldpotentiallybereplicatedinfutureUNpeacekeeping.Attheparadigmaticlevel,however,theInterventionBrigadedoesnotrepresentanythingsubstantiallynewinUNpeacekeepingfortworeasons.
Firstly, formore than a decade, theUN SecurityCouncilhasbeenaccustomedtoauthorisingpeaceoperationstouseforce,ifnecessary,toprotectcivil-iansunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,includingtheoperationsundertakeninHaiti,Sudan,Liberia,andCôted’Ivoire.Infact,theterm‘peaceenforce-ment’wasintroducedinAn Agenda for Peace(1992)publishedbythethenSecretary-GeneralBoutrosBoutros-Ghali,whichsignalledamoreactiveandresolutecollectivesecuritysystemfortheUNaftertheColdWar paralysis.The term ‘peace enforce-ment’was later transformed into the expression‘ChapterVIIoperations’inUN jargon,referringtothefactthattheUNSecurityCouncilhasthecom-petenceunderinternationallaw,namelyundertheUNCharter,toauthoriserobustenforcement-typeoperations.
UNpeacekeepinghas traditionallybeenbasedonincrementalismwithregardtotheuseofforce.Alloperations,regardlessofwhethertheyaredeployedunderChapterVIorVIIoftheUNCharter,areattheoutsetexpectedtoapplytheminimumuseofforceandrespecttheconsentofallparties,whicharealwayspreferredovercoercivemeasures,andtograduallyintensifytheuseofforceonlyifneces-sary.TheInterventionBrigadesignifiesadeparturefromthatincrementalistruleofthumbinthattheunusuallyrobustandassertivelanguageadoptedinitsmandateindicatesitsreadinesstoapplyrobustuse even at the outset ofthemission.However,itsactualcapacitytoconductcoerciveoperationswillultimately dependon itsmaterial capacities pro-videdbytroop-contributingcountries(TCCs)whichareneighbouringstatesoftheDRC.
Thenormativeandpoliticalfoundationuponwhichthe Intervention Brigade was established is thePeace,SecurityandCooperationFrameworkagree-ment for the Democratic Republic of the Congoandtheregion(‘thePSCFramework’),whichwassignedinAddisAbabaon24February2013bytheneighbouringgovernmentsoftheDRC.TheFrame-workconsolidatesandrenewsthecollectiveattemptby the international, sub-regional and regional
7 SeeforexamplePatrickCammaertandFionaBlyth,Issue
Brief: The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo,3July2013(NewYork:International
Thus, the Intervention Brigade constitutes onlyanadditionaltool–notthetool–ofMONUSCOtoextendthestateauthorityoftheDRCagainstmilitiagroups.Itispartoftheoverallpoliticaltrajectoryofstatebuildingmaintainedbytheinternational,sub-regionalandregionalcommunitiestocreatespaceforthecentralgovernmentoftheDRC inEasternareascontrolledbysub-statearmedgroups,ratherthanastandalonemilitarytrajectory.
UNofficialsthemselvesemphasisetherelatednessoftheInterventionBrigadetotherenewedpoliticalwillthatemergedinspring2013.AsoneinterviewedUNofficialpointedouttotheauthor,“It’squiteclearthatthisapproach–establishingtheInterventionBrigade–has a lot of political support,which isimportant.It’sthedefiningfeaturethatcharacter-isesthis[InterventionBrigade]frompreviousefforts[bytheUNintheDRC],becauseyounotonlyhavethemandate,butyouhavethepoliticalwilltoactonthismandate.MONUChadaprettyrobustmandateanyway,buttherewasaquestionmarkofwhetheritalwayshadthepoliticalwillandwhetherthetroop-contributingcountriesalwayshadthepoliticalwilltoactonthat.”8
Plainly rendered, the UN ‘harnessed’ the newpoliticalwillemergingfromTanzania,SouthAfrica,
8 AninterviewinNewYorkon25July2013.
9 Interview,NewYork.
ICGLR (International Conference on the GreatLakes Region), SADC (Southern AfricanDevelop-mentCommunity), theAU and others under theUN umbrella. Thus, the Goma incident was nottheimmediatetriggerfortheestablishmentoftheInterventionBrigade, but it functionedonly as acatalyst for thewidermulti-levelprocess involv-ingsub-regional,regionalandinternationalactorswhichwasalreadyinmotion.Throughthatmulti-levelprocesstheconceptoftheInterventionBrigadewasgraduallyshapedandcoined.
