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UBS AG P.O. Box 8098 Zürich Public Policy EMEA Group Governmental Affairs Dr. Gabriele C. Holstein Bahnhofstrasse 45 P.O. Box 8098 Zürich Tel. +41-44-234 44 86 Fax +41-44-234 32 45 gabriele.holstein@ubs.com www.ubs.com
DG Markt European Commission Rue de spa 2 1000 Bruxelles
18 October 2012
Re: European Commission consultation document on ‘Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) – Product Rules, Liquidity Management, Depositary, Money Market Funds, Long-term Investments’
Dear Sir/Madam,
UBS would like to thank the European Commission for the opportunity to comment on the consultation document on ‘Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) - Product Rules, Liquidity Management, Depositary, Money Market Funds, Long-term Investments’. Please find attached our response to the Paper. We would be happy to discuss with you, in further detail, any comments you may have. Please do not hesitate to contact Gabriele Holstein on +41 44 234 4486.
Yours sincerely, UBS AG
Dr. Thomas Bischof Dr. Gabriele C. Holstein Head of Legislative & Regulatory Initiatives
Head of Public Policy EMEA Group Governmental Affairs
Response from UBS Page 1 of 39
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UBS Response to the European Commission consultation on Undertakings for
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS)
Product Rules, Liquidity Management, Depositary, Money Market Funds, Long-
term Investments
INTRODUCTION
UBS would like to thank the European Commission for the opportunity to comment on
its consultation paper on further regulation of UCITS. Please find below our high-level
comments as well as detailed responses to the specific questions posed in the
consultation.
As a general point, we consider it important to recognise that there has been a
significant amount of regulatory change impacting investment management in Europe
in recent years. In light of this, we believe it is important to have a period in which
further regulatory change is limited in order for recent changes to effectively bed-down.
For example, the recent UCITS IV requirements further enhanced the level of investor
protection offered by UCITS. Also, we consider that several of the issues covered in this
consultation, including in respect of transparency regarding counterparties,
collateralisation, type of collateral and securities lending revenues and costs, are already
appropriately addressed in the recently published ESMA “Guidelines on ETFs and other
UCITS issues”.
In relation to the question whether there is a need to review the UCITS requirements
regarding the scope of assets and exposures deemed eligible for a UCITS fund, we
highlight that, whilst the classification of eligible instruments does not cause any
problems, the lack of guidance as to how these assets could be used to implement
investment strategies leads to inconsistent interpretations across the EU. Therefore,
instead of reviewing the UCITS rules, we believe that the focus should be on ESMA
providing further guidance to ensure consistent interpretation of existing requirements.
We also note that, in our view, the most fundamental change that is required to ensure
the effective operation of UCITS is greater harmonisation of the tax framework at an EU
level.
ELIGIBLE ASSETS
Response from UBS Page 2 of 39
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The European Commission (EC) notes that, under the UCITS framework, UCITS funds
are required to invest in instruments that are sufficiently liquid. For this purpose, Article
50 of the UCITS Directive provides a list of eligible assets which comprises transferable
securities, money market instruments, units of collective investment schemes, bank
deposits and financial derivative instruments (FDI). It is also possible for a UCITS to gain
exposure to an index through the use of FDI provided that the index complies with a
defined set of criteria.
The UCITS Directive currently permits UCITS funds to gain exposure to non-eligible
assets in a number of ways. Derivative instruments may be used to gain exposure to
eligible assets as long as the global exposure relating to financial derivative instruments
does not exceed 100 percent of the total net value of the UCITS portfolio and complies
with the risk spreading rules. Currently the global exposure is measured by leverage
(commitment approach) or by the value at risk (VaR). However, VaR does not measure
leverage. Regarding the FDI itself, the manager is free to choose the most appropriate
structure, ranging from plain vanilla to exotic payoffs.
Box 1
Q1: Do you consider there is a need to review the scope of assets and
exposures that are deemed eligible for a UCITS fund?
The UCITS Directive provides a robust framework ensuring strong investor protection
which has only recently has been enhanced with the UCITS IV requirements. We hence
do not consider that there is a need to review the scope of assets and exposures
deemed eligible for a UCITS fund. But whilst the classification of eligible instruments
does not cause any problems, the lack of guidance as to how these assets could be used
to implement investment strategies leads to inconsistent interpretations across the EU.
Therefore, instead of reviewing the UCITS rules, we believe that the focus should be on
ESMA providing further guidance to ensure consistent interpretation of existing
requirements.
Q2: Do you consider that all investment strategies current observed in the
marketplace are in line with what investors expect of a product regulated by
UCITS?
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Expectations and needs of investors vary widely. We believe that it is important that the
UCITS framework remains flexible enough to allow a well-diversified product offering
while maintaining a high level of investor protection. Whether actual investment
strategies are aligned with expectations for a UCITS product are dependant on how
investment objectives and strategy as well as risks are communicated to investors. It is of
upmost importance that investors’ expectations are set in the right manner. Alongside
the prospectus and the annual report, the recently introduced KIIDs will ensure that this
communication takes place in a client-focused way i.e. ensuring that expectations are
aligned with the fund’s investment strategy.
Q3: Do you consider there is a need to further develop rules on the liquidity of
eligible assets? What kind of rules could be envisaged? Please evaluate possible
consequences for all stakeholders involved.
Liquidity risk deals with the situation where “a fund cannot meet the redemption
payment or is able to do so but with such an investment deviation that it could generate
claims from investors”. It can also relate to the situation when “a transaction cannot be
conducted at quoted market price due to the size of the required trade relative to
normal trading lots”. A fund is required to assess and to manage liquidity risk (see e.g.
CESR 09-963 / Level 2).
Measures to mitigate liquidity risk include having liquidity buffers (cash, more highly
liquid instruments, credit lines) as well as other measures such as redemption fees /
limits, temporary suspension, swing pricing and side pockets. The difficulty of managing
liquidity risk is, however, that not all measures are equally applicable to all types of
funds and that pure quantitative models and rules are often unable to capture situations
in which liquidity dries up. The management of liquidity risk is hence a science, but to
some extent, also an art.
Where an additional set of quantitative rules / restrictions related to liquidity
management are defined, it bears the risk that liquidity management is no longer
considered holistically by the fund. Mechanistic rules – in particular when applied to all
types of funds – will not be able to ensure that liquidity needs will be met all times.
Instead of strengthening liquidity, such rules may instead weaken the liquidity
management of funds. Instead of developing additional rules on the liquidity of eligible
assets, the focus should be set on ensuring consistent interpretation and application of
existing requirements across the industry.
Response from UBS Page 4 of 39
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Q4: What is the current market practice regarding the exposure to non-eligible
assets? What is the estimated percentage of UCITS exposed to non-eligible
assets and what is the average proportion of these assets in such a UCITS'
portfolio? Please describe the strategies used to gain exposure to non-eligible
assets and the non-eligible assets involved. If you are an asset manager, please
provide also information specific to your business.
We do not have any information on the percentage of UCITS exposed to non-eligible
assets and on the average proportion of such assets in such a UCITS’ portfolio.
A UCITS may directly or indirectly gain exposure to non-eligible assets. Directly via the so
called ‘trash ratio’ or indirectly by investing into eligible assets (e.g. structured financial
instruments that qualify as a transferable security, derivatives on eligible indices, closed
end funds) with the performance of such instruments linked to the performance of
assets not eligible to be purchased directly by the UCITS.
Regulation sets a variety of requirements for such cases. As an example, when an index
follows certain diversification criteria, no “look-through” is required, which allows, for
example, a UCITS to build up exposure to certain commodity indices.
Typically, we see exposures being built up to asset classes like real estate, hedge funds /
fund-of-funds, commodities or private equity. In our view, this allows a UCITS to build
up a better diversified portfolio.
Q5: Do you consider there is a need to further refine rules on exposure to non-
eligible assets? What would be the consequences of the following measures for
all stakeholders involved: (i) Preventing exposure to certain non-eligible assets
(e.g. by adopting a "look through" approach for transferable securities,
investments in financial indices, or closed ended funds). (ii) Defining specific
exposure limits and risk spreading rules (e.g. diversification) at the level of the
underlying assets.
We are in general not supportive of preventing exposures to certain non-eligible assets.
The outlined “look through” approach is, in our view sub-optimal, for a number of
reasons.
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First, we expect a “look through” approach to have a broad impact on the use of
financial indices, both in the case of eligible and non-eligible assets, by restricting the
use of a certain part of such indices.
