Transport layer security .

• transport layer security

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Transport Layer Security

1 Transport Layer Security



1 Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are cryptographic protocols

which are designed to provide communication security over the

Internet



1 As a consequence of choosing X.509 certificates, certificate authorities and a public key infrastructure are

necessary to verify the relation between a certificate and its owner,

as well as to generate, sign, and administer the validity of certificates



1 In the TCP/IP model view, TLS and SSL encrypt the data of network

connections at a lower sublayer of its application layer



1 TLS is an IETF standards track protocol, first defined in 1999 and last updated in RFC 5246 and RFC 6176 . It is based on the earlier SSL specifications (1994, 1995, 1996)

developed by Netscape Communications for adding the

HTTPS protocol to their Navigator web browser.


Transport Layer Security - Description

1 The TLS protocol allows client-server applications to communicate across

a network in a way designed to prevent eavesdropping and

tampering.



1 Since protocols can operate either with or without TLS (or SSL), it is

necessary for the client to indicate to the server whether it wants to set up

a TLS connection or not



1 Once the client and server have decided to use TLS, they negotiate a

stateful connection by using a handshaking procedure. During this

handshake, the client and server agree on various parameters used to establish the connection's security:



1 The client sends the server the client's SSL version number, cipher settings, session-specific data, and other information that the server needs to communicate with the

client using SSL.



1 The server sends the client the server's SSL version number, cipher settings,

session-specific data, and other information that the client needs to

communicate with the server over SSL. The server also sends its own certificate,

and if the client is requesting a server resource that requires client

authentication, the server requests the client's certificate.



1 The client uses the information sent by the server to authenticate the

server. If the server cannot be authenticated, the user is warned of the problem and informed that an

encrypted and authenticated connection cannot be established. If

the server can be successfully authenticated, the client proceeds to

the next step.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html


1 Using all data generated in the handshake thus far, the client (with

the cooperation of the server, depending on the cipher in use)

creates the pre-master secret for the session, encrypts it with the server's

public key (obtained from the server's certificate, sent in step 2), and then sends the encrypted pre-

master secret to the server.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html


1 If the server has requested client authentication (an optional step in

the handshake), the client also signs another piece of data that is unique

to this handshake and known by both the client and server. In this case, the

client sends both the signed data and the client's own certificate to the server along with the encrypted pre-

master secret.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html


1 If the server has requested client authentication, the server attempts to

authenticate the client. If the client cannot be authenticated, the session ends. If the client can be successfully authenticated, the server uses its private key to decrypt

the pre-master secret, and then performs a series of steps (which the client also

performs, starting from the same pre-master secret) to generate the master

secret.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html


1 Both the client and the server use the master secret to generate the session keys, which are symmetric keys used to encrypt and decrypt information exchanged during the

SSL session and to verify its integrity (that is, to detect any changes in the

data between the time it was sent and the time it is received over the

SSL connection).https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html


1 The client sends a message to the server informing it that future

messages from the client will be encrypted with the session key. It then sends a separate (encrypted) message indicating that the client

portion of the handshake is finished.



1 The server sends a message to the client informing it that future

messages from the server will be encrypted with the session key. It then sends a separate (encrypted) message indicating that the server

portion of the handshake is finished.



1 The SSL handshake is now complete and the session begins. The client

and the server use the session keys to encrypt and decrypt the data they send to each other and to validate its

integrity.



1 This is the normal operation condition of the secure channel. At

any time, due to internal or external stimulus (either automation or user

intervention), either side may renegotiate the connection, in which

case, the process repeats itself.



1 This concludes the handshake and begins the secured connection, which is encrypted and decrypted with the

key material until the connection closes.



1 In step 3, the client must check a chain of "signatures" from a "root of trust" built into, or added to, the client. The client must also

check that none of these have been revoked; this is not often implemented correctly, but is a requirement of any

public-key authentication system. If the particular signer beginning this server's chain is trusted, and all signatures in the chain remain trusted, then the Certificate

(thus the server) is trusted.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html

Transport Layer Security - Secure Network Programming API

1 Early research efforts toward transport layer security included the Secure Network Programming (SNP) application programming interface (API), which in 1993 explored the

approach of having a secure transport layer API closely

resembling Berkeley sockets, to facilitate retrofitting preexisting

network applications with security measures.


Transport Layer Security - SSL 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0

1 The SSL protocol was originally developed by

Netscape


Transport Layer Security - TLS 1.0

1 TLS 1.0 was first defined in RFC 2246 in January 1999 as an upgrade of SSL Version 3.0. As stated in the RFC, "the differences between this protocol and SSL 3.0 are not

dramatic, but they are significant to preclude interoperability between TLS 1.0

and SSL 3.0. " TLS 1.0 does include a means by which a TLS implementation can downgrade the connection to SSL 3.0, thus

weakening security.



