TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON THEIR APPROACHES …

MARMARA AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGiSi JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

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MARMARA irNiVERSiTESi A VRUPA BlRLiGi ENSTiTUSU YA YINI A PUBLICATION OF MARMARA UNIVERSITY EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTE

Yaymlayan I Publisher Prof. Dr. Necla Pur Marmara Dniversitesi Rektorii I President of Marmara University

Editor I Editor Prof. Dr. Muzaffer Dartan

Editor Y ard1mcdan I Associate Editors Prof. Dr. Osman Kii9iikahmetoglu • Yard. Do9. Dr. imre Ersoy • ~· Gor. Levent Eraydm • Ar~. Gor. Emirhan Goral

Dam~ma Kurulu I Advisory Board Prof. Dr. Taner Berksoy, Bilgi University • Prof. Dr. Christopher Brewin, Keele University • Prof. Dr. Nedret Kuran Bun;:oglu, Yeditepe University • Prof. Dr. A. Lorca Corrons, Madrid Autonomous University • Prof. Dr. Georges Delcoigne, CERIS • Prof. Dr. Naz1m Engin, Marmara University • Prof. Dr. Haluk Kabaalioglu, TUNAECS • Prof. Dr. Erol Katircwglu, Bilgi University • Prof. Dr. Hagen Lichtenberg, Bremen University • Prof. Dr. Nanette Neuwahl, Montreal University • Prof. Dr. Cengiz Okman, l~1k University • Prof. Dr. Vural F. Sava~, Yeditepe University • Dr. Karen Smith, London School of Economics • Prof. Dr. Orhan $ener, Kadir Has University • Prof. Dr. Paul Taylor, London School of Economics.

Yaym Kurulu I Editorial Board Prof. Dr. Muzaffer Dartan • Do.y. Dr. <::igdem Nas • Yard. Do.y. Dr. Armagan Emre <::aku • Yard. Do.y. Dr. Sait Akman • Yard. Do.y. Dr. Murat T. Yoriing • Yard. Do9. Dr. imre Ersoy • Yard. Do.y. Dr. Rana izci • Yard. Do.y. Dr. Miinevver Cebeci • Dr. Yonca Ozer • Dr. Mustafa T. Karayigit • Dr. Y1ld!ray Sak • Dr. E. ilker Mutlu • Ar~. Gor. H. Selin Piirselim

Tiim yaz1~ma ve katklda bulunmak isteyenler i\!in adres: Avrupa Ara~tlrmalar1 Dergisi, Marmara Dniversitesi Avrupa Birligi Enstitiisii, Goztepe Kampiisii Kad1koy, 34722 istanbul

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Copyright © 2009

MARMARA AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGiSi JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

ISSN 1301-1359

Cilt I Volume: 17 Sayt I No: 1-2 2009

i9indekiler I Contents

Sayfa I Page

• Post - Lisbon Criminal Law Competency of the European Union • Bahadzr Yakut............................................................................................... 1

• An Analysis of the EU Commission's Progress Reports Regarding to the Freedom of Expression and Turkey's Accession to the EU • Kerem Batzr.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... ... . .. .. ..... .. .. .. .. .. .. ... .. ... .. .. ... . . . .. .. .. . . . . .... .. ... .. ... . .. .. . ... .. .. 53

• ihtilafstz Para Alacaklan i9in Avrupa icra ilamt Tiiziigii • Hatice Selin Piirselim Dogan . ..................................................................... 77

• Avrupa Birligi'ne Uyelik Siirecinde Tiirkiye ve Almanya'daki Universite Ogrencilerinin Tiirkiye ve Tiirkler Hakkmdaki Gorii~leri • Nurhayat <;elebi ....... .............................................................................. .. 95

• Transatlantic Relationship between the European Union and the United States with a Special Focus on Their Approaches towards Middle East and North Africa Region in the Post-Cold War Era: From Competition to Cooperation • Aylin Onver Noi............................................................................................ 121

• Avrupa Birligi'nin Kimlik Yaratma <;abalan • Yasemin Oguzlar Tekin ............................................................................... 145

• Competition and Productivity in the Turkish Manufacturing Industry • Zeynep Kaplan . . . . . . ... ... ... .. . . .. . .. . . . . . . ...... ... .. .. ... .. ... .. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. . . . .. . . .. ... ... .. ... ..... 175

• Makale Yaztm Kurallan /Notes for Contributors.................................... 195

MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES • Volume 17 • No:1- 2 • 2009

POST -LISBON CRIMINAL LAW COMPETENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Bahad1r Y AKUT*

Abstract:

After came into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the institutional structure of the EU transformed radically. The third pillar abolished and EU instruments in crimina/law principally "communitarised". This shift has the possibility to increase significantly the review of EU criminal legislation either by the European Parliament or the Court of Justice. The EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters supposed to take the appearance of mutual recognition and EU crimina/law bodies instead of harmonization in the Lisbon Treaty.

As to the former provisions on criminal justice, the EU had competence over both cooperation and minimum levels of harmonisation in substantive criminal measures. In terms of procedural issues, it had implicit competences only where it was firmly essential for the operation of the principle of mutual recognition. The Lisbon Treaty maintained establishing the principle of mutual recognition at the heart of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. However, the free movement of criminal judgments is allowed without free movements of supranational safeguards for human rights across the Union. There will be significant improvement in case where EU will be party to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Lisbon Treaty provisions regarding criminal judicial cooperation were reshaped in light of the Constitutional Treaty in order to empower a clear EU criminal competence to ensure measures for procedural rights of the defence.

• LLB, LLM, PhD, Judge at the Turkish Ministry of Justice.

2 POST-LISBON CRIMINAL LAW COMPETENCY OF THE EU

Keywords: EU criminal competency, criminal judicial cooperation, mutual recognition, Lisbon Treaty

Ozet: Lizbon Antla~masznm yuriirluge girmesinden sonra AB 'nin kurumsal yaplSl c;ok onemli degi~iklikler gec;irmi~tir. Oc;uncil sutun ortadan kalkmz~ ve ceza hukuku alamndaki mevzuat topluluk mevzuatz ozelliklerini kazanmz~tzr. Lizbon Antla~masmda AB ceza i~lerinde

i~birliginin harmonizasyondan ziyade kar~zhkh tamma ve AB kurumlarz olarak ortaya pktzgz goriilmektedir.

Ceza hukuku ile ilgili Lizbon 6ncesi hukumlere gelince, AB i~birligi ve maddi ceza hukuku konusunda minimum seviyede harmonizasyon yetkisinin bulunmaktaydz. Ceza usulii konusunda ise kar~zhkh tamma ilkesinin i~lemesi ic;in c;ok gerekli oldugu durumlarda i~ari yetkisi bulunmaktaydz. The Lisbon Antla~masz kar~zlzkh tamma ilkesini ceza i~lerinde i~birliginin en temel ilkesi olarak kabbul etmi~tir. Bununla birlikte Birlik c;apznda supranasyonel bir insan haklarz korumasz saglanmakslZln cezai kararlarm serbest dola~zmz ongoriilmektedir. AB 'nin Avrupa jnsan Haklan Sozle~mesine taraf olmasz durumunda c;ok onemli geli~me kaydedilecektir. Lizbon Antla~masznm ceza i~lerinde adli i~birligi hukumleri AB 'nin cezai yetkisi usulii savunma haklarzmda ic;erecek ~ekilde Anayasal Antla~ma z~zgznda yeniden ~ekillendirilmi~tir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB 'nin cezai yetkisi, ceza i~lerinde i~birligi,

kar~zlzkh tamma, Liz bon Antla~masz

Introduction

A new Article 1 a of the TEU provides that the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and respect for human rights. Article 2, TEU provides for objective of the Union as the promotion of peace, its values and well- being of its people; "an area of freedom, security andjustice" without internal frontiers. Fully in line with this specific objective of the EU, it further states "the pursuit of its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with its competences on it by the Treaties". The "Competence" is the capacity to act. The EU has competence where the Treaties confer on it as the requirement of the "principle of coriferraf' (TEU, Article 5). Article 67/1 of the TFEU stresses that 'the Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and the traditions of Member States'. This objective shall be achieved by 'cooperation' and 'coordination' between the judicial authorities as well as

MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES 3

mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters and approximation, where necessary, rules of criminal laws in the Member States (Article 67/3 of the TFEU). The whole scope of judicial cooperation under chapter 4 of the TFEU is determined by this objective (Corstens and Pradel, 2002: 466). This constitutes the former so-called third pillar and it was abolished by the Lisbon Treaty (TEU, Article 29).

Within the area of criminal law, the EU does not have its own criminal courts except for the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice and they have power in regard to judicial oversight on the functioning of the EU but not over criminal trials (Loof, 2006: 422). Criminal cooperation within the EU is wholly dependent upon cooperation between and the functioning of judicial systems of the individual Member States (Nuotio, 2005: 79). Therefore, it might be argued that the area of freedom, security and justice provided to its citizens by the EU has not an autonomous criminal justice system on its own. The EU aims to establish an area of freedom, security and justice through cooperation and coordination by abolishing the borders between autonomous criminal justice systems of the Member States (Yakut, 2008: 85). There had been two important parameters within the field of criminal law: requirements for effective implementation of criminal law within the criminal justice systems of Member States and limitations on states' power concerning rights of individuals within the area of criminal law. The EU criminal law added a third parameter: the extent to which the EU has competence in the area of criminal law. The EU's goal of establishing a sufficient legal basis for effective implementation of criminal law is the one aspects of the EU' competence in the field of criminal law. On the other hand, the question remains whether in regard to criminal law is there any clear legal basis for guaranteeing rights of individual parties to trial within the existing former TEU and the TFEU provisions, amended by the Lisbon Treaty. (Loof, 2006: 422)

In light of foregoing questions the evolution of the EU criminal cooperation can be seen in the existing legal framework within the TFEU and TEU after the Lisbon Treaty came into force. (Perron, 2005: 5)

This paper will analyse the scope of EU competence in the area of criminal justice cooperation, -in both substantive and procedural criminal law- and specifically address the question of whether or not ambiguity of competency of the EU in the area of crimina/law have been solved and the EU has gained a clear legal basis within the TFEU provisions. Then the paper will consider whether the Lisbon Treaty represent a step forward in


terms of the existing ambiguity concerning the EU's criminal competence and whether the visions of the EU in the amended Treaties present a clear basis for harmonization and mutual recognition of criminal judgments.

1. Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters before Lisbon Treaty

1.1. Overview of Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters before the Lisbon Treaty

Article 29 of the TEU covers the core objectives of the EU in regard to judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Its expressed purpose is that EU citizens should enjoy a high level of safety within the area of freedom, security and justice which is to be achieved through a common area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It also specifies, in numerous clauses, a list of objectives. (TEU, Article 29)

In light of the foregoing, the framework of TEU provisions on criminal judicial cooperation is determined by Articles 29-42. They elaborate the exact scope of judicial cooperation under Title VI, which amounts to the socalled third pillar. However, the establishment of the three pillar structure in the TEU, which is now the framework within which cooperation in criminal matters are convened, did not create a complete supranational criminal justice system. (Monar, 2001: 747-763; Romanovska, 2005: 1624-1640) However, it seems to appear that a' sui generis supranational criminal justice system has been emerging gradually, specifically after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force (TEU, Article 29-42).

The exact scope of judicial cooperation in criminal law is laid down in Article 31 of the TEU, which includes the following objectives: cooperation between ministries and judicial, or with corresponding institutions, as well as, if necessary, cooperation through Eurojust, concerning the proceedings and the execution of verdicts; easing extradition; providing approximation across the EU's respective procedures, as may be essential to enhance judicial cooperation; precluding jurisdictional disputes between Member States; and progressively introducing instruments to set out the minimum principles regarding the constituent elements of criminal crimes and offences in the areas of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking in the Member States (TEU, Article 31).

Eurojust was inserted into Articles 29 and 32 of the TEU. Afterwards, by creating Eurojust and Europol, further changes were achieved which entail a new institutional framework for collaboration and assistance (TEU, Article 29-32).


The Eurojust will provide judicial cooperation by: supporting effective cooperation between the prosecution services of Member States; improving the criminal investigations in cases of severe trans-border offences, especially where there is organised crime (bearing in mind analyses performed by Europol); supporting close cooperation between Eurojust and the European Judicial Network, specifically, so as to assist the enforcement of letters rogatory and the execution of extradition requests (TEU, Article 29).

Article 29 of the TEU (in regard to criminal judicial cooperation) provides for, 'closer cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities of the Member States including cooperation through the Eurojust, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 31 and 32; and 'approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the Member States, in accordance with the provisions of Article 31(e)' (TEU, Article 29).

Article 31 of the TEU formulates methods of aspects of harmonisation by emphasising that it shall be realised by minimum principles describing the constituent elements of criminal conducts and sentences in the area of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking (TEU, Article 31 ). Moreover, the safeguards for the financial interests of the community were reinforced in Article 280 of TEC, which gave rise to heated debate on whether paragraph 4 of this Article bestows competence on the Community in criminal matters. 1

1 See for discussions Peers S., (2007), EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Oxford University Press, at.389-427; House of Lords European Union Committee (2007), The Criminal Competence of the EC: Follow-up Report, ll th Report, session 2006-07, HL Paper 63 (London Stationary Office); Mitsilegas V., (2008), The Competence Question: The European Community and Criminal Law, in Guild E., and Geyer F., (eds) Security versus Justice?, Ashgate Publishing Company, at. 153-171; Borgers M.J. and Kooijmans, T ., (2008), The Scope of the Community's Competence in the Field of Criminal Law, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 16, at. 379-397; Mitsilegas V., (2006), Constitutional Principles of the European Community and European Criminal Law, European Journal ofLaw Reform, vol. 8 no.2/3, 301-24; Mitsilegas V., (2008), Trust-building Measures in the European Judicial Area in Criminal Matters: Issues of Competence, Legitimacy and Inter-institutional Balance, in Carrera S., and Balzacq T., (eds), Security versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe's Future (Aldershot: Ashgate), at.279-89; Perron W., (2005), 'Perspective of the Harmonization of Criminal Law


However, even though judicial cooperation in criminal matters is articulated in the third pillar, it is also mentioned in the first pillar. Indeed, Article 6l(e) EC covers, within measures to be introduced by the Council, those 'in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters' (apart from whether such measures intend a particular dimension); 'the prevention and the fight against delinquency in the Union, according to the provisions of the TEU'; and the objective of 'an area of freedom, security and justice' the latter is included in Article 61 of EC and Article 2 of TEU as well (TEC, Article 61).

The decision making procedures of the former third pillar, which requires unanimity vote, and the binding legal effects of instruments on the other side maintain a sort of sui generis procedure (Piris, 2006: 168). Article 34 of the TEU clarifies that EU judicial cooperation establishes new legal measures, which require unanimous action by the Member States, the Commission or the Council, in pursuit of the objectives of the Union. Firstly, the TEU introduces 'common positions' to identify the perspective of the Union on specific issue (TEU, Article 34). Secondly, it adopts 'framework decisions', which do not have direct effect, on the grounds of approximation of the laws of the Member States. However, the ECJ has bestowed an indirect effect for Framework Decision in the Pupino Case2

where it held that domestic courts have a general duty to interpret domestic law in conformity with the requirements of the EU framework decisions. With this judgment, the ECJ vested significant effectiveness in the EU measures of the Third Pillar. A framework decision, then, is binding upon the Member States. However, national authorities have discretion about what form and methods to adopt into the domestic law they use. The Framework Decision, as a new legal tool, was driven by the TEU in order to provide better harmonisation in criminal matters and to ensure that Member States would incorporate new measures into their domestic law in accordance with common parameters and objectives (TEU, Article 34).

However, framework decisions do not ensure a drastic shift in decision making and adoption into the national legal procedures, since they require

and Criminal Procedure in European Union' in Strandbakken, A., Harmonization of Criminal Law in European, Intersentia Antwerpen-Oxford Publishing, at.8; White S., (2006), Harmonization of Criminal Law under the First Pillar, European Law Review, vol. 3 no.l, at.81-92; Wasmeier M., and Thwaites N., (2004), The Battle of Pillars: Does the European Community Have the Power to Approximate National Criminal Laws?, European Law Review, vol. 29 no.5, at.613-34. 2 For the details ofPupino case, see: Case C-105103, Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino, 16 June 2005.


unanimous votes of the member states and adoption by national legislatures, which is a time-consuming process. On the other hand, the European Parliament does not play a prominent role in the setting out and implementing of the measures. Nonetheless, the TEU gave rise to significant improvement in the legislative performance of the Union in the area of criminal law and established a formal framework which exerts pressure on the member state to develop mutual assistance and cooperation in this area, even though criminal law has remained within the domain of national sovereignty (Perron, 2005: 5).

Third, the TEU establishes 'decisions,' which are also binding but not with any direct effect, for any other function based on the objectives of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, though decisions do not govern any efforts toward including any approximation of the laws of the Member States. Lastly, it provides conventions which require unanimous votes and necessitate adoption by domestic legislators consistent with domestic preconditions of the Member States. Member States must launch the adoption proceedings within a term to be defined by the Council (TEU, Article 34).

Organisation of the institutional aspects of the Union and its decisionmaking procedures laid down by Article 34 of the TEU has been entirely intergovernmental and Member States hold the exclusive competences (Kuijper, 2004: 609-626).

Articles 35 and 46 of the TEU enshrine the principles of judicial review with respect to judicial cooperation. These provisions set out the rights to refer to the Court of Justice by national judges' and tribunals' within the scope of preliminary ruling on the interpretation or validity of the instruments (common positions, framework decisions, decisions and conventions) established in the Article 34 of the TEU.(TEU, Article 35)

The referral of cases by national courts for preliminary ruling procedure is attached to the declaration of Member States' admission the jurisdiction of the ECJ. The ECJ will ask whether the referral for a preliminary ruling is acceptable by domestic tribunal against verdicts (whose verdicts for which there is no legal review in the context of domestic legal order), without any indication of whether this deficiency of judicial review is related to a respective case or pertains to all circumstances. (TEU, Article 35)

Additionally, Article 35 sets out a preliminary ruling with regard to framework decisions and decisions, as stipulated by Article 230 of TEC,


(TEC, Article 230) in addition to proceeding envisaged to resolve the conflicts between the Member States in terms of the adoption of measures for catalogue in Article 34(2) (d) of the TEU (TEU, Article 34).

1.2 Problems with regard to the Former Pillars Structure

As concerns the above-mentioned organisation of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, one of the main problems is the ineffectiveness in criminal judicial cooperation because of the division between the first and third pillars. There is a dual legal personality, which arises from the ambiguity of the exact legal impact of each instrument outside of its specific area. Intricacy, vagueness and deficiency of precision are also consequences of the pillar division. An acceptable solution to this problem appears in the Lisbon Treaty which abolishes the pillar divisions. (De Hert, 2004: 55-99; Guild and Carrera, 2006: 1 0)

On the other hand, judicial cooperation in criminal matters is organised upon a rather flexible foundation causing difficulties with effectiveness, which is based on the intergovernmental method (Mitsilegas et.al., 2003: 40). A mechanism for supranational legislative and enforcement may provide coercive pressure for implementing a uniform and increasing legal certainty, precision in enforcement. Therefore, majority voting in the decision making procedure should be adopted. Otherwise, the result will be a disparity and inequality in the daily life of citizens with regard to rights of individuals in criminal matters. On the respective procedural rights, there are no parliamentary controls guaranteeing to prevent abuse of the system. (De Hert, 2004: 55-99).

1.3. Limits of EU Competence in the Criminal Law before the Lisbon Treaty

1.1. EU's Procedural and Substantive Criminal Competence in the Third Pillar

The third pillar is a classic case of mixed competences. The first thing which should be mentioned is that judicial cooperation in criminal matters must be dealt with in the framework of the third pillar (Mitsilegas, 2009:35; De Hert, 2004: 82). Competence to regulate in the area of criminal judicial cooperation is vested in intergovernmental method within the framework of the TEU.

The most important question concerning the criminal competence of the Union is raised in relation to legislative competence in the area of criminal procedure. The argument is that criminal cooperation within the EU is not a separate criminal justice mechanism, but consists of co-operation between


sovereign criminal justice systems to deal with issues across the Union. The question is 'Can the EU legislate measures regarding procedural rights with this limited competence?'

The wording of Articles 29 and 31 of the TEU specifies that, 'common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters' contemplates either: cooperation with respect to institutional, procedural simplification in terms of the proceedings and execution of judgments and the compatibility of cooperation rules; or harmonisation of measures. These measures concern the adoption of minimum rules with respect to the constituent elements of criminal offences and sanctions in the fields of organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking (TEU, Article 29, 31 ). Therefore, the Third Pillar is aimed not only at improving cooperation but also at the establishment of new measures which correspond to a Community instrument. Thus harmonisation of criminal law constitutes one of the methods of the achieving the objectives of judicial cooperation on criminal matters.

On the face of the TEU, the only issue which has an explicit legal basis and consists of common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters, is harmonization of substantial criminal law (Fletcher et al, 2008: 105). There is an issue of whether types of crimes enumerated in Article 29 and 31 are contained in indicative or enumerative clauses. These provisions delimit the types of crimes. Apparently, it seems the clauses are exhaustive, but actually they are not. For example, what of cyber crime? Prima facia computer crime would seem to fall outside this article, except where the measures are related to the listed crimes. However, the Article 29 provisions do not exhaustively describe the limits of Community action; they are only indicative (Walden, 2004: 329). The EU concurred with this opinion and enacted the Framework Decision concerning cyber crime as based on this article.

While, this article establishes the clearest basis for harmonisation, it limits harmonisation in terms of contents (some aspects of criminal law) and level of harmonisation (refers only to minimum rules). These limitations of the Article have prevented harmonisation except for those areas the Article explicitly spells out. (Weyemberg, 2005: 1569)

In light of the expression of Article 29 of the TEU, it might be inferred that criminal procedural law is not expressly denoted as a specific objective of this pillar. However, is the door left open, by means of articles 30, 31 and 32 of the TEU, to address criminal procedural law? (Schutte, 2000: 43-55)


As regards the particular competence in relation to cooperation between criminal justice systems of Member States, Article 31 (1) of the TEU stipulates to facilitate and accelerate cooperation between competent ministries and judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States. These include where appropriate, cooperation through Eurojust, in relation to proceedings and the enforcement of decisions; facilitating extradition between Member States; ensuring compatibility of rules applicable in the Member States, as may be necessary to improve such cooperation; preventing conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States'.

These provisions enshrine EU interventions in regard to varied dimensions of criminal procedure. It might be argued that there are different levels of ambiguity. The first one is that stipulated EU actions are not exhaustive and widely crafted provisions leave the door open for different readings of the Article. Secondly, in terms of the methods EU may use to take precautions, there is also vagueness. That is, while the provisions merely refer to the term 'common action,' there is uncertainty concerning which legal instruments shall be employed to achieve goals in relation to cooperation between the justice systems of Member States. However, it can not be deduced from this that the Treaty provisions empower the Council to have discretion on criminal procedure whenever they achieve a unanimous vote. The efforts to find out the limits of EU competence along with decision maker-institutions and decision the making-procedure, the certainty on type legal instruments, the principles on judicial control and insufficient basis for competence prove that the third pillar is the area of attributed competence which means that there is limited competence and it exists whenever it is vested by the Treaty. The EU legal measures in the third pillar necessitate the Treaty legal basis in order to adopt including concepts of subsidiarity and proportionality as was appeared in two cases (environmental crimes framework decision case and ship source pollution case). These two framework decisions were annulled by the ECJ on the grounds that third pillar decision making process was employed instead of the firs pillar legal basis. (Fletcher et al., 2008: 106)

In the course of confirming the validity of EA W in the case of Advocaten voor de W ereld, the Court widened the means of harmonization beyond the substantive criminal law dimension in Article 31 (1) (e) to the criminal procedure dimension in Article 31. The ECJ also held that the Council has discretion to select between different legal instruments to lay


down principles of same issue complying with the requirements of the instruments selected. 3

Following the Tampere Conclusion, which adopts the principle of mutual recognition as a cornerstone for criminal cooperation, in terms of mutual recognition, importance of either execution of sentences and protection of suspects and accused rights was remarked.4 Although breakthrough developments have been achieved in the area of mutual recognition in criminal justice, less attention has been paid to defence rights (Peers, 2000: 187). In 'negative legal integration' which means extensive use of mutual recognition in criminal matters, it may be noted that the EU has neglected the minimum level of harmonisation in defence rights (Peers, 2000: 187). Remarkable procedural successes have been achieved in the implementation of the EA W. However, executing states do not have to, prima facia, check the procedural rights of the issuing state. (Alegre and Leaf, 2004: 200-217)

On the other hand, it might be argued that current TEU provisions provide no solid grounds for seeing mutual recognition as the 'cornerstone' of cooperation. The Council preferred mutual recognition politically as a method to achieve 'closer cooperation'. However, according to some writer that making mutual recognition the cornerstone of cooperation does not in itself present sufficient evidence to prove that due to exceptional features of penal law and this innovation, mutual recognition was not intended by the legislator ofthe TEU. Therefore, every employment of it, in cases where the measures cannot be based on other clauses of the TEU, amounts to an excess of competence by the bodies of the Union (Gbandi, 2005: 23). As a result, this causes doubts regarding legal basis of procedural rights, because there is express lack of legal basis. However, it can be considered that there is implicit competence in terms of mutual recognition (LoOf, 2006: 430).

Why have the procedural rights of suspects and the accused, at the minimum level of harmonisation standards, not been taken into consideration in adopting the European Arrest Warrant? It has been argued that this is due to lack of legal competence. While Article 31 ( 1) (b) of the TEU vests competence in the EU to make extradition easier, it does not

3 For the details, see: C- 303/05 A vocaten voor de Wereld, judgment of 3 May 2007, para. 32-37. 4 For the details, see: Mutual Recognition of Final Decision in Criminal Matters (COM(2000) 495 final), at.2


bestow clear power to establish procedural rights. The Commission has found a way around this and interpreted the Article as if it confers authority implicitly (LoOf, 2006: 424). It proposed a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings ('FDPR').5 By interpreting the requirements mutual recognition and given the way in which the EU institution had expressed its opinion on the issue, the Commission inferred that the drafter of Article 31 (1) (c) of the TEU contemplated conceding criminal procedural competence to the EU in the proposed FDPR. The expression 'as may be necessary to improve such cooperation' authorises the EU to enact the measures in the sphere of criminal co-operation to provide the necessary harmonization of laws. (Loof, 2006: 424)

One scholar has asserted that proposal of FDPR would clarify ambiguity concerning the EU competence on procedural rights and that it is based on a controversial reading of the existing Third Pillar (Morgan, 2005). On the other hand, some others maintain that the idea behind the empowerment of the EU concerning procedural rights is based on intergovernmental peculiarity and with its corollary the unanimous vote requirement of the Third Pillar. The third pillar has not empowered normative competence to the EU and it has not created a system of attributed competence. Hence, the EU has limited competence. Whatever the EU intergovernmental Council decide it has the competence to enact.(Mitsilegas, 2006: 301-24)

On the other hand, Advocate General Kokot in Pupino maintained that the phrasing of Article 31(1) of the TEU is not vague in respect of the limited competence when it states that 'common action on judicial cooperation in criminal matters shall include ... ' (Loof, 2006: 425) Some argues that in the light of the expression of Article 29 of the TEU, it might be inferred that establishing procedural law is not expressly denoted as a specific objective of this pillar. However, the door for this is left open, as articles 30, 31 and 32 of TEU deal with criminal procedural rights (Schutte, 2000: 43-55). One scholar does not consider there to be any ambiguity and argues that a satisfactory legal basis for certain EU measures on procedural rights is in the expression ofthe Article 31(1) ofthe TEU. (LoOf, 2006: 425)

As regards my concern, there are no clear legal bases of EU competence in regard to the regulation of procedural rights. The door is left open to address procedural issues where it is essential to ensure the effective functioning of the mutual recognition. On the other hand, argument of that

5 For the details, see: Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the EU(COM (2004) 328 final)


the Council has power over whatever it chooses, without this being envisioned by the provisions of the Treaty appears unreasonable, since the EU law is based upon the Treaties.

1.2. The Question of the Community Competency in First Pillar Criminal Law

The Question of whether the Community has competence in the area of criminal law constitutes one of the impasses in the sphere of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The TEC did not contain provisions vesting express competence to the Community in criminal matters by defining criminal offences and setting sanctions from the very beginning of the Treaties to the present versions. This approach casts doubts holding competence in regard to imposing definition of crimes and establishing sanctions on Member States. There is a tension between effort to make Community law more effective and doubts on the party of individual states about sharing sovereignty with the Community in the field of criminal law (Mitsilegas, 2008: 153-171). Those who are considered in the favor of holding competence assert that competence within the penal area ought not to be seen differently from the competence on other sphere of law. Those who hold this view believe the Community should hold competence to protect the policies of the Community by imposing criminal law. Opponents of this argument consider criminal law as the most important area of state sovereignty and believe the Community is not vested with competence in this area, as can be deduced from silence on the Treaties. (Peers, 2006:390-400; Wasmeier and Thwaites, 2004: 613-34; Mitsilegas, 2006: 301-24)

The Commission has tried to set up Community competence criminal law by drafting first pillar criminal instruments on crimes and sanctions. During the Council deliberations however, none of them could be adopted due to resistance from Member States that believe that the Community is not empowered to exercise express criminal competence. This tension between different approaches paved the way for adoption of first pillar instruments in which prohibition of certain conducts were made, definitions of crimes and sanctions though were not adopted as in the example of 1991 first money laundering directive before Maastricht. However, a change in approach was reflected by prohibiting certain conduct with first pillar instruments on the one hand, and on the other hand, defining the same actions as crimes and their sanctions are enshrined by equivalent third pillar instruments during the post-Maastricht era as was appeared in directive and framework decision concerning facilitation of unauthorized entry and ship-


source pollution. Another example was the framework decision on environmental crime which was adopted as a third pillar instrument rather than first pillar instrument and then annulled by the ECJ (Vervaele, 2006: 87-93). The ECJ addressed for the first time the issue of the criminal competence of the Community in the environmental crimes case (White, 2006: 81-92; Tobler, 2005: 835-54). 6 The Commission, concurring with European Parliament in this case asserted that as environmental protection is addressed within the first pillar competence. This issue should have been regulated by first pillar instruments. Therefore, the Commission asserted that framework decision was requited to be annulled. The Commission further maintained that the Community has been given competence to lay down sanctions for breach of environmental principles within the Community law, if it is necessary and effective to harmonize criminal law measures to protect the Community policy at stake. The Commission also had the view that criminal competence is ceded to the Community on the grounds that Member States have an obligation to cooperate faithfully according to principles of efficient and equal cooperation (Case C-176/03 para. 19-20). The Council rejected this opinion- with not least than 11 supporting member states- and defended the view that the Community does not hold competence to impose criminal law in light of the actions encompassed by the framework decision. This problem of competency is not only due to lack of express delegation of competence. It is due to the fact that that there is no implicit basis for adopting this competence which can be vested on the Community where substantive competences are bestowed under Article 1 7 5 of the TEC (Case C-1 7 6/03 para. 26-2 7).

The ECJ held that the framework decision was null and void. It emphasized that nothing in Articles 47 and 29 of the TEU has impact on the TEC and furthering that duty of the ECJ is to prevent third pillar measures to encroach the competence of Community conferred upon by the TEC (Case C-176/03 para. 38-39). Then the Court· stated that environmental protection is one of the essential aims of the Community and the aim is to protect the environment by establishing which actions constitute serious environmental crimes (Case C-176/03 para. 45-47). As a Community goal, environmental protection is at stake to determine whether criminal law can be applicable as a tool to achieve this aim. The Court considered that, in principle criminal law and criminal procedure are not within the scope of Community competence. However, this does not prevent the EC legislature

6 For further details, see: Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council, 13 September 2005.


from taking measures in relation to the criminal law of the member states, if the application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national authorities are essential measures to combat serious environmental crimes, when it is required that the rules which it lays down on environmental protection are fully effective (Case C-176/03 para. 47-48). The Court held that the purpose of the Article 1-7 of the framework decision regarding environmental offences is protection of environment; however these offences could have been established properly based on Article 175 of the TEC. Despite the fact that these provisions of the framework decision to specify conduct detrimental to the environment, the discretion to determine the choice of penalties- which need to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive,- are left to Member States (Case C-176/03 para. 49).

The Court conferred express criminal competence upon the Community with this judgment. Striking points within this judgment are the effectiveness of Community law and the achievement of Community aims. Where Community goals are in question, criminal law is considered as a tool rather than a particular area of law which need particular rules to adopt and seen within the scope of Community competence. However, it is not clear whether the Court's interpretation in this regard bestows general competence in the area of criminal law or is confined to environmental crimes alone. (Mitsilegas, 2006: 307-8)

The Court's ruling in Ship Source Pollution Case, presents a certain degree of clarity in terms of delimiting the Communities criminal competence. On the one hand, the judgment can be considered as confirmation of the Community competence in criminal law for those who support the first pillar criminal law on the one hand. On the other hand, the Court held that there is competence to adopt a wide range of criminal law measures and further clarified the ambiguities on the extent of the first pillar criminal1aw competence. The Court emphasized that imposing criminal law in this case is within the scope of the first pillar; however, the imposition of criminal sanctions falls within the third pillar. The Court adopted a balanced approach in regard to confining Community competence to the achievement of essential Community objectives. (Mitsilegas, 2008: 166)

1.3. Question of Supranational or Intergovernmental Competence

As concerns the question of whether judicial cooperation in criminal matters is based on supranational or intergovernmental competence; first,


draftsmen of the Treaty consistently used the term judicial 'cooperation', 'operational cooperation' and 'closer cooperation' throughout the related section of the TEU and also between the Articles 61-69 of the TEC (TEC, Article 166-169). This indicates the intent of the legislator as to what kind of competency it intended to confer upon the EU.

Secondly, the foundation of intergovernmental or supranational structure can not be reduced to only one dimension. It is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and several different factors reflect the level of integration. The first parameter may be the use of legal power encompassing the right to initiate legal action (Walter, 2004: 16). Article 34 of the TEU empowers Member States this right to initiate and, to a limited extent, to the EU institution and the Commission.

Third, the competence to adopt legal instruments is granted by the Council leaving the discretion of the Member States the method of incorporating those into national law. This is the case specifically in the third pillar in which almost all decisions are reached with participation of the Member States. There is no opportunity for parliamentary participation or co-decision. The existing measures taken within the framework of the third pillar permit the executive of the EU to impose legal instruments and the EU has enactment power within the domestic legal orders in the Union scale, with very limited discretion to the Commission or the Parliament and with limited space for judicial review. We may call this situation 'sui generis supranational competence.' (De Hert, 2004:93) Within the third pillar structure this drives the EU criminal system towards a quasi supranational criminal justice system. These supranational peculiarities -such as relations with the Commission and consultation with Parliament and the binding nature of legal measures- push the boundary of intergovernmental structure. This competence is not exclusive and is not a shared competence of the Community.

As regards the features of third pillar legal instruments, especially framework decision, especially, may be called a 'gentlemen's agreement. '(Guild and Carrera, 2005:3) It is binding in nature and is subject to preliminary rulings in terms of validity and interpretation, but it is not directly effective. However, the ECJ held that the framework decision is indirectly effective in the Pupino7 judgment. The power of judicial review is conceded to interstate relationships in restricted areas. In respect to

7 For further information about the case, see: Case C-105/03, Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino.


effectiveness, the decision making mechanism of criminal cooperation has yielded major rewards.

Lastly, the method of decision making expressed by the terms of Article 34 of the TEU requires unanimous vote with the 'initiative of any Member State' (TEU, Article 34, 35). Some writers have called the situation sui generis supranational inter governmental, due to strategic progress towards the supranational sphere, in which the EU supranational system is based on a intergovernmental in its decision-making procedure. Although the Council is intergovernmental in its organisation, in fact, it is supranational in the way in which it operates and binds member states with their corollary legal measures.(Ludlow, 2004: 14)

As to the view that considers the EU criminal matters as cooperation between sovereign criminal justice systems rather than an autonomous one; as the Union is built upon a sui generis supranational foundation with a distinctive intergovernmental features. It is not rational to expect the emergence of a complete independent Union justice system and it is not necessary to ensure such a system. As is implicit in the basic idea of the Union, 'united in diversity' reflects the most favorable approach for understanding the criminal policy of the EU.

Even though it has some sui generis or quasi-supranational features, in my opinion, bearing in mind this multi-dimensional picture, the character of the criminal judicial cooperation is intergovernmental not supranational and, the former nature outweighs the latter one. Attributing sui generis supranational characteristic to it does not have any practical consequences though.

1.4. Advocaten Voor De Wereld Case and the EA W

In Advocaaten Voor De Wereld Case, Belgian Arbitration Court referred to the ECJ questions on both procedural and substantive matters. Regarding the competency issue, Court called into question whether a framework decision was the suitable instrument for the purpose of approximating the laws and regulations of the member states. Advocaten voor de Wereld maintained that as the EA W was not a suitable instrument adopted for the purpose of harmonizing the laws of member states laws, and furthering a convention is the appropriate instrument for this purpose. The ECJ verified while addressing this question that the Council has the power to select which instrument to use in order to regulate specific issue, within the context of the standards envisaged for this instrument and in case where


principles laid down for this instruments are adhered to. (Fletcher et al., 2008: 120)

The Court interpreted that harmonization of national laws as a means to ensure that the common action referred to Article 31 of the TEU could not be confined merely to establishing the elements of certain crimes. At paragraph 29 the ECJ clarified the relationship between the principle of mutual recognition and harmonization as follows: 'The mutual recognition of the arrest warrants issued in the different Member States in accordance with the laws of the issuing State concerned requires the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States with regard to the cooperation in criminal matters and, more specifically, of the rules relating to the conditions, procedures and effects of surrender as between national authorities'.

The ECJ enumerated the provisions of the EA W that were aimed at having a harmonizing effect, such as Article 2 (2) on double criminality and Article 3 and 4 on refusal to execution. Framework decision is suitable instrument for laying down rules for the EA W area, though international conventions were employed to regulate these fields previously. (Fletcher et al., 2008: 121)

2. Key Changes by the Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1st of December 2009. It amended existing organization and structure significantly and simplified decision making procedure of the European Union (EU). It changed the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the EC Treaty and renamed as the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU). The TEU covers general constitutional provisions and specific provisions on foreign policy, and the TFEU covers essentially provisions on the special EU policies and areas of action(Craig, 2008: 137-166; Dougan, 2008: 617-703 8 The European Union continued as a single legal personality and the European Community was abolished. New Article 1 of the TEU states that both Treaties have the equal legal value and there is no hierarchy and superiority or priority between them. A most important innovation established by the new Treaty structure is the abolition of the pillar structure and the three-pillar structure merged into one 'Union', despite the fact that some special procedure in foreign policy, security and defence remained (Mitsilegas, 2008:37; Duff, 2009). This

8 For further details, see also: House of Lords European Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment, Volume 1, lOth Report, session 2007-08, HL Paper 62-1.


amendment has important implications for the area of freedom, security and justice. Instruments on police and criminal judicial cooperation are incorporated into the former first pillar structure and consequently the area of freedom, security and justice became 'communitarised'. On the other hand, it should be realized that without doubt considerable communautarisation of the area of freedom, security and justice is away from unqualified, with several 'intergovernmental' aspects continuing. The features of communitarising the third pillar will be examined after an outline of the number of key changes.

Summary of the Key Changes by the Treaty of Lisbon:

The Union has acquired single legal personality.

Three Pillar structure merged into one.

Double majority rule was adopted.

Co-decision procedure between the European Parliament and Council was confirmed as so-called ordinary legislative procedure.

Instead of sixth month rotational Council Presidency, two and half year term European Council Presidency was adopted.

High Represantative for Foreign and Security Policy was established.

Right to initiative for citizens was recognized.

Democratic participation by European and National Parliaments and for citizens sthrenghtened.

As a result of the these changes, this new Treaty will increase the efficiency of functioning of institutional structure and decision making procedure of the EU. The objective of the Union with this Treaty is to overcome the global problems arising from terorizm, crossborder crimes as such of which pose significant treat to citizens of the Union.(Duff, 2009)

Although, the Charter of Fundamental Rights was not incorporated into the Treaties, it entered into force and became binding tool with entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Charter has the same legal value with the Treaties. The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Lisbon Treaty revitalizes the Charter and strenghtens the rule of law in the Union and eliminates the democratic deficiency in the EU. (Miller, 2007:3)


3. Overview of the Criminal Judicial Cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty

3.1. Reforms on Institutional Framework

The major characteristics of institutional changes about the criminal judicial cooperation that the Lisbon Treaty brought about are mainly three, all attributable to the abolition of the pillar structure and merging them into the one structure.

The first important attributes arising from the Lisbon Treaty is pertinent to legal sources. Uniform set of legal acts is ensured for all the areas which are laid down under the competence of the Union. This refers to uniform legislative procedures, according to qualified majority voting, and the participation of the European Parliament to the legislative process35

, which is important in terms of the principles of democratic participation and the rule of law. These acts for most part pursue the areas envisaged within the previous EC Treaty: to use Union's competences, the type of legal instruments shall be regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. The main feature of the regulation will be binding its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States and shall have general application. A directive shall be binding; however, form of choice and method of transposition into domestic law was left to the national authorities. (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 82, 83)

A decision shall be binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them. Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force. (TFEU, Article 288)

The second important attribute arising from the Lisbon Treaty refers to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, which is consequently bestowed the judicial control among the diverse fields of EC/EU law provided under the EC Treaty before the Lisbon Treaty. Without considering the field, the Court has competence in annulment proceedings in so much as that it is filed by a real or a legal person (TFEU, Article 263). Furthermore, regardless of the necessity for declaration in advance in an attempt to recognize its competence, the ECJ can deliver preliminary rulings as regards the interpreting the provisions of the TEU and the TFEU and the validity and interpretation of legal acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union (TFEU, Article 267). The Lisbon Treaty also envisages the responsibility of referral to courts or tribunals for the judgments and decisions of which there is no further judicial remedy within the domestic


legal order similar to that of previous system provided under Community method. This reinforced the recently adopted amendments as regards the rules of proceedings of the ECJ, which laid down rules of emergent preliminary ruling in the field encompassed by Title VI of the former TEU Treaty and Title IV of Part Three of the former EC Treaty, which target to establish an area of freedom, security and justice, through shorter deadlines and limitation of the parties and other concerned people empowered to present argument of case or written explanation. In cases of excessive necessity, even the written phase of the proceedings may be excluded. (Belfiore, 2009: 1-22)

The third attribute within the Lisbon Treaty that specified a critical point in judicial criminal cooperation as regards the remedies: infringement proceedings are generally applicable. The indefensible situation where Member States exercise the concession not to put into practice third pillar acts appropriately or at all and enjoy an absolute immunity in comparison with any violation of EU law is modified in favors of a consistent method of remedies. In fact, sanctions against non-put into practice are required in the criminal area which necessitates by its character certainty of law and non-discrimination in the midst of the addressees of the same act. For that reason, where a Member State flawed to realize an EU requirement, the Commission shall convey a reasoned view on the subject after delivering the State concerned the opportunity to present its explanation. The Commission may even carry the issue before the ECJ in case where the State does not abide by the view within the specified timeline. (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 258)

After abolishing the pillar structure by the Lisbon Treaty, judicial remedies up to now granted, for instance State legal responsibility, also became applicable to the criminal field, in order that compensation have been established even to persons affected by non applied EU criminal acts. (Belfiore, 2009: 20)

3.2. Objectives

The mutual recognition in criminal matters has been established by the case law of the ECJ, specifically after the Cassis de Dijon case. This concept has been enshrined first time in the Treaty, albeit its certain function in the course of action of the EU integration together with the economic and the criminal law field. (Belfiore, 2009: 20)


Through the Lisbon Treaty, mutual recognition has been officially accepted with regard to the former third pillar. Criminal judicial cooperation shall be relied on the concept of mutual recognition of judgments and other judicial decisions, and shall contain the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States in specified fields (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 82 para 1). Especially, minimum rules may be created to the extent that requires to make possible mutual recognition of judicial decisions and police and criminal judicial cooperation in proceedings as regards the trans border dimension (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 82 para II). Minimum rules shall be related to: mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States; the rights of individuals in criminal procedure; the rights of victims of crime; any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has acknowledged beforehand by a decision (for the adoption of which the Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament). (Belfiore, 2009: 20)

Therefore, the Lisbon Treaty promotes the principle of mutual recognition and enlarges the scope of criminal judicial cooperation. Mutual recognition is transposed into an explicit purpose of the Union and harmonization of laws, which is a mechanism by which realizing this purpose and it may be valid to new fields thus far disregarded in the EU agenda. This agenda unquestionably reveals the recognition at political stage ofthe mounting implication ofEU criminal law. (Belfiore, 2009:20)

3.3.Transitional Measure

Article 10 of Title VII of Protocol 36 on transitional provisions envisages that instruments in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters adopted before the Lisbon Treaty, the competence of the ECJ under the former Title VI of the TEU, shall subject to the same rules, applicable for the instruments adopted under the former Article 35(2) of the TEU. These transitional provisions will be remain in force after five years the date of come into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

Within the Article 10 of Title VII of the Protocol n. 36 on transitional measure, as regards instruments in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters adopted before the Treaty of Lisbon, the competences of the Commission under Article 258 shall not be enforceable. This provisional measure will stay in force until the end of five years after the date of entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

The Court of Justice does not have competences of judicial control on the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or


other law enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities conferred on Member States in regards the preservation of law and order and the protection of domestic security. (TFEU, Article 276)

3.4. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Lisbon Treaty

The objective of the Union as an 'area of freedom, security and justice' is improved in the Lisbon Treaty, further it acquired to a certain extent position of an outstanding area within it. The 'area of freedom, security and justice' emerges in the new EU Treaty, elevated on the listing of the Union's affirmed objectives in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TEU, the Union will 'offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime '.

Furthermore, the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' embraces the title of Title V TFEU, which encompasses the rules and principles on Justice and Home Affairs covering issues formerly within the third pillar. The preliminary clause stipulates that the Union will comprise an area of freedom, security and justice with respect to fundamental rights and the different legal systems and customs of the Member States. (TFEU, Article 67(1))

Besides it includes further three paragraphs intending to endow with a classification of the subjects covered by the field: borders, immigration and asylum; (TFEU, Article 67(2)) criminal law, positioned under the rationale of guaranteeing a 'high level of security'; (TFEU, Article 67(3)) and civil law, within the concept of the facilitation of 'access to justice' (TFEU, Article 67(4)). This relatively shallow classification is unusual in that it appears to connect 'freedom' -which is though not explicitly stated in the related paragraph -with internal frontiers, immigration and asylum; 'security' with criminal law; and 'justice' with civil law. (Mitsilegas, 2008: 38)

What if any consequences can be encompassed relating to the future course of EU action in Justice and Home Affairs-whose distinction in the EU program Lisbon appears to affirm-and the connection among freedom, security and justice from the common clauses of the Lisbon Treaty? Firstly, the stress in Article 3(2) TEU on the Union proposing an area of freedom, security and justice to its citizens is significant: it entails an affirmative obligation for the EU. It has also implication merely to obligation of the EU


cttlzens but not necessarily to third country nationals. Furthermore, the Treaty maintains the stress on the notion of an 'area', with Article 3(2) the TEU once more connecting Union Justice and Home Affairs law-as well as criminal law-with free movement. But, this connection is not as much of overt in the genuine Title V the TFEU, specifically Article 67: there, freedom is prominently missing from the particular stipulation on criminal law (it is also missing from the stipulation on immigration); justice is even missing; criminal law is particularly, and purposely, related with security in Article 67(3) TFEU. Nevertheless, this explicitly 'securitised' approach is lessened by two different Treaty clauses: the clause on the principles of the Union, which embrace human dignity, freedom, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights (markedly other than security) (TEU, Article 2), and the clause introducing the Charter of Fundamental Rights into Union law and bestowing a legal base for the accession of the Union to the ECHR. (TEU, Article 6; Mitsilegas, 2008: 38)

Despite the fact that the exact implication of these clauses to the rearrangement of the correlation between freedom, security and justice in the EU needs to be observed, they supply functional instruments for taking into consideration fundamental rights in the progress and construal of the EU 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' provisions. The responsibility of the Court of Justice will be vital in this perspective (Mitsilegas, 2008:38).

3.5. The Communautarisation of the Third Pillar

The Lisbon Treaty establishes numerous important alterations in the functioning of EU institutions in criminal law areas, 'communautarising' considerably the third pillar. The first important alteration is related to decision-making, which, for the enormous amount of Title V instruments will be adopted within the scope of the 'ordinary legislative procedure', codecision which will be taken by majority voting between the Council and the European Parliament (TFEU, Article 289(1) and 294). This represents a substantial enhancement the role of the European Parliament, which efficiently is bestowed a right of veto. The ordinary legislative procedure is basically applicable to legislative actions in the areas of principle of mutual recognition and harmonisation in criminal matters (TFEU, Article 83(1) and 83(2)), framework law on restrictive measures as regards terrorism (TFEU, Article 75(1)), crime prevention (TFEU, Article 84), the development of Europol (TFEU, Article 88(2)) and Eurojust (TFEU, Article 85(2)), and police co-operation between national authorities (TFEU, Article 87(2)). The enhancement the role of the European Parliament in this scope may contribute to overcome problems concerning the lack democracy in decision


making process in the third pillar. Nonetheless, the performance of the European Parliament in deliberation of draft legislation in relation to 'communitarised' Title IV issues,9 and the preference of EU criminal law instruments such as principle of mutual recognition and the preference of criminal law bodies reveals that the Treaty of Lisbon clauses by itself may not provide sufficient evidence to tackle the issues of transparency, democratic control and legitimacy of EU criminal law entirely.

