Ukraine’s Fault Lines: The Quest for Regional Hegemony in the Post-Soviet Space

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the soviet and post-soviet review 42 (2015) 150-173

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Ukraine’s Fault Lines: The Quest for Regional Hegemony in the Post-Soviet Space

David AlengaGraduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University Seoul, Republic of Korea

[email protected]

Abstract

This paper presents a critique of the European Union’s flagship Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP) within the context of its geopolitical ramifications on the political cri-sis in Ukraine. It particularly highlights the role of the Russian Federation as the prin-cipal protagonists and its quest to counter the EU’s normative power within their shared neighborhood. The EaP has among its goals promoting a broad range of politi-cal and economic reforms with the partner states with the view to help them deepen liberal democratic values and enhanced security and stability within the framework of an enhanced Association Agreement. The Kremlin believes the EaP undermines Russian interest in the region. This paper therefore presents a critical analysis of the contending dynamics of the competing efforts to use Ukraine as the launching pad to reshape the post-Cold War regional order.

Keywords

European Union – Eastern Partnership – Ukraine – Russia

Introduction

The implosion of the Soviet Union and with it, the ideological assumptions that bound the Eastern bloc, has been widely viewed as the coming age of Western normative dispositions. It further brought renewed interest in the inherent utility of normative power as the new geopolitical currency, espe-cially in Western Europe. The aura of normative triumphalism has since fuelled

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the multiple waves of European Union (eu) eastward expansion in a way that is materially changing the complexion of Europe’s traditional regional order, especially in the post-Soviet space—triggering counter reactions from the Russian Federation. This contest for the post-Soviet space, which Moscow calls its “near abroad” and the eu its “Eastern Neighborhood” was the lightning rod for the Maidan protests and the resulting chain of events that has reawakened the simmering East-West fault lines. It begs the question of how much of the post-Cold War regional arrangements remain relevant to the geopolitical reali-ties of the post-Soviet space.

In the light of the eu’s active involvement in Ukraine and the resulting drawn out clash with Russia, many are beginning to wonder if the eu is steadily aspiring to become a collective regional hegemon or simply standing up to a Russian worldview that remains frozen in a Cold War mentality. In other words, where should the line be drawn between the perceived universal Euro-centered liberal norms of democracy, rule of law, freedom against the particularism of the Kremlin in the post-Soviet space?

The Ukraine crisis, I argue in this article, is in many ways the consequence of a conflation of worldviews inasmuch as it is a quest for the place of power in shaping the regional order. Following that trajectory, the crux of this paper’s argument is built on how Ian Manner’s theory of Normative Power Europe (npe) has shaped eu strategic thinking going into Ukraine within the frame-work of the post-Cold War European geopolitical order. Given Russia’s vested interest in the region, history of paranoia and perceived security vulnerability, I also present Russia’s reaction to the eu’s normative power as a response to its perceived hegemonic threats.

A lot of ink has been spilled on the question of whether Europe should be defined on the broadly construed parameters of norms, values, interests or geography (See Sjursen, 2006; Hyde-Price 2006; Diez 2005; Manners 2006). Building on the seminal work of Francois Duchene and Ian Manners, the question of the status of the eu as a normative power has moved beyond a given consensus to the realms of a discursive construction. Its distinctive-ness as a normative power is best expressed by its lack of military instru-ments in the service of its policy interests (Duchene, 1972, p. 45; Manners, 2002, p. 38).

I am particularly interested in interrogating how the collision of the world-views of the contending actors is being played out in Ukraine. I discuss the eu’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) as a case study of how the colliding worldviews in Ukraine are part of the ongoing quest to shape the regional order of the post-Soviet space. I draw on sociological and international relations theories to complement Manners’ theory of Normative Power Europe (npe) to explain

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the state of the current normative posturing in Ukraine, their justifications and underlying cleavages.

By this approach, I am hoping to provide a good theoretical explanation for the Ukraine crisis and its broader regional implications. Hence, the format of this article begins with a discussion of the normative theories used to support the clash of worldviews thesis. These theories are then used to present the competing arguments of the European and Russian worldviews. The next sec-tion then presents the EaP as a case study of the arguments presented in the preceding section. A critique of how these positions are impacting the post-Cold War regional order and its implications for long term peace and stability.

Part I: Theoretical Debate

This section begins with a discussion of what has been widely presented as the theoretical basis of the evolution of the eu’s normative outlook and how it is situated within the ongoing geopolitical debate of the post-Soviet space. As an offshoot of the normative debate, discussions of the eu’s status as a normative power often begins on the premise of its identity as an exclusive polity of states defined by a shared worldview (Hyde-Price, 2008; Manners, 2006; Aggestam, 2008). As a polity, its collective external approach is presumed to gyrate from this ‘narrowly’ defined worldview. In terms of its practical scale, social and political orders become conjoined to the extent that they represent mutually agreed arrangements of aggregated norms. The basis of the mutual agreement springs from how effectively these shared norms can be justified and validated in a perceived rational sense (Sjursen, 2006; Habermas 2006; Smith 2006).

Social order, based on the sociological argumentation of Durkheim (1973), is a consequence of collective norms and traditions born out of a process of intersubjective communication processes. Weber (1978) further leans credence to the inherently cultural and social contexts under which norms are inher-ently developed through routine processes of socialization and internalization (For similar works see Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999; Adler 1997).

