Transparency and JANOS BERTOK, final.pdfTransparency drives lobby reforms Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency

JANOS BERTOK, OECD

Transparency and integrity in lobbying

Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying:

a Comparative Perspective

Workshop for Committee on Constitutional Affaires European Parliament 22 September 2015 Janos Bertok

Head of Public Sector Integrity Division OECD

Trust in government is low and has been decreasing

Source: Gallup World Poll

Transparency in policymaking is a lever for trust in government

Source: World Economic Forum – Global Competitiveness Report (2013-2014)

AUS

AUT

BEL

CANCHL

CZK

DNK

EST

FIN

FRA

DEU

GRCHUN

ISL IRL

ISR

ITA

JAP

KOR

LUX

MEX

NLD

NZL

NOR

POLPRT

SVK

SVN

ESP

SWE

CHE

TUR

GBR

USA

OECD

R² = 0.75

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Tra

nsp

are

ncy

of

gove

rnm

en

t p

oli

cym

aki

ng,

1-7

(b

est

), W

EF

Public trust in politicians, 1-7 (best), WEF

Correlation between public trust in politicians and transparency in government policymaking (2013)

Transparency drives lobby reforms

Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying, OECD 2014

42%

26% 26%

5%0%

38%36%

16%

8%

2%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Stronglydisagree

Legislators

Lobbyists

Does transparency in lobbying increase citizens’ trust in the public decision-making process?

Does transparency in lobbying increase citizens’ trust in the public decision-making process?

Regulation of lobbying is accelerating 16 countries have regulated lobbying

8 in the past 5 years, including Ireland in 2015

Implementation: How to make it effective?

Raising awareness with tailored measures Most effective ways to learn about lobbying rules/guidelines according to legislators; and integrity standards

and transparency tools according to lobbyists

50%

17%

33%

67%

33%

67%

33%

33%

17%

55%

22%

67%

24%

37%

35%

36%

26%

36%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Briefing

Lecture

Workshop

Online training

Conference or learning event

Direct communication

Scenario-based training

Provision of training material

Information on the website of the officeresponsible for lobbying

Legislators

Lobbyists


Implementation What measures are considered effective?

Incentives for compliance

There are generally no effective rewards for agreeing to comply with lobbyist codes of conduct

13%

32%

51%

4%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Yes, there are effectiverewards for agreeing tocomply with the code

Not really, there aresome benefits for

complying but they arenot compelling

No, there are noeffective rewards for

agreeing to comply withthe code

Don’t know


Implementation What measures are considered effective?

Sanctions

Are there compelling sanctions for breaching the lobbyist code of conduct?

38% 39%

12%

40%34%

18%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Yes, there areeffective penalties for

breaching the code

Not really, there aresome penalties but

they are notcompelling

No, there are nopenalties for

breaching the code

Lobbyists (2009)

Lobbyists (2013)


Areas of Concern 1: Revolving doors Are there restrictions on public officials engaging in lobbying activities after they leave the government?


Generally no restrictions are in place (e.g. a "cooling-off" period) to restrict legislators from engaging in lobbying activities after

they leave Parliament

5% 5%

16%

74%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Yes, there arerestrictions but they

are too restrictive

Yes, there arerestrictions and they

are sufficientlyrestrictive

Yes, there arerestrictions but theyare not sufficiently

restrictive

No, there are norestrictions


Pre-public employment: OECD countries’ restrictions on lobbyists to fill regulatory or advisory posts in government


No 29%

Yes 71%

Pre-public employment: lobbyists’ view on restrictions

to fill regulatory or advisory posts in government

3%

12% 12%

46%

28%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Yes, there arerestrictions but

they are toorestrictive

Yes, there arerestrictions and

they aresufficientlyrestrictive

Yes, there arerestrictions but

they are notsufficientlyrestrictive

No, there are norestrictions

Don't know


Areas of Concern 2: Advisory-expert groups A balanced composition of interests?


Lobbyists are sitting on advisory groups in a personal capacity

18%

60%

22%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Yes, lobbyists are and I amcurrently sitting on a government

advisory/expert groups orParliamentary advisory/expertgroups in a personal capacity

Yes, lobbyists are and but I ampersonally not sitting on a

government advisory/expertgroups or Parliamentary

advisory/expert groups in apersonal capacity

No


Availability of information on advisory-expert groups


The way forward

• Compliance by incentives and enforcement remain a

challenge

Intensify efforts in addressing lobbying concerns and risks in order to foster confidence in policy making

• Limited measurement of costs and benefits

Identify relevant data, benchmarks, and indicators in relation to transparency in lobbying

• The broader integrity framework remains vital Establish a whole-of-government 21st-century integrity framework

Types of information that stakeholders believed should be made publicly available

84%

Actors & types of communication that stakeholders believe should be covered by lobbying rules

What incentives? Easy registration


www.oecd.org/gov/ethics

Thank you

DAVID COEN University College London

Institutional and Constitutional Aspects of Interest Representation (Policy Department study for AFCO)

INSTITUTIONAL & CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF

SPECIAL INTEREST REPRESENTATION

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND

CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS

Presentation September 2015.