The added value of unmanned
aerial vehicles for UN peacekeeping
ThesecondassumedlynewinnovationappliedbytheUN in theDemocraticRepublicof theCongo,namelyunmannedaerialvehicles(UAV),shouldalsobeconsideredmoreasacontinuumandextensionofthealreadyongoingstatebuildingoperationunder-takenbyMONUSCO,ratherthanasagroundbreak-ingnewdevelopmentinUNpeacekeeping.
TheuseofUAVswasapprovedbytheUNSecurityCouncilinJanuary2013toundertakeadvancedcol-lation,analysisanddisseminationofinformationonmilitiaactivities,whichisexpectedtoimprovethesituationalawarenessandtimelydecision-makingofMONUSCO.UNofficialsopenlyadmitthatUAVsarean‘unchartedterritory’fortheUNOrganisationanda‘noveltool’10atitsdisposal.Interestingly,acontractbetweentheUNandanItaliancommercialcompanyregardingtheutilisationofUAVsintheDRCwassignedinsummer2013beforetheSecretariathad developed general procedures on the use ofUAVsandthedisseminationofinformation.11
Oneof theoutstandingquestions iswhetherandhow politically and strategically sensitive andpotentially critical information collated byUAVsregardinganarmedconflictcanbechannelledanddisseminatedtopartiesinsideandoutsidetheUNsystem.Thequestionappearspertinentinlightofthefactthatsomestatepartiesprivytothatinfor-mationmay alsobeparties to the conflictwhichtheinformationcollationbyUAVsconcerns.InthecaseoftheDRC,theproblemconcernsRwandain
10 Interview,NewYork.
11 Interview,NewYork.
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particular, which reportedly sponsors the M23whileholdingaseatasanon-permanentmemberoftheSecurityCouncil,whichisthemaindecision-makingbodyontheconflictintheDRC.
UAVshavetypicallybeenviewedwithsuspicionbysomeUNmemberstatesonaccountoftheirpoten-tial(mis)useforintelligencepurposesatthepresentstageandthefactthattheycouldbeweaponisedatalaterstage,althoughthelatterprospectremainsaremotepossibility.PerhapsthemainreasonforcautionamongmemberstatesregardingUAVssim-plyrelatestotheirnoveltyassuch:intheabsenceof prior lessons regarding their applicability andviabilityinactualpeaceoperations,memberstateshaveadopteda‘waitandsee’approach.
ThetacitapprovalofUAVsbycountrieslikeRussiaandPakistanwasthefirstvictoryfortheUNSec-retary-GeneralandforotherreformistUNofficialsanddiplomats,whohaveadvocatedtheuseofUAVsfora longer time,but thereare substantialopen-endedlegalandfinancialquestionsconcerningtheirusewhichneedtoberesolvedattheUNinthenearfuture.The real political wrangling betweenUNmemberstatesonthosequestions,particularlytheoneconcerningthedisseminationof information,hasnotyetbegunandwillultimatelydeterminethefateofUAVs.
Despite theirnoveltyat thetacticalandstrategiclevels, at the paradigmatic level the applicationofUAVs, like thedeployment of the InterventionBrigade, formspart of the already existing state-building operation undertaken byMONUSCO intheDRC,ratherthanaturningpointintheoverallpeacekeepingdoctrine.UAVswillpotentiallypro-vide critical support toMONUSCO in performingthekeystate-buildingfunction,namelycontrollingandpolicingthevastterritoryoftheDRC.Under-taking that function by means of deploying UN
peacekeepers– ‘painting thecountryblue’–hasproved to be practically andmaterially difficult,unviable or impossible in a vast country like theDRC.UAVscouldprovideapracticalsolutiontothisperennialproblemofstatebuilding.
UAVscouldenablea state-buildingoperation likeMONUSCO to undertake targeted, more preciseactionagainstmilitiasbyprovidingitwithaccurateinformationandasituationalanalysisofmovementsbymilitiagroups,andbyenablingtheprojectionofforceagainst thosegroupswithin itsvastAOR, iftheuseofUAVswasefficientlysynchronisedwiththerapidreactionforcesandreconnaissanceunitoftheoperation.Byenablingsuchrobust,flexibleandswiftoperations,UAVscould,metaphorically,enablethe‘cat’tofly.Furthermore,theycould,atleastinprinciple,renderlargeinfantrybattalionsorhelicopterunitspreviously applied for similarpurposesuselessand free themup toserveothertasks,althoughthisprospectalsoremainsaremotepossibilityatpresent.