It is with this in mind that I now turn to Ian Manner’s oft-quoted status of the eu as a normative power in terms of how it exerts itself as an actor on the international political space (Manners, 2002). The eu, Manners argues, by way of identity is a normatively different polity that basis its legitimacy on its unique history, scope and commitment to a set of universal liberal norms that “pre-disposes it to act in a normative way” (241). He classifies the norms into five broad categories of liberty, peace, democracy, human rights and rule of law. He also has a list of four minor norms, which he concedes do not have a

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universal assent. They include social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance and anti-discrimination.

The second strand of Manners’ argument is how the eu should be perceived as a normative power in the light of its ability to shape ideas of what passes for “normal” in the discourse of international politics. He cites informational dif-fusion, contagion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, and cul-tural filter as the six mechanisms through which eu norms are propagated. The eu’s ability to define and shape this state of normalcy leads Manners to conclude is “the greatest power of all.”

Since its publication, Manners’ thesis has come up for serious theoretical criticism regarding how it uncritically accepts and portrays the eu as an actor “pre-disposed to act in a normative” way. Some have even gone as far as calling his choice of the death penalty example as an “easy case,” which in its true essence posed no threat to the material interest of any member state (Aggestam 2008; Diez 2005). Aggestam (2008) has been especially critical of the conflating undertones between the eu’s espoused normative disposition and what appear to be instances of the promotion of material interests. The conflation, accord-ing to Aggestam (2008), have not only blurred the lines but also in most cases moved in tandem with the preferences of the eu’s material interests.

Structural-realists and rationalists have also joined in the criticism of the normative power thesis. The former group disputes the claim of the eu as an “actor” in international politics. The eu’s actions are still primarily rooted in state-centered conceptions of the international system; thus in reasoning along those lines, they insist that the eu is nothing but a vehicle through which its most influential members collectively pursue hegemonic power interests in its external relationship (Hyde-Price, 2006, 2008; Bjorkdahl, 2005). By this logic, the argument that the eu is an actor pre-disposed to act normatively in pursuit of universal values becomes questionable, so long as there is no way of effec-tively delineating the strategic interests of the influential members from that of the collective whole.

Jorgensen (2006), however, takes issue with the structural-realist under-standing of norms being synonymous with ideals, especially when it comes to the formulation of foreign policy. Central to his conclusion is the assertion that there is no palpable correlation between norms and policies in the light of the diverse competing principles that actors have to consider in the policy formu-lation process. Another strand to Jorgensen’s argument is the absence of a universally acceptable theoretical perspective on the question of the role of principles in decision making.

Consequently, any attempt to link the two risks painting an overly simpli-fied picture of an otherwise complex phenomenon. Jorgensen’s position is

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re-echoed by a similar caution by Erikson (2006) against the tendency to base the judgment of a polity’s normative nature with the “propensity to act on honorable motives” (252). Like Jorgensen, Erikson points to the risk of having normative standards born out of arbitrary constructs, which has the added danger of either ignoring the interest or values of third parties or condescend-ingly reacting to them.

Additionally, a growing body of scholars, ranging from historians and intergovernmentalist to neofunctionalist has joined in calling into question Manner’s conceptualization of the eu as a normative power driven by altruis-tic motivations (Milward 2000; Moravcisk, 1998). With increasing consistency, the eu is being presented as a polity that pursues a dual prong of normative and material interests in its external relations with third parties. Manners reject the charge of uncritical and unreflective analysis of the theoretical basis of his original thesis by pointing to the intended goal of helping to illuminate the sort of principles promoted by the eu (Manners, 2008). In that respect, he reiterates that the normative power Europe theory primarily tells us how the eu acts and is impacted in the international political discourse. I will now pro-ceed in the next section to discuss the conflicting framework of the material interests and normative disposition in Ukraine.

The Russian Worldview in UkraineRussia’s perceived unease with the eu’s eastward expansion is steeped in the three layers of its belief system. Its historic mores and normative configuration further feeds into its adversarial worldview vis-à-vis the outside world, the manifestation of which the eu’s actions seems to further justify. Much of this resonates with Russia’s history of approaching foreign policy through a maxi-malist interpretation of ideas and the world (Ginsburg and Rubinstein, 1978), as lucidly playing out in Ukraine.

To understand Ukraine’s current troubles with the EaP is to understand Russia. And to understand Russia is to understand the historical basis of its worldview. Worldviews, according to Keohane and Goldstein (1993), constitute one of the three strands of what they call the concept of a “belief system.” Principled beliefs and causal beliefs make up the other two components of the concept. They explain that worldviews are the beliefs a people hold about the universe in general and consequently how that conception of the universe determines actions and outcomes. Principled beliefs refer to the normative basis for establishing specific basis for differentiating wrong from right and just from unjust. Finally, the causal beliefs explain the link between cause and effect. Viewed from this prism, the Russian posturing can be effectively ana-lyzed from a normative plane.