Second, the approach is very difficult to operate in practice. It will require the
regrouping of non-eligible assets into eligible assets (that can be considered as
underlying) versus those which continue to be non-eligible assets (and still cannot be
considered as underlying). It is in our view difficult to make a comprehensive grouping
of all assets into these two categories. We would as an example, be unsure whether
“Infrastructure” should be considered a distinct asset class or a “Private Equity”
investment into infrastructure.
Third, a look though approach assumes that (only) assets which are eligible for direct
investment are eligible as an underlying. Thus, it would deem inconsistent to have assets
eligible as an underlying, but not allow the fund to directly invest into such assets. Thus,
under such an approach, we would argue the assets eligible as an underlying would also
have to be eligible for direct investment.
Compared with the first measure, we are more supportive of the second i.e. defining
specific exposure limits and risk spreading rules (e.g. diversification) at the level of the
underlying assets. We note that this is already the case for financial indices and could
also be applied for alternative wrappers.
Q6: Do you see merit in distinguishing or limiting the scope of eligible
derivatives based on the payoff of the derivative (e.g. plain vanilla vs. exotic
derivatives)? If yes, what would be the consequences of introducing such a
distinction? Do you see a need for other distinctions?
We do not see any particular merit in distinguishing or limiting the scope of eligible
derivatives based on the payoff of the derivative. It is in our view more important to
consider the use of the derivative and the impact it has on the fund profile.
Should the EC nevertheless consider making such a distinction, we would emphasize
our view that any criteria for doing so would need to be well defined. Typically, a certain
payoff can be created by using or combining different instruments. As an example, to
get the payoff of a call option, a portfolio manager can buy/sell a call option or he can
Response from UBS Page 6 of 39
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combine cash, the underlying asset and a put option to receive an identical payoff.
Regulations preventing the portfolio manager to use call options would thus not restrict
him to get the pay-off of a call option (the regulatory intention), but he could rather
apply more complex and expensive techniques to get that pay-off. It is therefore
important to recognise that the complexity of a derivative is not the same as its risk and
a distinction based only on complexity may not be appropriate.
To distinguish plain vanilla derivatives and exotic derivatives, we would suggest to apply
criteria similar to those of the Swiss FINMA. According to the FINMA Ordinance on
Collective Investment Schemes, CISO-FINMA (951.312) an exotic derivative is defined as
a “derivative with a mode of operation that cannot be described as a basic form of
derivative or a combination of basic forms of derivatives” e.g. a path-dependent option,
option with several factors or option with contract modification. Plain-vanilla derivatives
would in particular be any combination of futures/forwards and options such as e.g.
swaps and swaptions.
Most UCITS use derivatives in some form; be it for the purpose of hedging or for the
purpose of efficient portfolio management. Typically, most instruments are “plain
vanilla” derivatives, with the exception of funds that run quite complex derivative
strategies. Any attempt to distinguish between, or limit the scope of, eligible derivatives
based on the payoff should ensure that the use of plain vanilla derivatives is not
restricted by any means.
Q7: Do you consider that market risk is a consistent indicator of global exposure
relating to derivative instruments? Which type of strategy employs VaR as a
measure for global exposure? What is the proportion of funds using VaR to
measure global exposure? What would be the consequence for different
stakeholders of using only leverage (commitment method) as a measure of
global exposure? If you are an asset manager, please provide also information
specific to your business.
We have no figures on the proportion of strategies which employ VaR as a measure for
global exposure, but believe the figure to be increasing.
Initially the VaR approach was used by funds with complex strategies in particular and
those hitting the limits defined by the commitment approach. Given that the
commitment approach is an over-simplifying approach to measure leverage / risk and
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the VaR approach requires a manager to better understand the characteristics of the
portfolio giving a much more accurate picture on the actual risk / risk factors, we see
some trend towards the VaR approach. This is also supported by the fact that the SRRI
on the KIIDs, is in certain cases, also based on a VaR approach.
We do not agree that the leverage test (gross leverage or commitment approach) should
be the only available method to calculate global exposure. Such a limitation is likely to
put significant additional restrictions on the management of UCITS investment
strategies, potentially increasing both the risk of the strategy and the cost to the
investor. As an example, actively managing the currency risk of a portfolio often uses a
large portion of the allowed leverage. The commitment approach thus restricts such
currency risk management, which might have an adverse effect in terms of investor
protection by increasing the overall risk of the portfolio.
We thus strongly recommend that the VaR approach continues to be permitted as a
means of managing and restricting the risk of a UCITS portfolio. We also believe that
the VaR approach should be permitted to be used by a fund as the single measure of
global exposure and should not have to be used in conjunction with other measures.
Q8: Do you consider that the use of derivatives should be limited to
instruments that are traded or would be required to be traded on multilateral
platforms in accordance with the legislative proposal on MiFIR? What would be
the consequences for different stakeholders of introducing such an obligation?
We do not agree that derivatives should be limited to instruments that are traded or
would be traded on multilateral platforms. Currently multilateral platforms only cover a
limited range of derivatives in a broad and efficient manner. A requirement to have all
derivatives to be traded on such platform would have strong negative implication for
many strategies (e.g. in high yield or emerging market debt funds) by limiting the ability
of UCITS to manage the market risk of their portfolios. Furthermore FX forwards are not
exchange traded. If UCITS were limited to using only derivatives traded on multilateral
platforms, they would be significantly restricted in their ability to hedge currency risk. It
should also be noted that EMIR introduces reporting requirements for derivatives that
should materially increase the transparency of the derivatives market. Furthermore, EMIR
introduces risk mitigation requirements for non-cleared OTC derivatives including with
regard to margin (non-cleared derivatives would not be required to be traded on a
Response from UBS Page 8 of 39
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trading venue under MiFIR). These requirements should significantly enhance the
robustness of the market for derivatives not traded on trading venues.
EFFICIENT PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT (EPM)
The EC highlights that, according to the UCITS Directive, Member States are
empowered to authorise UCITS to employ certain techniques and instruments for the
purpose of EPM subject to conditions laid down by Member States. EPM techniques
may for example include securities lending and repurchase agreements (repos). Criteria
that must be fulfilled for techniques and instruments to be considered for the purpose
of EPM are risk reduction, reduction of cost or generation of additional capital or
income, provided that the level of risk is consistent with the risk profile of the UCITS and
risk diversification rules.
EPM techniques are widely used and potentially involve a substantial proportion of any
given UCITS' portfolio. Questions have been raised regarding: (1) the transparency of
EPM techniques; (2) counterparty risk assumed by those funds using EPM; (3) the quality
of collateral or the reinvestment of collateral. Regulators around the world are currently
assessing the systemic risk inherent in the use of EPM techniques. The EC Green Paper
on Shadow Banking also addressed certain aspects of the above topics.
Box 2
Q9: Please describe the type of transaction and instruments that are currently
considered as EPM techniques. Please describe the type of transactions and
instruments that, in your view, should be considered as EPM techniques.
Currently, securities lending, repurchase agreements (repos), reverse repos and
reinvestment of cash collateral are considered as EPM techniques. There are two
fundamentally different securities lending models: i) principal lending and ii) agent
lending. In the principal lending model, all credit risk from the lending market stops with
the principal, i.e. is not borne by the Fund. Another differentiating dimension is what
type of lending activity the lender engages in, significantly impacting the level of return
generated.
Q10: Do you consider there is a specific need to further address issues or risks
related to the use of EPM techniques? If yes, please describe the issues you
consider merit attention and the appropriate way of addressing such issues.
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We believe that the recently published ESMA “Guidelines on ETFs and other UCITS
issues” thoroughly address the need for more transparency regarding counterparties,
collateralization, type of collateral and securities lending revenues and costs. However,
we would like to express our concern that different securities lending models will be
compared at the level of the ‘revenue split’ only, not properly taking into account the
underlying differences and ultimate revenue outcomes for the Funds. While we consider
that a forced comparison across providers is a sensible idea per se, we would emphasize
the importance that it is done in proper way, e.g. as in the case of OGC where the
scope is clearly defined. We regret that this approach has not been chosen for the
disclosure of securities lending revenues and costs/fees and would support a
reevaluation of the potential benefits of this approach.
Q11: What is the current market practice regarding the use of EPM techniques:
counterparties involved, volumes, liquidity constraints, revenues and revenue
sharing arrangements?
The use of EPM techniques is a common practice in the market place. The securities
lending models (principal vs. agent lending model), type of lending activities, i.e.
number of income sources (general collateral trading, special trading, dividend
business), volumes (utilization/lending ratio), quality and number of counterparties,
quality of indemnifications received, quality of collateral, diversification and constraints
(strict vs. loose limits), liquidity and minimum credit rating requirements, as well as
revenues and revenue sharing arrangements, vary widely across market participants.