A further important institutional alteration relates to the functions of the Court of Justice, and the 'communautarisation' of judicial review. The Court has at the present absolute power to ruling on infringement proceedings in criminal law (TFEU, Article 258-260) a progress that reinforces the Commission's position as 'watchdog of the Treaties' to supervise the accomplishment of EU criminal law by Member States. Additionally, the absolute competence of the Court in the preliminary rulings at this time be appropriate-with the restrictions presently applicable in the former third pillar (TEU, Article 267). The Court also takes for granted absolute competence to files for reparation for damages (TFEU, Article 268) and the examination of validity, with the extensive competence: to eliminate the 'individual concern' standing requirement for real or legal persons challenging regulatory acts not requiring implementing measures (TFEU Article 263(4)); review the conformity of legislative instruments with the principle of subsidiarity; and review the validity of acts of the European Council and bodies, offices or agencies of the Union anticipated to tum out legal impacts in relation to third parties (TFEU, Articles 263(1)) and 277}revealing as a consequence the enhancing function that these institutions and bodies take part in the course of action and legislation in the EU criminal law. The entire amendments will add considerable progress in efficient judicial safeguard in the area of criminal law (TEU, Article 19(1)).10 Broadened jurisdiction of the Court on preliminary rulings specifically will ensure

9 For detailed information, see: House of Lords European Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon, HL Paper 62-1, para 4.130; The Memorandum to the Committee by Steve P., reproduced in House of Lords European Union Committee, The Treaty ofLisbon: An Impact Assessment, Volume II: Evidence, lOth Report, session 2007-08, HL Paper 62-11, at.S153 and oral evidence by Steve Peers and Tony Bunyan, same Report, QQ 82-87 (at. E15-E17). 10 See for further information Lenaerts K., (2007), 'the Rule of Law and the Coherence ofthe Judicial System ofthe European Union', vol. 44 Common Market Law Review, at. 1629-1630.


opportunity allowing a channel of communication between domestic legal systems and the ECJ on subjects of constitutional implications (Mitsilegas, 2008; 41).

A further main shift towards 'communautarisation' has been the alteration in the legal instruments adopted for criminal law. The Treaty envisages the legal instruments of the criminal law as regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions (TFEU, Article 288(1 )). This implies that according to Lisbon Treaty, laws within the scope of the 'area of freedom, security and justice', embracing criminal law, be required to adopt in the type of aforesaid instruments. The main alteration established is the likelihood for EU criminal law-which is most probable to adopt as the directives post-Lisbon-to encompass direct effect (which was explicitly debarred in the former third pillar). Generally, the elimination of the third pillar will connote that Community method be applicable to fields formerly under the third pillar. It should be also notable is that former third pillar instruments-comprising framework decisions, conventions and common positions- are not envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty. The Protocol on Transitional Provisions annexed to the Treaty, expresses that the legal impacts of these instruments will be maintained until repealed, annulled or amended in framework of the Treaties (TFEU, Article 9). The former third pillar institutional structure regarding the ECJ and Commission competence will continue concerning third pillar instruments (TFEU, Article 10(1)). The modification of an instrument will prompt the employment of the Lisbon institutional structure (TFEU, Article 10(2)). Whatever the case, the legal impacts of Union legislation enacted ahead of come into force of the Lisbon will come to an end five years subsequent to such entry into force (TFEU, Article 10(4)). It is anticipated that this clause will be a driving force for the putting forward several draft legislation in post-Lisbon era, changing former third pillar legislation with new instruments in the type of regulations, directives or decisions, ensuring therefore a new impetus to EU criminal law enactment (Mitsilegas, 2008; 41 ).

3.6. Opposition to communautarisation

The amendments suggested in the preparation for the Constitutional and the Lisbon Treaties regarding the third pillar have caused many sovereignty objections in several Member States. The harmonisation of these objections has been revealed in numerous occasions in the Lisbon Treaty. Analysis of its clauses -particularly Title V on the 'area of freedom, security and justice' -exposes that the 'communautarisation' of the third pillar is distant from perfect, with innumerable 'intergovernmental' constituents being


either maintained or recently established by the Treaty. This section intends to classify and analyses these intergovernmental constituents, which disclose more or less amount a distinct opposition to the 'communautarisation' of criminal law. This opposition is articulated by exclusions to the 'Community' methods on decision-making, initiative and judicial control; it is also indicated by insertion Member States at the heart ofthe enhancement and analysis ofEU criminal law (Mitsilegas, 2008; 41).

3.6.1. Difference in Legal Systems of Member States

The initial constituent reflecting opposition to communautarisationaligned with opposition to the entire sameness of EU criminal law-is the persistent stress of the Lisbon Treaty to tolerate the differences of states' legal systems. Tolerance for national differences by now takes up a essential position at the beginning Article of Title V TFEU, Article 67(1), which expresses that the Union will establish an area of freedom, security and justice as regards for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of Member States'. The requirement to regard the differentiations between national legal traditions and systems emerges in the stipulation setting up a legal foundation for the acceptance of definite minimum EU rules in criminal procedure, revealing once more the eagerness of Member States not to endow with the Union with an unlimited competence in the area (TFEU, Article 82(2)).

Two supplementary issues are notable to raise in this scope. The first one is that competence of the EU for harmonisation of criminal procedural laws is merely bestowed with to the extent that it is essential to facilitate mutual recognition in criminal matters. The Lisbon Treaty gives prominence to the principle of mutual recognition as a means of European criminal law cooperation, and in this occurrence harmonisation is subsidiary to mutual recognition in order to make it more efficient. This preference is important as mutual recognition does not entail technically the harmonised EU principles and in any case, on the face of it is supposed by governments, as not as much of menacing to national sovereignty because they would not have to alter their law. The second issue embraces the type of EU acts regarding harmonisation of substantive criminal law and criminal procedure. Equally in these circumstances, harmonisation will occur through Directives (TFEU, Article 82(2), 83(1) and (2)). This preference is important, as directive abandon Member States a substantial margin of discretion as regards how to adopt EU law into domestic law, subject to binding effect as to the impact to be accomplished however giving up to the national


authorities the option of form and manners (TFEU, Article 288(3)). This discretion abandoned to Member States may supply to consider the distinctiveness of their national criminal justice mechanisms while urged to realize EU legislations on subjects for example principles on the admissibility of evidence or the rights of the defendant in criminal proceedings (TFEU Article 82(2)(a) and (b)). It is evident that Member States preferred such discretion instead of entirely the same principles throughout the EU.

Criticisms concerning the tolerance of differences in domestic legal systems and the weakening of national sovereignty due to the move towards community methods in decision-making in EU criminal law have been expressed explicitly in the clauses creating a alleged 'emergency brake' in the enactment of directives in the areas of criminal procedure and substantive criminal law. Within scope of the 'emergency brake' procedure, at which a Member State deems that a draft legislation 'would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system', it may demand that the draft law be sent to the European Council ensuring the suspension of the ordinary legislative procedure. Subsequent to deliberations in the European Council, if they reach compromise, in four months of this suspension the draft is returned to the Council of Ministers for the recommencement of deliberations. If there is no-compromise, in the same timeline, enhanced cooperation laid down in Articles 20(2) TEU and 329(1) TFEU with this draft for Member States which are willing to continue is deemed to be applicable?34 By this way, unwilling Member States which may be in the minority may provide that they do not become involved in the legal instrument, whilst permitting those in supportive of the instrument to take course of action towards its enactment. As was seen in participation of the European Council in the enactment procedure, the emergency brake is a principally political means''.

3.6.2. Security, Counter-Terrorism and Judicial Control

3.6.2.1. Internal and National Security

On numerous occurrences, the Lisbon Treaty includes clauses aspiring to maintain national sovereignty in the area of security. At the beginning stage of the TEU, in the provision subsequent the one on the principle of conferral, it is acknowledged that the Union will regard the necessary State powers of Member States, 'including ensuring the territorial integrity of the

11 See for detailed information House of Lords European Union Committee the Treaty of Lisbon, HL Paper 62-1, paras 6.44-6.66.


State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security' and that specifically, 'national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State' (TEU, Article 4(2)). Title V TFEU on the 'area of freedom, security and justice' (AFSJ) encompasses a clause- evocative to the former Treaty provision--expressing that the Title will 'not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security' (TFEU Article 72). Besides, the Treaty maintains to restrict the competence of the ECJ in enjoying its authority pertaining to criminal judicial cooperation and police co-operation within the scope of Title V. The ECJ will have no power to control the validity or proportionality of operations performed by the police or other law enforcement bodies of a Member State or the perform the obligation of Member States as regards the safeguarding of law and order and the protection of internal security (TFEU, Articles 276 and also 88(3)).

The extent to which these stipulations will restrict enactment instruments in EU criminal law and the ECJ's participation in the judicial control of operations with a domestic aspect on the one hand. On the other hand, subsequent responsibilities within the scope of the Union law are controversial and needs to be seen. 12 In analysis of the effect of these provisions, the terms used are, though, notable, there is no mentioning to the 'area of freedom, security and justice' -at the national aspect, this is reference to the 'internal security', or 'national security'. As of the concept of 'security' in the AFSJ, these notions are not described and their substance are ambiguous.Z40 It is also ambiguous in terms of whether 'national security' corresponds to or partly covers with 'internal security', or whether 'internal security' ought to be considered as encompassing mainly police co-operation, as 'national security' supposed to be regarded as embracing military and/or intelligence acts. In case where this is correct, the impacts of containing referrals to 'national security' in the section on the 'area of freedom, security and justice' might require to be extra investigated (TFEU, Article73).

12 See for detailed information House of Lords European Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon, HL Paper 62-1, paras 6.235-6.243; Ladenburger C., (2008), 'Police and Criminal Law in the Treaty of Lisbon. A New Dimension for the Community Model', European Constitutional Law Review, vol4, at. 36.


3.6.2.2. Counter-terrorism

Restrictions to the ECJ' s competence still maintain relating to EU limiting acts obliged on persons in the context of EU counter-terrorism measures. The Lisbon Treaty bestows with a legal ground for the legislating within the Title V (area of freedom, security and justice), of 'a framework for administrative measures with regard to capital movements and payments, such as the freezing of funds, financial assets or economic gains belonging to, or owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or nonState entities' (TFEU, Articles 75(1) and 75(2)). On the other hand, the Treaty further maintains an extra intergovernmental, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) constituent: in line with Article 215 TFEU, in case where a decision assumed under Title V TEU (on CFSP) bestows with for the interruption or lessening, partly or wholly, of economic and financial connections with one or more third states, the Council, legislating by a qualified majority on a co-suggestion from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission will enact the required instruments. If such decision is delivered, the Council can legislate limiting acts within the scope of mentioned proceedings against real or legal personality and grouping or non-governmental bodies. (TFEU, Article 215(2)).

This intergovernmental perspective is implicated in the appearance of a particular clause on the ECJ's competence: this is the case merely in the framework of case referred by real or legal persons in the concepts bestowed by Article 263(4) TFEU examination of the validity of restrictive acts enacted within the scope of Title V TEU (TFEU Article 275(2)). Whilst the explicit conceding of ability for real or legal personality in these rulings is considered positive in acknowledging the requirement and ensuring a obvious remedy for legal safeguard (TFEU, Article 75(3) and 215(3)), the authority of the ECJ in the framework of Article 275(2) TFEU is limited to the judicial control of the validity of 'decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons'. This appears to leave out the implementing measures enacted by the Council within the framework of Article 215(2) TFEU the Court's competence. But these instruments may have considerable impact on the status of persons.13 Additionally, the

13 See for detailed information Tridimas T., the Memorandum submitted by to the House of Lords Constitution Committee for their inquiry on the European Union (Amendment) Bill: see House of Lords Constitution Committee European Union (Amendment) Bill and the Lisbon Treaty: Implications for the UK Constitution, 61

h

Report, session 2007-08, HL Paper 84, at. 78.


phrasing of Article 275(2) TFEU appears to restrict the Court's power to the examination of legality, not including therefore other degrees of competence for instance preliminary ruling. It needs to be observed how this clause will appertain to the ECJ's growing attempts to expand the remedies of legal safeguard for real and legal personality in this scope (TFEU, Articles 75 and 215).

3.7. Initiative

A major institutional progress in the Lisbon Treaty is the explicit acceptance of the European Council as one of the EU institutions (TEU, Article 13(1). In accordance with the Treaty, the European Council provides the Union with the required driving force for its progress and identify the common political course of actions and main concerns thereof-however will not use lawmaking responsibilities (TEU, Article 15(1)). This is an instance classified as the 'high politics character of the European Council decisions (Dougan, 2008; 627; Yakut, 2010; 54-88). This function of the European Council is affirmed in the particular framework of EU Justice and Home Affairs, with Title V TFEU expressing that the European Council will describe 'the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' (TFEU, Article 68). It is therefore Member States' head of states and governments who will continue to supply with the common principles for the improvement of EU Justice and Home Affairs law-with insignificant contribution from other EU bodies or NGOs. Right to initiative continues to stay at the hands of governments both at the phase of the commencing the procedure of policy and strategy and at the phase of the commencing legislative proceedings: Member States maintain to hold the discretion of initiative, distributed between Member States and the Commission. The draft proposals on police and criminal judicial co-operation can be put forwarded not only by the Commission but also by a quarter of the Member States (TFEU, Article 76).

In conjunction with its position as a course of action and policy designer, the European Council also takes for granted in Lisbon the function of a negotiator if Member States state have worries about the improvement of EU criminal law. As revealed above, the European Council occupies a central position in the 'emergency brake' process, by means of Member States concerned that draft legislation concerning the harmonisation of substantive or procedural law may have impact on essential aspects of their national criminal justice mechanism directing the proposal to the European Council. Deliberations of the European Council resolving the possible


dealing with the draft law may prompt enhanced co-operation in this area. A analogous course of action is foreseen, if there is no compromise on draft law creating a European Public Prosecutor, and law initiating operational co-operation among law enforcement bodies of Member States (in either circumstances, on the other hand, unanimous vote is theoretically obliged in the Council) (TFEU, Article 86(1) and 87(3)).

Furthermore, the European Council undertakes a key position in identifying the effects of non-involvement of the UK and Ireland in prospective Schengen-establishing provisions, which establish on the regulations to which these Member States have at the moment opted in. In case where the UK and Ireland come to conclusion not to take part in such cooperation, they must assume the monetary effects arising from the termination of their involvement (Protocol on the Schengen acquis, Declaration 47 on Article 5(3), (4) and (5)). These impacts will be identified by the Council, on the grounds of the principles of preserving 'the broadest probable measure of involvement of the Member State pertaining to devoid of gravely influencing the realistic operability of the different elements of the Schengen acquis, whilst regarding their consistency (Protocol No 19 on the Schengen Acquis integrated into the Framework of the European Union, Article 5(3)). In case where the Council does not succeed to agree on a decision on the base of these principles, a Member State may demand that the issue be submitted to the European Council, which ought to adopt a decision at its subsequent summit (Protocol No 19 on the Schengen Acquis, Article 5(4)).

3.8. Decision-making

Regardless of the common progress of the Lisbon Treaty as regards the "communitarisation" of decision-making in subjects previously enshrined under the third pillar, there continue numerous exemptions to the principle which is majority voting in the Council and co-decision with the European Parliament (Yakut, 2010; 54-88). The first kind of exemptions entails law which would broaden Union competency in criminal law. In these circumstances, despite the delicateness of the matters, the "Community method" diminishes regarding the Council, however is reinforced regarding the European Parliament. Therefore unanimous vote is necessitated in the Council (in company with to a large extent enhanced function for the European Parliament, which have to show its approval), for law determining fields of criminal procedure (as well as those in its entirety specified in the Treaty) at which the Union can determine minimum rules (TFEU Article 82(2)). The identical procedure is applicable for the approval of law


increasing the Union's competency in approximation of substantive criminal law for offenses except for those enlisted in the Treaty (TFEU, Article 83(1)); and for the enactment and improvement of laws setting up a European Public Prosecutor's Office (TFEU, Article 86(1) and (4)). The second kind of exemptions entail operational co-operation, at which the further conventional "intergovernmental" way of decision-making applicable: unanimous vote in the Council and the solely consulting with the European Parliament is needed for the enactment of law setting up provisions in relation to operational co-operation among Member States' authorised institutions especially law enforcement bodies (TFEU, Article 87(3)); laws establishing the stipulations under which police and judicial institutions may operate in the jurisdiction of other Member States (TFEU, Article 89) and provisions to guarantee administrative co-operation among the appropriate sections of Member States (TFEU, Article 74). The third type of exemptions entails stipulations applicable restrictive counterterrorism legislation at which the European Parliament is in an entirely secondary position: the Treaty envisages that the Council can enact these kinds of implementation legislations (TFEU, Article 75(2) and 215(2)). The restricted function of the European Parliament in the two latter types of circumstances implicates effectively the political delicateness of the subjects for Member States (TFEU, Article 70).

3.9. Subsidiarity

A vital subject in the debates on the modification of the previous EU Treaties, bolstering equally the Constitutional and the Lisbon Treaty, has been the subject matter of "bringing Europe closer to its citizens" by means of principle of subsidiarity, accustomed to paramount distribution in the intensity of beloved achievement in Europe, in performing a fundamental element in this framework (Craig, 2006; 419-427; Tridimas, 2007a: ch 4). The move forward to a stronger emphasize on subsidiarity in the EU as a way of enhanced rationale for EU wide initiative and of linking citizens with the EU has been inseparably connected with urges to ensure national parliaments with a enhanced function in the improvement of EU acts. 14 The

14 See for further details Verges B. A., Rethinking the Methods of Dividing and Exercising Powers in the EU: Reforming Subsidiarity and National Parliaments, Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/02, NYU School of Law, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org; Cooper I, (2006), 'The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 44, no 2, at. 281-304; House of Lords European Union


opinion that national parliaments can overcome the lack of democracy in the EU by ensuring a functional intermediary relationship amid the Union and citizens in the different Member States, and can grant further controls to put forwarded EU act especially by scrutinizing subsidiarity, reasoning and bolster the extension of the pertinent stipulations in the Lisbon Treaty. 15

The Lisbon Treaty provides national parliaments significantly in the Union's legal composition. Article 12 of the TEU, Member States' parliaments involves dynamically to the sound operation of the Union in many processes, containing being reported by EU bodies on draft laws (TEU Article 12(a)) and realizing that the concept of subsidiarity is taken into consideration16 by way of comprehensive stipulations on both functions incorporated in different Protocols annexed in the Treaty. 17 A particular stipulation on national parliaments and subsidiarity is also amalgamated in Title V TFEU, expressing that national parliaments guarantee that draft laws in the field of police criminal judicial co-operation in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity comply with the pertinent (TFEU, Protocol Article 69). The Protocol on subsidiarity sets up a alleged "early warning system" creating a "yellow card": any national parliament can refer to EU bodies, within eight weeks from the referral of proposals and their modified drafts, a rationale of views expressing why it deems that the proposal at issue does not adhere to the concept of subsidiarity (Protocol, Articles 4 and 6); if these reasoned views on drafts for EU criminal law represents in any case one forth of the votes envisaged for Member States' parliaments, the proposal be obliged to be examined (TEU, Article 7(2)). Additionally, the Protocol covers a, "orange card" system: within the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure, at which reasoned views represents in any case a plain majority of the votes envisaged for Member States' parliaments, the draft be obliged to be examined, and in case where the Commission prefers to maintain the draft, a particular procedure is commenced in the Council and the European Parliament considering

Committee (then Select Committee on the European Union), The Future of Europe: National Parliaments and Subsidiarity-the Proposed Protocols, 11th Report, session 2002-03, HL Paper 70. 15 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Democracy and Accountability in the EU and the Role of National Parliaments, 33rd Report, session 2001-02, HC 152. 16 For the principle of subsidiarity see Articles 12(b) and 5(1) and (3) of the TEU. 17 See for the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality Protocol No l on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union and Protocol No 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and proportionality respectively.


whether deliberations be supposed to proceed (TEU, Article 7(3) of the). The Protocol further covers a stipulation on the previous scrutiny of subsidiarity, bestowing power to the Court of Justice in acts against enacted laws on the basis of violation of the principle of subsidiarity under Article 263 TFEU (TEU, Article 8).

There are several issues concerning the implementation of such clauses, especially regarding the process of the "yellow" and "orange" cards: would the reasoned views cover the equivalent substance/arguments on the violation of subsidiarity in order for them to attain the votes threshold necessitated by the Protocol, or are various subsidiarity challenges permitted in this framework? Will state parliaments in conjunction with the issues of applicable co-ordination they encounter center exclusively on subsidiarity, or will subsidiarity challenges be combined or mixed with challenges on proportionality and competence? Furthermore, there is a subject matter as regards the application of the Court's validity control: standing is established in this framework to Member States for their national parliament or a chamber thereof (TEU, Article 8 (1) and Article 8(2)). The wording of this clause implicates the complexities in including national parliaments in the EU lawmaking process, as the second one do not represent an EU bodies in the conditions of the Treaties. So as not to make unstable the domestic institutional equilibrium in the EU, standing is bestowed to Member States for their parliaments however, given the general formulation of Article 7, the issue of how binding a demand from a legislature to its Government to refer an act before the Court is still possible. It is presented that Union legislation poses on Member States' the responsibility to refer an act before the Court in case where the national parliament apply for such a demand; however it is domestic legislation which lay down the exact procedural in this scope in detail. 18 Despite such intricacies, the stipulations on subsidiarity characterize an obvious inclination towards delegating review of EU law at the domestic legal order, specifically by forcing EU bodies to rationalize in depth the reason why it is required and EU wide initiation each occasion draft law is being proposed (TEU, Article 5, Article 7(2) and Article 7(3)).

18 For further details see Memoranda submitted by T Tridimas and J Usher to the House of Lords Constitution Committee for their inquiry on the European Union (Amendment) Bill: see House of Lords Constitution Committee, at. 76 and 81; House of Lords European Union Committee, Strengthening National Parliamentary Scrutiny, para. 228-240.


3.10. Evaluation

An additional aspect of the Lisbon Treaty representing the enhanced stress on the requirement to rationalize and verify the supposed "added value" of EU law, especially in the area of freedom, security and justice, is the legal underpinning founded in Title V TFEU allowing the initiate of systems for the "objective and impartial evaluation" of the realization of the Union policies mentioned in this Title by state institutions specifically with the aim of assist complete appliance of the principle of mutual recognition (TFEU, Article 70). Evaluation is therefore a past duty of inspection method, encompassing powerful intergovernmental aspects: it will be carried out by Member States (in cooperation with the Commission) with the European Parliament and national parliaments being "informed" of its substance and consequences (TFEU, Article 70). A multiparty interparliamentary participation (of the European Parliament and national parliaments) is further foreseen concerning the assessment of the actions of Eurojust (TFEU, Article 85(1) of the and TEU, 12(c), TFEU, Article 88(2) of the and TEU, 12(c)).

The Lisbon Treaty implicates mounting urges for the instituting of systems for the assessment of the realization of EU criminal law by Member States.19 Specifically as regards the use of the principle of mutual recognition in criminal law areas, it has been suggested that assessment would boost the mutual confidence among criminal justice mechanism of Member States. Evaluation instruments in criminal law areas are not novel mechanism for Member States: the latter have been concerning in peer review methods in international medium (Levi and Gilmore , 2002; 341-368). Furthermore, many evaluation methods are used in the scope of the; presently they continue to exist in the appearance of peer reviews of Schengen attentiveness which have had a important function in enlargement and the assessment of relevance for full Schengen membership (Weyembergh and de Biolley, 2006; 0 de Schutter, 2008; 44-88i0 and in the structure of evaluation methods of the realization of particular third pillar law on organised crime and terrorism (Nilsson, 2006; 115-124 ). 21

19 See COM (2006) 332 final, 28 June 2006. 20 See for further details EU JHA acquis (Joint Action 98/429/JHA, OJ L191, 7 July 1998, p.8). On the Schengen evaluations, see Genson R., and van de Rijt W., 'L'evaluation de Schengen dans le cadre de l'elargissement', in Weyembergh and de Biolley, at. 219-234. 21 Joint Action 97/827/JHA, OJ L344, 15 December 1997, p 7; Decision 2002/996/JHA, OJ L349, 24 December 2002, at.1.


The objective and neutral assessment of the realization of freedom, security and justice law, particularly in the fields connected to the individuals' rights, is unquestionable theoretically. On the other hand, its precise factors are still quiet disputable, given the lawful and constitutional boundaries of the existing position of EU law.22 It is not apparent who will assess within the Lisbon Treaty: Article 70 TFEU relates to assessment by Member States through the participation of the Commission. But the position of the second one and the affiliation among the Commission and Member States are not obvious. Furthermore, it is not apparent as regards the whether EU agencies for example the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) will be taken part in these assessment applications, and if not, what would the connection be amid "Article 70 evaluations and FRA evaluations. The technique of evaluation is also not apparent in company with the issue of who will evaluate issues of the principles of evaluation and the achievements of its consequences are pertinent in this circumstance for example, will the outcomes be revealed, and is the objective of"naming and shaming" application?23 The similar issue can be raised on the subject of the effects of the evaluation. The type of sanctions concerned for nonconformity requires being additional discussion. Similarly, the connection among the Commission's authority to initiate violation procedures by way of the evaluation method recognized within the Lisbon is imprecise: the Treaty affirms that this method is 'without prejudice' to Articles 258-260 TFEU addressing the infringement proceedings: but, it is not obvious whether a affirmative assessment under Article 70 TFEU will in fact exclude infringement act by the Commissionin the second circumstance, the Commission's position as 'watchdog of the Treaties' will be diminish significantly, by means of Member States themselves undertaking the vital function in evaluating their personal conformity with EU criminal law. Conversely, the effect of a negative assessment requires also to be regarded: will this kind of negative assessment cause the proceedings of Article 7 TEUf4 As a final point, the subject matter of aim of the assessment mechanism is not apparent. It may not be easy to differentiate connecting the assessment of the accomplishment of a particular EU criminal law provisions for example the draft law on defence

22 For further details see Mitsilegas V., 'Trust-building Measures'; Mitsilegas, V.,

(2006), 'The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU', Common Market Law Review, vo143, pp 1277-1311. 23 See for evaluation COM (2008) 38 final, Brussels, 4 February 2008, p 4. 24

For details see Article 7 of the TEU Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the EU in 2004, at. 31.


rights and the assessment of a Member State's human rights protection mechanism entirely. The being continuation of EU competency to trigger this kind of far-reaching assessment is doubtful. The Commission's latest Communications nevertheless appear to foresee an extensive assessment. 25

3.11. Non-participation opt-outs

Besides the several occasions of oppositiOn to comunautarisation referred before, issues as regards the implication of the "communitarisation" of criminal law in the Lisbon Treaty on Member State sovereignty have driven to the increase of measures thereby Member States were presented the eventual "opt-out": the opportunity not to take part in EU criminal acts enacted within the scope of the Treaty. Subsequently the model appearing in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, major Member State which has opt outs has been the United Kingdom: in fact, the intensifYing the cooperation in criminal areas has been a alleged "red line" in the UK bargaining position on the Constitutional Treaty, however further than so in the Lisbon Treaty.26

The initial method which may give rise perhaps to opt outs is the emergency brake proceedings referred previously.27 This course of action is available to each Member State in the area of approximation of substantive criminal and criminal procedural law issues give rise to the bringing the legislative proposal to the European Council and, in case of conflict, Member States aspiring to continue may progress within the scope of enhanced co-operation. Another method of non-participation, as regards the Amsterdam, contains the opt outs of the UK and Ireland in Schengenbuilding measures (Protocol No 19, Article 5). As referred above, the major alteration in this framework is that the Treaty now explicitly states that these member states may prefer opt out to instruments constructed on elements of Schengen where they already involve in this circumstance, these States may be urged to abide by the express economic results of this opt out (Schengen Protocol, Article 5(3) and Final Act of the Lisbon IGC, Declaration 47). The third method of opt out expands the UK and Ireland's right of opt out in

25 See further details COM (2005) 195 final, pp 8, 9. 26 See for more information on position of the UK The concession for the UK (and Poland) Protocol No 30 to the Treaty, attempting to limit the application of the Charter in the domestic legal orders of these Member States. See House of Lords European Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon, HL Paper 62-1, n 193 above, paras 5.84-5.111. 27 UK Government's Explanatory Memorandum to the Lisbon Treaty submitted to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, at. 26, 27 para 28.


provisions laid down within the scope of Title IV TEC to contain opt outs in the entire Title of V TFEU in the "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice", covering therefore opt outs in EU criminal law provisions?8 The right to opt oue05 also broadens to measures modifying present instruments which are binding for the UK and Ireland.29 In these kind of circumstances, the timeline wherein the UK and Ireland be obliged to inform their involvement is expanded in case where the Council decides that their opt outs lead to the instruments inapplicable in another Member States.30 In the same way as the Schengen Protocol, opt outs of these states in measures modifying a present instrument whereby they are obliged to be bound, can give rise to abiding by the express financial outcomes arising from these kind of opt outs (Article 4a (3)). The final method of opt outs are laid down in the Protocol on Transitional Provisions, which referred above postpones the appliance of the Community effect in its entirety to legislations enacted within the scope of third pillar for a timeline of up to five years following the came into force of the Lisbon Treaty (Protocol No 36, Article 10(3)). This Protocol bestows the UK the right not to recognize the "Community" competencies of the bodies in areas of the third pillar (Protocol No 36, Article 10(4) and Article 10(5)) in which such instruments will stop to be applicable to the UK. This and the comparable revision to the Schengen Protocol is an extraordinary progress, enabling a Member State to abdicate from legislations which are already officially obligatory for it (Dougan, 2008; 683).

28 Protocol No 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Declaration 56 annexed to the Final Act of the Lisbon Treaty). The UK has declared its intention to participate in restrictive counter-terrorism measures under Art 75 TFEU (Declaration 65 annexed to the Final Act of the Lisbon Treaty). 29 Protocol No 22 on the position of Denmark, stating that Denmark will not take part in the adoption of all Tide V measures (Article 1(1)) and mat no Tide V measure will be binding upon or applicable to it (Art 2). Denmark has also declared that it will not block measures which contain both provisions applicable to it and provisions not applicable to it (Declaration 48 annexed to the Final Art of the Lisbon Treaty). 30 Article 4a(2). See also Declaration 26 annexed to the Final Act of the Lisbon Treaty stating that, where a Member State opts not to participate in a Title V measure the Council will hold a 'full discussion on the possible implications and effects of such non-participation. For a discussion on the threshold required for a measure to be deemed inoperable', see House of Lords European Union Committee (Lisbon Treaty Report), paras 6.262-6.269.


Such non-participation, especially the radical resolution to enable Member States to successfully abdicate from EU instrument which is already obligatory for them, have been considered crucial to guarantee the decent approval of the Lisbon Treaty specifically in Westminster. But, together with the broader subject matter of changeable geometry that they put forward, they may also have major political impacts relating to the initiation ofEU instruments in criminal law areas. The employment ofthe emergency brake proceedings may give rise to acceleration of legislative process by enthusiastic Member States within the enhanced co-operation. Furthermore, the process in which the transitional arrangement Protocol is drafted may in fact increase performance of the EU lawmaking in criminal law areas postLisbon. The stress on the likelihood of altering current third pillar legislation (Protocol on transitional provisions, Declaration concerning Article 10 of the Protocol on transitional provisions) may generate a considerable impetus as regards the enactment of further EU criminal instruments, and activating a set of modifications to vital third pillar legislations, for example the European Arrest Warrant.31 The Protocol affirms that the entirety of "Community" competencies of the EU bodies will be applicable to post-Lisbon instruments which alter present third pillar instruments (Protocol on transitional provisions, Article of the 1 0(2)). This may generate an encouragement for the Commission to propose a set of draft law modifying and adjusting third pillar regulation right after the came into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in this way, both the legal appearances of such measures will be updated such as Framework Decisions will be substituted by Directives and the entirety of "Community" method's impact will be applicable (Protocol on transitional provisions, Declaration No 50 concerning Article 1 0).

The 'pick-and-choose' approach of Member States, especially the UK, along with the competing stipulations identifying Union powers in criminal law areas, may also give rise to a large extent legal intricacy as regards the implementation of EU criminal measures to Member States with nonparticipation. This is especially the case within the scope of the subsidiary position of EU criminal procedure instruments within the rationale of principle of mutual recognition. Given the case of EU principles of defence rights, presently the UK Government is refused to accept the enactment of an officially binding third pillar instruments in this area, and has proposed

31 Mitsilegas V., Memorandum submitted to the House of Lords European Union Committee for the inquiry on the Lisbon Treaty (House of Lords European Union Committee, HL Paper 62-11, Evidence to the Lisbon Treaty Report, E166-E169, para 11).


another option of a non- binding resolution.32 All at once, the UK has been a willing proponent of the European Arrest Warrant, a major model of mutual recognition which the draft proposal on defence rights intends somewhat accompany with. As referred earlier, within the scope of the Lisbon, the United Kingdom has the choice of non-participation to the Title V instruments, together with instruments on criminal procedure. The situation is not apparent, but, in circumstances at which the UK has opted in or desires to become involved in prospect mutual recognition instruments, for example the European Arrest Warrant and its altering law post-Lisbon. But does not aspire to opt in criminal procedure measures, for example measure on defence rights which are considered essential to make possible this mutual recognition. Whilst the wording of the legislation specifies that the UK has the preference not to take part in, in case where the Government so desires, the political and rational impacts of this choice may be considerable. If the EU has enacted minimum principles on the defence rights and the UK has opted out this instrument, the feasibility of the function of the European Arrest Warrant in the UK may be critically raised as an issue (Mitsilegas; 63-64; paras 14-15). The degree of which the UK will desire to non-participation of vital initiatives in EU criminal law along with these intricacies needs to be to be observed. In the area of freedom, security and justice in which progressively more integration has been achieved, the approach of the UK which is "pick and choose" may confirm to a great extent difficult to maintain (Mitsilegas, 2008; 56).

4. EU's Criminal Competence within the Lisbon Treaty

As was the case in the Constitutional Treaty, according to the Lisbon Treaty, the EU will succeed the Community as a single legal personality and the pillars structure will be abolished (Mitsilegas, 2008; 166; Borgers and Kooijmans, 2008; 379-395; Yakut, 2010; 54-88). The Treaty of Lisbon was amended after the unsuccessful attempt to adopt the EU Constitution which clarified the requirements for comprehensive reform in the area of criminal law. The Lisbon Treaty reflected these requirements to a certain extent. It appears, however, that criminal law is considered still as a field that necessitates some safeguarded area for Member States (Yakut, 2008; 124-140; Fletcher, et al., 2008; 37).

32 See for details House of Lords European Union Committee, Breaking the Deadlock What Future for EU procedural Rights? 2nd Report, session 2006-07, HL Paper 20.


Article 2 C (2) enumerates criminal law as shared competence between the EU and Member States on the one hand. On the other hand, Declaration 36 annexed to the Treaty substantiates that Member States, can reach agreements with third states or international organisations in the area of police and criminal judicial cooperation to the extent that these agreements adhere to Union law (Craig, 2006;145-147). There is no question from the factual standpoint. However, it can be argued that this provision bestows freedom, security and justice matter to a certain extent equal to Community competency method as was in such areas internal market, environment, and transportation. It appears that discussion on whether criminal law competence of the EU is supranational or intergovernmental will not continue much longer, except for the special position of the U.K. in terms of establishing an area of freedom, security, and justice (Fletcher, et al., 2008; 37). Additionally, Title V itself also includes issue of supporting action in criminal matters, crime prevention Article 84 of the TFEU. But, crime prevention is not enlisted in the fields of supporting action envisaged in Article 6 of the TFEU.

Mutual recognition and harmonization is based on more solid ground with the new Lisbon Treaty (Fichera, 2009; 76; Treaty amending the TEU and the TEC, [2007] OJ C 306/1 0). This could lead to the view that the current ambiguity over the EU's criminal competence will be clarified (Mitsilegas, 2008; 166; Borgers and Kooijmans, 2008; 379-395). The EU's competence in the area of crimes and sanctions was explicitly enshrined as two competing mechanism by the Lisbon Treaty: mutual recognition and harmonization. As was mentioned before, mutual recognition which is considered as the cornerstone of criminal judicial cooperation did not have a clear foundation in a treaty so far (Yakut, 2008; 124-140). Article 61 (3) of the Lisbon Treaty recognizes the legal position of mutual recognition in criminal cooperation by emphasizing that 'the Union shall endeavor to ensure a high level of security through the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters and, if necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws.' (Lisbon Treaty, Article 61 (3)). This approach in the provision buttressed mutual recognition as a cornerstone of criminal cooperation, and harmonization is considered as a facilitator of functioning of mutual recognition. (Fletcher, et al., 2008; 37).

Provisions of the Lisbon Treaty made a clear differentiation between substantive criminal competence and criminal procedural matters. Article 69 A ofthe Lisbon Treaty addresses the criminal competence of the EU, while Article 69 B deals with substantive criminal competences (Fletcher, et al., 2008; 37).


4.1. Competence in Substantive Criminal Law

EU's standards in criminal competence of substantive criminal law are not a priori associated to mutual recognition. The standards envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty are based on a separation of criminal law into 'core' or 'traditional criminal law' and 'regulatory criminal law' (Fletcher, et al., 2008; 39). Regarding the core or traditional criminal law, Article 69 B (1) of the Lisbon Treaty addresses the substantive criminal law of the EU. The European Parliament and the Council were given to competence to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of serious trans-border criminal offences and sanctions by the Lizbon Treaty (Article 69B, replacing TEU, Article 31 ). The seriousness of these offences which have justified the need to have closer cooperation among the member states depends on the nature and impact of the crimes and a special need to combat them on a common basis. These areas of crimes are as follows: terrorism, trafficking in human being and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organized crime. Type of crimes can be broadened by the Council acting unanimously depending on acquiring the consent of the European Parliament on the basis of developments in offences (Article 69F (1) first indent).

Although the scope of competence relating to crimes and sanctions seems to be limited compared to the ECJ's interpretation in the two cases (Ship-Source Pollution Case and Environmental Crime Case), as was in the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty confers on the Union expanded clear criminal law competence empowering to establish minimum rules on sanctions without necessitating that member states adopt proportionate, effective and dissuasive penalties. Instead of empowering the Union with criminal competence to reach objectives and policies, the new Treaty delimits competence with exhaustive list of crimes on the grounds of seriousness, cross-border dimensions, impact or the requirement to combat on a trans-border basis. This categorical list of types of crimes can be broadened by unanimous decision by the Council (Article 69F (1) first indent; Mitsilegas, 2008; 167). These crimes are more numerous than the crimes enlisted within the existing TEU provisions and are subject to harmonization measures (Fichera, 2009; 76).

As regards the regulatory criminal law, Article 69 B (2) enshrines a self reliant legal basis for the harmonization of criminal law in regards to infringement of EU regulation in other policy areas (Fletcher, et al., 2008;


39). In the area of core criminal law, harmonization is intended by the provisions of Article 69 B (1) TFEU, as these crimes are especially serious and have a trans-border dimension. With respect to regulatory criminal law, whereas Article 69 B (2) bestows EU competence to harmonize the definition of crimes and sanctions, effective implementation of the Union policy can be ensured by this harmonization. This approach was developed upon controversies in relation to existing ambiguities on Community competencies in area of criminal law by judgments in two cases: environmental crimes and ship-source pollutions (Fletcher, et al., 2008; 183).

4.2. Competence in the Criminal Procedure

Article 69 A of the Lisbon Treaty laid down principles regarding competences of the EU in the area of criminal procedure. Article 69 A reflects a priority line between the principle of mutual recognition and harmonization by differentiating between the procedures envisaged for the cooperation of justice systems of Member States (Article 69 A (1)) and aspects of criminal procedure- so-called forensic criminal procedure- for special trials (Article 69 A (2); Fletcher, et al., 2008; 38). The Lisbon Treaty adopts significant amendments concerning the EU's competence over criminal procedure and clarifies existing vagueness over the existence and scope of such competence. As was discussed above, this ambiguity on criminal procedural competence appeared to have clear legal basis regarding the proposed Framework Decision on the Rights of the Defendant in criminal proceedings. Article 69E of the Lisbon Treaty explicitly empowers the Union to have competence to establish minimum rules regarding the admissibility of evidence between the member states, rights of individuals in criminal proceedings and rights of victims of offences and furthering admissibility of other new areas by a unanimous decision by the Council with the consent of European Parliament (Lisbon Treaty, Article 69E (2)). The EU' s competency on criminal procedure extends only to areas that require facilitating mutual recognition of judgments and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Instruments of criminal procedure and their effects on human right issues which may have tension between efficient operation of mutual recognition are foundation for judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU (Mitsilegas, 2008; 168).

Article 69 A (1) of the Lisbon Treaty envisages four fields of EU action in regard to judicial cooperation in criminal matters between the judicial systems of Member States: 'lay down rules and procedures for ensuring recognition throughout the Union of all forms of judgments and judicial


decisions'; 'preventing and conflicts of jurisdiction between the Member States'; 'support the training of the judiciary and judicial staff and, to facilitate cooperation between judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation to proceedings in criminal matters and the enforcement of decisions'.

As regards the areas enlisted by Article 69 A (2) of the Lisbon Treaty, EU action may require to harmonizing distinctive aspects of forensic criminal procedure to facilitate the functioning of mutual recognition in criminal matters. The following interventions are envisaged: 'mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States'; 'the rights of individuals in criminal procedure'; 'the rights of victims of crime'; and 'any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has identified in advance by a decision; for adoption of such a decision, the Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.'

A systematic approach reflected by the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty concerning EU's criminal competence enshrined explicitly the legal basis of mutual recognition, on the one hand. On the other hand, a dividing line established by these provisions- between the procedure to arrange coordination between the judicial system of Member States and the forensic penal proceedings- ensured a clarification in existing ambiguity of EU competency (Yakut, 2008; 124-140). The legal basis of the EU's criminal competence was curved with the aim of broader employment of the principle of mutual recognition. Therefore harmonization of criminal procedure is acceptable where mere mutual recognition of disparities among laws and procedures are not capable of satisfying the requirements of closer cooperation. This objective needs to be in line with ensuring satisfactory coordination on the one hand. On the other national characters of judicial systems of individual Member States ought to be respected by these efforts. However, it should be emphasized that in terms of ambiguity in tension between harmonization and mutual recognition, these provisions maintained this vagueness between these two criminal law mechanisms (Fletcher, et al., 2008; 38). Furthermore, Article 69 A (1) (b) furthered the EU's existing competence on preventing conflicts of jurisdiction to the points where EU has power to settle these conflicts (Fletcher, et al., 2008; 39).

5. Conclusion

The progress of the institutional structure on the third pillar reveals the tension among the initiation of EU instruments and the continuation of State


sovereignty in the criminal law area. In this scope, the initiation of the third pillar measure had been a slow and inefficient process, and the result of a set of difficult consensus accomplished in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. These consensus are transposed into a very intricate lawful context, bestowing Union powers in criminal law areas however consisting of several very important intergovernmental constituents: together with the maintenance of a divided pillar for EU measures in criminal law, these constituents are especially the efficient upholding of the unanimity in the Council which means that Member States have right to veto; the significant restrictions to the authority of the Court of Justice; the inefficient, though enhanced in Amsterdam third pillar measures; and the serious lack of democracy in the third pillar, underlined above all by the inadequate consultation function for the European Parliament.

Such deficiencies are not the mere restrictions on democratic and judicial control and responsibility in the third pillar. An overview of the appearance of EU acts in third pillar areas demonstrates a shift from harmonisation, and the compromise of EU laws and regulations, in course of actions of European integration in these areas progressively more by principle of mutual recognition, the instituting of EU organs for example Europol and Eurojust and the stress on operational co-operation and EU databases. These varieties of EU acts hold numerous tough intergovernmental aspects and raise several subject matters concerning democratic control, legitimacy and accountability, since these are mainly yielded from the inspection regulations that go together with the enactment of the principles of harmonisation instruments (Mitsilegas, in Martin; 34-43).

After came into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the institutional structure of the EU transformed radically. The third pillar abolished and EU instruments in criminal law principally "communitarised". This shift has the possibility to increase significantly the review of EU criminal legislation either by the European Parliament or the Court of Justice. Nevertheless, overview of the Lisbon constitutional provisions implicates that several intergovernmental features still continue in the area of EU criminal law. Specific consequence in this circumstance that Member States is established at the heart of legislation of the EU criminal law: the differences of criminal justice systems of Member States be obliged to be esteemed; Member States' governments maintain for the most part of the right to initiate the EU criminal legislation in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. The essential alterations to EU powers in criminal law areas necessitate unanimity in the Council; operational action is envisaged to continue mostly out of bounds for the European Parliament and the Court; and EU acts in


criminal law areas are strongly reviewed at the Member States rank either ex ante (especially by means of the subsidiarity controls by national parliaments) or ex post (via the assessment of the application of EU criminal legislation by Member States). It needs to be observed how this prominence on the Member States will have an implication on the enactment of EU criminal legislation post-Lisbon, in addition to legitimacy, transparency and accountability. In this scope, it is also notable that the EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters supposed to take the appearance of mutual recognition and EU criminal law bodies instead of harmonization in the Lisbon Treaty. The ECJ jurisprudence established on the first pillar, in accordance with which the selection of legal foundation for a instrument may not rely merely on an institute's discretion in respect of the purpose chased, however ought to be depend on objective dynamics which are subject to legality check.33 It may possibly further conflict with the ECJ's claim in the ne bis in idem circumstances that mutual confidence in Member States' criminal justice mechanisms already exists (Mitsilegas, 2008; 56).

As concerns the progressive evolution of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, it appears that a sui generis supranational criminal justice system has been emerging gradually within the EU law, with the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

As to the former EU competency in the area of criminal justice, the EU had competence over both cooperation and minimum levels of harmonisation in substantive criminal measures. In terms of procedural issues, it had implicit competences only where it was firmly essential for the operation of the principle of mutual recognition. This does not mean that former provisions explicitly allowed regulating procedural defence rights.

As regards the perspective of criminal policy via the CT, firstly, the CT would remove the ambiguity around EU competence in the field of criminal justice; in particular it would introduce minimum principles on defence rights. Secondly, it would officially establish mutual recognition at the heart of criminal justice cooperation, which was not spelled out in the TEU. This would be accompanied by EU competency in harmonisation of substantial criminal and procedural provisions concerning certain mutual recognition standards in core areas. However, both the Hague Programme and the

33 See for more information Case C-300/89, Commission v Council [1991], ECR1-2867.


Action Plan in terms of harmonisation and mutual recognition mostly influenced by the sprit of the CT.

However, the Lisbon Treaty maintains the idea that the border between the Member States is the boundaries of jurisdiction and court decisions being designed to have legal consequences within the jurisdiction of different Member States (notwithstanding the basic human rights concern). The free movement of criminal judgments is allowed without free movements of safeguards for human rights across the Union. This means that there is no supranational protection of procedural rights of defence in the context of the mutual recognition principle within the Lisbon Treaty, though there will be significant improvement in case where EU will be party to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Lisbon Treaty provisions regarding criminal judicial cooperation were reshaped in light of the Constitutional Treaty in order to empower a clear EU criminal competence to ensure measures for procedural rights of the defence.

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MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES • Volume 17 • No:1- 2 • 2009 53

AN ANALYSIS ON THE EC COMMISSION'S PROGRESS REPORTS REGARDING TO THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

AND TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EU

Kerem BATIR*

Abstract:

The aim of this study is to evaluate Turkey's reform process within the framework of EU accession negotiations with a major focus on freedom of expression. It is argued that EU membership has become a major incentive for Turkish reforms and this includes legislative changes with regard to freedom of expression as well. The extent that Turkey has succeeded to adopt political and social rights generally shared within the EU is analyzed in this study by examining EU progress reports along with official documents on Turkey's progress in reform implementation. A brief overview of cases will serve to a better understanding of the improvements in freedom of expression. The study ends by concluding that EU has become an external force for Turkish political reforms and those changes have become more obvious especially since the opening up of accession negotiations in 2005.

Keywords: Human Rights, Freedom of Expression, Accession Process, Progress Reports.

Ozet:

Bu t;ah$manm amacz Tiirkiye'nin AB Katzhm Miizakereleri t;ert;evesinde Turkiye'nin reform siirecini ifade ozgiirliigiinii adak noktasz olarak alarak degerlendirmektir. AB iiyeliginin Tiirkiye'nin gert;ekle-$tirdigi reformlar it;in onemli bir saik haline geldigi ve ozellikle ifade ozgiirliigu konusundaki yasal degi-$ikliklerin de bu kapsamda yaplldzgz iddia edilmektedir. Tiirkiye'nin reformlarz uygulamadaki ba-$arlSl konusunda diger resmi

• Assist. Prof. Dr., <;anakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Biga Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations.

54 AN ANALYSIS ON THE PROGRESS REPORTS

belgeler yamnda AB ilerleme raporlanm inceleyerek Turkiye'nin gene! olarak AB tarafindan payla$zlan siyasi ve sosyal haklarm kabuliinde hangi ok;ude ba$arTll oldugunu incelenmeye r;alz$Zlml$flr. Bazz davalar hakkznda gene! bilgiler vermek ifade ozgurliigu konusundaki geli$melerin daha iyi anla$zlmasma yardzmcz olacagz da dii$iinulmii$fiir. 9alz$ma AB'nin Turk Siyasi reform/an ir;in dz$sal bir gur; haline geldigi ve bu degi$ikliklerin 2005 yzlmda muzakerelerin ar;zlmaszndan bu yana daha gaze r;arpmakta oldugu sonucuna varmaktadzr.

Anahtar Kelimeler: insan Haklan, /fade Ozgurliigu, Katzlzm Sureci, ilerleme Raporlarz

Introduction

The founding treaties of the European Communities (EC) did not make any explicit references to human rights especially to the freedom of expression. This results primarily from the fact that the central motivation of the EC was economic, rather than political. The aim of the founding members was to establish a common market by eliminating all kinds of physical, technical and fiscal barriers to trade, facilitating the free flow of capital and labor, and establishing an economic and monetary union. To that end, the key strategy used to foster the process of economic integration was to harmonize divergent economic policies of the EU member states. This meant changing national legislations concerning socioeconomic issues by a number ofEU regulations, directives and decisions (Cini, 2003).