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The Russian psyche is also hinged on its identity of exclusive values, norms and institutions backed by an intelligentsia that have always been distrustful of Western ideas and practices. Beginning in the 13th century when the Kievan Rus was established as the first Eastern Slavic state with its capital in Kiev, the Russian Empire was the target of invasion from states as far afield as the Mongols, the Ottoman Turks, Sweden’s Charles xii, Napoleonic France, Poland, Imperial Japan, to Nazi Germany. Indeed, as an imperial power, Russia also has on multiple occasions embarked on campaigns of conquests, colonization and coercive diplomacy. For a nation that paid the highest price of Nazi Germany’s murderous campaign in Europe, notwithstanding Hitler’s security pledge to Stalin, this level of mistrust can be expected.1

The shared cultural, religious, and historical ties between Russia and Ukraine, in part explains why Ukraine is viewed not just another state but an intrinsic part of the Russian motherland. The reality on the ground is however a far cry from this overly simplified notion, in light of the complexly interwo-ven identities and loyalties in Ukraine. It explains why the Kremlin continues to court the counsel of ideologues like former Moscow State University aca-demic Alexander Dugin, who believes that Moscow’s intervention in Ukraine reflects an inevitable step to “save Russia’s moral authority.”2

Russian scholar Pyotr Stegny in explaining the thinking within the Kremlin regarding the post-Soviet space contends that Russia has a hard time accepting that the Western values of human rights, democracy and neoliberalism are the sine qua non for running the international order. It is also informed by the deep resentment of being made to integrate into this new international system under Western terms as was the case in the Boris Yeltsin years (Stegny, 2014, p. 48). Hence the Kremlin under Putin’s reign has been restlessly exploring every opportunity to compel the West to renegotiate the configuration of the current international order, at least within its immediate regional sphere.

The timing of Putin’s advent is also crucial in juxtaposing the resurgence of Russia particularly given that its international standing and credibility had

1 Based on the so-called Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet Union and Nazi German reached an understanding to divide Eastern and Northern Europe into their respective spheres of influence. Estonia, Finland and Latvia were to be part of the Soviet orbit. Poland was to be partitioned and controlled by the Soviet Union and Germany. Lithuania which was initially assigned to Germany was subsequently reassigned to the Soviet Union. See “Modern History Sourcebook: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939” http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1939pact.html.

2 Dina Newman, “Russian Nationalist Thinker Dugin Sees war with Ukraine,” bbc News http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28229785, Accessed on July 28, 2014.

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tremendously suffered under the chaotic years of Yeltsin’s reign.3 Of particular worry to Kremlin strategists is the ambivalence of the West to its stake as an important player in the international system. One of the principal messages coming out of the Ukraine conflict is a Moscow that is for the first time in the last quarter century assertively willing to sacrifice its relationship with the eu. In other words, Moscow no longer feels bound to maintain good relations with the eu at the cost of its strategic interests.

Moscow’s assertiveness in Ukraine is often construed in a manner that reflects Vladimir Putin’s oft-quoted statement that the “collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster…tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory.”4 Putin’s critics accuse him of imperialist fits in the guise of protecting ethnic Russians abroad.5 Whether one agrees with its status as a regional power or not, Russia’s imperial footprints are somewhat palpable. Russia, however, differs from the Soviet Union in terms of its less ambitious territorial interests, which is limited to the former Soviet states. Russia also lacks the solid ideological traction that the Soviet Union wielded (Stegny, 2014, p. 48). Neither can Putin be compared to Vladimir Lenin, in terms of his grandiose internationalist outlook as reflected in the Communist International (ComIntern). It is also fair to say that Soviet foreign policy priorities by the time of Mikhail Gorbachev had actually shifted from the internationalist trappings of the previous decades (Goncharov et al., 1993; Bellamy, 2008; Leffler, 2008); a shift in paradigm that was more the conse-quence of strategic imperatives than any real altruistic persuasions.

3 Under Yeltsin, Russia was resigned to accepting nato’s eastward expansion, the German uni-fication and the leasing of several Central Asian bases to the us. The price for these conces-sions in the minds of Kremlin strategist has been an exponential increase in the Western sphere of influence and absolute contempt for Russia’s strategic interests.

4 Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation April 25, 2005 The Krem-lin, Moscow http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912 _87086.shtml.

5 Russia is not alone in this area after all. Iran has a long history of dominating the Persian Gulf region both under Khomeini and the Shah. The same can be said of Brazil and its heavily subsidized electricity generated from the Iguazu Falls to the state of Paraguay. Despite pro-tests from Argentina, the uk has not been dissuaded from military actions in defense of its citizens on the disputed Falklands/Malvinas. Washington has for instance, for many years claimed an exclusive hegemonic control of the Western hemisphere through its Monroe Doctrine and maintained that status quo for years. If European states lived with American claim to exclusive control of its region, then Moscow insists that the same be applied to its status as the regional hegemon of the post-Soviet space.

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But its strategic leverage over the West in the post-Soviet space compen-sates for its ideological dearth (North and Kishore, 2008). The best proof of this assertion is the fact that most of the former Soviet states rely on Russia for security and economic sustenance. Its role in two of the region’s largest organi-zations, the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (csto) leans further credence. But the complex interplay of interests and internal divisions set Ukraine apart from most of the region’s states.

European Normative WorldviewGoing back to the 1993 Copenhagen Council Conclusions, Europe’s eastern frontiers have occupied a significant portion of the eu’s external relations policy. Nearly two decades after the expansion experimentation following Copenhagen, the eu is now faced with the complex dilemmas of its eastern neighborhood. Events in Ukraine poignantly point to a significant clash in the worldviews of the eu and the Russian Federation in many respects. What appears to be a clear discrepancy between an eu conceived universalism is coming against a Russian worldview of particularism, especially on the ques-tion of its material interests.