Furthermore, volumes vary not only across market participants, but also across time as a
function of changing market demand for lending. The collateralisation ratios are also
subject to variation; some Luxembourg Funds apply the legally required 90%
collateralization ratio while others are 5% overcollateralized.
Q12: Please describe the type of policies generally in place for the use of EPM
techniques. Are any limits applied to the amount of portfolio assets that may,
at any given point in time, be the object of EPM techniques? Do you see any
merit in prescribing limits to the amount of fund assets that may be subject to
EPM? If yes, what would be the appropriate limit and what consequences
would such limits have on all the stakeholders affected by such limits? If you
are an asset manager, please provide also information specific to your business.
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Over time, on average and across UBS (Lux) Funds (ex MMFs which do not participate in
any lending programme), the lending ratio ‘only’ amounts to 25-30% (with significant
variation across markets and time) even in the absence of a specified maximum lending
ratio (not exceeding 100%) and despite the incentive for the securities lending principal
to maximize securities lending revenues where he participates proportionally in the
revenues. This is due to the fact that the cost of equity capital acts as a
counterbalancing mechanism to the incentive to maximise securities lending revenues
and thus ensures that securities lending is not used without bound.
When identifying amounts of assets a UCITS will make available to lend, many factors
should be taken into account (including, but not limited to, risk appetite, asset type and
level of redemptions). Therefore, a regulatory limit may be inappropriate.
Q13: What is the current market practice regarding the collateral received in
EPM? More specifically:
- are EPM transactions as a rule fully collateralized? Are EPM and collateral
positions marked-to-market on a daily basis? How often are margin calls made
and what are the usual minimum thresholds?
- does the collateral include assets that would be considered as non-eligible
under the UCITS Directive? Does the collateral include assets that are not
included in a UCITS fund's investment policy? If so, to what extent?
- to what extent do UCITS engage in collateral swap (collateral
upgrade/downgrade) trades on a fix-term basis?
We do not believe that securities lent are, as a rule, fully collateralized. UBS Global Asset
Management consistently applies 100% plus a margin and collateral is transferred daily
with all loans and collateral positions being marked-to-market on a daily basis.
We note that collateral is received as security and should not be subject to UCITS asset
eligibility rules. Notwithstanding this, collateral received generally complies with the
UCITS eligible assets requirement and in particular with ESMA’s “Guidelines on ETFs and
other UCITS issues”. Collateral received - not only in the case of UBS, but also more
generally in the market - is often not included in the UCITS’ investment policy. As
collateral serves to mitigate against the risk of the securities lending counterparty
defaulting, it is important to require the collateral to be of high quality, liquid and well
diversified, but of a different type than the securities under the UCITS investment policy.
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Although we currently do not engage in collateral swap transactions on a fix term basis,
we note increased demand for such transactions following recent regulatory
developments. With prudent risk management, a UCITS that appropriately aligns the
fund objectives with its own risk management could undertake this activity – the level of
such activity should be defined by the UCITS.
Q14: Do you think that there is a need to define criteria on the eligibility,
liquidity, diversification and re-use of received collateral? If yes, what should
such criteria be?
We do not think that there is a need to define criteria on the eligibility, liquidity,
diversification and re-use of received collateral beyond ESMA’s “Guidelines on ETFs and
other UCITS issues”.
Q15: What is the market practice regarding haircuts on received collateral? Do
you see any merit in prescribing mandatory haircuts on received collateral by a
UCITS in EPM? If you are an asset manager, please provide also information
specific to your business.
Please find below an example of a haircut schedule:
1. MarginAs collateral for the lent securities we require to receive a portfolio of equal value plus margin.
Volatility regime Standard VolatileMargin 5% 5%
2. HaircutsThe collateral value of any security equals its market value net of the following haircuts:
Equities (constituents of one of the indices mentioned under point 3 below) 8% 10%
Government bonds US, JP, UK, DE, CH 0% 0%
Government bonds (Minimum rating A, excpet US, JP, UK, DE, CH) 2% 3%
Corporate bonds (Minimum rating A) 4% 5%
We do not see any merit in prescribing mandatory haircuts on collateral received by a
UCITS in EPM. Rather, a requirement to disclose the haircut policy, or more generally,
the whole collateral requirement, could be considered. We would, however, highlight in
this context that sophisticated clients already request and receive this type of
information today.
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Q16: Do you see a need to apply liquidity considerations when deciding the
term or duration of EPM transactions? What would the consequences be for the
fund if the EPM transactions were not "recallable" at any time? What would be
the consequences of making all EPM transactions "recallable" at any time?
We already have in place a policy that securities lent are recallable at any time. A
mandatory requirement to make all EPM transactions recallable would, however,
change the nature of the setup in that we would be legally required to do so. Further,
prohibiting UCITS from utilising term REPO or Securities Lending transactions would
reduce the effectiveness of EPM techniques.
Q17 Do you think that EPM transactions should be treated according to their
economic substance for the purpose of assessment of risks arising from such
transactions?
Whilst securities lending and repo are very similar in risk profile, the underlying contracts
differ, and they are therefore treated differently for accounting purposes, which we
believe to be entirely appropriate and consistent across UCITS and other funds. When a
loan is settled, title transfers to the borrower, but the UCITS retains the economic
exposure to the assets via the legal agreements used. Equally, when a UCITS holds an
asset as collateral, the economic exposure is retained by the borrower. This is one
reason why the mark to market process and daily collateral process is so important. In
the event of an asset which is on loan defaulting, any losses would be incurred by the
UCITS in the same way as they would if the asset were not lent. If an asset held as
collateral defaults, it is marked to market and additional collateral called for.
Q18: What is the current market practice regarding collateral provided by UCITS
through EPM transactions? More specifically, is the EPM counterparty allowed
to re-use the assets provided by a UCITS as collateral? If so, to what extent?
UBS UCITS funds do not engage in repo agreements. We therefore choose not to
comment on this question.
Q19: Do you think that there is a need to define criteria regarding the collateral
provided by a UCITS? If yes, what would be such criteria?
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No, we do not believe that there is a need to define such criteria. Collateral
requirements are thoroughly described in ESMA’s “Guidelines on ETFs and other UCITS
issues”.
Q20: What is the market practice in terms of information provided to investors
as regards EPM? Do you think that there should be greater transparency related
to the risks inherent in EPM techniques, collateral received in the context of
such techniques or earnings achieved thereby as well as their distribution?
The current market practice is to provide information to clients who request it, with
such clients generally being well informed and sophisticated clients. Consistent with
this, we believe information on EPM should be available to those who request it, but we
do not see a need for a mandatory requirement for greater transparency in relation to
the risks inherent in EPM techniques, collateral received or earnings achieved in the
context of such techniques as well as their distribution, beyond what is already required
by ESMA’s “Guidelines on ETFs and other UCITS issues”.
OTC DERIVATIVES
The EC considers that the introduction of the clearing obligation in EMIR raises the
question of how OTC derivative transactions should be dealt with when assessing UCITS
limits on counterparty risk. UCITS rules permit management companies to reduce UCITS
exposure to a counterparty of an OTC derivative transaction through the receipt of
collateral. Therefore, should a counterparty provide sufficient collateral (covering more
than 90% of the UCITS' exposure to this counterparty), even an investment strategy
where the entire UCITS portfolio consists of an exposure to a single counterparty does
not breach the counterparty risk exposure limits. Exposure to a single counterparty, even
if highly collateralised, raises concerns relating to insolvency or potential conflicts of
interest.
Management companies are required to calculate UCITS global exposure on at least a
daily basis. There is no corresponding requirement with respect to the calculation of the
OTC counterparty risk and issuer concentration. This discrepancy could lead to different
market practices with inherent risks to investor protection. The counterparty risk limit is
set as a percentage of UCITS assets. In order to apply this percentage, both the value of
the counterparty exposure (mark-to-market value of the derivative minus mark-to-
market value of the collateral) and the value of the UCITS assets must be up-to-date (or
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calculated on a daily basis). However, this requirement may be difficult to reconcile with
the fact that UCITS are permitted to value certain eligible assets on less frequent
intervals, such as units in closed-ended funds or securities that are not traded on
regulated markets.
Box 3
Q21: When assessing counterparty risk, do you see merit in clarifying the
treatment of OTC derivatives cleared through central counterparties? If so,
what would be the appropriate approach?