However, since then, the economic integration within Europe has achieved a much higher degree than was conceivable in the 1950's. The harmonization of economic policies and the pooling out sovereignty to different levels of governance have had a significant impact on citizens which created, in tum, the need for considering social and political aspects of integration as well. As a result, human rights have become important topics of the EU agenda. This includes sustainability of democratic institutions, ensuring equality, the rule of law, social justice and guaranteeing human rights. It is safe to argue that over the years the EU has succeeded in creating certain political and social standards shared by all member states.

Meanwhile, Human Rights have become foreign policy tools of the European Union. Especially since the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 the European Union has set conditions for countries aspiring for the EU membership. As regards political conditions, candidate countries are


expected to fully ensure individual rights such as human rights, protection of minorities, democratic governance, freedom of expression and freedom of association in order to join the EU. The same standards apply to Turkey which has been a candidate of the EU since 1999 Helsinki Summit. After the granting of an official candidate status in 1999, Turkey initiated a reform process whereby a number of legislative amendments were made to comply with the European principle (Kubicek, 2005; Gunter, 2007).

Progress reports (referred to originally as Progress Reports and later as Regular Reports) are the instruments used by EC Commission in order to analyze annually whether, with respect to Copenhagen Criteria, reforms had been implemented. The first progress reports were released in 1998 after the beginning of official negotiations with Central and Eastern Europe Countries. For Turkey the first Progress Report was released in 1998, even before the announcement of her official candidacy. The accession negotiations of Turkey were started seven years after the first progress report.

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression is a keystone of democratic rights and freedoms in a democratic society. It is one of the basic conditions for society's progress and for the development of every person. The right to freedom of expression upholds the rights of all to express their views and opinions freely. In European level the Freedom of expression is secured by the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Convention states that:

'Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without inteiference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. '

The freedom of expression can be restricted by individual governments in some extraordinary situations if this kind of restriction has already been prescribed by law and is crucial in a society governed by democratic principles. Article 10 of the Convention continues that:

The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of


disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has often recalled that freedom of expression constitutes one of the most essential foundations of a democratic society and basic conditions for individuals' self-fulfilment. It is an essentiall right which should be promoted and protected to a maximum extent given its critical role in democracy and public participation in political life. So the protection of this right is crucial for the society and as European Court of Human Rights stated " every "formality", "condition", "restriction" or "penalty" imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' (ECHR Handyside Judgment,1976)

At early stages, the freedom of expression was deemed to guarantee effective political and social debate essential for the proper operation of any democratic system. However the freedom of expression has evolved into a more individual freedom that permits individuals to freely communicate between each other to send or receive information. So the freedom of expression extends beyond the political dimension and covers areas like science, literature, theather, the arts, and even pornography.

Freedom of Expression in the European Union (EU)

The founding treaties did not consist of any explicit reference to human rights and freedom of expression was never mentioned. Nevertheless, with the Single European Act ( 1987), the European Community made a significant move towards the enhancement of the fundamental rights of the Community citizens. The EC states declare in the preamble that:

'Members are determined to work together to promote the democracy on the basis of the fUndamental rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and fUndamental rights and the European Social Charter'

In the field of external relations, the Community points to its commitment to fundamental norms and values set out by the United Nations and declares that it will respect and these principles in its relations with third countries. The EC members state that they are:

'( .. .)aware of the responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever increasingly with one voice and to act with consistent solidarity in order to more effectively protect its common interests and independence, in particular to display the

MARMARA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

principles of democracy and in compliance with the law and with human rights to which they are attached so that together they make their own contributions to the preservation of international peace and security, in accordance with the undertaking entered into by them within the framework of the United Nations Charter'

57

In 1991, the EC member states signed the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) agreed on the establishment of the European Union. With the TEU, the EU drew attention to the: 'the importance of systems of government founded on principles of democracy, respect for fundamental rights, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.' Later with the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU members amended this article and stated that ECHR would become the fundamental source of the Union's human rights principles. Article 6 amended by the Amsterdam Treaty states that:

'I. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.

2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November I950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law(. . .)'

As the EU growed in numbers of the Member States, the Union payed much more attention to the Human Rights. First, the provisions regarding to human rights wer inserted into EU Constitution. After the failure of the ratification process the efforts were focused to a new treaty. By Lisbon treaty the above metioned Article 6 was amended and now it states that:

I. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on I2 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.

The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.

The rights; freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.


2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties.

3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles ofthe Union's law.

Lisbon treaty is a major step for protection of human rights inside the Union. The Charter of Fundamental Rights lists political, social, and economic rights for EU citizens. Under the provisions quoted herein above, the Charter is legally binding (except for those member states with an optout for this provision i.e. the United Kingdom and Poland). The Charter is intended to make sure that, EU legislations should not contradict the European Convention on Human Rights which is ratified by all EU Member States and now, to which the EU as a whole has acceded under the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union elevated the Charter to the same legal value as the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Besides, there are other legal sources of the EU's human rights other than the Community Law. For instance, throughout the European integration, decisions made by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have become important reference points for the enhancement of the legal foundation of human rights in the EU. In many instances, the ECJ has pointed out that legislation of individual member states along with the international treaties that member states have ratified form the basis of the EU's human rights policies. Particularly important is the European Convention on Human Rights and the various articles related to fundamental freedom of individuals. In many cases, the ECJ have made references to the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and decisions were taken accordingly.

For example in Bernard Connolly vs. Commission' the ECJ found an infringement of freedom of expression and ruled in reference to article 10 of ECHR. In this case, Mr. Connolly is dismissed from his post at the Commission on the grounds that he published a book criticizing in a harsh

1 Connolly v. Commission, C-274/99, Judgment of the Court of6 March 2001, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61999J0274:EN:HTML


way the policies of the economic and monetary integration. Although he obtained the documents used during the writing process without having asked for the permission of the institutions, the ECJ decided on the infringement of the freedom of expression which it identified as one of basic freedoms of a democratic society. ECJ stated that:

"Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, whose observance the Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights has special significance in that respect. Those principles have been restated in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union. "

The EU has a separate judiciary body, however for the cases regarding to human rights issues the EU and her court ECJ strictly bound themselves to the Council of Europe's Convention and her court ECHR.

EU Accession and Freedom of Expression in Turkey

The EU has played a significant role in initiating political changes on a continent that had for centuries characterized by violent clashes and wars. This includes both economic development and harmonization of divergent political and social policies to foster integration. The improvements achieved since the beginning of the European integartion are noteworthy. Over the years Europeans have made important steps so that human rights including the freedom of expression are fully respected by all member states. The same applies to candidate countries waiting for EU accession. The main instrument used by the EU to stimulate political change in candidate countries is its conditionality meaning that EU offers membership (carrot) on the condition that the candidate country fully respects the same political standards shared by the member states. If the candidate country follows the path, accession is finalized (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003).

Consequently, the EU has become an important catalyst for political change in candidate countries. The same is true for Turkey which is since 1999 Helsinki Summit an official candidate aspiring to become a full member of the EU. During Helsinki, the EU declared that in order to start with accession negotiations, Turkey has to fulfil some conditions that are applicable for all countries wishing to join the EU:


'Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accessionwith particular reference to the issue of human rights (Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999).'

Since then, Turkey has initiated a reform process in order to comply with the criteria set by the EU at the Copenhagen Summit of 1993. This process intensified during and after the initiation of accession negotiations in 2005. The reform package includes both economic and political reforms including provisions related to the freedom of expression (Ba~, 2005). As noted above, the freedom of expression is one of the essential elements of a pluralist liberal democratic society; therefore legislative changes in this area constitute a significant part of Turkey's accession negotiations. In Turkey, freedom of expression is guaranteed by both domestic laws and international treaties. Since the start of legislative amendments on 3 October 2001, freedom of expression in Turkey was regulated by the Article 26 issued of the 1982 Constitution. Article 26 states that:

"Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his thought and opinion by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or collectively. This right includes the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas without interference from official authorities. This provision does not preclude subjecting transmission by radio, television, cinema, and similar means to a system of licensing. The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the purposes of preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly classified as a State Secret, protecting the reputation and rights and the private and family life of others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the proper fUnctioning of the judiciary.

No language prohibited by law may be used in the expression and dissemination of thought. Any written or printed documents, phonograph records, magnetic or video tapes, and other means of expression used in contravention of this provision shall be seized by a duly issued decision of judge or, in cases where delay is deemed prejudicial, by the competent authority designated by law. The authority issuing the seizure order shall notifY the competent judge of its decision within twenty-four hours. The judge shall decide on the matter within three days.

Provisions regulating the use of means of disseminating information and ideas shall not be interpreted as a restriction of the


freedom of expression and dissemination unless they prevent the dissemination of information and thoughts" (unofficial translation by Erhan Ya$ar).

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Hakyemez and Akgiin (2002) argue that because the aim of the 1982 Constitution was to defend the Republic against individuals and groups, it reflected some authoritarian elements putting restrictions on individual freedoms. Article 13 states that:

Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, with the aim of safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, general peace, the public interest, public morals and public health, and also for specific reasons set forth in the relevant articles of the Constitution ... The general grounds for restriction set forth in this article shall apply for all fundamental rights and freedoms (cited in Hakyemez and Akgiin, 2002).

During the 1980's and 1990's, prosecutors as well as judges put restrictions on the freedom of expression on the basis of Article 13. When interpreting cases brought under Article 26, fundamental rights were restricted in order to protect the state from individuals that could constitute a danger to the Republic. However with the initiation of reforms in October 2001 a number changes were made relating to the fundamental freedoms. This included the extention of the scope of social and economic rights such as personal liberty and security, freedom of association, secrecy of communications, freedom of residence and freedom, the right to work, the right to form labour unions and the right to an equitable wage. In total 34 Articles were amended including Article 13. With the amendment, the general grounds for restrictions on fundamental rights were deleted. The new Article 13 states that:

"Fundamental rights and liberties may be restricted only by law and solely on the basis of the reasons stated in the relevant articles of the constitution without impinging upon their essence. These restrictions shall not coriflict with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, the requirements of democratic social order and the secular Republic, and the principle of proportionality" (cited in Ozbudun, 2007).

The 2001 amendments brought changes to Article 26 as well. With the 2001 amendment, the wording language prohibited by law' was removed from the text. Likewise, as regards Article 176, Grand National Assembly replaced the phrase 'thoughts and opinions' by the word 'activity'. The amended Article 176 reads as follows: "(N)o protection shall be afforded to


thoughts and opmwns contrary to Turkish national interests, the indivisibility of the State with its territory and nation, Turkish historical and moral values; Atatiirk 's nationalism, his principles, reforms, and modernism. "

A significant improvent was the amendement of Article 90 of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic in 2004 which states that with the ratification of international treaties by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, international legislation takes precedence over Turkish domestic law. Turkish courts have so far made a number of decisions referring in an explicit way to specific provisions of treaties and protocols signed within the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights. Meanwhile, Turkey makes several legal amendments, including the abolishment of certain provisions such as the death penalty, in order to become eligible for EU membership.2 Since the opening up of negotiations with the EU in 2005, Turkey has initiated a comprehensive reform process, whereby a wide range of laws related to fundamental freedoms and human rights have been amended.

An Examination of Freedom of Expression in EC Progress Reports on Turkey

Turkey's success to comply with the Copenhagen criteria is examined by EU institutions and accordingly the European Commission prepares Progress Reports indicating the development in areas including political and social rights. The Commission has so far issued ten annual reports on Turkey's progress in reforms. These reports are based on information provided by Turkish authorities, the European Parliament, Council of Europe, international organizations and various non-governmental organizations (EC Commission, 1998).

In its Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards EU Accession issued in 1998, the European Commission pointed to several problems with regard to freedom of expression and criticized Turkey by noting that:

'(. . .)freedom of expression is not fully assured in Turkey. An excessively narrow interpretation of the Constitution and

2 For a complete analysis of the changes in the form of legislative reform packages please read Ercument Tezcan, "Tfukiye'nin Kopenhag Siyasi Kriterlerine Uyumu Sfuecinde Yap1lan ve Yap1lmas1 Gereken Yasal Degi~iklikler Ozerine Bir Degerlendirme" (An Analysis on the Legal Changes Enacted in the Turkey's Harmonization Process to the Copenhagen Political Criterion) Marmara Journal of European Studies, Vol:ll, No:l-2, 2003:59-96.


other legal provisions (Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, Articles 158, 159, 311 and 312 of the Criminal Code) concerning the unity of the state, territorial integrity, secularism and respect for formal institutions of the state is regularly used to charge and sentence elected politicians, journalists, writers, trade unionists or NGO workers for statements, public speeches, published articles or books that would be acceptable in EU Member States'

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In its 1999 Progress Report the Commission refered to the worsening of the freedom of expression in Turkey especially after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan during the same year. Special attention is paid to communique issued by the Minister of Justice that urges Turkish Governors to identify individuals, associations, foundations, piblications and organisations that tend to behave in favour of Ocalan. In this changing political scene in Turkey, sentences related to the abuse of freedom of expression were raised. A significant step was made as President Suleyman Demirel agreed on a law that ensivaged the postponement of prosecutions and punishments for offences made via press and broadcasting. With this law, sentences can be postponed for a three-year period and if persons in question commit the same offence during three years, the original sentence is to be applied. However, the Commission criticizes the situation of journalists who are already in prison for having been charged with belonging to an illegal organization. Cases mentioned in the report are that of Akin Birdal and the NGO TOSA V that was charged with having made speratist propaganda. During 1999, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in eleven cases that Turkey had infringed the freedom of expression ensured by the ECHR. This included cases concerning the freedom of press which, in the eyes of the European Commission, has shown no real progress (EC Commission, 1999).

The 2000 Progress Report was less than promising. Besides reiterating the various cases that violated the freedom of expression in Turkey, the Commission noted that Turkish courts particularly restrict the freedom of expression regarding views about the situation of the Kurdish people. Calling on Turkey to find long-lasting solutions to end further infringements, the Commission urged Turkish courts to respect the ECHR and restrict the freedom of expression only in situtions causing violence. Regarding the Turkish media, the European Commission paid particular attention to the High Board of Radio and Television (RTUK). The progress report criticized the suspension of the broadcasting activities of various television and radio stations by R TOK and urged Turkey to improve the situation through legal amendments (EC Commission, 2000).


In its report in 2001, the Commsision criticized the widespread usage of the Article 159 of the Penal Code in restrictions on the freedom of expression. This encompasses mainly insults to the Turkish Parliament, Turkish Army, the Turkish Republic and the Turkish judiciary. Moreover, the Commission called for the amendment of Article 312 used to charge individuals for inciment to racial, ethnic and religious hostilities. Particular attention was paid to various cases where judges restrict the freedom of speech by referring to Article 7 and 8 of the anti-terrorist law (disseminating separatist propaganda). Constitutional amendments particularly with regard to Articles 13 and 14 as well as Articles 22, 26 and 28 are appreciated while noting that further changes were necessary to fully ensure the scope of freedom of expression. The Commission welcomed the the decisions on the abolishment of provisions that prohibited the use of languages other than Turkish. Another important development was the abolishment of the provising that had long prohibited the publications made in certain languages (EC Commission, 2001 ).

Meanwhile, the European Commission pointed to the high number of infringements of the freedom of expression in Turkey. One important case in this regard was the prosecution of sixteen journalists for the re-production of articles in a book on freedom of thought. Also, the Commission expressed its concern about the imprisonment of eighty journalists in 2001 for political moves or alleged violation of Turkish laws. These include charges of insulting the judiciary and the Republic; as well as of disseminating separatist propaganda and portraying the Republic in a 'state of weakness.' The Commission stated that though legislative changes are promising, more legal amendments are necessary. It also urged Turkish courts to implement the newly adopted legislation in concrete cases and guarantee the respect for the freedom of press. As for the situation of broadcasting, the report pointed to a law adopted by the Turkish Parliament in 2001 which forsaw the nomination to the High Audio-Visual Board of a member by the National Security Council. The Commission made it clear that the practice of such legislation contradict EU standars and would highly restrict the freedom of expression in Turkey.

In 2002, the Commission progress report on the situation of the freedom of expression in Turkey is very rich in scope. Turkey's adoption of three reform packages was highly appreciated by the European Commission. Particular emphasis was paid to the amendment of various articles to ensure the full implementation of the freedom of expression in Turkey. This includes amendment of Article 159 (insults to the State and to State insitutitons and views threatening the indivisibile unity of the Turkish


Republic) which decreased prsion sentences from six to three years imprisonment. This amendment also removed fines imposed on individuals expressing critical views about Turkish laws. With the amendment of Article 159, individuals criticizing Turkish institutions would no long be charged unless their aim is to 'insult' or 'deride' them. The Commission also welcomed the amendment of dthe escription of Article 312 (incitement to hatred on the basis of differences of social class, race, religion, sect or region). With the newly revised description, only activities that constitute a threat to the public order would be subject to charges. Moreover, the report pointed a number of improvements regarding the reduction of prison sentences for offences in general and the shortening of bans on television and radiobroadcasting (EC Commission, 2002).

However, the Commission declared its dissatisfaction with the result achieved in reality. While appreciating legislative developments in the form of both reform packages and specific provision amendments, the Commission observed an inconsistency between legal changes and the implementation in concrete cases. For instance, specific emphasis has been placed on the tendency to use articles (other than the amended ones) of the Constitution to bring cases with regard to the freedom of expression. An example is the frequent usage of Article 169 of the Turkish Penal Code (support of illegal organizations) which was commonly used by judges in 2002. The Commission criticized the banning of several books and periodicals as well as cenure on films on the ground of incitement to state institutions. 3

With regard to the freedom of the press and broadcasting, the progress report of 2002 welcomed legal amendments and reform packages adopted to improve freedom of expression in Turkey4

. However, the Commission

3 According to a report published by the Association of Turkish Editors on 25 May 2002, 40 books were banned or subject to investigation in the first half of 2002 alone. In the same years, a film called Big Man, Small Love, was banned on the grounds that the depiction of police brutality in the film offended police officers.

4 In the area of freedom of press, the first reform package amended Article 8 of the Anti-Terror law increasing fines imposed on publishers charged with making terrorist propaganda. The second reform package reduced the maximum suspension of publishing companies as well as the maximum length of imprisonment for the ones who continue to publish during suspension periods. The third reform package chaged the Press Law replacing prison stences with heavy fines. As regards freedom of broadcasting, the first reform package reduced the maximum closure period for radio and TV channels found guily of making propaganda against !he


pointed out that despite significant changes legislative changes, the Turkish Press Law still constitutes a significant obstacle towards the ensurement of freedom of press and dissemination of thought. In this regard, the progress report criticized the widespread use of Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terror Law and Articles 159 and 169 of the Turkish Penal Code to put restrictions on members of press corporations. The Commission demonstrated its dissatisfaction with the censorship intrduced by RTUK on freedom of expression. This includes restrictions on the Internet content and charges in the use of 'offensive language, libel, obscenity, incitement to separatism, or for the broadcasting of programmes in Kurdish. ' 5

The 2003 Progress Report contained several encouraging views as regards developments in the area of freedom of expression in Turkey. The Commission welcomed the abolishment of various restrictions as well as the release of prisioners found guilty for opinions that were considered as nonviolent. Among the positive developments in 2003 was the abolishment of the Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state) within the framework of the sixth reform package. The Commission stated that the reduction of the minimum sentence under Article 159 of the Penal Co<!_e (insulting the state and state institutions and threats to the indivisibte~ unitfor the Turkish Republic) from one year to six months was an important step towards the ensurment of the freedom of speech. Thanks to this amendment, expression of views aimed to criticize and not aimed to 'insult' or 'deride' state institutions were no longer charged with prison sentences or fines. Another significant improvement was the narrowing of the scope of Article 169 of the Penal Code (aiding and abetting terrorist organizations) through repealing the pro vi son that had often used to sanction 'actions which facilitated the operation of terrorist organisations in any manner whatsoever.' Likewise, the seventh package amended Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law by putting 'resorting to violence or other terrorist means' instead of using 'terorist methods' as a cause for charging individuals for making propadanda of a terrorist oganization. Accordingly, prison sentences for such crimes remained the same wheras

indivisibile unity of the Turkish Republic to seven days instead of fifteen days. The third reform package amended the RTOK law enabling broadcasting in languages other than Turkish as well as different dialects used by Turkish citizens. The amendment points out that broadcasts are subject to restrictions if activities threaten the unity of the State.

5 Examples of censorship by RTUK include closure of CNN Turk for a day in April 20~2 and Gun TV for the whole year.


fines were increased. As regards broadcasting, the 2003 progress report welcomed efforts to eliminate previous actions aimed at banning and suspending works. With the sixth reform package, only works considered to 'undermine the fundamental principles of the Republic the indivisible integrity of the state' were covered by the legislation. (EC Commission, 2003)

The Commission welcomed these developments considering them as significant movements towards the strengthening of the freedom of expression in Turkey. Yet, it also pointed to the need for further legal amendments. It also drew attention to the existing gap between legislative changes and daily practice. The Commision expressed its concern about the tendency among Turkish prosecutors to rely on alternative provisions to restrict the freedom of expression including Articles 312 and 169 of the Penal Code and the Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law. The progress report also urged judges and prosecutors to make consistent interpretations and implementation of the legislation improved in the reform process. As regards the freedom of press, the Commission expressed an explicit concern about the slow pace ofreforms.6

At the same time, the progress report criticized the failure of the Turkish Authorities to implement legislative changes in concrete cases. Here, the Commission obsevered a lack of consistency between reform adoption and reform implementation. It criticized heavy penalties and imprisonement of several journalists, authors and publishers found guily for expressing critical views about state institutions and policies as well as elimination of publications and technical equipments and censorship on publishing houses and the internet. The Commission also emphasized the expectation from Turkey to put reforms allowing the use of other languages other than Turkish into practice. 7

6 In 2003, Turkey made a number of legislative amendments related to the freedom of press. For instance, the fourth reform package introduced a provision preventing authoritites to force periodicals, editors and writers to explain theie sources. The seventh reform package amended Law 765 and excluded scientific and artistic works from the scope of the relevant legal provisions that had long prohibited publications based on moral arguments. 7

In 2002, Turkey introduced an amendment opening up a possibility to broadcast in languages and dialects used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. Yet, this kind of broadcasting could only be done in TRT (the public broadcaster of Turkey). In the 2003 Turkey adopted a new legislation within the sixth reform package allowing private stations, in addition to TRT to broadcast in languages other than


The 2004 progress report on Turkey's reform process within the framework of EU accession welcomes the diminishing number of prosecutions and convictions in cases relating to the freedom of expression. Amendments to the Ant-Terror Law and the Press Law were appreciated as well as the beginning of broadcasting in laguages and dialects used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. Special emphasis was paid to the reducing number of cases as regards Articles 159 (insulting the state and the state institutions) 169 (adding and abetting terrorist organizations) and 312 of the Penal Code (incitement to racial, ethnic or religious enmity) as well as Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law (propaganda in connection with the (terrorist) organisation in a way that encourages the resort to violence or other terrorist means). A significant development in 2004 was the acquittal of all persons convicted under the amended Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state and the shortening of prison sentences with the changes made to Articler 159.8 The 2004 progress report also welcomed the tendency in judgements to make references to Artcile 10 of the ECHR and the acquittals made accordingly describing it a significant move towards the ensurement of freedom of expression (EC Commission, 2004).

With regard to the freedom of press, the Commission declared its satisfaction with the degree of progress made by legal amendments. For instance, it was decided that Article 30 would no longer be used for the seizure of printing equipments of publishers found guilty for their expressions. An important step was the adoption of the new Press Law in June 2004 which strengthened the right of journalists not to reveal their sources and reinforced the right to reply and correction. Further improvement made with the Press Law was the replacement of prison sentences with fines and the removal of sanctions in the form of closing publications, stopping their distribution and seizure of publishing equipment. The Commission also welcomed the first broadcasts in Bosnian,

Turkish. However, the progress report in 2003 states that despite these legislative developments, no broadcasts have so far been made in languages and dialects other than Turkish.

8 The report mentions that the official figures indicated that as of April 2004, 204 persons were acquitted thanks to the legislative amendments made by the State Security Courts. As of May 2004, 5 809 persons were detained for terrorism related crimes, an almost 35% decrease when compared to 2000,2001, and an almost 10% decrease when compared to 2002.


Arabic, Circasian and the Kurdish dialects of Kirmanci and Zaza in June 2004.

As in previous cases, the progress report expressed critical opinions about the real implementation of legislative reforms. Prosecution and conviction of persons on the basis of amended articles of the Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law were stil widespread in 2004 and prosecuters still charged persons expressing non-violent opinions by relying on alternative provisions. This includes the revised Article 159 in cases where individuals make ciritical opinions about state institutions including religious staff criticizing the state and those expressing opinions leading to the discouragement of people from military service. The Commission urged Turkey to accelarate the reform process and make amendments so that Turkish legislation could be in accordance with Article 10 of the ECHR. It also asked Turkey to ensure the dircet effect of the ECHR and its judgements in the interpretation of domestic legislation. The progress report also criticized the heavy fines imposed on press corporations at both local and regional levels and the still widespread banning ofpublications.9

With the 2005 progress report on Turkey, the Commission welcomed reforms within the area of freedom of expression. Relying reports provided by Turkish Authorities and various NGO's as regards restrictions on freedom of expression, the Commission pointed to the diminishing number of cases and prosecutions and encouraged Turkey to make further amendments. It emphasized the importance of a number of amendments towards the reinforcement of freedom of expression in Turkey including the narrowing of the scope of Article 125 and the abolishment of Article 305 (offences against fundamental national interests). Likewise, the progress report points that publications related to Kurdish and Armenian issue were easier in 2005 than previous ages and as Turkish Publishers Association acknowledge authors and publishers found guilty for such offences were more likely to be released in the same year. The Commission also expressed its support for the positive developments achieved after the adoption of the new Press Law and the new Criminal Code. Based on figures provided by the Turkish Press Council in 2005, there were no journalists in prison because of the nature of their works (EC Commission, 2005).

9 According to figures by the Turkish Publishers Association 18 books were banned

in the first half of 2004. In 2003 a total number of 43 books were banned and also 54 persons were found guilty for their opinions.


On the other hand, the progress report expressed strong concern about the broad usage of Article 301 of the new Criminal Code, formerly Article 159 (insulting the State and State institutions). The Commission criticize that in 2004 this provision was frequnetly used to charge individuals for expression of their views. Article 301 encompasses the following:

"-A person who explicitly insults being a Turk, the Republic or Turkish Grand National Assembly, shall be imposed a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to three years.

- A person who explicitly insults the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial bodies of the State, the military or security organisation shall be imposed a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to two years.

- Where insulting being a Turk is committed by a Turkish citizen in a foreign country, the penalty to be imposed shall be increased by one third.

- Expression of opinions with the purpose of criticism does not require penalties. "

The provision attracted substatial criticism because of its widespread usage for prosecuting writers and journalists. The author was charged under Article 301 being found guilty for insulting Turkishness with his description of 1915 events as a massacre of Armenians. Likewise, the same article was used in a case taken against a well-known journalist Hrant Dink for insulting Turkish identity and he was sentenced to six-month imprisonement. In September 2005, Emin Karaca was charged under Article 301 for expressing critical views about the past activities of the Turkish military. His five month prision sentence was replaced by a fine. Ragip Zarakolu was also found guilty for publishing his opinions about the Kurdish and the Armenian topics. Considering all these cases, the Commission urges Turkey to bring cases only in situations leading to violence, rebellion or enmity among the public. It also encourages the interpretation of domestic legislation in accordance with Article 10 of the ECHR. As regards broadcasting, the progress report points to the limited progress achieved in 2005 and inadequate number of programs in languages and dialects other than Turkish. It also criticized the intervention of RTOK in broadcasting through cancellation or suspension of programs.

The 2006 progress report starts with the welcoming of a circular issued by the Turkish Ministry of Justice calling on prosecutors to explicity refer to European Convention on Human Rights when interpreting cases in the area of freedom of expression. This circular also foresaw the monthly monitoring of criminal investigations and cases against the mass media. The progress


report also pointed that the broadcasts in languages other than Turkish became easier than the years. Nevertheless, the Commission was still critical about the high number of cases brought against non-violnet expression of opinions. It paid special attention to the Article 301 which was widely used to prosecute journalists, writers, publishers, academics and human rights activists found gulity of insulting Turkishness, the Turkish Republic and its institutions although the intent was not to create violent actions that could constitute a threat to public order and security. This includes the confirmation of the six-month prison sentence for the journalist Hrant Dink for insulting Turkishness in his article on the Armenian identity. The Commission urged Turkish authorities to make necessary amendments to Article 301 so that legal provision would be in accordance with European standards. It also expressed its concern about the Anti-Terror Law and its usage against non-violent expressions. The Commission stated that the definition of the crimes in Anti-Terror Law were not in line with the Concil of Europe Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism and that: "(f)reedom of the press and media could be undermined by provisions allowing the suspension of periodicals and introducing the liability of chief editors and of press and media owners for publishing terrorist propaganda or praise in press or media organs. " This includes the arrest and detention of Fiisun Erdogan (Ozgiir Radyo) and 22 other journalists; 5 from Atilim newspaper, 5 from Ozgiir Halk and Gen<; Bak:J.~, 2 from Odak Newspaper and 10 other journalists (EC Commission, 2006).

However when compared to previous reports, the 2006 progress report was much more positive as regards the Commission's evaluation about improvements in the area of freedom of expression in Turkey. Though there was still criticism about the limited consistency between reforms and law implementation in daily practice, the Commission welcomed the dimishing number of cases as well as of the arrest and detention of journalists, writers and publishers for expression of individual opinions.

The 2007 progress report was very critical in nature although it points to a number of improvements related to the freedom of expression in Turkey. The Commission welcomed the open discussion of various topics which had previously been regarded as sensitive issues by the Turkish society. However, the report particularly emphasized the raising number of prosecutions under Article 301. A1gan argues that Article 301 makes no contribution to the broadening of freedom of expression in Turkey. Because the replacement of the word 'Turkishness' by the term 'Turkish Nation' with the 2008 amendment created no changes in the content of the Article 301, it is still too broad in scope and prosecuters could still use it to bring


cases against persons expressing their views on a wide range of topics on Turkey. The same applies to lack of difference between the terms 'Republic' and 'the State of the Turkish Republic.' Here again, no significant change has been made to remove restrictions on freedom of expression. 10

It pointed to some cases that raised concerns about Turkey's compliance with European standards of freedom of expression. The suspension of publication of the weekly newspaper Nokta which published a wide range of articles on Turkish military is one example mentined in 2007 progress report on Turkey. Particulary important was the case brought against Professor Baskm Oran and Professor i:brahim Ozden Kaboglu who were charged with 'inciting hatred and hostility' in their discussion of 'citizenship in Turkey' in which they urged Turkey to recognize Kurds as a distinct minority. Their acquittal in May 2007 was a positive improvement towards the enchancement of freedom of expression in Turkey, though their acquittal was overturned by the Court of Appeal in September 2007 (EC Commission, 2007). In short, the Commission was not totally satisfied with Turkey's success in complying with European standards. However, when compared to previous years an examination of 2007 progress report illustrates the gradual progress achieved in reforms and their implementation in daily practice. Despite critical points, a new era opened in Turkey's reform process towards EU accession beginning with 2006 and 2007.

The 2008 progress report provides further evidence on Turkey's progress towards the strengthening of freedom of expression and the Commission's positive evaluations about a wide range of improvements.

In 2009, Commission's views about the freedom of expression in Turkey start with a positive development. The Commission noted that the amendment of Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code led a "significant decline" in prosecutions compared with the previous years. 11 According to

1° For a detailed analysis on Amendment of Article 301 and Freedom of Speech Cases in Turkey please read, Algan, B. (2008) 'The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression Cases in Turkey' German Law Journal, 9 (12): 2237-2252. 11 After the amendment a permission from the Minister of Justice is required to launch a criminal investigation on the basis of Article 301. According to the figures given in the Progress Report, the Minister of Justice authorized only 8% of the pending cases referred to him.


the Commission Article 301 is no longer used systematically to restrict freedom of expression. Apart from this improvement the Commission believes that the Turkish legal framework still fails to provide sufficient guarantees for exercising freedom of expression. On the whole Commission expresses her concern about the increase of open and free debate in Turkish Society (EC Commission, 2009)

Conclusion

In the first Progress Report the Commission clearly stated that freedom of expression was not fully assured in Turkey. Up until now, the Commission released 12 Progress Reports and stsrting from 2002 Progress Report the critics on the freedom of speech began including progress in the area. At the beginning the main critical areas were Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, Articles 158, 159, 311 and 312 of the Criminal Code. During this period the new Criminal Code was enacted and related provisions of Anti-Terror Law was amended. The last reports were crtisizing the application of Article 301 of the new Criminal Code, however an amendment was done in 2008 and now the tensions on Article 301 also went down.

In the past years, the situation of journalists, writers and academics constituted an important part in Commission's reports on Turkey's progress towards EU membership. Especially, with the opening up of accession negotiations in 2005, an obvious change in the content and wording of reforms relating to freedom of expression could be observed in progress reports. This includes both legislative changes in the form of amendments and abolishments, and the dimishing number of cases brought gainst persons charged with expressions of non-violent opinions. This does not lead us to the conclusion that Turkey has succeeded to fully comply with the relevant provisions set out by the Copenhagen criteria. The Commission still believes that Turkish Legal framework is still failing to secure the Freedom of Speech and wants new legislative guarantees. More progress is needed so that Turkey becomes eligible for EU membership. This encompasses both further legislative changes and law implementation when dealing with concrete cases. Meanwhile, the Commission urges Turkey to take into consideration both domestic legislation and European Convention on Human Rights in cases brought against freedom of expression. This would enable Turkey to abolish the existing restrictions both in legal and practical terms and fully ensure the freedom of expression. It would also help Turkey to comply with the European norms.


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Tezcan, E. (2003). "Tilrkiye'nin Kopenhag Siyasi Kriterlerine Uyumu Siirecinde Yap1lan ve Yap1lmas1 Gereken Yasal Degi~iklikler Uzerine Bir Degerlendirme" Marmara Journal of European Studies, Vol: 11, No:1-2, 2003.

The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, translated by Erhan Ya~ar, retrieved on 1 June 2009 from: http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982 Constitution-1995-1.pdf

Treaty of Amsterdam, retrieved on 1 June 2009 from: http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treatiesldat/11997D/htm/ 11997D.html.

75

Treaty of the European Union. OJ 92/C 191/01, retrieved on 1 June 2009, from: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/treaties_ founding.htm.

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGiSi • Cilt 17 • Say1: 1-2 • 2009

iHTiLAFSIZ PARA ALACAKLARI i<;iN A VRUPA iCRA iLAMI TUZUGU*

77

Hatice Selin Pfirselim Dogan**

Ozet:

jhtilaftzz Para Alacaklarz ic;in Avrupa kra jfamz Tilzilgu, 21 Nisan 2004 tarih ve 805/2004 sayzh Avrupa Parlamentosu ve Konseyi Tilzilgil 'nun 21.10.2005'de yilrilrlilge girmesiyle Danimarka harici Avrupa Birligi devletlerinde uygulamaya girmi~tir. Tilzilge gore, ilye bir devletten ~artlarz haiz bir mahkeme kararz verildigi takdirde, bu karar diger bir ilye devlette de aym ~ekilde gec;erli olacaktzr. Tilzilgun temel hedefi, eger tahkikat usulleri belli standartlara uygunsa, bu usulden dogan haklar, Tilzilk'iln Avrupa jcra hamz olarak verildigi devlette teyit edilebilir. Soz konusu haklar, tenfiz zorunlulugu olmayan ba~ka bir ilye devlette ifa edilebilir. Tilzilk sayesinde, Brilksel I Tilzilgundeki tenfiz prosedilril belirli durumlarda ortadan kaldzrzlmz~tzr. Uye devletlerin, kesinle~mi~ mahkeme kararzmn icraszm reddetmeleri ic;in sadece c;ok kzszth haller bulunmaktadzr. C::alz~mamzzda, Tilzilgiln uygulanma ko~ullarz ve getirdigi faydalar ilzerinde durulmaya c;ah~zlacaktzr.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birligi 805/2004 sayzlz Tilzilgil; Avrupa jcra jfamz, jhtilaftzz Para Alacaklarz ic;in Avrupa jcra j[amz Tilzilgu

Abstract:

A Council Regulation creating a European Enforcement Order will apply from 21 October 2005 in all Member States except for Denmark.

• Bu yah~ma Marmara Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitiisii Ozel Hukuk Doktora Program1 kapsammda 27 Nisan 2009 tarihinde savunulmu~ ve oybirligi ile ba~anh bulunmu~ olan Avrupa Birligi Tiiziikleri (:eryevesinde Avrupa icra Hukuku isimli doktora tezinin sadece bir boliimiiniin genel bir ozetinden olu~maktadtr. •• Dr., Marmara Universitesi, Hukuk Fakiiltesi, Devletler Ozel Hukuku Anabilim Dah.

78 iHTiLAFSIZ PARA ALACAKLARI iCiN AVRUPA iCRA iLAMI TOZOGO

According to the EC Regulation on European Eriforcement Order ("EEO'') a judgment of a court of a Member State can be certified as a European Eriforcement Order in the Member State of origin. The basic idea of this regulation is that if investigatory proceedings correspond with a certain standard, the claim arising from the proceedings can be confirmed in the state where it was issued as a European eriforcement order. Such a claim can be executed in another member state without the necessity of exequatur, i.e. recognition proceedings. The exequatur procedure from the Brussels I Regulation is abolished in certain cases. In the Member State of eriforcement there are only very limited possibilities of refusal of eriforcement of a certified judgment. This paper aims to explain the implementation and the advantages of the European Enforcement Order in the European Union.

Keywords: Regulation (EC) No 805/2004; European Enforcement Order; European Eriforcement Order for uncontested claims

Giri~

A vrupa Birligi Komisyonu, 21 Nisan 2004 tarihinde 805/2004 numarah ihtilafs1z Para Alacaklan is;in Avrupa icra ilam1 Tuziigu 'nil (Verordnung (EG) Nr. 805/2004 zur Einfiihrung eines Europaischen Vollstreckungstitels fiir unbestrittene Forderungen vom 21. April 2004) uygulamaya koymu~tur. A vrupa Birligi Hukuku, bu sayede yeni bir kavrama ("A vrupa icra ilam1") sahip olmu~ (Staudinger, 2006:14); ihtilafs1z Para Alacaklan is;in Avrupa icra ilam1 sayesinde, smular otesi olan ama Avrupa Birligi'nin s1mrlan is;inde kalan ilamm icras1, h1zlandmlm1~ ve basitle~tirilmi~tir. Tuziigun amac1, kararlann, mahkeme is;i sulhlerin, resmi belgelerin Avrupa Birligi'ne uye devletlerde serbest dola~1mmm saglanmas1; icranm uygulanacag1 uye devlette tamma ve tenfizden once ara yargllama yap1lmasma gerek kalmadan (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1452) uygulamaya ges;ilmesidir.

A vrupa Birligine uye devletler arasmda tamma ve tenfiz davalanmn kaldmlmas1 ilk kez 805/2004 numarah Tuziik ile yapllan bir duzenleme degildir; klSlth bir uygulama alam olsa da 2201/2003 numarah Aile Hukukuna ili~kin Konularda Yarg1 Yetkisi ile Tamma ve Tenfize ili~kin Tuziik madde 41 i1e bu uygulamaya ges;ilmi~ti 1• 805/2004 numarah Tuziik

1 220112003 numarah Aile Hukukuna ili~kin Konularda Yargt Yetkisi ile Tamma ve Tenfize ili~kin Ttizlik madde 41 'e gore, yocugun ebeveynlerinden bir tanesi ile ilgili gorii~me hakkma dair verilmi~ mahkeme kararlan belirli ~artlar altmda A vrupa Birligi'ne tiye tlim tilkelerde dogrudan tammr ve tenfiz edilir.

AVRUPA ARA~TIRMALARI DERGiSi 79

ile ihtilafstz para alacaklan i9in "Avrupa icra ilamt" haztrlanmt~; iiye devletlerdeki mahkeme kararlanmn, mahkeme i9i sulh ve resmi belgelere dair asgari hiikiimlerin saptanmas1 ile serbest9e dola~1mm saglanmas1, icranm uygulanacag1 iiye devletlerde tamma ve tenfizden once ara yargllama talep etmek zorunda kalmakslZln miimkiin kllmmt~tlr (md. 1 ). Tiiziik, noter uygulamalan i9in de ge9erli olmaktadtr(Schiitze, 2005: 243; Kropholler, 2005: 560; Stadler, 2004: 801; Stein, IPRax 2004: 181; Stein, EuZW 2004: 679; Wagner, R., 2002: 75; Rauscher, 2004: 286; Rellermeyer, 2005: 389).

I. Tiiziik'iin Konusu

Tiiziik hukuki ve ticari konularda2 uygulanma alam bulmaktad1r (md. 2); vergi ve giimriik i~lemlerine dair hallerde, devletin sorumlulugunda egemenlik haklannm kullamldtgi i~lemlerde veya ka9mmalar gibi idare hukuku meselelerinde ise uygulanmamaktadtr. Ger9ek ki~ilerin statiisii, hak ve fiil ehliyeti ile ger9ek ki~ilerin kanuni vekilleri, evlilik mal rejimleri, oliime bagh tasarruflar ile ilgili diizenlemeler dahil olmak iizere Miras Hukuku, iflaslar, mahkeme d1~1 sulhler ve benzeri davalar, sosyal giivenlik, hakem mahkemesine dair uygulamalarda Tiiziik uygulama alam bulmayacaktlr (Coester-Waltjen, 2006: 49).

Tuziik'te "iiye devletler" kavram1 ile kastedilen, Danimarka hari9 olmak iizere rum iiye devletlerdir.

Tiiziik, mahkeme karan Tiiziik'iin uygulama alam i9erisinde ilan edilmi~se, sulh bOlgesel olarak orada akdedilmi~se veya resmi beige orada diizenlenmi~ ise, uygulanacaktlr. Tiiziik uygulamasmda, taraflann uyruguna veya yerle~im yerine baktlmamakta (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1456 dipnot 19'da amlan Gebauer/Wiedmann/Klippstein Kapital 31 Rn 3 ff); ii9iincu iilkelerde haztrlanan 1cra ilamlan A vrupa icra ilam1 olarak onaylanmamaktad1r.

Tiiziik madde 4 'te, Anglosakson geleneklerine uygun olarak, 9e~itli

kavramlann tammlan belirtilmektedir (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1469). Bu bali ile Tiiziik madde 4 I, 44/2001 numarah Tiiziik'iin 32. maddesinde

2 Bu kavramlann tammlanmas1 i.;;in, ozellikle Tiiziik'iin uygulanmas1 is;in onemli yer arzeden egemenlik muamelelerindeki uygulama s1mnm belirleyen 44/2001 numarah Tiiziik'te yer alan aym hukuki terimlerin kullamlma alanlanna bakiimas1 gerekmektedir.

80 iHTILAFSIZ PARA ALACAKLARI l~iN AVRUPA ICRA ILAMI TOZOGO

bulunan ve A vrupa Adalet Divamnm ic;tihatlan ile ic;ini doldurdugu kavramlann tammlanm tekrar etmektedi2:

Tiiziikte kullamlan "karar" kavramt ile, herhangi bir ilye iilkedeki mahkeme tarafmdan verilen, masraf konusunda bir mahkeme gorevlisi tarafmdan verilen de dahil olmak ilzere tammlamalara baktlmakstzm verilen hilkiimler, Odeme emirleri veya icra kararlan kastedilmektedir. icra ilamt olarak nitelendirilen bir belge de bu degerde ele almacakttr; mahkeme, gorevi icabt taraflar arasmdaki ihtilaflar hakkmda karar c;tkaran her yargt orgamdtr4

.

Tiiziik'te kullamlan "alacak" kavramt, belirli bir meblagm odenmesine ili~kin, vadesi gelmi~ veya vadesi belirli olan mahkeme karannda, mahkeme ic;i sulhte veya resmi belgede beyan edilmi~ para alacagmt kapsamaktadtr.

3 EuGH Rs 125/79 Denilauler/Couchet Freres 21.05.1980; 1553, Rn 8. Amlan kararda Alman Denilauler firmas1 ile Frans1z Freres firmas1 arasmda bir uyu~mazhk soz konusudur. ihtilafm konusunu sozle~meden dogan bir bon; olu~turmaktad1r. Frans1z firmas1, sozle~meden dogan para borcu nedeniyle Fransa'da Alman firmasma kar~I dava a<;mi~? ve goriilen dava Alman firma aleyhine sonu<;lanmi~br. Karara gore, Alman firmamn bankadaki hesab1 iizerine ge<;ici tedbir karan konulmu~tur. Frans1z firma, bu karan Almanya'da tenfiz etmi~tir. Ancak bu tenfiz karan iizerine, Alman firma md. 36 uyannca tenfiz karanna itiraz etmi~?tir; zira Fransa mahkemesinde goriilen dava s1rasmda Alman firmam dinlenmemi~, kendini savunmasma imkan tanmmam1~t1r. itiraz iizerine Alman mahkemesi, Avrupa Adalet Divam'nm gorii~?iinii almak iizere davay1 Divan'a ta~Imi~br. Divan, savunma hakkmm ihlal edildigine karar vermi~tir. Buna gore, davalmm savunmas1 dinlenilmeden, davahya usuliine uygun tebligat yapmadan verilmi~ olan kararlar tenfiz edilemeyecektir. 4 EuGH Rs C-414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH/Emilio Boch 02.06.1994; 1-2247; Rn 17. Uyu~mazhk konusu olayda, Alman tanm makinalan iireticisi bir firmamn italya'daki dagitiCISI olan firma, Alman firmaya kar~I Milano'da dava a<;mi~tJr. A<;Ilan bu dava, mahkeme i<;i sulh ile karara baglanmi~tir. Ancak italyan firma, Alman tanm makinalan iireticisi firmaya kar~I tekrar dava a<;mi~tir; bu dava Bologna'da goriilmii~tiir. Bologna mahkemesinden verilen karan Almanya'da tenfiz etmek isteyen italyan ~irketi, Alman makine iireticisinin itiraz1 ile kar~Jla~mi~tir. Alman makine iireticisinin itirazmm dayanag1 ~u ~ekilde

a<;Iklanabilir: Bologna mahkemesinden ahnan ilam daha once Milano mahkemesinden verilmi~ olan ve mahkeme i<;i sulhe aykmhk te~kil etmektedir; bu nedenle Alman makine iireticisi, Briiksel Konvansiyonu madde 27 III uyannca tenfizin murnkiin olamayacagm1 iddia etmektedir. A vrupa Adalet Divam, mahkeme i<;i sulhlerin madde 25 anlammda karar saytlamayacagmdan bahisle, Konvansiyon madde 27 III'iin uygulanamayacag1m; taraflar arasmda davay1 sona erdirse dahi mahkeme i<;i sulhlerin karar kavramma dahil edilmedigini belirtmektedir.

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGISi 81

Mukabil eda kar~thgmda kademe kademe bir parasal edimin odenmesi hakkmdaki ilamlar, ihtilafs1z haciz haklan, teslim haklan, netice itibariyle ayni eda haklan bu ti.izi.ik kapsamma girmemektedir. Burada, madde 4 ftkra II' de tarif edildigi gibi, StnlrSlZ bir odeme ilaml soz konusu degildir; <;iinkii bir mukabil eda ger<;ekle~tirilmelidir (Wagner,R., 2005: 189; Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1471). Tiiziik alacagm miktanna ili~kin bir alt veya fist smu ongormemektedir, belirli bir para alacag1 olmas1 yeterlidir (Gerling, 2006: 1471).

Tiizi.ik madde 4 III a genel olarak resmi belge kavramm1 tammlamaktadtr5

• Tiizi.ikte kullamlan "resmi belge" kavram1, resmi belge ~eklinde haztrlanml~ veya tescil edilmi~ yaz1h belgeleri kapsamaktad1r. Belgenin i<;erigi olmah ve altmda imza bulunmahdtr; resmi bir makam tarafmdan veya ba~lang19 ilye devletteki yetkili merci tarafmdan haztrlanml~ olmahd1r (md. 4 III a) veya bir idari makam tarafmdan haztrlanmt~ veya onun belgeledigi nafaka sozle~mesi veya nafaka yiikiimliiliigu ~eklinde

olmahdtr (md. 4 III b)6•

Ba~lang19 ilye devlet kavram1, mahkeme karanmn verildigi, mahkeme i<;i sulhun onayland1g1 veya buna karar verildigi veya resmi belgenin haztrlandtgt ve bu belgelerin A vrupa icra ilam1 olarak onayland1g1 devleti ifade etmektedir (md. 4 IV). ilamm ba~langw ilye iilkesi, karann verildigi; sulhun onaylandtgt ya da resmi belgenin diizenlendigi ulkedir. ilamm icra edilebilir hale gelecegi her ilye iilke icra ilye iilkesi olabilir; icranm uygulandtgt devlet, A vrupa icra ilam1 olarak onaylanm1~ karann, mahkeme i<;i sulhun veya resmi evrakm icrasmm yaptlacag1 ilye devlettir (md. 4 V). Ba~lang19 mahkemesi, madde 3 I a/b/c'nin ongordiigu ~artlann dava Sirasmda yerine getirilecegi mahkemedir (md. 4 VI). Ba~lang19 mahkemesi, Tilzilk madde 3 f1kra I a'dan c'ye kadar ongorillen ko~ullann yerine getirildigi tarihte davaya bakan mahkemedir; alacak gecikmeden dolayt ba~mdan itibaren ihtilafstz hale ge1irse (Tiizi.ik madde 3 I b), o ha1de genellikle soz konusu olan ilk derece mahkemesidir (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1476). Bu hilkiim, Tiiziik madde 3 II'de diizenlenen bir durum soz konusu

5 Resmi beige i9in gene I bir tamm i9ermeyen Briiksel Konvansiyonunun ve 44/2001 numarah Tiiziik'iin aksine Avrupa Adaiet Divam ongoriiien kriterler Tiiziik madde 4 ftkra 3 a'ya devrahnmt~tlr. 6 EuGH Rs C 260/97 Unibank NS/ Christensen 17.06.1999; 1-3724; Rn 15. Avrupa Adaiet Divam'nm Unibank NS/ Christensen kararmda, resmi beigenin tamm1 beiirlenmi~tir. Buna gore, diizeniendigi iiikenin yetkiii kurumian uyannca resmi beige oiarak haztrlanmamt~ beigeier, Briiksei Konvansiyonu madde 50 aniammda da resmi beige sayilamayacakttr. Bir beigenin resmi sayilabiimesi i9in, diizeniendigi iiikenin resmi beige kriterlerini tam oiarak ta~tmas1 gerekmektedir.

