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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008- 2009 HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY FEAS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT LECTURER: Assistant Prof. Dr. Özlen Çelebi
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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009. HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY FEAS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT LECTURER: Assistant Prof. Dr. Özlen Çelebi. BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY. There are different approaches in classification. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Page 1: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICYSummer School, 2008-2009

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITYFEAS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENTLECTURER: Assistant Prof. Dr. Özlen Çelebi

Page 2: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

• There are different approaches in classification.• There are plenty of factors which shape a country’s

foreign policy behaviours/objectives.• According to Mustafa Aydın:• There are structural variables and conjunctural

variables. “ One kind, which may be called structural variables, are continuous, and rather static. The other, which may be termed conjunctural variables, are dynamic and subject to change under the influence of domestic and foreign developments.”

Page 3: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

• “The structural factors are not directly related to the international political medium and the daily happenings of foreign politics. They can exert a long-term influence over the determination of foreign policy goals. Geographical position, historical experiences and cultural background, together with national stereotypes and images of other nations, and long-term economic necessities would fall into” this category.

Page 4: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

• “Conjucntural variables …are made up of a web of interrelated developments in domestic politics and international relations.”

• The structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy, according to M. Aydın are:

• 1. The historical experiences, specifically the Ottoman Empire heritage.

• 2. Geographic location of Turkey and geopolitical conditions.

Page 5: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

• 3. Culture, especially the political culture of country and the decission-making.

• The basic determinants of Turkish foreign policy according to Ülman and Sander are:

• 1. Security concerns and alliances.• 2. Geographic location (neighbours, neighbouring

regions, the straits).• 3. Administrative structure, understanding of

politics and perceptions of the decision makers.

Page 6: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

• 4. Economic needs/requirements.

Page 7: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

• 1. Westernization in the sense of modernization and adoptin western values such as democratic rule, respect to rule of law and being an independent/sovereign nation sate within the international system;

• 2. Preserving staus quo: Protecting international peace and stability; no room for non-pacific solutions (esp. condemning wars);

• 3. Respect to international law, working in cooperation with international organizations;

• 4. Balanced and rational foreign policy decision-making.

Page 8: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

1919-1923 PERIOD

• I. The Lausanne Conference:• The Lausanne Conference opened on 21

November 1922, but only after encountering serious problems as to who was to attend.

• A. Soviet participation: An invitation was issued to the Soviets on 27 November 1922 on condition that they could only participate in those discussions which had to do with the future of the Straits.

Page 9: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

1919-1923 PERIOD

• B. Seperate invitations were issued to the Ankara government and to that of the Sultan in Istanbul. Mustafa Kemal Paşa and his colleagues were anxious to prevent a divided Turkish representation at Lausanne. The Assembly abolished the Sultanate on 1 November.

• C. Representatives: Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, on the one part and Turkey of the other part.

Page 10: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

1919-1923 PERIOD

• D. Parts (4), sections, clauses and articles (143) of the Treaty.

• II. Negotiations:• The Lausanne Treaty was signed on 24 July

1923 at Lausanne.• British diplomatic strategy: Aiding the estb. Of

an independent Turkey as an anti-Soviet barrier, while protecting British interests.

Page 11: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

1919-1923 PERIOD• The Straits: Britain’s main interests, as Lord Curzon saw them, were

to secure freedom of passage for British warships through the Straits, and the attachment of disputed province of Mousul to British-ruled Iraq, rather than to Turkey.

• The British sought to have the Straits opened to warships, while the Soviets aimed to keep them closed. Meanwhile, the British wished to prevent the Turks from closing the Straits to Western navies. The Turks were prepared to allow limited access to the Black Sea for the navies of non-Black Sea states, so as to maintain a balance of power against Russia. The result was a compromise under which non-Black Sea powers gained limited access to that sea, and both sides of the straits were demilitarised. These arrangemets were going to be supervised by an international commission.

