Draft version: Comments and suggestions welcome Two Different Export-oriented Growth Strategies under a Wage-led Accumulation Regime: à la Turca and à la South Korea Özlem Onaran* Engelbert Stockhammer** version 1.9 prepared for presentation at the METU Conference in Economics September 11-14, 2002 - Ankara * Corresponding author Istanbul Technical University, ITU Macka 80680 Istanbul - Turkey e-mail: [email protected]**Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration e-mail: [email protected]A former version was presented at the Annual Conference of URPE at ASSA January 4-6, 2002, Atlanta.
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Draft version: Comments and suggestions welcome
Two Different Export-oriented Growth Strategies under a
Wage-led Accumulation Regime: à la Turca and à la South Korea
Özlem Onaran* Engelbert Stockhammer**
version 1.9
prepared for presentation at the METU Conference in Economics
September 11-14, 2002 - Ankara
* Corresponding author
Istanbul Technical University, ITU Macka 80680 Istanbul - Turkey
with the expected signs being b32, b45, b51, b53, b65>0; b42, b52<0. All the diagonal elements are
positive by definition. Note that the zeros in the B matrix depict no contemporaneous interaction,
but the lagged interaction between the variables will still be at work.
We assume that investment decisions respond both to profit share and capacity utilization with a
lag, considering the time lag between investment decision and the expenditure.
Problems arose in estimating simultaneous contemporaneous effects. In particular, the model was
unable to attribute specific effects in the simultaneous interaction between growth and the profit
share. The standard errors of the model increased significantly in this specification. In order to
simplify the model, it was assumed that the profit share responds to growth, as well as
employment with a lag. Thus in addition to investment, distribution is also contemporaneously
exogenous.
Also since our capacity utilization variable is the growth rate, imports are only a function of z,
not of I/Y. The same is also true for the employment equation. In addition, the employment
variable (in logarithms) has to be introduced in difference form in the employment equation,
whereas it has to be used in level form in the profit share equation in order to reflect the labor
market pressures. The autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) specification of the VAR model will
automatically make the necessary transformations, if the employment equation has to be
specified in difference form13. Finally, the equation for the contemporaneous interactions for z
does not include imports. This equation reflects the components of demand, and the effect of
imports is assumed to be captured via profit share, which is one of the determinants of imports.
This modification has the additional advantage of decreasing the computational complexity by
13 In this case the autoregressive coefficients will add to unity.
21
way of decreasing the number of simultaneous interactions in the system. Without imposing this
restriction, the model was unsolvable.
The model includes two lags to control for the problems that might arise from autocorrelation
and non-stationarities in the time series. VARs give consistent results even in the presence of
unit roots (Sims, Stock and Watson, 1990) if more then one lag is employed. The employment of
higher number of lags is not considered because it will not add much in the case of annual data,
and also it will further reduce the already low degrees of freedom due to the lack of sufficiently
long time series data.
Consistent with the aim of the paper, which is to analyze the impact of distribution on
accumulation, capacity utilization and employment, our main focus will be on the responses of
investment, growth and employment to a one-time shock -an innovation- to the profit share. The
impulse response functions offer an advantage in interpreting results within a systems approach.
The response of a variable to an innovation to another variable in the system is not equivalent to
the partial derivatives that are the outcomes of standard regression models. Different from
comparative statics, the response to an innovation incorporates the combined response of the
variable to all the changes created in the system following a shock to one of the variables. VAR
models also help to trace the interaction through a time period.
7. Estimation results
This section first presents the SVAR estimations based on the contemporaneous interactions as
defined in Section six, and then analyses the impulse response functions. The estimation period
is 1965-97 for Turkey, and 1970-2000 for South Korea14.
14 The periods are determined by data limitations. For Turkey, stylized facts point out that both
1970s and the post-1980 period are similar in terms of the direction of the link between
distribution and accumulation and growth. For South Korea, the accumulation regime might have
changed after the democratization process in 1987, i.e. from early 1990 until the crisis of 1997.
However, it is impossible to perform separate estimations for too short time-periods.
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The VAR results of OLS estimations are presented in Appendix B. However we don’t discuss
them explicitly since they are already incorporated in the impulse response functions. VAR
estimations, in general, tend to suffer from multicollinearity problems that lead to low t-statistics.
This is why impulse responses are of particular interest.