Professor David Coen & Alexander Katsaitis.

University College London. School of Public Policy.

Accredited Individuals across committees; 2012-2014 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500

AFCO

AFET

AGRI

BUDG

CONT

CULT

DEVE

ECON

EMPL

ENVI

FEMM

IMCO

INTA

JURI

LIBE

ITRE

PECH

PETT

REGI

TRAN

Professional consultancies/law firms/self-employed consultants

In-house lobbyists and trade/professional associations

Non-governmental organisations

Interest groups contact during different phases of

the policymaking cycle (Q6).

9

8

2

2

6

4

13

5

4

2

21

26

16

25

17

8

24

18

24

11

55

61

55

50

58

55

47

37

44

36

4

0

2

4

0

2

4

0

2

23

4

0

8

8

8

9

2

16

4

2

6

5

16

10

12

23

9

24

20

26

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Public Affairs

Consultancy

Legal Affairs Office/

Firm

Association

Trade Union

Company

NGO/ SMO

Think Tank

Religious Groups

Regional/ Municipal

Groups

Member State

Representatives

Commission Proposal Preparation Commission Proposal

European Parliament Committee Amendments Trialogue Negotiations

Plenary Amendments Plenary Vote

Interest groups’ influence (Q4)

5

9

2

2

4

2

7

12

5

0

18

26

16

18

18

12

19

40

23

9

49

47

49

50

32

43

42

39

48

36

21

12

28

27

35

34

32

9

21

39

7

5

5

4

12

9

0

0

2

16

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Public Affairs Consultancy

Legal Affairs Office/ Firm

Association

Trade Union

Company

NGO/ SMO

Think Tank

Religious Groups

Regional/ Municipal Groups

Member State

Representatives

Not at all influential Slightly influential Moderately influential

Very influential Extremely influential

MEPs Perceptions regarding the TR

Completely

Disagree Disagree

Neither

Agree nor

Disagree

Agree Completely

Agree

Improves the

behaviour of

interest groups

2 10 27 53 8

Reduces

inappropriate

influence caused

by lobbying

3 19 27 41 10

Improves the

transparency of

the EU

5 0 17 46 32

Is helpful for

public interest

groups

5 5 24 49 17

Conclusions/ Recommendations • The EP could consider further augmenting the activity of public interests that surround it,

especially in committees with less activity.

• Further enhance the European Parliament Research Service & expand resources provided to committee secretariats to support rapporteurs and MEPs directly.

• The EP could further incentivize administrators across EU institutions and levels to communicate primarily with special interests registered on the TR.

• The EP could make information regarding special interests entering the Institution and meeting with specific MEPs and administrative staff publicly available.

• The EP could further increase its transparency & legitimacy by making information on accreditations (and registrations) more easily available to the public.

• Special interests, both those registering as well as those with accreditations, could be given options to indicate clearly which committees and DGs they are most interested in lobbying.

• The inclusion of the Council of the EU in the TR would considerably assist the mapping and understanding of EU inter-institutional lobbying.

ROLAND BLOMEYER, Blomeyer & Sanz

Scrutiny of declarations of financial interests (Policy Department study for AFCO)

Scrutiny of declarations of financial interests

in national legislatures Roland Blomeyer, 22 September 2015

32

Contents

(1)Context

(2)Conclusions

(3)Recommendations

sanction

guide

rule monitor

report

33

(1) Context

• Code of Conduct adopted in December 2011 / Implementing

Measures in April 2013

• Accordance with relevant moral values and norms

• Rules versus values

34

(1) Context

Asset disclosure

No GRECO

recommendation

GRECO

recommendation

not applicable

35

(1) Context

Codes of Conduct

Code > 10 years

Code < 10 years

not applicable

36

(2) Conclusions

•Why? More integrity / transparency?

•What? Review existing experience / practices.

•How? Exchange with Member State parliaments.

•When? Proactive / ongoing reform.

37

(3) Recommendations - rule

• Identification of debts (map)

• Actual income / detailed income brackets

• Revolving doors

• Family members (map)

rule

38

(3)

Recommendations:

debts

applicable

not applicable

39

(3)

Recommendations:

family

applicable

not applicable

40

(3) Recommendations - guide

• Leadership

• Strategy

guide

41

(3) Recommendations - monitor

monitor

self-scrutiny administration

external scrutiny

(only members)

external scrutiny

(public office holders)

42

(3) Recommendations

Publication of declarations

Database

Integrated document

Individual documents

43

(3) Recommendations - monitor

Resources for monitoring (members per 1 monitor)

monitor

44

(3) Recommendations - sanction

• Integrity issues affecting the President or a member of the

Advisory Committee

• Judging by peers versus external independent assessment

sanction

45

(3) Recommendations - report

• Evaluation of performance

report

Thank you

Roland Blomeyer, [email protected] / www.blomeyer.eu

46

mailto:[email protected]

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Transparency and JANOS BERTOK, final.pdfTransparency drives lobby reforms Source: Lobbyists, Governments and Public Trust, Volume 3. Implementing the OECD Principles for Transparency

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