Yes, we agree that the counterparty risk of cleared OTC derivatives should be treated
differently. The requirement to centrally clear OTC derivatives that are clearing eligible
will result in a change in market practice with regard to margining of OTC derivative
trades. Whereas, currently, OTC derivative margin requirements are determined
bilaterally between the counterparties, EMIR prescribes minimum requirements for initial
margin and variation margin for centrally cleared derivatives. Furthermore, asset
managers will be required to post a narrow range of eligible collateral to CCPs as initial
and variation margin, thereby losing the previous flexibility of types of collateral
considered acceptable. We understand that the initial margin posted to a CCP would be
treated as an exposure to the CCP that could not be offset. Consequently, it is
important that clarification is provided as to how the currently defined limits on OTC
derivative exposures to a single counterparty apply in the context of central clearing. We
would advocate that the 5-10% limits are removed for any exposure to a CCP as such a
limit could prevent UCITS moving to central clearing. Also, the prohibition from re-using
cash obtained through repo transactions for the collateralisation of other investment
should be reviewed in the context of central clearing as UCITS should not be subject to
restrictions impeding their ability to provide sufficiently liquid collateral to CCPs.
Q22: For OTC derivatives not cleared through central counterparties, do you
think that collateral requirements should be consistent between the
requirements for OTC and EPM transactions?
While we are in favour of a consistent approach as it would facilitate the operational
management of collateral, it should also allow for sufficient flexibility in the approach to
to reflect differences in the nature of each transaction. We would emphasize the fact
that for an OTC deal, specific collateral is one to one related to a specific transaction. In
our EPM business, securities to be lent out are pooled across all funds being part of the
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securities lending agreement. As such EPM collateral is usually better diversified and
although the minimum credit quality might be marginally lower than in the OTC
business, it is still high quality. In the current CSA contracts between UBS wholesale
funds Switzerland / Luxembourg and third parties we only accept highly rated
government bonds and cash as collateral.
Q23: Do you agree that there are specific operational or other risks resulting
from UCITS contracting with a single counterparty? What measures could be
envisaged to mitigate those risks?
Yes, we agree that there are specific risks resulting from the use of a single
counterparty. The first risk which we would like to highlight is the time lag between the
execution and confirmation of an OTC deal which is best mitigated through a timely
confirmation such as confirmation within 24 hours instead of two days before maturity.
Another risk is where the counterparty would seek to unwind a position for whatever
reason.
Q24: What is the current market practice in terms of frequency of calculation of
counterparty risk and issuer concentration and valuation of UCITS assets? If you
are an asset manager, please also provide information specific to your business.
Daily valuation is current market practice.
Q25: What would be the benefits and costs for all stakeholders involved of
requiring calculation of counterparty risk and issuer concentration of the UCITS
on an at least daily basis?
For UBS wholesale funds, we apply daily valuation and daily calculation of counterparty
risk and issuer concentration. The benefit is to receive a transparent up to date overview
on exposures not only related to counterparty and concentration risk but also on
investment risk. These are the principles of good quality Portfolio Management practice.
Costs relate to data maintenance, data consolidation and updates on IT infrastructure.
Q26: How could such a calculation be implemented for assets with less frequent
valuations?
Response from UBS Page 16 of 39
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For assets with less frequent valuations we would stress the importance of having clear
processes and controls in place. The procedures for the valuation of UBS wholesale
funds are set out in the policy of the UBS Global Valuation Committee. In the absence
of market or vendor pricing, or if market or vendor pricing is deemed unreliable, illiquid
securities and financial instruments are valued based on a number of factors: (i)
analytical data, including analysts’ reports and financial statements, (ii) type of security,
(iii) public trading in similar securities of the issuer or of comparable companies, (iv) the
liquidity of the market for the security, including the nature and duration of restrictions
on trading, (v) whether the issuer has other securities and, if so, how those securities are
valued and (vi) other factors the portfolio manager deems relevant.
For illiquid securities and financial instruments without regular prices from an
independent pricing service, or readily-available indicative prices or bids from more than
one independent broker, valuation will be the mean of indicative prices obtained from
at least [X] independent dealers that have been approved by the Committee. If the only
indicative price can be obtained from an independent dealer, that price may be used,
however, where it is only available from an affiliate of UBS Global AM, the price must
be approved by the Committee. If indicative prices are not obtainable, the securities
shall be valued based on available information and thereafter submitted for final
approval by the respective Committee.
EXTRAORDINARY LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT TOOLS
The EC outlines that a UCITS is required to redeem units on request by investors, but
that the Directive does not specify how in practice such a right must be applied. The
temporary suspension of redemptions is the only derogation from the general right to
redeem units of UCITS on request which are allowed only in "exceptional cases where
circumstances so require and where temporary suspension is justified having regard to
the interests of the unit-holders". The EC further stresses that no guidance is provided
as regards to the meaning of "exceptional cases" which has led to different
interpretations among the Member States. Some take the view that more developed
rules on a European-wide basis may help fund managers facing liquidity bottlenecks,
better ensure high-levels of investor protection and support a better functioning of the
single market. Any framework should seek an appropriate balance between the
interests of investors who are redeeming their investments and those investors
remaining invested in the fund.
Response from UBS Page 17 of 39
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The EC further outlines that deferred redemptions aim at preventing a situation in which
a UCITS would be obliged to sell a large part of its portfolio in a short period of time
and at a potentially deflated price because it is confronted with an unusual amount of
redemption orders. The mechanisms involve postponing the execution of all or part of
the redemption orders. Side-pockets can be applied in situations where a part of the
assets in the UCITS portfolio becomes illiquid. In such a case, liquid assets are separated
from illiquid assets and a new fund is created. Member States shall prohibit UCITS,
however, from transforming themselves into non-UCITS funds.
Box 4
Q27: What type of internal policies does a UCITS use in order to face liquidity
constraints? If you are an asset manager, please provide also information
specific to your business.
UBS Global Asset Management is subject to a liquidity risk policy that sets out the
liquidity monitoring requirements for funds it manages. The primary goal is to ensure
that the degree of liquidity in the funds allows the funds to meet redemptions
obligations in a variety of situations, while respecting the requirement of equal
treatment of investors. When appropriate to its objective and liquidity risk tolerance, a
fund can also have a liquidity contingency plan setting the process for addressing
liquidity issues in extreme circumstances.
Q28: Do you see a need to further develop a common framework, as part of the
UCITS Directive, for dealing with liquidity bottlenecks in exceptional cases?
We would potentially support the development of a common framework for dealing
with liquidity bottlenecks in exceptional case, as it would be of interest in sustaining and
differentiating UCITS as a “high liquidity standards” brand. But we highlight that it is
not possible to give a firm response to this question given the high level concept of a
‘common framework’ and lack of detail as to exactly what that would entail in practice.
In order to protect the interests of investors, we believe any common framework should
be developed in a way that does not reduce the flexibility of UCITS managers in dealing
with exceptional cases. Therefore, we do not support detailed rules or limits on the
ability of UCITS managers to address such cases as it is necessary to retain flexibility to
take the most appropriate course of action given the specific circumstances.
Response from UBS Page 18 of 39
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In addition, it should be made clear to investors that meeting redemptions is a
commitment on means (sound and proactive management of liquidity) and not on
results. In exceptional circumstances, UCITS managers still have the ability to suspend
redemptions in the interests of unit holders as foreseen in Article 84 of the UCITS
Directive.
Q29: What would be the criteria needed to define the "exceptional case"
referred to in Article 84(2)? Should the decision be based on quantitative and/or
qualitative criteria? Should the occurrence of "exceptional cases" be left to the
manager's self-assessment and/or should this be assessed by the competent
authorities? Please give an indicative list of criteria.
Being aware of the inherent limitations of defining criteria for “exceptional cases”, an
indicative list of criteria could include i) the closure of exchanges on which a significant
portion of the fund’s investments are traded or suspension or restrictions on trading; ii)
levels of redemptions exceeding a predefined threshold combined with a significant dry
out of the liquidity of a fund’s assets; iii) any significant request for redemption that, if
met, could threaten the requirement of equal treatment of investors by for example,
leaving remaining investors with potentially illiquid assets. The decision should, where
possible, be based on quantitative criteria. The occurrence of exceptional cases should
be left to the assessment of the Fund’s Board of Directors which has the duty to act in
the best interest of investors.
Q30: Regarding the temporary suspension of redemptions, should time limits be
introduced that would require the fund to be liquidated once they are
breached? If yes, what would such limits be? Please evaluate benefits and costs
for all stakeholders involved.