A trend is included in the VAR model to capture long-term effects such as structural shifts in
trading relationships, or domestic and international financial markets that are not causally
affected by variations in the system. The trend is significant in some equations. The models are
also estimated without trend, and the results are fairly robust between estimations with and
without trend.
Table 3 presents the SVAR estimation results for Turkey and South Korea, namely the entries in
matrix B-1 of contemporaneous correlations among error terms.
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Table 3: Structural VAR Results: The contemporaneous interaction between the error terms(1)
(The elements of B-1, where u=B-1e (t)) Turkey South Korea Estimation period (after adjusting for lags)
1965-97 1972-2000
I/Y Innovation 0.927 0.971 [0.00000] [0.00000] π Innovation 1.843 0.496 [0.00000] [0.09222] X/Y π 0.323 -12.442 [0.01171] [0.08300] Innovation 1.068 8.264 [0.00000] [0.10714] M/Y π 0.320 -1.089 [0.41630] [0.63308] z 0.047 -1.021 [0.82585] [0.23658] Innovation 1.664 2.295 [0.00004] [0.01555] z I/Y 0.910 0.778 [0.11339] [0.00420] π -0.940 -1.706 [0.06098] [0.00200] X/Y 0.111 0.208 [0.87742] [0.26841] Innovation 2.397 1.037 [0.00001] [0.00000] E z 0.002 0.005 [0.03836] [0.00000] Innovation 0.010 0.005 [0.00000] [0.00000] (1) p-values in parenthesis. A trend and a constant is added to VAR model. Estimation period is determined due to availability of data. Computations by Easyreg, Bierens (2000).
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The coefficients have the expected signs with the exception of foreign trade block in South
Korea, and are mostly quite significant. The contemporaneous positive demand effect of
investments and the negative consumption effect of profits on growth are confirmed. Exports
also have a positive demand effect, though insignificant. The strong positive contemporaneous
relationship between growth and employment is in line with the Okun's law. For Turkey, the
profit share has a highly significant positive contemporaneous effect on exports, capturing the
degree of competitiveness of the exports. For South Korea, this positive effect shows up only
with a lag. The equation for imports doesn't perform well for both countries. The coefficient of
both growth and the profit share are insignificant. There may be various aspects behind this
result, which may be common to both countries. Firstly, profits might be unable to capture the
price competitiveness of imports. Secondly, if the propensity of demand for imported goods out
of profit income is higher than that out of wage income, the competitiveness effect of a higher
profit share may be offset by the increase in the demand for luxurious imported goods. Finally
the price elasticity of the demand for imports can be rather low in developing countries, which
have a high degree of import dependency, not only for capital goods, but also for intermediate
inputs. It may also be argued that lagged responses to relative prices (which are supposed to be
captured by the profit share) are more important, however the simple VAR results do not verify
this argument. Additionally, for the case of Korea, the effect of active state policies on foreign
trade explains part of the poor performance of the estimations of exports and imports.
In the following, we refer to the impulse responses of accumulation, growth and employment to
innovations in the profit share when discussing whether the regime is wage-led or profit-led. A
response is called wage-led (profit-led), if the cumulative effect of the impulse responses on a
shock to the profit share is negative (positive) after three years15.
The results of the impulse responses are suggestive, although the confidence intervals are large in
many cases. Figure 2 and 3 show the impulse response functions for Korea and Turkey
respectively. Figures 2a and 3a show the responses of investment to the profit share. The impulse
response of investment to the profit share incorporates the direct profit effect, as well as the
15 This definition is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, but the rationale should be clear. VAR analysis is appropriate for short run analysis. Three years might be considered a rather long concept of the 'short run', however the indirect effect that are of interest here, take some time to work themselves out.
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indirect effects of the change in profit share on the system via international and domestic
demand.
Figure 2 and 3
In Turkey an innovation to the profit share creates a negative response of investment rate in the
next period, and the shock continues for another period, and then dies without leading to any
significant improvement in investment. These results are in line with the empirical evidence
about the stagnant investment rates in spite of increasing profit share, as well as the single
equation estimates provided by Onaran and Yentürk (2001) for manufacturing industry. However
the standard errors are high, and although the results clearly show that accumulation is not profit-
led, they do not indicate a strong wage-led regime as well.
