UK Biological Security Strategy

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A. Strategic context 9
Part Two – Our Response 13
A. Understand 15
B. Prevent 18
C. Detect 23
D. Respond 26
F. The role of industry and academia in
biological security 33
Strategy Implementation 37
Annex B – Glossary 41
among the highest impact risks faced
by any society – threatening lives and
causing disruption to public services
and the economy. This is true whether
such outbreaks occur naturally, such
as pandemic influenza or emerging
infectious diseases, or in the less likely
event of a disease being caused by
an accidental release from scientific
or industrial facilities, or as the result
of a deliberate biological attack. Large
scale disease outbreaks in animals
or plants can be equally significant in
terms of economic, environmental and
social impact.
interconnected world, diseases that emerge
in one country can soon prove a global
threat – either directly where disease spreads
or by destabilising already vulnerable regions.
Britain is a global nation, open to the world
and outward facing. This means we are
exposed to these risks, both at home and
overseas, but it also gives us the opportunity
to work with international partners to tackle
such threats at source.
this risk landscape is evolving. As technology
develops and improves we are better able to
counter these threats but are also potentially
exposed to new risks. As a global leader in
biological sciences, we have an opportunity
to demonstrate our expertise and be at the
forefront of work to meet these challenges.
As a Government, we already act both at
home and overseas to protect UK citizens and
British interests from the risk of a significant
disease outbreak, no matter the source. This
strategy brings together, and sets out in one
place for the first time, the wide range of
activity that is carried out across Government
to do this. It also explains how in the future
we will co-ordinate our activity more strongly
and take a truly comprehensive approach to
meet the evolving risks (and opportunities) in
this area. This will mean closer work between
departments, so that prevention activity, the
deployment of response capabilities, research
programmes, and our engagement with
international partners, industry and academia
are aligned and their impact maximised.
The strategy also recognises the importance
of intervening early to prevent biological
threats from emerging, or from spreading
once they emerge. To this end, it sets
out how we will make best use of our
international activity to help reduce the risks
to the UK and our interests, at home and
overseas. This includes our engagement with
international partners (at local, regional and
national levels) and forums.
Home Office
Steve Brine MP
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Public Health and Primary Care
Department of Health and Social Care
Lord Gardiner
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Rural Affairs and Biosecurity
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Our investment in overseas biological security
education and our international work on
global health security, led by DHSC and
DFID, is building resilience to health threats
in developing countries. We achieve this
through:
preparedness and response capacity.
better vaccines, drugs, diagnostics
resistance through research, better
developing countries.
partners to strengthen global health
systems and improving their response to
emerging health risks.
of ensuring that we can rely on the right
science capabilities in this field. The world-
leading capabilities within Government and
in UK industry and academia need to be
sustained for the future. We also need to
guarantee that in addressing biological risks
we do not impede legitimate research and
development activity that will be crucial to
combating current and future threats, and
which makes an important contribution to
UK economic prosperity.
in a co-ordinated way across and beyond
Government, and thinking globally that we
will be best prepared to meet the threat of
significant disease outbreaks (however
first time the work that takes place
across Government to protect the
UK and its interests from significant
biological risks, no matter how these
occur and no matter who or what
they affect. It reflects on the evolving
landscape and sets out how we will
build on our existing activity to
further improve our ability to reduce
and respond to risks, and to
exploit opportunities.
the nature of the biological risks and the
opportunities we face, and looks at how this
landscape is continuing to evolve. It notes
that while the likelihood of many of the worst
case biological risks is low (particularly those
that describe accidental releases or deliberate
attacks), their potential impact is significant.
Factors such as globalisation and developing
technology will affect our risk picture –
bringing both challenges and opportunities.
Part Two – Our Response
response to biological risks:
today and could face in the future.
• Prevent biological risks from emerging
(where possible) or from threatening
the UK and UK interests.
• Detect, characterise and report biological
risks when they do emerge as early and
reliably as possible.
reached the UK or UK interests to lessen
their impact and to enable a rapid return to
business as usual.
pillars and are drawn out separately:
• All elements of the Government’s response
must be underpinned by the right
scientific capabilities and capacity, now
and in the future.
opportunities that the biological sector
offers the UK, as well as thinking about
the risks.