82 iHTiLAFSIZ PARA ALACAKLARI i<;iN AVRUPA iCRA iLAMI T0Z0G0

ise ve bor9lu kanuni itiraz yolu olarak ba~vurulan mercide gecikmi~se de ge9erli olmaktad1r.

II. ihtilafs1z Alacagm Tammi

ihtilafstz Alacagm tamm1 Ttizlik madde 3 'te yap1lmaktad1r. Para alacag1, ~ayet resmi bir belgede kabul edilmi~ ise, ihtilafs1z sayllmaktadtr. Resmi belge kavram1 Ttizlik'tin 4. maddesi III. f1krasmda genel olarak tammlanm1~tlr. Ozellikle yetkili merci tarafmdan haztrlanm1~ nafaka ilamlan bu gruba dahil olmaktad1r (Pietsch, 2005: 180). icra edilecek olan alacak- tutan bak1mmdan da - somut bir ~ekilde belgede gortilmelidir.

Mahkeme ilam1, sadece, temel te~kil eden para alacagmm ihtilafs1z kalmw olmas1 durumunda bir Avrupa icra ilam1 olarak onaylanabilir.

Bor9lunun pasif kald1g1 davalar (g1yabi kararlar, icra kararlan) (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1463f problemli bir durum arz etmektedir; 9tinkti bor9lunun bu hususa ili~kin pozitif bir ifadesi bulunmadtgmdan dolay1 bor9lunun davram~mdan sadece dolayh olarak bor9lunun alacaga kar~1 itiraz etmedigi sonucuna vanlmaktad1r. Burada, bor9lunun onceden davamn a91lm1~ oldugu hususunda bilgilendirilmi~ oldugundan ve bor9luya en azmdan etkin bir savunma olanagma sahip olacak ~ekilde usule cevap verecek yeterli zamanm tamnm1~ oldugundan emin olunmas1 gerekmektedir (Hess,B., 2002: 2417). Ttizlik madde 3 I b'de, bor9lunun dava esnasmda itiraz etmemesine dair durum duzenlenmi~tir:~Bor9lu dava stirecinde hi9bir tarihte alacaga kar~I itiraz etmezse, para ahicag1 ihtilafs1z sayllmaktad1r (Mankowski, 2004: 587). Bu ba~hk altmda degerlendirilen ba~ka bir hal, odeme Slkmtlsma dayah itiraz halidir. Bor9lunun, odeme Sikmtlsma bagh olarak alacag1 odeyemedigi ve bu nedenle alacagm ertelenmesine veya takside baglanmasma karar verilmesini talep ettigi yontindeki savunma ifadesi de bir itiraz i9in yeterlidir (Rellermeyer, 2005: 389). Taslagm as1l lafzma gore bu dava ihtilafstz para alacag1 konusuna dahil olmaktad1r. Ba~ka bir irnkan, bor9lunun dava stirecinde alacaga itiraz etmesi ( davada itiraz) zorunlulugudur. Bor9lu, alacaga kar~1 -hangi ~ekilde olursa olsundavanm mahkemede ikame edilmesinden once veya mahkeme d1~1 yaz1~ma yoluyla itiraz ederse, bor9lunun bu itiraz1 dikkate ahnmamaktadtr (Rellermeyer, 2005: 389).

Yukanda da belirttigimiz tizere, Ttizlik, ihtilafs1z para alacaklanna dair mahkeme i9i sulh, resmi belgeler ve mahkeme kararlan i9in ge9erlidir (md. 3). Bor9lu, yarg1lamada kati bir ~ekilde tamma vas1tastyla veya

7 Rauscher/Pabst, bunu ihtilafs1zhk i~in Y orumlama Dayanag1 Olarak Pasiflik (Passivitaet als Interpretationsgrundlage fur Nichtbestreiten) olarak nitelendirmir?tir.

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGiSi 83

mahkemenin onaylanmasi yoluyla veya mahkemeden once sulhuna karar verilmi~ a~amada alacag1 kabul ettiyse (md. 3 I a); bon;lu yargilamada ba~langw liye devletin hukukunda yer alan dava ile ilgili hliklimlere gore hi<;bir zaman itiraz etmemi~ ise (md. 3 I b); bor<;lu duru~madayken alacagm henliz ortaya <;tkmami~ olmas1 veya bununla beraber savunulmam1~ olmas1, onceden yargilamada alacaga itiraz edildikten sonra, ~ayet bOyle bir tutum ba~langt<; liye devletin hukukunda znnni nza gosterme olarak anla~Iltyorsa veya alacakh tarafmdan iddia edilmi~ hayat olay1 olarak gorlilebiliyor ise (md. 3 I c); bor<;lunun alacag1 resmi bir belgede a<;Ik<;a kabul etmi~ olmas1 halinde (md. 3 I d) para alacag1 ihtilafstz olarak degerlendirilir.

Tlizlik, A vrupa icra ilam1 olarak onaylanm1~ kararlann, mahkeme i<;i sulh veya resmi belgelerin iptalinde uygulama alam bulmaktadtr (md. 3 II). Tlizlik madde 3 II, belirli ko~ullar altmda, kanuni itiraz yollan hakkmdaki kararlan da ihtilafs1z para alacaklanna dair mahkeme ilami kavramma dahil etmektedir. Esasen kanuni itiraz yollan hakkmdaki kararlar Tlizlik'lin uygulama alanmdan tamamen <;tkartilmi~ olmahdtr (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006:1466); fakat bunun yapilmas1 halinde bor<;luya kolay yoldan Tlizlik'lin uygulama alamndan <;tkma ftrsati sunulmu~ olmasmdan endi~e duyulmu~tur. Kanuni itiraz yollanna ba~vurularak itiraz edilmi~ olan ilamlar, nihai metin uyannca, bor<;lunun sadece kanuni itiraz yoluna ba~vurmas1 ve ondan sonra yeniden ve halen daha pasif davranmas1 yonlinde Tlizlik'ten <;tkanlmayacakt1r.

III. A vrupa icra iiami Olarak Onaylanmanm ~artlan

Ba~langw devletin mahkemesi, ilamm A vrupa icra ilami niteligine sahip olduguna dair bir onay vermektedir. Bu ~artm dt~mda, ilamm 44/2001 numarah Tlizlik'te dlizenlenmi~ yetki ile ilgili kurallara uygun olmas1 gerekmektedir (Coester-Waltjen, 2006: 47) 8

• Avrupa Birligi'ne liye devletlerin mahkemeleri, eger davayt ba~latan teblig ile veya buna e~ degerdeki yaz1h beige ve aym zamanda ahc1 i<;in belirli asgari talepleri de i<;eriyorsa, bu ilama sadece A vrupa icra ilami olarak onay vermekle yliklimllidlirler (Coester-Waltjen, 2006: 48). Bulunmas1 gereken bu ~art,

805/2004 numarah Tlizlik'te mevcuttur; ancak Tlizlik'te teblig ve talimatlara dair normlara yer verilmemi~tir. Bu dlizenlemelerin ~ekli, liye devletlerin takdirine btraktlmt~tir (Coester-Waltjen, 2006: 48; Wagner, R., 2005: 189, 196). ilam'm, 44/2001 numarah Tlizlik madde 22'de ve madde 6 I b'da dlizenlenen yetki ~artm1 da ta~tmasi asgari ~art olarak gorlilmektedir.

8 6zellikle 805/2004 numarah Tiiziik'te de yer verilmi~ ~Ian Tiiketici Mahkemesi ile ilgili yetki diizenlemelerine dikkat edilmesi gerekmektedir.

84 IHTiLAFSIZ PARA ALACAKLARI iCIN AVRUPA ICRA ILAMI TOZOGO

A vrupa Birligi 'ne iiye devletlerin birinden verilmi~ mahkeme karan, misal olarak Almanya' dan verilen mahkeme karan Polonya Medeni Yarg1lama Kanunu madde 1153 uyannca otomatik olarak Polonya icra ilam1 olarak kabul edilecektir (Taborowski, 2007: 253). ilam, ~artlan haiz ise, tenfiz davas1 a~Ilarak ilamm tenfiz edilmesine gerek kalmayacakt1r. Belirli bir alanda kullamlan ulusal nitelikli ilam, otomatik olarak Avrupa ~apmda icra edilebilirlik kabiliyetini ta~1maktad1r (Coester-Waltjen, 2006: 47; Wagner, R., 2005: 189; Rellermeyer, 2005: 390-391; Wagner, R., NJW 2005: 1157).

Tiiziik madde 6'ya gore, ba~langw devletteki ihtilafs1z para alacagmdan dogan karar her zaman dilek~e yoluyla ba~langw devletin mahkemesinde Avrupa icra ilam1 olarak tammlamr. Avrupa icra ilam1 olarak onaylama talep iizerine yapilmaktad1r; talep bir siireye baglanmami~tlr. Alacakl1 ancak ba~ka bir iiye iilkede icra edilebilir olan bir ilama ihtiya~ duydugunda ilam1 bir A vrupa icra ilam1 olarak onaylatt1rmakta serbesttir; ~a yet itirazs1zhk durumu soz konusu ise, daha karar ~1karblmadan ( dava ile birlikte) talepte bulunulabilir (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1485).

A vrupa icra ilam1 olarak onaylama i~in sahip olunmas1 gereken nitelikler mevcuttur: Oncelikle, ilamm iiye ba~langw devletinde icra edilebilir nitelikte olmas1 gerekmektedir (md. 6 I a). 6ncelikle, Mahkeme tarafmdan bir hiikiim verilmi~ olmahd1r. Karann d1~an kar~1 etki kazand1g1 tarihi, lex fori belirlemektedir (Rauscher, 2004: 286-288). Onaylanacak olan karar ba~lang1~ iilkede icra edilebilir olmahd1r. Karann kesinle~mesi bir ~art degildir; ge~ici icra edilebilirlik yeterlidir. icra edilebilirligin ne zaman soz konusu oldugunu ise, ba~langw iiye iilkenin hukuku yani lex fori belirler (HiiBtege, 2004: 371, 376; Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1486).

Onaylama usuliinde, 44/2001 numarah Tiiziik madde 1 'in ilk f1krasma gore, tamma davalannda da dikkate ahnmas1 gereken miinhas1r yetkiye ve sigorta meselelerinde (44/2001 numarah Tiiziik Boliim IV3) yetkiye uyulup uyulmad1g1 kontrol edilmektedir (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1487).

Tiiziik Boliim III' de diizenlenen asgari standartlar, Tiiziik madde 3 'de onaylama usullerinde aktif olarak ihtilafs1z para alacaklan ile bor~lunun salt pasifligi arasmda yaptlan aynma bagh olarak kontrol edilmelidir. Bu standartlann korunmas1, sadece bor~lu pasif davranm1~ ise ve bu nedenle bor~lunun bu dava hakkmda verecegi bilgiler belirleyici ise, onem ta~1maktad1r (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1490). Tiiziik madde 6 I c'nin amac1, bir tamma ve tenfiz davasmda tebligatm yap1hp yapilmadigi sonradan kontrol edilmeden, bor~lunun savunma haklannm saglanmas1d1r (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1490).


Karann verildigi devlet aym zamanda bon;:lunun yerle~im yerinin oldugu devlet ise, para alacagt ihtilafstz olarak madde 3 I b veya c anlammda olmahdtr; yaptlan sozle~mede amaca uygun olarak tiiketicinin mesleki veya ticari faaliyeti sozle~meye mahsup edilemez; bon;:lu tiiketici olmahdtr (md. 6 I d).

A vrupa icra ilamt olarak onaylanmt~ ilamm, icra kabiliyetini yitirmesi veya icra ilammm kabiliyetinin durdurulmast veyahut smtrlandmlmast soz konusu olabilir. Boyle bir durum var ise, ba~langw devletine her zaman dilek~e ile (sozle~me ek IV' de bahsedilen matbu form) ba~vurularak, icramn yerine getirilmeyecegi veya icranm stmrlanmt~ oldugu belirlenecektir ( md. 6 II). Bu dlizenleme, bor~luya, A vrupa icra ilamt 'ndan daha geni~ kapsamh onaylamalara kar~I koruma saglamaktadtr (md. 6 II) (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1494 ve orada dipnot 36'da amlan Gebauer/Wiedmann!Klippstein Kapital 31 Rn 49t Tlizlik madde 6 ftkra I' de dlizenlenen onaylama ile haztrlanan belge i~in belirli bir zaman stmrlamast yoktur; her zaman yaptlabilecek olan talep lizerine verilir. Bu ~ekilde bir stmrlamamn olmamast, Tlizlik'lin uygulamadaki etkinligini de kammtzca arttlracakttr. Talepte bulunma hakkt bor~luya aittir. Bor~lu dilek~esini, ba~langw mahkemesine sunulmahdtr; karar t~m yetkileri mlinferit liye Ulkeler de duzenlemektedir (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1494).

Madde 6 I' e gore A vrupa icra ilamt olarak ge~erli saytlan ilamm iptaline Ek 5 'teki matbu formun dilek~e ~eklinde verilmesi ile ikame karar dlizenlenecektir, meger ki bu karar ba~langw devlette icra edilebilsin. Bu hal de Tlizlik madde 12 II uygulanmaz. Burada bir A vrupa icra ilamt olarak onaylanmt~ ve yasal yollarla itiraz edilmi~ bir karar haztr bulunmahdtr; ancak belirsiz gorlinen, hlikrnlin sadece, ilk karar, bu (ilk) karara yasal yollarla itiraz edildigi tarihte zaten bir A vrupa icra ilamt olarak onaylanmt~ oldugunda mt ge~erli oldugudur (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1495). Tlizlik madde 6 dlizenlemesine gore, madde 12 II mahfuz ka!maktadtr; buna gore kanun yoluna mliracaatta da (Rechtsmittelverfahren) asgari standartlar korunmahdtr; bu ihtirazi kaytt, itiraz edilen karann daha once A vrupa icra ilamt olarak onaylamm~ olmast halinde de ge~erli oldugunu a~tk~a ortaya koymaktadtr (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1496). ikame onay (Ersatzbestatigung), slireye tabi olmayan ba~vuru lizerine verilmektedir.

9 Tiiziik madde 11 'e gore onay, sadece ba~langu;: iiye iilkedeki icra edilebilirlik ven;:evesinde etkilidir. Bu icra edilebilirlik, misal olarak bir teminata kar~thk bir icramn ertelenmesi veya icra emrinin verilmesi nedeniyle degi~irse, bu durum onayda goriilemez.

86 iHTILAFSIZ PARA ALACAKLARI ic;;IN AVRUPA iCRA iLAMI T0Z0G0

Tiiziik madde 7 uyannca, hiikiim, mahkeme masraflan ic;in faiz varsa bunlar dahil olmak iizere, Tiiziik uygulama alamna giren mahkeme masraflan konusundaki kararlan da kapsamaktadtr ve bunlar da A vrupa icra ilam1 olarak onaylanabilir. Rauscher/Pabst ve bizim de katlldtgtmtz gorii~e gore, mahkeme masraflan konusundaki kararlann sadece Tiiziik'iin uygulama alamna giren esas konusundaki bir kararla baglantlh olarak onaylanamayacagm1 soylenebilir (Kar~1la~tmmz, Wagner, R., 2005: 189-196). Esasa dair karann da Avrupa icra ilam1 olarak onaylanabilmesi gerekli degildir; ozellikle davanm reddini ic;eren mahkeme masraflan konusundaki kararlar ve bir para talebi ic;ermeyen ve bu nedenle onaylanamayan esas konusundaki kararlar tasdik edilebilir (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1498). Ancak kararda yaz1h masraflann tutanmn belirtilmi~ olmas1 ~art olarak aranmaktad1r (md. 7). Tiiziik madde 7'ye gore, sadece ilgili usul hukuku uyannca esas konusundaki kararda Tiiziik madde 4 II 'ye gore "belirli bir para tutan" ile belirtilmi~ olan masraf konusundaki kararlar onaylanabilir (Gerling, 2006: 1472).

Borc;lu, masraf tutanna ve mahkeme masraflanyla yiikiimlU olduguna kar~1 itiraz etmi~ ise, ana alacagm ihtilafstz olup olmadtgma baktlmakstzm mahkeme masraflan konusundaki karann onaylanmas1 miimkiin degildir; borc;lunun ana alacag1 kabul edip muhakeme masraflanm kabul etmemesi halinde bOyle bir durum mevcuttur (Wagner, R., 2005: 189-196; Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1499). Borc;lunun sadece masraflann yiiksek olmasma kar~1 itiraz etmesi halinde, mahkeme masraflanmn kimin tarafmdan kar~tlanacagt kanunda yaz1h oldugundan ve dolaytstyla lege fori inkar edilemeyeceginden dolay1, nasll hareket edilecegi problemi dogabilir; lege fori'ye gore masraf tutanmn kabul edilmemesinin usuliine uygun olarak ileri siiriilmesi c;oziim ic;in yeterli olacaktlr (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1499; Wagner, R., 2005: 189-196; Hok, 2005: 1099- 1102) 10

.

ilamm ktsmi qlarak A vrupa icra ilam1 ~eklinde onaylanmas1 miimkiindiir. Tiiziik'iin gerektirdigi ~artlar, verilmi~ olan mahkeme ilammda sadece ktsmi olarak mevcutsa, bu durumda ilamm Avrupa icra ilam1 ~eklinde onaylanmas1 sadece ~artlann bulundugu klsm1 kapsamaktadtr (md. 8). Bu sayede, ozellikle miinferit belirlenmi~ haklar ic;in onay ~artlan eksik olmasmdan dolay1 bir ilamm onaylanmasmm topyekiin yapllamamas1 engellenmi~ olmaktad1r. Miiracaat sm1rs1z olarak yaptlmt~ ise ve taleplerin bir kismi ic;in onay verilememesi halinde onay1 veren mahkeme bir b6liinme/ktsmi kabul ongorebilir (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1499). Bilhassa

10 Yazar, masraf sonucu kanunda zorunlu olarak belirlenmi~ ise kar~I tarafa masraflann yiiklenmesi muracaatm1 red olarak kabul etmemektedir.

AVRUPA ARA~TIRMALARI DERGiSi 87

mahkeme masraflan konusundaki kararlar ayn ayn onaylanabilir (madde 7). Konu a<;tsmdan tiiztigiin uygulama alamna girmeyen bir esasla ilgili alacaklar konusunda verilen kararlar bir A vrupa icra ilamt olarak ktsmen onaylanmaya miisaittir; misal olarak bo~anma ile ilgili bir davadaki nafaka alacaklan buna omek gosterilebilir (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1501 ).

IV. Avrupa icra iiami Olarak Onaylama

Ba~langt<; iiye devletinde (Ursprungsstaat) Avrupa icra ilamt olarak onaylanmt~ mahkeme karan, diger iiye devletlerde tenfiz davasma ihtiya<; kalmakstzm tanmacak ve bu onay iptal edilmeksizin icra edilecektir (Tarzia, 1996: 223; Schiitze, 2005: 243). Yabanct iilke kararlanmn tenfizinden onceki tiim geleneksel usul i~lemleri [ki bunlara itirazi nitelikteki (inzident) tamma incelemesi veya 44/2001 numarah Tiizi.ik ile uygulanan belirli asgari on ~artlann itirazi incelemesi dahildir] bu diizenleme ile ortadan kaldmlmt~tlr (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1477). Avrupa icra ilamt yurt i<;inde verilen bir icra ilamma her yonden e~ittir. icramn yaptlacagt iiye iilkede, kararm herhangi bir ~ekilde incelenmesi engellenmektedir (md. 5). icra edilebilirlik, ba~langt<; iiye iilkedeki onay i~lemine tabidir. Bir ilamm icra edilebilirligi konusundaki gerekli on ~artlann incelenmesi tamamen ba~langt<; iiye iilkedeki mahkemelere aittir; bu husustaki tiim itirazlar ba~langw iiye iilkesindeki mahkeme huzurunda yaptlmahdtr (ABL C 203 E vom 27.8.2002: 86). 805/2004 numarah Tiiziik, 44/2001 numarah Tiiztik'iin tenfiz sistemiyle kar~tla~tmldtgmda, bor<;lunun, karann icra edilecegi iiye iilkesinde bilhassa eksik veya zamamnda yaptlmayan bir tebligat nedeniyle ba~vuru irnkamm kaybettigi; aym zamanda kamu diizeninin korumasmdan da yararlanamadtgt goriilmektedir (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1478). Tiiztigun sadece icra ama<;lan i<;in kabulii diizenledigi, icra i~lemi dt~mdaki onaylan kapsamadtgt gorii~ii ktsmen mevcuttur; bu husus 44/2001 numarah Tiiztik 33 ve devamt maddelere dayandmlmaktadtr (Coester-Waltjen, 2003: 183-197; Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1478).

ilamm icra edilecegi iiye iilkede bir kamu diizeni incelemesi yapt1amayacakttr (Wagner,R., 2002: 75, 90; Stadler, 2004: 2; kar~t gorii~

i<;in bkz., Stein, 2004: 181). Kamu diizenine yonelik ihtirazi kaytt, uygulamada nadiren bir onem arzetse de, ozellikle hukuk devleti ihlalleri baktmmdan i~lem yaptlmast gereken istisnai ve miinferit hallerde biiyiik onem ta~tmaktadtr (Stadler, 2004: 2, 8; Stadler, (RIW) 2004: 801, 803; Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1480). A vrupa Adalet Divam 'nda 2000 ytlmda goriilen bu konudaki en onemli davalardan biri, Krombach/Bamberski

88 iHTILAFSIZ PARA ALACAKLARIICiN AVRUPA iCRA iLAMI T0Z0G0

davastdtr (Stolz, 2002: 541)11. Davamn konusunu, Alman hekimin (davah

Krombach), Franstz vatanda~t bir ktz yocuguna yapttgt igne ve ktz yocugunun bu igne yiiziinden hayatmt kaybetmesi olu~turmaktadtr. Ktzm babast Bamberski, Alman hekim aleyhine dava aymt~ ve Franstz ceza mahkemesi huzurunda ktzmt oldtirmekten yargtlanan Krombach'tan manevi tazminat talep etmi~tir. Duru~mada haztr bulunmayan Krombach, avukat yoluyla temsil edilmi~tir. Franstz Usul Kanunu uyannca, savunma avukatt dinlenilmeden karara vanlmt~ ve Krombach'm manevi tazminat odemesine htikmedilmi~tir. Paris mahkemesinin (Cour d'assises Paris) 13.03.1995 tarihli karannm Almanya' da tenfiz edilmek istenmesi tizerine btiyiik bir problem ortaya ytkmt~ttr: Alman mahkemesi, Franstz ceza mahkemesinin Krombach aleyhine 350 000 Franstz Frangt tazminat cezast odemesini ve 15 ytl cezaevinde kalmasma htikmettigini, ancak Paris'te gortilen bu davada Alman hekim ve avukatmm hiybir ~ekilde davaya dahil olmadtgt, karann gtyapta ahnmt~ oldugunu, bu konuda Brtiksel Konvansiyonu 1 numarah Protokoltin 2. maddesine attf yaparak belirtmi~; kamu dtizeni ihlalinin olu~up olu~madtgt gerekyesi ile Avrupa Adalet Divam'na ba~vurmu~tur. Burada mesele kamu dtizeninin hangi hukuka gore belirlenecegidir. Avrupa Adalet Divam 'mn karanna gore, ulusal mahkemeler bu alanda insiyatif sahibidir ve kamu dtizenine dair ulusal htiktimlerini uygulamakla beraber, bu uygulamalann smm A vrupa Adalet Divam tarafmdan belirlenecektir: Divan, insan Haklan A vrupa Sozle~mesi ile koruma altma alman adil yargtlanma hakkmm, tenfiz ve tammamn amacmdan daha tisttin oldugunu; bir tarafmdan savunmast dinlenilmeden verilmi~ olan htikmtin, kamu dtizeninin ihlal edecegini ve tenfizin reddedilmesi gerektigini vurgulamt~ttr.

44/2001 numarah Ttizlik'e dayanarak ilamm tenfiz edilecegi tiye tilke, 44/2001 numarah Ttiziik madde 34' de yazth kamu dtizeni ihtirazi kaydt ile hareket edebilir; tamma ve tenfizi reddedebilir. Bu halde, 805/2004 numarah Ttizlik uyannca, ilamm icra edilecegi tiye tilke A vrupa Adalet Divamnda gortilen yukanda ele aldtgtmtz Krombach/Bamberski karanm da dogrudan tenfiz etmek zorunda kalacaktt; ulusal yargtlama hukukuna gore ytllarca stirecek hapis cezasma maruz kalma riskine girmeden, borylu tarafmdan Ttiziik'tin ongordtigu hukuk savunmast yaptlamamasma ragmen bu durumun doguracagt ifade bu !;lekilde degerlendirilmektedir (Rauscher /Pabst, 2006: 1481 ). Ancak Franstz mahkemesi 'nden verilmi~ olan karar, ulusal yargtlama hukukuna gore dogru oldugundan, Franstz mahkemeleri ontinde (ba!;llangw tiye tilkesi) mtiracaat yollan bir sonuy

11 EuGH Rs. C-7/98 Krombach!Bamberski, 28.3.2000, 1-1935, Rn. 12, 13, 14, 15, 35.


getirmeyecekti. Bunun yam Slfa yaptlacak tenfiz, yeni bir "temel haklara miidahale" olacak; A vrupa'da heniiz bir yeknesak hukuk ortam1 mevcut olmad1gmdan, tenfiz, ulusal hukukta oldugundan farkh olarak sadece temel haklara mi.idahalenin devam1 anlamma gelmeyecekti (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1481, 1482)12

• Boylece Topluluk Hukukunda tespit edilmi~ olan temel haklan ihlal etmenin sorumlulugu miinferit iiye iilkelerdedir (Kohler, 2004: 63, 77), ancak kamu diizeni incelemesinden mahrum kalan bu iilkeler, bu sorumlulugu yerine getiremeyeceklerdir (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1482) 13

•

A vrupa icra ilami olarak onaylamamn iptali veyahut tashihi (Widerruf der Bestaetigung oder Berichtigung) miimkiindiir. Bor~lunun a~Ik~a haks1z olarak verilen onaylanf kar~I iptal veya tashih hakk1 mevcuttur. A vrupa icra ilam1 olarak onaylama, dilek~e yoluyla ba~langw mahkemesinde yapilacaktir. Mahkeme karan ve maddi bir hata gerek~esi ile onay birbirinden farkl1 ise bir tashih soz konusu olmaktad1r (md. 10 I a). Tashih ile ilgili hukuki ~areye miiracaat yolu, mahkeme karanmn ve onaym birbirini desteklemedigi durumlan i~indir. ~ayet Tiiziik'te diizenlenmi~ ~artlara aykm olarak a~Ik bir ~ekilde hataya yer verilmi~ ise, iptal soz konusu olmaktad1r (md. 10 I b). Onay "kesin bir ~ekilde haks1z" olarak verilmi~se, bu onay miiracaat iizerine iptal edilecektir; kesinlik simrlamasi dar bir yoruma i~aret etmektedir (Rauscher /Pabst, 2006: 1511 ). Onaylama ~artlanndan birinin eksik olmas1 halinde onay tamamen haks1z olarak verilmi~ olmaktad1r (Stein, 2004: 679, 681).

Avrupa icra ilam1 olarak onaylanm1~ ilamm tashihi veya iptali konusunda ba~lang1~ iiye devletin hukuku yetkili ktlmmi~tir (md. 10 II). Bu

12 EuGH Rs. C-7/98, Krombach!Bamberski 28.3.2000; 1-1935, Rn. 12, 13, 14, 15, 35. 13 Kamu diizeninin bireyselle~tirilmesi yolu miimkiindiir; 44/2001 numarah Tiiziik ile re'sen yapilacak kamu diizeni incelemesi bor91u tarafmdan hukuki 9areye ba~vurulacak iki miiracaat yolunu ortaya koymaktad1r. Bu imkanlar ~un1ardir:

Bor91u "bireysel itirazda bu1unacak" ve "tenfizin ertelenmesi talebinde bulunacak"tlr. Bu bireyselle~tirme 44/2001 numarah Tiiziik'te belirlenmi~tir.

44/2001 numarah Tiiziik'te de tenfiz kararma kar~I kamu diizeni incelemesi, sadece miiracaat yolu usuliine gore yapilmaktadir (44/2001 numarah Tiiziik madde 41, 43). 44/2001 numarah Tiiziik'e gore tammanm reddedilmesi i9in en onemli sebep, madde metnini 44/2001 numarah Tiiziik kapsammda inceledigimiz madde 34 II'dir: Usuliine uygun yap1lmayan tebligat nedeniyle davahnm dinlenmemesi. Bu koruma, Tiiziik'te, yukanda madde metnini incelemi~ oldugumuz madde 6 f1kra I c' de yaz1h asgari hiikiimlerle saglanmaktadir. Aym husus 44/2001 numarah Tiiziik uyannca, tenfiz davalannda yetki hiikiimlerinin incelenmesinin miirnkiin oldugu durumlarda geyerlidir; burada madde 6 f1kra I b ve d'ye gore benzeri korunma saglanmahd1r.

90 iHTiLAFSIZ PARA ALACAKLARI i~iN AVRUPA iCRA iLAMI TOZOGO

durum, Tiiziik'iin usul kurallan konusunda bir diizenleme getirmedigi hallerde lex fori'nin uygulandtgt genel prensibe uygundur.

Tuzuk madde 11, A vrupa icra i1ammm etki1erini ba~langt<; uye iilkenin karannm etkilerine baglamaktadtr; daha once de degindigimiz iizere A vrupa icra ilammm ba~ka iiye iilkelerde icra edilebilirligi ba~langt~ iiye iilkedeki karardan daha ileri gidememektedir. Avrupa icra ilamt olarak onaylama, sadece kararm tenfizi ~er~evesindeki etkileri kapsamaktadtr (md. 11). A vrupa icra ilamt etkileri ileri safhalannda da karann ba~langt~ iiye iilkedekine e~it olmahdtr; yani A vrupa icra ilamt karann tum degi~en etkilerine de kattlmaktadtr (Komisyonun 09.02.2004 tarihli tasanst ); bu haliyle A vrupa icra ilamt karann tum ktsttlamalanm iistlenmektedir (Rauscher/Pabst, 2006: 1515).

V. Sonu~

Tuziik, Avrupa Medeni Usul Hukukunda temel bir perspektif degi~imi olarak kabul edilmektedir (Coester-Waltjen, 2006: 47). Bu diizenleme ile birlikte, iHAS madde 6, Adil yargtlanma hakkt uyarmca, alacakhmn etkin cebri icra hakkt kuvvetlendirilecektir (Staudinger, 2006: 14; Hess, B., 2005: 540, 545). Tiiziikte ozellikle belirtilen icra karandtr; bor~lu ilamstz takip usulunde itirazda bulunmazsa, bunun uzerine ~tkanlacak olan icra karan A vrupa icra ilamt olarak onaylanabilmektedir.

Tuziik, icra takip i~lemi i~in icramn uygulanacagt uye iilkedeki hukukunu ge~erli ktlmaktadtr. Avrupa icra ilamt olarak onaylanmt~ karann, icramn yaptlacagt iiye iilkede, bu iilkede verilen bir kararla aym ~artlarda icra edilecegini Tuziik'te a~tk~a belirtmektedir (Komisyonun 09.02.2004 tarihli tasanst).

Tuziik'teki ama~, icra uye iilkesinde her tiir gecikmeyi engellemek ve bunun i~in, her ne kadar bu husus icra uye ulkesindeki hakime ba~langt~ uye iilkesindeki gereksinimleri bilme ve inceleme zorunlulugunu getirse de, ba~langt~ iiye ulkesi hukukuna gore gereksinimleri (belgeleme i~lemlerini) belirlemektir.

Alacakh, icra takibatmt, dogrudan icranm yaptlacagt uye iilkenin mercilerinde yapabilmektedir. Tiiziik'e gore icra takibi yaptlmasmm reddi miimkundiir; onaylanan karar, daha once verilen bir kararla uyu~mamast a~tsmdan reddedilebilir ve bunun iizerine A vrupa icra ilammm icra edilmesi durdurulabilir.

AVRUPA ARAl;)TIRMALARI DERGISi 91

Kaynakfa:

Coester-Waltjen, (2006). Der Europaische Vollstreckungstitel Bestandsaufnahme und kritische Bewertung, Festschrift for Tugrul Ansay, Netherland.

Coester-Waltjen, (2003). Einige Uberlegungen zum kunftigen europiiischen Vollstreckungstitel, Festschrift for Kostas Beys, Athen.

Gerling, (2006). Die Gleichstellung auslandischer mit inliindischen Vollstreckungstiteln durch die Verordnung zur Einfilhrung eines Europiiischen Vollstreckungstitels for unbestrittene Forderungen- Im Vergleich zum bisherigen Recht und zur Rechtslage in den USA, 1. Auflage, Frankfurt.

Hess, B., (2005). Die Konstitutionalisierung des Europaischen Privat- und Veifahrensrechts, JZ.

Hess, B., (2002). Neues deutsches und europiiisches Zustellungsrecht, NJW.

Hok, (2005). Der Europaische Vollstreckungstitel for unbestrittene F orderungen, Zeitschrift for die Anwaltspraxiss.

HiiBtege, (2004). Brauch! die Verordnung uber den europaischen Vollstreckungstitel eine ordre-public-Klausel? Festschrift fur Erik Jayme, Miinchen.

Kohler, (2004). "Von der EuGVVO zum Europaischen VollstreckungstitelEntwicklungen und Tendenzen im Recht der Anerkennung und Vollstreckung ausliindischer Entscheidungen". Reichelt/Rechberger, (2004). Europaisches Kollisionsrecht, Anwendbares Recht, Gerichtliche Zustandigkeit, Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen im Binnenmarkt, Wien.

Kropholler, (2005). Europiiisches Zivilprozej3recht, Kommentar zu EuGVO, Lugano-Ubereinkommen und Europiiischem Vollstreckungstitel, 8., vollig neuarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage, Frankfurt a.M.

Mankowski, (2004). Entwicklungen im Internationalen Privat- und Prozessrecht 2003/2004: RlW Teil II.

Pietsch, (2005). Der Europaeische Vollstreckungstitel for unbestrittene Forderungen im Jahre 2005, Forum Familienrecht 512005; s. 180-183.

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92 IHTiLAFSIZ PARA ALACAKLARI lyiN AVRUPA ICRA ILAMI TOZOGO

Rauscher!Pabst,(2006)."Verordnung (EG) Nr 80512004 des Europaischen Par/aments und des Rates vom 21.04.2004 zur Einfiihrung eines Europaischen Vollstreckungstitel fiir unbestrittene Forderungen ". Rauscher, Europaisches Zivilprozessrecht, Band I-II, Mlinchen.

Rellermeyer, (2005). Der Europaische Vollstreckungstitel fiir unbestrittene Forderungen, Rpfleger.

Schlitze, (2005). Deutsches Internationales Zivilprozessrecht unter Einschluss des Europaischen Zivilprozessrecht, 2. vollig und bearbeitete Auflage, Berlin.

Stadler, (2004). Kritische Anmerkungen zum Europaischen Vollstreckungstitel, RIW, s. 801-808.

Stadler, (2004). Das Europaische Zivilprozessrecht - Wie vie! Beschleunigung vertragt Europa?- Kritisches zur Verordnung iiber den Europaischen Vollstreckungstitel und ihrer Grundidee, IPRax, s. 2-11.

Staudinger, (2006). "Verordnung (EG) Nr 44/2001 des Rates vom 22. Dezember 2000 iiber die gerichtliche Zustandigkeit und die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung von Entscheidungen in Zivil- und Handelssachen". Rauscher, Europaisches ZivilprozeBrecht, Kommentar, Band I, Mlinchen.

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AVRUPA ARA~TIRMALARI DERGISI 93

Wagner, R., (2005). Die neue EG-Verordnung zum Europaischen Vollstreckungstitel, IPRax, s. 189-199.

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04.04.2009, http://eur-lex.europa.eu!LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= OJ:C:2004:098:0005:0007:DE:PDF

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGISI• Cilt 17 • Say1: 1-2 • 2009 95

A VRUPA BiRLiGi'NE iiYELiK SURECiNDE TURKiYE VE ALMANYA'DAKi UNiVERSiTE OGRENCiLERiNiN TURKiYE VE

TURKLER HAKKINDAKi GORUSLERi•

Nurhayat <;ELEBr•

Ozet:

Bu ara:jtzrma, Almanya 'daki universite ogrencileri ile Turk universite ogrencilerinin Avrupa Birligi 'ne (AB) ili:jkin Turkler ve Turkiye hakkmdaki goril:jlerini almak i9in yapzlmz:jlzr. Ara:jtzrmaya Almanya-Bonn Universitesi Turk{:e Mutercim Tercumanlzk ve Asya Dilleri Bolilmunde ogrenim goren 226 ogrenci ile Turkiye-istanbul Marmara ve Almanca olarak 22 madde olarak hazzrlanmz:jtzr. Ankette yer alan 22 maddenin 5 'i ki:jisel bilgileri, diger 17 madde de ogrencilerin AB ile ilgili goru:jlerini yansztmaktadzr. Ki:jisel bilgiler bOlilmunde; ogrencilerin cinsiyet, ya:j, milliyet ve bildikleri yabancz dil ya da diller ile politik egilimleri sorulmu:jtur. Diger 17 maddeden 7'si "Evet, Hayzr, KararslZlm, Fikrim Yok" se9eneklerini i9ermektedir. Altz madde de katzlzmczlarm birden fazla se9enegi i:jaretleyecekleri bi9imde duzenlenmi:jtir. Bir madde, Turkiye 'nin gelir duzeyi ile ilgilidir. U9 madde de a9zk u9lu olarak hazzrlanmz:jtzr. Elde edilen veri/ere gore, iki ogrenci grubunun verdigi cevaplar kar:jzla§tzrmalz olarak yorumlanmz:jtzr. Ara:jtzrma sonu9larma gore, Almanya 'daki universite ogrencileri, Turk universite ogrencilerine gore daha iyimser bir yakla:jzm sergilemi:jlerdir. Her iki ogrenci grubunun AB hakkmda bilgileri 9ok szmrlzdzr ve Turkiye 'nin AB ye giri:ji ile de 90k ilgili degillerdir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birligi, Turkiye, Demokrasi, Politika, Kulturlerarasz Farklzlzk.

* Bu ara~tmna, iki klSlmdan olu~mu~tur. Birinci boliimii " Kuram ve Uygulamada Egitim Bilimleri" dergisinde (2009, Vol.9, Sayi:2) yaymlanmi~tlr. Aym ara~tlrmanm ikinci bOliimii 07-09 Ekim-2009 tarihlerinde M.D. Atatiirk Egitim Fakiiltesi'nde diizenlenen IV. Sosyal Bilimler Egitimi Kongresi'nde bildiri olarak sunulmu~tur.

** Yard. Doy. Dr., Marmara Universitesi, Atatiirk Egitim Fakiiltesi.

96 ONIVERSITE OGRENCILERiNIN TORKIYE VE TORKLER HAKKINDAKI GORO~LERi

Abstract:

This study was conducted to take the opinions of both Turkish and German university students about Turks and Turkey in relation to the European Union. The study was participated in by 226 students studying at the Department of Turkish Translation and Interpreting and Department of Asian Languages at the University of Bonn, Germany, and 270 students studying at the Ataturk Faculty of Education of the Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey. The questionnaire was prepared in Turkish and German languages consisting of 22 items. The questionnaire involves 5 items consisted of personal information and 17 items consisted of the opinions of students related to the EU In the personal info section, the participants have been asked about their age, sex, nationality, political tendencies and the foreign languages they know. 7 out of 17 items involve 'yes, no, indecisive, no idea" options. The other 6 items are organized in a way that the participants can choice more than one option. One item is related Turkey's income level. Three questions are open-ended. According to the acquired data, the responses given by both group of students have been interpreted comparatively. According to the results of the study, the German university students are more optimistic than Turkish university students about Turkey's joining the EU Both student groups have very limited knowledge about the EU and are not much interested in Turkey's joining the EU

Keywords: European Union, Turkey, Democracy, Political, Intercultural Difference.

Giri~:

Avrupa Birligi iiyeligi, Tiirkiye'nin oncelikli hedefleri arasmda giincelligini koruyan bir konudur. Bugiinkii Avrupa Birligi, Avrupa'daki farkh iilke ve kiiltiirlerin bir araya gelmesiyle olu~mu~ bir topluluktur. Birlige dahil iilkeler, kiireselle~en diinyadaki ekonomik ve politik degi~imin ana cizgilerini belirleyen kuramsal cer<;evenin olu~turulmasl i<;in biiyiik bir cab a harcamaktadtrlar.

Avrupa Birligi dii~iincesinin fikir babas1 olarak kabul edilen Jean Monnet, bu yapmm temelini olu~turmu~tur. Monnet'in fikirlerinden esinlenen o zamanki Fransa Dt~i~leri Bakam Robert Schuman (1950) Fransa

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGISI 97

ile Federal Almanya arasmda komi.ir ve 9elik kaynaklannm birle~tirilmesini onermi~ ve bOylece italya, Li.iksemburg, Hollanda, Bel9ika ve Fransa demiryelik i.iri.inlerinde bir ortak pazar yaratma fikriyle bir araya gelerek, Avrupa'da ilk ekonomik birle~meyi geryekle~tirmi~lerdir. Daha sonra, 25 Mart 1951 'de imzalanan Paris Antla~mas1 sonucunda Avrupa Komi.ir ve Ticaret Toplulugu (AKc;T) kurulmu~tur. 25 Mart 1957'de imzalanan Roma Antla~mast'nm 1 Ocak 1958'de yi.iri.irli.ige girmesiyle AKc;T'yi kuran i.ilkeler, Avrupa Atom Enetjisi Toplulugu (AURATOM) ve Avrupa Ekonomik Toplulugu'nun (AET) kurulu~unu ger9ekle~tirmi~lerdir (Bulut, 2005; c;elik, 2006& Demir, 2007). ingiltere, kendi i9 ve d1~ kaynakh siyasi sorunlar1 nedeniyle 1973 yllma kadar Topluluga girmemi~tir. Ancak daha sonraki tarihlerde AB, Avrupa'da geni~leme si.irecine girmi~tir. Bugi.in, AB'ye i.iye i.ilkeler "Tek Bir Pazar" olu~turmak ve i.iye i.ilkelerde yatmmlan arttrarak i.iye i.ilkelerin geli~imlerini saglamak, i~sizligin azalmas1 i9in 9ah~mak, bu i.ilkelerde ya~ayan insanlann ya~am kalitesini arttrmak i9in yah~maktadtrlar. AB'de demokratik degerlerin yi.ikselmesi ve Avrupa'da ban~m si.irekliliginin saglanmas1 i9in yeni politikalar geli~tirilmektedir.

AB 'yi kuran, degi~tiren kurucu antla~malara ek olarak i.iye devletler arasmda bir9ok antla~malar yapllmt~tir. Bunlann en onemlileri olarak; Paris, Roma, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice ve Avrupa Tek Senedi antla~malarmi sayabiliriz. Avrupa Ekonomik Toplulugu'nun "Avrupa Birligi" adtm almas1 1992 Maastricht Antla~masi ile ba~lami~tir (Wallace, 1992; Ozdemir, 2001; Berksoy ve I~Ik, 2004; Nas, 2004; c;elik, 2006& Mayes, 2007).

1987 ytlmda yi.iri.irli.ige giren Avrupa Tek Senedi'nin ba~lang19

boliimi.inde "insan haklan ve demokrasiye baghhk" ifadeleri onemle yer almaktadtr. Bu anla~malar ile "Birlik" vatanda~hgmm hukuki 9er9evesi 9izilmekte, i.iye i.ilke vatanda~lannm serbest9e hareket etme, yerle~me ve vatanda~hk haklannm korunmas1 ve demokrasiye baghhk gibi" onemli adtmlann atilmasi saglanmi~tir. Ozellikle Maastricht Antla~masmda, i.iye devletlerin ki.ilti.irel geli~mesine katktda bulunulmast, ki.ilti.irel ve dilsel 9e~itlilige saygt gosterilmesi ve AB'nin 1990 sonras1 donemindeki genel stratejileri baglammda toplumsal, ekonomik ve siyasal degi~kenlerle birlikte degerlendirilmesine ili~kin hi.iki.imler onemlidir. Yine AB, AB 'ye girmek isteyen aday i.ilkelerden Kopenhag kriterlerinin uygulanmasmi istemektedir. Kopenhag kriterlerinde, "istikrarh ve kurumsalla~m1~ bir demokrasinin var olmast, hukuk dev1eti ve hukukun iisti.inliigu, insan haklanna saygt ve azmhklarm korunmast" ile ilgili hi.iki.imlerin kagtt i.izerinde kalmamast ve uygu1amada da gori.ilmesi gerektigi vurgu1anmaktadtr. AB'nin bu 9abalan,

98 ONiVERSiTE OGRENCiLERiNiN TORKiYE VE TORKLER HAKKINDAKi G0R0$LERi

<;ok kiiltiirliiliik ve kiiltiirel <;ogulculuk anlay1~1 etrafmda ger<;ekle~mektedir. Ancak bu <;abalara ragmen, AB 'deki sorunlar heniiz <;6ziilmii~ degildir (Ulger, 2003; Duparch, 1992, akt. Ilgaz, Demir, 2006; Andy, El-Agraa, 2007, Mayes, 2007; Ulger, 2003; Musaoglu, 2004; TEU, 1992& Demir, 2007).

Tiirkiye'nin Avrupa Ekonomik Toplulugu'na iiye olmak i<;in ilk miiracaatl Temmuz 1959 yllmda yapllm1~t1r. Tiirkiye ile Topluluk ili~kileri, 12 Eyliil 1963 tarihinde Ankara'da imzalanan "Ortakhk (Ankara) Anla~mas1" ile resmiyet kazanm1~t1r. 1996' da ba~layan Giimriik Birligi Anla~mas1 ve sonrasmda Helsinki Zirvesi (1999) ve ardmdan 3 Ekim 2005'te miizakerelere ba~lanmas1 yoniinde Zirve karan ile Tiirkiye'nin iiyelik siireci AB 'de en fazla tart1~Ilan onemli konulardan biri haline gelmi~tir. Boylece Tiirkiye ile AB arasmdaki ili~ki, <;ok onemli bir doniim noktasm1 a~arak Tiirkiye'nin AB'ye tam iiyeligini hedefleyen yepyeni bir siirece girmi~tir (D1~ Ticaret Miiste~arhg1, 2007).

Tiirkiye, ba~ta insan haklan ve demokrasi alanlannda olmak iizere Avrupa Birligi miiktesebati niteligindeki evrensel normlar ile ilgili uygulamalara daha fazla uyum saglamak amac1yla 2001 y1hnda Ulusal Program1'm haz1rlam1~ ve AB'ye sunmu~tur. Bu program; ozgiirliik<;ii, kat1hmc1, giivenceli, devlet organlan arasmda gorev ve yetkileri dengeleyen, hukuk devleti ilkesini iistiin k1lan Anayasa ve yasa hiikiimlerinin, Tiirkiye'nin uluslararas1 taahhiitleri ile AB standartlan temelinde daha da geli~tirilmesine yonelik olmas1 bak1mmdan onemlidir. Programda "siyasi, ekonomik, kiiltiir, Giimriik Birligi, serbest dola~1m,

sermaye, vergi, parasal birlik gibi" bir<;ok alanda gerekli olan reformlann yapllmas1 wm gerekli diizenlemeler Tiirkiye 'nin onemli giindem maddelerini olu~turmaktad1r. Aynca Tiirkiye, tiim uluslararas1 sozle~melere taraf olacagma ve bunlann etkin ~ekilde uygulanmasm1 saglayacak tedbirleri alacagma ili~kin imzalad1g1 antla~ma metnine uygun olarak kararhhgm1, bir<;ok alanda yapm1~ oldugu reformlarla gostermektedir. Tiirkiye'nin AB iiyeligi i<;in Kopenhag ol<;iitleri olarak bilinen ortakhk belgesinde belirtilen "siyasi, ekonomik ve topluluk mevzuatmm benimsenmesi" ile ilgili AB kriterlerine uyum konusunda yapm1~ oldugu reformlar i<;inde 17 Ekim 2001 'de yiiriirliige giren Anayasa degi~ikligi bu yolda onemli bir ad1md1r (Resmi Gazete, 2001; Kula, 2003; Kopenhag Kriterleri, 22 Haziran 2003& ABGS, 2009). Fakat Tiirkiye'nin AB'nin geni~leme siireci i<;inde, son ylllarda yap1sal olarak ger<;ekle~tirmi~

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGiSI 99

oldugu reformlar heniiz istenilen duzeye ula~amam1~tlr. Tiirkiye ekonomisi i<;in sfirdiliiilebilir bir donemin ba~lay1p ba~lamad1g1 en iyimser tahminlerde bile hala belirsiz bir gorfinfim <;izmektedir (Saygll10glu, Bilgin& An, 2003). Tfukiye'nin fiyelige kabul ko~ullanm yerine getirebilmesi konusunda Katlhm Ortakhg1 Belgesi'nde yer alan hususlann neler oldugu a<;Ik<;a belirlenmi~tir. Ancak, AB Komisyonu raporunda, Tiirkiye'nin mfizakere surecinden itibaren yapm1~ oldugu <;ah~malann yeterli olmad1g1, "sivil anayasa <;ah~malannm sonu<; vermedigi, yolsuzlukla miicadeledeki ba~ans1zhk, dini ozgiirliikler, cinsiyet aynmc1hgi, kiiltfuel haklar, K1bns gibi" konularda ilerleme kaydedilmedigi ele~tirilmi~, demokrasi ve insan haklanm gii<;lendirecek reformlann yapllmas1 <;agnsmda bulunulmu~tur

(NTVMSNBC, 2008).