In South Korea an increase in the profit share creates a strong and persistent negative effect on
accumulation. These results point at a strongly wage-led accumulation regime, and indicate that
lower profit share goes along with higher investment rates. This result is consistent with the
results provided by Seguino (1999) for the manufacturing sector, who estimates the rate of
capital accumulation as a positive function of wage share and capacity utilization within a single
equation framework. However, our model goes beyond the limits of this reduced form estimation
in explaining the simultaneous interaction between distribution, demand and accumulation.
In both countries, the response of accumulation to growth is significantly positive, verifying the
Keynesian emphasis on demand in determining the investment decisions, as can be seen from the
impulse response functions in Figures 2b and 3b.
The indirect effects of the profit share on accumulation become clearer when the impulse
response functions of growth to the profit share that are shown in Figures 2c and 3c are explored.
An increase in the profit share is immediately transformed into a decline in growth, indicating a
stagnationist regime in both countries in the short-run. In Turkey the effect turns positive in the
next period, however it takes three periods for the growth rate to recover16. In South Korea the
16 Note that the impulse response graphs shown here are not cumulative, rather they show the
response to the initial shock in each period.
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negative effect continues for another period and then dies away. The recovery of the growth rate
is due to the improvements in exports. Analyzing the overall impact of a shock to the profit share
on growth in the impulse responses includes the indirect impact via export demand. This latter is
expected to counteract the initial negative effect of an increase in the profit share through
consumption demand. However, in Turkey it takes rather long –three periods- for the positive
effect of increased exports to lead to a recovery, and in South Korea the recovery does not take
place at all. The immediate decline in growth due to an increase in the profit share explains the
decline in accumulation in the second period, and the demand effect also has a persistence in the
next periods offsetting the profit effect. Also investment decisions are highly path dependent; a
slow down in accumulation tend to be rather long lasting.
As an expected consequence of the inability of profits to enhance growth and accumulation, the
employment regime is also wage-led in both countries. Figures 2d and 3d show the impulse
response of employment to the profit share for the two countries. In South Korea the wage-led
employment pattern is more evident, whereas in Turkey the cumulative negative effect dies away
five periods later. Contrary to the arguments of neoclassical economics, a lower wage share does
not stimulate employment. The initial decline in growth and accumulation provides a coherent
explanation for the stagnation in employment in spite of the lower wage share. Figures 2e, 2f and
3e, 3f show the impulse response functions of employment to growth and accumulation for the
two countries. The results show that demand is the main driving force behind employment, and
accumulation is an important component to enhance the job creation capacity of the economy.
Another point that needs to be highlighted about the estimation results is the response of
distribution to growth and labor market pressures. Although distribution does not immediately
adjust to changes in demand and balance of power relations in the model, the lagged effects are
significant and in the expected direction for Turkey. In South Korea, the labor market pressures
on distribution are effective, whereas pro-cyclical mark-up behavior isn’t observed. Distribution
seems to be determined more exogenously in South Korea.
The model presented here indicates that both South Korea and Turkey have wage-led regimes, in
fact, overall the macroeconomic parameters for the two economies as well as the corresponding
impulse response function look remarkably similar. Nonetheless the countries have experienced
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rather different economic performances. In Turkey an increasing trend in the profit share
throughout the structural adjustment episode has led to stagnant rates of investment, whereas in
South Korea periods of decreases in the profit share have gone together with an increase in the
investment rate. Thus, while the wage-led accumulation regime are part of the story, it needs to
be complemented by an analysis of institutional settings and state policies, that affect
accumulation through channels other than demand and distribution. The remainder of this section
speculates about such factors.
The active industrial policies implemented by the state are key to understanding the high
accumulation rates, which are quite independent of the profit share in South Korea. The financial
structure and the government’s intervention in channeling financial resources to industry, the
export subsidies and import allowances have been the determinant aspect behind the high levels
of investment moving in parallel with the wage share. Seguino (1999) refers to state’s industrial
and financial policies as “carrots” which the firms can reach only if they upgrade
technologically. In this setting there are two consequences of an increases in the wage share: On
the one hand, a reasonable level of wages helps to maintain the level of domestic demand, as we
have already discussed above. On the other hand, high wages create a pressure on firms to
upgrade technologically, preventing productivity growth from stagnating due to reliance on labor
intensive, low-wage production methods. In spite of the profit squeeze created by higher wages,
thanks to the subsidies and import allowances, the firms respond to higher wage shares by
increasing investments in order to preserve their export performance so as to be able to go on
receiving the subsidies, and other supports. This mechanism leads to positive effects on not only
productivity but also effective demand. In sum, wage increases above productivity, i.e. a rise in
unit labor costs and a decline in the profit share, may even further increase wages and
employment. Within a business environment created by active state policies, there was a virtuous
cycle of increasing wage share, high investment, high productivity, high growth in South Korea,
as opposed to the Turkish case with the vicious circle of decreasing wage share, low growth, low
investment, low productivity.
