Tthe Concept of Representation in Democratic Theory - Urbinati and Warren. 2008

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The Conceptof Representationin ContemporaryDemocratic TheoryNadia Urbinati1 and Mark E. Warren2

1Department of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027;email: [email protected] of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver,British Columbia V6N 2H7, Canada; email: [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008. 11:387–412

The Annual Review of Political Science is online athttp://polisci.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053006.190533

Copyright c© 2008 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

1094-2939/08/0615-0387$20.00

Key Words

democracy, representative democracy, constituency, elections,accountability, deliberation

AbstractDemocratic theorists have paid increasing attention to problemsof political representation over the past two decades. Interest isdriven by (a) a political landscape within which electoral representa-tion now competes with new and informal kinds of representation;(b) interest in the fairness of electoral representation, particularlyfor minorities and women; (c) a renewed focus on political judgmentwithin democratic theory; and (d ) a new appreciation that participa-tion and representation are complementary forms of citizenship. Wereview recent innovations within democratic theory, focusing espe-cially on problems of fairness, constituency definition, deliberativepolitical judgment, and new, nonelectoral forms of representation.

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INTRODUCTION

The topic of political representation hasbecome increasingly visible and importantwithin contemporary democratic theory fortwo reasons. The first is a disjunction betweenthe standard accounts of democratic repre-sentation, focused primarily on territoriallybased electoral representation, and an increas-ingly complex political terrain, which is lessconfined within state territoriality, more plu-ralized, and increasingly dependent on infor-mal negotiation and deliberation to generatepolitical legitimacy. These developments aredriving renewed interest in the impact of elec-toral representation on broad patterns of in-clusion and exclusion (Lijphart 1999; Powell2000, 2004), as well as in the new forms of rep-resentation that are rapidly evolving in non-electoral domains such as administrative pol-icy development (Stephan 2004, Brown 2006,Fung 2006a), civil society advocacy (Alcoff1991, Warren 2001, Strolovitch 2006), andglobal civil society (Keck & Sikkink 1998,Anheier et al. 2004, Grant & Keohane 2005,Held & Koenig-Archibugi 2005). Here welimit our attention to recent developments indemocratic theory, which has been as muchaffected by these developments as other areasof political science.

The second reason is indigenous to demo-cratic theory, which has tended to follow Jean-Jacques Rousseau in assuming that represen-tative democracy is, at best, an instrumentalsubstitute for stronger forms of democracy(Pateman 1976, Barber 1984). Until recently,participatory and deliberative democrats paidlittle attention to political representation,leaving the topic to neo-Schumpeteriantheorists who viewed democracy as primarilyabout the selection and organization ofpolitical elites (Sartori 1987, Manin 1997; cf.Kateb 1992). This consensus division of laborbegan to unravel about 15 years ago at thehands of those interested in broad patternsof inclusions and exclusions in politicalrepresentation, particularly of minorities andwomen (Phillips 1995, 1998; Williams 1998;

Mansbridge 1999; Young 2000; Dovi 2002).The turning point was clearly identified byDavid Plotke, who wrote in 1997 that “theopposite of representation is not partici-pation. The opposite of representation isexclusion. And the opposite of participationis abstention. . . . Representation is not anunfortunate compromise between an ideal ofdirect democracy and messy modern realities.Representation is crucial in constitutingdemocratic practices” (Plotke 1997, p. 19;see also Urbinati 2000). In addition, demo-cratic theorists are increasingly appreciatingthe contributions of representation to theformation of public opinion and judgment,as well at its role in constituting multiplepathways of social influence within and oftenagainst the state. (Habermas 1989 [1962],1996; Ankersmit 2002; Urbinati 2005, 2006).Importantly, these reassessments are leadingan increasing number of democratic theoristsboth to reengage problems of electoral design(Beitz 1989, James 2004, Thompson 2004,Rehfeld 2005) and to think about democraticrepresentation beyond the ballot (Saward2006a,b; Warren 2008).

We review the concept of representationfrom the perspective of recent democratic the-ory. In the first section, we list the political andsocial reasons for rethinking democratic rep-resentation. In the second section, we reviewthe background in democratic theory. In thethird section, we comment on the develop-ments that are sending democratic theoristsback to “first things”—the nature of politicalrepresentation itself. Next, we argue that con-stituency definition, long ignored in theoriesof representation, is among the most funda-mental of first things because it establishesthe frame—the inclusions and exclusions—within which issues are decided. From thisperspective, we can appreciate the renewedinterest in representative institutions withindemocratic theory, discussed in the fifth sec-tion. Last, we consider emerging nonelectoralforms of representation: new citizen forumsand decision-making bodies, representativeclaims by civil society and advocacy groups,

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and other “voice entrepreneurs,” for example.Nonelectoral forms of representation, we be-lieve, are increasingly important to expand-ing and deepening democracy. But these de-velopments challenge the existing conceptualand normative resources of democratic the-ory. Democratic theorists need to develop newtools and critical analyses that are sensitive tothese new forms of political influence and in-direct forms of power.

THE CHANGING POLITICALLANDSCAPE OF DEMOCRATICREPRESENTATION

Representative democracy as we know it todayevolved from two key sources. First, duringthe twentieth century, the expansion of thefranchise transformed liberal, constitutionalregimes into mass democracies. Second, whenstructured through constitutionalism, elec-toral representation enabled a dynamic, if of-ten fractious, balance between the rule ofelites and the social and political democra-tization of society, with political parties dis-placing parliaments as the primary loci ofrepresentation. Until relatively recently, thesetwo sources molded what we call, followingD. Castiglione & M.E. Warren (unpublishedmanuscript), the “standard account” of repre-sentative democracy.

The standard account has four main fea-tures. First, representation is understood asa principal agent relationship, in which theprincipals—constituencies formed on a ter-ritorial basis—elect agents to stand for andact on their interests and opinions, thus sep-arating the sources of legitimate power fromthose who exercise that power. Second, elec-toral representation identifies a space withinwhich the sovereignty of the people is identi-fied with state power. Third, electoral mecha-nisms ensure some measure of responsivenessto the people by representatives and politicalparties who speak and act in their name. Fi-nally, the universal franchise endows electoralrepresentation with an important element ofpolitical equality.

The complexities of the principal-agentrelationship at the core of the standard ac-count are well recognized (Pitkin 1967). Thetranslation of votes into representation, forexample, is mediated by varying electoral sys-tems with more or less exclusionary charac-teristics. Parties, interest groups, and corpo-ratist organizations set agendas, while publicspheres, civil society advocacy, and the me-dia form preferences and mold public opinion,as do debate and leadership within legislativebodies themselves (Habermas 1989). In addi-tion, the principal-agent relationship betweenvoters and representatives is notoriously diffi-cult to maintain, for numerous reasons rang-ing from information deficits to the corrup-tion of representative relationships (Bobbio1987, Gargarella 1998).

These complexities remain, but they havebeen overtaken by new realities such thatthe very formulation of problems withinthe standard account is increasingly inade-quate. Perhaps the most significant of thesedevelopments has been the dislocation, plu-ralization, and redefinition of constituencies.The central feature of the standard accountis that constituencies are defined by territory;individuals are represented insofar as they areinhabitants of a place (Rehfeld 2005). Begin-ning with the formation of the modern state,territorial residence became the fundamentalcondition for political representation—acondition more inclusive than status- andcorporate-based representation. Indeed,territory has had an important historicalrelationship to political equality that carriedover into modern times. In ancient Athens,Cleisthenes changed the condition for count-ing as an Athenian citizen from family andclan identity to demes or village residence(Hansen 1993). In this way, Cleisthenestransformed the bare fact of residence into asufficient condition for equal power-sharing,and laid the basis for the modern conceptionof constituency.