Thusfar,theInterventionBrigadehasbeenabletofulfilitsmandate,asM23rebelshavebeenpushedtowardstheNorthandtheynolongerposeadirectandimmediatethreattoGomaanditspopulation.That situation,however,maynot last, and ithasbeen largely due to the fact that the capacity ofMONUSCOandtheInterventionBrigadetoholdtheirgroundhasnotyetbeenseriouslytestedbymilitiagroups.That,inturn,ispartlybecausetheM23hasbeenweakened internally and externally, as evi-dencedbythesurrenderofitsformerleader,BoscoNtaganda,–alsoknownas‘theTerminator’–totheInternationalCriminalCourton22March2013.
TheemergingnewtechnologiesofUNpeacekeeping,includingUAVsandthestrengthenedreconnaissanceunit of the Intervention Brigade, also offer newopportunitiesforTCCs.ThecontributionsofWest-ernTCCstoUNpeacekeeping,particularlythoseoftheNordic countries, have been remarkably low
the FiNNish iNstitUte oF iNterNatioNal aFFairs 9
sincethe1990scomparedtodevelopingcountries,whichalsoconsequentlybeartheheaviestpoliticalandhumanpriceofUNpeacekeepingintheformof fallenUN soldiersandotherriskstothesafetyandsecurityoftroopsinchallengingandcomplexsecurity environments like MONUSCO’s AOR inNorthKivu.
Thismismatchhascausedrecurrentpolitical ten-sions andgridlocksbetweenUNmembers of theglobal South and those of the global North, par-ticularlyattheC34,theUNSpecialCommitteeonPeacekeeping.Westerngovernmentshaveprovedunwilling to fulfil their part of political commit-mentsunder theResponsibility toProtect (RtoP)frameworkestablishedattheUNWorldSummitin2005,whichrequiresthemtoprovideinternationalassistanceandsupporttofailed,fragileandweakstatesliketheDRC.
Theprotracted civilwar in theDRC poses one ofthegreatestthreatstohumansecurityofallarmedconflicts,butithasthusfarfallenofftheradar,orbeyondthe‘humanitariangaze’,ofbroaderinter-nationalconcern.TheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossestimatesatotalof5.4millionwar-relateddeathsinthecountryfortheperiodfromAugust1998toApril2007,whichcomesclosetothenumberofpeoplelivinginFinland.
TheUNistheonlyinternationalorganisationwhichhas engaged in comprehensive conflict manage-mentandstabilisationeffortsinthecountry,butitsoperationalcapacityisseriouslyhamperedbythelackofpoliticalwillonthepartofmemberstatesto providematerial resources.The technologicalturnofUNpeacekeepinggivesWesternTCCsanewopportunitytobemoreactiveandengagedinUNpeacekeepingandtobeartheirpartoftheoverallburdenofconflictresolutionandRtoPintheDRCandofthecollectivesecuritysystemoftheUNatlarge,asitcreatesanewdemandforsophisticatedtechnologieswhichonlyWesternTCCscanoffer.Itisnoteworthy,however,thattheUNSecretariatdidrequestUAVcontributionsfromTCCsinthecaseoftheDRC,butdidnotreceiveany.Instead,thecon-tractwassignedwithacommercialcompany.12
12 Interview,NewYork.
To summarise the main findings of this briefingpaper,thenewinstrumentsadoptedintheDRC–theInterventionBrigadeandUAVs–canassisttheUNtoresolveoneperennialproblemofstatebuilding,namelythelackofresourcestocontrolavastAOR.However,theirusemaysimultaneouslyaggravateanotherkeyproblemofstatebuilding,namelythesideeffectsofstatebuildingwars.
Accordingtooneassessment,theuseoftheInter-vention Brigade may instigate militia groups tostepup retaliatory attacks against soft targets ofMONUSCO,includingunarmedcivilianprofession-alsworkingforMONUSCO.Thusfar,however,thedeploymentoftheInterventionBrigadehasman-agedtocreateasecureenvironmentaroundGoma,inwhichNGOsandhumanitarianagenciescannowoperatefreely,unimpededbymilitiaattacks.TheInterventionBrigadealsocontributedtotherecentmilitarydefeatsoftheM23,whichannouncedon5November2013thatitwoulddisarmanddemobilise.
Ultimately, thegreatestaddedvalueof the Inter-ventionBrigadeandUAVsdoesnotrelate to theirmilitarycapacity,buttothefactthattheyembodythe new political determination and concerted efforts among regional actors, includingAfricangovernmentsandorganisations,totacklethecivilwarintheDRC.Inmanysimilarcasesofstatebuild-ingwars, includingthecaseofAfghanistan,suchregionalpoliticalsupportvitalforstatebuildingislacking.
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