Sosyal bilimciler, diinya politikalannda dinsel konular i<;in yenile~me <;abalanna dikkat <;ekmektedirler. Ancak, AB i<;inde baz1 formal olmayan politikalar izlenmekte ya da islam kar~Itl bir yapllanma izlenmektedir (Silvestri, 2006). AB 'de din ozgiirlugune ili~kin onemli hususlardan birisi de AB anayasasmda "H1ristiyanhk" kavramma yer verilmemesi karan, uzun tart1~malardan sonra almm1~t1r. "Din" sozcfigu Avrupa'daki rum dinleri kar~Ilayacak bi<;imde "Giri~" sayfasmda "kiiltfu ve insani degerlerle birlikte Avrupa'nm mirasm1 olu~turan degerler" arasma eklenmi~tir (Ilgaz, 2004). AB; laisizm, sosyal bildirgeler, sosyal haz1rhk ve sosyal ilgi olmakslZln, ozellikle ki~isel inan<;lara izin verilmesini de istemektedir. Toplulugun payla~Ilan degerlerinden biri ozel inan<;land1r (Banus, 2005). 1990'dan beri AB'nin izledigi politikalarda laiklik, yeni bir egilim olarak goriilmektedir. AB'ye fiye ulkeler, dengeli olarak ulusal farkhhklan kabul etme ve kendi normlan ile diger Ulkeler arasmda ortaya <;1kan tereddfitleri gidermeye <;ah~maktad1r (Phinnemore, 2003).

Tfukiye' de islam dininin to plum fizerinde onemli bir etkisi bulunmaktad1r. Ancak Turkiye laik bir iilkedir. Devlet yonetiminde dinin hi<;bir ag1rhg1 yoktur. Yasal alanda laikle~me, Kemalist hareketin getirdigi bir yenilik degildir. Ulkenin islami bir devlet oldugu donemlerden ba~layarak sfiren ve ad1m ad1m ~ekillenmi~ bir sfire<;tir (<;imen, 2007).

Tfukiye'nin AB fiyeligi AB'de ve Tfukiye'de toplumun her kesiminde tart1~Ilmaktad1r. AB, Tfukiye'nin AB'ye giri~ i<;in henfiz haz1r olmad1g1 gorfi~findedir. Herhangi bir aday i<;in uygulanan ko~ullan Tiirkiye'nin yerine getirmesi durumunda bile, omegin Fransa, fiyelik vetosunu kullanabilecegini belirtmektedir. Bugiin, Tfukiye'de kiireselle~en diinyaya

100 ONiVERSiTE CGRENCiLERiNIN TORKiYE VE TORKLER HAKKINDAKi GCR0$LERi

uyum konusunda AB 'ye girmek isteyen bir grup ile radikal sag ve sol gruplann engelleyici gorii~leri vard1r. Radikal gruplar, AB iiyeliginin emperyalizmin ve kapitalizmin iistiinliigu oldugunu, ulusal bag1mhhk yaratacagm1 dii~iiniirken, bir klSlm grup da AB'ye girmemizin gelecek ac;1smdan pek c;ok faydalan oldugunu, bilhassa Bah ile entegrasyonun saglanmasmda ekonomik yonden c;ok onemli bir pazar olu~turdugunu dile getirmektedirler (Dartan, 2002; Browne, 2005& Crisis Group, 2007). Bu tart1~malann devam ettigi siirec; ic;inde, Tiirkiye'nin AB'ye giri~i ile ilgili Tiirkiye'deki ve Almanya'daki iiniversite ogrencilerinin gorii~lerine

ba~vurulmu~tur. <;iinkii bu ogrencilerin gelecekte Tiirkiye'de ve Almanya'da c;ah~abilecekleri ve onemli gorevler iistlenebilecekleri dii~iiniildiigunde, onlann AB ile ilgili gorii~leri bizim ic;in onem ta~1maktad1r.

Bu amac;la, Tiirkiye ve Almanya'daki ogrencilerin Avrupa Birligi ile ilgili Tiirkiye ve Tiirkler hakkmdaki gorii~leri anket yoluyla toplanm1~ ve anket sonuc;lanna gore iki ogrenci grubunun gorii~leri kar~Ila~tmlm1~br. Bu ara~tlrmamn temel problemi olarak "Tiirk ve Alman ogrencilerin Tiirkiye'nin AB'ye giri~i ile ilgili genel olarak Tiirkiye ve Tiirkler hakkmdaki gorii~leri nedir?" sorusu ahnm1~ ve yamtlanrnaya c;ah~Ilmi~t1r.

Yontem:

Bu ara~tlrmadaki veriler, betimsel ara~tlrma yontemlerinden olan genel tarama tipi bir c;ah~ma modeli kullamlarak degerlendirilmi~tir.

Evren ve Orneklem:

Ara~tlrmamn c;ah~ma evrenini, 2006-2007 ogretim y1lmda Almanya Bonn Universitesi Tiirkc;e Miitercim ve Terciimanhk Boliimii ile Asya Dilleri Boliimiinde okuyan yabanc1 ogrenciler (420) ile Marmara Universitesi Atatiirk Egitim Fakiiltesi Yabanc1 Diller ile Sosyal Bilimler ve Fen Bilgisi Boliimlerinde okuyan ogrenciler (1145) olu~turmaktad1r.

Rastlanhsal ornekleme ahnan c;ah~ma grubu, her iki evrenden sec;ilen (Almanya'dan 226, Tiirkiye'den 270) 476 iiniversite ogrencisinden olu~maktad1r. Tiirkiye'deki iiniversite ogrencileri 3 ve 4. s1mf, Almanya'daki ogrenciler ise; 5- 6- 7-8. somestre ogrencileridir. Ara~tlrmada iic; ve dordiincii s1mf ogrencilerinin tercih edilmesinin nedeni, bu s1mflarda okuyan ogrencilerin ya~ olarak egitim kariyerlerinin onemli bir devresini olu~turduklan ve anket sorulanna daha saghkh cevap verecekleri dii~iincesinden kaynaklanmaktad1r. Almanya'daki Bonn Universitesi Tiirkc;e


Miitercim ve Terciimanhk ile Asya ve Dogu Dilleri Boliimlerinin seyili~ nedeni, ogrencilerin yogunun Tiirkyeyi bilmeleri ve Tiirkiye hakkmda bilgilerinin olmas1d1r. Her iki iilkede de anketin uygulama siiresi iki ay1 bulmu~tur. Her iki gruptan ogrencilerin eksik doldurduklan gerekyesiyle 17 anket degerlendirmeye ahnmami~tlr. Ogrencilerin ki~isel ozellikleri ve AB hakkmdaki gorii~leri a~ag1da verilmi~tir.

Veri Toplama Arac1

Ara~tlrmada, veri toplama arac1 olarak anket kullamlmi~tlr. Anket sorulan, ara~tirmaci tarafmdan geli~tirilmi~, ancak anketteki birkay soru Dartan, Nas, Akman ve Savran'm (2004) AB ile ilgili yaptiklan bir ara~tlrmadan yararlamlarak olu~turulmu~tur. Anketin Almanca dil geyerliginin anla~Ihrhgmi test etmek iyin Tiirkye ve Almanca'ya hakim dart Universite ogretim iiyesi ile Almanya'da iiniversite ogrencisi olan Tiirk ve Alman ii~Y ogrenciden yararlanilmi~tir. Anketin birinci bOliimii 22 maddeden olu~mu~tur. Bu boliim, bir ba~ka ara~tirmada aynca degerlendirilmi~tir (<;elebi, 2009). Anketin ikinci bOliimiinde 17 madde yer alrm~t1r. Ankette, aynca be~ soru, ki~isel bilgileri iyermektedir. Ki~isel bilgiler boliimiinde; ogrencilerin cinsiyet, ya~, milliyet ve bildikleri yabanc1 dil ve diller ile politik egilimleri sorulmu~tur. Bu 17 sorudan 7'si "Evet, Hay1r, Kararsizim, Fikrim Yok" seyeneklerini iyermektedir. Bu sorular, "Tiirkiye'nin genel goriiniimii (4 soru), ogrenci degi~im programlan (1soru), bildikleri iiniversiteler ve adlan (1 soru) ve hayattan memnuniyet duyma (1 soru) ile ilgilidir. Diger 6 madde, katihmcilann birden fazla se<;enegi i~aretleyecekleri biyimde diizenlenmi~ ve ogrencilerin degi~ik ayilardan Tiirkiye'ye ve uluslar aras1 kurumlara yakla~Imlan irdelenmi~tir. Bir soru da Tiirkiye'nin gelir diizeyi ile ilgilidir. U!Y soru da a<;Ik Uylu olarak diizenlenmi~tir. Bu sorular, "Bildikleri Tiirk politikacilan, bildikleri iiniversitelerin adlan ve bildikleri dergi ya da bir makale ad1" ile ilgilidir. Ara~tirma, Tiirk ve Alman ogrencilerin AB 'ye giri~i ile ilgili anket maddelerine verdikleri yamtlarla sm1rh tutulmu~tur.

Verilerin <;ozfimlenmesi

Ara~tlrma verileri, SPSS istatistik paket program1 kullamlarak yoziimlenmi~tir. istatistiksel analizlerde frekans ve yiizdelik kullamlrm~tir. Analiz sonuylan, konu benzerligine gore gruplandmlarak bir ba~hk altmda tab1olar haline getirilmi~ ve yorumlanmi~tlr.

102 ONiVERSiTE OGRENCiLERINiN TORKIYE VE TORKLER HAKKINDAKi G0R0$LERi

Bulgu ve Y orumlar

Ki~isel ozelliklere gore; Ara~tlrmaya katllan Almanya'daki iiniversite ogrencilerinin %31 'i (70) erkek, %69'u (156) kadmdtr. Ya~ gruplanna gore; en fazla 20-23 ya~ (%36,3), sonra 24-26 ya~ (%33,6) gelmektedir. Milliyetlerine gore; ara~ttrmaya kattlanlann %73 'ii Alman' dtr. Digerleri, ba~ka iilke vatanda~landtr. Bildikleri yabanct dillere gelince; Almanya'daki ogrencilerin %63,7'si iyi derecede iki yabanct dil, digerleri ii<; ve daha <;ok yabanct dil bilmektedirler. Politik egilimlerine gore; ogrencilerin %59,3 'ii, kendilerini sosyal demokrat, %10,6'st muhafazakar, %16,4'ii de liberal olarak tammlamt~lardtr. Ogrencilerin %15'i ise herhangi bir gorii~ bildirmemi~tir.

Marmara Universitesi Atatiirk Egitim Fakiiltesi'nde okuyan ogrencilerin %33,7'si (91) erkek, %66,3'ii (179) kadmdtr. Ya~ gruplanna gore; ogrencilerin %87,8'si 20-23 ya~, % 12,2'si 24-26 ya~ grubu arasmdadtr. Milliyet durumlanna gore; ogrencilerin %95,2'si kendilerini Tiirk,% 4,6'st Kurt olarak tammlamt~tlr. Yabanct dil olarak; ogrencilerin %64,8'i orta diizeyde ingilizce, digerleri ise <;ok az derecede Almanca, italyanca ve Franstzca bildiklerini belirtmi~lerdir. Politik egilimlerine gore; ogrencilerin %34,8'i kendilerini sosyal demokrat, %21,5'i muhafazakar olarak tammlamt~tlr. <:;ok az saytdaki ogrenci kendisini liberal, sosyalist olarak tammlam1~t1r. Ogrencilerin %18'i ise hi<;bir gorii~ bildirmemi~tir.

Ara~tirmaya Katdan Ogrencilerin Tiirkiye'ye ve Tiirkiye'nin AB'ye giri~i ile ilgili Gorii~leri:

Ara~ttrmaya katllan Tiirk ve Alman iiniversitelerindeki ogrencilerin Tiirkiye'ye ve Tiirkiye'nin AB'ye giri~i ile ilgili gorii~leri a~agtda verilmi~tir:

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGiSl 103

Tablo 1. Ogrencilerin Tiirkiye'nin Genel Goriiniimii ile ilgili Dii~iincelerini Gosteren Dagdun

Tfirkiye'nin Genel Ulke Evet Hayrr KararslZ Fikriyok Gori.infimii

f % f % f % f % Tfirkiye' de etnik aymmcthk: olduguna Aim 73 32,3 151 66,8 - 2 0,9 inamyormusunuz? TUrk 13 4,9 244 90,4 10 3,7 3 1,1

Tfirkiye'nin din ve k:iiltUr farkhh~Tfirk:iye'ninAB'ye Aim. 72 31,9 153 67,7 - 1 0,4 giri~ini etkiler mi? TUrk 121 44,8 123 45,6 22 8,1 I 0,4

Tfirkiye' de ban k:admlarm ortfirlmeleri (tUrban ve yar¢) AB i~ bir sorun Aim 104 46,0 114 50,4 3 1,3 5 2,2 yaratrr m1? Tfirk 74 27,4 167 61,9 22 8,1 7 2,6

Tiirk: halk:mm AB 'ye uyeliginde bir kimlik sorunu Y*yacagma inantyor Aim 160 70,8 57 25,2 9 4,0 musunuz? TUrk: 169 62,6 64 23,7 32 11,9 5 1,8 N:226 (Almanya'daki ogrenciler), N: 270 (lUrk ogrenciler)

Tablol 'e gore: Tiirk ogrencilerin %90,4'u, Almanya'daki ogrencilerin %66,8'i Turkiye'de bir etnik sorun ya~anmadtgmt dile getirmektedirler. Tiirk ogrencilerin %45,6'st, Almanya'daki ogrencilerin de %67,7'si din ve ktiltur farkhhgmm Turkiye'nin AB'ye gm~m1 etkilemeyecegini du~unmektedirler. Ancak din ve ktiltur farkhhgmm Turkiye i<;in her zaman tartt~ma konusu yapilmast Turk ogrencilerin bu konuda olumsuz du~unmelerine yol a<;maktadtr. Almanya'daki ogrencilerin %46'st, Turk ogrencilerin %27'4'u, kadmlann dinsel bir simge olarak tUrban takmalanndan ve <;ar~af giymelerinden rahatstzhk duymaktadtrlar. Bulbul, Ozipek ve Kalm'm (2008) mtilakat yoluyla <;e~itli ~ehirlerde ki~ilerle ytiz ytize yapttklan gorti~melerde; genelde ara~ttrmaya kattlanlann Batt 'ya ili~kin kayttstzhk i<;inde olduklanm, Htristiyanhga ili~kin negatif ya da kollileyici bir dil kullanmadtklanm, ancak Batt ktilttirtine ve ktireselle~menin ktilttirel etkisine yonelik bir korku ve endi~e i<;inde olduklanm gozlemi~lerdir. Katthmctlar, Tiirkiye'nin AB'ye giri~ine olumlu

104 ONIVERSiTE OGRENCILERINiN TORKIYE VE TORKLER HAKKINDAKi GOR0$LERI

bakmaktadtrlar. Miilakat yaptlan ki~ilerin c;ok azt, AB'nin din eksenli ve AB'nin bir "Htristiyan ittifakt" olduguna inanmaktadtr. Katthmctlann c;ogu, Tiirkiye 'de insan haklanna ili~kin sorunlann oldugunu kabul etmekte, ancak Batth devletlerinin bu konudaki ele~tirilerini samimiyetsiz bulmaktadtr. Burada ilgi c;eken sonuc; ise, Miisliiman olmamn AB'ye girmek ic;in Tiirkiye ac;lSlndan degil ama AB ac;tsmdan bir engel olu~tugu yoniinde bir kanaat gozlenmi~tir. Witzens (2005), A vrupa Birligi 'nin Tiirklerin belirttigi gibi, AB'nin bir Htristiyan Kuliibii olmadtgmt, aksine iilkelerin alt kiiltiirel topluluklannm olu~turdugu bir "Birlik" oldugunu vurgulamaktadtr. Witzens, bugiin ve gelecekte bile farklt dinlerde ve etnik toplumlarda tek merkezli yonetimden soz edilemeyecegini, rasyonalizm, liberalizm, laiklik gibi fikirlere dayanan c;ok yonlii kiiltiirel Birliklerin olu~turdugu bir yaptla~manm kac;mtlmaz oldugundan soz etmektedir.

Aynca Tiirkiye'nin AB'ye iiyeligi durumunda Almanya'daki ogrencilerin %70,8'i, Tiirk ogrencilerin %62,6'st Tiirklerin bir kimlik sorunu ya~ayacagma inanmaktadtr. Kimlikle ilgili olarak tartt~tlan

"Avrupahla~ma kavramt", "Avrupa kirnligi ve Avrupa siyasal topluluk duygusunun geli~imi" olarak goriilmektedir. Bu siirec;te iist A vrupa kimliginin ulusal kimliklerin yerine gec;erek onlan yok etmeye dogru gotiiriip gotiirmeyecegi veya kolektif kimliklerin A vrupa ulusal veya bOlgesel diizeyler arasmda bOliiniip bOliinmeyecegi tartt~tlmalan zaman ic;inde goriilecektir (Nezihoglu, 2000). Tiirkiye, AB amacma uygun olarak demokrasi ve ozgiirliiklerin alamm geni~lettigi siirece, bilhassa A vrupa' da en fazla Tiirklerin bulundugu Almanya' daki Tiirklerin c;agda~ bir kimlik geli~tirmelerine de katkt saglayacakttr (Kula, 2003).

AVRUPA ARA~TIRMALARI DERGiSI 105

Tablo 2. Ogrencilerin Tiirkiye'nin Tamtdmasmda Etkili Oldugwm Dii~dillderi Faktorleri Gosteren Dagmm

Faktorler Aim. Ogrenci Tiirk Qgrenci f % f %

TV 208 38,6 197 23,5 Kitap 19 3,5 97 11,5 Konferans- seminer 66 12,3 69 8,2 Radyo 28 5,2 31 3,7 internet 87 16,2 158 18,8 GOniillfi kumlupar 13 2,4 103 12,3 Parti t~atlan 27 5,0 33 3,9 Dergivegazeteler 80 14,8 137 16,3 B~a 11 2,0 15 1,8 Top lam 539 100,0 840 100,0

Tablo 2'ye gore; Tiirk ve Alman ogrenciler, Tiirkiye'nin tamtllmasmda en ~ok televizyonun etkili oldugunu dii~iinmektedir. Daha sonra tamttmda etkili olarak internet, gazete ve dergiler gelmektedir. "Ba~ka" se~enegini i~aretleyen Alman ogrenciler, Tiirkiye'nin tamttlmast i~in akademik tartt~ma ve forumlann yapllmasmt, turistik ve kiiltiirel gezilere onem verilmesini istemektedirler. Tiirk ogrenciler ise; Avrupa'da Tiirk okullanmn a~tlmasmt, sivil toplum orgiitleri ile spor, sanat~t, edebiyat ve bilimsel alanda yeti~mi~ elemanlann Tiirkiye'nin tamtlmmda onemli roller iistlenebileceklerini belirtmi~lerdir.

Tablo 3. AB Ulkeleri Arasmda Ogrenci DegiJim Programlarmm Ulkenin Tamtdmasmdaki Katklsmt GOsteren Daglhm

Degi'im Programlan Aim.Ogrenci Tiirk Ogrenci f % f %

Evet 159 70,4 199 73,7 Hayrr 41 18,1 36 13,3 Fikrimyok 26 11,5 35 13,0 Top lam 226 100,0 270 100,0

Tablo 3'e gore ogrenciler, ogrenci degi~im programlanmn iilkenin tamtlmt a~tsmdan Tiirkiye 'ye geni~ ol~iide katkt sagladtgmt dii~iinmektedir

106 ONIVERSiTE OGRENCILERiNiN TORKIYE VE TORKLER HAKKINDAKI G0R0l?LERI

(Alm. Ogr.%70,4, Tiirk Ogr. %73,7). Erasmus kapsammda ogrenci degi~im programlan; A vrupa universite agmm kurulmast, ogrenci burs projesinin uygulanmast, okul egitiminde kalitenin artmlmas1, diplomalann e~degerliginin tamnmas1, okul egitirninde yah~an personelin mesleki geli~iminin saglanmast, ogrenci ve ogretim uyesi degi~imi ve degi~im ilgili kurulu~lara ve yaymlara parasal destek saglanmas1 gibi uygulamalan iyermektedir. Bu programlar, uye ulkelerden gelen genylerinin birbirlerini tammalan, kiiltiir ve dillerini ogrenmeleri aytsmdan son derece yararh olmaktadtr (Sezgin, 2001; iKV, 2005& Horvath, 2007). Bu programlar sayesinde ulke halklan iyin onyargth davram~lar da zamanla azalacakttr.

Tablo4.. Alman Ogrenc:ilerin Tii:rlriye'de Tiirk ogrenc:ilerin Alm.:mya'da Bildikleri Universite Olnp Olmadlgm.J GOsteren Dag.hm

Bildikleri Universite

Evet Hayli' Fikrim yok Toplam

Alm.Ogrenci. f %

119 79;1 37 16,4 10 4.4

226 100,0

TUrk Ogrenci. f %

40 14.8 219 81,1

11 4,1 270 100.0

Tablo 4'e gore; Alman ogrencilerin %79,2'si Turkiye'de, Tiirk ogrencilerin ise sadece %14,8'i Almanya'da bildikleri universite oldugunu belirtmi~tir. Alman ogrencilerin Tiirkiye'de en yok bildikleri universiteler; Ankara, ODTU, Bogaziyi, Kay, Ege, Galatasaray ve istanbul Universitesi'dir. Turk ogrenciler; Goethe, Koln, Heidelberg, Berlin, Hamburg, Mannheim Universitelerini saymt~tlr. Ancak Tiirk ogrenciler, iilke adlanm da kan~tlrmt~tlr. Turk ogrencilerden bir ktsmt, Edinburgh Universitesini Almanya'da olarak yazmt~tlr. Aynca Turk birkay ogrenci de "bilmeme gerek yok" ifadesini kullanmt~tlr.

"Turkiye ile ilgili yaymlanan bilimsel bir yaym, dergi ya da makale ismi biliyor musunuz?" ~eklinde aytk uylu olarak sorulan bu soruyu Almanya'daki ogrencilerin %94'ii bo~ btrakmt~tlr. Almanya'daki ogrencilerden dergi ismi yazan olmamt~tlr. Ancak birka9 ogrenci, tlp alamnda birkay makalede Tiirk adma rastladtklanm belirtmi~tir. Turk ogrencilerin ise %67,8'i dergi ve makale ismini bildigini ifade etrni~, ancak dergi isimleri olarak yok az ogrenci cevaplamt~tlr. Cevap veren ogrenciler,


dergi ad1 olarak "Bilim ve Teknik, S1zmt1" dergilerini yazm1~tlr. Yazar olarak da birkac; ogrenci "Oktay Sinanoglu ve ismail Bekc;i" isimlerini yazm1~tlr. Bu yamtlar, ogrencilerin dergi ve bunun gibi bilimsel yaymlarla ilgilenmediklerini gostermektedir.

Tab:lo 5. Ognmcilerin Tiirk Politikaabrun Nasd Bu.lduk:brou Gfisterea Dagdml

Ahn.Ogrenci TUrk Ogrenci TUrk Politikacdan f % f %

i~en. samimi 59 23.4 46 ll,6 Giivenilir 3& 15,1 45 11,3 Dengesiz 63 25.0 11& 29,6 <;lkara 65 25,& 115 2&,9 Egitimsiz 19 7,5 63 15,& B~ g 3,2 11 2,& Toplam 252 100,0 39& 100.0

Tablo 5'e gore; Almanya'daki ogrencilerin %25,8'i Turk politikac1lanm c;Ikarcl, %25'i dengesiz, %23,4'u ic;ten ve samimi olarak nitelemi~tir. Tiirk ogrencilerin ise %29,6'sl Tiirk politikacllanm dengesiz, %28,9'u 91karc1 bulmaktad1r. "Ba~ka" sec;enegini i~aretleyen Almanya'daki ogrenciler, Tiirk politikacllanm "yolsuzluk yapan, inatc;1, koltuk sevdahs1, bencil, ilerleme ic;in c;abada yetersiz olan ki~iler" olarak gormektedir. Tiirk ogrenciler de, "ciddiyetsiz, rantp, ama iyi niyetli, d1~ politikada ba~anh ki~iler" olarak nitelemektedir. Goriildugu gibi her iki grup da Turk politikacllanm olumsuz algllamaktad1r.

Ac;1k uc;lu olarak, Alman ogrencilere, "Bildiginiz Turk Politikacllann adlar1", Tiirk ogrencilere de "Bildiginiz AB'ye uye ulke politikacllann adlar1" sorulmu~tur. Almanya'daki ogrencilerin c;ok az1 bu soruyu yamtlam1~hr. Turk politikacllan olarak; Tayyip Erdogan, Tansu <;iller ve Siileyman Demirel'in isimlerini yazm1~lard1r. Tiirk ogrenciler ise; Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel, Tony Blair, Silvio Berlusconi, Kostantin Karamanlis, Gerhard SchrOder, Jacques Chirac, Javier Solona ve Claudia Roth isimlerini yazm1~hr. Ancak Gonzales Rice, Bill Clinton, George Bush, Kofi Annan ve George Clooney gibi Amerikah politikac1 ve sanatc;1 isimlerini de yazanlar olmu~tur- Birkac; ogrenci de "tammak istemiyorum" ifadesini kullanm1~hr.

108 ONIVERSiTE OGRENCILERiNiN TORKIYE VE TORKLER HAKKINDAKI G0R0$LERI

Tablo 6. Ognmcilerin Tiirk insamm Nasd Tanwhkl:nma ~ GOriiJ)erini GOsteren Dagdon

TUrk iDS3D1 Ahn.Ogrenci TUrk Ogrenci f % f %

Sevecen. sempatik 130 29.9 130 14,4 Giivenilmez 35 8.0 144 15,9 i~en 80 18.4 178 19,7 To1eransh 46 10.6 78 8.6 Dengesiz ll 2.5 68 7.5 K.avgaa ll 2.5 97 10.7 Aktif 23 5,3 7l 7.9 K.aba 50 11.5 55 6.1 Kuma.z 33 7.6 60 6,7 K.atlamlmaz 10 2,3 14 1.6 B~ 6 1,4 9 1.0 Toplam 435 100.0 904 100.0

Tablo 6'ya gore; Almanya'daki universite ogrencilerinin %30'u, Turk insamm "sevecen ve sempatik ve i~ten" olarak tammlarken, Tfukiye' deki universite ogrencilerinin %19,7'si "i~ten ama giivenilmez" olarak tammlamt~tlr. Yine Tfuk ogrencilerin, Almanya' daki ogrencilerden ayn olarak Turk insamm "kavgact" olarak tammlamalan dikkat ~ekicidir.

"Ba~ka" se~enegini i~aretleyen Almanya' daki ogrencilerin bir ktsmt Tfuk insamm; "yardtmsever, misafirperver, comert" olarak olumlu yonden algtlarken; bir ktsm1 "katl, ho~goriisiiz, geri kalmt~, gelecek i¢in kaygtstz, ihtirash, i~ten pazarhkh" olarak olumsuz yonden algtlamaktadtr. Aynca "bullin insanlar birbirine benzer, her toplumda ~e~itli karakterde insanlar vardtr" diyen ogrenciler de olmu~tur. Turk ogrenciler ise; Turk insamm "zeki, ~evik, ahlakh, misafirperver, art niyetli, ~tkarct" olarak nitelemektedirler. A VCl 'nm (2007), universite ogrencileri iizerinde yaptlgt bir ara~ttrmada da ogrenciler, Tfuk insamm "kumaz-tutucu, ho~goriilukonuksever, yurtsever ve durust" olarak yorumlamt~lardtr. Aydm'm 1989-96 ytllan arasmda ingiltere'de Turkiye'nin Batl'daki imaj1 uzerine yapt1g1 ~ah~mada, vatanda~lann yanh~ bilgiye sahip oldugu, halen erkeklerin fesli, kadmlann kara ~ar~aflt olarak algtlandtgt belirtilmi~tir (Aydm, 2009). Turizm Bakanhgt'nm (2009) ~e~itli Ulkelerden ulkemize gelen turistlere yaptlrdtgt ankete gore turistler; Turk insam ile ilgili olumlu goru~lere sahip olarak ulkemizden aynldtklanm ve Tfuk insamm genelde "misafirperver, arkada~ canhst, dost, rahatlahct" olarak tamd1klanm belirtmi~lerdir.


Tablo 7. Ogrenc:ilerin En Fazb Giiven Duydnklan Kunun ve ToplululrlangOsteren Dagdun Kmum.veK~ Alm.Ogrenci T-iirk Ogrenci

f % f % Sivil Toplum K1IIUlu§lan 32 5.3 52 19,2 Avrupa insan Haldan Mahkemesi 44 7.3 56 20,7 NATO 108 18,0 31 11,4 A vrupa Birligi 98 16,3 19 7,0 BirlqmiJ Milletler 54 9,0 19 7,0 Diinya Ticaret OrgU.tii 27 4,5 ll 4,1 IMF ve Diinya Bankast 44 7.3 15 5,6 Diinya Saghk QrgUtii 15 12,5 19 29,3 UNESCO 83 13,8 18 6,7 Uluslararas1 Adalet Divam 36 6,0 28 10,4 Bll§ka ll 4,1 Top]am. 601 100,0 339 100,0

Tablo 7'ye gore, Alman ogrenciler NATO, Avrupa Birligi ve UNESCO'ya gtivenmektedir. Tfirk ogrenciler ise, Diinya Saghk Orgtitii, Avrupa insan Haklan Mahkemesi ve Sivil Toplum Kurulu~lan'm en gtivenli kurulu~lar olarak gormektedirler. Ancak bu tablodan Turk ve Almanya'daki ogrencilerin uluslar aras1 bu kurulu~lar hakkmda fazla bilgiye sahip olmad1klan da anla~Ilmaktad1r. Dartan ve arkada~lanmn (2004) yapt1g1 ara~tlrmaya gore ogrenciler en gtivendikleri kurum olarak; Sivil Toplum Kurulu~lan'm gostermi~lerdir. Kiis;iikcan ve Giingor'iin (2006), Sivil Toplum Orgtitleri'nin Avrupah Tiirkler iizerinde biiyiik etkisi oldugunu, Tfirkiye'nin AB iiyeligi sfirecinde Avrupah Tiirklerin AB ve Tfirkiye arasmda bir koprii olu~turdugunu ve onemli katkllar yapabilecegini vurgulamaktad1rlar.

110 ONiVERSiTE OGRENCiLERiNiN TORKiYE VE TORKLER HAKKINDAKi GOR0$LERi

Tablo Sa. Tti.rkiye'deki Ogrencilerin AB ve Tti.rkiye'nin Uygulatbga Politikalar ile ilgm GoriiJ)erini GOsteren Dagdun

AB Politikalan Tmki.ye Politikalan Politikalar f % f % Para Politikas1 46 5,0 184 11,7 Tanm 31 3,4 203 13,0 Savunma 16 1,7 218 13,9 D~Politika 41 4,4 187 11,9 i§siztik 141 15,3 86 5,5 <;evre Sag!~ 135 14,6 94 6,0 Saghk ve Sosyal Hizmetler 136 14,7 95 6,1 Egitim 103 11,1 126 8,0 Adalet ve Y argt 92 10,0 137 8,7 Teror 99 10,7 113 7,2 G~ 84 9,1 124 7,9 Toplam 924 100,0 1567 100,0

Tablo 8a'ya gore; Turk ogrenciler, en fazla Tiirkiye'yi tanm, savunma, para ve dt~ politika yoniinden ba~anh bulmaktadtrlar. AB 'yi ise, i~sizlikle miicadele, s;evre saghgt, saghk ve sosyal hizmetler ve egitim yoniinden ba~anh bulmaktadtrlar.

Tablo 8b. Alm.anya'daki Ogrencilerin AB ve Tti.rkiye'nin Uygubcbga Politikab.r ile ilgiJi GOriqlerini GOsteren Dag.lun

Politikalar Para Politikast Tanm Savunma D!.§ Politika i§sizlik Sorunu <;evre Saghg1 Saghk: ve Sosy.Hizm. Egitim Adalet ve Y argt Teror G~ Toplam

AB Politikalan f %

40 7,3 36 6,6 36 6,6 52 9,5 43 7,8 61 lU 69 12,5 50 9,1 63 ll,S 57 10,4 42 7,6

549 100,0

Tiirlciye Politikalan f %

37 9,3 52 13.1 65 16,3 40 10,1 23 5,8 21 5,3 28 7,0 32 8,0 35 8,8 45 11,3 20 5,0

398 100,0

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGISi Ill

Tablo 8b'ye gore, Almanya'daki ogrenciler, Avrupa Birligi'ni <;evre saghg1, saghk ve sosyal hizmetler, Tiirkiye'yi de; savunma, tanm ve teror konulannda ba~anh bulmaktad1rlar.

Tablo 9. Ogrencilere gore Tiirkiye'de KiP Bapna D~ MiDi Ge6ri Gosteren Dagdon

$ 2000'den az $2000-3000 $3001-4000 $4001-6000 $6001 'm listii

Fikriyok Toplam

Alm..Ogrenci f 18 20 50 63 49 26

226

% 8,0 8.8

22.1 27,9 21.7 11.5

100.0

TmkOgrenci f

158 35 33 17 27

270

% 58.5 13,0 12.2 6,3

10.0

100,0

Tablo 9'a gore; ogrenciler, Tiirkiye'nin ki~i ba~ma dii~en milli gelirin ne kadar oldugunu bilmemektedir. Bilhassa Tiirk ogrencilerin ki~i ba~ma dii~en milli geliri bilmemesi olduk<;a dii~iindiiriiciidiir. Tiirk ogrencilerin %58,5'i yllhk gelirin 2000 dolardan az oldugunu belirtmi~tir. Almanya'daki ogrencilerin %27,9'u Tiirkiye'de ki~i ba~ma dii~en geliri olduk<;a dogru ifade etmi~tir. Ara~tumanm yaplld1g1 2006 yth itibariyle ki~i ba~ma dii~en milli gelir 5477 dolard1. Tiirkiye'de, 2007 y1h cari fiyatlarla satm alma giicii paritesine gore, ki~i ba~ma reel Gayrisafi Yurt i<;i IHis1la (GSYiH), 2007 y1h itibariyle 8,200 dolard1r (TUiK, 2006; TUiK, 2008 &NTVMSNBC,2008).

Tablo 10. Ogrencilerin Hayattan Memnoniyetlerini GOsteren Dagdun

Hayattan memnuniyet Alm..Ogrenci Turlc: Ogrenci f % f %

Evet 176 77,8 190 70.4 Hayn- 44 19,5 80 29,6 Bazen 6 2,7 Toplam 226 100,0 270 100,0

Tablo lO'a gore; Almanya'daki ogrencilerin %77,8'i, Tiirk ogrencilerin %70,4'ii hayatlanndan memnun goriinmektedir. Esmer'in (1999)'da bireysel mutluluk ve tatmin diizeylerini 6l<;meyi ama<;layan ara~tumasmda,

112 ONIVERSiTE OGRENCiLERININ TORKIYE VE TORKLER HAKKINDAKI GOR0$LERI

TUrk insamnm genelde mutlu oldugu belirtilmi~tir. Kendini mutlu hissedenlerin oram %62'dir. Hanelerinde ekonomik diizeylerini tatminkar bulma durumlan incelendiginde ara~tlrmaya kattlanlann %45 'i olumlu yakla~mt~tlr. Saghk durumunda ise oran %43 'tiir.

Sonu~ ve Tartt~ma

Bu ara~ttrmada genel olarak, Tiirkiye'deki ve Almanya'daki ogrencilerin Tiirkiye'nin AB'ye giri~ i<;:in yapttgt tiim <;:abalar kar~ts1nda yeteri kadar bilgi sahibi olmadtklan ve geli~melerle ilgilenmedikleri goriilmii~tiir.

Ara~ttrma sonu<;:lanna gore, TUrk ve Almanya'daki ogrencilerin biiyiik bir <;:ogunlugu, iilkelerinde etnik kokenli yurtta~larla ya~amaktan ve iilkelerinde ana dilden ba~ka dillerin konu~ulmasmdan rahatstzhk duymamaktadtr. Ancak ya~adtgtmtz ortamda dinsel simge olarak kadmlann tUrban takmalan Almanya'daki ogrencileri, Tiirk ogrencilerden biraz daha fazla rahatstz etmektedir. Bugiin Avrupa'da 20 milyon Miisliiman ya~amaktadtr. Diger taraftan AB iiyeleri, Avrupa Birligini "Htristiyan Birlik" olarak gormek ve ya~amak istemektedirler. Bu egilim marjinal gruplarda olduk<;:a yogundur (La<;:iner, 2005). Merkezi Washington'da bulunan Bagtmstz Ara~tlrma Sirketi Pew'in "Global Project Attitudes" kapsammda Tiirkiye'nin de i<;:inde bulundugu 42 iilkede yapttgt ara~ttrma sonu<;:lanna gore (971 yeti~kin); diinyada <;:ogunluk laikligi desteklese de en <;:arptct degi~imin Tiirkiye'de goriildiigii a<;:tklanmaktadtr. 2002 ythnda Tiirkiye'de yaptlan bir ankette "din, ki~isel inan<;: meselesidir ve siyasetten ayn tutulmahdtr" gorii~iinii savunanlann oram %73 iken, 2007'de %55'e gerilemi~tir. Bu da Tiirkiye'de gittik<;:e laisizmden aynlmak isteyenlerin <;:ogaldtgmt gostermektedir (Hiirriyet, 2007: 36). Tiirkiye'de son donemlerde ba~lanm kapatan kadm sayts1nda olduk<;:a biiyiik bir artt~ gozlenmektedir. Tiirkiye'de Konda Ara~tlrma Sirketi tarafmdan (2007), 41 ilde yaptlan bir ara~ttrmaya gore, son dort ytlda b~mt ortenlerin oram %64,2'den %69,4'e <;:tkmt~tlr (Milliyet, 3Arahk 2007, 14-15& 4 Arahk, 2007: 16-17). Ancak, bugiin itibariyle Avrupa Birligi'ne bagh insanlar kendilerini yakla~tk ktrk farkh millet olarak tammlamakta ve yetmi~ kadar ayn lisam konu~maktadtrlar. Bu kadar farkh bir grubu kendi yerel milliyetlerini -miimkiin oldugunca- terk ederek bir list milliyet<;:ilige ikna etmek hi<;: de kolay bir i~ degildir (Yel, 2004).

6grencilerin Tiirk politikactlan hakktnda da olumlu fikirlere sahip olmadtklan goriilmii~tiir. Almanya'daki ogrenciler TUrk politikactlanm


~tkarct, dengesiz, i~ten ve samimi, Tiirk ogrenciler de Tiirk politikactlanm dengesiz, ~tkarct ve egitimsiz olarak nitelemektedir. Bu durum Turkiye'deki politikacllara giivenin azhgmt, imajlanmn olumsuz oldugunu gostermektedir.

Almanya'daki ogrenciler, Tiirk insamm sevecen ve sempatik ve i~ten olarak tammlarken, Turk ogrenciler, Tiirk insamm i~ten, ama giivenilmez olarak tammlam1~lardtr. Yine Tiirk ogrencilerin Almanya' daki ogrencilerden ayn olarak Turk insamm kavgact olarak tammlamalan dikkat ~ekicidir. Tiirk ve Almanya'daki ogrencilerin iilkeleri dt~mda iiniversiteler hakkmda ve onemli dergi ve yaymlar hakkmda fazla bir bilgilerinin olmadtgt goriilmu~tiir. AB ile ilgili politikact isimlerini de ogrencilerin ~ok azt bilmektedir ya da yanh~ soylemektedir. Bu da ogrencilerin sosyal ve politik konularla ilgilenmediklerini gostermektedir.

Almanya'daki ogrenciler NATO, Avrupa Birligi ve UNESCO'yu en giivenli kurulu~ olarak malarken, Tiirk ogrenciler, Dunya Saghk Orgiitii, A vrupa insan Haklan Mahkemesi ve Sivil Toplum Kurulu~lanm (STK) en giivenli kurulu~lar olarak gormektedirler. AB, Sivil Toplum Kurulu~lart agmm kurulmasma ve STK'larla karar alma siirecinde yonetsel ili~kilerin iyi bir ~ekilde kurulmasma, dam~ma ~er~evesi i~inde fikir ah~veri~ine buyiik onem vermektedir. Avrupa Birligi'nde, ozellikle Avrupa Parlamentosu i~inde STK'lanmn rolu ve oneminin giderek artmast, AB'nin gelecegi baklmmdan siyasetin ve devletin ~effafltgt ilkesiyle yonetilecegi Komisyon raporunda ifade edilmektedir (Devlet Planlama Te~kilatt, 2005).

Tiirk ve Almanya'daki ogrenciler Turkiye'nin tamttlmasmda en ~ok televizyonun etkili oldugunu du~unmektedirler. Daha sonra internet, gazete ve dergiler gelmektedir. Bu konuda Turkiye'nin kendini tamtlct program ve diziler yapmast, Turkiye hakkmdaki on yargtlann giderilmesi afi:lSlndan onemli bir ftrsatttr.

Tiirk ve Alman ogrenciler, ogrenci degi~im programlannm iilkenin tamttmt apsmdan Tiirkiye'ye geni~ ol~ude katkl sagladtgmt du~unmektedirler. Bu programlar dil ogretimini de cazip hale getirmi~tir. Her ytl bu programlara 27 Avrupa ulkesi ve Tiirkiye dahil4 Avrupa iilkesi olmak uzere 31 iilkeden 180 binden fazla ogrenci kattlmaktadtr. Bu programlardan 1987'den beri 200 milyon ogrenci yararlanmt~ttr. 2012'ye kadar ama~, 3 milyon ogrencinin kattlmastdtr (European Commission, 2009).

114 ONiVERSiTE OGRENCiLERiNiN TORKiYE VE TORKLER HAKKINDAKi GOR0$LERi

Turk ogrenciler, en fazla Turkiye'yi tanm, savunma, para ve dt~ politika yonunden, Avrupa Birligi'ni ise i~sizlikle mucadele, <;evre saghgt, saghk ve sosyal hizmetler ve egitim yonunden ba~anh bulmaktadtrlar. Almanya'daki ogrenciler ise, Turkiye'yi; savunma, tanm ve teror konulannda ba~anh, Avrupa Birligi'ni ise <;evre saghgt, saghk ve sosyal hizmetler, adalet ve yargt konulannda ba~anh bulmaktadtrlar.

Tiirk ogrencilerin ki~i ba~ma du~en geliri bilmemesi olduk<;a du~undurucudur. Turk ogrencilerin %58,5'i ytlhk gelirin 2000 dolardan az oldugunu belirtmi~lerdir. Alman ogrencilerin %27,5'i, Turkiye'de ki~i

ba~ma du~en geliri olduk<;a dogru ifade etmi~tir.

Memnuniyet ara~tlrmasmda iki ogrenci grubu da hayatlanndan memnun gorunmektedir. Alman ogrencilerin %77,8'i, Turk ogrencilerin %70,4'u hayatlanndan memnun gorunmektedir. Eurobarometre'nin 2005'de yapt1g1 ara~tlrmaya gore AB Ulkeleri halkmm % 80'i, Turk halkmm %76'st hayatlanndan memnun · gorunmektedirler. Ancak 2008 'deki ara~ttrmaya

gore ise "hayattan memnuniyet"te bir du~u~ gozlenmektedir. Burada dunyadaki kriz ortammm hayattan memnuniyeti etkiledigini gostermektedir. AB ulkelerinde hayattan memnuniyet %76 iken, Tiirk halkmda ise% 59'dur (Eurobarometer 66, 2006 & Eurobarometer 70, 2008).

Turk ve Alman ogrencilerle yaptlan ara~tlrmada, birinci bOlumde; "Tiirkiye'nin AB'ye giri~i ile ilgili halk oylamas1 yaptlsa oyunuz ne olurdu?" sorusuna Alman ogrencilerin %68,6's1 evet derken, Turk ogrencilerin yalmz %49,6'st Turkiye'nin AB'ye giri~ini onaylamaktadtr. AB 'ye giri~ konusunda kamuoyu yoklamalannda da destek gittik<;e du~mektedir. Yine "Tiirklerin AB'ye giri~inin ka<; ytl alacagma" ili~kin ogrenci goru~leri dikkate almdtgmda, Almanya'daki ogrencilerin %37,6'st Turkiye'nin AB'ye giri~inin 5-10 yil alacagmt belirtirken, Turk ogrencilerin yalmz %21,9 'u bu goru~u desteklemektedir. Aynca Turk ogrenci1erin %33,9'u "hi<; girmeyecek" se<;enegini i~aretlemi~lerdir. Bu durum, AB'ye giri~ surecinin <;ok uzun bir siire<; oldugunu ve gittik<;e inandmcthgmt yitirdigini gostermektedir (<;elebi, 2009). Avct'nm(2007); Dartan, Nas, Akman ve Savran'm (2004); Kaya, Kth<; ve Ytldmm'm (2008) AB ile ilgili universite ogrencileri uzerinde yapttklan ara~tirmalarda da aym paralelde sonu<;lar elde edilmWir.

Butun bu a<;tklamalardan da anla~tldtgt gibi Turkiye 'nin AB 'ye giri~i

daha uzun yillar tartt~tlacak gibi gorunmektedir. Ancak Turkiye, yapmak

AVRUPA ARA:;!TIRMALARI DERGiSi 115

istedigi reformlan, AB 'ye giri~ 19m de gil, kendi halkmm ve gelecek ku~aklann daha refah ya~amas1 ve degi~en dtinya konjonkttirtinde kendine iyi bir yer edinmek i9in gecikmeden yapmahd1r. Tiirkiye'nin AB'ye kat1lmas1 durumunda Turk halk1, AB vatanda~lannm elde ettigi ya~am standartlanna kavu~acak ve AB ya~antlsma da farkl1hk getirecektir. Ashnda laik, demokratik, modem ve iyi egitilmi~ bir Mtisltiman ntifus, AB i9in onemli bir deger olabilir (Dobson, 2006).

Ara~tlrma sonu9lan dikkate almd1gmda; Tiirkiye, AB 'ye girme konusundaki kararhhgm1 devam ettirmeli ve halk1 bilgilendirmelidir. Bilhassa ogrenci degi~im programlanm iyi kullanmah, iki tilke arasmdaki gen9lerin bilgi ve eneijilerinden yararlanarak ortak projeler geli~tirilmesine destek saglamahd1r. Tiirkiye, AB'ye girdiginde AB'ye yapacag1 katkllann, AB'ye getirecegi ytikten 90k daha fazla olacagm1 one 91karacak politikalar izlemeli, bu konuda basm-yaym ara9lanm ve medyay1 iyi kullanmahd1r.

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Yel, A. M. (2004). Avrupa Birligi'nin kiiltiirel entegrasyonu. Koprii. D~ ayhk fikir dergisi. No:85.


TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON THEIR APPROACHES TOWARDS MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH

AFRICA REGION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: FROM COMPETITION TO COOPERATION*

Aylin Unver Nor·

Abstract:

This article assesses the transatlantic relationship between the European Union (EU) and United States (US) by focusing on their role in the international arena particularly in the Middle East and North Africa region(MENA) In this connection, security concerns, interests and aims of these two powers in this region, their different approaches and the factors which leads to divergences in their approaches to this region, rivalry between the EU and the US, and finally changing international environment which might lead to closer relationship between these two powers are evaluated.

Keywords: Transatlantic relationship, military power, civilian power.

Ozet:

Bu makale Avrupa Birligi (AB) ve Amerika Birle$ik Devletleri (ABD) arasmdaki transatlantik ili$kileri, on/arm uluslararasl arenadaki rollerine ozellikle de Ortadogu ve Kuzey Afrika Bolgesi 'ne odaklanarak degerlendirmektedir. Bu baglamda, giivenlik endi$eleri, bu iki giiciin bolgedeki 91kar ve ama9lar1, bu bOlgeye kar$1 farkh olan yakla$lmlarl ve yakla$lmlarmdaki farkhhklara neden olan faktorler, AB ve ABD arasmdaki

• This article is derived mainly from a part of the author's book entitled "The EuroMediterranean Partnership and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: Competing or Complementary Projects?", which will be published by University Press of America, Inc. A Member ofRowman & Littlefield Publishing Group. •• Ph.D., researcher and author.

122 TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP WITH A FOCUS ON MENA REGION

rekabet, ve son olarak da degi!$en ve bu iki gii9 arasmda daha yakm bir ili~kiye neden olabilecek uluslararas1 ortam degerlendirilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Transatlantik j!i~kileri, askeri gii9, sivil gii9.

Introduction:

The Middle East and North Africa region has become the central focus of the US and the EU diplomatic relations. However, geographic proximity/distance of the EU and the US and their different historic, economic and demographic links with this region hinder them to achieve forging a common approach to this region. On the other hand, the Middle East and North Africa is likely to be an area which will determine the future of transatlantic relations between the EU and the US (Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon, 2006: 1, 2).

Their different perceptions, divergent and sometimes complementary interests shaped their approaches towards this region and affected transatlantic relationship. Although the security interests of the EU and the US were more or less the same during the Cold War period, it was possible to witness differences in perceptions and divergent interests which effects their approaches to this region.The EU's Middle East approach after the first Oil Crisis of 1973; and the EU's Iran policy based on "engagement" which is contrary to the US' "isolation" policy after the first decade of the Revolution are all examples to these different perceptions, divergent interests and approaches, which in tum led to transatlantic rifts and time to time loosened transatlantic solidarity. The reason lying behind these transatlantic rifts is hidden in transatlantic competition which has been mostly denied by the EU and the US.