1 TLS 1.1 was defined in RFC 4346 in April 2006. It is an update from TLS

version 1.0. Significant differences in this version include:



1 Support for IANA registration of parameters.



1 TLS 1.2 was defined in RFC 5246 in August 2008. It is based on the

earlier TLS 1.1 specification. Major differences include:



1 The MD5-SHA-1 combination in the pseudorandom function (PRF) was

replaced with SHA-256, with an option to use cipher suite specified

PRFs.



1 The MD5-SHA-1 combination in the Finished message hash was replaced with SHA-256, with an option to use

cipher suite specific hash algorithms. However the size of the hash in the

finished message is still truncated to 96-bits.



1 The MD5-SHA-1 combination in the digitally signed element was replaced with a single hash

negotiated during handshake, defaults to SHA-1.



1 Enhancement in the client's and server's ability to specify which hash

and signature algorithms they will accept.



1 Expansion of support for authenticated encryption ciphers,

used mainly for Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and CCM mode of Advanced

Encryption Standard encryption.



1 TLS Extensions definition and Advanced Encryption Standard cipher suites were

added.



1 All TLS versions were further refined in RFC 6176 in March 2011 removing their backward compatibility with SSL

such that TLS sessions will never negotiate the use of Secure Sockets

Layer (SSL) version 2.0.


Transport Layer Security - Applications and adoption

1 However, it has also been implemented with datagram-oriented transport protocols, such as the User

Datagram Protocol (UDP) and the Datagram Congestion Control

Protocol (DCCP), usage which has been standardized independently

using the term Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS).


Transport Layer Security - Websites

1 A prominent use of TLS is for securing World Wide Web traffic

between the website and the browser carried by HTTP to form HTTPS. Notable applications are electronic commerce and asset

management.


Transport Layer Security - Key exchange or key agreement

1 Before a client and server can begin to exchange information protected

by TLS, they must securely exchange or agree upon an encryption key and a cipher to use when encrypting data

(see Cipher)



1 The TLS_DH_anon key agreement method does not authenticate the

server or the user and hence is rarely used. Only TLS_DHE and TLS_ECDHE

provide forward secrecy.



1 Public key certificates used during exchange/agreement also vary in the

size of the public/private encryption keys used during the exchange and hence the

robustness of the security provided. In July 2013, Google announced that it

would no longer use 1024 bit public keys and would switch instead to 2048 bit

keys to increase the security of the TLS encryption it provides to its users.


Transport Layer Security - Cipher

1 Website cipher security against publicly known feasible attacks



1 [note 3][note 4][note 5] Depends N/AN/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Insecure

Depends Insecure Insecure



1 [note 3][note 5] Depends Depends N/AN/A Depends N/A Depends Insecure

Depends Insecure Insecure



1 [note 3] Secure Secure N/A N/ASecure N/A Secure Insecure Secure

Insecure Insecure



1 [note 3] Secure Secure SecureSecure Secure Secure Secure

N/A N/A N/A Insecure


Transport Layer Security - Libraries

1 Several free and open source software projects have implemented SSL and TLS. Programmers may use

the PolarSSL, CyaSSL, OpenSSL, MatrixSSL, NSS, or GnuTLS libraries

for SSL/TLS functionality.



1 Microsoft Windows includes an implementation of SSL and TLS as part of its

Secure Channel package.



1 OS X includes an implementation of SSL and TLS as part of its Secure Transport package.



1 Delphi programmers may use a library called

Indy.



1 GnuTLS: a free implementation (LGPL licensed)



1 cryptlib: a portable open source cryptography library (includes TLS/SSL implementation)



1 JSSE: a Java implementation included in the Java Runtime Environment

supports TLS 1.1 and 1.2 from Java 7, although is disabled by default for client, and enabled by default for

server



1 MatrixSSL: a dual licensed implementation



1 Network Security Services (NSS): FIPS 140 validated open source

library



1 PolarSSL: A tiny SSL library implementation for embedded devices that is designed for

ease of use



1 CyaSSL: Embedded SSL/TLS Library with a strong focus on speed

and size.



1 A paper presented at the 2012 ACM conference on computer and

communications security showed that few applications used some of

these SSL libraries incorrectly, leading to vulnerabilities. According

to the authors



1 "the root cause of most of these vulnerabilities is the terrible design of the APIs to the

underlying SSL libraries. Instead of expressing high-level security properties of network tunnels

such as confidentiality and authentication, these APIs expose low-level details of the SSL

protocol to application developers. As a consequence, developers often use SSL APIs

incorrectly, misinterpreting and misunderstanding their manifold parameters,

options, side effects, and return values."