Yet territoriality, though historically essen-tial to the evolution of democratic represen-tation, identifies only one set of ways in which

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individuals are involved in, or affected by, col-lective structures and decisions. Issues such asmigration, global trade, and environment, forexample, are extraterritorial; they are not con-tained by any existing territorially organizedpolity (Benhabib 2004, Gould 2004, Held& Koenig-Archibugi 2005, Bohman 2007).Other issues are nonterritorial, particularlythose involving identity, such as religion,ethnicity, nationalism, professional identity,recreation, gender identity, and many socialmovements. Such nonterritorial interests arenot new to democratic theorists. The mainobject of disagreement in making and inter-preting the democratic constitution of theWeimar Republic, for example, was whetherrepresentation should represent individuals orcorporate interests. In modern constitutionaldemocracies, however, the older corporatistviews of parliaments and representation havegiven way to the representation of individ-uals whose only commonality is residence.Thus, legislatures attend to nonresidentialconstituencies only indirectly—not becausecitizens have equal shares of power assignedby territory, but rather because pressure andadvocacy groups can organize territory-basedvotes along nonterritorial lines (Dahl 1956,1971; cf. Mansbridge 2003). Other venueshave emerged to represent other kinds of con-stituencies. The world is now populated with avery large number of transnational, extraterri-torial, and nonterritorial actors, ranging fromrelatively formalized institutions built outof territorial units (such as the United Na-tions, the World Bank, the European Union,and numerous treaty organizations), to amultitude of nongovernmental organizations,transnational movements, associations, andsocial networks (Anheier et al. 2004, Saward2006a), each making representative claims andserving representative functions.

Closely related, the sites of collective de-cision making are increasingly differentiated.In the developed democracies, markets andmarket-oriented entities are likely to con-tinue to function as the dynamic sources ofchange. Governments are increasingly agile

at channeling market forces and incentives, asare civil society organizations. In many cases,these developments dramatically shift the lo-cus of collective decisions away from state-centric models of planning—those that cangather, as it were, sovereignty from the peo-ple in order to act in their name—and towardgovernance models. These issue-based andpolicy-driven networks of government actorsand stakeholders are often more effective thanbureaucracies accountable to legislatures, butthey lack formal legitimacy and clear repre-sentative accountability to those affected bydecisions.

The landscape of democratic representa-tion is also clouded by the growing complexityof issues, which increasingly strains the pow-ers of representative agents, and thus their ca-pacities to stand for and act on the interestsof those they represent. There is the familiartechnical and scientific complexity that comeswith the vast amounts of information and highlevels of technology involved in most pub-lic decisions (Zolo 1992, Brown 2006, Beck1997), which is often compounded by thepolitical complexity that comes with multi-ple and overlapping constituencies (Andeweg2003).

As a consequence of these developments,the standard account has been stretched to thebreaking point. Among the most fundamen-tal of problems, ironically, is the very elementthat ushered in democratic representation—residency-based electoral representation. Theclaim of any state to represent its citizens—its claim to sovereignty on behalf of thepeople—is contestable, not because states donot encompass peoples, but because collectiveissues only partially admit of this kind of con-stituency definition. Electoral representationcontinues to provide an ultimate referencefor state power. But whereas Burke (1968, cf.Manin 1997) imagined that representativescould monopolize considered opinion aboutpublic purpose through the use of delibera-tive judgment, representative assemblies to-day must reach ever further to gather politi-cal legitimacy for their decisions. Judging by


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the declining trust in governments generallyand legislative bodies in particular, represen-tative claims based on territorial constituen-cies (under the standard model) continue toweaken (Pharr & Putnam 2000, Dalton 2004).Electoral representation remains crucial inconstituting the will of the people, but theclaims of elected officials to act in the nameof the people are increasingly segmented byissues and subject to broader contestationand deliberation by actors and entities thatlikewise make representative claims. Politi-cal judgments that were once linked to statesovereignty through electoral representationare now much more widely dispersed, andthe spaces for representative claims and dis-courses are now relatively wide open (Urbinati2006). In complex and broadly democratic so-cieties, representation is a target of competingclaims.

THE NEW CONCEPTUALDOMAINS OF DEMOCRATICTHEORY

Until recently, democratic theorists were notwell positioned to respond to these develop-ments, having divided their labors betweenthose who work within the standard accountof representation and those concerned withparticipation and inclusion. The division oflabor followed the channels dug by Rousseauwell over two centuries ago, which identi-fied res publica with direct self-governmentand representative government with an aris-tocratic form of power. The English people,Rousseau famously claimed, are free only inthe moment of their vote, after which theyreturn to “slavery,” to be governed by the willof another. “Sovereignty,” Rousseau wrote,“cannot be represented for the same reasonthat it cannot be alienated. It consists essen-tially in the general will, and the will cannot berepresented. The will is either itself or some-thing else; no middle ground is possible. Thedeputies of the people, therefore, neither arenor can be its representatives; they are nothingelse but its commissaries. They cannot con-

clude anything definitively” (Rousseau 1978[1762] p. 198). Rousseau thus confined repre-sentation to the terms of principal-agent del-egation while stripping the delegate of anyrole in forming the political will of the people.In legal usage, Rousseau understood politicalrepresentation in terms of “imperative man-date”: the delegate operates under a fiduciarycontract that allows the principal (the citizens)to temporarily grant an agent their power totake specified actions but does not delegatethe will to make decisions, which is retainedby the principal.

Rousseau’s distinction between legitimategovernment (or democratic government, incontemporary terminology) and representa-tion built upon discourses with quite differenthistorical roots. Democracy originated asdirect democracy in ancient Greek city-stateswhereas representation originated in themedieval Christian church and the feudal re-lationships encompassed within the Holy Ro-man Empire, its monarchies, municipalities,and principalities (Pitkin 2004). In moderndiscourse, however, the concept of politicalrepresentation evolved beyond this distinc-tion, becoming something more complex andpromising than the Rousseauian distinctionbetween the (democratic) will of the peopleand the (aristocratic) judgments of politicalelites. Developing along with the constitu-tionalization of state powers, representationcame to indicate the complex set of relation-ships that result in activating the “sovereignpeople” well beyond the formal act of electoralauthorization. After Rousseau, representativepolitics is increasingly understood as havingthe potential to unify and connect the pluralforms of association within civil society, inpart by projecting the horizons of citizensbeyond their immediate attachments, and inpart by provoking citizens to reflect on futureperspectives and conflicts in the process ofdevising national politics (see Hegel 1967).Political representation can function tofocus without permanently solidifying thesovereignty of the people, while transformingtheir presence from formally sanctioning


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(will) into political influence (politicaljudgment). And importantly, political repre-sentation can confer on politics an idealizingdimension that can overcome the limitsof territoriality and formal citizenship onpolitical deliberation.

Rousseau’s formulations, however, failedto shed light on these transformative poten-tials of political representation. Although hebelieved representatives to be necessary, heheld to electoral selection rather than lotteryor rotation—mechanisms traditionally asso-ciated with democracy. Whatever his inno-vations in other areas of democratic theory,with respect to representation he restatedMontesquieu’s idea that lottery is democraticwhereas election is aristocratic. He concluded,with Aristotle, that whereas all positions re-quiring only good sense and the basic senti-ment of justice should be open to all citizens,positions requiring “special talents” should befilled by election or performed by the few(Rousseau 1978, see Urbinati 2006).

The contemporary view that representa-tive government is a mix of aristocracy anddemocratic authorization is the late childof Rousseau’s model. “Realist” and “elite”democrats in the mold of Schumpeter (1976),Sartori (1965), and Luhmann (1990) repli-cated Rousseau’s view that representation isessentially aristocratic, while viewing demo-cratic participation in political judgment asutopian. Modern societies—with their bu-reaucratic concentrations of power, theirscale, and their complexity—dictate that cit-izens are mostly passive, mobilized period-ically by elections (see also Bobbio 1987,Sartori 1987, Zolo 1992; cf. Manin 1997).Although elite and realist democratic theo-rists have been widely criticized within demo-cratic theory, it has not been for their accountof representation as periodic selection, butrather for their portrayal of citizens as pas-sive. Pluralist democratic theory, originatedby Truman (1951) and Dahl (1956) in the1950s, emphasized the many ways in whichcitizens of contemporary democracies canpush their interests onto the political agenda

in addition to voting, owing to the porousdesign of liberal democracies. Participatorydemocratic theorists writing in the 1960s and1970s pointed out that the many channels ofrepresentation in pluralist democracies were,in fact, filled by those with the most re-sources, particularly education and wealth.Pulling ideals from Aristotle, Rousseau, Marx,J.S. Mill, and Dewey, participatory democratsfocused instead on those features of democ-racy most immediately connected with self-determination and self-development, whileaccepting Rousseau’s view of representationas essentially nondemocratic (Pateman 1976,Macpherson 1977, Barber 1984; cf. Young2000, Urbinati 2006).

Communitarians within democratic the-ory, borrowing from classical republicanism,have sometimes overlapped with participa-tory democrats owing to their focus on activecitizenship. Although classical republicanismfocused on institutional design—particularlychecks and balances—these strains were ab-sorbed by the standard account of represen-tation, leaving contemporary communitariansto focus on closeness rather than distance, anddirect engagement rather than indirectness(Arendt 2006; Wolin 2004; Held 1996, ch. 2).