Whilst we acknowledge that the introduction of time limits regarding the temporary
suspension of redemption may better ensure the equal treatment of investors,
consistent with our response to Q28, we would prefer not to have prescriptive
restrictions that might impede the flexibility of the UCITS. There is already a strong
incentive in UCITS to keep the suspension period of redemptions short, and setting
additional limits, and thus impeding the flexibility of liquidity management of the UCITS,
might not be in the best interests of investors. We note that prescribed time limits
would mean that, during the liquidation process, performance would no longer be the
main objective.
Response from UBS Page 19 of 39
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Q31: Regarding deferred redemption, would quantitative thresholds and time
limits better ensure fairness between different investors? How would such a
mechanism work and what would be the appropriate limits? Please evaluate
benefits and costs for all the stakeholders involved.
This technique is used in the case of limited liquidity funds (mainly funds whose
investment process relies primarily on illiquid assets). We do not recommend extending
this technique to UCITS.
Q32: What is the current market practice when using side pockets? What
options might be considered for side pockets in the UCITS Directive? What
measures should be developed to ensure that all investors' interests are
protected? Please evaluate benefits and costs for all the stakeholders involved.
The use of side pockets is widespread in the hedge funds management industry. The
use of side pockets in the UCITS Directive could ensure a fair treatment of investors by
ensuring an unchanged risk profile for the fund. However, given the high standards on
liquidity for UCITS, this mechanism should only be used in some exceptional
circumstances. The criteria for setting up side pockets should, in our view, include the
“complete” liquidity dry out of some assets of the fund.
Q33: Do you see a need for liquidity safeguards in ETF secondary markets?
Should the ETF provider be directly involved in providing liquidity to secondary
market investors? What would be the consequences for all the stakeholders
involved? Do you see any other alternative?
We disagree with the statement that the ETF provider should be directly involved in
providing liquidity to secondary market investors. By doing so, the ETF provider may
potentially endanger the requirement of fair treatment of investors remaining in the
fund. Additionally, direct involvement of the ETF provider in the secondary market
would increase transaction costs at the expense of investors thus increasing the tracking
error.
Q34: Do you see a need for common rules (including time limits) for execution
of redemption orders in normal circumstances, i.e. in other than exceptional
cases? If so, what would such rules be?
Response from UBS Page 20 of 39
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We do not see a need for additional rules other than those stated in prospectuses or
agreed with clients. Best practice indicates that time limits for execution of redemption
should be aligned on the settlement terms of underlying assets.
DEPOSITARY PASSPORT
The EC outlines that at present, UCITS depositaries have no European passport as the
UCITS Directive requires that a depositary shall either have its registered office or be
established in the UCITS' home Member State. The fund industry has already for some
time been debating whether UCITS should be limited to the services of depositaries
located in the same jurisdiction as the fund. The AIFMD and the proposal on UCITS V
aim to harmonize the rules governing entities eligible to act as depositaries, the
definition of safekeeping duties and oversight functions, the depositary's liability, and
the conditions for delegation of the custody function. The introduction of a depositary
passport is sometimes seen as the capstone to this wide-ranging harmonisation.
Box 5
Q35: What advantages and drawbacks would a depositary passport create, in
your view, from the perspective of: the depositary (turnover, jobs, organisation,
operational complexities, economies of scale …), the fund (costs, cross border
activity, enforcement of its rights …), the competent authorities (supervisory
effectiveness and complexity …), and the investor (level of investor
protection)?
In principle, we are supportive of the idea of a passport. However, we believe it is crucial
that the interests of the investors are at all times protected. In order to achieve this, we
are of the view that harmonisation of the operation of depositaries across different EU
jurisdictions should be achieved before the passport is introduced. We do not believe
the introduction of the passport should be rushed but rather it should be available only
once the potential benefits clearly outweigh the costs.
We believe a passport would have the following advantages and disadvantages:
Advantages from the perspective of the Depositary: (i) We believe the passport would
result in new business opportunities for large firms who have in place the operational
infrastructures and networks to onboard large promoters and accommodate various
Response from UBS Page 21 of 39
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local regulatory constraints and (ii) the ability for depositaries to serve wider markets
should furthermore generate economies of scale.
Drawbacks from the perspective of the Depositary: (i) We consider there to be a material
risk that depositaries who use the passport to operate in member states in which they
have not previously operated could misinterpret and incorrectly apply local laws with a
potential increase in financial, regulatory and legal risk. The passport could furthermore
intensify cross-border competition and result in consolidation and fewer, more
specialised, custodian banks. This will increase concentration risk and potentially have
systemic risk implications.
Advantages from the perspective of the Fund: (i) The passport could enable
management companies to adopt a centralised operating model by leveraging
infrastructures and relationships located today in domestic markets and (ii) the passport
will trigger increased competition, economies of scale and should result in a reduction
of custodian fees.
Drawbacks from the perspective of the Fund: (i) Concentration risk: the passport will
likely benefit large firms to the detriment of smaller firms triggering a consolidation and,
as a consequence, a reduction of the number of service providers resulting in a
concentration risk for the overall fund business. (ii) Given the absence of harmonised tax
laws in the EU, there could be tax implications for funds and investors if the depositary
is located in a different member state to the fund.
Q36: If you are a fund manager or a depositary, do you encounter problems
stemming from the regulatory requirement that the depositary and the fund
need to be located in the same Member State? If you are a competent
authority, would you encounter problems linked to the dispersion of
supervisory functions and responsibilities? If yes, please give details and
describe the costs (financial and non-financial) associated with these burdens as
well as possible issues that a separation of fund and depositary might create in
terms of regulatory oversight and supervisory cooperation.
UBS, both in its role as a depository as well as fund manager, has not encountered
problems stemming from the regulatory requirement that the depositary and the fund
need to be located in the same Member State. We believe that there are benefits from
the fund and the depository being located in the same Member State as this ensures
Response from UBS Page 22 of 39
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that the depositary is familiar with the relevant local laws and regulatory requirements.
As previously stated however, we are supportive of a passport in principle provided the
appropriate framework is in place.
We also note that it is important that depositaries be permitted to delegate to sub-
custodians. This should include the ability to sub-delegate into jurisdictions that do not
provide for adequate supervision in certain exceptional circumstances where such
delegation is required for legal or other valid reasons as stated in the AIFMD.
Q37: In case a depositary passport were to be introduced, what areas do you
think might require further harmonisation (e.g. calculation of NAV, definition of
a depositary's tasks and permitted activities, conduct of business rules,
supervision, harmonisation or approximation of capital requirements for
depositaries…)?
Harmonisation within the EU is crucial to making a depository passport viable and
attributing an equal level of protection level to all investors. We believe harmonisation is
needed in respect of taxation, the liability of the depositary in case of insolvency,
depositary tasks and responsibilities. It would also be important to clearly set out how
the depositary passport would apply to third country depositaries. We do not consider
harmonisation of the NAV calculation to be a necessary condition for an effective
depositary passport as the calculation of NAV is not the responsibility of the depositary.
Q38: Should the depositary be subject to a fully-fledged authorisation regime
specific to depositaries or is reliance on other EU regulatory frameworks (e.g.,
credit institutions or investment firms) sufficient in case a passport for
depositary functions were to be introduced?
We believe it would be appropriate to introduce an authorisation regime specific to
depositaries. We believe this would be justified to reflect (i) the increased complexity
that is likely to arise as a result of a passporting regime and (ii) that the depositary
function has very specific duties and responsibilities which are not covered by sufficiently
tailored and granular requirements in other EU regulatory frameworks.
Q39: Are there specific issues to address for the supervision of a UCITS where
the depositary is not located in the same jurisdiction?
Response from UBS Page 23 of 39
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We consider this to be a question primarily for competent authorities. We do however
highlight that it is necessary to ensure clear allocation of responsibilities between
relevant competent authorities to avoid unnecessary and costly overlap whilst also
ensuring the interests of the investors are protected at all times.
MONEY MARKET FUNDS
The EC draws attention to the fact that that MMFs are widely used by all types of
investors such as households, corporate treasurers, pension funds or insurance
companies, who regard MMFs as a "safe" short term liquid asset class for investing
cash. In this case they are close substitutes to deposits. MMFs are themselves key
lenders to issuers of short dated high quality money market instruments. They provide
an important source of funding for a variety of institutions such as sovereigns, banks, or
companies. Active trading by MMFs is vital for liquid markets for commercial paper,
short-term bank debt and sovereign debt. Increased liquidity is in turn beneficial to
market efficiency and leads to a reduction in the cost of capital for firms. The potential
systemic importance MMFs, including their susceptibility to runs, have been analysed in
the context of FSB the shadow banking work stream. In the EU, CESR has already
adopted guidelines on a common definition of European MMFs.
