Transforming Space Surveillance To Meet Today’s Space Superiority Needs 15 th AAS/AIAA Space Flight Mechanics Conference Copper Mountain, Colorado January.

Transforming Space Transforming Space Surveillance To Meet Today’s Surveillance To Meet Today’s

Space Superiority NeedsSpace Superiority Needs

1515thth AAS/AIAA Space Flight Mechanics Conference AAS/AIAA Space Flight Mechanics ConferenceCopper Mountain, ColoradoCopper Mountain, Colorado

January 26, 2005January 26, 2005

Dave DesrocherDave DesrocherPresident & CEOPresident & CEO

Situational Awareness Solutions, Inc.Situational Awareness Solutions, Inc.Ph: 719-884-1195Ph: 719-884-1195

Email: Email: [email protected]@SAS-Corp.net

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Transformation: The Bar is SetTransformation: The Bar is Set

Space Surveillance Role in Space Surveillance Role in Space SuperioritySpace Superiority

Conditions Leading to Today’s Conditions Leading to Today’s State of Space SurveillanceState of Space Surveillance

ProblemsProblems

Required ChangesRequired Changes

OverviewOverview

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March, 1998March, 1998

Transformation: The Bar is SetTransformation: The Bar is Set

“…“…the U.S. must be able to identify and track much smaller the U.S. must be able to identify and track much smaller objects in space than it can track today…An improved space objects in space than it can track today…An improved space

surveillance network is needed to reduce the chance of collision surveillance network is needed to reduce the chance of collision between satellites, the Space Shuttle or the International Space between satellites, the Space Shuttle or the International Space Station and the thousands of pieces of space debris orbiting the Station and the thousands of pieces of space debris orbiting the earth. It will also have to track objects deeper in space, such as earth. It will also have to track objects deeper in space, such as

asteroids or spacecraft. And to reduce the possibility of surprise by asteroids or spacecraft. And to reduce the possibility of surprise by hostile actors, it will have to monitor space activity.”hostile actors, it will have to monitor space activity.”

11 January, 200111 January, 2001

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Space Surveillance Role inSpace Surveillance Role inSpace SuperioritySpace Superiority

Counterspace OperationsCounterspace OperationsThe “Ways and Means” to Space SuperiorityThe “Ways and Means” to Space SuperiorityComponents: DCS, OCS, SSAComponents: DCS, OCS, SSA

Space Situation AwarenessSpace Situation AwarenessComprised of Intelligence, Surveillance, Comprised of Intelligence, Surveillance,

Reconnaissance, Environmental Monitoring, C2Reconnaissance, Environmental Monitoring, C2

Space SurveillanceSpace SurveillanceContributes to SSAContributes to SSAIncreased Importance to DCS and OCSIncreased Importance to DCS and OCS

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Conditions Leading to Today’s State of Conditions Leading to Today’s State of Space SurveillanceSpace Surveillance

Born of Cold War Necessity to Enable Missile Born of Cold War Necessity to Enable Missile WarningWarningTied to ITW/AA EnvironmentTied to ITW/AA EnvironmentStove-Piped, Classified C2 SystemsStove-Piped, Classified C2 SystemsUpgrades Very Difficult & ExpensiveUpgrades Very Difficult & Expensive

Predominantly Ground Based RadarsPredominantly Ground Based RadarsEstablished Trusted Access PersonnelEstablished Trusted Access PersonnelSet Stage for Development EnvironmentSet Stage for Development Environment

National Space Asset InvolvementNational Space Asset Involvement Introduced “Trump Card”Introduced “Trump Card”Co-opted Development Approach, Controlled PlayersCo-opted Development Approach, Controlled Players

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ProblemsProblems

Too Few “Outsiders” Allowed to ContributeToo Few “Outsiders” Allowed to Contribute