Deliberative democratic theory, the thirdand most recent wave of contemporary demo-cratic theory, is centered on inclusive politi-cal judgment. From this perspective, the stan-dard account of representative democracy issuspect for its thin understanding of politicalwill formation. The standard account, withits emphasis on elections, pressure groups,and political parties, suggested that politi-cal judgments are, in effect, aggregated pref-erences. Deliberative theories of democracywere spearheaded by Habermas in the mid-1980s and rapidly followed by parallel theoriesfocused on judgment: Gutmann & Thompson(1996), Pettit (1999a), the later Rawls (2005),Richardson (2003), and others turned their at-tention to the formation of public opinion andjudgment, the institutionalization of deliber-ation, and the relationship between inclusionand deliberation. Problems of representation,


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however, were bypassed by several strains ofdeliberative democratic theory, either becausedeliberation was conceived within a participa-tory framework (Cohen 1996) or because itwas conceived within already established in-stitutions (Rawls 2005).

For others, such as Habermas (1996), how-ever, problems of representation reappearedin potentially productive ways. First in TheStructural Transformation of the Public Sphere(1989 [1962]) and then more completely inBetween Facts and Norms (1996), Habermascast representative institutions as mediatingbetween state and society via public spheres ofjudgment, such that representation is incom-plete without the deliberative attentiveness ofcitizens mediated by public spheres, and thereflective transmission of public deliberationsinto the domain of representative institutions.Habermas was interested not only in thecorrelation between judgments emanatingfrom the public sphere and institutionalizedrepresentation, but also in those moments ofdisjunction that generate extraparliamentaryforms of representation, particularly throughnew social movements and other kinds ofcivil society associations. Importantly, thesecreative disjunctions are intrinsic to thefunctioning of representative democracy. Inthis way, Habermas opened a window onrepresentation beyond the standard account.

Direct attention to representation withincontemporary democratic theory has comefrom three other sources as well. The mostbroadly recognized of these, Pitkin’s now clas-sic The Concept of Representation (1967), camefrom within the standard account itself. Pitkinprovided a comprehensive theory of represen-tation, primarily within electoral contexts, justwhen participatory democracy had capturedthe imaginations of progressive democrats.Indeed, Pitkin herself turned to the partici-patory paradigm shortly after publication, re-turning to the topic only to note that the al-liance between democracy and representationis “uneasy” owing to their distinct genealo-gies (Pitkin 1967, p. 2; Pitkin 2004; Williams2000). If democracy is based on the presence

of citizens, representation is at best a surro-gate form of participation for citizens who arephysically absent.

Nonetheless, Pitkin sketched out thegeneric features of political representation inconstitutional democracy. For representativesto be “democratic,” she argued, (a) they mustbe authorized to act; (b) they must act in a waythat promotes the interests of the represented;and (c) people must have the means to holdtheir representatives accountable for their ac-tions. Although Pitkin understood these fea-tures within the context of electoral democ-racy, they can in fact vary over a wide range ofcontexts and meanings, as we suggest below(D. Castiglione & M.E. Warren, unpublishedmanuscript).

Pitkin did not, however, inquire morebroadly into the kind of political participa-tion that representation brings about in ademocratic society. Nor were her initial for-mulations further debated or developed. In-stead, they stood as the last word on repre-sentation within democratic theory for threedecades, until the appearance of Manin’s ThePrinciples of Representative Government (1997).Manin combined an elitist-realist approachto democracy with a deliberative approach,arguing that representative government is aunique form of government owing to the con-stitution of deliberative politics through elec-tion. Manin’s work departed from the stan-dard model by focusing on the deliberativequalities of representative institutions. But inother respects, he replicated the standard divi-sion between democracy and representation.In the spirit of Montesquieu, Manin viewedelections as a means of judging the charac-ters of rulers. The value of democratic elec-tion is that the many are better than the fewat recognizing competent individuals, thoughworse than the few at acting competently(Manin 1997, ch. 4). But electoral suffrage initself, in Manin’s view, produced no change inthe practice and institution of representation,which are substantially the same today as theywere when few citizens had the right to vote.Representative government is inevitably an


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elected form of aristocracy because it discrim-inates among citizens and excludes some fromthe decision-making process. As de Malberg(1920, p. 208) put it, the very purpose of rep-resentative selection is to form an aristocraticregime. On this line of thinking, it follows thatdiscourses that implicate representative insti-tutions as exclusionary are simply incoherent.Such institutions cannot be something otherthan they are, namely, aristocratic entities thatare at best constituted and contained by demo-cratic elections. Thus, in this account, parlia-mentary sovereignty can be seen as an elec-toral transmutation of Rousseau’s doctrine ofthe general will of the people, which, para-doxically, transforms the people into a passivebody, with periodic capacities for selection butnot voice (De la Bigne de Villeneuve 1929–1931, p. 32).

Important though these debates about ac-tive versus passive representative inclusionwere, they glossed over the glaring fact thatmany groups within the established democra-cies lacked even passive inclusion. Althoughearlier participatory critics of the standard ac-count had turned away from representation,by the early 1990s, theorists began to focuson the representative exclusion of marginalizedgroups—particularly those based on gender,ethnicity, and race—from the centers of po-litical power. The initial questions were aboutinjustices in the form of exclusion. But thesequestions went to the very heart of not onlythe meanings of representation, but also itsmechanisms and functions. Kymlicka (1995)argued for group representation within the in-stitutions of representative democracy, notingthat the representation of individuals qua indi-viduals is not sufficient to self-development, asself-identity depends on group relationshipsand resources. Phillips (1995) argued in ThePolitics of Presence that the “politics of ideas”—one in which interests, policy positions, andpreferences are represented by agents withinpolitical institutions—fails to grasp that right-ful inclusions require that diversities withinsociety have represented presence, embodiedwithin representatives who bring distinctive

perspectives into political institutions (see alsoGuinier 1994, Gould 1996, Mansbridge 1999,Young 2000, Dovi 2002).

Within this literature, Williams’ (1998)Voice, Trust, and Memory most directly en-gaged the issue of marginalized groups inthe language of representation, framing allof the classic issues of representation withinthe terms of the contemporary debate. “Lib-eral representation” of the kind descendedfrom Locke, though promising formal equal-ity, systematically underrepresents the histor-ically marginalized. By treating individualsas individuals rather than as situated mem-bers of groups, Williams argues, liberal ac-counts of representation fail to conceptual-ize patterns of disadvantage that are basedin group situations, and are often replicatedwithin representative institutions. The lib-eral account (at least in its Lockean form)assumes a trustee relationship based on con-vergent majority interests, which does not infact exist for disadvantaged groups. Whensuch assumptions legitimate electoral sys-tems that simply aggregate votes based onterritorial constituency—particularly in theform of single-member districts—they serveto justify and stabilize existing patterns ofdisadvantage. For this reason, Williams ar-gues, we need to think beyond principal-agentmodels of representation in which principalsare presumed to be formally equal individ-uals. We need to understand representationas a relationship, mediated by group histo-ries and experiences, through which relevantconstituencies—particularly those related tofairness—come into existence. Finally, fairrepresentation requires some relationship oftrust between individuals and representatives,based on shared experiences, perspectives, andinterests, and this is demonstrably not presentfor historically disadvantaged groups withinresidence-based systems of representation.

Still, the relationship between individualand group representation with respect to fair-ness remains ambiguous in Williams’ argu-ment. Disadvantages in society generate ten-sions between the formal equalities that lend


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legitimacy to representative institutions, andtheir results, which will often fail to reflector address issues related to systematic groupdisadvantages. Clearly, for minorities whoseclaims consistently fail to be present withinpolitical institutions, representation based onformal equality also fails basic fairness. Yet thestrongest historical argument for fair repre-sentation has not been based on group advan-tage or disadvantage, but rather the propor-tional representation of individual interests. Ifall individuals have an equal claim to represen-tation, their representatives should have pres-ence in representative institutions in propor-tion to the numbers of individuals who holdinterests they wish to be represented. Indeed,as Mill argued, nonproportional counting asoccurs in majoritarian systems is a violationof quantitative fairness, whereas proportionalrepresentation “secures a representation, inproportion to numbers, of every division ofthe electoral body: not two great partiesalone” (Mill 1991, p. 310). Altering represen-tative systems to increase their sensitivity tohistorical group disadvantage may trade offagainst the fairness embodied in quantitativeproportionality, a tension that continues todeserve the attention of democratic theorists.