Contrary to South Korea, in Turkey the unregulated financial sector and the lack of a systematic
industrial policy have favored financial investments against physical investments. Increased rates
of return in financial markets, higher volatility and uncertainty, and higher costs of capital have
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been the most significant factors behind the slowdown in accumulation in the 1980s (Yentürk,
1998; Onaran and Yentürk, 2001).
In the South Korean case, the irresponsiveness of investments to the profit share is also related
with the allocation of bank credit by the state relying more heavily on the firms’ performance in
terms of exports rather than on the typical measures of profitability used by the financial
intermediaries.
The response of investment rate to international competition provides a particularly interesting
picture regarding this aspect of the black box of the accumulation regime. The comparison of
Turkey and South Korea in this aspect is also very educational in terms of understanding the
crucial differences between the two different approaches to export-oriented growth. Figures 2g
and 3g show the impulse response of investment rate to export/GDP. In South Korea the
response is very strong and persistent, whereas in Turkey the response hardly shows up with a
lag of three years and is never too strong. Turkey’s export growth based on low wages and
increased use of existing capacity rather than new investments proves to be unable to stimulate
investments, whereas in South Korea export competitiveness is the primary stimulus behind
investment decisions of firms. In Turkey, investments are stimulated by domestic demand,
whereas in South Korea exports are even more important than domestic demand. In Turkey
exports increase when unit labor costs decline and domestic demand contracts, i.e. the increase in
Turkey’s exports is dependent on the creation of an exportable surplus in the domestic output.
However in South Korea, exports are a systematic target of industrial policy, and
competitiveness is based on improvements in productivity.
The consequence of this striking difference in the export-oriented growth strategies shows up
also in the labor demand. The response of employment to an increase in exports is persistently
negative in Turkey, whereas it is strongly and persistently positive in South Korea, as can be
seen in Figures 2h and 3h. This result points at a very important policy implication indicating
that the increase in competitiveness, which is maintained by low wages, does not transform into
higher employment. Another important implication of the results for Turkey is that they provide
counter-evidence to the expectations about an increase in labor intensity of production following
an increase in export orientation. These findings verify the argument that it is increasingly harder
29
for developing countries to increase their competitiveness by labor intensive technologies in the
global market. In spite of the fact that their exports may be more labor intensive with respect to
the advanced capitalist countries, the capital intensity of most export oriented sectors are
increasing (Wood, 1997; Yentürk, 1997; Günçavdı and Küçükçiftçi, 1999). However, the
increase in capital intensity need not be a hindrance to employment growth as can be seen from
the case of South Korea.
Another important factor behind the negative relationship between the profit share and
investments in South Korea is closely related with the over accumulation tendency in the
economy. This is a typical example of the survival strategy of a “Marxist firm” as opposed to a
"Keynesian firm", which does not have the luxury of dying without a fight in spite of falling
profits (Crotty, 1993). In a period of anarchic competition, firms do make investments in order to
survive under intense competition. In order to keep up with other conglomerates, South Korean
firms had to invest even in industries, which exhibit over-supply at a period when growth
perspectives were starting to look poor and labor costs were rising (Wei Cheng, 1998).
Investment decisions by South Korean capital have created excessive capacity growth funded by
foreign debt (Yentürk, 1998b). Cheap finance in a way has exacerbated the tendency of the
chaebol to get involved in everything. The dynamics of capitalist competition brings another
dimension to the understanding of high accumulation rates, which are different from the
institutionalist “active state” or “carrot and stick” scenarios that are proposed by Seguino (1999)
or Amsden (1989).