Box 6
Q40: What role do MMFs play in the management of liquidity for investors and
in the financial markets generally? What are close alternatives for MMFs?
Please give indicative figures and/or estimates of cross-elasticity of demand
between MMFs and alternatives.
MMFs are important providers of short-term funding to financial institutions, businesses
and governments. However, the importance of this role and of the risks associated with
the link of MMFs to the short-term markets should not be overestimated as MMFs have
not reached a systemic size in Europe.
As reported by the FSB in its report dated 27 October 2011, the assets of MMFs
domiciled in Europe amounted to EUR 1,171 million at end 2010, of which CNAV
(VNAV) MMF assets domiciled in Europe totalled EUR 464 (707) million. Monetary data
from the European Central Bank (ECB) indicate that MMF shares/units held by euro area
investors are very small relative to the deposits managed by euro area credit institutions
(only 3.7% at end 2010). At the end of September 2011, MMF shares/units were held
Response from UBS Page 24 of 39
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by euro area investors as follows: households (EUR 196 billion), non-financial
corporations (EUR 169 billion), insurance corporations and pension funds (EUR 81
billion), and other sectors (EUR 162 billion). The ECB data also indicates that MMFs held
less than 2% of all debt securities issued by euro area non-financial sectors in mid 2010,
and 7% of all debt securities issued by euro area credit institutions.
Thus, bank deposit is the principle vehicle used by retail investors in Europe to manage
their cash and MMFs are playing a very modest role in credit intermediation in Europe.
This is largely due to the fact that the European financial system is bank-dominated.
The answer to the question in regards to the closest substitute to MMFs is dependant
on the type of MMF and the type of client:
CNAV MMF VNAV MMF
Institutional
clients
MM mandate with
capital guarantee
MM mandate without
capital guarantee
Retail clients Insured bank deposit Insured bank deposit
We believe that institutional investors have a very close substitute at hand (namely a
separately managed MM mandate), especially with regard to investment objectives and
mitigation of credit risk (diversification of counterparties). The same does not hold true
for retail clients, however, as their closest substitute (bank deposit covered by deposit
insurance) is not at all diversified and credit risk becomes a key issue for holdings
exceeding deposit insurance coverage.
For institutional (retail) clients, we would expect the cross-elasticity of MMF demand to
its closest substitute to amount to about -0.9 (-0.7) with a relatively small (large)
variance in case of institutional (retail) clients.
Q41: What type of investors are MMFs mostly targeting? Please give indicative
figures.
MMFs are mainly targeting retail and institutional (primarily corporate) clients. For
figures, please refer to our answer to Q40.
Q42: What types of assets are MMFs mostly invested in? From what type of
issuers? Please give indicative figures.
Response from UBS Page 25 of 39
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The types of assets MMFs mostly invest in are Certificates of Deposit, Commercial Paper
and Treasury Bills. The range of issuers covers banks, corporate issuers and
governments.
Q43: To what extent do MMFs engage in transactions such as repo and
securities lending? What proportion of these transactions is open-ended and
can be recalled at any time, and what proportion is fixed-term? What assets do
MMFs accept as collateral in these transactions? Is the collateral marked-to-
market daily and how often are margin calls made? Do MMFs engage in
collateral swap (collateral upgrade/downgrade) trades on a fixed-term basis?
Our MMFs do not engage in transactions such as repo and securities lending. Therefore
we do not wish to comment on this question.
Q44: Do you agree that MMFs, individually or collectively, may represent a
source of systemic risk ('runs' by investors, contagion, etc…) due to their central
role in the short term funding market? Please explain.
It is important to make the distinction between different types of MMFs. Due to their
(implicit) capital guarantee, CNAV MMFs are much more susceptible to runs than VNAV
funds with their variable NAVs. But we do not agree with the idea that MMFs may
represent a source of systemic risk as we consider that their role in the short term
funding market in Europe is far from being central. Indeed, monetary data form the
European Central Bank show that MMF shares/units held by euro area investors are very
small relative to the deposits managed by euro area credit institutions (only 3.7% at the
end of 2010). This statistic confirms that bank deposit is the principle vehicle used by
retail investors in Europe to manage their cash and MMFs are playing a very modest role
in credit intermediation in Europe.
Q45: Do you see a need for more detailed and harmonised regulation on MMFs
at the EU level? If yes, should it be part of the UCITS Directive, of the AIFM
Directive, of both Directives or a separate and self-standing instrument? Do you
believe that EU rules on MMF should apply to all funds that are marketed as
MMF or fall within the European Central Bank's definition15?
We do not see the need for a more detailed and harmonised regulation on MMFs at EU
level as we believe that the CESR/ESMA Guidelines, which took effect in July 2011,
Response from UBS Page 26 of 39
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provide a sufficient regulatory framework. In addition to defining two MMF
subcategories, “short-term money market funds” and “money market funds”, the
guidelines provide a robust framework to limit the main risks to which MMFs are
exposed, i.e. interest rate risk, credit/credit spread risk and liquidity risk.
While the reduction in the weighted average maturity (to no more than 60 days for
Short-term MMFs and 120 days for MMFs) limits the overall sensitivity of the funds’ NAV
to changing interest rates, the reduction of the weighted average life (to no more than
6 months for Short-Term MMFs and no more than 1 year for MMFs) limits credit and
credit spread risk. Overall, the requirement to invest in high quality money market
instruments reduces credit risks. In practice, the requirements from the CESR/ESMA
guidelines and the UCITS Directive oblige MMF managers to keep high-quality and
liquid portfolios to avoid running into liquidity difficulties.
The CESR/ESMA guidelines also require managers of MMFs to draw investors’ attention
to the difference between the MMF and investment in a bank deposit. Enhancing
investor awareness about the exact nature of MMFs will strengthen MMFs’ resilience in
crises.
It should also be noted that the vast majority of MMFs are UCITS. This means that their
managers must, amongst others, employ a risk management process which enables
them to monitor and measure at any time the risk of the positions and their
contribution to the overall risk profile of the portfolio. For a MMF, this includes a
prudent approach to the management of currency, credit, interest rate, and liquidity risk
and a proactive stress-testing regime. In addition, managers of MMFs must have
appropriate expertise and experience in managing these types of funds.
We would also emphasize that according to the European Central Bank, the change in
the definition brought about by the CESR/ESMA guidelines had a significant impact on
the size of the MMF industry. In Ireland and Luxembourg, in particular, the redefined
MMF industry was approximately 28% respectively 22% smaller in terms of the total
net asset value. The overall impact of changes to the reporting funds in the euro area
amounts to a reduction of EUR 193.7 billion (18%) of the MMF sector’s total net asset
value since July 2001.
Response from UBS Page 27 of 39
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Q46: Should a new framework distinguish between different types of MMFs,
e.g. maturity (short term MMF vs. MMF as in CESR guidelines) or asset type?
Should other definitions and distinctions be included?
As mentioned in our response to Q45, the CESR/ESMA guidelines already make the
distinction between different maturity types of MMFs, therefore we do not believe that
there would be any merit in further differentiating between asset types. However, as
mentioned, a difference indeed exists between CNAV and VNAV MMFs with regards to
the former’s (implicit) capital guarantee.
VALUATION AND CAPITAL
According to the EC, the low or almost non-existent fluctuation of the net asset value
(NAV) of so-called Constant NAV MMFs (CNAV MMFs) and regular sponsor support to
maintain a stable NAV may give the impression to investors that CNAV MMFs contain a
capital guarantee. This has been held to give rise to a run once investors fear that the
CNAV MMF is prone to 'break the buck' and no longer be able to offer redemption at
par (e.g. the "Reserve Primary Fund" in the US). There is also a concern that the
amortized cost valuation method (used by CNAV MMFs) allows MMFs to disregard the
gap between the real value and the book value of assets. Variable NAV MMFs (VNAV
MMFs) value their assets on the basis of the mark-to-market model, therefore they allow
for changes in the NAV. It is estimated that in Europe, 60% of the MMFs follow a VNAV
model whereas 40% follow the CNAV model.
Box 7
Q47: What factors do investors consider when they make a choice between
CNAV and VNAV? Do some specific investment criteria or restrictions exist
regarding both versions? Please develop.