Although Williams’ argument was fo-cused on representing historically disadvan-taged groups, she built on the emergingdiscourse of group representation to cast po-litical representation as fundamentally aboutinclusion and exclusion—that is, about thebasic problems of democratic theory andpractice (cf. Phillips 1995, ch. 7). At thesame time, the strain of thinking origi-nated by Manin—that focusing on the rela-tionship between representation and politi-cal judgment—increasingly intersected withdeliberative democracy, drawing the “aristo-cratic” approach to representation closer todemocratic problems of discursive inclusion(Plotke 1997, Young 2000, Ankersmit 2002,Urbinati 2005, cf. Williams 2000). Together,these lineages are now producing a new waveof democratic theory.

WHEN IS REPRESENTATION“DEMOCRATIC”?If democratic representation is to be under-stood as more than a division of labor be-tween political elites and citizens, we need tounderstand representation as an intrinsic partof what makes democracy possible. To do so,we must distinguish between generic normsof democracy and the institutions and prac-tices through which the norms are realized.Much democratic theory has moved in thisdirection, conceiving democracy as any set ofarrangements that instantiates the principlethat all affected by collective decisions shouldhave an opportunity to influence the outcome(see, e.g., Habermas 1996, p. 107; Dahl 1998,pp. 37–38; Held 1996, p. 324; Young 2000,p. 23; Gould 2004, pp. 175–78). Althoughthere are important variations in the norma-tive presuppositions embedded in this prin-ciple, most democratic theorists hold that(a) individuals are morally and legally equaland (b) individuals are equally capable ofautonomy with respect to citizenship—thatis, conscious self-determination—all otherthings begin equal. It follows that collectivedecisions affecting self-determination shouldinclude those affected.

The advantage of such a norm—call itdemocratic autonomy or simply collectiveself-government—is that it enables us to avoidreduction of “democracy” to any particularkind of institution or decision-making mech-anism. It allows us to assess emerging in-stitutions and imagine new ones by askingwhether they fulfill the norm of democraticautonomy—a question we need to be able toask, for example, of the many transnationalregimes that increasingly affect the lives ofindividuals in ways the standard account ofrepresentative democracy cannot encompass,nor even conceive.

At the same time, without the relativelystraightforward conceptual apparatus of thestandard account, we need to formulate theconcept of democratic representation with arigor sufficient to identify and assess what


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has become a rich domain of representativerelationships—a concern that increasinglydrives the new literature (see, e.g., Williams1998; Mansbridge 2003; Rehfeld 2006;Rubenstein 2007; D. Castiglione, A. Rehfeld,M.E. Warren, et al., unpublished manuscript).

We owe an initial formal specificationto Pitkin, who—despite misgivings aboutformalizations—observed that democratic re-sponsiveness includes, in one way or another,(a) authorization of a representative by thosewho would be represented, and (b) account-ability of the representative to those repre-sented. Building on Pitkin, D. Castiglione &M.E. Warren (unpublished manuscript; seealso Rehfeld 2006) characterize these rela-tionships as follows:

1. Political representation involves repre-sentative X being authorized by con-stituency Y to act with regard to goodZ. Authorization means that there areprocedures through which Y selects ordirects X with respect to Z. Ultimate re-sponsibility for the actions or decisionsof X rests with Y.

2. Political representation involves repre-sentative X being held accountable toconstituency Y with regard to good Z.Accountability means that X provides,or could provide, an account of his orher decisions or actions to Y with re-spect to Z, and that Y has a sanctionover X with regard to Z.

These elements are generic; they specifyonly that a democratic relationship of rep-resentation is one of empowered inclusionof Y in the representations of X with re-spect to Z. Under this formula, the individualsor groups who are represented are not pas-sive. There are points at which they assent tobe represented, and the practices of assent—including communication—typically requiremultiple kinds of participation. For their part,if representatives are democratic, they are re-sponsive to those they would represent, withrespect to particular goods. A wide varietyof actors may potentially fit these criteria:

elected representatives, nongovernmental or-ganizations, lay citizens, panels, committees,and other entities. A wide variety of goods maybe formulated and represented: preferences,interests, identities, values. And, in principle,a wide variety of authorization and account-ability mechanisms are possible. Along withelections, the possibilities include voice, de-liberation, exit, oversight, and trust. This vari-ety of relationships, entities, and mechanismsis close, we think, to encompassing the nu-merous kinds of representative relationshipsthat inhabit contemporary democracies. Eachshould be parsed out and specified both in itsown terms and in terms of its role within thebroader political ecology.

CONSTITUENCY DEFINITION

Because it defines the initial terms of au-thorization and thus the nature of inclusionin representative relationships, the conceptof constituency is receiving new attention.As Rehfeld (2005; see also Burnheim 1989,Pogge 2002) points out, the idea that con-stituencies should be defined by territorial dis-tricts has been all but unquestioned until veryrecently, although it has long been recognizedthat initial decisions about who is included in(or excluded from) “the people” constitutedthe domain of democracy (Dahl 1989, Held1996).

But there is an even more fundamentalissue. For the most part, the project ofdemocratizing “democracies” has been con-ceived as a matter of progressively includingmore classes of individuals within territorialcommunities. But no matter how universalthese inclusions, when represented geograph-ically, the people are only a “demos” insofaras their primary interests and identities aregeographical in nature. Nongeographicalconstituencies—those emerging from race,ethnicity, class, gender, environment, globaltrade, and so on—are represented only inso-far as they intersect with the circumstancesof location, producing only an accidentalrelationship between democratic autonomy


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(particularly the distributions of opportunitiesnecessary for self-determination) and formsof representation (Bohman 2007; cf. Gould2004, Held & Koenig-Archibugi 2005).

More generally, issues of justice raised byrepresentation are issues of isegoria, or theequal chance each citizen should have tohave his or her voice heard (Dworkin 2000,pp. 194–98). “Democratic representation isfair or just representation insofar as it involvesissues of advocacy and representativity; is-sues of a meaningful presence, not simplypresence alone, in the game of discord andagreement that is democracy” (Urbinati 2006,p. 42). Fraser (2007, pp. 313–14) has formu-lated the relationship between representationand justice quite precisely (see also Williams1998, Fraser 2005, Rehfeld 2005, Saward2006a):

[R]epresentation furnishes the stage onwhich struggles over distribution and recog-nition are played out. Establishing criteriaof political membership, it tells us who isincluded, and who excluded, from the cir-cle of those entitled to a just distributionand reciprocal recognition. . . . Representa-tion, accordingly, constitutes a third, politi-cal dimension of justice, alongside the (eco-nomic) dimension of redistribution and the(cultural) dimension of recognition.

From this perspective, the equality en-sured by universal suffrage within nations is,simply, equality with respect to one of thevery many dimensions that constitute “thepeople.” Thus, from a normative perspec-tive, geography-based constituency definitionintroduces an arbitrary criterion of inclu-sion/exclusion right at the start. Exclusionswork not on people, who are, after all, univer-sally included through residency-based fran-chise, but rather on issues, since residency-based constituencies define residency-basedinterests as most worthy of political conver-sation and decision—an effect that is arbi-trary from the perspective of justice. Althoughthe costs of territorial constituency defini-

tion are highest for disadvantaged groups, assuggested above, the theoretical point cutseven more broadly and deeply, as suggestedby Fraser’s formulation: Representation is adimension of justice.

But territory is not entirely destiny, evenwhen it is the starting point for constituencydefinition as well as the residence-baseddistribution of one vote to every citizen. Thehistory of race-based districting in the UnitedStates can be understood as attempts to moldgeographical constituencies in ways that en-compass nongeographical issues, and to do sothrough the inclusion of racial minorities indecision-making bodies. Quotas and reservedseats also compensate for the inflexibilitiesof geography, although each arrangementcomes with costs to other dimensions ofrepresentation (Guinier 1994; Williams1998, chs. 3, 7; James 2004). Functional roleadjustments, even if ad hoc, may sometimecompensate. Mansbridge (2003) notes thatempirical political scientists increasinglyidentify forms of representation that are notbased on standard “promissory” mechanisms,whereby candidates make promises to votersand are then judged in subsequent electionsby the results. In “surrogate representa-tion,” for example, a representative claimsa constituency beyond his or her electoraldistrict, as when Barney Frank (a memberof the US House of Representatives fromMassachusetts) represents gays beyond hisdistrict, or Bill Richardson (Governor of NewMexico) represents Latinos beyond his state.These functional adjustments testify not justto the inadequacies of territorial constituency,but also to its malleability. A key challengefor democratic theorists is to imagine howthis malleability might be harnessed beyondthe borders of nation-states.