An important point to be discussed as a consequence of this comparative analysis is the
sustainability of the South Korean way of export-oriented growth. This strategy worked out
in South Korea at its semi-industrialized stage of development since there continued to be
potential for manufacturing industries to capital-deepen and the necessary capital goods and
technologies were available from industrialized countries (Seguino, 1999). When the
technological limits of this regime of accumulation are reached, the tools the state can use
such as import allowances are rather limited. Also the problem of over-accumulation and the
consequent high dependence on exports is making the economy very fragile to changes in
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international demand, particularly in a world where financial movements are liberalized, and
exchange rate volatility is high (Yentürk, 1998b; Adelman and Yeldan, 2000). Although it is
outside the scope of this paper, the crisis of 1997 suggests the limits of the wage-led high
accumulation model of South Korea and the sustainability of active state policies in the long
run. Furthermore the limits are not only created by financial liberalization at an international
scale but also are due to the tendencies created by over-accumulation in a competitive and
stagnant world economy. There certainly is need for a paper titled “two different export-
oriented growth strategies with wage-led accumulation regimes and two different versions of
crisis”.
To sum up, the model presented here just points at the end results that we observe. But the
mechanisms that lead to wage-led regimes are much more complicated than a simple demand-led
mechanism that can be observed on the surface. Indeed the complicated link between the wage
share and investments could to some extent be uncovered with a model that decomposes the
wage share into real wages and productivity. Such an analysis would provide an insight on how
distribution, investments and technological change interfere. However, this will be the task of a
forthcoming paper.
The incorporation of financial sector to the model would also improve the model. Unfortunately
not only the limitations of SVAR, but also limitations regarding the data to measure these effects
related with financial variables and expectations, leave these crucial aspects unexplored. Real
interest rates are clearly unable to capture the full complexity of the structural change in the
financial system for the case of Turkey, and the institutional complexity in the case of South
Korea.
Another critical point is that the profit share variable that is used in the analysis is gross profits,
which do not decompose the differences in the sources of capital income. Finally, our use of two
lags may be unable to capture the dynamics behind the building up of profit expectations and
business confidence.
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8. Conclusion
The aim of the paper was to compare the relationship between distribution, growth, accumulation
and employment in Turkey and South Korea, which are two examples representing two very
different export-oriented growth experiences. The results of the adjustment experiences of both
countries present a striking contrast to the orthodoxy, however they also present a counter-
examples to each other in terms of their ways of integrating to the world economy. The paper
tests whether accumulation and employment are wage-led in these two countries by means of a
post-Keynesian open economy model, augmented by a demand-driven labor market and a reserve
army effect in the Marxian sense. The model is estimated in a structural vector autoregression
form, in order to capture the complex simultaneous interaction between distribution,
accumulation, growth and employment within a systems approach. This model, and the method
of estimation are the two innovations of this paper in addressing the crucial policy issues related
with structural adjustment problems in developing countries.
The estimation results show rather unambiguously that accumulation and employment are not
profit led, and the growth regime is stagnationist, at least in the short run in both South Korea
and Turkey. Although the results for Turkey do not point out a strong wage-led regime of
accumulation, a high profit share clearly does not enhance investments. In terms of the effect of
foreign trade, the results also indicate that a high profit share can only in the medium run create
an increase in the export demand high enough to compensate for the decline in consumption out
of wages. However, although both countries are close to wage-led accumulation regimes, the
difference in their export-oriented growth strategies has led to quite different outcomes. In
Turkey an increasing trend in the profit share throughout the structural adjustment episode has
led to stagnant rates of investment, whereas in South Korea periods of decreases in the profit
share have gone together with an increase in the investment rate.
Although the wage-led accumulation regime scenario and the effect of demand on accumulation
explain part of this story, there certainly are more to that in explaining the striking difference in
investment rates between these countries. Within the institutional and class structures of these
economies, there are many factors that determine accumulation other than demand and
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distribution. Within a business environment created by active state policies, there was a virtuous
cycle of increasing wage share, high investment, high productivity, high growth in South Korea,
as opposed to the Turkish case with the vicious circle of decreasing wage share, low growth, low
investment, low productivity. An analysis that could incorporate the effect of different financial
regimes would certainly shed more light on the determinants of accumulation and growth. Also a
model that decomposes the effect of the wage share to the changes in real wages and productivity
would better account for the links between distribution, demand, technological innovation,
investments, and exports.