In our experience it is primarily institutional investors who differentiate between CNAV
and VNAV MMFs. In our view, a very important differentiating factor is the settlement
period which is typically shorter (t+0 or t+1) for CNAV than for VNAV (t+2 or t+3)
MMFs. This is because CNAV MMFs are primarily used for liquidity management
purposes of corporate treasuries and hence are required to redeem as quickly as
possible. VNAV MMFs are primarily used by retail clients who temporarily park their
money (within a mandate or advisory based) when redeeming from other (Bond or
Equity) Funds which also have a long, and hence, matching settlement period.
Response from UBS Page 28 of 39
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Another important consideration might be the strength of the (implicit) capital
guarantee by the fund sponsor but we have no strong evidence for that as the primary
target clients of our (VNAV) MMFs are private clients.
We are not aware of specific investment criteria or restrictions distinguishing CNAV and
VNAV.
Q48: Should CNAV MMFs be subject to additional regulation, their activities
reduced or even phased out? What would the consequences of such a measure
be for all stakeholders involved and how could a phase-out be implemented
while avoiding disruptions in the supply of MMF?
In order to ensure a level playing field between CNAV and VNAV MMFs, we would
favour a requirement to make the implicit capital guarantee of CNAV MMFs explicit,
e.g. by requiring the sponsor to record a deferred liability (for example 5% of the asset
value of each CNAV MMF sponsored) on his balance sheet and to disclose actual
‘support’ given to any CNAV MMF in the annual report.
Q49: Would you consider imposing capital buffers on CNAV funds as
appropriate? What are the relevant types of buffers: shareholder funded,
sponsor funded or other types? What would be the appropriate size of such
buffers in order to absorb first losses? For each type of the buffer, what would
be the benefits and costs of such a measure for all stakeholders involved?
No, we do not believe imposing capital buffers on CNAV funds to be appropriate. A
fund should reflect the value of its underlying holdings. Where this is too variable, a
capital guarantee should be considered by the fund. Investors unwilling to bear the
additional costs associated with the capital guarantee should be advised to invest into
VNAV MMFs or a mandate.
Q50: Should valuation methodologies other than mark-to-market be allowed in
stressed market conditions? What are the relevant criteria to define "stressed
market conditions"? What are your current policies to deal with such
situations?
Response from UBS Page 29 of 39
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We do not believe that valuation methodologies other than mark-to-market should be
allowed in stressed market conditions. We would emphasize our view that during
stressed market conditions mark-to-market valuation is the most appropriate valuation
methodology, also for MMFs. What is important, however, is to ensure appropriate
communication to clients. During a stressed market situation, we would consider to
quickly introduce Partial Single Swinging Pricing (“PSSP”) in order to compensate the
fund for increased illiquidity when investors are redeeming.
LIQUIDITY AND REDEMPTIONS
The EC outlines that MMFs allow investors to withdraw on demand, with almost
immediate execution and a relatively stable principal value. At the same time, MMFs
invest in assets that mature in the future and which do not necessarily display daily
liquidity and that this situation might impede MMF's ability to face large redemption
requests from investors. Different options are considered possible to increase the
stability of MMFs. Liquidity fees might reduce incentives for investors to redeem first,
because first redeemers would have to compensate remaining investors that might
thereby be disadvantaged. Redemption restrictions might serve to limit the number of
shares that a manager has to repurchase, thus limiting the risk and size of asset fire
sales. Liquidity constraints may be imposed so managers hold highly liquid assets to be
able to face redemptions.
Box 8
Q51: Do you think that the current regulatory framework for UCITS investing in
money market instruments is sufficient to prevent liquidity bottlenecks such as
those that have arisen during the recent financial crisis? If not, what solutions
would you propose?
Yes, we consider that the current regulatory framework is sufficient.
Q52: Do you think that imposing a liquidity fee on those investors that redeem
first would be an effective solution? How should such a mechanism work?
What, if any, would be the consequences, including in terms of investors'
confidence?
Yes, we refer to our response in Q50 and would consider introducing PSSP to our
MMFs.
Response from UBS Page 30 of 39
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For our UBS Switzerland and Luxembourg Fund range we introduced Single Swinging
Pricing (“SSP”) in 2007 and moved to Partial SSP (“PSSP”) in 2010 (”partial” in the
meaning that the fund-specific swing factor is only applied to its NAV if the daily net
flow in % of funds’ assets exceeds a pre-defined threshold). For the MMFs part of the
fund range we have SSP in the Prospectus with the intention to invoke it by MMF Board
of Directors decision during times of market stress/reduced liquidity. By and large our
experience with the system has been positive. It effectively compensates the funds from
transaction costs incurred by subscribing and redeeming investors. Swing factors are
adjusted quarterly, thresholds annually.
Q53: Different redemption restrictions may be envisaged: limits on share
repurchases, redemption in kind, retention scenarios etc. Do you think that they
represent viable solutions? How should they work concretely (length and
proportion of assets concerned) and what would be the consequences,
including in terms of investors' confidence?
Redemption restrictions should only be envisaged as a measure of last resort. If needed,
we would argue that one of the most effective and efficient measures is gating (without
preference given to any client type), i.e. to limit daily net redemptions in % of the
Funds’ net asset value (for example, at 5%, depending on the liquidity available in the
market place), apply the redemption amount pro rata to redeeming investors and defer
net redemption requests above the threshold to the next day. The threshold is lifted
when net redemptions and markets normalize. UBS Global Asset Management was only
once, in 2008, in a situation where such a gate had to be applied to an EM Debt Fund
for a short period of time. While investor’s confidence was not hampered in case of the
EM Debt Fund concerned, reactions in case of a MMF could be different.
Q54: Do you consider that adding liquidity constraints (overnight and weekly
maturing securities) would be useful? How should such a mechanism work and
what would be the proposed proportion of the assets that would have to
comply with these constraints? What would be the consequences, including in
terms of investors' confidence?
We are unclear as to whether the question refers to liquidity constraints at the Fund
level for redeeming investors or within the Fund and would appreciate clarification of
this point. Liquidity constraints at the Fund level would be only be partially feasible as it
Response from UBS Page 31 of 39
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is typically unclear how long an illiquid situation may last in which the fund may still not
be in a position to meet redemption requests.
Q55: Do you think that the 3 options (liquidity fees, redemption restrictions and
liquidity constraints) are mutually exclusive or could be adopted together?
We see the 3 options as staggered lines of defence as a response to an aggravating
special situation/crisis in money markets:
1) introduction of liquidity fee (PSSP in our case)
2) introduction of redemption restriction in size
3) introduction of liquidity constraints up to (temporary) suspension of redemption
Q56: If you are a MMF manager, what is the weighted average maturity (WAM)
and weighted average life (WAL) of the MMF you manage? What should be the
appropriate limits on WAM and WAL?
UBS (Lux) Global Asset Management EUR MMFs currently have a WAM of 79 days and a
WAL of 88 days.
INVESTMENT CRITERIA AND RATING
The EC notes that the MMF industry relies extensively on credit ratings in order to assess
credit risk associated with their assets. On the one hand MMFs may be rated and on the
other hand the assets in which they are authorized to invest have to follow credit ratings
criteria (CESR MMF guidelines) in many cases.
Most of the funds that are rated are awarded an AAA credit note. A downgrade of one
of these AAA-rated MMFs may have the consequences that investors may want to
switch their positions quickly to another AAA-rated fund. Such a sharp decline in the
fund's assets might have systemic effects. It is argued that banning the rating of MMFs
would force investors to assess for themselves the risk / reward profile of the funds
instead of relying on credit rating agencies' opinions. This would increase their
monitoring and reduce the potential for systemic overreactions to sudden new
developments.
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MMF managers are required to invest only in assets that are awarded top quality credit
ratings. If a downgrade in these assets were to happen, the manager would be forced
to sell these assets in order to continue complying with the rules. The managers are
already currently required to assess the credit quality of their investments but a purely
internal assessment without reference to ratings is also sometimes discussed.
Box 9
Q57: Do you think that the definition of money market instruments (Article
2(1)(o) of the UCITS Directive and its clarification in Commission Directive
2007/16/EC16) should be reviewed? What changes would you consider?
We have no comments to provide.
Q58: Should it be still possible for MMFs to be rated? What would be the
consequences of a ban for all stakeholders involved?
The use of ratings is an established way to communicate the risk breakdowns to clients.
We would, however, be open to alternative solutions.
Q59: What would be the consequences of prohibiting investment criteria
related to credit ratings?
It is likely to make communications with clients more difficult.
Q60: MMFs are deemed to invest in high quality assets. What would be the
criteria needed for a proper internal assessment? Please give details as regards
investment type, maturity, liquidity, type of issuers, yield etc.