Page 12: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

1919-1923 PERIOD

• The Mousul issue: The Turks based their claim to the province of Mousul on the grounds that it was part of the non-Arabic territories which were included within the putative Turkish State under the National Pact, and had not been under British occupation at the time of Mudros armistice. The British were anxious to attach the Mousul Province to Iraq as a defensive barrier against Turkey. Moreover, parties were keen to gain control of rich oil resources of the Province. The question was left unsettled when the Lausaane Treaty was signed.

1919-1923 PERIOD

Page 13: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

1919-1923 PERIOD

• The exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece: More than 1 million; homogenization of the populations and security concerns.

II. Settlement and Challenges:A. The domestic politicsB. The settlement of Mousul problem:1923-1926: Ankara Treaty

Page 14: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

1923-1939 PERIOD• C. Turkey and the settlement of basic foreign policy principles:• A delicately balanced and multiplied foreign policy based on a larger

historical perspective and political evaluations; rational decisions and decison makers.

• D. Turkey and relations with the USSR:• Dec. 1925: Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship and it was renewed in

1929 with a protocol. Turkish policy makers attributed high importance to balanced relations with the USSR.

• E. Turkey and relations with Greece:• Exchange of populations-problems –Patriarchy; problems continued over

properties issue until 1929. In 1930, Prime Minister Venizelos visited Turkey Oct. 1930). Previously, in June 1930 an agreement was signed between the two countries which settled the dispute over properties.

Page 15: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

1923-1939 PERIOD• F. Turkey and the West: • Relations with France and the UK.• G. Hatay issue: 1938 Hatay Republic; 1939 Hatay acceeded to Turkey following a

plebicit.• H. Turkey, international security and alliances:• Turkey signed bilateral agreements with her neighbours and the other international actors

such as the USA and the League of Nations. These treaties were reflecting Turkey’s security concerns, in general, and also the aim of solving international problems by peaceful methods.

• Alliance in the Balkans:• Major objective of Turkish policy was to form an entente with at least one, or preferably

two of her balkan neighbours. • 1933: Entente Cordiale under which Turkey and Greece mutually guaranteed their

common frontier in Thrace and agreed to consult with one another on all questions of common interests.

• Balkan Pact; 1934 between Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia.

Page 16: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

1923-1939 PERIOD

• 1937 saadabad Pact: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan

• Turkey obtained an armaments credit from the British in May 1938 and another one in Oct. 1939. Anglo-Turkish decleration was issued on 12 May 1939. Draft treaty betwn Turkey, France and Britain was signed on 1 Sept. 1939.

Page 17: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING 1980s

• According to W. Hale:• “During the first half of the 1980s, Turkish

foreign policy-particularly in relation to the superpowers- entered a phase of re-engagement in the western alliance, in the sense that the previous tension in Turkish-US relations abated markedly, talk of altering Turkey’s position within NATO subsided, and some of the old suspicion and hostility returned to Turkish-Soviet relations.

Page 18: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING 1980s

• As in the case of the previous phase, this realignment had both international and domestic political causes.”

• International: The second stage of Cold War (Iran, Afghanistan…)

• Internal: 12 September 1980, coup.; November 1982, new cons.; the elections in November 1983)

Page 19: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING 1980s

• Özal era (as PM and then, President)• Relations with the West:• 1. The USA• A. DECA: 1980; 1985 to 1987/88• B. Lobbies (Armenian and Greek)• C. Middle East: Iran; Iran-Iraq war; Rapid Deployement Force Task• D. US loans and credits; foreign military sales: Conditions on the

Cyprus issue and later on, human rights and the PKK issue• 2. The USSR:• A. Military concerns (+)• B. Financial support (-): After 1989 (+)• 3. Europe: Turkey’s relations with the EC?

Page 20: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING 1980s

• 4. Cyprus issue: 1983, TRNC– Özal and TRNC: economic considerations

• 5. The Middle East:• A. Iran-Iraq War: 1980-1988• B. PLO and Turkey (1981 events, 1982 Lebanon events; Sabra and Shatilla

massacres; Arafat’s second visit to Turkey, 1986; Palestinian Intifada (1987); recognition of the Palestinian State, 1988.)