Brussels acknowledged in its 2003 European Security Strategy (ess) that the first wave of its eastward expansion had ushered “the eu closer to troubled seas,”6 a subtle admission of the state of the prevailing regional order. This admission however failed to dissuade Brussels from staying true to its princi-pled beliefs in the role of universal norms in the conduct of international rela-tions. We now see an eu that in one breadth that seems to acknowledge Russian sensibilities in the region, in the next sticks to the letter of its belief in an international order that guarantees the rights of states to liberty and peace irrespective of material resources.

The European normative architecture is further premised on the notion of a European solidarity that springs from having diverse states bound together by a specific set of norms. In the eyes of the adherents of this worldview, Europe is both the territorial and normative center of this normative order. Based on Keohane and Goldstein (1993), the normative underbelly of this Euro-centered principled belief gives rise to this loyalty to the normative conception of Europe and by extension its inclination to act as a legitimate power. Europe thus approaches the international order armed by the belief in its messianic mission to imprint the prevailing order on the universality of its norms.

6 European Security Strategy, accessed from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-strategy/.

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If anything, there is a sense that the eu’s eastward expansion is transcend-ing the question of territorial cleavage (See Bjereld et al., 2008). Given how discredited communism has become, we now have to relish with the near-monopoly of liberal values of democracy and freedom. Two immediate rea-sons for the case for uniting Europe under a common normative umbrella immediately come to mind. Firstly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states has strengthened the case of those arguing that the east-west geographical gulf has to give way to building a territorially unified Europe. Secondly, the territorial unity ought to be augmented by a credible normative architecture based on Europe’s cultural and political structures.

Another interesting dimension to the Euro-centered worldview is the notion that the future of Europe’s security also lies in strengthening and spreading these norms. A territorially united Europe bonded by a common set of values is more inclined to be stronger, stable and secure, so goes that school of thought. Its proponents further attribute the collapse of the Soviet Union to the inherent superiority of liberal values over authoritarianism. The last stage of the capitulation of the discredited authoritarian systems of the former Eastern bloc has a place in the causal belief process of working towards a single territorial entity held together by the superior European norms.

Part ii: Background to the Eastern Partnership (EaP)

In his opening remarks marking the official inauguration of the eu’s EaP, Mr. Radoslaw Sikorski, former Foreign Minister of Poland, was quoted as saying “to the South, we have neighbors of Europe. To the East, we have European neighbors. They all have the right one day to apply for eu membership.”7 The EaP as envisaged by its sponsors, Sweden and Poland, constitutes a more streamlined version of the eu’s European Neighborhood Policy (enp).8 Driven by a desire to guarantee stability on its eastern flanks through deeper coopera-tion, the EaP seeks to achieve a normative transformation of the eastern neigh-borhood in exchange for financial aid, market access and visa waivers to the initiative’s partner states.

Ukraine’s ongoing conflict arguably has everything to do with the tussle between Moscow and Brussels to define, claim and exert influence over a part

7 Arne Delfs and Brian Parkin, “Merkel Evokes Cold War in Warning of Long Ukraine Crisis.”8 The enp is the eu’s policy of strengthening cooperation between the eu and its neighbors

to the south and east. The enp target countries include those who seek future membership of the eu and those who are interested merely in having closer integration with Brussels.

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of Europe they both claim to be their respective neighborhood. Domestically, it is also known that this external jostling for control is also tearing the nation apart along the lines of those with European aspirations against those keen on maintaining the historic ties with the Russian Federation. Beyond the compet-ing demands, the facts on the ground cuts both ways, which is why the focus of this section will be a critique of the role of the EaP within the grand narrative of the normative power of the eu.

Borne out of the enp, the EaP streamlines the principal objective of sharing the eu’s benefits to its neighbors to the east. Cadier (2013) discusses how the eu’s eastward expansionist instincts are hinged on the ideational belief in how the eu sees itself as a force for good. It also goes further than the enp by increasing the eu’s bilateral engagement with Eastern Partner states (Popescu and Wilson, 2009, p. 173) aimed at creating the framework for future deeper multilateral cooperation.

In many ways, the EaP reflects strategic concerns that Brussels con-fronts regarding the challenges in its new neighborhood. First and fore-most, the eu’s foray into the east marks a bold step into a region that was insulated from Western Europe for the better part of a century. Indeed, the challenges of this step by no means are to be taken lightly. Flowing from this arises, a specific concern by Poland about the implications of instability within its immediate periphery. For Warsaw, the eu’s eastern flanks are not merely frontiers but an integral part of its geopolitical cal-culation, which by extension is a European frontier. Warsaw’s active pro-motion of the EaP largely reflects this strategic thinking (Popescu and Wilson, 2009, p. 122).