RETHINKING ELECTORALREPRESENTATION

Electoral democracy is that subset of rep-resentative relationships in which represen-tatives are authorized through election to


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represent the citizens of a constituency to acton behalf of their interests, and then are heldaccountable in subsequent elections. Theserelationships have been examined and reex-amined by political scientists during the post-war period (e.g., Eulau & Karps 1977). Whatis new is the reemergence of electoral repre-sentation as a topic within democratic theory.

Constitutional Design

Most fundamentally, electoral representationis established and molded by constitutionaldesign—that is, the way in which politicalinstitutions form and formulate the patternsof inclusion to which they are subject. Again,this is an issue with an old pedigree. Contem-porary interest is found primarily within thefield of comparative politics—most notably,in debates about the democratic merits ofpresidential versus parliamentary forms ofgovernment. Here we highlight renewed in-terest within democratic theory, particularlyin the impact of constitutional assignments ofresponsibility on the capacities of representa-tives for deliberation and political judgment.

Most generally, constitutions provide twoconcurrent forms of responsibility, one demo-cratic (through elections) and the other hi-erarchical (appointment by superior organsof political power). The relationship be-tween representation and political judgment ismolded by choices between these forms. Con-sider, for example, the quite different ways inwhich the US and European constitutions lo-cate the positions of judges, the clearest ex-ample of representatives assigned particularresponsibilities of judgment. In the UnitedStates, many local and state judges are electedjust like any other political representative andare therefore directly responsible to the peo-ple (see Kelsen 1999). In Europe, the judge isaccountable only to the law and must not deferto the opinions of the people (Friedrich 1963,Kelsen 1992). In the US case, the role of thejudge as representative of law often clasheswith the political responsiveness required ofan elected representative—which perhaps ex-

plains why many states seek to increase judges’independence by declaring elections to benonpartisan (Thompson 1987), and certainlyexplains why higher courts are insulated fromdirect representative accountability. In theEuropean case, however, the democratic le-gitimacy of judges is borrowed entirely fromrepresentative bodies that create the law, andjudgment is viewed as limited to the applica-tion of law. In this way, European constitu-tions preserve the democratic element of rep-resentation within the judiciary, but at the costof conceiving judges’ powers of judgment asthe application of rules.

The broader implication of this judicialexample is that the ways in which constitu-tions assign responsibility and structure ac-countability affect representatives’ capacitiesfor judgment. Elections establish the nonin-dependence of the representative from therepresented in principle, although in practice,representative institutions require enough au-tonomy to carry out their political functions,which will require bodies that can engage indeliberative political judgments (Bybee 1998).Accordingly, most constitutions forbid imper-ative mandate. But because political represen-tation can only exist in the juridical form ofa mandate that is not legally bounded, someother form of mandate is needed to check rep-resentatives, which is why almost all demo-cratic constitutions delimit the responsibilityof the representatives.

Electoral System Design

The central feature of democratic legitimacy,of course, resides in the electoral system.When we vote, we do two things at once: Wecontribute to forming a government or oppo-sition, and we seek representation of our po-sitions and preferences. This means that elec-tions are not just a race that some win at theexpense of others, but a way of participatingin the creation of the representative body, asis suggested by Plotke’s (1997) argument thatthe opposite of representation is not partici-pation but exclusion.


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Although comparative analysis is beyondthe scope of this essay (cf. Lijphart 1999,Powell 2000), it is worth noting here that dif-ferent electoral systems empower this kindof participation quite differently, primarily bystructuring the inclusiveness of the initial au-thorization and the strength of vote-based ac-countability (Urbinati 2006). The key designchoice is between electoral systems based onsingle-member plurality (SMP) districts andthose that seek proportional representation(PR) through multi-member districts (Farrell2001, Przeworski et al. 1999, Powell 2004).

From the perspective of representing res-idence, it is worth noting that PR systemsare inherently less geographical than SMP.Within the boundaries of a district (which maybe the size of the entire state, as in the casesof Israel and the Netherlands), voters deter-mine their constituency at the time of the vote(Duverger & Sartori 1988, Rehfeld 2005). Inaddition, because PR enables representationat lower thresholds (depending on the num-ber of representatives within each district), PRsystems tend to include a broader range of in-terests and identities than SMP systems. It isbecause of their greater inclusiveness and fair-ness that democratic theorists at least sinceMill have favored PR over SMP systems. Agovernment should reach decisions on the ba-sis of debates among representatives of “everyopinion which exists in the constituencies” ina body that reflects “its fair share of voices”(Mill 1991 [1861], pp. 448–50; see also Kelsen1929, Friedrich 1968, Fishkin 1995). Demo-cratic theorists concerned with the represen-tation of disadvantaged groups also prefer PR,simply because its more inclusive logic in-creases the chances that disadvantaged groupswill have representation (Amy 1996, Barber2001). In addition, PR may result in more de-liberative legislative bodies: Because the elec-toral system is less likely to produce governingmajority parties, parliaments operating un-der PR are more likely to develop consensusforms of government (Sartori 1976, Lijphart1999, Powell 2000, Steiner et al. 2005). Forsimilar reasons, the design of local electoral

systems—particularly municipal systems—isnow back on the table (Guinier 1994).

Electoral systems that produce more inclu-sion may have costs to one feature of repre-sentation. They often produce coalition gov-ernments that can diffuse accountability, asparty platforms that were authorized by votersare subsequently compromised for purposesof governing. Likewise, because they separatepowers, presidential systems are often said todampen responsiveness to citizens and diffuseaccountability (Dahl 2003). In contrast, par-liamentary arrangements based on SMP tendto provide citizens with stronger ex post ac-countability. These systems authorize govern-ing majorities, which are then clearly respon-sible for governing as long as they retain theconfidence of majority party members of thelegislature.

It is not clear, however, that inclusivenessand accountability necessarily trade off againstone another, given the variety of possibleaccountability mechanisms (Warren 2008).Some of these other forms of accountabil-ity are deliberative in nature, and depend onpublics demanding that representatives pro-vide accounts of their positions and deci-sions, even as they change (Mansbridge 2004,Urbinati 2006). This increasing attention todiscursive accountability is yet another rea-son democratic theorists have paid more at-tention to the impact of constitutional designon deliberative judgment (Habermas 1996,Manin 1997, Elster 1998, Sunstein 2002,James 2004). These issues have returned alsoin contemporary debates over fair representa-tion (Beitz 1989, Williams 1998, Thompson2002). At this time, however, theories relat-ing constitutional forms and electoral systemsto new accounts of democratic representationremain underdeveloped.

Because of the normative importance ofproportionality to the democracy-justice rela-tionship, a small but growing number of the-orists are becoming interested in represen-tative bodies that are randomly constituted.Randomness would, on average, ensure thatsuch assemblies would represent whatever


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issues are salient to the public at the momentof selection, not only in proportion to thenumbers of individuals with interests in par-ticular issues, but also in proportion to the in-tensity with which interests and opinions areheld (Burnheim 1989, Fishkin 1995, Pogge2002, Rehfeld 2005; cf. Dahl 1989, Warren &Pearse 2008). Closely related is the concept ofrandomly selected citizen representative bod-ies, discussed below.

Political Parties

Although democratic theorists have beenreengaging questions of institutional de-sign, they have ignored political parties (cf.Rosenblum 2008). No doubt the explanationfor inattention mirrors the more general pic-ture: Parties have been viewed as strategic or-ganizations that are primarily instruments ofpolitical elites rather than venues of participa-tion. Moreover, parties are, well, partisan—and thus do not provide a hospitable en-vironment for reasoned deliberations aboutcommon ends, the preferred mode of politi-cal interaction for political philosophers fromPlato to Rawls.