Uniformed Personnel at DisadvantageUniformed Personnel at DisadvantageAt Mercy of Closed Group of Advisors & DevelopersAt Mercy of Closed Group of Advisors & DevelopersFrequent Rotation Aids Status QuoFrequent Rotation Aids Status QuoCannot Readily Assess Merits of One Approach or Cannot Readily Assess Merits of One Approach or

Method from AnotherMethod from AnotherDo Not Learn the “Art of the Possible”Do Not Learn the “Art of the Possible”Limited by Organizational Authority, Time, Money, Limited by Organizational Authority, Time, Money,

Contract HurdlesContract Hurdles

Deficiencies Only Come to Light in CrisisDeficiencies Only Come to Light in CrisisExplained Away and/or Forgotten…Until Next CrisisExplained Away and/or Forgotten…Until Next Crisis

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Required ChangesRequired Changes

1.1. Expand Sharing of Information Expand Sharing of Information and Dataand Data

2.2. Create Means for Rapid Create Means for Rapid Integration of New or Improved Integration of New or Improved CapabilitiesCapabilities

3.3. More Broadly Engage and More Broadly Engage and Unleash Human PotentialUnleash Human Potential

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“What all these stories have in common is a system that requires a demonstrated "need to know" before sharing. This approach assumes it is possible to know, in advance, who will need to use the information. Such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Those Cold War assumptions are no longer appropriate. The culture of agencies feeling they own the information they gathered at taxpayer expense must be replaced by a culture in which the agencies instead feel they have a duty to the information—to repay the taxpayers' investment by making that information available.”

“Recommendation: Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge.”

“But the security concerns need to be weighed against the costs. Current security requirements nurture overclassification and excessive compartmentation of information among agencies. Each agency's incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks (criminal, civil, and internal administrative sanctions) but few rewards for sharing information. No one has to pay the long-term costs of over-classifying information, though these costs—even in literal financial terms— are substantial. There are no punishments for not sharing information. Agencies uphold a "need-to-know" culture of information protection rather than pro moting a "need-to-share" culture of integration.15”

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Required ChangesRequired Changes Means for Rapid IntegrationMeans for Rapid Integration

““Modernize” C2 and Ops Integration Modernize” C2 and Ops Integration PathwayPathway

Emulate Successes of Air DomainEmulate Successes of Air Domain Remove Space Surveillance from ITW/AA Remove Space Surveillance from ITW/AA

Development EnvironmentDevelopment Environment

Move to “TACSAT-Like” Approach for Move to “TACSAT-Like” Approach for Developing Exploitation Methods & Developing Exploitation Methods & ApplicationsApplications

Establish “Effects-Based” Acceptance Establish “Effects-Based” Acceptance CriteriaCriteria

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Required ChangesRequired Changes Engage and Unleash Human PotentialEngage and Unleash Human Potential

Restore an Advisory Body Like Restore an Advisory Body Like the Old JAWG, But…the Old JAWG, But…

With General Officer AccountabilityWith General Officer Accountability With Safeguards to Ensure Promotion With Safeguards to Ensure Promotion

of “Best of Breed” Capabilitiesof “Best of Breed” Capabilities With Specified Problems to Solve (May With Specified Problems to Solve (May

Be Identified By the Group)Be Identified By the Group) With Broader Review of Capabilities With Broader Review of Capabilities

(e.g., via DCS Exercises)(e.g., via DCS Exercises)

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ConclusionConclusion

““Transformation” in Space Surveillance Transformation” in Space Surveillance Must Be Revolutionary, Not Must Be Revolutionary, Not EvolutionaryEvolutionary

The Role That Space Surveillance Must The Role That Space Surveillance Must Play in SSA Has ChangedPlay in SSA Has Changed

Broader Collaboration is Needed to Broader Collaboration is Needed to Ensure Greatest Space Surveillance Ensure Greatest Space Surveillance Contribution to SSA and to Space Contribution to SSA and to Space SuperioritySuperiority