Polish strategists have complained about the lack of recognition within Brussels about the strategic importance of the eastern neighborhood to the broader security interests of the region—so to make up for this lack of interest within the eu bureaucracy, Warsaw has embraced the challenge of taking up the cause of the eastern neighborhood as its focal strategic priority. Sweden’s active support of the EaP helped in infusing synergy between the eu’s old guard and the new members, a fact which Donald Tusk, former Polish Prime Minister admitted was crucial in attracting more interest within the eu bureau-cracy for the initiative (Lipert, 2008, p. 45). Sweden’s role was also vital in addressing the growing enlargement fatigue concerns from veteran members and at the same time sustaining the momentum of the European aspirations of the countries in the eastern neighborhood (Lipert, 2008, 34). It is worth acknowledging that despite the fact that in principle the EaP’s target has been Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, its energy has been prin-cipally expended on Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s former Orange coalition government under President Viktor Yuschenko whilst commending the joint Polish-Swedish effort was con-cerned that the initiative did not offer a clear eu membership perspective for the partner states. Whilst Azerbaijan also welcomed the initiative, it fell short of making an explicit commitment to full European integration, apart from assurances of bilateral cooperation on specific programs that suited its interest.9

Goals and Aspirations of the EaPThe goals of the EaP as outlined in the founding Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, is to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between European and interested partner countries.”10 These goals are expected to be achieved through the implementation of programs that inculcate European liberal norms such as good governance, democracy and the free market into the agreed reform plans with the partner states. Below are the proposed steps for the EaP’s bilateral cooperation activities with the partner states:

• TailoredAssociationAgreements(aa) to be negotiated with partner states depending on the level of interest and commitment to implement radical reforms to meet eu standards. The aa provides a comprehensive framework for tailored bilateral cooperation between a partner state and the eu on areas such as a tentative Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (dcfta), foreign policy and security cooperation and dialogue, judicial sec-tor and economic cooperation. Interestingly, the dcfta requires partner states to adopt about 80% of the eu’s codified legislation, court decisions, and legal acts which are collectively dubbed the acquis communautaire, unlike its predecessor Partnership Cooperation Agreement (pca) which was based on nominal economic ties between the eu and selective adop-tion of eu standards. The aa, beyond establishing free trade links seeks to also ensure political stabilization in the partner state.

9 apa Press Agency, “Minister: Azerbaijan views Eastern Partnership initiative as very positive,” December 9, 2008, http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=93383 (Accessed March 21, 2009).

10 Council of the European Union, “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit,” last modified May 7, 2009, Accessed from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration _en.pdf.

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• Thesecondstepenvisagesaprogressiveintegrationofthepartnerstateintothe European economy. This provision allows for the first step in the process of meeting the membership requirements of the World Trade Organization (wto).

• Thirdly, todesign tailored “mobilityandsecurity”arrangementsaimedatfacilitating the capacity of partner states to combat illegal immigration, reforming asylum legislations to meet eu standards, addressing corruption and reforming public administration systems, visa liberalization and effec-tive border control and a host of others.

• Fourthly,negotiatingandimplementingpoliciesaimedatachievingenergysecurity, with priority given to finalizing the process of including Ukraine and Moldova in the Energy Community. Speeding up the process of inte-grating Ukraine’s energy market into that of the eu and inviting all partner states to join the Intelligent Energy Europe Program.

• Finally, the implementation of programs aimed at facilitating social andeconomic development across the region as well as an extension of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Initiative-financed cross-border cooperation to include the borders of partner states.

On the multilateral level, the Prague Declaration identified four core themes namely: democracy, good governance, and stability; economic integration and convergence with eu sectoral policies; energy security and people-to-people contacts. Effective measures should be put in place to facilitate the implemen-tation of joint so-called flagship initiatives aimed at deepening a range of areas of cooperation such as in the diversification of energy supplies, developing renewal energy and regional energy markets.

How Coherent is the EaP?Contrary to Brussels’s public pronouncements about its commitment to the EaP, the Ukrainian case has exposed a great deal of ambivalence within the eu. A major discrepancy between the rhetoric and actions within the EaP is its failure to provide an explicit guarantee of future membership to partner states. The absence of such an explicit offer is quite telling about how the eu really perceives Ukraine and the broader region. Even in seeking to externalize eu governance to Ukraine and other partner states, Brussels isn’t interested in committing to future membership. Indeed, it is inconceivable to implement far reaching reforms without a corresponding offer of accession (Cadeir, 2013, p. 87). Within this realm, the EaP debate within Ukraine has been transferred to the realm of geopolitics and a real disconnect between the aspirations of the pro-eu adherents and Brussels.

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Beyond the diplomatic niceties, one will also be hard pressed to find a per-fectly aligned stream within the eu on the question of Ukraine in the broader sense. There is no definitive answer to the question of whether Ukraine repre-sents a strategic priority for the bloc as a whole or within the narrowly defined spectrum of some states. Yet on the bigger issue of the eu as a putative norma-tive force that must act in Ukraine as a matter of principle there is barely any forthright explanation about how to bring that about. A case in point is how eu states in the eastern frontier and the Baltics are driven more by realpolitik impulses over and above the normative rhetoric. For them, the Russian assertiveness in Ukraine poses a real existential threat and as such deserves to be treated as one. This approach has however come up against a major indiffer-ence to the region by core states such as the uk, France and to a lesser degree Germany.

