Ultra-leftists and sectarians : Notes for a history of left-wing extremism “In a September day, a few months after the prison of his comrades Sacco and e Vanzetti, an Italian anarchist called Mario Buda, parked his horse-driven cart, near the Wall Street corner, in front of J.P Morgan company(...) A few blocks ahead a frightened postman found some leaflets that warned : ‘Free the political prisoners or you will die all!’, signed by the ‘American Anarchist Fighters’. The Trinity Church’s bells started to toll at midday, and when they stopped the cart charged with dynamite and metal scraps exploded, converted into a fire ball full of shrapnel(...) Buda did not like to know that J. P. Morgan was not among the 40 dead and more than 200 wounded (...) he was faraway in Scotland in his hunting summer-house. Despite that, the poor immigrant, with some stolen dynamite, a heap of metal scraps and an old horse had provoked an unprecedented terror in the heart of capitalism(...) The car-bomb was converted into a semi-strategic weapon comparable to the air force for its capability of destroying important urban centers and headquarters. The suicide truck-bomb that devastated the American embassy and the marines’ barracks in Beirut in 1983 (...) obliged Reagan to withdraw from Lebanon.” (DAVIS, 2006-1) The Marxist historiography established as its theoretical-methodological premise that ideas do not govern the world’s fate, it is the world that commands the fate of ideas . Material interests condition the political representations in contemporaneous societies. However, this formula, in general correct, is, by itself, insufficient. Radical projects transform themselves also into material forces when they conquer influence among millions, and start to be the fuel for historical transformation. Without the force of powerful ideas it would not be possible to
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Ultra-leftists and sectarians : Notes for a history of left-wing extremism
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Ultra-leftists and sectarians :
Notes for a history of left-wing extremism
“In a September day, a few months after the prison of his comrades Sacco and e Vanzetti, an Italian anarchist
called Mario Buda, parked his horse-driven cart, near the Wall Street corner, in front of J.P Morgan company(...)
A few blocks ahead a frightened postman found some leaflets that warned: ‘Free the political prisoners or you will
die all!’, signed by the ‘American Anarchist Fighters’. The Trinity Church’s bells started to toll at midday, and
when they stopped the cart charged with dynamite and metal scraps exploded, converted into a fire ball full of
shrapnel(...) Buda did not like to know that J. P. Morgan was not among the 40 dead and more than 200 wounded
(...) he was faraway in Scotland in his hunting summer-house. Despite that, the poor immigrant, with some stolen
dynamite, a heap of metal scraps and an old horse had provoked an unprecedented terror in the heart of
capitalism(...) The car-bomb was converted into a semi-strategic weapon comparable to the air force for its
capability of destroying important urban centers and headquarters. The suicide truck-bomb that devastated the
American embassy and the marines’ barracks in Beirut in 1983 (...) obliged Reagan to withdraw from Lebanon.”
(DAVIS, 2006-1)
The Marxist historiography established as its theoretical-methodological premise that ideas do not govern the
world’s fate, it is the world that commands the fate of ideas. Material interests condition the political
representations in contemporaneous societies. However, this formula, in general correct, is, by itself, insufficient.
Radical projects transform themselves also into material forces when they conquer influence among millions, and
start to be the fuel for historical transformation. Without the force of powerful ideas it would not be possible to
change the world.
In such an unequal and unjust world, the ruling classes could not keep the control of power – that is, the monopoly
of force – if they were not capable of presenting their needs as universal ones. In order to politically legitimize
their interests, they were based on, besides the fear of reprisals, the inherited costumes and alienating traditions,
which are the inertial forces that reinforce conservatism in contemporaneous societies.
The dominant culture manifests in an ideological repertoire and political vocabulary that are transformed by the
mediation of the clash of values and conceptions. This struggle expresses the world perceptions that are born from
a material experience and are formulated based on the social conditions in which the human beings are inserted,
that is, their class condition. The historians of the socialist movement could not put aside the same criterion to
explain the lower or greater influence of any of the egalitarian tendencies, at each country and at the epoch.
However, there has never been an immediate coincidence between the moods of the social classes and their
spokespersons. Both the proprietary and the dispossessed classes had divergences with the political organizations
that intended to translate into programs the needs brought up at each historical-concrete reality. A long minority
“exile” has been the destiny of the political tendencies that fought against the current.