We have no comments to provide.
LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS
The EC notes that investing on a long-term basis is generally perceived as a factor for
growth for the economy. Although long term investing only offers returns over the long
term, such investing may better contribute to the financing of new projects and
expansion plans that normally require longer time horizons for completion.
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Long-term investments share one common feature: a low level of liquidity. They are
generally associated with long lock-up periods. This is why access to this type of
investments is normally reserved for institutional investors only. Nonetheless, some EU
Member States have sought to develop ways of facilitating access to long-term
investments for retail investors, though a common approach to this has not emerged.
Long-term investing remains therefore segmented along national lines, with barriers to
the free movement of capital across borders.
Promoting long term investment funds could take several forms, including different
legislative options; access to retail investors would of course entail high standards of
investor protection, as is already the case for UCITS.
Box 10
Q61: What options do retail investors currently have when wishing to invest in
long-term assets? Do retail investors have an appetite for long-term
investments? Do fund managers have an appetite for developing funds that
enable retail investors to make long-term investments?
Retail Investors can typically only invest in listed real assets, for example listed real estate
funds, listed PE funds, listed Infrastructure funds. Alternatively they can also invest in
shares of companies that are active in these sectors, for example utilities or
infrastructure concession companies. However, investing into listed products /
investments does bring additional volatility driven by overall market movements which
are less related to the investment intention.
Currently longer term investments cannot be captured by real retail-products which are
broadly distributable based on a registration (UCITS funds). If UCITS would allow for a
category of funds offering such asset classes to investors, this would certainly be of
interest by providers as well as retail and institutional investors alike.
Q62: Do you see a need to create a common framework dedicated to long-term
investments for retail investors? Would targeted modifications of UCITS rules or
a stand-alone initiative be more appropriate?
We refer to our comments in Q61. Such a common framework dedicated to long term
investments could be seen to be attractive.
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Q63: Do you agree with the above list of possible eligible assets? What other
type of asset should be included? Please provide definitions and characteristics
for each type of asset.
Yes, we agree with the list. But we also believe consideration should be given to
expanding the range of eligible assets to include assets on less liquid and “newly”
emerging financial markets.
Q64: Should a secondary market for the assets be ensured? Should minimum
liquidity constraints be introduced? Please give details.
Due to the illiquid nature of the assets, a secondary market is difficult to organise. For
example, information regarding the investments is typically not publicly available and
there is a multitude of structural and tax aspects to consider.
Q65: What proportion of a fund's portfolio do you think should be dedicated to
such assets? What would be the possible impacts?
For a dedicated “Long-term Asset Fund”, no restriction on the proportion invested into
such assets should exist. But it would be very important to ensure there was clear
disclosure to investors of the nature of any long term investments and the risks posed.
We believe such funds should not make up more than, say, 10% of a clients total
financial assets. The exposure to Long-term Assets is a matter of proper overall asset
allocation across all different investments of a client rather than a question of the
specific maximum investment proportion within a fund.
Q66: What kind of diversification rules might be needed to avoid excessive
concentration risks and ensure adequate liquidity? Please give indicative figures
with possible impacts.
UBS Global Asset Management non-UCITS multi-manager products aim for broad
diversification across managers, sectors, geographies and investment styles in order to
avoid concentration risks. A typical multi-manager infrastructure product would have 20
or more underlying fund investments. It should be noted that even broad diversification
might not help to ensure adequate liquidity at the fund level if the liquidity of a fund’s
underlying holdings is poor.
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Q67: Should the use of leverage or financial derivative instruments be banned?
If not, what specific constraints on their use might be considered?
Large infrastructure projects are very capital intensive and could not be financed without
leverage. We do not however support double layers of leverage at both an asset and on
a fund level and believe that this should be prevented.
Leverage is a core element of certain buyout strategies that rely on debt repayment in
terms of value creation. Also, interest and FX risks are partly managed with derivatives.
Therefore, a ban may increase the risk of such transactions.
Q68: Should a minimum lock-up period or other restrictions on exits be
allowed? How might such measures be practically implemented?
Liquidity in infrastructure products is only available upon exit/disposition of an asset.
Therefore prior liquidity options would represent a liquidity mismatch which we would
not propose. Private equity is illiquid and usually implies a multi year lock up for the
investor at the expense of liquidity.
Q69: To ensure high standards of investor protection, should parts of the UCITS
framework be used, e.g. management company rules or depositary
requirements? What other parts of the UCITS framework are deemed
necessary?
We have no comments to provide.
Q70: Regarding social investments only, would you support the possibility for
UCITS funds to invest in units of EuSEF? If so, under what conditions and limits?
We have no comments to provide.
UCITS IV IMPROVEMENT
9.1. Self-managed investment companies
The EC notes that Article 31 of the UCITS Directive lays down general requirements on
administrative procedures and internal control mechanisms for investment companies. It
mirrors, to a great extent, Article 12 of the UCITS Directive, which applies to
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management companies. However, it does not provide for an empowerment for the
Commission to adopt delegated acts specifying the administrative procedures and
internal control mechanisms. As a result, the Level 2 measures developed for Article 12
do not apply to investment companies.
9.2. Master – feeder structures
The EC notes that Article 64(1) of the UCITS Directive requires UCITS to provide
information to investors in the following two cases: where an ordinary UCITS converts
into a feeder UCITS, and where a master UCITS changes. However, this article does not
cover a third possible scenario, that is, where a feeder UCITS converts into an ordinary
UCITS. Such conversions lead to a significant change in the investment strategy. It can
be argued that similar information standards should apply across all three scenarios.
9.3. Fund mergers
The EC notes that the merger of two UCITS is subject to prior authorisation by the
competent authorities of the merging UCITS home Member States. These authorities
must inform the merging UCITS about their decision within 20 working days from the
date of the receipt of the complete application. It is not clear how to reconcile the
general 20 working day time limit for the competent authorities of the merging UCITS
for their decision on the authorisation of the merger with a 20 working day time limit
for the competent authorities of the receiving UCITS for their assessment of the
modified version of the information to investors. Revision of the provisions on the
timelines for the mergers of the UCITS could therefore be considered so as to increase
legal certainty.
9.4. Notification procedure
The EC notes that UCITS IV has introduced a new electronic regulator-to-regulator
notification procedure. However, Article 93(8) of the UCITS Directive requires that any
change to the information on marketing arrangements in a host Member State or
marketing of a new share class should be notified to the UCITS host Member State in a
written form. The EC suggests two improvements could be considered: (i) Introduction
of the notification of the update to the UCITS host Member State in electronic form; (ii)
Clarification that information on a share class is limited to share classes marketed in a
host Member State. It can be also considered whether to introduce a regulator-to-
regulator notification for any changes to the notification file including the information
on arrangements for marketing or marketing of a new share class.
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9.5. Alignment with the AIFM Directive
The EC notes that the AIFM Directive, which will apply as of July 2013, has been
adopted to cover alternative investment funds. In order to prevent systemic risks and to
create a safe environment for investors, many important provisions have been
introduced. Some of these provisions are more detailed in the AIFM Directive than
comparable ones in the UCITS Directive, including measures on organisational rules,
delegation, risk and liquidity management rules, valuation, reporting or calculation of
leverage.
Box 11
Q71: Do you think that the identified areas (points 1 to 4) require further
consideration and that options should be developed for amending the
respective provisions? Please provide an answer on each separate topic with
the possible costs / benefits of changes for each, considering the impact for all
stakeholders involved.
Yes, we agree.
Q72: Regarding point 5, do you consider that further alignment is needed in
order to improve consistency of rules in the European asset management
sector? If yes, which areas in the UCITS framework should be further
harmonised so as to improve consistency between the AIFM Directive and the
UCITS Directive? Please give details and the possible attached benefits and
costs.
No, we do not believe that further alignment is needed. As an overarching comment,
we highlight that there has been a significant amount of regulatory change impacting
investment management in Europe in recent years. In light of this, we believe it is
important to have a period in which further regulatory change is limited in order for
recent changes to effectively bed-down. Such a period would enable firms to better
integrate into their ongoing operations and business models the recent and current
regulatory reforms, whilst still having sufficient resources to concentrate on the core
business of investment managers which is to generate investment performance for their
UCITS investors. We note that, in our view, the most fundamental change that is
required to ensure the effective operation of UCITS is greater harmonisation of the tax
framework at an EU level. Such a harmonised tax framework is necessary to eliminate
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tax uncertainties in cross-border fund operations and deliver the UCITS IV efficiencies to
investors.