In spite of the fact that the empirical estimations are not fully capable of capturing all the
interactions within the system, the responses of accumulation, growth and employment to
distribution are suggestive in explaining some crucial aspects of the mechanism behind the
inability of an export-oriented growth strategy relying on decreasing wage shares to stimulate
a accumulation and employment. Following this basic conclusion, a couple of policy
implications need to be brought into discussion. Firstly, the results suggest that a pro-capital
income policy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to achieve higher
accumulation and growth, and wage suppression is unable to improve the growth rate of
employment. On the contrary, the decline in domestic demand can have negative effects on
growth if the improvements in international competitiveness are not strong and sustainable.
Secondly, demand is the driving force behind employment. This result points at a very
important policy implication indicating that the increase in competitiveness, which is
maintained by low wages, does not transform into higher employment. The limits in creating
employment via low wages and a growth regime based on the use of existing capacity, rather
than new investments point out the significance of active policies to stimulate accumulation.
This alternative line of economic policy necessitates a different perspective of international
competitiveness, which is based on enhancing productivity. The Korean experience raises the
question of the sustainability of such policies, however answering this question is beyond the
scope of this paper and has to be left for future research.
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Appendix A: Definition of variables and data sources Turkey: Y: real GDP in nonagricultural sector, State Institute of Statistics (SIS), 1998. I/Y: Private non-agricultural investment/Y, State Planning Organization (SPO), 2000. π: Gross profits/Y in non-agricultural sector, Özmucur (1994) and Temel and Kelleci (1994)17. z: annual growth rate of real GDP in nonagricultural sector (growth rate of Y) X/Y: Exports of goods and services excluding agricultural exports /Y, SIS, (1998). M/Y: Imports of goods and services /Y, SIS, (1998). E: non-agricultural employment in natural logarithms, SIS, 1997 and Bulutay, 1995. South Korea: Y: real GDP I/Y: Private investment/Y, (non-agricultural distinction wasn’t available) π: Gross profits/Y in non-agricultural sector, 1-wages/Y, where wages/Y are calculated as follows: wage share index=average monthly real earnings in non-agricultural sector index / labor productivity index in industry. Then using the data for wages/value added in manufacturing industry provided by the World Bank World Tables for 1993, the index is converted into levels. z: annual growth rate of real GDP in nonagricultural sector X/Y: Exports of goods and services /Y M/Y: Imports of goods and services /Y E: non-agricultural employment in natural logarithms Source: National Statistical Office, Republic of Korea, http://www.nso.go.kr/eng/
17 The data after 1994 and before 1968 do not exist in these studies, therefore the percentage
increase in profit/value added ratio in the private manufacturing industry is used to extend the
s.e. 1.357 2.460 1.897 2.311 4.280 0.016 R-Square 0.899 0.754 0.964 0.938 0.407 0.998 p-values in parenthesis. A trend and a constant is added to VAR model. Estimation period is 1965-97 after adjusting for lags.
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Appendix B2: South Korea VAR results (OLS estimations)
s.e. 29.381 12.607 45.986 31.332 39.580 22.765 R-Square 0.784 0.925 0.729 0.802 0.511 0.998 p-values in parenthesis. A trend and a constant is added to VAR model. Estimation period is 1972-2000 after adjusting for lags.
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Figure 1a: Private Investments/GDP and Profits/GDP in Turkey (1963-1997)
Figure 1b: Private Investments/GDP and Profits/GDP in South Korea (1970-2000)
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Figure 2 a: Impulse reponse of I/Y to a one std. error shock in profit share b: Impulse reponse of I/Y to a one standard error shock in zTurkey
c: Impulse reponse of z to a one standard error shock in profit share d: Impulse reponse of E to a one standard error shock in profit share
e: Impulse reponse of E to a one standard error shock in z f: Impulse reponse of E to a one standard error shock in I/Y
g: Impulse reponse of I/Y to a one standard error shock in X/Y h: Impulse reponse of E to a one standard error shock in X/Y
Note: The dots represent +/- 2 standard
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Figure3 a: Impulse reponse of I/Y to a one std. error shock in profit share b: Impulse reponse of I/Y to a one standard error shock in zKorea
c: Impulse reponse of z to a one standard error shock in profit share d: Impulse reponse of E to a one standard error shock in profit share
e: Impulse reponse of E to a one standard error shock in z f: Impulse reponse of E to a one standard error shock in I/Y
g: Impulse reponse of I/Y to a one standard error shock in X/Y h: Impulse reponse of E to a one standard error shock in X/Y