Trieste, October 19, 2006 Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics Angel Sánchez po Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GI nto de Matemáticas – Universidad Carlos III d to de Biocomputación y Física de Sistemas Complejos Universidad de Zaragoza ith Carlos P. Roca and José A. Cuest
49
Embed
Trieste, October 19, 2006 Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics Angel Sánchez Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC) Departamento de Matemáticas.
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Trieste, October 19, 2006
Time Scales in Evolutionary Dynamics Angel Sánchez
Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC)Departamento de Matemáticas – Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Instituto de Biocomputación y Física de Sistemas Complejos (BIFI)Universidad de Zaragoza
He who was ready to sacrifice his life (…), rather than betray his comrades, would often leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature… Therefore, it seems scarcely possible (…) that the number of men gifted with such virtues (…) would be increased by natural selection, that is, by the survival of the fittest.
A man who was not impelled by any deep, instinctive feeling, to sacrifice his life for the good of others, yet was roused to such actions by a sense of glory, would by his example excite the same wish for glory in other men, and would strengthen by exercise the noble feeling of admiration. He might thus do far more good to his tribe than by begetting offsprings with a tendency to inherit his own high character.
… but only partial! Strong reciprocity (Gintis, 2000; Fehr, Fischbacher & Gächter,
2002) typically human (primates?)
altruistic rewarding: predisposition to reward others for cooperative behavior
altruistic punishment: propensity to impose sanctions on non-cooperators
Strong reciprocators bear the cost of altruistic acts even if they gain no benefitsHammerstein (ed.), Genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation (Dahlem Workshop Report 90, MIT, 2003)
E. Pennisi, Science 309, 93 (2005)“Others with a more mathematical bent are applying evolutionary game theory, a modeling approach developed for economics, to quantify cooperation and predict behavioral outcomes under different circumstances.”
Experimental resultsExtraordinary amount of dataCamerer, Behavioral Game Theory (Princeton University Press, 2003)
Henrich et al. (eds.), Foundations of Human Sociality : Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies (Oxford University Press, 2004)
“At this point, we should declare a moratorium on creating ultimatum game data and shift attention towards new games and new theories.”
Increasing system size does not changes basins of attrractions, only sharpens the transitionsSmall s is like an effective small population, because inviduals that do not play do not get fitnessIntroduce background of fitness: add fb to all payoffs
• In general, evolutionary game theory studies a limit situation: s infinite! (every player plays every other one before selection)
• Number of games per player may be finite, even Poisson distributed
• Fluctuations may keep players with smaller ‘mean-field’ fitness alive
• Changes to equilibrium selection are non trivial and crucial
Conclusions
New perspective on evolutionary game theory: more general dynamics, dictated by the specific application (change focus from equilibrium selection problems)
C. P. Roca, J. A. Cuesta, A. Sánchez, arXiv:q-bio/0512045(submitted to European Physical Journal Special Topics)
A. Sánchez & J. A. Cuesta, J. Theor. Biol. 235, 233 (2005)
A. Sánchez, J. A. Cuesta & C. P. Roca, in “Modeling Cooperative Behavior in the Social Sciences”, eds. P. Garrido, J. Marro & M. A. Muñoz, 142–148. AIP Proceedings Series (2005).
C. P. Roca, J. A. Cuesta, A. Sánchez, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 158701 (2006)