A response for the division of the left between the program of the revolution and that of the reforms of the mode of
production, that is, for the difficulties of a unified class representation of labor, was sought by the Marxist
historiography – like Eric Hobsbawn’ Age of Extremes – in the history of capitalist itself, therefore, in the
capability of the system, under certain historical-economic circumstances and determined political conjunctures,
such as in Europe and the US in the end of the 19th century, or in the countries of the Triad in the thirty years after
1945, to absorb the partial demands, if threatened by the danger of the extension of revolutions. They did not
ignore also, the pressure exerted by the proprietary classes on the socialist movements, by giving incentives to the
moderate leaderships, which were also promoted. The organizations integrated into the defense of the regime of
bourgeois domination found, in conditions that favored concessions to the workers, a major political-social echo
for their program of reforms of capitalism.
On the one hand, since its foundation, the socialist movement has been international, and its outcomes were
indissociable from the confrontations between revolution and counter-revolution worldwide. The existence of
States that claimed to support the socialist project, in societies in which revolutionary processes led to the
expropriation of Capital, but remained isolated, has exerted a powerful authority over the world left during
decades: the “nationalism of the Soviet Union”, that is, the socialist campism - or Stalinism – has been one of the
most influent ideologies in the 20th century. Stalinism was not only the policy of the Third Period, or the policy of
the Popular Fronts, or the policy of pacific coexistence. The defense of the interests of these States – and of the
bureaucratic apparatuses that took their control – sacrificing the ideals of internationalism - has produced
important divisions in the proletariat.
However, beyond the ideological differences, other factors should be considered in the analyses about the division
in the left. The social stratification of wage labor has been turning more complex. It cannot be ignored that the
contemporaneous proletariat has been diversifying at such a degree that its representation by a single party is not
politically useful or even possible in the majority of urbanized societies. Despite this social diversity, it is
insufficient to attribute the divisions and even dispersions in the left only to social heterogeneity. Sociological
analyses have to be historically contextualized. There is a complex history of dispute between the visions about
which would be the possibilities and limits of capitalism, and that refers to the turnabouts of the revolutionary
processes in the 20th century. The revolutionary victories have inflamed militant hopes, theoretical renewal and
political unifications. And the defeats have fed the eclectic nomadisms of the parties, the theoretical dispersion of
Marxism, and, eventually, social diasporas in the intellectuality.
The political identities of the Marxist-inspired and working-class based left did not end in the border line between
the two big camps, reform and revolution. Two other political traditions have remained along the last hundred
years, centrism and ultra-leftism, although they have not always preserved an international organic continuity. The
subject of this article will be the presentation of the polemics with ultimatist currents, which are criticized in the
Marxist tradition by their imaginary identity with the interests of the revolution in the future. In this text we will
produce some notes about the place and the formulations of what we may call the tradition of sectarian
organizations that, with different vocabularies, deserve to be treated as heirs of 19th century’s anarchism.
Ultra-leftism is not the same as sectarianism
A superficial perception of the theme can lead to an undifferentiated association of ultra-leftism, sectarianism and
sects. This first perception, even if superficial, is not totally incorrect, but rather unsatisfactory. It is reasonable to
claim that ultimatist organizations were, predominantly, doctrinarian in theory, that is, they had a very closed or
conservative ideological framework, and sectarian defensive reflections. However, although closely associated,
neither the ultra-leftist groups were always more sectarian than the other currents in the socialist movement, nor
sectarians were always ultra-leftists. Ultra-leftism should not be identified, therefore, by professional historians, as
equal to sectarianism, even when accused as such by their political foes. In the Marxist tradition, sectarianism was
neither, necessarily, an accusation of extremism, nor a synonym of intransigence, although the sectarians have
been intolerants. This is still a superficial critique.
Ultra-leftism can be defined as a policy or even as a doctrine, if we consider that anarchism has preceded, in the
19th century, great part of what would be the repertoire of 20
th century‘s ultra-leftism. As to sectarianism, it was
more a method of interpretation of reality or a political conduct that has elected as its priority the defense of a
fixed body of ideas or the interests of a group. On the one side, political sectarianism was understood as
propagandism, that is, the permanent agitation of the same program, independently from the concrete situation,
and on the other hand, the preservation of the apparatus, a set of self-affirmation procedures. Sectarian tendencies
have much difficulty to accomplish the united front, even when possible agreements for joint campaigns were
possible, as they identified the possible allies, especially the closest ones, as enemies.