Strategy Implementation
departments’ existing portfolios and
also commitments that can only be delivered
if Government works together across
departments. A new cross-departmental
other new commitments. This governance
board will report to the National Security
Council (NSC), through the Security Minister.
The Government Chief Scientific Adviser
(GCSA) will maintain oversight of the
strategy’s outcomes.
Part One – The Context
1 Summarised in the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf
2 Significant animal diseases are also covered in the National Security Risk Assessment.
3 Within the context of this strategy, the terms ‘plant diseases’ and ‘plant health’ should be taken to cover plant pests as well as pathogens.
Pathogens are micro-organisms - such as bacteria and viruses - that cause disease.
4 ‘Notifiable animal diseases’ are those that carry a legal obligation to report to the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) – those that are
‘exotic’ are those diseases not normally present in the UK.
5 Taylor LH, Latham SM, Woolhouse ME, ‘Risk factors for human disease emergence’, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2001) 356, 983–989.
A. Strategic context
biological security. In this strategy we use the
term to cover the protection of the UK and
UK interests from biological risks (particularly
significant disease outbreaks) whether these
arise naturally, or through the less likely
event of an accidental release of hazardous
biological material from laboratory facilities,
or a deliberate biological attack. These risks
could affect humans, animals or plants.
The risks
(NSRA1), based on a judgement of both
likelihood and impact, identifies a major human
health crisis (such as pandemic influenza) as
one of the most significant civil emergency
risks facing the UK (a Tier One risk). Such an
outbreak could have the potential to cause
hundreds of thousands of fatalities and to cost
the UK tens of billions of pounds. Antimicrobial
Resistance is also included in the NSRA as
a Tier One risk. Lord O’Neill estimated, in his
independent review on AMR, that if no action
was taken, by 2050, AMR will account for an
extra 10 million deaths a year globally.
Alongside this, a deliberate biological attack
against the UK is a Tier Two risk in the 2015
NSRA – again based on a judgement of
both likelihood and impact. While the current
placement is based on the assessment that
this risk is low likelihood and high impact, the
NSRA assesses that biological (and chemical)
attacks against the UK or its Armed Forces,
and the proliferation of chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) technology
to state and non-state actors, are aspects
of this risk picture that may become more
likely over the longer term. The UK’s counter
terrorism strategy, CONTEST, also sets out
the importance of preparing for the highest
impact terrorist risks, including those using
biological agents.
diseases3 are also far-reaching, and such
outbreaks are more likely to occur. Alongside
the continuous management of diseases
endemic to the UK, there were 22 outbreaks
of exotic notifiable animal diseases4 in the UK
between August 2000 and December 2017.
These individual outbreaks are estimated to
have incurred costs to the Government ranging
from £300,000 to more than £3 billion. Plant
and animal disease outbreaks can also have
significant effects on the environment and
on human health. Around 60% of all human
diseases and 75% of all new and emerging
infectious diseases are zoonotic diseases – that
is, naturally transmitted from animals to people.5
the UK Government and Devolved
Administrations already invest hundreds of
millions of pounds each year to address
biological risks. It is vital that we ensure that
this investment is well co-ordinated across
Government and that the public is getting the
best possible value for money.
Changing risks and opportunities
is constantly changing. The continuing
global trends of migration towards urban
centres, and the expansion of international
travel, increase the potential for diseases to
spread. Other drivers such as changes in
diets in urban populations and the rapidly
rising demand for animal-sourced foods will
increase the interactions between humans,
domestic livestock and wildlife, changing the
nature of the risk of new zoonotic6 outbreaks.