• C. Relations with Israel: decreasing diplomatic relations (1980, Jerusalem case)

• D. Relations with Syria: PKK issue; water problem• E. Relations with Iraq: PKK ; Peshmerges and their escape to Turkey,

1988-89: deterriorating relations with Iraq and Iraq’s violence on Turkmen’s in Iraq.

Page 21: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• I. The End of the Cold War ?• The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the SU and the Eastern

Block, altered Turkey’s international environment as profoundly as either of the two previous transformations, of 1918-23 and 1945.

• * The security threat from the SU had effectively ended. A series of small successor states had emerged in the Black Sea region, Central Asia and Transcucasia.Turkey now was surrounded by smaller neighbours which were weaker than itself both militarily and economically.

• * Turkey’s foreign policy agenda expanded into new areas. However, Turkey remained a committed member of NATO and an aspirant for full EU membership.

Page 22: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• TFP during the 1990s was profoundly affected by the global

transformation. However, the domestic political environment also had a strong influence over the direction of foreign policy. Turgut Özal’s hold on power was severely reduced by his party’s defeat in the general elections of 1991, and ended with his death in 1993. This opened a phase of serious governmental instability, which severely limited government abilities to formulate or implement effective policies. More radical political currents-primarily those of politicised Islam- also tried to challenge previously accepted positions. The rise of Kurdish seperatism had profound effects on TFP. Finally, economic demands and ambitions came to have an increased role in foreign policy making.

Page 23: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• II. Turkey and the West After the Cold War:• A. Turkey and the United States:• 1. In 1992, when TurkeySDECA with the USA came up for renewal, it was

extended for only one year. Turkey then asked for a renegotition of its terms, but in practice the agreement was renewed on an annual basis. Meanwhile, the US military presence in Turkey was drastically reduced. This was part of the US’ global policy of reducing its military commitments worldwide. By the mid-1994 8 of the 12 US military bases previously established in Turkey had been closed orhanded over to the Turkish forces. The vital NATO airbase at İncirlik continued in operation and it was to be of crucial importance during the Gulf war of 1991 and its aftermath. US military aid to Turkey was also scaled down substantially- partly because of congressional opposition over human rights and other issues, but partly also because there seemed to be less need for it.

Page 24: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• 2. Common interests and common approaches:• a. Both countries supported the admission of new Eastern

European members to NATO, and that of the states of the former SU to the OSCE, NATO’s PfP, and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

• b. In the early 1990s, the US helped to sponsor the idea that Turkey could be projected as a model of democracy and the liberal economic system in the newly independent states of Central Asia.

• c. The US gvt. Strongly supported the plan to built an “East-West energy corridor” linking the states of the Caspian basin to the world markets via Turkey, and avoiding Russian territory.

Page 25: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s

• d. Turkey also played an active role in supporting actions by the UN and then by the USA and the rest of NATO, in BiH.

• e. For both sides, the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991 was a critical turning point, since it gave Turkey an important actual and potential role in US policy in the Middle East:

• -2 Aug. 1990: Iraq invade Kuwait;• -6 Aug. 1990: The UN Resn. No. 661 (economic

embargo to Iraq);

Page 26: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• -8 Aug. 1990: It was announced that Turkey would suspend all commercial

dealings with Iraq and close the oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Yumurtalık.• The Turkish gvt. had also have to face with crucial questions of sending troops to

join the war in the gulf; or to open a second front against Iraq; or to allow the coalition powers to use İncirlik for attacks on targets in N. Iraq. This has led to a political crises in Turkey which caused to the resignation of two ministers and the Chief of General Staff. Opposition was supported by M. Yılmaz, who was one of the most important figures within ANAP. Finally, Turkey gave permission to the coaltion forces to use İncirlik for regular aircraft sorties. The second wave of the crisis came with the flood of Kurdish refugees from Iraq to Iran and Turkey, mainly. (April 1991)

• 7 April 1991: Özal’ proposal to establis a “safe heaven” in N. Iraq. The idea was adopted by the British and US gvts. Under the UN Sec. Coun. Resn No. 688 an intl. Force was stationed at Silopi. Virtually most of the refugees returned to Iraq by the end of May as part of “Operation Provide Comfort.”