Even some eastern states like Bulgaria are also cringing at the possibility of poking the Russian bear lest they hurt their economic interests with Russia. France and the Mediterranean states promoting the Southern Neighborhood project are also keen to ensure that the EaP does not take precedence over their projects. The French attitude to the EaP particularly brings to the fore a subtle concern within Brussels about the question of not just the competition for funding but also the broader question of complementarity and duplication of similar regional initiatives. Quite frankly, as far as the French are concerned the risk of irking Moscow is better avoided all together.11

These notwithstanding, Brussels fell into the trap of playing the hardball rhetoric of “now-or-never” in the buildup to the Vilnius Summit. I also contend that in its zeal to woo Ukraine, Brussels overestimated its capacity to elicit concessions from ousted President Viktor Yanukovych. Placing the review of the conviction of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, for instance, as a major precondition for signing the aa ultimately proved to be foolhardy because of its failure to incorporate the implications of such a move on the domestic balance of power in Ukraine. The release of former Premier Tymoshenko was by no means going to offer any domestic political dividends for Yanukovych and his political base. Ex-President Viktor Yanukovich there-fore so conveniently exploited this aberration of eu policies to shield himself

11 France’s dilemma reflects that of many eu states, regarding how to balance their eco-nomic interests with the pressure to tow along taking tough measures against Moscow. Of particular friction was France’s contract to deliver frigates to the Russian army which came in for severe criticism following the escalating military tension in Ukraine.

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from the responsibilities of advancing on the badly needed reforms Kiev needed. Yanukovych in essence was offered a very convenient excuse to walk away from the obligations of signing the aa, much less committing to the criti-cal judicial reforms required under the EaP.

Compromises are alien to Ukrainian domestic politics, so to link the release of his political foe Tymoshenko to the aa was clearly misguided. Beyond the sticky political rhetoric, most keen observers are aware that Ukraine does not matter to Brussels as much as it does to Moscow. Besides, Ukraine’s prospects of eu membership have been made untenable because of its instability. The longer the polarization and division of the country continues, the lower the chances of deeper cooperation.

First Phase of the Ukraine Crisis

Date Event Outcome

November 2013 President Viktor Yanukovych abandons an agreement on closer ties with the eu in favor of closer ties with Moscow

Initial minor protests in response to his decision began to grow by late November.

December 2013 • Protesters occupy Kiev City Hall

• President Putin agrees to buy $15 billion of Ukrainian debt

• Russia offers nearly 30% discount in gas prices to Ukraine

Opposition to Yanukovych escalates with nearly 800,000 people attending a protest rally on Maidan Square.

January 2014 • Anti-government protests turn bloody

• Parliament enacts restrictive anti-protest laws

• Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigns

• Outrage against Yanukovych spreads beyond Kiev as protest-ers takeover government buildings in Western Ukrainian cities

• Parliament withdraws ant-protest laws and puts forward amnesty bill for protesters

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Date Event Outcome

Early February 2014 • Compromise agreement reached and 234 detained protesters are released

• Protesters leave Kiev City Hall

• Maidan Protesters remain resolute in opposition to President Yanukovych

• Violent clashes result in 18 deaths in Kiev

20–21 February 2014 • Bloodiest 2 days in the protest movement claims 88 lives

Yanukovych signs compro-mise deal with opposition leaders, outlining plans for early elections and the establishment of a unity government

22 February 2014 Protests escalate as Maidan crowd rejects the deal brokered with Yanukovych

• Yanukovych flees Kiev • Protesters takeover

Presidential Administration building

• Parliament votes to impeach Yanukovych

• Jailed opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko released

23–26 February 2014 • Parliament votes to remove Russian as second official language

• Parliament names Speake Olexander Turchynov as Interim President

• Arseniy Yatsenyuk nominated Prime Minister

• Arrest warrant issued for impeached President Yanukovych

Discontent against the interim government in Kiev begins to boil over in Russian speaking regions in the Southeast

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Date Event Outcome

27–28 February 2014 • Pro-Russian gunmen takeover government building in Simferopol, Crimea

• Unmarked military person-nel take hold of strategic locations in Crimea

• Plans announced for a referendum for Crimea’s secession from Ukraine

• Interim government declares the move illegal

March 2014 • Russian parliament approves Putin’s request to deploy Russian troops into Ukraine to safeguard Russian interest

• 97 of Crimean voters approve the decision to join Russia

• Putin signs bill to formally absorb Crimea into the Russian Federation

Western sanctions against Russia

April 2014 • Protesters takeover major government buildings in Lugansk, Donetsk and Kharkov

• Acting President announces anti-terrorist military operation against pro-Rus-sian separatists in the east

• Geneva talks convened to deescalate the conflict

• Protests against the interim government in the Southeast gains momentum

• Protests escalate into full-scale military action

Second Phase of the Ukraine Crisis

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Date Event Outcome

May 2014 • Fatal clashes erupt in Black Sea Coastal city of Odessa

• Pro-Russian separatists declare the independence of Lugansk and Donetsk from Ukraine

• Petro Poroshenko President in elections that excluded rebellious regions

• Faltering military operation against the rebels in the east

• Violence escalates

June–July 2014 • Russia withdraws authoriza-tion to use force in Ukraine

• eu signs Association Agreement (aa) with Ukraine

• Malaysia Airlines flight mh17 shot down in rebel-territory

• International pressure on Russia to deescalate the conflict

• More Western sanctions against Russia

September –October 2014

• Minsk I Protocol signed between separatists and government of Ukraine

• Pro-eu parties win majority in parliamentary elections

Repeated ceasefire viola-tions on both sides

February 2015 • Leaders of Russia, Germany, France, and Ukraine convene for Minks ii Protocol

The eu is further constrained in its ability to project hard power largely due to capacity deficiencies and declining military spending. There is very little appe-tite for military confrontation with Russia over Ukraine across the Euro-Atlantic area in general.12 But the eu’s biggest problem lies in the fact that it is designed

12 nato’s lead sponsor the us is particularly going through a shift in strategic policies from Europe to East Asia. The uk in its current state is fatigued from its missions in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last decade. France is equally bogged down in its missions in Mali and

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to act as a normative power not a military power, which is worth noting. Put together, acting by the playbook of normative power in and of itself under-mines its ability to forcefully assert itself in Ukraine. This notwithstanding, there is also a commensurate acknowledgement of the potency of the eu’s nor-mative power as a credible strategic threat to Moscow’s gambit in the region.