At the time of Bush administration, the rift has been exacerbated and policy differences over the following issues contributed to this exacerbation: 1) treatment of suspect individuals in the US and suspect terrorist fighters held in Guantanamo Bay naval station in Cuba; 2) the US' embrace of preemptive military action (War in Iraq) as a foreign policy doctrine and 3) finally neglect and imbalance in the US' policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process which has been seen as factor of risk by the EU (Hamilton, 2004: 71).


This article evaluates the aims and interests of these two powers, their foreign policy instruments with a focus on "civilian power" EU and "military power" US concepts. It also provides a brief history of transatlantic relationship and an analysis of rivalry between the US and the EU in order to find out whether there is a shift from competition to cooperation between them in the Middle East and North Africa region.

The Aims and Interests of the EU and the US in the Middle East and North Africa Region

The EU's and the US' interests in the region largely converge rather than diverge as long as the core interests are concerned, such as energy security, stability and prosperity through democratization and liberalization of this region to maintain secure flow of oil and gas at reasonable prices, for selling their goods in these liberalized markets, preventing spread of WMD, terrorism etc. (Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon, 2006: 1 ). As stated in the European Commission's European Union-United States Relations document, 'both the EU and the US share common interests in developing coherent strategies in order to promote peace and stability, to create conditions for harmonious economic development in the wider world and to promote the stability of the international trade, financial and monetary systems, as well as the economic integration of countries in transition and developing countries'(European Union-United States Relations: sheet 2).

Besides shared security concerns of the EU and the US, they have economic concerns due to their dependence on the oil of this region. Europe imports more than 30% of its oil from this region whereas the US imports about 10% of its oil from this region. One of the shared interests between the US and the EU is thus energy security, or in other words, maintaining free flow of oil from this region at reasonable prices (Khalilzad, 1998: 196, 198).

Another shared interest between the EU and the US is regional stability and prosperity of this region. In this respect, promoting economic liberalization and democracy which might lead to economic prosperity and regional stability to this region were determined as one of the aims of both US National Security Strategy (2002) and the Europe's Security Strategy (ESS) (2003). These interests are interrelated to each other since internal instability threatens potential economic growth due to reduction in the foreign investment in regional actors. Instability also threatens free flow of oil at reasonable prices since conflicts may destroy key oil production and transportation facilities. The worst scenario related to this is that use of oil


as a weapon against major importers by the extremist groups which might possess the control of countries of this region. Moreover, internal instability may sometimes harm the relationship of these countries with the EU and the US. For instance, internal conflict in Algeria in the beginning of the 1990s resulted in targeting of all or some of the western living in this country (Khalilzad, 1998: 198).

Promoting stability to the Middle East and North Africa is more important for the EU due to its geographic proximity. Problems of this region might be transformed easily into the problems of the EU through immigration from the countries of this region to EU member states along with existing immigrants living in the EU member states (Sadoff, 1997: 19; Khalilzad, 1998: 201-203).1

One of the shared interest between the EU and the US is slowing down the introduction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and creating a Middle East free zone weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons) in order to eliminate acquisition of such weapons by terrorist groups (Blackwill & Stiirmer, 1997: 299). In addition to this, acquisition of nuclear power by one of the countries of this region might create a domino effect on others which is totally controversy for the interests ofboth the US and the EU.

Along with above mentioned shared interests such as energy and regional stability between the EU and the US, the US also has another core interest which is preserving the security of Israel in this region. The US and Israel relationship is different from any other the US has in the world whereas the EU's tie with Israel is not as strong as those between Israel and the US (Sadoff, 1997: 10, 11). 2 Although both the EU and the US have

1 Increasing number of illegal immigrants and the increasing differences between the immigrants living in the EU member states and the Europeans and its effects on alienation to each other also affects internal political stability in the EU member states through increasing xenophobia and strengthening the hands of extreme right parties, on the one hand, leading to potential emergence of North African origin immigrants' revolts as we witnessed in France and some other EU member states when two young Algerians died because of the French police, on the other hand (Unver Noi, 2007: 12). 2 Arab oil boycott against the Netherlands following the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the first oil crisis made a great change in the Europe's overall relations with the Arab world and the Israel as a community composed of industrialized countries which strongly need oil for their economic prosperity. It thus balanced its approach to Israel, one the one hand, its Arab neighbors, on the other hand (Rhein, 1997: 49).


favored peace between Arabs and Israelis, their approaches have been different and sometimes the Arab-Israeli conflict became a source of contention between the US and the EU (Khalilzad, 1998: 196- 197).

The US also has a strong interest in preventing any single power (outside this region like Soviet Union during the Cold War period or a potential regional power) from controlling this energy rich region (Sadoff, 1997: 10). As it is argued by some, this also explains the hidden agenda behind the US' invasion of Iraq. As Chomsky (2007) stated "If Iraq were an island in the Indian Ocean and its main export were pickles, not petroleum, Iraq would not be invaded by the US" (p. 162).

Foreign Policy Instruments used by the EU and the US in the Middle East and North Africa Region

Since the Six Days War of 1967 and the British withdrawal from Aden in 1971, The US and Europe have maintained an informal division of labor regarding the Middle East. Hence, the US has been recognized as a leader with two main regional projects; promoting Arab-Israeli peacemaking and maintaining Gulf security, whereas Europe has limited roles such as supporting and financing US initiatives, pursuing particularistic economic and political interests in the region. In other words, Europe has a secondary status in the Middle East in spite of its geographic proximity, historical connection and organic economic and demographic links to the area (Sadoff, 1997: 7-8).

Their different approaches to the region first emerged after the oil crisis of 1973. The outbreak of the first oil crisis in 1973 and the other developments such as collapse of the Bretton Wood system (1971-73) led Europe to take measures against a prospective crisis and made their approaches to the Middle East different from those of the US (Onver Noi, 2005: 83, 96).3 Regional stability has become a matter of increasing priority for the EU due to Europe's dependence on the Middle East's energy resources. Its major instruments to that end became trade liberalization, cooperation, and policy dialogue (Rhein, 1997: 45). The EU's policy of "engagement", which is contrary to the US' policy of "isolation and "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran, can also be explained from this perspective.

3 Today, if the eight countries ofthe Gulf that hold 40% of known global oil and 25 % of known global gas reserves were to stop their exports to the rest of the world for just two months, the global system would nearly collapse: oil and gas price would increase tremnendously due to energy scarcity (Rhein, 1997: 41).


The EU member states sometimes perceive the threats of this region differently than the US. On the other hand, they sometimes have the same threat perception. In the post- 9/11 era, the US National Security Strategy shares a fairly similar analysis of security threats with the ESS (2003). Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, state failure and organized crime are challenges for both sides of the Atlantic. However, the foreign policy instruments used by the US and the EU for dealing with the common threats are different. In other words, the EU does not share the US approach to dealing with these threats since the US and the EU have significantly different views on the use of force, legitimacy and the right way to solve problems in the Middle East.

The US prefers rapid transformation of the region through using its "military power" contrary to the EU's preference for gradual change and immediate focus on conflict resolution through using its "civilian power".4

As stated in the ESS, the EU prefers to confront these new threats by using much more innovative and transnational approaches based on "civilian power" understanding and using civilian instruments rather than by using purely military means due to the feature of these new threats -more diverse, less visible, less predictable and transboundry- and inability of the EU to confront them by using purely military means (ESS, 2003: 3, 7). In this respect, the EU gives much more its attention to overall socio-economic stability particularly in this region in order to cope with the threats stemming from this region. In this connection, it stressed economic instruments to ensure reconstruction. In order to promote reform and ensure stability in this region, the EU focuses much more trade and development policies along with assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures as powerful tools (Sjursen, 2005: 4, 5).

In the post-9/11 era, the EU preferred to use civilian instruments whereas the US gave priority to using military instruments along with others. To highlight the EU's uniqueness, comparisons are often made between it and the US. Contrary to the US, the EU believes that diplomacy can produce the best result. There is no transatlantic consensus on making military force part of the democratization process in the region due to the belief that military action will simply make the situation worse in these regions. (Blackwill &

4 The EU has been described as a 'civilian power'(Duchene, 1972) which refers to the EU's pursuit of distinct foreign policy principles: the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives such as respect for international law and a concentration on non-military, primarily economic means, to secure goals (Smith, 2003: 15).


StUrmer, 1997: 6; Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon, 2006: 219; Khalilzad, 1998: 207). However, it is worth to mention that some EU member states became part of the US coalition "fight for freedom of Iraq". This policy of the EU might be partly explained by the absence of the EU's efficient military power to use, the EU's limited capability to use its military power and the need for alternative ways to become a global actor which can change the behavior of other actors of the international scene by using its civilian power and/or soft power instead of military power. Also, the conflicting EU and the US approaches regarding the use of force can be explain as the widening gap between the military doctrine (preemptive and preventive / war) and capabilities of the US and those of the EU. The US defence expenditures are almost what three main powers of the EU (Britain, France and Germany) had spent in 2000. This is a facilitating factor of the US' use of "military power" to make regime changes in unfriendly regimes of the US in this region (El-Sayed Selim, 2004: 228; Walt, 2005: 34). This rapid force projection over long distance ability enables the US to act unilaterally (Blackwill & StUrmer, 1997: 7). In comparison to the emphasis ofthe US on unilateralism, the EU prefers to pursue a multilateral approach to global security. It relies on multilateralism and international law, which are at the core of the ESS and "civilian power" Europe, to resolve conflicts rather than on unilateral measures (Elgstrom & Smith, 2006: 3).

The EU prefers persuasion and positive incentives rather than coercion. Also, it prefers constructive engagement rather than isolation (Elgstrom & Smith, 2006: 3). The EU mostly adheres to "soft power" and tries to be a "force of attraction" by using its full membership and/or partnership card (El-Sayed Selim, 2004: 228). The EU's "soft power", in other words "force of attraction" and the ED's "civilian power" used to shape the countries in the ED's own image is the basis of EU's foreign and security policy although it has efforts to develop its military capabilities through establishment of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which also make the EU independent from US. 5

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US perceived terrorism as the main security threat and that threat can only be dealt with through traditional military instruments. The Bush Administration opted for military power

5 Although there are arguments that if the EU develops its "military power", it loose its "civilian power", Maull (2005) argues that having military power does not mean that the EU will loose its "civilian power". According to Maull (2005), if it is necessary, military power might be applied collectively by obtaining international legitimacy only in the pursuit of 'civilizing' international relations (781 ).


over civilian power which is "hard power" strategy instead of "soft power" in Nye's terms.6 The US foreign policy which was based on "deterrence" and "containment" between the end of the Cold War and the September 11th terror attacks, thus replaced by Bush Doctrine of war which is based on "preemptive" and "preventive" war. This new foreign policy of the US was also unilateral since 'Bush Administration was more skeptical of existing international institutions including the US' Cold War alliances and far more willing to -go it alone- in foreign affairs' (Walt, 2005: 31 ). Briefly, the US foreign policy action was based on military preemption, unilateral action, military superiority and a commitment to "extending democracy, liberty, security to all regions" (Kreft, 2005: 70, 71) since the large and diverse economy of US gave it a considerable political leverage and enabled the US to create and equip a powerful military force and make it the dominant military power (Walt, 2005: 32-34).

The US first used its military power in Afghanistan right after terrorist attacks to the World Trade Centers and Pentagon to fight against terrorism. Afghanistan was the right place to do that since Taliban government had provided bases for Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda terrorists. The second target was Iraq with the claim based on WMD development. Without having a UN mandate, the US launched its unilateral war on Iraq in March 2003 by adding that they fight for "freedom of Iraq". This operation took place after launch of the US democratization agenda in the Greater Middle East region with the initiation ofMEPI (2002) as a part of Bush Doctrine.

The US believed that there was a need to use force in order to cope with the problems of the Middle East and North Africa region. Yet, the US realized that making externally enforced regime changes using military power is not sufficient to tackle the root causes of the structural problems which threaten the interests of the west. Moreover, the US preference for using military power particularly in Iraq harmed the US image and increased anti-US sentiments in the region. The necessity to have a multilateral civilian approach to this region emerged and led to emergence of the US-led BMENA project in 2004. With this development, the US used its military power -"hard power"-, through sanctions and military invasions, as a complementary to its civilian power-"soft power"- based on free trade

6 When one country gets other countries to want what it wants--might be called cooptive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants (Nye, 1990: 166).


agreements (MEFTA), financial aids (MEPI), development projects (BMENA) etc. There was a belief that both roles complement each other as the soft security role facilitates the hard security one. In this respect, the US carried out military agenda as an instrumental to its political goal which is democratization of the region. In other words, the US used military approach to complement its political/civilian approach. However, military power used by the US particularly against Iraq with the claim that it develops WMD undercut the effect of its civilian power or in Nye's term "soft power" to transform the countries of this region into "democratic" one (Nye, 2006).

The US approach to this region which is mostly based on its "military power" was criticized by the EU as well as Arab world. Developments in Iraq indicate that it would be a vague assumption to believe the US claim that 'democratic Iraq through the US military intervention guarantees peace and stability and prevents emergence of threats from this country'. From this perspective, the war in Iraq could not achieve a rapid and positive transformation as a result of policies of Bush. As Ikenberry stated the neoimperial grand strategy of Bush administration triggered antagonism and resistance that will leave the US in a more hostile, divided and less secure world (Ikenberry, 2002: 45). In other words, Bush Administration failed to combine "soft power" (civilian power) and its "hard power" (military power) into a winning strategy (Nye, 2006).

With the Obama Administration, there are some signals of shift of the US' policy from "military power" to "smart power" which combines "hard power" and "soft power" together. In other words to use a mix of diplomatic, economic, military, political and cultural strategies with respect to its foreign policy in order to recast the image of the US harmed by Bush Administration's approaches weighted on use of unilateral "military power" to this region.7 In addition to this, multilateralism seems to be one of the important elements of the new foreign policy approach of the US for this region: "America cannot solve the most pressing problems on her own, and the world cannot solve them without America". These words were expressed first by U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, for evaluating the US foreign policy approach to the Middle East (IslamOnline.net, 2009).

7 The ability to combine "soft power" and "hard power" into a winning strategy is smart power (Nye, 2006).


Assessment of Transatlantic Relationship between the EU and the US concerning the Middle East and North Africa Region in the PostCold War Era

Europeans and Americans share common values and maintain close cultural, economic, social and political ties. Successive waves of immigration from every European country to the US which contributed also to the richness and diversity of American society during the past five hundred years is one of the major factors that have lead to this warm and close Transatlantic relations (European Commission, 1990). However, this close Transatlantic relations has been interrupted time to time. For instance, during the Yom Kippur War and the following first oil crisis (1973) the US backed Israel whereas many European states were more equivocal due to their dependence on Middle East oil. These Transatlantic frictions resurfaced during the Cold War period since the US and the EU disagreed sometimes over the right balance between defense and detente. However, these disagreements did not lead to deterioration of Western alliance, on the contrary Western alliance held firm and the Cold War was won. The challenge to the West fro.m the Middle East and North Africa today is neither the same as that from the Soviet Union during the Cold War nor entirely different (Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon, 2006: 219).

With the collapse of Communism and disintegration of the Soviet Union, bipolarity and East-West axis disappeared as a defining feature of the international system. In this new system, the EU has become an actor of a more multipolar world and a "New Transatlanticism" emerged. With this new development, political links between the US and the EU were deepened and institutionalized. However, the sources of conflict in US-EU relations also appeared due to the emergence of distinct features of international relations after the Cold War. Disappearance of a Soviet threat as a force for unity in Western foreign policies, which led to Europe's dependence on US security guarantees, also eliminated the need for Europe towards compromise and conciliation in Transatlantic disputes (Blackwill & Stiirmer, 1997: 299). Moreover, emergence of new threats also changed the existing security understanding of the EU since military power is no more effective in solving issues such as environmental degradation, widening disparities between rich Northern and poorer Southern states, terrorism, organized crimes and failed states (Peterson, 1996: 8, 9).

In addition to this, the US and the EU are challenged by their declining collective power to dictate the terms of global trade and investment. For the economic issues, both the US and the EU now have more alternative


partners with whom they can form alliances. In the defense and security field, the end of Cold War has also encouraged the EU to seek a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) which has a potential to undermine the role of NATO in the future if it includes the creation of a European army.8 The EU's efforts like developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDI which are based on "neo-Gaullist approach" which seek to enhance Europe's identity by distinguishing it from the US is another factor that contributed to loosening the transatlantic solidarity in the post-Cold War period (Blackwill & Stiirmer, 1997: 299).

In the post-Cold War period, the EU-US Presidential summits came into being as a result of the November 1990 Transatlantic Declaration in order to continue transatlantic alliance and to assess and develop transatlantic cooperation. The Transatlantic Declaration recognized the EU's pivotal role in both the political stability and economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Moreover, it also stated a series of other issues such as the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the situation in the countries of the former Eastern bloc, the war in Bosnia and later in Kosovo, the fragile peace process in the Middle East, and the need to safeguard economic growth and employment and the need for a joint response by the US and the EU to solve these issues. In order to meet these challenges, the EU-US Summit was held in Madrid, in December 1995 and the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) was adopted. The EU and the US pledged to work together "to promote peace, democracy and stability, foster economic growth and liberalization world-wide, meet global challenges such as terrorism and environmental degradation, and to build stronger non-governmental links between the people of Europe and the US". In other words, NTA provided a forum in which they may discuss and work together constructively to narrow their differences and reach a common basis (European Commission, 1995).

The scope of Transatlantic Partnership was broadened to allow for a dialogue between the EU and the US on many foreign policy issues and cooperation on international global challenges. Moreover, this dialogue has reinforced the convergence of their analysis and the perception of their common interests. This dialogue also allows them to act jointly and efficiently to enhance global stability and prosperity. However, this does not

8 ESDP includes the common defense policy which in time lead to a common defence. It is developing in a manner that is compatible and coordinated with NATO (EUROPA (a), n.d.).


preclude differences of appreciation and some divergence of policies based on national interest, historical perceptions, or other factors, affecting the EU's interests. The cooperative spirit and intense dialogue in the New Transatlantic Agenda (NT A) framework helps the EU and the US to address these differences in a constructive and forward-looking manner. In this sense, the Quartet (US, EU, Russian Federation, United Nations) can be regarded as one of the substantial joint efforts of the EU and the US working together to revive the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) (European Commission, 1995).

Yet, diverging assessments of the impact of some of their policies sometimes overshadow the prospects of Transatlantic alliance in pursuit of their shared aims in the Middle East and North Africa region. For instance, in case of Iran, the EU has considered more chance of success for a a policy of constructive engagement than a strategy of isolation and economic sanctions. Hence, the US policy of "Dual Containment" of Iran and Iraq was not supported by the EU. Contrary to the US policy of "Dual Containment", they preferred policy of engagement through "Critical Dialogue" with Iran due to energy dependency and commercial attractiveness of these countries until Mykonos verdict (Blackwill & Stiirmer, 1997: 4). The EU also refused to join economic sanctions against Iran under ILSA (Iran and Libya Sanctions Act). Moreover, the EU complained about the US to the WTO due to the US' insistence that the EU should follow its lead in sanctions (ILSA) and labeled this insistence as illegal in international law and contrary to freedom of international trade (Unver Noi, 2005: 81, 86). This led to another Transatlantic friction.

Fighting terrorism became a priority for the EU and the US before the September 11th terror attacks to the US since at June 2001 summit for Transatlantic Cooperation both sides had already identified anti-terrorism as one of the five priority areas. After the September 11th terror attacks to the US, this has become the overriding priority. The EU has worked with the US to build a global coalition against terrorism, and to establish joint initiatives designed to combat international terrorism (European Commission, 1995).

The EU took part in global actions aiming to fight against terrorism such as "freezing terrorist assets, implementing external assistance programs, supporting the efforts of third countries to comply with UNSC Resolution 1373 on the fight against terrorism and supporting political and cultural dialogue with those parts of the world where terrorism comes into being". The processes like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was


already underway since 1995, gained more importance as an organization that aimed political, economic transformation of the region and establishment of intercultural dialogue to create a peaceful environment in this unstable part of the world (EUROPA, 2007b ).

However unilateral preemptive military act in Iraq as a part of US policy to "fight against terrorism" without having a UN mandate violated UN resolutions and international law. It also led to transatlantic rift because the war on Iraq was seen as a risky mistake and unnecessary move by many Europeans contrary to the US' military act in Afghanistan (Aliboni, 2005: 1 ). Germany and France showed anti-US stand throughout the Iraqi crisis. The National Security Strategy of the US, which is based on strong unilateralism and principle of preventive war to impose its values from outside, was inconsistent with ESS(2003) which is based on the presumption that backward economic, social and political conditions in this region put threats or risks to its security (Aliboni, 2005: 2). The Iraq war thus showed that Washington pays little heed to European views on international political issues (Layne, 2004: 63).

Different perceptions of security and different foreign policy instruments used by them prevented closer transatlantic cooperation to emerge and moreover led to transatlantic rifts. Along with the war in Iraq, treatment of suspect individuals and terrorists in Guantanamo Bay, neglect and imbalance in the US policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process (Hamilton, 2004: 71), and Lebanon and Syria question have become one of the other factors which negatively contribute to the rift between the transatlantic partners although both the EU and the US have the same aims such as to halt Syrian support for Hizbullah, terrorist access to Iraq via Syrian territory, democratization and liberalization. The gap between the EU and the US is greater on Syria since their approaches towards this country are different. The EU prefers policy of engagement through the Association Agreement signed between the EU and Syria whereas the US prefers policy of isolation (Daalder, Gnesotto & Gordon, 2006: 223, 231).

The expectations about the initiatives such as Bum-Mediterranean Partnership-EMP (1995), Middle East Partnership Initiative-MEPI (2002), Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative-BMENA (2004) in terms of encouraging both the EU and the US to act more cooperatively in pursuing their shared goals towards this region could not be met although the US and the EU converge on promotion of democracy and economic development in this region. As stated in the European Union-United States Relations paper, 'the EU and the US as two largest economies in the world


by working together, can promote their common goals and interests in the world much more effectively than they can separately' (European UnionUnited States Relations, sheet 2). The EU wants to be accepted by the USdominant power in the Middle East since WWII - as a "partner on equal terms". In this respect, the EU member states emphasized in the ESS, "Transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the EU and the US can be a formidable force for good in the world. The EU's aim is to be an effective and balanced partnership with the US" (European Security Strategy, 2003).

As Cheema said 'the rift was a temporary phenomenon since these two powers are trading partners and enjoy considerable economic interaction including investments, strong security linkages and a collective security system like NATO, and finally their societies have common cultural roots and intellectual traditions' (Cheema, 2004: 9). When pro-American leaders, Sarkozy and Merkel, were elected as president and chancellor in their countries, France and Germany respectively, the rift, which had emerged at the time of Chirac and SchrOder, was bridged. Obama's election as a President of the US and his administration's new approach which is based on smart power understanding (combination of hard power and soft power in Nye's term) and starting a "new beginning" in the Middle East contributed to this process.

Analysis of the EU and the USA Rivalry concerning the Middle East and North Africa Region

European-American relations in general terms is based on four images: 1) the image of complementarity 2) the image of competition 3) the image of balance of interests and 4) the image of divided Europe vis-a-vis the US (El-Sayed Selim, 2004: 227). Although their interests mostly converge as El-Sayed Selim argued 'to redesign the political architecture of the Middle East'(El-Sayed Selim, 2004: 227), their different approaches to have greater say in the region reveals the fact that there is a kind of a competition between the EU and the US.

The image of competition also exists in European-American economic control of markets. Some argue that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the US-sponsored project of 1994, was perceived as threat to the EU's economic interests in the region and led to the emergence of the EU led project the EMP in the same year (El-Sayed Selim, 2004: 227, 235). Since the end of the Cold War, the EU and the US have been jointly working to spread trade liberalization and privatization to the countries of


the Middle East and North Africa in order to enable them to open their markets for their products. However, this created an environment in which the US and the EU have been competing (El-Sayed Selim, 2004: 234).

In 1993, the US suggested the establishment of a Middle East and North African system of economic cooperation. The countries of the region were persuaded to take part in the first MENA ministerial conference held in Casablanca in 1994 to formulate projects for regional cooperation. The EU was invited to the Casablanca Conference as an observer. They found out that they were being marginalized in the projected MENA cooperation. The same pattern persisted in the following three MENA conferences held in Amman in 1995, in Cairo in 1996 and in Doha in 1997.9 As the Europeans discovered that their economic interests in the region would be threatened by the 1994 the US-led project, they presented their own project for Mediterranean cooperation in the same year. The American backed MENA project collapsed in 1997 as a result of the election of the hawkish Netanyahu government in Israel. (El-Sayed Selim, 2004: 234).

In North Africa, 2003 witnessed European-American competition as the US and some southern European countries competed over who would have the upper hand in the economic domain of this sub-region. This was reflected in the revival of the European sponsored 5+5 Dialogue and the American economic project for North Africa. In 1990, five European countries Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta initiated a dialogue with five Arab North African countries, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. However, this dialogue was suspended by the European side after Security Council resolution on the American-Libya crisis was adopted (El-Sayed Selim, 2004: 236).

The Egyptians and the Americans took advantage of the suspension of the Dialogue to pursue their agenda. Because the Egyptians were excluded from the Dialogue, they called for the establishment of a pan-Mediterranean framework for cooperation entitled the Mediterranean forum. The Americans presented a proposal to establish a partnership with the North African countries entitled the American-Maghreb Partnership in June 1998 (El-Sayed Selim, 2004: 236).

9 After the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, the US renewed its economic drive in the region. In June 2003 President Bush suggested to establish a free trade area between Middle Eastern countries and the US.


After the end of the American-Libya crisis in 2003, European countries expressed an interest in renewing the 5+5 Dialogue. This was because of two factors; the American economic drive in the Maghreb countries that began in 1998, and disillusionment of the EU countries with the EMP. This partnership was plagued by the reluctance of the European to play an active role in the MEPP, and the insistence of the Arab countries to link EMP with the political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Europeans thought that renewing the 5+5 Dialogue would signal to the Arab Mashreq countries that the EU could freeze the EMP and focus on sub-regional cooperation in the west Mediterranean, and to the Americans that North Africa is in the European socio-economic sphere of influence. Under strong French persuasion, 5+5 Dialogue convened a summit meeting in Tunisia in 2003. Two days before the summit, Colin Powell visited Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia to revive the 1998 American proposal. During this visit Powell suggested that Tunisia would be the headquarters of the American office to promote the American democracy project, in addition to the city ofDubai in the UAE. President Chirac denied that the Powell visit was a reflection of European-American competition in the Maghreb countries, arguing that Europe would like to help develop the Maghreb countries and it would be a good idea if the Americans also contributed to the achievements of this goal. Publicly, the EU leaders assert that there is no competition between them and the Americans in the North Africa. This statement applies mainly to the political-security sphere, but it is hardly applicable to the economic one (El-Sayed Selim, 2004: 236, 237).

The competition between the EU and the US went on when Barcelona Summit took place since the US was not invited as an observer to this summit. This summit irked the US due to implications of this process for the peace process, especially the Syria-Israel track. The following year, the EU was not consulted prior to the October 1996 Arafat-Netanyahu summit in Washington as a response to which the EU decided to name its own Middle East envoy and to approve an anti-Israeli communique in sixteen years (Satloff, 1997: 35).

Economic competition revealed itself with the establishment of a free trade area between the EU and the non-EU Euro-Mediterranean Partners since it might affect the US interests and as Khalilzad argues, it could have a detrimental effect on American-North African trade. This explains why the US officials were unhappy that they were not invited to the Barcelona meeting of 1995 and the US' Middle East Free Trade Area initiation (MEFT A) (Khalilzad, 1998: 209). Another indicator of rivalry between the


US and the EU in this region is the EU' s lack of strong willingness to cooperate in this region within the framework of the US-led initiative Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) which gave one line reference to the EMP although they share similar interests and objectives (Aliboni, 2005: 7).

The rivalry between these two powers also exists in weapon sales to this area due to the US' preeminent position for weapon sales in comparison to the EU and in Arab-Israeli peace due to the US' leading role in the peace process and the EU's secondary role as a "payer" rather than a "player" (Khalilzad, 1998: 207). Since 1973, the US thus has assumed the leading role in the peace process in the Middle East. The EU has played relatively marginal political and diplomatic role, more prominent economic role in the region (Sadoff, 1997: 30).10

Conclusion

Common values (democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms), close cultural ties between the EU and the US and their shared aims and interests in the the Middle East and North Africa region might lead to the perception that there is a transatlantic cooperation rather than competition in this region. The similarities between the threat perceptions given in both the EU's and the US' National Security Strategies and the aim of transforming the countries of this region into democratic and liberal ones also contribute to the perception that these two powers are in cooperation to achieve objectives set by them.

Although their approaches in terms of interests and aims seem complementary, there is a kind of competition between the EU and the US to have a control over this part of the world since being an effective global actor in international relations is also important for the EU. The establishment of the CFSP and the ESDP which seek to enhance Europe's identity by distinguishing it from the US is the major indicator of this aim of the EU. With this act, the EU did not contribute to transatlantic solidarity. In addition to this, the US' unilateral military approach to the region as a complementary to its political approach (BMENA) for "preventing

10 The EU is major financial donor of the Palestinian Authority. The EU has two ESDP operations in the Palestinian Authority; The EU Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah), the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) since 2005 (Council of the European Union, n.d.).


proliferation of WMD" and rapid transformation of this regwn into a "democratic" one is another indicator of this competition.

Although their interests and aims converge in terms of political and security issues their approaches to the resolution of problems stemming from this region diverge and sometimes keep the other side out of the process as witnessed in many cases: Madrid Middle East Peace Conference of 1991 and the US efforts to keep the EU outside of this process in order to prevent the EU to have a political role to play; initiation of the Barcelona Process without inviting the US as an observer as a Union's response to being excluded from US-led Madrid Peace Conference; the US' Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) and the EU's refusal to implement those sanctions and its 'critical dialogue' with Iran contrary to the US' policy of "isolation" and "containment"; the US' unilateral war on Iraq; its negative impact on the EU member states and weakening the CFSP; initiation of the BMENA by mentioning only one line about the EMP (an initiative launched 9 years before with the similar objectives); and finally the EU's unwillingness to take active part in the BMENA projects.

These cases have revealed the fact that there is a kind of competition between the US and the EU in the Middle East and North Africa region. Economic concerns constitute the main determinant of this competititon. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU and the US have been jointly working to spread trade liberalization and privatization to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa in order to enable them to open their markets for the EU's and the US' goods. However, this created an environment in which the US and the EU have been competing. Free trade areas, which are trying to be established between the EU and each non-EU EMP partners, the US and the BMENA countries, might serve to kindle the economic competition that has emerged between these two powers. For instance, establishment of a free trade area between the EU and the non-EU EMP partners may affect the US' economic interests in these countries.

Moreover, the differences between the approaches of the EU and the US to this region -particularly the US' use of "military power" unilaterallywhich lead to transatlantic rifts, also contributed to much more competition rather than cooperation between the EU and the US. The US perefers to make "rapid transformation" by using its military superiority in this region in order to exert control over the oil rich countries of this region by creating pro-American regimes. On the other hand, the EU through "gradual transformation" understanding aims to shape the countries of this region in


the EU's own image. These two different approaches of the EU and the US might explain the competiton between the EU and the US for this region.

However, the EU and the US initiatives such as EMP, MEPI, BMENA and the US military occupation of Iraq failed transform the countries of this region into democratic ones and to make them more secure and prosperous. The emerging major economies in the world like BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and their growing economies showed that they might be converted into new rivalries in the multipolar world if they achieve to convert their economic power into political power to have more say in the world. 11 The latest meeting of the BRIC held in Yaktenburg indicated this possibility. Global economic and financial crisis, which has a great impact on economies of the EU member states and the US, made China world's largest merchandise exporter of 2009 passing Germany and the US. In this new international system, the US needs much more conciliatory policies rather than confrontation. Obama Administration gives signals of shift from Bush administration's clear-cut unilateral policies mostly based on "military power" to "smart power" which combines civilian power/soft power and military power/hard power together. The Obama administration's new approach to the Middle East and North Africa region as he stated in his Cairo speech along with France's changing attitudes towards the US and the NATO and the EU's economic interests in this newly emerging international system might facilitate Transatlantic cooperation and contribute much more to cooperation between the EU and the US rather than competition.

11 According to Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill, these countries would

overtake developed states like Britain, Germany and France by 2050. In other words the largest economies in the world may no longer be the richest by income per capita. Brazil, Russia, India and China could become a much larger force in the world economy (Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003: 2).


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AVRUPA ARA$TIRMALARI DERGISI • Cilt 17 • Say1: 1-2 • 2009 145

A VRUPA BiRLiGi'NiN KiMLiK YARA TMA <;ABALARI

Yasemin Oguzlar TEKiN*

Ozet:

AB 'nin hukuki temelleri, ulus devletlerin birtak1m yetkilerini daha ust ortak siyasi kurumlara devrederek ortak bir siyasi irade sergilemelerine dayanmaktad1r. Bu ortak iradenin temelinde bOlgede surdurillebilir ban~. istikrar ve refah yer almaktad1r. Bu baglamda AB, ekonomik ve politik butunle~menin yamnda kulturel anlamda butunle~erek ve ortak kimlik olu~turarak derinle~mek istemekte ve kuresel bir medeniyet projesi olma niyetini ta~1maktad1r. AB 'nin bu amaca ula~mas1 tarihsel surer; ir;inde kazand1g1 deneyim ve degerleri - dunyevi degerlerin yuceltilmesi, bireyin ozgilrle~tirilmesi ve du~uncelerini ozgurce ifade edebilmesi, humanist bir yakla~zmla digerleri ile e#tlik, bireyin yonetenlerini demokratik yontemlerle ser;ebilmesi ve iktisadi ozgilrlilk gibi - bu medeniyet projesinin temelleri olarak olu~turmasma baglzdzr. Tarihi surer; ir;inde edinilen degerler Kopenhag kriterlerinde ba~arzlz ~ekilde ifade edilmi~tir. Bu r;alz~mada soz konusu degerlerin tarihi surer; ir;in de naszl olu~tugu incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birligi (AB), Avrupa Kimligi, Aydmlanma Degerleri

Abstract:

The legal foundation of EU is based on a common politic will, which is formed by giving the nation states' power to federal mechanism. In this context, sustainable peace, stability and welfare shape the base of common politic will of EU Furthermore, EU wants to be an alternative global civilization project by forming common identity and deepening its unity. To reach this goal, EU should make the Enlightenment values - exalting of secular values, the liberalization of human being, freedom expression, equality to others with humanism approach, election of governors by

• Uludag Universitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitiisii, Uluslararas1 ili~kiler Anabilim Dah.

146 AVRUPA BiRLiGI'NiN KiMLiK YARATMA c;:ABALARI

democratic ways, economic liberation- which were gained in the historical process, the basis of this civilization project. These values are expressed favorably in the Copenhagen Criteria. In this study, how these values have formed in the course of time is debated.

Keywords: European Union (EU), European Identity, Enlightenment Values

I. Giri~

Ttirkiye'nin AB tam tiye1ik stirecinde ilerledigi ~u gtinlerde kimlik ve ktilttir konulan oldukya yo gun ilgi gormektedir. A vrupa kimligi ile Turk kimliginin etkile~imi, yatl~malan ve uzla~ma ihtimalleri biryok platformda hararetle tart1~1lmakla birlikte genelde konuya yakla~Imlar kesin onyargtlara dayanmakta ve bu onyargtlar onemli bilgi eksiklikleri iyermektedir. Bu baglamda A vrupa kimligi tizerine yaztlmt~ kapsamh bir Ttirkye eserin bulunmamast da gayet manidardtr. Adayhk stirecinin devam ettigi gtintimtizde Avrupa Birligi'ni daha yakmdan tammak ve ileride alacagt ~ekil konusunda bilgi sahibi olmak yok onemlidir. Bu yah~ma var alan bu bilgi eksikligine az da olsa bir katk1 saglamak amact ile haztrlanmt~tlr. <;:ah~mada AB tiye tilkelerinin tarihlerinde edindikleri ve gelecegi ~ekillendirebilecek deneyim ve bilgileri derinlemesine analiz edilmektedir.

Kimlik kelimesi Latince "identitas" sozctigtinden gelmektedir ve insanlar veya herhangi bir ~eyin kar~Ila~tmlmas1 halinde, mevcut olabilecek iki ttir ili~kiyi ifade etmektedir: "benzerlik" ve "farkhhk". Daha kapsamh bir ~ekilde, kimlik oteki ve otekiye kar~1 etkile~im yoluyla ~ekil alan sosyal bir olgu ve ili~kiler sistemi olarak da tammlanabilir (inany, 2005: 15). Kimlik kavramt hem bireysel ya~amda hem de toplumlann hayatmda onemli rol oynamaktadtr. Olaya birey aytsmdan yakla~tldtgmda, kimlik duygusunun birey ile dtinya arasmda bir vastta oldugunu, olaylan olyen ve degerlendiren bir mekanizma gibi i~lem gordiigunti gormekteyiz. Toplumu olu~turan bireyleri birbirine baglamakta kimlik kavram1 hayati rol oynamaktadtr.

AB'nin Avrupa tilkeleri adma konu~abilen gtiy olarak ortaya yikabilmesi iyin ise A vrupahlar tarafmdan me~rula~mas1 gerekmektedir; bu da A vrupa

AVRUPA ARA$TI RMALARI DERGiSi 147

anayasasmm kabulii ve uygulanmas1 sonrasmda miimktindiir. Ad1 ge~en me~ruiyeti peki~tirebilmek i~in ise ortak AB kimligi onem kazanmaktad1r. Toplumu olu~turan bireyleri birbirine baglamakta kimlik kavram1 hayati rol oynamaktad1r. AB, 1999 Helsinki Zirvesi'nde Tiirkiye'nin adayhgm1 kabul ederek Avrupa kimligine a~1khk getirme ~abasmdad1r. Tiirkiye'nin adayhgmm kabulii ile AB, tam iiye olacak herhangi bir adaym, din ve kliltiir fark1 nedeniyle d1~lanamayacagm1 belirtmi~tir. Avrupa'nm ortak degerlerinin ol~iitii olarak da aydmlanma sonrasmda olu~turulan demokratik degerlerin (Kopenhag Kriterleri) k1stas almacag1 benimsenmi~ ve kabul edilmi~tir. Her ne kadar bu karara ters dii~en gorii~ler, AB iiye iilke liderleri ve kamuoylan tarafmdan dile getirilse de, AB ile Tiirkiye arasmdaki miizakereler devam etmektedir. Kopenhag Kriterleri, AB 'nin ortak kimlik olu~turmas1 baglammda olumlu bir geli~medir; ~iinkli Avrupa'nm tarihi sure~ i~inde edindigi kazammlar bu kriterlerde ba~anh bir ~ekilde

belirtilmektedir.

<;ah~ma giri~ ve sonu~la birlikte dort ana ba~hktan olu~maktad1r. ikinci ana ba~hkta, Avrupa'da kimlik olu~umu siirecine katkls1 olan ve Milattan Once (MO) ba~layan eski Yunan kliltiirii, yine M.O var olan Roma Cumhuriyeti doneminde geli~tirilen ve Milattan Sonra (MS) 4. yiizy1la (yy.) kadar ge~erli olan Roma kliltiirii, MS 4. yy.'dan sonra hakim olmaya ba~layan ve H1ristiyanhk ya~am tarz1m ongoren dini kliltiir ve aydmlanma ~ag1 ile beraber ba~latllan modern Avrupa kliltiirii ele almacaktlr. D~iincii ana ba~hkta ise A(E)T'nin olu~turulmas1yla ba~layan kimlik olu~turma siireci irdelenecek ve ~ah~ma dordiincii bOliim olan genel degerlendirmeyle son bulacakt1r.

II. A vrupahhk Kimliginin Olu~umuna Katki Yap an Faktorler

Bu ba~hk altmda A vrupahhk kimligine Eski Yunan ve Roma kliltiirlerinin, H1ristiyanhgm ve Aydmlanma donemi ile olu~an degerlerindiinyevi degerlerin one ~lkanlmasl, bireysel ozgiirliik, ifade ozgiirliigii, hiimanizm, iktisadi ozgiirliik ve yonetenlerin demokratik yontemlerle se~ilmesi - katkllan irdelenecektir.

A. Avrupa Kimligine Eski Yonan ve Roma Kiiltiirlerinin Katkllan

"Avrupa" ismi cografi bir ifade olmaktan ote, mitler ve efsaneler diinyasma ait bir kavram olarak ortaya ~1km1~t1r. A vrupa kelimesi Eski Yunan mitolojilerinde kullamlmakla birlikte, Hititler tarafmdan giine~in

148 AVRUPA BIRLiGI'NiN KiMLIK YARATMA <;ABALARI

battlgt topraklar anlammda kullamlmt~tlr. Bunun dt~mda mitolojide Europa, Phoneix'in ktz karde~inin adt anlamma da gelmektedir (Hay, 1957: 5'den akt. Delanty, 2005: 27). Boylece Avrupa adt cezp etme ve gizemlilik kazanmt~ olmaktadtr. Cografi aytdan A vrupa kttasmm kesin stmrlanmn belli olmamast, insanlann dti~tince dtinyalanna uygun dti~ecek ~ekilde smtrlar belirlemelerine yol aymt~ ve bu durum gtintimtizde de devam etmektedir. Antik donemden gtintimtize A vrupa, genel olarak Girit Adast ve ttim Yunanistan'm hinterlandtm kapsayan toprak paryasmm ismi olarak kullamlmt~ttr. Ancak Yunanhlar antik yagda kendilerini Avrupah olarak tammlamamt~lardtr. Eski Yunan ktilttir ve uygarhgt da bu yontiyle, Aydmlanma <;agma kadar, Avrupa ktilttirti olarak algtlanmamaktaydt. Aym donemde, Roma Curnhuriyeti ve onu izleyen Roma imparatorlugu da bOyle bir iddia da bulunmamt~tlr. Her iki uygarhk da kendilerini Akdeniz Havzast ile stmrh ve en geli~mi~ uygarhklar olarak tammlamakta ve kendi stmrlan dt~mdaki her ~eyi barbar veya ilkel olarak adlandtrmaktaydtlar (Delanty, 2005: 28-29).

Eski Yunan kent devletlerinin geli~tirmi~ olduklan ktilttirlerin modem Avrupa ktilttirti tizerinde dogrudan bir etkisi olmasa da dolayh olarak A vrupa ktilttirleri tizerinde, aydmlanma yagt sonrasmda, etkilerinin oldugu kabul gormektedir. Yunan kent devletlerinin de zamanmda kendi iylerinde ortak ktilttirleri1 bulunmamaktaydt. Ancak btiytik Yunan dti~tintirleri, Sokrates, Platon, Aristoteles ve Stoa ogreticilerinin felsefe, tiyatro, drama, devlet yonetim ~ekilleri gibi biryok konuda Avrupa'yt etkiledikleri soylenebilir. Bilhassa Atina'mn geli~tirdigi egitim, siyasi yonetim, sosyal ve ekonomik ktilttir anlayt~t bu etkilemede oncti rol oynamt~tlr. Modem Avrupa'nm algtlayt~ tarzma eski Yunan dti~tintirlerinin belki de en onemli katktst, laik ve rasyonel dti~tinme tarzlandtr.

Roma Curnhuriyeti ve Roma imparatorlugu donemlerinde (MS 3. yy'a kadar) geli~tirilen hukuk, ozgtir ve laik dti~tinme, kapah olmayan ya~am ve tiretim tarzt ve global ekonomi anlayt~t gibi konular aydmlanma donemi

1 Eski Yunan kent devletlerinin en onde gelen Atina ve Atina kiiltiirii ile Sparta ve Sparta'mn geli~tirmi~ oldugu "Spartanik" kiiltiirii birbirlerinden farkhdtrlar. Bu nedenle Eski Yunan diinyasmda uyumlu bir kiiltiirden bahsedilemez. <;iinkii Atina demokratik bir kiiltiirii yayarken, Sparta aristokratik kiiltiirii one 91karmaktadtr.


sonrasmdaki geli~melere t~tk tutmu~tur. Hem eski Yunan ve hem de adt ge((en Roma imparatorlugu donemlerinde ticaret ve iiretim kent ve ktrsal ilretimi biitiinle~tirmi~tir. Bu yonuyle de her iki kiilrur Avrupa'daki serbest ticaret ve ilretim anlayt~ma onciililk etmi~lerdir. Eski Yunan ve adt ge((en Roma imparatorlugu donemlerinde var olan laik anlayt~tan dolayt mevcut pagan dinleri ozgiir bir ortamda faaliyet gostermekte ve bireylerin inan((lan dogrultusunda kendilerine tanrt se((melerini milmkiin ktlmaktaydt. Resmi bir dinin olmast dahi bireylerin farkh dinleri benimsemelerini engellememekteydi. Ktsaca laik bir kiiltiirel anlayt~ mevcuttu. Su dini anlayt~ tarzt aydmlanma ((agt sonrasmdaki Avrupa'ya t~tk tutabilmi~ ve modem kiilruriin olu~umunu etkilemi~tir (Schwan, 1991: 157-224).

B. Hiristiyanhgm A vrupa Kimligine Katkisi

Roma imparatorlugu'nun 3. yy.'da zaytflamasmm ardmdan resmi din konumuna yiikselen Htristiyanhk farkh bir soylem getirmi~tir. Bu soylem, Htristiyanhk dini ((attst altmda rum diinyayt Roma imparatorlugu ~emsiyesi altmda birle~tirmeyi ve hatta diinya dilini Latincele~tirmeyi ama((lamt~ttr. Bu kapsamda rum Avrupa'nm uyumlu Htristiyan cemaatlerine donu~rurillmesi, diinya imparatorlugu i((in ilk a~ama olarak kabul edilmi~tir. Bu dini ini~ kurammdan yola ((tktlarak Htristiyanhk inam~ ve ya~ayt~ tarzt yaygmla~tmlmaya ((ah~tlmt~tlr. 5. ve 6. yy'a geldigimizde Htristiyanhk Avrupa'da Kelt ve diger pagan dinlerini yasaklamt~, katletmi~ veya etkisiz hale getirmi~tir. Avrupa kara par((asmda Htristiyanhgm kok salmast, Roma Katolik kilisesinin A vrupa ilzerindeki hegemonyasmt gii((lendirmi~tir.

Htristiyanhgm yilkseli~i A vrupa kralhk yetkilerinin zaytflamasma neden olmu~tur. Bundan huzursuz olan kralhklar diinyevi (bu diinya ili~kileri)

yonetim ile ruhani (olumden sonraki ya~amt) yonetimlerin ayn ellerde toplanmast gerektigini belirtmi~lerdir. Bu soylemle ortaya ((tkan kralhklar ile kilise arasmdaki iktidar ((atl~malan, bin ytl kadar devam etmi~tir. Bu ((att~maya 1600'lii ytllardan sonra ba~layan aydmlanma donemi son vermi~ ve dualist bir yetki dagtltmt Otuz Ytl Sava~lan (1618-1648) sonunda, Westfalya Antla~mast ile, her iki taraf((a da kabul edilmi~tir. Din ve devlet i~lerinin birbirinden aynlmast ve varhklanm paralel silrdiirmeleri (sekiilarizm) gilnilmilzde de devam etmektedir.

Htristiyanhgm Avrupa'da farkh unsurlan birle~tiren gii!;lu bir kimlik olarak ortaya ((tkmasmda, islamiyet'in "oteki" olarak algtlanmasmm rolii onemlidir. "Oteki" olarak algtlanan islam'm Htristiyanhga kar~t takmdtgt

150 AVRUPA BiRLiGi'NIN KiMLiK YARATMA <;ABALARI

tavtr o1masaydt, <;e~itli etnik k6ken1ere sahip Htristiyan Avrupahlann zaman zaman birle~meleri mlimkiin olmayabilirdi. islam'm kilise tarafmdan oteki olarak tammlanmasi ve Htristiyanlarca kutsal kabul edilen mekanlann miisliimanlann elinde olmas1 nedeniyle <;e~itli etnik kokene ve dillere sahip insanlann organize olup, Ha<;h Seferlerini ba~latmalan miimkiin olmu~tur. Papalar Ha<;h seferlerini me~ru gosterip, Kudiis ugruna olenlerin cennet ile miikafatlandmlacaklanm, kalanlann ise ele ge<;irilecek ganimetler ile odiillendirileceklerini belirtmi~lerdir. Boylece Ha<;h seferleri, oteki olarak algllanan islam' a kar~I Avrupa'nm bir araya gelmesini saglamt~tlr (Delanty, 2005: 37-40 ). Sonu<; olarak, yakla~Ik 15. ve 16. yy.'m sonuna kadar, Htristiyanhk Avrupa'da belirleyici olabilirken, giiniimiizdeki Avrupa Birligi ortak A vrupa kimligini olu~tururken temel ogeler olarak aydmlanma sonrasmda geli~tirilen degerleri - bilhassa kuzey A vrupa iiye iilkelerinin kabul ettirmeleriyle - one <;tkarmaktadtr.

C. Aydmlanma Doneminin A vrupa Kimlik Olu~umuna Katkisi

Giiniimiizde modem degerler iizerine yiikselen A vrupa, varhgm1 aydmlanma donemine ve bu aydmlanma donemi sonras1 geli~melere

bor<;ludur. (,:ah~ma bu degerleri k1s~ca v~. ayn [ayn analiz edecektir. Bu degerler olarak, diinyevi degerlerin yil~· c ltilmesi, ~irey;lerin ozgiirle~tirilmesi ve dii~iincelerini ozgiirce ifade edebil elefi, hiim!lnist bir yakla~tmla e~itlik anlay1~mm gelmesi, bireylerin yon teAlerini i demokratik yontemlerle se<;ebilmeleri ve iktisadi ozgiirliik ~ayllabilir. Ktsaca, Orta (,:ag (Avrupa'da baz1 akademik <;evrelerde "kararlllk c;ag" olarak da adlandmlmaktad1r) boyunca cemaat iiyesi alan birey, yonetilen olarak, ya yan kale ve topraga bagtmh konumda veya kentli olarak sadece stmrh vatanda~hk haklanna sahiptir. Birey bu konumuyla aydmlanma ile birlikte giderek daha ozgiir ve digerleri ile daha e~it statiiye kavu~arak, siyasi ve sosyal haklar elde etmi~tir.