Since the 2014-16 Ebola epidemic in
West Africa, the UK has substantially
increased its international support and
Official Development Assistance (ODA)
global health threats, led by the Department
for International Development (DFID) and
the Department of Health and Social Care
(DHSC), as part of the wider government
response. The Government’s Independent
Commission on Aid Impact (ICAI) carried
out a learning review of the aid funded
programme and research portfolio following
the Ebola outbreak, and awarded an
amber-green score overall in January 2018,
highlighting progress made.
international borders. Disease outbreaks
indirect through the loss of regional stability
negatively affecting trade, causing migration
pressures and creating ungoverned spaces
in which terrorism and criminality can flourish.
In this context our international development
programmes – which save and improve the
lives of millions of people in the poorest areas
6 Zoonoses are diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans.
of the world by building capacity to combat
infectious diseases and address increased
drug-resistance through supporting the
and vaccines – contribute to protecting UK
citizens from significant disease threats and
securing the UK’s long term national security.
The pace of global technological change and
the democratisation of scientific knowledge
have the potential to shape the biological
risk picture in the future – both positively and
negatively. While a deliberate biological attack
against the UK by a state or terrorist group
is unlikely, technology and the spread of
scientific knowledge online have the potential
to bring the necessary tools within the reach
of an increasing number of actors. However,
these developments have potential to bring
great benefit, creating opportunities for new
preventive, diagnostic and treatment options
for diseases of epidemic and pandemic
potential, new means of detecting and
addressing potential risks, and significant
possibilities for our world-leading biological
sciences sector – which generates more than
220,000 jobs and over £60 billion each year
for our economy – to add to UK prosperity.
We often do not need cutting-edge
technology to make major biological
security gains. In less developed countries,
transferring knowledge of basic infection
control techniques, and better engineered
and maintained infrastructure, have the
potential to drastically reduce cases of
endemic diseases such as cholera and
malaria. To realise these benefits, we must
encourage and facilitate legitimate research
and technology development, while ensuring
responsible science – including having the
right controls in place to prevent misuse.
DFID’s work on strengthening health
systems in developing countries continues to
highlight the critical role of collaboration and
partnership with local, regional and national
partners (who understand the local context)
if we are to build robust resilience to health
threats.
The global political context in which these
risks and opportunities sit also continues to
evolve. The UK is committed to promoting
global peace, security and stability, and
is a leading supporter of the international
rules-based system. Our commitment to
our extensive co-operation with international
partners remains steadfast and we will
continue to help ensure that the global
community is able to respond to changing
risks and identify opportunities. The UK is
leaving the European Union (EU) and while
our future relationship with the EU is still to be
determined, we are not leaving Europe. We
will want the strongest possible links with our
European neighbours, as well as our close
friends in North America, the Commonwealth
and other important partners around
the world.
This document sets out our strategy for
meeting these challenges and exploiting
the opportunities – some of this will be
achievable within this Parliament, while some
will only be achievable in the longer term.
Alongside this strategy we must be
conscious of a range of other relevant
national and international programmes,
These include the vision set out in the 2015
Strategic Defence and Security Review, our
Global Health Security and UK Antimicrobial
Resistance Strategy, and our counter
terrorism strategy CONTEST, the National
Counter-Proliferation Strategy to 2020, the
UK Influenza Preparedness Strategy, the
Strategy for UK Life Sciences, the Vision
and high level Strategy for UK Animal
and Plant Health Research to 2020 and
Beyond, and the Strategy for Agricultural
Technologies and the Department for
International Development’s (DFID’s) 2016
Research Review.
or replace the work set out in those other
documents (many of which focus on specific
areas within this landscape in more detail),
but rather to set out an overarching narrative
for how the cross-Government effort fits
together, and to highlight those areas where
we will seek to do more collectively.
B. Main assumptions to 2020 and
beyond
set out in the previous section, there are a
number of specific assumptions that inform
our response to significant biological risks
(including those risks highlighted in the
2015 NSRA). These are:
physically interconnected through travel
health security and deliberate threats. This
will lead to challenges, but there will also
be increased opportunities and capacities
for strengthened global surveillance and
early response.
and growth, as well as having a positive
impact on our security by allowing us to
address risks in new ways. However, such
technology will also become more available
to state and non-state actors, who may
misuse it to endanger our security.