Yet if elections provide real choices forcitizens—that is, if citizens are able to use thevote to authorize and to hold to account thosewho would represent them—parties will nat-urally form, structurally determined by thecharacteristics of electoral systems, the reg-ulations that enable elections, and the consti-tutional form of government. As Rosenblum(2008) notes, in contrast to democratic the-orists, most political scientists view demo-cratic representation as unthinkable withoutparties. They are arguably the key representa-tive bodies within representative government.Their representative functions include aggre-gating and deliberating interests and values,and linking issues through programmatic vi-sions within political environments that areincreasingly segmented. Because they per-form these functions in ways that can be moreor less inclusive and more or less delibera-tive, political parties should find their way

back onto the agenda of democratic theory(see Beitz 1989). Such integration, however,will require that we understand partisanshipas an essential feature of deliberation. Partiesas organizations are not to be confused withfactions since they can and should transformparticular forms of advocacy into more com-peting accounts of common goods and inter-ests, and in this way structure public discourse(Urbinati 2006, pp. 37–38; Rosenblum 2008).

Ethical Obligationsof Representatives

If representative roles are structured in part byinstitutional rules and inducements, they arealso structured by the ethical duties of pub-lic office. Representatives are elected to docertain jobs, and their jobs come with obli-gations. The question of representative roleswas famously conceived by Burke (1968), whoargued that representatives should serve astrustees of the interests of those who electedthem—“virtual representatives”—rather thanserving as delegates. Representatives shouldnot be bound by the preferences of con-stituents; they should use their autonomousjudgment within the context of deliberativebodies to represent the public interest.

The notion that representatives aretrustees is widely understood as a quasi-aristocratic understanding of representation:the best judgment of elites replaces the judg-ment of the people. This understanding ofthe delegate-trustee distinction crowds all“democratic” meanings of representation intothe delegate model. The formulation drainsthe meaning from “democracy” and tells usnothing about how constituents’ interests areconverted into decisions within the context ofa representative institution. That is, the con-cept of delegation provides no explanation ofdecision making and thus fails to provides anaccount of democratic rule. Pitkin (1967) of-fered more nuance when she noted that rep-resentatives cannot simply reflect their con-stituents’ interests—in part because interestsare often unformed (thus, it is unclear what


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should be represented) and in part becausetheir jobs include making collective decisionsthat accord with democratic institutions. In-stead, Pitkin argued, we should understandrepresentatives as having the ethical obliga-tion to be responsive to their constituents’ in-terests. This formulation had the advantage ofcovering the complexities of the relationship,although it did not provide much more.

Ironically, perhaps, early incarnations ofgroup representation arguments fell on thetrustee side of the dichotomy, with its eli-tist leanings. If a representative is descrip-tively representative of a group, then thegroup’s members must trust their represen-tative, since descriptive similarity in itselfimplies no mechanisms for accountability—and, indeed, carries ambiguous role obli-gations. But working through the require-ments for group representatives has put theproblem of role ethics back on the agenda(Phillips 1995, Williams 1998, Mansbridge1999, Young 2000, Dovi 2002). Interestingly,the category of trust has proved more fruitfulthan that of delegate, reconfigured so it is clearthat, as a trustee, the representative is obli-gated to keep his or her constituents’ interestsin view (Dovi 2007, ch. 5). Mansbridge (2003)argues that much democratic representationis “gyroscopic”: Voters select a representa-tive because she holds values that convergewith theirs. Voters then pay little attentionto the representative, trusting her to do theright thing. They often “select” rather than“sanction”; they trust rather than monitor. OnMansbridge’s view, there is nothing undemo-cratic about this strategy. Voters are, in effect,judging character rather than performance,but they retain their capacity to remove a rep-resentative should the bases of their trust bedisappointed or betrayed ( J. Mansbridge, un-published manuscript).

Interest in the ethical obligations of repre-sentatives has also been fueled by problemsof campaign finance and corruption (Beitz1989, ch. 9; Thompson 1995; Stark 2000;Warren 2006). We are likely to see full the-ories of representative ethics in the near fu-

ture (cf. Dovi 2007; E. Beerbohm, unpub-lished manuscript).

Deliberation and Judgment

As we suggested above, one of the most im-portant inspirations for rethinking politicalrepresentation within electoral democracy hasbeen the increasingly sophisticated empha-sis on deliberation within democracy. Fromthis perspective, representation induces andforms relationships of judgment that enabledemocracy, some of which may be formalizedby election, and others of which may workthrough group advocacy, voice, the media, orindeed, representative claims by any numberof actors from both within and outside insti-tutionalized politics (Rosanvallon 1998). In-trinsic to these processes of judgment is whatUrbinati (2006) calls indirectness in politics—the representation of citizens’ judgments tothem by their representative and vice versa—through which the demos reflects on itself andjudges its laws, institutions, and leaders (seealso Ankersmit 2002).

These reflexive relationships often gounnoticed, but they are essential to mak-ing political judgment work in complex,pluralistic, democratic societies. Represen-tation functions to depersonalize claims andopinions, for example, which in turn allowscitizens to mingle and associate without eras-ing the partisan spirit essential to free politicalcompetition. Representation serves to unifyand connect citizens, while also pulling themout of the immediate present and projectingthem into future-oriented perspectives. Rep-resentation, when intertwined with citizens’reflexivity and participation, evokes andfocuses the natality of politics, through whichindividuals transcend the immediacy of theirinterests, biographical experience, and socialand cultural attachments, and enlarge theirpolitical judgment on their own and others’opinions (Urbinati 2006; see Arendt 1989).Thus, even at its most divisive, in a democraticsociety representative institutions are neversolely descriptive of social segmentations


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and identities. And at their best, they tendtoward transcendence of the here and nowin a process that is animated by a dialecticbetween what is and what can be or ought tobe (Przeworski 1991, p. 19; cf. Hegel 1967).Finally, of course, representation also enablescitizens to survey and discipline power hold-ers, not only through the direct mechanismsof voting but also through the gathering andexposure of information by groups and themedia who claim (not always credibly) to actas representatives of the public.

In short, we should think of representativedemocracy not as a pragmatic alternative tosomething we modern citizens can no longerhave, namely direct democracy, but as an in-trinsically modern way of intertwining partic-ipation, political judgment, and the constitu-tion of demoi capable of self-rule. Understoodin this way, elections are not an alternativeto deliberation and participation, but ratherstructure and constitute both. Elections arenot a discrete series of instants in which thesovereign will is authorized, but rather con-tinuums of influence and power created andrecreated by moments in which citizens canuse the vote to select and judge representatives(Dahl 1971, pp. 20–21). Likewise, we shouldunderstand electoral representation as havingan elective affinity with deliberative politicsbecause it structures ongoing processes of ac-tion and reaction between institutions and so-ciety, between mistrust and legitimacy, andbetween sanctioned will and censuring judg-ment from below (Rosanvallon 2006).

THE NEW FRONTIER:NONELECTORALDEMOCRATICREPRESENTATION

As we argued above, there are limitationsto a purely electoral rendering of democracyand representation. Some of these limitationsare mutable in principle but unlikely to bechanged in practice. The central organizingprinciple of territorial constituency, for ex-ample, is likely to remain, if only because it

provides a transparent and practical basis forthe distribution of votes to persons. But someof the primary virtues of electoral democracyare also limitations. Elections, for example,can and should be institutionalized in sucha way that the rules are knowable and pre-dictable, and accountability can be achievedover long periods of time (Thompson 2004).Yet the very stability of elected representativesand electoral institutions means that they areslow to respond to emerging or marginalizedconstituencies. Neither are elections very sen-sitive to information. Although the campaignsleading up to elections are, ideally, energeticperiods of issue-focused deliberation, votesin themselves are information-poor. Electedrepresentatives are left to rely on other means(polls, advice, focus groups, letters, petitions,and the like) to guess what voters intendthem to represent—over what spectrum of is-sues, in what proportion, and with what in-tensity. Although electoral cycles of autho-rization and accountability provide a strongcheck against gross abuses of power, as rep-resentative devices they lack nuance and sen-sitivity (Dunn 1999). Stated more positively,insofar as electoral representation works, itdoes so in conjunction with a rich fabric ofrepresentative claimants and advocacy withinsociety (Rosanvallon 2006, Urbinati 2006).This point was appreciated within early plu-ralist theory, though without the critical eyefor the social and economic inequalities thatgroup advocacy–based democracy usually en-tails (Truman 1951; Dahl 1956; cf. Held 1996,ch. 6).