Transport Layer Security - Other uses

1 The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) can also be protected by TLS.

These applications use public key certificates to verify the identity of

endpoints.



1 TLS can also be used to tunnel an entire network stack to create a VPN,

as is the case with OpenVPN and OpenConnect



1 TLS is also a standard method to protect Session Initiation Protocol

(SIP) application signaling. TLS can be used to provide authentication and encryption of the SIP signaling associated with VoIP and other SIP-

based applications.


Transport Layer Security - SSL 2.0

1 Identical cryptographic keys are used for message authentication and encryption.



1 SSL 2.0 has a weak MAC construction that uses the MD5 hash function with a secret prefix, making it vulnerable

to length extension attacks.



1 SSL 2.0 does not have any protection for the handshake, meaning a man-in-the-middle downgrade attack can

go undetected.



1 SSL 2.0 uses the TCP connection close to indicate the end of data. This

means that truncation attacks are possible: the attacker simply forges a

TCP FIN, leaving the recipient unaware of an illegitimate end of data message (SSL 3.0 fixes this

problem by having an explicit closure alert).



1 SSL 2.0 assumes a single service and a fixed domain certificate, which

clashes with the standard feature of virtual hosting in Web servers. This

means that most websites are practically impaired from using SSL.



1 SSL 2.0 is disabled by default, beginning with Internet Explorer 7,

Mozilla Firefox 2, Opera 9.5, and Safari



1 SSL 3.0 improved upon SSL 2.0 by adding SHA-1 based ciphers and

support for certificate authentication.



1 From a security standpoint, SSL 3.0 should be considered less desirable than TLS 1.0



1 There are some attacks against the implementation rather than the

protocol itself: In the earlier implementations, some CAs did not

explicitly set basicConstraints CA=FALSE for leaf nodes


Transport Layer Security - TLS

1 TLS has a variety of security measures:



1 Protection against a downgrade of the protocol to a previous (less

secure) version or a weaker cipher suite.



1 Numbering subsequent Application records with a sequence number and using this sequence number in the

message authentication codes (MACs).



1 Using a message digest enhanced with a key (so only a key-holder can

check the MAC). The HMAC construction used by most TLS cipher suites is specified in RFC 2104 (SSL

3.0 used a different hash-based MAC).



1 The pseudorandom function splits the input data in half and processes each one with a different hashing algorithm (MD5 and SHA-1), then XORs them together to create the

MAC. This provides protection even if one of these algorithms is found to

be vulnerable.


Transport Layer Security - Renegotiation attack

1 A vulnerability of the renegotiation procedure was discovered in August

2009 that can lead to plaintext injection attacks against SSL 3.0 and

all current versions of TLS


Transport Layer Security - Version rollback attacks

1 Modifications to the original protocols, like False Start (adopted and enabled by Google Chrome) or Snap Start, have been reported

to introduce limited TLS protocol version rollback attacks or to allow modifications to the cipher suite list sent by the client to the server (an attacker may be able to influence the cipher suite selection in an attempt to

downgrade the cipher suite strength, to use either a weaker symmetric encryption algorithm or a weaker key exchange)


Transport Layer Security - BEAST attack

1 On September 23, 2011 researchers Thai Duong and Juliano Rizzo

demonstrated a proof of concept called BEAST (Browser Exploit

Against SSL/TLS) using a Java applet to violate same origin policy

constraints, for a long-known cipher block chaining (CBC) vulnerability in

TLS 1.0



1 Mozilla updated the development versions of their NSS libraries to

mitigate BEAST-like attacks. NSS is used by Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome to implement SSL. Some web servers that have a broken

implementation of the SSL specification may stop working as a

result.



1 Microsoft released Security Bulletin MS12-006 on January 10, 2012,

which fixed the BEAST vulnerability by changing the way that the

Windows Secure Channel (SChannel) component transmits encrypted

network packets.



1 Users of Windows 7, Windows 8 and Windows Server 2008 R2 can enable

use of TLS 1.1 and 1.2, but this workaround will fail if it is not

supported by the other end of the connection and will result in a fall-

back to TLS 1.0.


Transport Layer Security - CRIME and BREACH attacks

1 The authors of the BEAST attack are also the creators of the later CRIME attack, which can allow an attacker

to recover the content of web cookies when data compression is used along with TLS. When used to

recover the content of secret authentication cookies, it allows an

attacker to perform session hijacking on an authenticated web session.