Aydmlanma hareketi, genelde bir taraftan yonetimde me~ruiyet sorununu <;ozerken, bir taraftan da devlet ile birey arasmdaki hukuki ili~kiyi yeniden diizenlemi~tir. Aydmlanma donemi dii~iiniirlerinden Jean Bodin "Six Livres de Ia Republique" adh eserinde halkm (= insanlann), toplumsal sozle!?me sonrasmda, dogal ortamdan sozle!?meli ortama ta!?Idtklan egemenlik yetkilerinin bir ktsmmt ozgiirce se<;tikleri yoneticilerine devrederek, bunlann kendilerine daha iyi hizmet sunmalanna izin verdiklerini belirtmektedir (Denzer, 1986: 257-259). Bireylerin sahip olduklan

AVRUPAARA$TIRMALARI DERGiSi 151

egemen1ik giicii bOliinemez bir ~ekilde halkta toplanmakta ve halk bunu belirli siireler i9in se9tigi yoneticilerine devredebilmektedir. Boylece yonetenler halk1 olu~turan bireylerin nzasm1 ald1klan siirece yonetebilmekte ve yonetimdeki icraatlan me~ru sayllabilmektedir (Schwan, 1991: 170-171 ). Bu baglamda, aydmlanma, sosyal ya~amda yeni siyasi yonetim ufuklan a9m1~, sanatta ve edebiyatta da evrimci ve ilerlemeci bakl~ a91S1 getirerek, humanist fikirlerin yerle~mesini saglam1~hr. Bu yakla~1m, Avrupa'mn sekiilerle~mesini saglam1~ ve aym zamanda akllc1 ve deneyci metotlan getirerek bilimsel alanda onemli geli~melerin (bulu~lann) oniinii a9m1~hr (inan9, 2005: 138). Modernite ile beraber H1ristiyanhgm devam etmesinin yamnda Orta <;ag H1ristiyanhk kiiltiirii ag1rhgm1 giderek yitirip arka plana gerilemi~tir. Delanty 'ye gore bu siire9te H1ristiyanhk A vrupa devletlerinin ortak devlet dini olmaktan 91km1~ veya en azmdan din d1~mdaki kimlikleri belirleyen ozelligini yitirmi~tir. Din rasyonelle~mi~ formda bireyler bazmda varhgm1 siirdiiren konuma indirgenmi~tir (Delanty, 2005: 97). Yukanda ad1 ge9en ve 9ogunlukla aydmlanma doneminde geli~tirilen degerler deskriptif yontemle analiz edilmeye vah~llacakt1r.

1. Diinyevi Degerlerin One (:Ikanlmasi

Diinyevi degerlerin one 91kanlmas1 Aydmlanma doneminde olu~up,

giiniimiiz Avrupa'sma ~ekil veren "Batl" degerleridir. Orta <;ag'da hakim unsur olan H1ristiyanhk diinyevi degerleri kii9iimsemekle birlikte, bireyin daha iyi bir diinya kurmasmm anlams1zhgm1 gostermekteydi. Birey ancak oldiikten sonra ger9ek degerlerine ula~abilecekti. Aydmlanma donemi ise bunun aksine bu diinyanm ya~anabilir bir mekan oldugunu ve isteyen her akllc1 bireyin, Bentham'a gore faydasm1 bu diinyada maksimize edebilecegini ongormekteydi. Aydmlanma doneminde ger9ekle~en reform hareketleri sonucunda dinsel anlamdaki diinya alg1lanmas1 ikinci plana itilmi~ ve diinyevi alan dinden aynlarak sekiilerle~tirilmi~tir. Ornegin; Machieavelli dini temeller iistiine in~a edilmi~ ahlak anlay1~1 yerine, bu diinyay1 ve insan dogasm1 temel alan ve insanm kendi iradesiyle kendi iyiligini yaratabilecegine inanan yeni bir siyasi ahlak anlay1~m1 ortaya koyarak, modern aydmlanma dii~iincesinin onciiliigunii yapm1~tlr. Bu baglamda din toplumsal, siyasi ve ekonomik hayatm tiimiinde belirleyici olmaktan 91km1~ ve bireysel ve ozel alana gerilemi~tir. Dinin b1Takt1g1 bo~lugu aydmlanma ile yiiceltilen dlinyevi degerler alm1~tlr. Bu

152 AVRUPA BiRLiGI'NiN KiMLiK YARATMA <;ABALARI

sekiilerle~me siireci, yani rasyonel dti~tincenin one <;1kmas1, Avrupa'mn ytikselmesinde onemli rol oynam1~tlr (Schwan, 1991: 157-224 ).

2. Bireysel Ozgfirlfik

Aydmlanma doneminde ortaya 91kan en onemli deger ise, bireyin ozgtirle~mesidir. Aydmlanma donemi oncesinde birey (tanmsal tiretimin ag1r bast1g1 alanlarda) cemaat iiyesi veya kentlerde s1mrh iiretim yapan ve esnafm orgiitledigi loncaya bagh ve edilgen konumdayd1. Aydmlanma sonrasmda birey, cemaat iiyesi olmaktan kurtulmu~ ve kendi ayaklan iizerinde durabilen bir varhk konumuna ytikselmi~tir. Bu baglamda, ozgiirliik insamn insan oldugu i<;in dogu~tan elde ettigi bir hak olmu~tur. Bireyin artlk sonsuz evrende kendini degersiz ya da <;ok kii<;tik hissetmesine gerek yoktur; <;tinkii o belirleyici olan konumdad1r. Boylece aydmlanmadan btiytik derecede etkilenen Amerikan ve Frans1z Devrimlerinde birey, yonetim dii~tincesinde ba~rolti oynayan ve kendi kaderini kendisi belirleyen konumuna ytikselmi~tir. "Virginia Bill of Rights" (1776) ve "Decleration des droits de I'homme et du citoyen" (1789) bildirgelerinde bu durum per<;inle~mi~tir (Dicke, 1998: 240).

immanuel Kant' da "Saf Aklm Ele~tirisi ve Pratik Aklm Ele~tirisi" adh eserlerinde ozgiirltik meselesini giindemine ta~Imi~tlr. i. Kant'a gore negatif ozgiirliik insamn Tann'dan veya dogadan bag1msizla~arak ozgiirltigunti kazanma siireci iken, pozitif ozgiirltik insamn kendi kendine geli~tirdigi bir etkinliktir. Kant'a gore bireyin ozgiirle~mesi ait oldugu cemaatten bag1msizhgma tekabtil etmektedir ve bu durumu Kant "dignitates" olarak adlandumaktad1r (Kahraman, 2001: 24). Ozgiirltik bir kendiligindelik stirecidir ve insamn kendisini, oztinti, benligini kendi kendine belirleme giiciidtir. Bireyin kendi hareketlerinin hesabm1 verebilen birey haline gelmesidir (Dicke, 1998: 240) Bireyin ozgiirle~mesinde temel nokta bireyin cemaat yap1s1mn kendi hayatl iizerindeki belirleyiciliginden kurtulmas1d1r. Orta <;ag' da bireye cemaat i<;inde var olma olanag1 verilirken, aydmlanma donemi ile birlikte, bireye temel humanist degerler <;er<;evesinde ozgiir birey olmamn yolu a<;Ilml~tlr. Sosyal bir varhk olan bireyi, 91karlan geregi veya zorunlu olarak, farkhlal;ltirmu,;ken, hukuki anlamda el;lit olmas1 aydmlanma donemi sonrasma tekabtil etmektedir. Kant' a gore insanlar aklllanm vesayet altmda b1rakt1klan stirece kul konumuna indirgenmi~lerdir ve edilgendirler. Bu baglamda aydmlanma insamnlbireyin htir bir ~ekilde hareket etmesi, kendini ozerk hissetmesi ve sagduyulu davranmas1 ve ayn1 zamanda kendi


hareketlerinin hesabmt verebilen birey haline yiikselmesi demektir (Fetcher, 1991: 158).

Birey ozgfuliigunii elde ederken oncelikle topluluk i~inde hukuki hayatmt garantilemektedir. Bireyin ozgfuliigu ve temel haklan, devlet ve kurumlan tarafmdan ve aym zamanda uluslararast alanda da korunmaktadtr. 1830'h ytllardan sonra Avrupa'daki anayasal diizenlemeler, bireysel haklan bu anlamda garanti altma almaktaydt. Bireyin ya~ama hakkt, emniyette olma hakkt, dini ozgiirliik ve miilkiyet hakkt hukuk devleti kurallan ~er~evesinde korunmaya ba~lanmt~ttr. Bireyin siyasi haklan olan serbest se~me hakkt, fikir ozgiirliigu ve dii~iincelerini ozgiirce yaymlama hakkt giderek kabul gormeye ba~lamt~ttr. Bireyin sosyal haklan kapsammda yer alan i~ hakkt, sosyal giivencesinin saglanmast hakkt, egitim ve giri~imcilik alanlannda ozgiirce faaliyette bulunma gibi haklar 19. yy. sonlannda ve 20. yy. ortalannda garanti altma ahnmt~ttr. Birle~mi~ Milletler olu~tuktan sonra ise bu haklar geli~tirilerek, evrensel haklar konumuna yiikseltilmi~lerdir (Dicke, 1998: 240).

3. ifade Ozgurlugu

Aydmlanma doneminde dini degerlerin hakimiyetinin ytktlmast bireylere dii~iincelerini ozgiirce ifade edebilmelerinin oniinii a~mt~ttr. Orta~agda oldugu gibi dii~iinceler dini kurama uygun olmadtgt t~m cezalandmlmamaktadtr. Tam tersine aydmlanma donemi sonrasmda insanoglu arttk hem dogayt hem de kendisini bilimsel ve ussal bilgi aracthgt ile anlama ~abasma giri~mi~tir. Bireyin dii~iincelerini ozgfuce ifade edebilmesi bireyin bu dii~iincelerini ozgiirce yaymlayabilmesini de kapsamaktadtr. Bireye birey oldugu i~in deger veren aydmlanma donemi ile birlikte bireyin dii~iincelerini ozgfuce ifade edebilmesi vazge~ilmez bir hak olmu~tur (Lee, 2004: 253-259).

4. Humanizm

Aydmlanma donemi ile sadece sekiilerle~me siireci ba~lamam1~ttr, aym zamanda hiimanizm dii~iincesinin ortaya ~tkmasma zemin haztrlayarak, insanm diinyadaki yeri ve Tanrt ile olan ili~kilerini sorgulama siirecini de ba~latmt~ttr. Yunanh Pisagor'un "jnsan her ~eyin oh;ilsildilr" dii~iincesinden hareket edilerek, ara~ttrmalar Tannbilimin giicii ve stmrlan yerine, insanhgm dogast, potansiyeli ve ba~anst iizerine yogunla~mt~ttr. Diinyadan kopup, ke~i~ tarzt ~ileci bir hayat ya~ama dii~iincesi terk edilerek,

154 AVRUPA BiRLiGI'NiN KiMLiK YARATMA <";ABALARI

toplum ili~kilerine aktif bir katihmm insan <;abalarmm en degerlisi olarak goren toplumcu hiimanizm dogmu~tur (Lee, 2004: 13-14).

Hlimanizm ile dinsel inanca daha bireysel ve sagduyulu yakla~Im geli~mi~tir. Klasik yapttlann ara~tmlmast, eskiden beri dogru varsayt1mt~ saytstz dinsel kavramm tartt~Ilmasma yol a<;mt~tlr. Bu durum yerle~ik kilise dii~iincesinde gedikler a<;Ilmasma yol a<;mi~ ve kilisenin ciddi kurumsal zaytfltklanmn ortaya <;tkmasma neden olmu~tur. Bununla birlikte hiimanizmin geli~mesi tarihsel ara~tlrmalarda da koklii degi~iklikleri beraberinde getirmi~tir. Bu sayede tarih Tann bilimin betimleyici bir biitiinleyeni olmaktan kurtulup, kendi dogrulanna sahip ba~h ba~ma bir disiplin olarak ortaya <;Ikmt~tlr. Boylece insan ili~kilerinin ilahi planlamalanmn sonucu olarak tasvir edilmesinin online ge<;ilerek, ilahi yonlendirme, ya da miidahale olmakstzm insamn siyasal geli~im hikayesi anlattlabilmi~tir (Lee, 2004: 16-18).

5. Yonetenlerin Demokratik Yontemlerle Se~ilebilmesi

Aydmlanma donemi sonrasmda egemenlik konusu ele almarak, egemenligin halkta oldugu saptanarak halkm yonetime katilma hakkt dogmu~tur. Aydmlanma donemi dii~iiniirlerinden Jean Bodin, "Six Livres de Ia Republique" adh eserinde insanlann egemenlik yetkileri ile donatJldtgmt ve yoneticilerine de bu yetkilerinden bir ktsmmt devrederek, yoneticilerin kendilerine hizmet sunmalanna izin verdiklerini belirtmektedir (Denzer, 1986: 240). DolayiSiyla gii<; bOliinemez bir ~ekilde halkta toplanmaktadtr ve halk bunu belirli siireler i<;in se<;tigi yoneticilerine devretmektedir. Yonetenler de halkm nzasmt aldtklan siirece me~ru saytlabilmektedirler (Schwan, 1991: 170-171). John Locke'e gore ise insan dogal ortamda Hobbes'un iddiasmm aksine, hiirriyet ve e~itlik i<;inde ya~amaktadtr. Bu ya~am1 belirleyen hayat, hiirriyet ve miilkiyet haklanm ihtiva eden dogal hukuktur. Dogal ortamm ve hukukunun siirekligini saglayacak bir otorite olmadtgt i<;in, insanlar dogal ortamdan siyasal topluma ge<;i~i benimsemi~lerdir. Bu noktada insanlar, sahip olduklan haklan bir otoriteye, belli bir sozle~meyle devretmi~lerdir. Bununla birlikte, insanlann ya~ama, hiirriyet ve miilkiyet haklan ihlal edildiginde ba~kald1rma haklan dogmaktadtr. Demek ki yonetenlerin iktidanndaki temel dayanak anayasadtr. Anayasa kraldan veya se<;ilen yoneticiden daha gii<;liidiir, <;iinkii kral veya se<;ilen yonetici varhgmt anayasaya bor<;ludur.


Kral'a veya se<;ilen yoneticiye oran1a halk, anayasayt yapan olarak, anayasadan da gii<;lii konumdadtr (<;igdem, 2003: 63-65).

6. iktisadi Ozgiirliik

Aydmlanma ile birlikte insan, rasyonel konumuyla diinyayt algtlamakta temel belirleyen olmu~tur. Orta<;agda kentte ya~ayanlan bir araya getiren, ktrsal alanda var o1andan daha karma~tk ve dinamik o1an i~b01iimii idi. Ureticileri birbirine baglayan oge, ticaret ve iiretime ili~kin <;Ikarlardi. Dreticiler, mala ve iiretime yonelik bir ya~am bi<;imini korumak ve zenginle~mek istiyorlardt. Ktsaca Orta <;ag "Batt" Avrupa'smda feodal iiretim ve statu ili~kileri dt~mda, kentlerde ge1i~en yerel pazar ekonomisi, tanm, ticaret ve iiretim teknigi ile boy gostermi~ ve giderek ka<;tm1maz olarak kapita1ist iiretim siirecine dogru yol almt~tir. Bununla birlikte cografi ke~ifler sonucunda Avrupa'da okyanus otesinden gelen degerli maden akmt, ekonominin htzla ticari1e~mesinde etkili olmu~tur. Bu siire<;te ticaret burjuvazisinin giderek agtrhgmt koymastyla ekonomik ya~am gittik<;e liberalle~mi~tir (Poggi, 1991: 50-53, 70; Ta~<;I, 2001: 70).

Aydm1anma donemi sonrasmda ya~anan geli~meler neticesinde Avrupa kimligi farkh sosyo-politik ve kiiltiirel anlamlar kazanmaya ba~lamt~tlr. Bu baglamda yeni olu~turulan A vrupa kimliginin i<;erigini yukanda saydtgtmtz degerler belirlemi~ ve bu degerler uygarhk kavramt ile ozde~le~tirilmi~tir. Avrupa kendisini 18. yy'm sonlanndan itibaren uygar olarak tammlayarak, Orta<;ag donemi ile baglanm biiyiik oranda koparmayt da ba~armt~tir. Medeniyetin ol<;Usii saytlacak birey haklan, ozglirliik, e~itlik, laikle~me, hiimanizm, demokrasi, sanayile~me ve rasyonellik aydmlanma siireciyle ivme kazanmt~tir. Medeniyet fikri, A vrupah karakterini belirginle~tiren bir sistem olarak diger toplum ve kiiltiirleri tasnif ve kategorize etmeyi saglami~ ve Avrupa'nm "Avrupahla~masma" hizmet etmi~tir. Avrupahlar kendilerini bu degerler ile ozde~le~tirerek, oteki toplumlara standart olu~turmu~lardtr (Gong, 1984: 3-20'den akt. Yurdusev, 1997: 45).

Modem donemde, Avrupa kimliginin olu~turucu unsurlannm bir degi~im ya~adtgt a~ikardtr. Bu degi~imin en onemli ogelerinden birisi de ulusdevlettir. Yurdusev'e gore ulus devletlerin dogu~u, ortak bir Avrupa kimliginin olu~umunu htzlandtrmt~tir. Bu noktada Ronesans ve Reformasyon sonrast laikle~me ve Avrupa'nm deniza~m geni~lemesi gibi faktorlerin de onemli yerleri vardtr. Bununla beraber ulus-devlet laik bir

156 AVRUPA BIRLIGI'NIN KIMLIK YARATMA <;ABALARI

A vrupa kim1iginin motorudur. Laikle~me ile ulus-devlet arasmdaki ili~ki iki yonli.idiir; bir taraftan laikle~me ulusalla~may1 beslerken, diger yandan ulusdevlet de laikle~meyi beslemi~tir.2 Laiklige yakm kavramlar olan sekiilarizm, rasyonalizm ve hiimanizm de ulus bilincinin olu~masmda etkili olmu~lardir. Boylece Avrupa aydmlanmas1 H1ristiyanhktan farkh kendine ozgii toplumsal, kiiltiirel ve politik bir anlam kazanm1~tlr. Bu baglamda, 16. yy'dan itibaren "Avrupah" sozciiguniin kullammmdaki art1~, Avrupahlann A vrupa <;er<;evesinde dii~iinmeye ba~lad1klannm bir gostergesi say1labilir (Yurdusev, 1997: 41).

Modemle~me siirecinde A vrupa kimliginin olu~umuna etkisi olan bir diger etken Avrupa 'nm deniz a~m yayllmasidir. 15 yy. 'm sonunda Ke~ifler <;ag1 ile ba~layan bu siire<;te A vrupa somiirgecilik boyutu ile biitiin diinyay1 kontrolii altma alm1~tlr. Cografi ke~ifler ile ba~layan somiirii Avrupa'da onemli degi~ikliklere ve siyasi donii~iimlere neden olmu~tur. Ke~fedilen yerlerden ta~man biiyiik miktardaki hammadde ve altm Avrupa'da kapital birikimine hizmet ederken, aym zamanda feodal yonetimlerin zay1flamasma ve y1kllmasma ve yeni bir s1mfm, burjuva s1mfmm, dogmasma biiyiik bir ivme kazand1rm1~tlr. Akan degerli madenler ekonomik parametreleri etkiledigi gibi, aym zamanda kiiltiirel degi~meleri de harekete ge<;irerek, sanat ve bilimde k1sa zamanda onemli geli~melere neden olmu~tur. On altmc1 yiizy1ldan bu yana Protestan kiiltiiriiniin ortaya <;1kl~1 ve yaygmhk kazanmas1 da bu siirece olumlu katklda bulunmu~tur. Bu temel dii~iinsel

donii~iim, A vrupa iilkelerindeki tiim kiiltiirel farkhhklara ragmen, A vrupa kimliginin temellerini olu~turmu~tur (Ergiir, 2004: 68). Deniz a~m yayllma i<;in gerekli sermaye ve teknik donamm, ulus-devletler tarafmdan kar~Ilanm1~ ve ulus-devletler somiirgeler edindikten sonra, gelen servetlerle, gii<;lerini artt1rm1~lardu.

2 Aydmlanma, rasyonalizm ve pozitivizm bir arada ele ahnd1gmda modernle~me siyaset teorisine onemli katk1s1 siyasi iktidann kaynagmm Tann 'dan gelmediginin ve halka ait oldugooun kabul edilmesi olmu~tur. Modernle~meyle ~ehirle~me, sanayile~me, bilim ve teknolojinin geli~mesi, iilke i9i giimriik s1mrlanmn kalkmas1, uluslararas1 diinya pazan, ulus devletlerin kurulmas1 onemli unsurlar olarak dikkati .yekmektedir. Diinyevile~me ile birlikte laiklik de modernle~menin sonucudur. Modernitenin akh on plana .yikaran rasyonalist ve pozitivist yakla~lmi ulus-devlet, ulus ve ulus.yulugoo temelini olu~turur. Ozellikle modern uniter devletin kokeninde, anayasanm iistiinliigii ilkesine verilen ozel rol onemlidir. Salt akh temsil eden anayasa gene! iradenin iiriiniidiir ve boliinmezdir. Ulkede ve ulusta birlik tek siyasal iktidar ve tek anayasa ile miimkiindiir. Tiirde~ ulusun insam ve iilkenin biitiinliigii ancak gii.ylii bir merkeziyet.yi yap1 ve onun s1k1 denetimindeki merkez d1~1 orgiitlenmeleri gerektirmektedir (Erozden, 19<T7: 11-40)


Laiklik i1kesi A vrupah1ann H1ristiyan olmayan diger top1uluklarla ili~ki kurma1anm aynca kolayla~tirmi~tlr. Bu siires;le bir yandan Avrupa kimligi tamm1amp yerle~irken biitiin diinyaya da omek kimlik ~ek1inde yayilmi~hr. Avrupa'nm somiirii ve kii1tiire1 teme1de yayilmasi, Avrupah1ann kiirese1 bir iistiinliik kazanma1anna yol as;mi~hr. Delanty'ye gore Avrupa bu siires;te H1ristiyan ges;mi~inden h1zh bis;imde uzak:la~m1~ ve kendisine ozerk bir soy1em olu~turmaya ba~lami~tlr. Bu siires;te, modem degerler, kiiltiirel bir referans olarak Hiristiyanhgm yerini almi~tlr (Delanty, 2005: 48). Erdenir'e gore ise A vrupa bu donii~iimii zorunlu bir ~ekilde ya~ami~hr. Miisliiman Doguyu maglup edemeyen A vrupa, "yeni diinyayi" ele ges;irerek ken dine iistiinliik hissi veren bir kimlige biiriinmeyi daha uygun bulmu~tur (Erdenir, 2005: 57).

D. Aydmlanma Donemi Sonrasmda A vrupald1k Kimliginin Olu~umu

Milliyets;iligin kok sald1g1 19. yy.'m ikinci yansma kadar Avrupa'da kiireselle~me ya~anm1~tlr. Hiimanizmin onciillerinden Erasmus'tan (1466-1536) itibaren Respublica Litterarum (Republic of Letters) olarak adlandmlan ve ulusal s1mrlan a~an elit kiiltiir olu~turulmu~tur. Omegin; bu donemde Frankofon dergileri Hollanda'dan St. Petersburg'a kadar Avrupa s;apmda geni~ bir ses;kin kitle tarafmdan okunmaktad1r. Aristokratlann ortak ya~am tarz1, turizm ve modada kendini gostermi~ ve bu baglamda Paris ve Londra bu ortak ya~am tarzlanmn kiiltiir ve moda merkezleri olmu~lard1r. Aynca 18. yy.'da, kuzey Avrupah aristokratlann katihmi ile Avrupa'mn tarihsel kokenlerini daha iyi anlamak amac1yla gers;ekle~tirilen Grand Tour yolculuk1an, ulusal s1mrlan a~an kozmopolit sosyal ya~amm onemli gostergeleri sayilmi~tir. Ulusal s1mrlann aristokrat s1mflar tarafmdan a~Ilm1~ olmas1 ile Avrupahhk bilincinin tohumlanmn atildigi ifade edilebilir. Bununla birlikte, A vrupah soylulann hanedanlar aras1 gers;ekle~tirdigi evliliklerle de ulusal ve yerel kimliklerden bagimsiz bir ortak A vrupa bilincinin temelleri atilmi~tlr. Avrupa aristokrasisi soo baglantilarla birbirlerine yakmla~m1~ olmasma ragmen, ortak Avrupa bilincini olu~turamami~lardir. Ancak bilim adamlan ve dii~iiniirler A vrupa dii~iincesini gelWirmeye ve yaymaya devam etmi~lerdir. Alman filozof immanuel Kant (1724-1804) ban~I temin etmek is;in Avrupa s;apmda federal bir orgiitlenme onerirken, benzer ~ekilde Victor Hugo (1802-1885) 1851 yilmda, Frans1z Meclisinde yaptlgi konu~masmda, Avrupa kavramm1

158 AVRUPA BIRLiGI'NiN KiMLIK YARATMA <;ABALARI

politik biitiinle~meyle e~ tutarak, bir anlamda ortak Avrupa degerlerini temel alarak, Avrupa Birligi fikrinin tohumlanm atm1~t1r. Victor Hugo

"Bir giin gelecek Fransa, Rusya, italya, Britanya, Almanya bu kltamn tum uluslan kendilerine ozgii niteliklerini ve muhte~em ki~iliklerini kaybetmeksizin, daha iist bir birlikte birbirlerine yakmla~arak A vrupa s;apmda karde~ligi ortaya s;tkaracaklar - t1pk1 Normandiya, Brotanya, Burgonya, Loraine, Alsace ve tiim bolgelerimizin birle~erek Fransa'y1 olu~turdugu gibi. Bir giin gelecek sava~ alanlan ticarete apk pazarlara donii~ecek ... kur~unlar ve bombalann yerini oylar, halklann genel oylamas1 ve egemen bir senatonun sagduyusu alacakttr" (Rougemont, 1965: 78'den akt. Erdenir, 2005: 69).

Frans1z dii~iiniir Baudrillard, ise Avrupa kavramm1 19. yy. burjuva riiyas1 olarak niteleyerek, ulusal burjuvazilerin ortak s;tkarlan as;tsmdan Avrupa'nm birle~tirici onemini vurgulam1~t1r. 19. yy. ortalanndan itibaren diinya ticaretinin kiireselliberalle~me kapsammda geni~lemesi, burjuvazinin giiciiniin ulusal stmrlan a~masma neden olmu~tur. Bu siires; zarfmda, A vrupa burjuvazisi ya~am tarz1 itibariyle aristokrat s;evrelerle biitiinle~me is;ine girmi~tir. Omegin, Grand Tour yolculuklanna 19. yy.'la birlikte -demiryolu, otel ve restoranlann geni~lemesiyle - burjuva s1mf1 da dahil o1mu~tur. Bununla birlikte 19. yy.'m ikinci yansmdan itibaren Avrupa'nm alt stmflan da etkilerini art1rarak, A vrupa kavram1 is;inde yer almaya ba~lamt~lardtr. Bu baglamda ozellikle sosyalist aktmlar, Avrupa burjuvazisine kar~1 i~s;i stmfmm hak11 taleplerini giindeme getirmi~ ve A vrupa degerlerinin tabana dogru geni~letilmesini saglamt~lardtr.

Ote yandan, 20. yiizytl ba~lannda Avrupa'mn ya~ad1g1 I. Diinya Sava~mm ardmdan ban~s;tl s;abalar artmt~tlr. Avrupa Birle~ik Devletleri gorii~ii immanuel Kant ve Victor Hugo gibi Coudenhove Kalergi tarafmdan 1923 ythnda Pan-Europa Manifestosu 'nda dile getirilmi~tir. Kalergi 'nin Manifestosu ~oyle ba~lamaktadtr:

"Avrupah Baylar ve Avrupah Bayanlar! Avrupa'mn kader saati belirlenmektedir. A vrupa erkeklerini pars;alamak is;in her giin Avrupa Fabrikalannda silah iiretilmektedir. Avrupa kadm ve s;ocuklanm zehirlemek is;in A vrupa laboratuarlannda zehirler iiretilmektedir. Bununla beraber Avrupa akll almaz

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMAlARI DERGISI

dii~iincesizlikle kendi kaderi ile oynamaktadtr; korle~mi~ haliyle kendisinin neyin bekledigini gorememektedir. Bu ~tkacak sava~ Avrupa'nm ekonomisinin ve kiiltiiriinlin sonu demektir. Avrupa'mn yaratacagt bo~lugu diger Diinya iilkeleri dolduracakttr. ikinci tehlike Avrupa'nm Rusya tarafmdan i~gal edilmesidir. Biitiin bu tehlikelerden kurtulmanm tek bir yolu vardtr, o da A vrupa'nm birle~mesidir. A vrupa i~in ii~iincii

oliimciil tehlike ise ekonomik ~okiintiidiir. Avrupa'daki iilkelerin birbirleriyle oldiiriicii sava~lann ancak tarafstz hakemlerin yaptlgt Paneuropa Antla~mast ile onlenebilir; Rus hakimiyeti tehlikesi yine ancak Paneuropa Savunma Paktt ile onlenebilir; ekonomik 96kii~ ise yine kurulacak Paneuropa Giimriik Birligi ile ger~ekle~ebilir.. Ancak A vrupah halklar/insanlar isterlerse bu Paneuropa ger~ekle~ebilir"

(Schwarzer, 1982: Tafel 18).

159

Coudenhove Kalergi 1922 ythnda ba~latttgt Pan-A vrupa hareketi ile Avrupa ~apmda ban~~tl bir biitiin1e~meyi hedefleyerek, bu baglamda be~ adet kongre diizenlemi~, kitaplar yaytmlamt~ ve entelektiiellerin dikkatini ~ekmeye ~ah~mt~tlr. Fakat geli~en milliyet~ilik hareketleri nedeniyle kitlelerin ilgisini ~ekememi~tir (White, 1989: 23-40' dan akt. Erdenir: 83). Benzer a~tklamalar Aristide Briand (Franstz Dt~i~leri Bakam) ve Gustav Stresemann (1923-1929 ytllart arasmda Alman. Weimar Cumhuriyeti Dt~i~leri Bakam) tarafmdan da dile getirilmi~tir. Aristide Briand'a gore Avrupa iilkeleri arasmdaki dii~manhklan a~manm yolu. Avrupa Birle~mi~ Devletleri'ni kurmaktan ge~mektedir. Briand, Avrupa birle~mesine

ekonomik alandan ba~lamp, daha sonra siyasi ve sosyal birle~menin

glindeme getirilmesini onermekteydi (Schwarzer. 19X2: Tafel 20). Alman Dt~i~leri Bakam Gustav Stresemann ise bu konuda ktsaca ~unlan soylemi~tir:

"Giiniimiizde teknoloji ile teknik ula~tm ara9lan geli~mi~ ve diinyamtz giderek kii~iilmii~tiir. Oysa biz halen s1mrlanmtzt giimriik duvarlan ile koruyoruz. Ticaret yapan tliccarlar saytstz stmrlarda bo~una bekletilmektedir. Gelin bu stmrlan kaldtrahm. Bu stmrlar Avrupa ticaretine yalmzca sorunlar yaratmaktadtr. Bazt kii9iik siyasi hesaplar '-Ona ermeli ve

160 AVRUPA BIRLIGi'NiN KiMLiK YARATMA <;ABALARI

A vrupa ortak parasmt ve ortak posta pulunu bile basttrabilmelidir" (Schwarzer, 1982: Tafel20).

Bu as;tklamalar maalesef amacma ula~amamt~, A vrupa ktsa sure sonra 1929 Diinya ekonomik krizinden payma dii~eni almt~, gelen ekonomik s;okiintii ile birlikte milliyets;i duygularm koriiklenmesini artttrnu~ ve bu nedenle Avrupa'mn biitiinle~mesi dii~iinceleri rafa kaldmlmt~tlr. Milliyets;i aktm ve partilerin giic;;lenmesi Avrupa'yt II. Diinya Sava~t'na gotiiren nedenlerin ba~mda gelmektedir. Ventotene'de 1940'da Ernesto Rossi ve Altiero Spinelli tarafmdan taslagt olu~turulan Manifestolarda, gelecek is;in ana hedef "Avrupa 'mn ulusal egemen devletlere bOliinii#ine tam anlam1yla son vermeR' olarak tammlanmt~ttr. Bunu, Avrupa Federalist Hareketi'nin olu~turulmast izlemi~ ve Franstz yazar Albert Camus 'da "Avrupah direni~ Avrupa Jll yeniden yaratacakt1r" inanctyla bir dizi konferanslar vermi~tir.

Bu dii~iinceler, Konrad Adenauer, De Gasperi, Henri Spaak,Jean Monnet ve Robert Schuman gibi sava~ sonrast donemin siyaset ve iktisatc;;tlanm etkilemi~tir. 1945 ile 1950 ytllan arasmda bu yonde lie; ana geli~me ya~anmt~tlr. ilki 1948'de Marshall Plam dahilinde yaptlan yardtmm dagttlmmt diizenlemek ic;;in kurulan A vrupa iktisadi i~birligi Orgiitii' diir [Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)]. Bu orgiit giimriik birligine ula~mayt hedeflemi~tir, fakat ingilizlerin kar~t c;;tkmast ile hedefine ula~amamt~ttr. ikinci geli~me giivenlik kaygtlan nedeniyle Fransa, Britanya, Hollanda ve Liiksemburg arasmda olu~turulan Briiksel Antla~mast'dtr (1948). Fakat bu olu~um da Kuzey Atlantik Antla~ma orgiitii olarak geni~leyip, Kanada ve Birle~ik devletleri de ic;;ine ahp, Avrupa'ya ait olma ozelligini yitirmi~ ve daha genel bir ortak giivenlik c;;erc;;evesine donii~mii~tiir. Avrupa siyasi birligi ic;;in Hague'de "belirli egemenlik haklannm ortak olarak uygulanmas1 i9in uluslar iistii bir organa aktarzlmas1" karan ahnmt~tlr. iktisadi alanda attlan adtmlar siyasi giri~imlerle de desteklenmi~ ve 05 Mayts 1949 tarihinde Londra'da ortak siyasi hedefleri koordine edebilmek ic;;in Avrupa Konseyi (The Council Of Europa: Europarat) kurulmu~tur. Avrupa Konseyi'nin hedefleri arasmda iiyelerin ortak miras olan ideal ve ilkeleri (Avrupa degerlerini) korumak ve hayata gec;;irebilmek ic;;in stkt i~birligini gerc;;ekle~tirmesi bulunmaktadtr (Lee, 2004: 322-327).

04 Mayts 1950 tarihinde Fransa Dt~i~leri Bakam Schuman'a Jean Monnet'in verdigi memorandumda, uygulanan arac;;lann Avrupa


biitiinle~mesini <;tkmaza siiriikledigi belirtilerek, bunu a~mamn yolunun ilk ba~ta iktisadi biitiinle~me iizerinde yogunla~mak oldugu savunulmu~tur. Sure<; i<;inde gelinen a~ama ile siyasal biitiinle~meye dogru geri doniilmez bir geli~me olmu~tur. 09 Mayts'ta yaymlanan Schuman Deklerasyonu'nda da bu gorii~ ~u ~ekilde belirtilmi~tir: "Avrupa bir defada tek bir biltiln haline gelmeyecektir; ilk elden de facto dayam~mayz yaratacak alan somut kazammlar tarafindan in~a edilecektir" (Krosig, 1970'den akt. Lee, 2004: 323). Bu niyetin pratik ifadesi olarak Avrupa Komiir <;elik Toplulugu (AK<;T) olu~turulmu~tur. Paris 'te 1951 ythnda olu~turulan AK<;T, Fransa, Batt Almanya, italya, Bel<;ika, Hollanda ve Liiksemburg'dan olu~maktaydt. AK<;T Yiiksek Otoritesi "tiizel ki~ilik" sahibi ve Avrupa'mn ilk ger<;ek uluslar iistii kurumu olmu~tur. 1957'de de aym altt iiye iilkenin liderleri Roma Antla~mast ile AK<;T'nin kapsammt geni~leterek Avrupa Ekonomik Toplulugu'nu (AET) ve EURATOM'u kurmu~lardtr. izleyen siire<;te AK<;T ve AURA TOM adlan yerine sadece AET adt tiimii i<;in kullamhr olmu~tur. AET Antla~masmda giimriikler ve iktisadi birligin kurulmast i<;in yirmi ytlhk bir ge<;i~ siireci ongoriilmii~tiir. Bu kapsamda sanayi, tanm, ta~tmacthk, sermaye ve hizmetler konulannda ortak politikalann yiiriitiilmesi ama<;lanmt~tlr (Lee, 2004: 324).

III. AET Olu~umu Sonras1 Ortak Kimlik Olu~turma Siireci

AET, ulus devletler arasmdaki ytktct rekabetin ve milliyet<;ilik hareketlerinin a~tlmasmt saglamak amactyla kurulmu~, uluslar-iistii siyasi bir olu~um olarak kabul edilebilir. Roma Antla~masmm giri~inde de ifade edildigi gibi AET ile "Avrupa halklan arasmda daha yakzn bir birlik"3

kurulmast ongoriilmektedir. Daha once 1952 ythnda, Paris Antla~mastyla, faaliyet gostermeye ba~layan AK<;T'nin giri~ bOliimiinde yer alan ~u ifade de hedefin ekonomik birlik olmamn otesinde bir biitiinle~me oldugunu gostermektedir. Ekonomik bir topluluk olu$turarak kanlz ihtilajlarla ayn dil~en insanlar arasmda daha kapsamlz ve derin bir toplulugun temelini atmak; bundan boyle payla~zlan bir kadere yon verecek kurumlarm temelini

3 Bu antla~malar iyin bkz: Consolidated Version of the Treaty Estab/ishmg the European Community. Eri~im: 15.03.2007, http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/ l2002E!htrn/C 2002325EN.00330l.html#anArtl52.

162 AVRUPA BiRLIGi'NIN KiMLIK YARATMA <;:ABALARI

olu~turma/(.4. Bu baglamda btitiinle~me rasyonel bir stire(( olarak algllanm1~ ve ekonomik ve teknik alandaki geli~melerin siyasi, sosyal ve ktiltiirel alanlara yayllacag1 varsayllmi~tlr (Ertugrul, 2001 : 146).

AET btitiinle~me stireci 1990'h y11lann ba~ma kadar fonksiyonalist ve neo-fonksiyonalist kuramlanm temel alan belirli bir btitiinle~me modeli 9eryevesinde ger9ekle~mi~tir.5 Bu kuramlara gore AET btitiinle~mesi A vrupa elitlerinin, uzmanlannm, btirokratlanmn ve tiye tilke liderlerinin ytirtittiigu apolitik, liberal, ekonomik ve siyasi bir stire9tir. Bu stire(( i9inde toplumsal aktorlerin, siyasal ve ktiltiirel aidiyet ve baglannm yeniden ve kendiliginden olu~turularak, merkeze dogru kayacag1 varsayllmaktadir. Gelinen noktada onemli mesafeler ahnmakla birlikte, ad1 ge9en entegrasyon modeli istenen amac1 ger9ekle~tirememi~ ve me~ruiyet, ortak siyasal ve ktiltiirel baghhk sorunlan a~Ilamami~tlr (Ertugrul, 2001: 146). Ba~ka bir ifadeyle, 1990 'h yillara kadar tiye tilke siyasileri arasmda de gil de halklan arasmda bir birligin olu~turuldugu izlenimi verilmi~ olsayd1, ktiltiirel, politik ve katihmcihk a((Ismdan A vrupahlardan kopuk bir btitiinle~me stireci ya~anmazd1. Bu demektir ki ortak siyasi ktiltiirtin olu~abilmesi i9in ekonomik, siyasi ve sosyal stire9lere tiim A vrupa halklarmm ortak katihmi gerekmektedir (Erdenir, 2005: 185).

AET'nin ekonomik alanda oldugu gibi siyasi alanda da btitiinle~me

giri~imleri 1970'li yillara kadar geri gitmektedir. AET, bu yondeki somut ad1mlanm ilk olarak 1973 Kopenhag Zirvesinde haz1rlanan A vrupa Kimligine ili~kin Bildirisiyle atmi~tlr. Bu zirvenin sonu9 bildirgesinde

4 Bu antla~malar i~in bkz: Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishmg the European Community. Eri!}im: 15.03.2007, http://eurlex.europa.eu/enltreaties/datl 12002E/htrn/C 2002325EN.003301.html#anArtl52. 5 Fonksiyonaiist teoride ekonomik ve teknik i~birligi esas ahnmakta; siyasi biitiinle~meden soz edilmemektedir. Fonksiyonalistlerin en onemli temsilcisi olan David Mitrany artan oranda i~birliginin iilkeler arasmdaki ~ah~malan en alt diizeye indirecegini ve sava~larm irnkanstzla~acagmi savunmaktadtr. Fonksiyonalistler biitiinle~menin siireklilik gosteren ve ba~ka alanlara yayiiarak biiyiiyen bir ozellige (spillover) sahip oldugunu iddia etmelerine ragmen, bu siirecin ka~mtlmaz olarak siyasi biitiinle~meyi de beraberinde getirecegini ongorememi~lerdir. i~te bu noktada neo fonksiyonalistler eksik kalan ktstmlan tamamlamak iizere devreye girmi~ler, karar alma yetkisinin zamanla ulus-iistii diizeye ~tkacagmt iddia etmi~lerdir

(Kaynak: http://www.asam.org.tr/temp/temp222.pdf)


donemin dokuz iiye iilkesi, ortak A vrupa uygarhgm1, ortak degerlerini ve ortak ya~am tarzm1 vurgu1amaktad1rlar. Diger onemli bir a~ama o1arak 1983 Solemn Bildirisi sayllabilir. Bu bi1diride de "Avrupahhk" bilincinin geli~tiri1mesi, A vrupa tarihi ve kii1tiiriine ili~kin c;ah~ma1ann gerekli1iginin a1tl c;izi1mi~tir. Bu siyasi biitiin1e~meyle AET ismi degi~tirilmi~, Avrupa Toplulugu (AT) olmas1 kararla~tmlm1~tlr. 1992 tarihinde irnzalanan Maastricht Antla~mas1 ile de, siyasi biitiinle~menin oniiniin ac;llmas1yla AT ad1 Avrupa Birligi (AB) olarak degi~mi~ ve siyasi ve kiiltiirel yakmla~ma c;ah~malanna h1z verilmi~tir. Maastricht II Antla~mas1 "r;e~itlilik ir;inde birli/C' veya "birlik ir;inde farkhh/C' sloganlanyla AB'yi sosyal, kiiltiirel ve politik bir birlik haline donii~tiirmenin ad1mlanm atmi~tlr. Bu baglamda Avrupa'nm tarihine, kiiltiiriine, ortak fikirlerine ve AB Anayasasma odaklanan c;ah~malar te~vik edilmi~tir.

1984 yllmdan ba~layarak Avrupa Konseyi, AT'nin vatanda~lan ve diinya nezdindeki kimlik ve imajm1 giic;lendirmek ve canland1rmak amac1yla bir komite de olu~turmu~tur. Bu c;ah~malar neticesinde MEDIA, RACE, EUROKA gibi yaymlar gerc;ekle~tirilmi~ ve 1988 y1h "Avrupa Sinema ve Televizyon Yllz" kabul edilmi~tir. Bu c;apta yaymc1hk ve ileti~im

endiistrisinin olu~turulmas1 AB tarafmdan Avrupa kiiltiirel kimligini giic;lendirir gerekc;esiyle desteklenmi~tir (Ertugrul, 2001: 148).

Takip eden siirec;te, A vrupa boyutu olan sanat eserlerine ili~kin KALEIDOSCOPE 2000, edebi eserler ili~kin ARIANNE ve kiiltiirel miras alamnda RAPHAEL programlan ile Avrupahlann ortak kiiltiirel baglanmn ara~tmlmas1 esas almm1~tlr. Amac;, A vrupahhk bilincine sahip, ulusal aidiyetlerinden s1ynlm1~, ortak evrensel degerler c;erc;evesinde biitiinle~mi~ yeni A vrupahlar yaratmakttr. Bu amac; dogrultusunda okul kitaplannda miifredat uygulamalanna gidilmi~, A vrupa fikri, kimligi ve kiiltiirii c;ah~malan desteklenerek ve irdelenerek geni~ literatiir olu~turulmaya c;ah~1lmi~tlr. AB ortak kiiltiiriinii geli~tirmek ve bu kiiltiiriin A vrupah halklar tarafmdan benimsenmesini garantilemek ic;in AB bayrag1 - beyaz y1ld1zlar mavi desen iizerine- olu~turulmu~, Beethoven'in 9. Senfonisi "Odd to Joy"u AB milli mar~1 olarak kabul edilmi~, 09 May1s A vrupa giinii olarak kabul edilmi~ ve AB vatanda~lanna ortak niifus ciizdanlan verilmi~tir. Bununla birlikte AB SOCRATES, LEONARDO DA VjNcj ve ERASMUS gibi programlarla A vrupa iiniversitelerinde ve okullannda - aday ii1ke egitim kurumlan da bu programlara dahil edilmi~lerdir - okuyan

164 AVRUPA BiRLiGI'NIN KIMLIK YARATMA <;ABALARI

ogrencilerin dola~1mmm saglanmasm1 te~vik eden programlar olu~turmu~tur. 2006 yllmda sona eren CULTURE 2000 PROGRAM! ile AB ortak kiiltiirel alana katk1da bulunacak eser ve projeleri te~vik etmi~tir. Aym program kapsammda "Avrupa Killtilr Ba~kentleri", "Avrupa Ortak Miras Giinleri" gibi kiiltiirel etkinliklerinin gen;ekle~tirilmesi saglanm1~tlr (bkz. Erdenir, 2005: 105-106).

A vrupa' da sosyal ileti~imi gii<;lendirmek i<;in - turizm, ticaret, elektronik haberle~me gibi ara<;lann de katkllanyla - A vrupahlar-aras1 etkile~im

artmlarak, giindelik ya~amm daha iyi payla~Ilmas1 ama<;lanmaktad1r. Bireylerin mobilizasyonunu art1ran A vrupa i<;i serbest yerle~im ve istihdam sayesinde, AB'nin farkh iilkelerinde ya~ayan Avrupahlar birbirlerine yakmla~maktad1r. Avrupah gen<yler, ucuz u<yak biletleri ile hafta sonlanm Amsterdam, Londra, Milano gibi A vrupa kentlerinde rahat<;a ge<;irebilmektedirler. Serbest dola~1m sayesinde AB vatanda~lan, kendi iilkelerinden farkh bir iiye iilkeye yerle~ebilmektedirler. Bu haktan yararlanan A vrupahlann saylSl tahminen 6 milyona ula~m1~tlr. Bununla birlikte, AB 'nin geli~tirdigi ortak simgeler ve ara<ylar A vrupa ortak kimliginin sosyo-kiiltiirel bir kavram olarak anlam kazanmasm1 saglam1~ ve bireylerin aidiyet hissine katklda bulunabilmeleri imkan dahiline girmi~tir. Bu baglamda, AB Komisyonunun istatistik ofisi olan EUROSTAAT ile kamuoyu yoklamalanndan sorumlu EUROBAROMETER'in yaptlklan kamuoyu ara~tlrmalan da yeni kategoriler ve kavramlar yaratm1~tlr. 15-20 yll once mevcut olmayan "Avrupa Kamuoyu", "Avrupa Tiiketicileri", "Avrupa Yurtta~lan" gibi kavramlar giindelik ya~amm hirer par<yas1 olmu~lard1r. AB bayrag1, s1mr denetimlerin kaldmlmas1yla kullamlan ortak pasaport, ortak pazann sundugu ekonomik imkanlar, EURO'nun A vrupahlann giindelik ya~ammm her noktasmda dola~1ma girmesi gibi unsurlar AB kimliginin pragmatik boyutunu gii<;lendirmektedir. A vrupa <;apmda siirdiiriilen faaliyetlerden olan ~ampiyonlar Ligi ve Eurovision ~ark1 Yan~malan dahi Avrupa'mn biitiinliik hissine bir ~ekilde katklda bulunmaktad1rlar (Erdenir, 2005: 188-190).

Ortak para birimi EURO'nun iiye iilkelerin ulusal egemenlik haklanm simrlandirmasmm yamnda, yurtta~lann giindelik hayatma girerek olu~turdugu duygusal ve psikolojik etkisi AB'nin kiiltiirel boyutuna katk1da bulunmaktad1r. Her ne kadar tiim AB iilkelerinde kabul edilip uygulanmasa


da EUR06, A vrupa butiinle~me siirecmm soyut kavramlanm, somut

giindelik gen;:ekliklere donu~llirerek, A vrupa kimligine me~ruiyet

kazandtrmayt bir anlamda ba~armt~br. Aynca EURO, kazandtgt uluslararast para konumu ile, AB'nin dt~sal kimliginin gii!j:lenmesine, dt~ dunyadaki insanlar tarafmdan daha gii!j:lil olarak algtlanmasma da katktda bulunmaktadtr. Sonu!j: olarak denilebilir ki, Avrupah se(j:kinlerin ortak kimlik politikalan ve ortak kimligi vurgulamada yararlandtklan ara'Y ve simgeler Avrupahhk bilincini artttrmaktadu. Fakat bu unsurlar kimligin yerel ve milli boyutundan !j:ok makro duzeyde ve makro kurumlarda kendisini gosteren pragmatik boyutunu yansttmaktadtr (Fi~ne, 2003: 69).