Further limitations of electoral represen-tation inhere in its partisan qualities, how-ever necessary they are if elections are toserve as instruments of authorization and ac-countability (Urbinati 2006). This necessitytrades off against others: If speech is alwaysstrategic, it will dampen or subvert delibera-tion oriented toward norm- or fact-based con-sensus (Chambers 2004, Mansbridge 2004).The deliberative elements of representationare likewise dampened by the fact that legisla-tive institutions are responsible for decisions


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affecting the exercise of state power, mean-ing that they are poor venues for representingemerging agendas, which do much better inthe less restricted give and take of deliberationin the public sphere (Habermas 1996).

In addition, these features of electoralrepresentation—their inability to refract fine-grained representation into political insti-tutions and their dampening effects ondeliberation—fit poorly with the norms ofcitizenship evolving in the developed democ-racies. Dalton (2007) argues that new gener-ations of citizens are voting less but engag-ing more. They want more choice; they wantmore direct impact. These are goods that elec-toral representation cannot provide. This factalone should spur us to think about repre-sentation more broadly, including nonelec-toral venues—not necessarily as competingforms of representation (though they can be),but possibly as complementary forms (Saward2006a,b).

Finally, as we noted above (When is Rep-resentation “Democratic”?), the globalizationof democratic norms and expectations simplydoes not fit with any electorally based con-stituencies at all—not only within the inter-national domain but also in contexts that haveweak or nonexistent electoral democracies.

Owing to these functional limitations ofelectoral representation, practices of demo-cratic representation increasingly go beyondelectoral venues, a phenomenon that testifiesto the expansion and pluralization of spacesof political judgment in today’s democracies.One of the most remarkable developments hasbeen the proliferation of representative claimsthat cannot be tested by election. These claimscome from at least two classes of representa-tives, discussed below. First, there are innu-merable agents who, in effect, self-authorize:Advocacy organizations, interest groups, civilsociety groups, international nongovernmen-tal organizations, philanthropic foundations,journalists, and other individuals, includingelected officials functioning as surrogate rep-resentatives, claim to represent constituen-cies within public discourse and within col-

lective decision-making bodies. Second, gov-ernments and other entities are increasinglydesigning “citizen representatives”: new, non-elected forms of representative bodies such ascitizen panels, polls, and deliberative forums(Warren 2008).

Self-Authorized Representatives

Self-authorized representatives are not new.Individuals and groups have always petitionedgovernment and made representative claimson behalf of interests and values they believeshould have an impact. Interest group lib-eralism and pluralism assume that this kindof representation does much, if not most, ofthe work of conveying substance (Dahl 1971;Held 1996, ch. 6). Moreover, history is repletewith unelected leaders and groups makingrepresentative claims in the name of groups,peoples, or nations precisely because they arenot formally represented. The constitutionalrevolutions of the seventeenth century wereinduced by groups such as the Levellers. In theFrench Revolution, Sieyes declared the exis-tence of a “third class” that was the nation,and they proposed themselves as the speakersor representatives of this class, and thus forthe nation.

It is not the existence of self-authorizedrepresentatives that is new, but rather theirlarge number and diversity (Warren 2001).Collectively, self-authorized representativesorganize what might be called the “nega-tive power of the people” (Urbinati 2006)and can function as a “counter-politics” wheninstitutionalized politics fails its representa-tive purposes (Rosanvallon 2006). Groupsclaim to represent women, a particular eth-nic group, victims of landmines, the im-poverished and marginalized, parents, andchildren (Strolovitch 2006). They claim torepresent a wide variety of goods: humanrights and security, health, education, an-imals, rainforests, community, spirituality,safety, peace, economic development, and soon. They often claim to represent positionsand arguments, functioning as “discursive”


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representatives (Keck 2003; cf. Alcoff 1991,Dryzek 2000, ch. 4). So representation ofthis kind can be targeted and issue-specific;it can be flexible and respond to emerg-ing issues, and particularly to constituenciesthat are not territorially anchored. The col-lectivities representatives seek to influenceare increasingly diverse: not only govern-ments and power holders but also publicdiscourse and culture, as well as powerfulmarket actors such as corporations. Thesekinds of representatives can and do func-tion beyond borders. Not only do they havethe potential to compensate for electoralinflexibilities—providing high levels of tar-geted, information-rich representation—butthey also function in areas where no elec-toral democracy exists: in the global arena,and in authoritarian contexts (Dryzek 2000,ch. 5; Grant & Keohane 2005; Saward 2006b;Bohman 2007; Rubenstein 2007). Indeed,these representative functions are increasinglyrecognized by international organizations.For instance, the United Nations has begunrecognizing civil society organizations withinits programs as representative of groups thatare not well represented by its member states.The challenges for democratic theory are tounderstand the nature of these representa-tive claims and to assess which of them countas contributions to democracy and in whatways. It is now clear, for example, that self-authorized representation is not necessarily aprecursor to formal, electoral inclusion butrather a representative phenomenon in itsown right, which may contribute to democ-racy in ways that electoral representation can-not. But unlike electoral mechanisms, thearena of self-authorized representatives of-fers no discrete domain of institutional pro-cesses, and so identifying and assessing theirdemocratic contributions will take imagina-tion (D. Castiglione & M.E. Warren, unpub-lished manuscript).

One way to begin would be to ask the samegeneric questions asked of electoral represen-tation, as suggested above: (a) How are therepresentatives authorized by those in whose

name they act? (b) How are they held ac-countable by those they claim to represent?With respect to authorization, the nature ofthe representative agent will make a differ-ence. Many self-authorized representativesare voluntary organizations with followingsand memberships. In such cases, authoriza-tion might work through members’ votes andvoices. Other kinds of self-authorized repre-sentatives make claims on behalf of ascriptive,involuntary constituencies, such as racial orethnic groups (Alcoff 1991, Strolovitch 2006).Then there are agents who claim to representthose with little or no voice, such as interna-tional human rights organizations, or organi-zations representing the interests of childrenor animals. Finally, there are many agents—nongovernmental organizations and founda-tions, for example—who claim missions onbehalf of others, more or less formally (Grant& Keohane 2005, Saward 2006b). In thesekinds of cases, initial authorization is inher-ently problematic; agents claim representativestatus and it is up to those who are claimedas “represented” to say yes or no or to of-fer alternative accounts. Authorization is, asit were, reflexive and retrospective at best.Where those who are represented are silentbecause of their context—or absent, as inthe case of future generations—the analogyto electoral authorization breaks down alto-gether, and we are better off to look at genericnorms and functions of democratic represen-tation, and then to imagine nonelectoral de-vices that might serve these norms and func-tions (Rubenstein 2007).

No doubt because of the absence of for-mal authorization in most cases, the workrelevant to these new forms of representa-tion has focused primarily on accountabil-ity (Ebrahim 2003, Kuper 2004, Held &Koenig-Archibugi 2005, Castiglione 2006).There are several potential mechanisms ofaccountability. When membership-based vol-untary organizations claim to represent theirmembers, for example, members can eitherlend their names to the organization, or theycan exit, producing market-like accountability


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(Goodin 2003). Groups without power maygo public, gaining influence precisely becausethey can justify their representations (Warren2001, ch. 4). A group may be held to ac-count indirectly through “horizontal” polic-ing by other groups, by boards, or by themedia, often through comparisons betweenthe group’s representative claims (e.g., in itsmission statement) and its actions (Grant &Keohane 2005). Devices such as performanceindicators, audits, and surveys can add ele-ments of accountability.

Of course, this list of possible ways andmeans of authorization and accountabilityonly tells us that, in principle, we could de-velop theories that would stretch to the do-main of self-authorized representatives. It isneither a theory in itself, nor a judgmentas to whether or how this emerging do-main contributes to democratic representa-tion (cf. Warren 2001, ch. 7; 2003). But onekey issue for democratic theory is increas-ingly clear, even in advance of well-developedtheories. In the case of electoral representa-tion, an abstract equality is achieved throughthe universal franchise. There is no equiva-lent equality of influence or voice in the non-electoral domain, where the advantages ofeducation, income, and other unequally dis-tributed resources are more likely to trans-late into patterns of over- and underrepre-sentation (Warren 2001, Cain et al. 2003,Strolovitch 2006). The many advantages ofself-authorized representation—and they areconsiderable—may also result in increasinglyunequal representation.