Russia’s Trouble with the EaPIn the heat of the aa debate, the Kremlin had to confront the real risk of being undercut in the normative battle. For instance, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko castigated the eu for using its EaP to pressurize regional states to “choose” between Moscow and Brussels. As it became clear that it was swimming against the tides, Russia notched its pressure on Ukraine in July 2013 through the unilateral imposition of trade sanctions, prior to the planned Vilnius Summit. Moscow thus expressed its determination to resort to whatever means it takes to halt Ukraine’s move to the eu, even if that means through blatant coercive schemes. Indeed, this approach marked a significant change in Russia’s initial policy of seeking to entice Ukraine into Moscow’s Eurasian Customs Union to now resolutely obstructing its European path.

President Vladimir Putin is convinced that the EaP is aimed at consolidating the eu’s achievement in undercutting Russia in the shared neighborhood, dur-ing the first wave of eu expansion into Eastern and Central Europe. By seeking to export its norms and values to the area of the shared neighborhood, the eu would be able to achieve a strategic stranglehold on the shared neighborhood. Much as the Kremlin dreads this prospect, it has to jostle between the con-straints and leverages that can be brought to bear in response to the geopoliti-cal exigencies of the shared neighborhood.

Notwithstanding all the eu’s efforts to reassure and indeed in some cases address Russia’s concerns in the region, Moscow continues to view its relations with the eu from a geopolitical lens. This is all the more visible in the number of tactical and strategic concessions that the eu has had to make to Moscow in Ukraine. Some eu hardliners have cited the case of Crimea as an explicit capit-ulation to Moscow and even a reward for belligerence.

Moscow has in many ways not taken the eu’s offer of talks over Ukraine very seriously. Brussels has been keen to use the talks to rebut accusations that it has ignored Russia’s concerns in Ukraine. Moscow on the other hand prefers to return to the factors around the particulars of the regional order as opposed to the eu’s preferred universalist approach. The case of the dctfa immediately

the Central African Republic and the wider Maghreb region. Germany is showing no signs of coming out of its pacifist mood anytime soon.

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comes to mind, with the eu insisting on holding only bilateral negotiations with Kiev. In sticking to this position, Brussels is rejecting Moscow’s call for a re-negotiation of the tenets of the dctfa within the framework of the trilat-eral group of the eu, Ukraine and Russia. Brussels has so far refused to budge, insisting on not allowing Moscow to determine its scope.

At the time of negotiating and ratifying the aa, Ukraine had already ratified the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Agreement (cisfta) which came into force on September 20, 2012. The cis fta between Belarus, Ukraine and Russia requires the removal of customs duties, free movement of goods within the territory of the cis, a progressive decrease of export customs duties and the removal of quantitative restrictions in mutual trade. Moscow’s concerns about the potential impact of the aa on its economy cannot be dis-missed in the light of these realities.

Herein is the contradiction between the eu’s stated goal of pursuing peace-ful cooperation with Russia on the one hand and its resolve to achieve these goals by compelling Russia to do so on European normative terms on the other hand. The Ukraine conflict ultimately raises uncomfortable questions about the essence and indeed the future of the post-Cold War liberal order of security that has been the anchor of the European project.

Part III: Reflections on the Post-Cold War Structure

Can any historical lessons be drawn from the post-Cold War European geopo-litical landscape? I begin this section by dealing with the question of how the current international system of institutions and norms are being impacted by the remarkable events of 1989. In a recent article, development economist Jeffrey Sachs, very succinctly analyzed how the monumental crises that engulfed the world in 2014 are largely the consequence of the utter disregard for the hinge historical moments of the twentieth century, of which 1989 is at the core. From the carnage in the Middle East to Ukraine and Russia, Sachs, citing economist John Maynard Keynes, likened the treatment of post-Soviet Russia to the huge punitive war reparations imposed on Germany by the vic-tors of World War I. Now as then, Sachs contends that the intransigence of the victors posed serious risks to the international system.13

13 Jeffrey, Sachs, “Viewpoint: Why the shadow of ww1 and 1989 hangs over world events” bbc News, December 16, 2014, Accessed from http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine -30483873 (December 17, 2014).