Page 27: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• *No fly zones in Iraq north of the 36th paralell and south of the 32nd

paralell were established.• For T. Özal the primary reason for supporting the coalition in the Gulf

war was that it would re-establish Turkey’s strategic importance in the eyes of the western powers, esp. The USA. He also hoped that the war would result in the fall of S. Hussein and his replacement with a democratic regime in Iraq which could work out a settlement with the Kurds, restore Baghdad’s control in the north of the country and thus prevent the PKK from using it as a base for its attacks in Turkey. However, S. Hussein stood in power and Turkey’s economic losts grew stemming from the trade embargo against Iraq. Turkey did not receive a major support from her Western allies and thus had to maintain and actually develop eceonomic ties wit ME countries.

Page 28: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s

• More critically, the question of continuing the mandate for “the Operation Provide Comfort” turned out to be a problematic one in Turkey. It was feared that it might be used by the USA for other operations in the ME, over which Turkey had no control or that it was a part of a Western project to promote the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. The name of the operation was changed to “Northern watch” as from the beginning of 1997.

Page 29: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• According to K. Kirişçi, “…a key point of convergence between the

United States and Turkey was thier common interest in the emergence of democratic, secular, pro-Western regimes in the area and their desire to prevent the rebuilding of a Soviet/Russian empire.”

• “In the early 1990s…many US decision-makers even promoted Turkey’s market oriented economy, democracy, and secularism as a model for Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Many also talked about Turkey becoming a bridge between the West and those nations…both governments also saw those countries’ admissions to OSCE, NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program, and North Atlantic Cooperation Council as critical to consolidating a new geopolitics in the ex-Soviet sphere of influence.”

Page 30: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s

• “By the end of 1990s,…,there seemed to be growing convergence between Turkey and the United States toward a more common geostrategic stance to enhance the region’s independence from Russia and economic integration with the world. A key instrument in this effort was to support the opening of an ‘east-west energy corridor,’ oil and gas pipelines that went through Turkey instead of Russia. (the so-called New Great Game)”

Page 31: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s

• “Regarding regional economic development …the two countries appear to have similar approaches. Two good examples are the US support given to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and Turkey’s membership in the European Union.”

• “All these developments coincided with a period when Turkey had begun to develop relations with Israel, especially after the September 1993 Israel-Palestine Libertaion Organization Agreement.”

Page 32: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s

• Another important issue of cooperation between Turkey and the USA involved UN and NATO peace-keeping and humanitarian assistance operations.

• At the same time there were/are still important areas of diagreement, based on differing interests, over the status of N. Iraq and the Kurdish issue, sanctions agains Iraq, the Armenian issue, Cyprus and Turkish-Greek relations, and relations with Iran and Syria. The Kurdish issue was exaceerbated because of US annual human right case reports.

Page 33: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s• B. Turkey and EU:• 1. Impacts of EU’s deeper and enlarged relations with the CEECs

on relations with Turkey: post-Cold war politics; 1991, Mastricht Treaty; 1992, Lisbon Summit; 1993 Copenhagen criteria.

• 2. Customs Union: 1994/1995• 3. Impact of the Cyprus issue and the relations with Greece:• 1996, Kardak crisis, • 4. Human rights issue• 5. 1997, Luxembourg meeting, 1997 Amsterdam Summit and

the new treaty and Agenda 2000• 6. 1998, Cardiff Summit and the “Strategy for Turkey”

Page 34: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY Summer School, 2008-2009

TFP DURING and AFTER 1990s

• 7. 1999 Helsinki Summit and forthcoming developments: 1999 Progress Report and Turkey’s official candidacy for EU membership; Association Membership Document (for Turkey, 4 December 2000)

• 8. 2001 NAP( 24 March); 2001, Gotteburg Summitt and approval of Turkey’s NAP; 2001 Laeken Summit (perspective on membership negotiations are the next); 2003 and 2005 revions; December 2004, negotiations to be started at October 2005.

• The latest progress report (2008)