Citizen Representatives

Self-authorized representation provides apossible frame for understanding the rapidevolution of what we call, following Warren(2008), “citizen representatives” (Rowe &Frewer 2000, Brown 2006). These forms in-volve nonelected, formally designed venuesinto which citizens are selected or self-selected for representative purposes. The old-est form of citizen representative is the court-

room jury, which represents the consideredjudgment of peers. We can now add morerecent experiments with citizen juries andpanels, advisory councils, stakeholder meet-ings, lay members of professional reviewboards, representations at public hearings,public submissions, citizen surveys, deliber-ative polling, deliberative forums, and focusgroups (Pettit 1999b, Fung 2006b). Citizenrepresentatives typically function not as alter-natives but rather as supplements to electedrepresentative bodies or administrative bod-ies in areas of functional weakness, usuallyrelated to communication, deliberation, legit-imacy, governability, or attentiveness to pub-lic norms and common goods (Brown 2006,Warren 2008).

Although these representative forms aretypically categorized as participatory democ-racy, direct democracy, or citizen engage-ment, these terms are misleading because onlya tiny percentage of citizens are actively in-volved in any given venue. The more im-portant properties of these forms of citizenparticipation, we think, are representative. Afew citizens actively serve as representatives ofother citizens. What is most interesting aboutthese new forms is that they have the poten-tial to represent discursively considered opin-ions and voices that are not necessarily rep-resented either through electoral democracyor through the aggregate of self-authorizedrepresentatives in the public sphere. Fung(2003) highlights this unique representativefunction by referring to these new forms as“minipublics.” They have the potential to cap-ture opinions and voices that are not heard,not necessarily because of group-based dis-advantage, but because the sum total of ad-vocacy will often fail to represent unorga-nized interests and values. Minipublics canalso represent considered public opinion, par-ticularly opinions representing compromisesand trade-offs in complex or fractious issueareas. Under the standard model, the workof deliberatively crafting policies belongs tothe formal political institutions—and theseinstitutions find it increasingly difficult to


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represent considered, legitimate solutions be-fore the public. Under the citizen representa-tive model, venues are designed, as it were,to generate considered opinion. Deliberativepolls, for example, involve a random selec-tion of citizens who are convened for a week-end to discuss an issue such as health carepolicy. During this time, participants learnabout the issue, deliberate, and then regis-ter their opinions (Fishkin 1995). The re-sults should represent what informed pub-lic opinion would look like, were citizens toorganize, become informed, and deliberate.Presumably, the results are not simply coun-terfactual; they represent a statistically rep-resentative snapshot of the existing but la-tent preferences of citizens—preferences thatpower holders seeking to represent “the peo-ple” should need to know.

For similar reasons, governments increas-ingly constitute citizen juries and panelscharged with representing the views of citi-zens more generally, on a given issue (Brown2006). In an unusual experiment in non-electoral representation, the government ofBritish Columbia (BC) sought to assess theprovince’s electoral system and recommendan alternative in the form of a referen-dum question. Rather than leaving the jobto the legislature or an expert commission,the government constituted a “citizens’ as-sembly” composed of 160 members, selectedfrom voter rolls though a near-random pro-cess. The assembly met over a period ofnine months, which included learning, pub-lic hearings, and deliberations. Professionalrepresentatives—in particular, organized ad-vocates and professional politicians—were ex-cluded. They were invited to speak with theassembly, but the designers assumed that thepublic interest would be represented onlyif stakeholder advocacy were separated fromlearning, listening, and deliberation (Warren& Pearse 2008). In short, because it combinedauthorization by an elected government, ran-dom selection, a deliberative format, and ac-countability through a referendum, the BCCitizens’ Assembly was designed as a counter-

balance to both electoral representation andself-authorized representation. Its democraticcredentials stemmed from its initial constitu-tion by elected representatives, its statisticallyrepresentative makeup (so as to “look like thepeople of BC”), and its submission of its finalrecommendation directly to the people.

Randomly selected bodies represent anovel and potentially important new form ofrepresentative—or, more precisely, the redis-covery of an ancient form (Fishkin 1991, Lieb2004). Should these forms grow, they willbring new challenges. Because any randomlyselected deliberative body will inevitably gen-erate opinions that differ from public opin-ion, for example, connecting them to broaderpublics will require new institutions, yet tobe devised (cf. Fung 2003, Warren & Pearse2008). At worst, randomly selected bodiesmight become tools that elites use to le-gitimate policies while bypassing electoralaccountability, or they might substitute forbroader citizen judgment and participation(Ackerman 1991, p. 181). At best, however,such bodies might function as an importantsupplement to existing forms of representa-tion. They have the potential to link the judg-ments of political elites much more closelyto public opinion, while correcting for theinequalities introduced by the rise of self-authorized representatives.

THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

If elections alone qualify as representativedemocracy, then it is hard to find good ar-guments against the critics of contemporarydemocracy who seek to unmask the role ofthe people as a mere myth, and point tothe oligarchic degeneration and corruptionof electoral democracy. Such criticism de-pends on an institutional history of repre-sentative government that has not been sub-stantively edited since the eighteenth cen-tury. Moreover, the suggestion that we extendthe meaning of democratic representationto include the informal, discursive characterof a pluralistic public sphere of associations,


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political movements, and opinions risks look-ing like an ideological refurbishment, func-tional to the new legitimation strategies ofpolitical elites. Indeed, almost without ex-ception, it remains the case that only anelected political elite has both deliberative anddecision-making power, unlike the citizens,whose formal freedom to discuss and criticizeproposals and policies does not ensure thattheir opinions will affect legislation and pol-icy making.

Here, however, we draw attention to theimportant changes in representative institu-tions. These changes began with the adop-tion and extension of universal suffrage, whichgenerated new forms of political life within so-ciety, in turn altering the nature and functionsof representative institutions. Dahl’s (2003)comment on the US case goes precisely to this

point. “Even if some of the Framers leanedmore toward the idea of an aristocratic re-public than a democratic republic, they soondiscovered that under the leadership of JamesMadison, among others, Americans wouldrapidly undertake to create a more demo-cratic republic” (pp. 5–6). Given the complexand evolving landscape of democracy, how-ever, neither the standard model of represen-tation nor the participatory ideal can encom-pass the democratic ideal of inclusion of allaffected by collective decisions. To movecloser to this ideal, we shall need com-plex forms of representation—electoral rep-resentation and its various territorially basedcousins, self-authorized representation, andnew forms of representation that are capableof representing latent interests, transnationalissues, broad values, and discursive positions.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The authors are not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity ofthis review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Dario Castiglione and Nancy Rosenblum for their comments on previous drafts ofthis article.

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Annual Review ofPolitical Science

Volume 11, 2008Contents

State FailureRobert H. Bates � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �1

The Ups and Downs of Bureaucratic OrganizationJohan P. Olsen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 13

The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and ForeignPolicy: Toward a Theoretical SynthesisMatthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 39

What the Ancient Greeks Can Tell Us About DemocracyJosiah Ober � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 67

The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political CourtsRan Hirschl � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 93

Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and EconomicDevelopment: Theory, History, and FindingsStanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �119

The Role of Politics in Economic DevelopmentPeter Gourevitch � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �137

Does Electoral System Reform Work? Electoral System Lessons fromReforms of the 1990sEthan Scheiner � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �161

The New Empirical BiopoliticsJohn R. Alford and John R. Hibbing � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �183

The Rule of Law and Economic DevelopmentStephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �205

Hiding in Plain Sight: American Politics and the Carceral StateMarie Gottschalk � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �235

Private Global Business RegulationDavid Vogel � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �261

Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping LiteratureVirginia Page Fortna and Lise Morje Howard � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �283

v

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AR344-FM ARI 8 April 2008 18:44

Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideasand DiscourseVivien A. Schmidt � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �303

The Mobilization of Opposition to Economic LiberalizationKenneth M. Roberts � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �327

CoalitionsMacartan Humphreys � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �351

The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic TheoryNadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �387

What Have We Learned About Generalized Trust, If Anything?Peter Nannestad � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �413

Convenience VotingPaul Gronke, Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, Peter A. Miller, and Daniel Toffey � � � � � � � � �437

Race, Immigration, and the Identity-to-Politics LinkTaeku Lee � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �457

Work and Power: The Connection Between Female Labor ForceParticipation and Female Political RepresentationTorben Iversen and Frances Rosenbluth � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �479

Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political ScienceDennis F. Thompson � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �497

Is Deliberative Democracy a Falsifiable Theory?Diana C. Mutz � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �521

The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation ofSocial NetworksElisabeth Jean Wood � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �539

Political Polarization in the American PublicMorris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �563

Indexes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 7–11 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �589

Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 7–11 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �591

Errata

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Political Science articles may be foundat http://polisci.annualreviews.org/

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