The whole subject is even more complex, because not all ultra-leftist tendencies have degenerated into sects. Sects
are hyper centralized and incorrigible organizations, that is, unable to react to the social and political pressures
from the milieus in which they decided to act. The anarchists of the “Friends of Durruti” in Cataluña in the years
1936/37 of the Spanish revolution, were ultra-leftists. They supported, still under the monarchic regime, the
legitimacy of vengeful armed actions, such as the bomb attacks against public buildings, and punitive attacks
against hated authorities. They inherited the fascination by terrorist tactics of the Irish Fenians, the Russian
esserists – the militants of the revolutionary socialist Party – and part of anarchism. Nonetheless, it would be
superficial or even unjust to consider them as a sect. They even have not had enough time to become politically so
homogeneous as to become a centralized organization. Despite the great leadership of Durruti, they were sensitive
to the external political pressures, and kept fraternal relationships with the Trotskyites. Their political initiative had
an impact on reality. They were neither politically nor socially marginal. They were capable of organizing the most
combative sectors of the proletariat in Barcelona in the struggle against capitalism and fascism. They won the
admiration of the left worldwide for their heroism in the trenches of the Civil War in Aragon, and were among the
martyrs of the defense of Madrid. They acted in a political united front with different left tendencies, such as the
Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification (POUM) and the youth of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) –in
distinct junctures and joined a military united front with all the republican forces against fascism. On the other
hand, some pro-Moscow Communist Parties, even when they conquered influence over millions, like the German
CP in the beginning of the 1930s, when it accused the social-democracy of being social-fascist, and their left
critiques as trotsko-nazis, could not be judged as “ultra-leftist” – despite its leftist abuses of Stalinist tactics known
as the Third Period – although their sectarianism has been legendary. The German CP was far from being a sect,
but during some years had a sectarian posture.
Ultra-leftism or sectarianism, as well as opportunism, are evaluations that are assigned to political orientations and
practices. There are more than few tendencies in the history of the world left embraced, once in a while, ultra-
leftist or sectarian tactics. The CP of Brazil (nota para diferenciar do atual PC do B?), for example, has oscillated
from ultra-leftist to opportunist positions regarding the government of Getúlio Vargas in the first years of the
decade of the 1950s. The judgment of an organization as a sect, however, should take into account other factors,
besides the political line: its social presence, its internal regime, and moreover, its capability of reflecting about its
own history and suffering the pressures from social sectors where it intended to penetrate. Sects have great
capability of resistance to the internal pressures (??Valério, são pressões internas ou externas?).
Ultra-leftism has sought consistency in a program. It is characterized by a substitutionist perspective: it proposes
for the laborers and the youth - or to another exploited and oppressed subject - projects, demands or actions that,
they, mostly, do not identify as their own, being ahead of the experience of the bulk of the working class. They are
willing, sometimes, based on the most radicalized sectors, to accomplish exemplary actions that frighten their
enemies and incentive their allies. They may or not adhere to armed actions, but their proposals are beyond what
the major battalions of the working class would be willing to accomplish or even accept, that is, those are
ultimatist policies.
The workerism of the ultra-left tendencies – Marxist or Anarchist – tended to be inversely proportional to their
real implantation in the working class milieus, which has been historically a minority, if not rachitic, in most
countries and revolutionary processes. Its origin was an overvalued appreciation of the political and social
relations of forces. The ultra-left policies underestimate the reactionary forces and the obstacles for the
mobilization and organization of the workers, starting by the lack of people’s self-confidence. But its voluntaristic
eagerness has demanded a strong identity and internal cohesion.
Sectarianism as well should not be identified as a synonym of a sect. Sectarianism is a product of doctrinarian
conceptions. Sectarians have been essentially propagandistic and fought for the apparatuses proper. Their
professorial attitude has been an obstacle for the unity of action with other tendencies. Marx and Engels have
criticized the French egalitarianist tendencies of the 19th
century as sectarian currents, as they extracted their
theoretical conceptions or political conclusions about the program from principles and not from the critique of
reality. They were moderate, but severe, in their assessment of the leading tendencies of the Paris Commune:
“Naturally, the Proudhonists were chiefly responsible for the economic decrees of the Commune, both for their
praiseworthy and their unpraiseworthy aspects; as the Blanquists were for its political actions and omissions. And
in both cases the irony of history willed – as is usual when doctrinaires come to the helm – that both did the
opposite of what the doctrines of their school proscribed”. (ENGELS, at