Transport Layer Security - CRIME and BREACH attacks

1 CRIME was further developed in 2013 into a hacking technique, dubbed

BREACH, that also exploits the use of data compression algorithms


Transport Layer Security - Padding attacks

1 Earlier TLS versions were vulnerable against the padding oracle attack

discovered in 2002. A novel variant, called the Lucky Thirteen attack, was

published in 2013. As of February 2013, TLS implementors were still

working on developing fixes to protect against this form of attack.


Transport Layer Security - RC4 attacks

1 In spite of existing attacks on RC4 that break it, the cipher suites based

on RC4 in SSL and TLS were considered secure because of how

the cipher was used in these protocols


Transport Layer Security - Truncation attack

1 A TLS truncation attack blocks a victim's account logout requests so that the user unknowingly remains

logged into a web service. When the request to sign out is sent, the

attacker injects an unencrypted TCP FIN message (no more data from

sender) to close the connection. The server therefore doesn't receive the logout request and is unaware of the

abnormal termination.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html

Transport Layer Security - Truncation attack

1 Published in July 2013, the attack causes web services such as Gmail and Hotmail to display a page that

informs the user that they have successfully signed-out, while

ensuring that the user's browser maintains authorization with the service, allowing an attacker with

subsequent access to the browser to access and take over control of the

user's logged-in accounthttps://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html

Transport Layer Security - Survey of websites

1 As of November 2013, Trustworthy Internet Movement estimate the ratio

of websites that are vulnerable to TLS attacks.



1 Survey of the TLS vulnerabilities of the

most popular websites



1 support insecure renegotiation 1.4%

(+0.1%)



1 support secure renegotiation 8.4% (-

0.1%)



1 speak other than RC4 when using TLS 1.0 or SSL 3.0 N/A

N/AN/A



1 support TLS compression N/AN/AN/A


Transport Layer Security - Forward secrecy

1 Forward secrecy is a property of cryptographic systems which ensures that a session key derived from a set of public and private keys will not be

compromised if one of the private keys is compromised in the future


Transport Layer Security - Forward secrecy

1 Even where Diffie-Hellman key exchange is implemented, server-side session

management mechanisms can impact forward secrecy. The use of TLS session

tickets (a TLS extension) causes the session to be protected by AES128-CBC-SHA256 regardless of any other negotiated TLS parameters, including forward secrecy

ciphersuites, and the long-lived TLS session ticket keys defeat the attempt to implement

forward secrecy.


Transport Layer Security - Dealing with RC4 and BEAST

1 Because of the BEAST attack, administrators were advised to use RC4 on their web servers



1 support only TLS 1.1 enabled by default (TLS 1.2 disabled by

default)



1 (Firefox 26 Beta and 27 Aurora)



1 support both TLS 1.1 and 1.2 disabled by

default



1 Android default browser



1 Only one cipher can be assigned as the preferred cipher in most web

servers. PolarSSL since version 1.2.7, allows an application to select a ciphersuite based on the used

protocol. The Hiawatha webserver version 9.1 has implemented this: for

SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0, the RC4 cipher will be used; for TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.2,

AES or Camellia will be used.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html

Transport Layer Security - Protocol details

1 The TLS protocol exchanges records - which encapsulate the data to be exchanged in a specific format


Transport Layer Security - TLS handshake

1 When the connection starts, the record encapsulates a "control"

protocol — the handshake messaging protocol (content type 22)


Transport Layer Security - Basic TLS handshake

1 A simple connection example follows, illustrating a handshake where the

server (but not the client) is authenticated by its certificate:



1 A client sends a ClientHello message specifying the highest TLS protocol

version it supports, a random number, a list of suggested CipherSuites and suggested

compression methods. If the client is attempting to perform a resumed

handshake, it may send a session ID.



1 The server responds with a ServerHello message, containing the chosen protocol version, a random

number, CipherSuite and compression method from the

choices offered by the client. To confirm or allow resumed

handshakes the server may send a session ID. The chosen protocol

version should be the highest that both the client and server support. For example, if the client supports

TLS1.1 and the server supports TLS1.2, TLS1.1 should be selected;

SSL 3.0 should not be selected.



1 The server sends its Certificate message (depending on the selected cipher suite, this may be omitted by

the server).



1 The client responds with a ClientKeyExchange message, which

may contain a PreMasterSecret, public key, or nothing. (Again, this

depends on the selected cipher.) This PreMasterSecret is encrypted using

the public key of the server certificate.



1 The client and server then use the random numbers and

PreMasterSecret to compute a common secret, called the "master secret". All other key data for this

connection is derived from this master secret (and the client- and server-generated random values), which is passed through a carefully designed pseudorandom function.