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As fate would have it, the rise of Hitler’s Nazi Germany proved prophetic. Which is why the “the solidity of the system” of the post-World War ii system as Vladimir Putin explained “rested not only on the balance of power and the rights of the victor countries, but on the fact that this system’s ‘founding fathers’ had respect for each other, did not try to put the squeeze on others, but attempted to reach agreements.”14

For the most parts of the 1990s and the early 2000s, Russia was conspicu-ously squeezed and alienated from the international system, mostly born out of deep Western distrust. Unlike China, it was not until 2012 that Russia was accepted into the World Trade Organization (wto) despite the best efforts of the post-communist reformist efforts. The same can be said of the western-centered Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd). Yet the oecd has among its ranks former communist states such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Another case in point is how Russia has resigned to the strategic direction taken by its Baltic neighbors. Despite being home to significant Russian minorities, the Baltic states remain deeply distrustful of Russia, culminating into their neorealist reading of the strategic dynamics of the post-Soviet neighborhood.

George Kennan, the veteran American diplomat credited for coining the concept of “containment” warned the West in the 1990s against the promotion of democracy and human rights into the post-Soviet space. Arguing with a great deal of clarity, Kennan insisted that doing so would amount to “a strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions.”15 As with most parts of the eu’s exter-nal policies, the EaP as discussed in this article has become the medium for this same end—the promotion of Brussels’s strategic interests in the contested neighborhood. It certainly leads to the conclusion that the Ukraine conflict epitomizes the simmering resistance to the post-Cold War international order of unbridled Western triumphalism.

If there is any lesson to be learnt, the decomposing bodies, the smoldering airplane wreckage, and the senseless destruction resulting from the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight mh17 across rebel-held Donetsk in eastern Ukraine by a Buk surface-to-air missile is by far the most sobering critique of what has become of the post-Cold War European regional order. The eu, according to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, should brace for a long confrontation with

14 “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” on October 24, 2014 accessed from http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23137 (October 27, 2014).

15 Robert Skidelski, “Kennan’s Revenge: Remembering the Reasons for the Cold War.” The Guardian, April 23, 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/apr/23/project -syndicate-robert-skidelsky-kennan-revenge-russia-ukraine (October 18, 2014).

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Moscow over the future of Ukraine,16 a statement which all the more begs the question of how to reconcile the eu’s putative ideational status as a normative power with the saber rattling power of the Russian Federation.

There can be no breakthrough in the crisis without having the lead protago-nist actively playing a part in achieving any negotiated settlement—a fact that all the more makes the acknowledgement of Russia’s role and interests as the region’s economic and military power indispensable. This will require an understanding of the currently tenuous security conditions on the ground. The goal of stabilizing the eu’s eastern frontiers cannot be treated in isolation to this overwhelming truth.

Given the importance of outcomes in this high stake gamble, the current posturing by Moscow and Brussels has abundantly revealed that both sides have no consistent end plan for this tussle. Russia has not hidden its determi-nation to continuing destabilizing Ukraine until the eu relents in dragging Ukraine into a Western orbit. The West on the hand, despite its statements to the contrary, lacks the strategic fortitude to risk a potentially costly military collision with Moscow in defense of Ukraine. There is also no palpable politi-cal will in Brussels to fully embrace Ukraine into full eu membership. On this account, Kiev must begin to count its losses and consider reversing from an openly pro-eu posture to a non-aligned state.

After all is said and done, Ukrainians would have to honestly answer the question of the future of their country. In other words, as Roman Szporluk, Harvard University’s professor emeritus of Ukrainian history asks “should Donetsk be the ‘future’ of Lviv or the other way round?”17 And indeed, as has been explained in this paper, beyond strategic ambitions, Ukraine is by no means of any significance to the eu. Which is why as unorthodox as this may sound, it is about time for the eu to gracefully disengage in Ukraine and ultimately work towards restoring Kiev’s neutral stance. This offers the best possible prospect for normalizing relations with Moscow, restoring peace and security to Ukraine and ultimately restoring its capacity for viable state building.

16 Arne Delfs and Brian Parkin, “Merkel Evokes Cold War in Warning of Long Ukraine Crisis” Bloomberg, September 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-29/merkel-says -eu-u-s-may-be-facing-long-ukraine-crisis.html (Accessed on September 30, 2014).

17 Donetsk and Lviv are the citadels of the pro-Moscow and pro-eu centers of Ukraine respectively. “Ukraine Can be a Neutral State” http://www.aspeninstitute.cz/en/article/2 -2014-ukraine-can-be-a-neutral-state-an-interview-with-roman-szporluk-by-filip -memches/ Accessed on November 28, 2014.

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Conclusion

This article set out to analyze how the Ukraine conflict is predicated on the perceived and real changes to the configuration of the regional order and how that is construed by the contending actors. It has been argued in this article that the Russian Federation and the eu, as the principal contenders, are driven by their respective normative worldviews, which have incidentally come to a head in Ukraine. The theoretical basis of the arguments made in this article has been drawn mainly from Ian Manners’ theory of normative power Europe.

Along this line of thinking, I contend that the eu has had its sights on exporting its brand of liberal norms to Eastern Europe since the official col-lapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites in the region. Many within the bloc have justified this eastward policy on the moral imperative of the ‘shared European’ heritage. It has particularly being very unrelenting in getting Russia to tow this line by integrating it into the post-Cold War liberal European order, ranging from a web of bilateral to multilateral initiatives on a host of issues.

As has been argued in this article, the EaP has exposed serious deficiencies in the eu’s normative and benign strategic capacities. That the bloc’s heavy weights, France and Germany have not actively backed the EaP tells a lot about what they think of the status quo. France’s position on the EaP, really reflects the broad lack of interest by some of the core states in the bloc to engage in a confrontation with Russia over Ukraine.

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