For natural biological risks
urbanisation will increase the potential for
new infectious diseases to spread beyond
the areas of the world in which they were
once contained (such as the spread of
Dengue over the last 60 years), and to do
so rapidly. In many cases, such as Ebola,
diseases originating with animals will
affect humans.
implemented both nationally and
emergence and spread of antimicrobial
resistance (AMR), which can lead to
drug-resistant infections in both humans
and animals, and will have a massive
impact on both human health and the
global economy.
has the potential to lead to an increase
in the incidence of vaccine-preventable
diseases, including polio, diphtheria
will also increase the likelihood of pests
and vector-borne diseases7 spreading to
new areas of the globe, as they and their
carriers are able to survive in countries
where environments would previously not
have supported their circulation.
in pesticides can lead to a build-up
of resistance in pests (pathogens,
invertebrates and weeds), creating new
challenges for control.
growth of biological sciences sectors in a
greater number of countries, may increase
the likelihood of an accidental release of
hazardous biological material.
For deliberate threats
• While in the UK it is more likely that attacks
will seek to use conventional or low
sophistication methodologies (for example,
bladed weapons, home-made explosives,
shotguns), it is plausible that a threat from
crude biological weapons could become
more likely in the future.
• The internet, in particular the ‘dark web’,
provides increasing opportunities for our
adversaries to obtain expertise, materials
and equipment, including those associated
with biological weapons, that may not
otherwise be readily available in the UK.
• The 2015 NSRA states that biological
(and chemical) attacks against the UK or
its Armed Forces, and the proliferation of
CBRN technology to state and non-state
actors, may become more likely in the
longer term (beyond 2020).
7 Diseases transmitted by the bite of infected arthropod species, such as mosquitoes and ticks.
Part Two – Our Response 13
Part Two – Our Response
quality of our preparedness planning,
and we have world-leading capabilities
to address significant biological risks.
Across local and national Government
and the Devolved Administrations,
the UK invests hundreds of millions of
pounds a year in protecting against
and preparing for disease outbreaks
and biological incidents. However,
an international as well as a domestic
perspective.
world-view are essential if we are to avoid
the risks of inefficiencies and of gaps
going undetected or opportunities going
unexploited. We may also fail to maximise the
impact of our activities or to tackle issues as
quickly as we need to. This approach is even
more essential in the context of the evolving
risk landscape described in Part One. This
first UK Biological Security Strategy sets out
how we will do the following:
• Take an all-hazards approach – drawing
together our work on natural, accidental
and deliberate risks, for human, animal
and plant health. By linking the existing
cross-Government efforts on biological
approach, we can ensure a more effective
and efficient response. This is critical
in an area where not only do the risks
themselves often overlap, but where their
prevention and our ability to respond also
rely on complementary and sometimes
interdependent capabilities. A more
maintained more efficiently, and also to be
more effectively deployed and co-ordinated
when needed.
risks at source, recognising that in an
era of globalisation events overseas
can quickly escalate to become a direct
threat to the UK or UK interests. In
this effort we will not only include those
activities we undertake internationally
interests, but also acknowledge the way
in which our international development
programme directly benefits UK health
security. While focused on delivering
benefit for the world’s poorest, the work
of our development programme to help
build health system capacity in countries
overseas also reduces the risk of diseases
and drug resistance spreading or reaching
the UK by tackling these issues at source.
Biological Security Strategy14
sets out areas where we want to do better
and/or do more, much of its focus is on
ensuring that our existing capabilities are fully
coherent, fully exploited and able to flex to
the challenges of a rapidly evolving world. We
have learnt (and must continue to learn) from
our responses to past disease outbreaks
and biological incidents – recognising
mouth disease outbreak in the UK led to a
shift in Government’s approach to managing
a biological incident. The success of this
was demonstrated by the way in which
Government has responded to subsequent
outbreaks, including the 2007 foot-and-
mouth disease outbreak.
Government response is built around
four pillars:
face today and could face in the future.
B. Prevent biological risks from emerging
(where possible) or from threatening
the UK and UK interests.
C. Detect, characterise and report biological
risks when they do emerge as early and
reliably as possible.…