1 The client now sends a ChangeCipherSpec record,

essentially telling the server, "Everything I tell you from now on

will be authenticated (and encrypted if encryption parameters were

present in the server certificate)." The ChangeCipherSpec is itself a record-level protocol with content

type of 20.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html


1 Finally, the client sends an authenticated and encrypted

Finished message, containing a hash and MAC over the previous

handshake messages.



1 The server will attempt to decrypt the client's Finished message and

verify the hash and MAC. If the decryption or verification fails, the handshake is considered to have

failed and the connection should be torn down.



1 Finally, the server sends a ChangeCipherSpec, telling the client,

"Everything I tell you from now on will be authenticated (and encrypted,

if encryption was negotiated)."



1 Application phase: at this point, the "handshake" is complete and the

application protocol is enabled, with content type of 23. Application

messages exchanged between client and server will also be authenticated and optionally encrypted exactly like in their Finished message. Otherwise,

the content type will return 25 and the client will not authenticate.


Transport Layer Security - Client-authenticated TLS handshake

1 The following full example shows a client being authenticated (in

addition to the server like above) via TLS using certificates exchanged

between both peers.




number, cipher suite and compression method from the

choices offered by the client. The server may also send a session id as

part of the message to perform a resumed handshake.



1 The server requests a certificate from the client, so that the connection can be mutually authenticated, using a

CertificateRequest message.



1 The client sends a ClientKeyExchange message, which

may contain a PreMasterSecret, public key, or nothing. (Again, this

depends on the selected cipher.) This PreMasterSecret is encrypted using

the public key of the server certificate.



1 The client sends a CertificateVerify message, which is a signature over the previous handshake messages

using the client's certificate's private key. This signature can be verified by using the client's certificate's public key. This lets the server know that the client has access to the private key of the certificate and thus owns

the certificate.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html


1 Finally, the client sends an encrypted Finished message, containing a hash

and MAC over the previous handshake messages.


Transport Layer Security - Resumed TLS handshake

1 Public key operations (e.g., RSA) are relatively expensive in terms of

computational power. TLS provides a secure shortcut in the handshake

mechanism to avoid these operations: resumed sessions.

Resumed sessions are implemented using session IDs or session tickets.


Transport Layer Security - Resumed TLS handshake

1 Apart from the performance benefit, resumed sessions can also be used

for single sign-on as it is guaranteed that both the original session as well

as any resumed session originate from the same client. This is of

particular importance for the FTP over TLS/SSL protocol which would otherwise suffer from a man in the middle attack in which an attacker could intercept the contents of the

secondary data connections.


Transport Layer Security - Session IDs

1 In an ordinary full handshake, the server sends a session id as part of the ServerHello

message




number, cipher suite and compression method from the choices offered by the client



1 The server now sends a ChangeCipherSpec record,

essentially telling the client, "Everything I tell you from now on

will be encrypted. " The ChangeCipherSpec is itself a record-level protocol and has type 20 and

not 22.



1 Finally, the server sends an encrypted Finished message,

containing a hash and MAC over the previous handshake messages.



1 The client will attempt to decrypt the server's Finished message and verify the hash and MAC. If the decryption or verification fails, the handshake is

considered to have failed and the connection should be torn down.



1 Finally, the client sends a ChangeCipherSpec, telling the

server, "Everything I tell you from now on will be encrypted. "


Transport Layer Security - Session tickets

1 RFC 5077 extends TLS via use of session tickets, instead of session

IDs. It defines a way to resume a TLS session without requiring session-specific state at the TLS server.


Transport Layer Security - Session tickets

1 One particular weakness of this method is that it always limits encryption and authentication

security of the TLS connection to AES128-CBC-SHA256, no matter what other TLS parameters were

negotiated


Transport Layer Security - TLS record

1 This field identifies the major and minor version of TLS for the

contained message. For a ClientHello message, this need not be the

highest version supported by the client.



1 A message authentication code computed over the Protocol

message, with additional key material included. Note that this field

may be encrypted, or not included entirely, depending on the state of

the connection.



1 No MAC or Padding can be present at end of TLS records before all cipher

algorithms and parameters have been negotiated and handshaked and then confirmed by sending a

CipherStateChange record for signalling that these parameters will take effect in all further records sent

by the same peer.


Transport Layer Security - Handshake protocol

1 Most messages exchanged during the setup of the TLS session are

based on this record, unless an error or warning occurs and needs to be

signaled by an Alert protocol record , or the encryption mode of the

session is modified by another record (see ChangeCipherSpec protocol

below).



1 This is a 3-byte field indicating the length of the handshake data, not including the header.



1 Note that multiple Handshake messages may be combined

within one record.