Ancak AB kurumlannm egitim alamnda yilriltlligu ortak programlar uye ulkelerde mufredat engeli ile kar~tla~maktadtr. Bunun nedeni Maastricht Antla~mast'nm 126. Maddesinde egitimin i9erigi ve orgiitlenmesinde mutlak yetkinin ilye Ulkelerde oldugunun belirtilmesidir. DolaylSlyla bu alanda, egitimde, Avrupa !j:apmda derin olmayan bir i~birligi ongorulmektedir. Bu konuda mevcut olan diren(j: sadece uye Ulkelerden gelmemektedir; yaptlan kamuoyu ara~tlrmalan ortak egitim sisteminin Avrupahlar tarafmdan en az desteklenen program oldugunu gostermektedir. Egitim sisteminde AB ilye Ulkelerinde onemli farklthklann bulunmast AB bullinle~mesi ve ortak kimlik olu~umu i(j:in onemli bir engel olu~turmaktadtr (Picht, 1993: 87). Egitim dt~mda AB 'deki medya sektorlerinin hala ulusal seviyelerde orgiitlenmi~ olmas1 ve A vrupa ortak kitle ileti~im ara!j:lanmn eksikligi sorunun bir b~ka boyutunu olu~turmaktadtr. Benzer ~ekilde, A vrupa 9apmda orgiitlenmi~ siyasi partilerin orgiitlenme eksikligi nedeni ile ortak !j:tkarlar etrafmda bullinle~ebilecek A vrupahlar da birbirlerinden haberdar olamamaktadtrlar. Avrupa 9apmda orgiitlenme konusunda kabul edilebilecek ciddi giri~im, Y e~illerin 2004 ~ubatta olu~turdugu A vrupa Y e~iller Partisidir. Y e~illerin A vrupa Parlamentosu (AP) grup ba~kam Daniel Cohn-Bendit Haziran 2004 seyimlerinde Fransa yerine Almanya'dan aday olup, Se!j:ilerek Avrupa'da ba~ka uye Ulkelerde seyilebileceginin onunu a(j:ml~ ve gostermi~tir. AP'deki diger siyasi gruplar ise genellikle ulusal bazda orgiitlenmekte ve AP !j:abst altmda gev~ek ittifaklara gitme egilimindedirler (Erdenir, 2005: 170-172).

6 <;ek Cumhuriyeti, Bulgaristan, ingiltere, Danimarka, Estonya, Polonya, Romanya, isve9, Litvanya ve Macaristan halen EURO para birimini kabul edip uygulamt~ degillerdir.

166 AVRUPA BiRLiGI'NiN KiMLiK YARATMA CABALARI

Maastricht An1a~masi 'mn giri~ boliimiinde ve tas1ak anayasasmm 2. Maddesinde, Avrupa'mn ortak degerleri o1arak 6zgiir1iik, demokrasi, e~itlik, insanhk onuruna ve insan haklanna sayg1 ve hukukun iistiinliigu yer almaktad1r. 0 hal de A vrupa degerleri anayasaya bagh kimlik niteliginde ~ekillenebilecektir. Bununla beraber, bu degerlerin ortak kimlik olu~turmada yeterli olmayacag1 as;1kt1r. Antla~malarda ad1 ges;en temel degerler detayh bir ~ekilde vurgulanmamakla birlikte, Avrupa Birligi hukukunun bu temel degerler iizerine in~a edildigini ve bu degerler baz ahnarak hukuk mekanizmalanmn s;ah~t1nld1gmi soyleyebiliriz. Omegin; AB Adalet Divam, bireylerin ozgiirliiklerinin kisitlanmasi ve temel hak ve ozgiirliiklerin korunmas1 konularmda son derece hassas bir organd1r. Aynca, Nice Zirvesi'nde benimsenen ve "Temel Haklar Sartz"nda da yer alan bu degerlerin, Avrupa Anayasasmm yiiriirliige girmesi ile daha fazla one s;1kabilecegi de vurgulanmahd1r.

Biitiinle~tirici etkisinin olabilecegi varsayllan AB vatanda~hg1

Maastricht Antla~mas1 ile, hukuki ges;erlik kazanm1~t1r. Bununla birlikte, 1997 Amsterdam Antla~mas1'nda Avrupa vatanda~hgmm ulusal kimligin yerini alamayacag1 ve onu ancak tamamlayabileceginin alt1 s;izilmektedir. AB, ortak kimlikle ve iiye iilke vatanda~lanna sundugu haklarla, birlik s1mrlan is;inde, serbest dola~1m1 ve ikamet hakkm1 saglad1gm1, vatanda~lann farkh iiye iilkelerde ikamet etmelerinin miimkiin oldugunu ve diger iiye iilke vatanda~lanyla e~it haklara sahip olduklannm garantilemektedir. AB aynca yerel ve AP ses;imlerinde ses;me ve ses;ilme haklanm korumakta ve bunlann AP'ye dileks;e ile ba~vurma haklanm kabul ettirmektedir. Omegin bir iiye iilkenin (Almanya'nm) vatanda~1 bu haklardan yararlanarak ispanya'da hem yerle~ebilmekte ve hem de orada pasif oy hakkm1 kullanarak, yani kendisini aday gostererek ses;ilebilmektedir (Meyer, 2007 /22/reportage ).

AB'nin kabul ettigi yetki ikamesi ilkesi de (subsidiarity)* AB kurumlanna iiye iilke politikalanna geni~ miidahale yetkileri getirmekte ve

* Bu ilkeye gore, AB amaylanan bir hedefe iiye devletlerin yapacag1 tasarruflar ile tam olarak ula~Iiamayacagi durumlarda kendisi tasarrufta bulunabilmektedir. Y ani, uye devletler alacaklan kararlarla sorunu yeterli dUzeyde yozemeyeceklerse, AB kurumlan devreye girerek ve ad1 geyen kararlan ahp tiim AB iiye iilkelerinde geyerli olmasm1 saglayabilmektedirler. Bu sayede AB boyutunda, ortak

.......... ____________ _

AVRUPA ARA$TIRMAL.ARI DERGISI 167

boylece iiye iilkelerde ortak baz1 siyasi politikalann izlenmesi zorunlu kllmmaktadtr. Bu yoniiyle ikame ilkesi ortak kimlik olu~umuna ve - ortak uygulamalar getirdiginden - ortak kimligin olu~masma onemli arythmlar getirmektedir.

AB 'nin demokratik arytdan en onemli kurumu olan A vrupa Parlamentosu ser;imlerine dii~iik oranda A vrupahlann ilgi gostermesi ise dikkat r;ekicidir; 1979 ythnda %63 olan katlhm oram, 1984'te %61 'e, 1989'da %59'a, 1994'te %57'e, 1999'da %50'ye ve 2004 yth ser;imlerinde %46'ya kadar gerilemi~tir (BBC Turkish, Avrupa Parlamentosu Rehberi, 20.05.2007). Bu egilim, Avrupa ryapmda heniiz ortak siyasi kiiltiiriin olu~turulamadtgmm ve A vrupa halklanmn mevcut sisteme kar~1 olan ilgisizliklerinin devam ettiginin gostergesi olarak gosterebilir. Bununla birlikte, Avrupa r;apmda demokratik bir sUrer; iryin AB ryapmda iiye iilke sivil toplum kesimleri arasmda ili~kilerin ge1i~tirilmi~ olmas1 gereklidir. Baz1 sivil toplum orgiilerinin ve rytkar gruplannm Avrupa ryapmda ili~kiler geli~tirerek sivil toplum inisiyatifinin olu~abilecegini gostermesi yeterli degildir. AB r;apmda sivil toplumun olu~amamasmm oniindeki en ciddi sorunun ise ileti~im

eksikligi oldugu soylenebilir. ileti~imin geli~mesi ir;in ise ortak lisana, ortak egitim sistemine ve A vrupa r;apmda orgiitlenmi~ siyasi partilerin varhgma ihtiyary vardtr. Ortak dil konusunda, iiye iilkelerde, ingilizcenin te~vik edilmesi ise Fransa gibi iilkelerde tepki r;ekmektedir (Erdenir, 2005: 168-169)

AB at;lSlndan son 10 ytla (1997 - 2007) baktldtgmda, A vrupa ortak kimligi konusunda onemli adtmlann attldtgt goriilmektedir. Omegin 1999 Helsinki Zirvesinde hem "Avrupa Guvenlik ve Savunma Politikas1" (AGSP) konusunda onemli ilerlemeler kaydedilebilmi~, hem de Tiirkiye'nin adayhgt kabul edilerek, A vrupa ortak kimligine arytkhk getirilmi~tir. Tiirkiye 'nin adayhgmm kabuliiyle, din ve kiiltiir fark1 nedeniyle herhangi bir iilkenin dt~lanmayacagmm altl ryizilmi~tir. "Oteki" olarak degerlendirilmenin olryiitii demokratik degerleri benimseyip benimsememe olarak kabul edilmi~tir.

Yani AB ortak kimlik olu~turma siireci ir;inde "kabul edilebilir olmayanlann" (demokratik degerleri benimsemeyenlerin) varhgma vurgu yapllarak bunlann "otekiler" olduklan belirterek stmrlamalar yapllmaya

uygulamalar soz konusu olabilmekte ve AB vatanda~lan ortak uygulamalar sayesinde biitiinle~ebilmektedirler.

______________ .......... 168 AVRUPA BIRLiGi'NIN KIMLIK YARATMA CABALARI

yah~Ilmaktadtr. Boylece, AB'ye liye tilkeleri, ortak kimlik olu~turmak projesi kapsammda, liye olmayan lilkelerin vatanda~lanna "oteki" olarak bakabilecektir. Bu dururn "bizden olmayan" anlayt~mt yansttttgmdan tartt~ma ortammt yaratmakta ve kliltlirel farkhhklann algilanmasmda radikal yevrelerin (A~m Sagct ve Neo-Fa~ist) tezlerini gliylendirmektedir. "Oteki"nin rollinlin AB ortak kimligini olu~turmadaki onemi inkar edilmemekle birlikte, "oteki"ni dt~laytct ozellik - a~m sag ve fa~ist aktmlarm ekmeklerine yag slirmemek iyin - goz onlinde bulundurularak, kar~Iltkh gliven duygusu ve farkhhklara ho~gorli yakla~tmt politikast sergilenmeye yah~Ilmaktadtr. Ancak tUm bu tartt~malann ortak bir birlik bilincinin geli~mesine yardtmct olacagt ve AB iyin ortak kimlik ve me~ruiyet kaynagt olacagt ifade edilmektedir (Karaosmanoglu, 2001: 164).

AB, Maastricht ve Amsterdam Antla~malannda da belirtildigi gibi, ortak kimligini ortak degerler olan ozgtirllik, demokrasi, hukukun listlinlligli, insan haklan, temel ozglirliiklere saygt ve hukuk devleti esasma dayandtrmakta ve bu yoniiyle bir uygarhk projesi oldugunu da on plana ytkarmaktadtr. Bununla birlikte, AB kimligini oncelikle kliltiirel ivmeyle biyimlendirip geli~tirmeyi degil, ortak dt~ politika, Ortak Giivenlik ve Savunma Politikasz destegi ile biyimlendirip geli~tirmeyi de hedeflemektedir. Ktsaca, AB ortak kimligi sadece kiiltlirel bir aidiyet alam degil, aynt zamanda glivenlik alam yaratan bir anlam da ifade etmektedir. Bu nedenle, AB siyasal ve kliltiirel kimligini, kiilttir, uygarhk ve felsefe temellerine dayandtrmaktan yok, "oteki"lerin A vrupa degerlerine ve normlanna olan ili~kisi temelinde ve potansiyel tehlike ya da ytkar alanlarma gore biyimlendirmektedir. Bu algtlama nedeniyle 11 Eyllil olaylan sonrasmda AB islam ve Miisliimanhkla ozde~le~tirilen terorizm algtlamalanm Avrupa'mn ortak siyasal ve ortak kiiltiirel kimligini ~ekillendirme de kullanmak istemektedir. Ancak bu yakla~tm AB dii~iinlirlerince (Jiirgen Habermas gibi) ele~tirilmektedir. Ele~tiriler AB'nin ortak kimlik olu~turma projesi kapsammda "dt~lama" yapmamast gerektigi yoniindedir. Ktsaca, Habermas'm yakla~tmtyla;

"otekini benimsemenin kendi iyine kapanmak ve otekine kar~t kapanmak demek olmadtgmt, toplumsal stmrlann herkese, hatta ve ozellikle de birbirine yabanct olan ve birbirine kar~I yabanct kalmak isteyenlere aytk olmast. .. " (Ogan Balktz, 17.09.2006, Radikal iki).


gerektigini kavratmaya ~ah~makt1r. K1saca, Habermas AB ortak kimliginin "anayasal vatanda~hk" kavram1 iizerine in~a edilmesi gerektigi inancmdad1r. 14 Arahk 1973 Kopenhag zirvesi kararlan Avrupa kimliginin demokrasi ve insan haklanna sayg1 ile belirlendigini vurgulamaktad1r. 1992 Maastricht Antla~mas1 J-2 maddesi ile Ortak Dz~ ve Giivenlik Politikasz'mn (ODGP) amacmm insan haklan ve demokrasiyi korumak olarak tammlanm1~t1r. 1993 Kopenhag zirve toplant1s1 aday iilkelerdeki siyasi istikran, demokratik kurumlarm i~leyi~ini, insan haklanna sayg1y1 tam iiyelik i~in yerine getirilmesi gereken on ko~ullar olarak belirlemi~tir ( Miiftiiler Ba~, 2001: 129). Bununla birlikte Avusturya'da 3 Ekim 1999'da yap1lan se~imlerden a~m sagc1 A vusturya Ozgiirliik~ii Partisi hiikiimet ortag1 olunca (04 Subat 2000) Avrupa kamuoyundan Avusturya'ya yonelen sert tepkiler* yiikselmi~ ve AB ortak kimliginin yukanda bahsedilen degerler i.izerinde ~ekillendiginin altl ~izilmi~tir.

IV. Genel Degerlendirme ve Sonu~;

Bu ~ah~mada ilk olarak Avrupa Birigi'nde ortak kimlik olu~umu siirecine katk1s1 olan ve Milattan Once (MO) ba~layan eski Yunan kiiltiirii; ve yine M.O var olan Roma Cumhuriyeti doneminde geli~tirilen ve Milattan Sonra (MS) 4. yiizy1la (yy.) kadar ge~erli olan Roma kiiltiirii; ve MS 4. yy.'dan sonra hakim olmaya ba~layan ve H1ristiyanhk ya~am tarzm1 ongoren H1ristiyanhk kiiltiirii ile aydmlanma ~ag1 ile beraber ba~latllan modern "Batl" Avrupa kiiltiirii ele ahnm1~tlr. Daha sonra ise AB'nin olu~turulmastyla ba~layan ortak kimlik olu~turma siireci irdelenerek, AB ortak kimliginin aydmlanma donemi sonrasmda olu~turulan degerler iizerine in~a edilmesinin gerekliliginin altl ~izilmi~tir.

* Ozellikle tepkilerin boyutlannm AB iiyesi iilkelerin ve aday iilkelerin kamuoylanndaki tepkileri a~arak AB diizeyinde yaptmmlara donii~mesi bahsedilen degerlerin somut politikalan yonlendirmesine yol a«;mt~ttr. Bu baglamda AB Bakanlar Konseyi, birlik iiyesi Avusturya'ya yonelik ortak bir politika olu~turulmasmi karara baglamt~ttr. Bu «;er«;evede oncelikle A vusturya ile ili~kiler asgari diizeye, isti~are diizeyine indirilmi~tir. Avusturya'ya yonelik tepki AB ortak kimligi a«;tsmdan onemlidir. <;iinkii bu AB'nin para birligi ve ortak hukuki diizenlemelerin otesinde bir degerler toplulugu oldugunun aylk bir gostergesidir. Her ne kadar bu baglamda kar~I pkt~lar bulunsa da bu durum gittik«;e daha «;ok kabul gormektedir (<;elebi, 2002: 47).

170 AVRUPA BiRLiGI'NiN KiMLiK YARATMA <;ABALARI

AB'nin kiiresel surec;:te, Avrupahlar adma ustune du~en sorumlulugu yerine getirebilmesi btiytik oranda AB vatanda~lan tarafmdan me~ru

gortilmesine baghdtr. AB bu me~rulugu saglaytp vatanda~lan tarafmdan kabul edilmek ic;:in kolektif ortak kimlik olu~umuna onem vermektedir. <;unkii bireyler ancak kendi kimlikleri ile ozde~le~tirdikleri, kendilerini ait hissettikleri bir yonetimin iktidanm me~ru gortip onaylamaktadtrlar. Oysa gunumtize kadar, AB'nin me~ruiyeti ulus devletlerin yoneticilerinin destegine ve ulus devletlerin yonetimlerinin me~ruiyeti ise uye Ulkelerin vatanda~lanmn sec;:imlerle onaylamalanna dayandtgt kabul edilmekteydi.

Ozellikle 1992 yllmdan itibaren AB, ortak kiilttirti mumkiin kllabilecek programlar ve giri~imlere agtrhk vermeye ba~lamt~tlr. Bu amac;: dogrultusunda Avrupa fikri, kimligi ve kiilturti c;:ah~malan desteklenerek ve irdelenerek geni~ literallir olu~turulmaya c;:ah~llmt~tlr. Aym zamanda somut adtmlar da atllarak, AB bayragt - beyaz ylldtzlar mavi desen tizerine -benimsemi~, Beethoven'in 9. Senfonisi 'nin "Odd to Joy"u AB milli mar~t olarak kabul edilmi~, 09 Mayts A vrupa gtinu olarak kabul edilmi~ ve AB vatanda~lanna ortak nufus cuzdanlan verilmi~tir. Bununla birlikte AB SOCRATES, LEONARDO DA VjNCj ve ERASMUS gibi programlarla A vrupa universitelerinde ve okullannda - aday Ulke egitim kurumlan da bu programlara dahil edilmi~lerdir - okuyan ogrencilerinin dola~tmmm

saglanmasmt te~vik eden programlar olu~turmu~tur. 2006 ythnda sona eren CULTURE 2000 PROGRAM! ile AB ortak kiilttirel alana katktda bulunacak eser ve projeleri te~vik etmi~tir. Aym program kapsammda "Avrupa Kultur Ba~kentleri", "Avrupa Ortak Miras Gunleri" gibi kiilttirel etkinliklerinin gerc;:ekle~tirilmesi saglanmt~tlr (bkz. Erdenir, 2005: 105-1 06).

Tabii ki bu adtmlar yeterli degildir ve bu baglamda ahnmast gereken daha c;:ok uzun bir yol vardtr. Fakat AB olu~umu - tarihsel olarak da gostermeye c;:ah~ttgtmtz gibi- zorlu surec;:ler sonunda bu haline ula~abilmi~tir. Onemli olan temellerin gtic;:lu attlabilmesidir, kammca AB ortak kimlik olu~um surecinde- her ne kadar hazen c;:atlak sesler c;:tksa da- bu durum ba~anlmt~ttr. Ba~ka bir ifadeyle, AB'nim ortak kimlik degerlerini Kopenhag Kriterleri- demokrasi, hukukun tisttinltigu, insan haklanna saygt, i~leyen bir Pazar ekonomisinin varhgt vb.- ile tammlamast, Avrupa'nm hem tarihsel stirec;: ic;:inde edindigi kazammlara- dunyevi degerlerin yticeltilmesi, bireyin ozgtirle~tirilmesi ve du~uncelerini ozgtirce ifade edebilmesi, humanist bir yakla~tmla digerleri ile e~itlik, bireyin yonetenlerini


demokratik yontemlerle se<;:ebilmesi ve iktisadi ozgiirliik gibi .. - uygundur hem de AB'nin, kiireselle~en diinyada, bir medeniyet projesi olarak ortaya <;:1kmasm1 saglayacakt1r.

Kaynakf:a:

BBC Turkish, Avrupa Parlamentosu Rehberi. Eri~im: 20.05.2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/specials/l411_eu_parliament/page7.shtml.

<;elebi, Aykut (2002). Avrupa: Halklann Siyasal Birligi. istanbul: Metis Yaymlan.

<;igdem, Ahmet (2003). Aydmlanma Dii#incesi. istanbul: ileti~im Yaymlan.

Delanty, Gerard (2005). Avrupa 'nm kadz. (<;ev. Hiisamettin inan<;: ). Ankara: Adres Yaymlan.

Denzer, Horst (1986). "Bodin".Verlag C. H. Beck (Der.). Klassiker des politischen Denkens I, Miinchen, Druck und Bindung: May & Co

Dicke, Klaus (1998). "Menschenrechte". Wichard Woyke (Der.). Handworterbuch Internationale Politik Ed, Born: Bundeszentrale fiir politische Bildung

Erdenir, F.H.Burak (2005). Avrupa Kimligi Pan- Milliyetr;ilikten Post Milliyetr;ilige. Ankara: Omit Yaymlan.

Ergiir, Ali (2004). "Yeni Bir Avrupa Kimligine Dogru", Gorii~ Dergisi. Eri~im: 10.10.2006, http://www.tusiad.org/yayin/gorus/59/13.pdf.

Erozden, Ozan (1997). Ulus-Devlet. Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yaymlan.

Ertugrul, Kiir~ad (2001). "AB ve Avrupahhk". Dogu Batz Dergisi, No: 14.

Fi~ne, Mustafa (2003). "Avrupa Birligi'nin Dogu~u ve Geli~imi". Muhsin Kar ve Harun Ankan (Der.) Avrupa Birligi Ortak Politikalar ve Tiirkiye, istanbul: Beta Yaymlan.

Fetcher, Iring (1991). "Freiheit". DieterNohlen (Der.) Worterbuch Staat und Politik, Bonn: Bundezentrale fiir Politische Bildung.

172 AVRUPA BIRLIGI'NIN KIMLiK YARATMA CABALARI

Gong, G. W. (1984). The Standard of Civilisation in International Society. Oxford' dan akt. Yurdusev (1997).

Hay, Denys ( 1957). Europe: The Emergence of an idea, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 'den akt. Delanty (2005)

inan9, Hiisamettin (2005). AB ye Entegrasyon Siirecinde Tiirkiye 'nin Kimlik Problemleri, Ankara: Adres Y aymlan.

Karaosmanoglu, Ali (200 1 ). "A vmr~ Guvenlik ve Savunma Kimligi A91Smdan Tiirkiye-Avrupa Birligi ili~kileri". Dogu Bat1 Dergisi, No: 14.

Lee,Stephen J. (2004a). Avrupa Tarihinden Kesitler 1494-1789. Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Y aymlan.

Lee, Stephen J. (2004b). Avrupa Tarihinden Kesitler 1789- 1980. Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Y aymlan.

Meyer, Manuel (2007). Die deutsche Fraktion, Eri~im: 10.11.2007, http://www .zeit. de/ online/2007 /22/reportage-spanien.

Miiftiiler Ba9, Meltem (2001). Tiirkiye ve AB: Soguk Sava~ Sonras1 ili~kiler. istanbul: Alfa Yaymlan.

Ogan Balk1z, (2006). N. "Neyin Birligi". Radikal iki, 17.09.2006.

Poggi, Gianfranco (1991). 9agda~ Devletin Geli~imi. 9ev. Sule Kut, Binnaz Toprak. istanbul: Hiirriyet Vakf1 Yaymlan.

Rougemont, D. (1965). The Meaning of Europe, New York: Stein and Day' dan akt. Erdenir (2005).

Schwan, Alexander (1991). "Politische Theorien des Rationalismus und der AufkHirung". Hans J. Lieber (Der.). Politisch Theorien von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Bonn: Bundeszentrale fiir Politische Bildung.

Schwarzer, Deiner (1982). Europa und die Europaishe Gemeinschaft, Miinchen: Siiddeutscher Verlag

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AVRUPA ARA9TIRMALARI DERGISI 173

Yurdusev, A.Nuri (1997). "Avrupa Kimliginin Olu~umu ve Tiirk Kimligi". Atilla Eralp (Der.) Tiirkiye ve Avrupa: Batzlzla~ma, Kallanma, Demokrasi, istanbul: imge Yaymlan.

Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishmg the European Community. Eri~im: 15.03.2007, http://eurlex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002Eihtm/C_2002325EN. 00330l.html#anArt152.


COMPETITION AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE TURKISH MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY*

Zeynep KAPLAN**

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the impact of changes in the competitive market structure on industry productivity growth. The aim of the paper is to examine the determinants of productivity in Turkish manufacturing industries, by elaborating particularly at the impact of competition policy on productivity. Using a newly available panel data in Turkish manufacturing industry for the years 1992-2001, it is shown that competition (as measured by lower level of industrial price-cost margin) enhances productivity growth.

Keywords: Competition, Price-cost margin, Manufacturing industry.

Ozet:

Bu makale, rekabet9i piyasa yapzsmda meydana gelen degi$melerin sanayi sektorii verimlilik artl$larz iizerindeki etkisini incelemektedir. Makalenin amacz, ozellikle rekabet politikaszmn verimlilik iizerindeki etkisini dikkate alarak, Tiirkiye imalat sanayinde verimliligi belirleyici faktorleri incelemektir. Buna gore, Tiirkiye imalat sanayi 1992-2001 donemi verileri ile panel veri teknigi kullamlarak, daha dii$iik diizeydeki imalat sanayi fiyat-maliyet aralzgz ile ifade edilen rekabetin verimlilik artl$larma neden oldugu sonucuna ula$llabilmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Rekabet, Fiyat-maliyet marjz, jmalat sanayi.

*This study is a short synopsis of the PhD dissertation of the author defended on 6 February 2009, Marmara University European Union Institute, Department of European Union Economics. •• Ph.D., Yild1z Technical University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economics.

176 COMPETITION AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE TURKISH MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

1. Introduction

Casual argument generally asserts that competition, both domestic and international, may enhance the productivity of firms or industries by exerting downward pressure on costs, reduces slack, provides incentives for the efficient organization of production, and even drives innovation forward.

However, the theoretical literature on the effect of market competition does not clearly match with this casual argument. One of the reasons for this is that there are various definitions of competition in the theoretical literature. Market competition is captured by several proxies; the change in the mode of competition, from monopoly to perfect competition and from cartel to Coumot to Bertrand competition; increase in the number of firms; the number of other managers to whom each manager is compared; increase in the price elasticity of demand; reduction of the size of demand; decrease in profits; increase in the substitutability between products; reduction in the gap between a leader and a follower; the increase in the ratio of entrepreneurial firms relative to managerial firms; existence of a potential rival.

These models analyze how the optimal incentive scheme changes in response to the change in the extent of market competition. Since the definitions of competition are so diverse and, furthermore, the results rely on factors incorporated into these models. Not surprisingly, it is not theoretically evident whether the intensification of market competition would induce managers to exert more efforts.

In spite of the ambiguity of theoretical predictions, empirical studies have tried to test the hypothesis that market competition would increase productivity. Empirically, the extent of competition has been captured by several variables; price-cost margin, concentration ratio, and market share. In this paper, the price-cost margin is used to capture the change in the level of competition. A firm's profit above normal level (higher price cost margin) may feel less competitive pressure and thus make less effort, leading to lower productivity.

With regard to the effect of market competition on productivity, several rigorous empirical studies have been done. Nickell, Wadhwami and Wall (1992) show that the increases in the market share of a firm reduce its productivity growth. Baily et al. ( 1995), while explaining the international productivity differences in manufacturing industries across Germany, Japan and the US, show that there is a positive relation between the nature of


competition and relative productivity levels in a given industry in a given country. Nickell (1996) uses panel data on 670 UK manufacturing industry firms for the period 1972- 1986 to examine the relationship between competition and productivity performance by measuring competition in several ways, including measures of monopoly rents, concentration, import penetration, and number of competitors. He shows that there is clear evidence on the degree of competition to generate the productivity growth. Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1997) obtained the result that higher average rents normalized on value added tend to reduce productivity growth.

Economists also claim that deregulation, which is expected to intensify competition, raises productivity of firms. For example, Olley and Pakes (1996) show that in telecommunications equipment industry in the US, productivity growth accelerated after the deregulation of the industry. Similarly, the positive impact of deregulation in transition economies was shown by Li (1997) for China, by Djankov and Hoekman (2000) for Bulgaria, and by Grosfeld and Tressel (2002) for Poland.

On the other hand, there are many studies examining the productivity and the trade liberalization that is expected to intensify competition. For example, by using a large sample of Italian firm level data, Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001), find that the EU Single Market Program, which contains some deregulations, has lead to a decrease in the price-cost margin (markup) and an increase in productivity for those firms that were more sensitive to the abolition of external barriers. Pavnick (2002) also finds that reallocation of resources after trade liberalization in Chile significantly contribute to the productivity in tradable markets. Similarly, in an empirical study, Salgado (2002) investigates the potential impacts of reforms in trade, product markets and labor markets on productivity performance with an analysis based on panel data for 20 OECD countries during 1965-98. The results suggest that especially reforms in trade and product markets could explain improvements in trend productivity growth, even though the impact of such reforms on productivity may be weak or negative in the short run due to, for instance compliance costs. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) show two main effects of regulatory reform of entry and state control by using cross-country data. They find that countries with entry liberalization (lowering barriers to entrepreneurship) and reduced state control catch-up more the frontier in manufacturing industries and adopt best-practice technologies more quickly. Moreover, the process of privatization is found to involve direct productivity gains.


Recent empirical studies have pointed to a positive effect of product market competition on productivity growth, particularly at low levels of competition. Aghion et al (2006) assess the effect of increasing product market competition on productivity growth in South Africa. They find that higher past mark-ups are associated with lower current productivity growth rates. Okada (2005) examines the impact of product market competition on productivity by using panel data on around ten thousand firms in Japanese manufacturing industry for 1994-2000 periods. Okada found that product market competition (as measured by lower level of industrial price-cost margin) enhances productivity growth. Kahyarara (2004) analyze the role of competition policy on productivity, investment and export performance of Tanzanian manufacturing firms by focusing on the hypothesis that fair competition has a causal impact on productivity, investment and manufactured exports. In the study, competition policy was used as a dummy variable and it is found that there is a positive relationship between competition policy and productivity, investment and exports. Thus, competition policy enhances a firm's economic performance by increasing productivity.

On the other hand, there are also the empirical studies for Turkey on the relationship between competition and productivity. For example, Foroutan (1991) examines how the trade liberalization of 1980s in Turkey has affected the performance and competitiveness of the Turkish manufacturing industry for the period 1976-1985. The study shows that, international competition has decreased the price-cost margin and increased the rate of growth of productivity in the private sector during the period considered. Levinsohn (1993) also finds that trade liberalization, using firm level data from 1983 to 1986, was associated with lower industry markups in Turkish manufacturing industries where pricing above marginal cost was previously significant.

While analyzing the relationship between price-cost margin and trade liberalization in Turkish manufacturing industry for the period 1983-1994, Y als;m (2000) finds that while import penetration leads to a decrease in the price-cost margins in the entire private manufacturing industry, the pricecost margins in the highly concentrated private manufacturing industries increase by the import penetration. Bayar (2002) investigates the effects of foreign trade liberalization of Turkey after 1980 on the productivity of industrial sectors. The relationship is tested using panel data of twenty-eight ISIC three-digit industrial sectors for the 1974-1994 period. He shows that there is a positive shift in productivity and a negative shift in industrial mark-ups after trade liberalization.


Utilizing three-digit Turkish manufacturing industry level panel data, Erzan et al. (2003) analyze how increasing openness to international markets (including the CU with the EU) have affected the structure and performance of Turkish manufacturing industry over the period 1980-1999 with special emphasis on the market disciplining role of imports. They find that changes in import penetration had a significant positive effect on pricecost margins with a one-year lag in high price-cost margin industries and concluded that imports do not seem to provide discipline for manufacturing industries.

However, there are some other studies that contradict these results. For example, Metin-Ozcan et al. (2000) find that openness had very little impact on the levels of profit margins (mark-ups) and conclude that the manufacturing industry displays a resistance to increased competition despite the import discipline brought by the post-1980 liberalization program. Moreover, profit margins of trade adjusting sectors that were classified as inward looking in 1980, and became open by mid-1990s respond positively to openness. Similarly K1v1lclm et al (2002) contrary to expectations, find that openness had very little impact on mark-ups within manufacturing industry for the period 1980-1996. Furthermore the tradeadjusting sectors show a positive relationship between the profit margins and openness. They also find that profit margins are positively and significantly related to concentration ratio. These results are also supported by <;ulha and Y al~m (2005). They examine the determinants of the pricecost margins in the Turkish manufacturing firms for the period 1995-2003. Using panel data econometrics a large number of manufacturing firms by conditioning on their firm size, age, ownership and export orientation, they also find that import penetration seems to be ineffective to reduce the pricecost margins of large, high market share and foreign partner firms.

The recent empirical results support the view that openness and rivalry increases productivity in the Turkish manufacturing industry. According to a recent study on the impacts of the CU agreement, Akkoyunlu-Wigley and Mihci (2006) show that increasing imports from EU countries reduced the sectoral concentration ratio and thereby sectoral market power in Turkish manufacturing industry. Thus, increasing trade volume with EU countries during the CU period created beneficial effects on Turkish economy especially by means of increasing competitive pressure for falling mark-ups and market power. Hence, it is clear that there are welfare impacts as a result of such changes in the pricing behavior and market structure of the Turkish manufacturing industry. Taymaz and Yllmaz (2007) find a similar result in which productivity actually increased in the manufacturing sectors


along with increased import penetration rates after completion of the CU agreement in 1996. The study finds that productivity in import-competing sectors increased 14 % from 1995 to 2000 whereas it stagnated in exportoriented and non-traded manufacturing industries.

This paper mainly examines the behavior of labor productivity in the Turkish manufacturing in conjunction with other structural parameters such as price-cost margins, import penetration, export ratio and the impact of joining of Turkey to the customs union with the EU. Using industry-level panel data for Turkey from the Turkish Statistic Institute (TurkStat) Manufacturing Industry Annual Surveys for the period 1992-2001, we obtain three important empirical results. First, there is an inverse relationship between productivity and competition. Second the import penetration increases the productivity of the Turkish industry. Lastly, the empirical evidence points out that, on the contrary to the second result, Turkey's accession to the custom unions in 1996led to a negative impact on ·the productivity of the Turkish manufacturing. This contradiction may result from the fact that along with the Customs Union Turkey also adapted a new competition policy law, which brings some stringent regulations on the manufacturing industries. Thus the change occurring with the customs union likely affected the productivity in Turkey but it is difficult to separate the impact of trade liberalization coming with the Customs Union from that of the new competition policy.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature survey concerning the relationship between competition and productivity. Section 3 shows the general structure of the Turkish manufacturing industry. The rest of the paper includes a simple model to analyze the relationship between competition and productivity growth in Turkey. In this context, Section 4 presents the empirical methodology, the data sets and the measures used in the regressions. This section also considers the descriptive analysis about the determinants of the model and outlays some preliminary conclusions.

2. The General Structure of the Turkish Manufacturing Industry

Industrial development is considered as an essential element of both economic and social development of Turkey. Hence, in Turkey, industrial development strategies have always been one of the main priority areas. Since 1960s, industry based growth has been one of the main objectives in Turkey. Until 1980 Turkey implemented an import substitution policy and the industries where domestic production had been deemed sufficient, were subsidized in different ways by the state and protected from international competition (Emek, 2004:101). However, after 1980, significant progress


has been made towards establishing the principles and fundamentals of a free market economy through the introduction of an export oriented industrialization strategy. In other words, since 1980, the acceleration of industrialization period has been characterized in an export oriented way. Such developments made significant contributions to the dynamism of manufacturing industry in particular and Turkish economy in general.

The liberalization efforts of the 1980s made significant contribution to the dynamism of the private sector and improved the adaptability of national economy to internal and external impacts. In addition to the dynamism of the private sector, increased investments have been the main sources of industrial growth. Private sector has enhanced quality improvement-oriented modernization investments, thereby increasing the competitiveness of industry (SPO, 2003:38). In this context, it is also crucial to note that the share of public sector in the manufacturing industry has been decreased through privatization efforts in recent years. According to a report on Sector Profiles of Turkish Industry more than 80 % of production and about 95 % of gross fixed investment in the manufacturing industry is realized by the private sector. At the beginning of 1980s, these figures were 57 % and 63 % respectively (SPO, 2004b: 1 ).

The start of accession negotiations with the EU has also been an important development in influencing the development of industrial policy. Thus, together with the export-oriented policy regime of 1980s, the CU agreement of 1996 has opened up the Turkish manufacturing industry to foreign competition. As a consequence of CU agreement, Turkey is almost part of the European single market with respect to trade in manufacturing goods.

Furthermore the EU process and the preparatory works had done during that process give an impetus to the Turkish economic reform process. The quality and productivity perception that changed along with the EU process make great contributions to the Turkish manufacturing sector. Further, the improvement of investment environment, along with an improvement in macroeconomic indicators after the crisis in 2001, urged both the foreign and domestic to invest more in the sector.

Table 1 presents the main indicators of Turkish manufacturing industry for the period 1992 and 2006. The share of manufacturing industry in GNP was around % 20,6 on average for the period considered. However, growth rate in manufacturing industry declined by 5 %, 7,5% and 7.5 % respectively during the 1994, 1999 and 2001 crisis. In 2006, the production of the manufacturing industry has grown by 7,4 %. In addition, it is


observed that the industrial production has increased since 2002. Indeed, for the period including the years between 2002 and 2006, manufacturing industry became the main source of the total national growth by growing 8,1 % annually. Within this period -of 1992 and 2006, in manufacturing industry the value added was around 27,3 % on average. In the context of manufacturing industry, significant increases have been observed both in exports (from 83,5 % in 1992 to 93,8 % in 2006) and investments of manufacturing industry (from 18,4% in 1992 to 31,9% in 2005). Moreover, capacity utilization rate have been increased from 76,4% in 1992 to 81,3% in 2004.

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 k!!mGNP

21,6 20,8 22,1 22,6 21,1 21,6 19,4 19,2 19,2 20,6 20,1 20 20,4 20,8 ~rate 5,9 8,2 -5,7 12,1 7,1 10,4 2,0 -5 6 -1,5 9,4 7,8 9,4 6,5

~~ (%ofGDP)** 23 21 23 23 23 22 36 33 31 30 29 29 29 29

~& (%of total} 83,5 83,4 85,1 88,2 87,1 88,1 88,5 89,3 91,2 93,6 93,5 93,9 94,3 97,7 k!lin~. --

~ 18,4 18 19,6 22,6 21,6 18,2 18,0 17,5 19,4 17,8 23,8 28,2 33,2 31,9

aw~ ~ ·- rate 16,4 79,6 12,9 18,6 78 79,4 16,5 72,4 15,9 10,9 75,4 78,4 81,3 -5011110!: D&ra :1M 1992-2001 DPT ~ ~ ~ ~ 1950-2003, D&ra fm 2002-2006 DPT ~ n\ ~ ~ 1950-2006, • Rlplblic: of Tulkey, Pu!-J!ro!a:iaa HcmloaW: ~ ~B&Dk, ~~~~(2007).

2006

-7,4*

29

93,8

-

-

On the other hand, R&D, innovation and technology policies are determining factors in global competition. Turkey, however, has suffered from a low level of funding for R&D activities due to lack of political support and lack of resources to support the proper development of science and technology policies. The share of R&D expenditures in GDP, which was 0.58% as of2006, is quite low when compared to the EU-27 (1,84 %). The problem with the low share of R&D expenditures reflects into the export. As illustrated in Table 2 developments have been observed in industrial exports in medium and high technology sectors in 2005. On the other hand, although the share of medium and high technology sectors in the manufacturing industry rose significantly due to high increases in exports and production in automotive, machinery and electronics industries, when compared with the EU, the share of these sectors still remains low due to the lack of innovation activities (SPO, 2006b:44).


Table 2: Structure of Manufacturing Industry Production and Exports(%)

Technology Turkey EU intensity* Production Exports Exports****

2000** 2002 2005 2000 2002 2005 2003 High 5,9 5,1 6,3 7,8 6,2 6,0 21,5 Mid-High 22,5 18,2 25,3 20,4 24,3 28,5 41,9 Mid-Low 30,4 26,7 27,0 20,5 22,8 26,9 15,9 Low 41,2 50,0 41,4 51,3 46,8 38,7 20,7 Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0

Source: SPO (2006b) Ninth Development Plan 2007-2013, p.44 * OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard classification is taken as reference. ** It covers the businesses, which employ more than 10 people. ***Forecast ofSPO at 2002 prices **** EU countries, which are OECD members.

Improvement in macroeconomic stability, postttve effect of the EU membership negotiations on predictability, rigorous structural reform programmes and efforts of improving the investment environment has highlighted Turkey as an attractive investment location for foreign investors over the past years. For instance, Turkey has attracted high levels of FDI which is a significant sign of the improved macroeconomic environment in Turkey. In Turkey the total FDI inflow which was USD 1, 7 billion in 2003 reached to USD 22 billion in 2007 (Undersecretariat of Treasury, 2008:14). In fact, FDI highly contributes to economic growth, employment, technological development and helps to create a more competitive business environment for manufacturing firms.

Another constituent to define the Turkish manufacturing is the state of the SMEs. The SMEs are a crucial part of the Turkish economy because of their large share in the total number of firms and in. total employment. In Turkey, the number of SMEs (including SMEs in the service sector) constitutes 99.8% of total enterprises and 76.7% of total employment. The share of SME investments within total investments is around 38%, with a share of26.5% of the total value added (SPO, 2004a:8; OECD, 2004:27).

The Turkish manufacturing industry has both weak and strong sides. One of the most serious problems of Turkey's industrialization process is that it has not been successful in achieving its structural transformation. The natural resources and labor constitute a big share in manufacturing. And


from the beginning of the 1980's, the Turkish manufacturing, along with outward-oriented economic policies, became an industry in which low-wage workers have been employed. The manufacturing industry also uses low and intermediate technology. The main reason for this is the insufficiency of private and public R&D expenditures. On the other hand, the Turkish manufacturing sector has problems in terms of input cost and production capabilities. To a large extent, the Turkish manufacturing has been dependent upon imported inputs.

However, looking at its positive sides, it is seen that manufacturing industry in Turkey has an experienced and dynamic entrepreneurship. In addition to this, the existence of flexible and dynamic SMEs in Turkey, the production capacity of goods that require intermediate technology and adaptability to changes in demand and the variety of products are among the strong sides of Turkish manufacturing industry. The geographical location and historical background of Turkey is also important factor in supply of resources, marketing and distribution of goods.

3. Empirical Evidence for the Case of Turkey

In the previous sections, the structure of manufacturing industry and the evaluation of competition policy are descriptively examined for Turkey. The main objective of this section is to test whether there is impact of price-cost margin (mark-up), import penetration, export/output· ratio and customs union/competition policy on productivity in the Turkish manufacturing data for the period 1992-2001.

Before giving the estimation results of the econometric model, the variables that are used in the econometric model will be introduced descriptively. One of these variables is the price-cost margin, which is generally used as a measurement of performance and competitive level of the domestic industry. Since it is not possible to observe or measure competition directly, proxies have to be used instead. The extent of competition in an industry is proxied by the pricing power in the industry. There are alternative measures of pricing power. There exists a literature that devotes to the estimation of the size of the mark-up. We use a proxy of the Lerner index, one given by the differential between value added and the total wage payment as a proportion of gross output, which is

C = Value added- Total wages Output


The data of the private manufacturing industry indicate that price-cost margins have increased significantly in the private sector in the period 1992-1994 (Figure 1). However after 1994 until 2001, it started to decline drastically.

Figure 1: Price-cost margin between the period 1992-2001

Source: Own calculations from TurkStat Manufacturing Industry Annual Surveys

In general, there are two alternative measures that can be used to represent foreign trade: exports and imports. Trade liberalization is likely to result in greater competition for domestic producers from imports. One indicator of this for the manufacturing industry is the share of imports in domestic demand, defined as imports plus domestic production, which is called import penetration rate, defined as;

M = import import + output

Import penetration confirms that the degree of openness of the manufacturing industry arose considerably during the period 1992-2001 (Figure 2). This has accelerated with the CU with the EU in 1996.


Figure 2: Import penetration ratios between the period 1992-2001


Another indicator we use as the other explanatory variable for manufacturing industry is export/output ratio, X, which is defined as a the total exports divided by the total output value of Turkish domestic industries;

X= export output

As seen in the Figure 3, the export/output ratio (the share of exports in output) increased continuously as of 1992. This also implies the outward oriented development ofthe Turkish economy during the post-1980.

In this section, the linkage between productivity growth and competition variables in private manufacturing industries in the context of Turkey for the period 1992-2001 will be tested. For this an econometric model will be specified.


Figure 3: Export/output ratio between the period 1992-2001

1998


The econometric model employs industry-level panel data for Turkey from the Turkish Statistic Institute (TUIK) Manufacturing Industry Annual Surveys. The data employed for this study focus on the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) four-digit manufacturing industries over 1992-2001. Since data for post-2001 has been conformed to the NACE standards, they have not been released yet. We prefer to examine private manufacturing industries since the public employment policy may not be rationally conducted. Our data covers the 1992-2001 period and consist of 102 industries, including Turkish manufacturing firms with ten or more employees, after excluding several industries due to lack of data. The methodology utilizes ordinary least square, fixed effect and random effects model for the estimation. We estimate the general empirical specification given by:

where g it denotes a measure of productivity rate in sector i at time t, cit-!

is price cost margin with one year lag that is used as a measure of competitive pressure in sector i at time t, Mit-I is the import penetration


rate with one year lag in sector i at time t, Xu-! is the export/output ratio

with one year lag in sector i at time t, D1 is the dummy variable takes the

value of one for 1996 (Turkey's accession to the customs union) till 2001 otherwise zero. And Ii and 11 represent industry and year fixed effects.

This is the baseline model that is estimated in the coming empirical analysis. The most appealing feature of this methodology is its simplicity. Although its simplicity, it is a very easy model to understand the relationship between productivity, mark-up, trade structure and the competitive regime shift.

There are various possible measures of performance such as productivity, job creation or profitability. In this study, we employ an empirical measure of productivity growth: labor productivity growth, which is calculated as real value added divided by labor. Value added is deflated by the total price index taking the base year as 1994. Since calculation of the total factor productivity (TFP) is problematic due to the unreliability of capital stock, TFP is not used in this study. In fact, although there are some other indicators of productivity in the literature, the simplicity of labor productivity and its being operational are reasons for this indicator to be used by economists. However we follow Aghion et al (2006) in computing the extent of pricing power in an industry directly, by means of a proxy of the Lerner index.

In this study, the total penetration rate is used rather than the European import penetration rate. The difference between the total and European import penetration rates is the penetration rates for imports from non-EU countries. The non-EU import penetration rates remained at almost the same level (around 5 %) during the 1990s. Thus, it can be concluded that the EU increased its market share, but not at the expense of imports from other countries. In a simplistic manner it can also be claimed that this is an indication that at the aggregate level there was trade creation without trade diversion (Taymaz and Yilmaz, 2007: 132).

Concerning the econometric results, estimation procedure is carried out by using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE) Models in panel data analysis.


Table 3: Industry Evidence Dependent Variable: Labor Productivity Growth

OLS FE RE Independent variables

Constant 0.306 0.688 0.306 (0.055) (0.164) (0.048)

Price-Cost margin (Cit-!) -0.915*** -2.559*** -0.915*** (0.161) (0.314) (0.129)

Import penetration (Mit-! ) 0.048 0.623*** 0.048 (0.044) (0.223) (0.039)

Export/output ratio (X it-!) 0.099* 0.146 0.099** (0.056) (0.101) (0.050)

Dummy variable (D) -0.076*** -0.158*** -0.076*** (0.025) (0.021) (0.017)

Diagnostic statistics R-square 0.0777 0.0636 0.0777 Observations 918 918 918 Hausman test 158.51 ***

Note: Significance level: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.

Hausman specification (HS) test is the classical test that is used to compare the FE and the RE model. HS test compares the FE and RE model under the null hypothesis that the individual industry effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model. If there is such correlation (the null hypothesis is rejected), the RE model would be inconsistently estimated and the FE model would be the model of choice. As shown in the results, the Hausman statistic is high enough to reject the null hypothesis so we adopt the estimates of the FE model.

As can be seen from the estimation results by t4e fixed effect model (FE) which captures the industry specificity, there is a negative and significant relationship between mark-up level and productivity. Thus, the competitive industries are more productive during the period considered. On the contrary, there is a positive and significant linkage between productivity growth and import penetration in Turkish manufacturing industry during the period 1992-2001. Thus, as expected, it seems that import penetration increases the productivity. In a similar manner, import penetration ratios are expected to affect productivity positively if industries lower costs and become more efficient when import competition increases. Thus, trade liberalization (opening up domestic markets to foreign competition) leads to improvements in the productivity of domestic industries in Turkey.


On the other hand, it is generally expected that increased export shares should associate positively with productivity. This is also true for Turkey that there is positive but insignificant relationship between productivity rate and export/output ratio. Thus, in the Turkish case, the export/output ratio had not any significant impact on productivity even though it was positively related to productivity.

However, Turkey's accession to the CU does have a negative impact on the productivity of the Turkish manufacturing. At this point it is necessary to indicate that the completion of the CU between Turkey and the EU did not lead initially to considerable increases in trade with the EU. One of the reasons behind this was that the formation of the CU did not lead to considerable reductions in trade barriers on the EU side, because the EU had abolished the nominal tariff rates on imports of industrial goods from Turkey on September 1, 1971, long before the formation of the CU (Togan et al., 2005:94).

4. Conclusion

This paper attempts to explain some portion of productivity growth through changes in the competitive structure of 4-digit Turkish manufacturing industries. In this context, some important linkages in the Turkish manufacturing industry concerning productivity, competition and trade (import penetration and CU) by using panel data econometrics have been examined. Estimations of specifications lead to a number of conclusions. The main findings of the econometric estimations are mainly: (i) There is a negative and significant relationship between mark-up level (competition) and productivity in the Turkish manufacturing during the period 1992-2001; ( ii) it seems that import penetration increases the productivity; (iii) Turkey's accession to the customs union does have a negative impact on the productivity of the Turkish manufacturing during the period 1992-2001. Along with the Customs Union, Turkey also adapted a new competition policy law introduced in the year 1996. Thus the change coming with the customs union might affect the productivity in Turkey but it is difficult to separate the impact of trade liberalization coming with the CU from that of the new competition policy.


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TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON THEIR APPROACHES …

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