Transport Layer Security - Alert protocol

1 This record should normally not be sent during normal handshaking or application

exchanges



1 This field identifies the level of alert. If the level is fatal, the sender should

close the session immediately. Otherwise, the recipient may decide

to terminate the session itself, by sending its own fatal alert and

closing the session itself immediately after sending it. The use of Alert

records is optional, however if it is missing before the session closure,

the session may be resumed automatically (with its handshakes).



1 Normal closure of a session after termination of the transported

application should preferably be alerted with at least the Close notify

Alert type (with a simple warning level) to prevent such automatic

resume of a new session



1 1 warning connection or security may be unstable.



1 2 fatal connection or security may be compromised, or an unrecoverable error has

occurred.



1 20 Bad record MAC fatalPossibly a bad SSL implementation, or payload has been tampered with

e. g. FTP firewall rule on FTPS server.



1 30 Decompression failure fatal



1 43 Unsupported certificatewarning/fatal E. g. certificate has only Server authentication usage enabled

and is presented as a client certificate



1 46 Certificate unknown

warning/fatal



1 48 Unknown CA (Certificate authority)

fatal TLS only



1 49 Access denied fatal TLS only - E. g. no client certificate has

been presented (TLS: Blank certificate message or SSLv3: No

Certificate alert), but server is configured to require one.



1 71 Insufficient security fatal TLS

only



1 110 Unsupported extension warning TLS

only



1 111 Certificate unobtainablewarning TLS only



1 112 Unrecognized name warningTLS only; client's Server Name

Indicator specified a hostname not supported by the server



1 113 Bad certificate status response

fatal TLS only



1 114 Bad certificate hash value fatal TLS

only



1 115 Unknown PSK identity (used in TLS-PSK and TLS-SRP) fatal TLS

only


Transport Layer Security - Application protocol

1 Length of Application data (excluding the protocol header and including the

MAC and padding trailers)


Transport Layer Security - Support for name-based virtual servers

1 From the application protocol point of view, TLS belongs to a lower layer, although the TCP/IP model is too

coarse to show it



1 There are two known workarounds provided by X.509:



1 If all virtual servers belong to the same domain, a wildcard certificate can be used. Besides the loose host

name selection that might be a problem or not, there is no common

agreement about how to match wildcard certificates. Different rules

are applied depending on the application protocol or software used.



1 Add every virtual host name in the subjectAltName extension. The major

problem being that the certificate needs to be reissued whenever a

new virtual server is added.



1 In order to provide the server name, RFC 4366 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions allow clients to include a Server Name Indication extension (SNI) in the extended

ClientHello message. This extension hints the server immediately which

name the client wishes to connect to, so the server can select the

appropriate certificate to send to the client.


Transport Layer Security - Standards

1 The current approved version of TLS is version 1.2, which is

specified in:



1 RFC 5246: “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol

Version 1.2”.



1 The current standard replaces these former versions, which are now considered obsolete:



1 RFC 4346: “The Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Protocol Version 1.1”.



1 Hickman, Kipp E.B. (April 1995). "The SSL Protocol". Retrieved July 31,

2013. This Internet Draft defines the now completely broken SSL 2.0.



1 RFC 6101: “The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)

Protocol Version 3.0”.



1 RFC 2595: “Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP”. Specifies an

extension to the IMAP, POP3 and ACAP services that allow the server

and client to use transport-layer security to provide private,

authenticated communication over the Internet.



1 RFC 2712: “Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)”. The 40-bit cipher

suites defined in this memo appear only for the purpose of documenting the fact that those cipher suite codes

have already been assigned.



1 RFC 2817: “Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1”, explains how to use the Upgrade mechanism in HTTP/1.1 to

initiate Transport Layer Security (TLS) over an existing TCP connection. This allows unsecured and secured HTTP traffic to share the same well known port (in this case, http: at 80 rather

than https: at 443).



1 RFC 2818: “HTTP Over TLS”, distinguishes secured traffic from

insecure traffic by the use of a different 'server port'.



1 RFC 3207: “SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security”. Specifies an extension to

the SMTP service that allows an SMTP server and client to use

transport-layer security to provide private, authenticated

communication over the Internet.



1 RFC 3268: “AES Ciphersuites for TLS”. Adds Advanced Encryption

Standard (AES) cipher suites to the previously existing symmetric

ciphers.



1 RFC 3546: “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions”, adds a mechanism

for negotiating protocol extensions during session initialisation and defines some extensions. Made

obsolete by RFC 4366.



1 RFC 3749: “Transport Layer Security Protocol Compression Methods”,

specifies the framework for compression methods and the DEFLATE compression method.



1 RFC 3943: “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Compression Using Lempel-Ziv-Stac

(LZS)”.



1 RFC 4132: “Addition of Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)”.



1 RFC 4162: “Addition of SEED Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)”.



1 RFC 4279: “Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer

Security (TLS)”, adds three sets of new cipher suites for the TLS

protocol to support authentication based on pre-shared keys.



1 RFC 4347: “Datagram Transport Layer Security” specifies a TLS

variant that works over datagram protocols (such as UDP).



1 RFC 4366: “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions” describes both a

set of specific extensions and a generic extension mechanism.



1 RFC 4492: “Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security

(TLS)”.



1 RFC 4681: “TLS User Mapping Extension”.



1 RFC 4785: “Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer Security (TLS)”.



1 RFC 5054: “Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS

Authentication”. Defines the TLS-SRP ciphersuites.



1 RFC 5077: “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side

State”.



1 RFC 5081: “Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Authentication”, obsoleted by RFC 6091.



1 RFC 5288: “AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for

TLS”.



1 RFC 5289: “TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter

Mode (GCM)”.



1 RFC 5746: “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension”.



1 RFC 5878: “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization

Extensions”.



1 RFC 6066: “Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension

Definitions”, includes Server Name Indication and OCSP stapling.



1 RFC 6091: “Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication“.



1 RFC 6176: “Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Version

2.0”.



1 RFC 6209: “Addition of the ARIA Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)”.



1 RFC 6460: “Suite B Profile for Transport Layer Security

(TLS)”.



1 Encapsulations of TLS include:



1 RFC 5216: "The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol"


Transport Layer Security - Further reading

1 Wagner, David; Schneier, Bruce (November 1996). "Analysis of the

SSL 3.0 Protocol". The Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce Proceedings. USENIX

Press. pp. 29–40.



1 Eric Rescorla (2001). SSL and TLS: Designing and Building Secure

Systems. United States: Addison-Wesley Pub Co. ISBN 0-201-61598-3.



1 Stephen A. Thomas (2000). SSL and TLS essentials securing the Web.

New York: Wiley. ISBN 0-471-38354-6.



1 Bard, Gregory (2006). "A Challenging But Feasible Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack On Ssl".

International Association for Cryptologic Research (136).

Retrieved 2011-09-23.



1 IETF Multiple Authors. "RFC of change for TLS Renegotiation". Retrieved 2009-12-11.



1 Creating VPNs with IPsec and SSL/TLS Linux

Journal article by Rami Rosen


Datagram Transport Layer Security - Definition

1 RFC 6347 for use with User Datagram

Protocol (UDP),



1 RFC 5238 for use with Datagram Congestion Control

Protocol (DCCP),



1 RFC 6083 for use with Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) encapsulation,



1 RFC 5764 for use with Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)

latterly called DTLS-SRTP in a draft with Secure Real-Time Transport

Control Protocol (SRTCP).


Datagram Transport Layer Security - Libraries

1 Comparison of TLS implementations#Pr

otocol Support



1 a) DTLS 1.0 support on Windows 7 SP1 and Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 with update

KB2574819


Datagram Transport Layer Security - Applications

1 Cisco AnyConnect VPN Client that uses TLS and DTLS. Also the

compatible open-source OpenConnect client.



1 Both Google Chrome and Firefox support DTLS-SRTP for

WebRTC.


Datagram Transport Layer Security - Vulnerabilities

1 In February 2013 two researchers from the University of London

discovered an attack which allowed them to recover plaintext from a

DTLS connection when Cipher Block Chaining mode encryption was used.


Application delivery network - Transport layer security

1 Although often erroneously assigned to the application layer, Transport

Layer Security|SSL is the most common method of securing

application traffic through an ADN today. SSL uses Public key

infrastructure|PKI to establish a secure connection between the client

and the ADN, making it difficult for attackers to decrypt the data in

transit or hijack the session.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html

Datagram Transport Layer Security

1 The DTLS protocol is based on the Stream (computing)|stream-oriented

Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and is intended to provide

similar security guarantees



1 * RFC 6347 for use with User Datagram

Protocol (UDP),



1 * RFC 5238 for use with Datagram

Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP),



1 * RFC 6083 for use with Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) encapsulation,



1 * RFC 5764 for use with Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)

subsequently called 'DTLS-SRTP' in a draft with Secure Real-Time Transport

Control Protocol (SRTCP).



1 cnote2 | group=protocolsupportsecuretransport | a | DTLS 1.0 are available on iOS

5.0 and later, and OS X 10.8 and later.



1 * Cisco Cisco Systems#Software|AnyConnect VPN Client uses TLS and

DTLS, as does the AnyConnect-compatible open-source

OpenConnect client



1 * Web browsers: Google Chrome, Opera (web browser)|Opera and Firefox support DTLS-

SRTP for WebRTC


Datagram Transport Layer Security - Vulnerabilities

1 In February 2013 two researchers from Royal Holloway, University of

London discovered an attack[http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf Plaintext-Recovery Attacks

Against Datagram TLS] which allowed them to recover plaintext

from a DTLS connection when Cipher Block Chaining mode encryption was

used.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html

Multiplexed Transport Layer Security

1 In information technology, the 'Transport Layer Security' ('TLS')

protocol provides connection security with mutual authentication, data confidentiality and integrity, key generation and distribution, and security parameters negotiation.

However, missing from the protocol is a way to multiplex application data

over a single TLS session.https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html


1 'Multiplexed Transport Layer Security' ('MTLS') protocol is a new TLS sub-

protocol running over Transport Layer Security|TLS or Datagram Transport

Layer Security|DTLS. The MTLS design provides application

multiplexing over a single TLS (or DTLS) session. Therefore, instead of associating a TLS connection with

each application, MTLS allows several applications to protect their

exchanges over a single TLS session.



1 MTLS is currently in draft stage http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-badra-

hajjeh-mtls-06 which expired in October 2011.


Wireless Transport Layer Security

1 'Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS)' is a security protocol, part of

the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) stack. It sits between the

Wireless transaction protocol|WTP and WAP Datagram Protocol|WDP layers in the WAP communications

stack.


Wireless Transport Layer Security - Overview

1 WTLS is derived from Transport Layer Security|TLS. WTLS uses similar

semantics adapted for a low bandwidth mobile device. The main

changes are…



1 * Compressed data structures — Where possible packet sizes are

reduced by using bit-fields, discarding redundancy and

truncating some cryptographic elements.



1 * New certificate format — WTLS defines a compressed certificate format. This broadly follows the

X.509|X.509 v3 certificate structure, but uses smaller data structures.



1 * Packet based design — TLS is designed for use over a data stream. WTLS adapts that design to be more

appropriate on a packet based network. A significant amount of the

design is based on a requirement that it be possible to use a packet network such as Short message service|SMS as a data transport.



1 WTLS has been superseded in the WAP Wireless Application Protocol 2.0 standard by the End-to-end Transport

Layer Security Specification.


Wireless Transport Layer Security - Security

1 WTLS uses modern cryptography|cryptographic algorithms and in

common with TLS allows negotiation of cryptographic suites between

client and server.


Wireless Transport Layer Security - Algorithms

1 ** Elliptic curve cryptography|Elliptic Curve Cryptography

(ECC)


Wireless Transport Layer Security - Security criticisms

1 * Encryption/Decryption at the gateway — in the WAP architecture

the content is typically stored on the server as uncompressed Wireless Markup Language|WML (an XML

DTD)



1 * Digest truncation — HMAC message digests are truncated to reduce

transmission overhead, this reduces the theoretical effectiveness of the HMAC potentially reducing the data

integrity protection.



1 * Inadequate review — WTLS is significantly different from TLS, it is not clear that the changes made to

WTLS have not in some way weakened the security. The use of a new certificate format is an example

of this. The format defined in the WTLS specification may not be

appropriate for all the uses to which a certificate may be used.



1 * Client Implementation - As there are no official specifications which

WTLS implementations must adhere to, many may use insecure

cryptographic algorithms or key generation processes. In some client

software, WTLS may even be disabled.


Wireless Transport Layer Security - Interoperability

1 As mentioned above the client and server negotiate the cryptographic suite. This

happens when the session is started, briefly the client sends a list of supported algorithms and the server chooses a suite, or refuses the connection. The standard does not mandate support of any algorithm. An endpoint (either

client or server) that needs to be interoperable with any other endpoint may

need to implement every algorithm (including some covered by intellectual property rights).


Transport Layer Security Channel ID

1 'Transport Layer Security Channel ID' ('TLS Channel ID', previously known as 'Transport Layer Security – Origin

Bound Certificates' 'TLS-OBC')[http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-

balfanz-tls-obc-01 TLS-OBC RFC] is a draft Request for Comments|RFC

proposal[http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-01 TLS

Channel ID RFC] Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension that aims to

increase TLS computer security|security by using public key

certificate|certificates on both ends of the TLS connection


Transport Layer Security Channel ID

1 It can also protect users from the related domain cookie

attack.[http://security.stackexchange.com/a/12419/396 Related Domain

Cookie Attack][http://stackoverflow.com/q/96

36857/328397 additional info is available here]


For More Information, Visit:

• https://store.theartofservice.com/the-transport-layer-security-toolkit.html

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